Unpacking the Politicisation of EU Trade

A fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of EU trade agreement negotiations

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Master Thesis International Public Management and Public Policy

First reader: Dr. P. Tuytens
Second reader: Prof. Dr. M. Haverland
Word count: 11,954

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International Public Management and Public Policy
Erasmus School of Social and Behavioural Sciences
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Acknowledgements

Dear reader,

In front of you lies the last piece of work of my academic career. Upon completing my master thesis, a journey that started at the Technical University of Delft in the late summer of 2017 and finishes at the Erasmus University Rotterdam in the early summer 2024, comes to an end. It is a journey that I have thoroughly enjoyed and that has led me down a very different path than I thought it would when I started studying. But I am extremely grateful that it unfolded in the way it did, and I end it both with a smile and a tear. Without delving into too much nostalgia, I would like to take this opportunity to thank those who have supported me along the way, especially in the past months and during the process of writing this master thesis.

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Thank you for taking the time to read my master thesis. I hope you enjoy reading it as much as I did writing it, and I look forward to discussing it with you sometime soon.

Justus Koopmann
Rotterdam, June 2024

Abstract

This research investigates the conditions that influence the politicisation of EU trade agreement negotiations. During the past decades, the formerly technocratic field of EU foreign trade has become a central venue for political contestation. This has led to a consensus that EU trade agreement negotiations are an example of a politicised policy area, where politicisation can be understood as an increase in salience, polarisation and actors involved. Despite agreement that politicisation has increased, existing literature shows that it varies in intensity, ranging from high contestation against an ultimately failed agreement with the USA, to low salience of negotiations with countries such as Armenia or New Zealand. This reasons for this differentiated politicisation present a puzzle which has not yet been unpacked. Therefore, this research analyses the variable causal role played by conditions that have been identified as possible drivers of the politicisation of trade agreement negotiations between 2009 and 2024.

Due to the complexity inherent to the process of politicisation, as well as an assumed causal interrelation of different conditions, a fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) was deemed the most suitable research approach to comparatively analyse 15 trade agreement negotiations. Four conditions emerged from the literature as driving forces for politicisation, namely: European Parliament (EP) involvement, a national ratification requirement, a comprehensive regulatory scope and relative economic power of the trading partner. The necessity and sufficiency of the conditions regarding their role in bringing about both a politicised as well as a non-politicised outcome were structurally analysed using fsQCA set-theoretic methods.

The main empirical results show that, although there is no truly necessary condition that needs to be fulfilled, only a simultaneous presence of all four conditions provides a sufficient basis for politicisation to occur. Furthermore, the involvement of the EP and the economic bargaining power of the trading partner are identified as major contributors to politicisation. This leads to the conclusion that, in theory, only certain trade agreement negotiations fulfil these conditions and politicisation is therefore contingent on a constellation of structural conditions. This conclusion is limited in its generalisability due to the presence of important outliers. These point to an important role for the agency of national and supranational actors, which should be considered as a condition in itself in future research. By taking this into account, a more holistic understanding of the politicisation of EU trade can be gathered.

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List of Abbreviations

ACTA	Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
CAI	Comprehensive Agreement on Investment
CCP	Common Commercial Policy
CETA	Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
CJEU	Court of Justice of the European Union
CSO	Civil society organisation
csQCA	Crisp set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
DCFTA	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
DESTA	Design of Trade Agreements database
EP	European Parliament
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign direct investment
fsQCA	Fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
FTA	Free trade agreement
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
INI	Own initiative procedure
INTA	European Parliament Committee on International Trade
IPE	International Political Economy
IPR	Intellectual property rights
ISDS	Investor-State Dispute Settlement
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MERCOSUR	Southern Common Market (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay)
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OLP	Ordinary legislative procedure
PTA	Preferential trade agreement
QCA	Qualitative Comparative Analysis
SAA	Stabilisation and Association Agreement
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
WTO	World Trade Organisation

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Introduction

In September 2016, numerous European cities and the EU quarters in Brussels saw more than 200,000 protestors voicing their opposition against ongoing EU free trade agreement negotiations (Nienaber, 2016). The agreements in question, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the USA as well as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada (CETA), mobilised unprecedented opposition, gathering more than 3 million signatures in an opposition initiative (Young, 2019). The unexpectedly heavy opposition to TTIP made it *"one of the most hotly debated trade topics in recent history"* (Gheyle, 2016, p.1). Trade policy is one of the oldest exclusive EU competences and has traditionally been a highly technocratic affair, insulated from political contest (Young & Peterson, 2006). However, the recent polarisation concerning bilateral trade agreements signalled the *"arrival of normal politics to EU trade policy"* (De Bièvre et al., 2020, p. 241). This has resulted in an academic consensus that EU trade policy has become politicised (Meunier & Czesana, 2019), where politicisation can be understood as the *"accumulation of salience through contestation"* (Dür et al., 2024, p.3). There are different views on whether politicisation is a "one-off" phenomenon (Eliasson & Garcia-Duran, 2020a) or an enduring trend (Leblond & Viju-Miljusevic, 2019). This is underscored by the fact that, whilst TTIP and CETA were being negotiated, contemporaneous negotiations such as with Japan and Vietnam, did not become politicised (Meunier & Czesana, 2019).

1.1. Problem statement

The developments sketched above outline a varying degree in politicisation across time and trade agreements (De Bièvre & Poletti, 2020). Additionally, a variation in politicisation across EU member states has been observed (Meunier & Czesana, 2019). The EU sees itself as a powerful actor in global trade and relies heavily on its capacities as a trading powerhouse to advance its interests, which is why the differentiated politicisation of trade agreements presents a puzzle to academics and a problem for policymakers (De Bièvre, 2018). The international political economy (IPE) field has produced an emerging body of literature that aims to uncover the dynamic behind this, but has not yet arrived at an empirically tested assessment of the mechanism that leads to varying degrees of politicisation. This is further complicated by the fact that politicisation is conceived as a complex process, which makes a delineation of the phenomenon into variables that

can be studied independently difficult (De Bièvre et al., 2020). Grasping the underlying puzzle of why some negotiations become politicised while others remain largely under the radar is therefore a priority. In this respect, some studies have honed in on possible overarching causes such as the role of interest groups and the European Parliament (EP) (Dür et al., 2023; Basedow & Hoerner, 2024), but most have restricted themselves to singular case study analysis of TTIP or CETA. An overall assessment of the factors that contribute to the politicisation of EU trade agreement negotiations is lacking, which presents the main problem this research aims to assess.

1.2. Research aim and question

To address this problem, this research will aim to explain why there is a varying degree of politicisation across EU trade agreement negotiations. Scrutinising conditions that contribute to politicisation and assessing their occurrence across the full scope of agreement negotiations will provide insight into when and why the complex process of politicisation occurs. As the governance of trade policy in the EU was altered considerably with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 (Adriaensen, 2020), only trade agreements that were, at least partly, negotiated after this treaty will be considered. Overall, this leads to the following research question:

Which conditions explain the varying degrees of politicisation across EU trade agreement negotiations between 2009 and 2024?

To answer this question, a fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) approach is applied. Concisely summarised, *"QCA is a comparative case-oriented research approach"* (Marx et al., 2014, p.115) and is a suitable method for answering questions of causal complexity, such as the problem at hand.

1.3. Relevance

1.3.1. Academic Relevance

Recent crises have led to controversy and dissatisfaction regarding the functioning of the EU, which has spurred debate on the origins, manifestations and consequences of increasing politicisation (De Wilde, 2011; Grande & Hutter, 2016; Haapala & Oleart, 2022). The field of trade policy has often been overlooked in this regard (Dür et al., 2024), which is why this research will provide a valuable addition to this aspect of both IPE and EU integration literature. This is achieved by building on the research agendas formulated by Meunier and Czesana (2019) as well as De Bièvre and Poletti (2020), as the fsQCA approach provides a comprehensive empirical baseline that combines a qualitative and quantitative assessment of conditions driving politicisation. Ultimately, this allows for a more holistic understanding of differentiated politicisation and helps identify parts of this dynamic that warrant further research.

1.3.2. Societal Relevance

EU trade policy has entered challenging times (Young, 2017). In the past decades, the EU has sought to actively include normative values *"such as democracy, rule of law, human rights and sustainable development in its trade agenda"* (Marx, 2023, p.5). The recent call for strategic autonomy as well as multiple politicised trade negotiations have complicated policy-making in this area. This poses a problem for the effective use of trade as a powerful foreign policy tool (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006). In light of the difficulties in concluding the MERCOSUR trade agreement and the revival of negotiations with important partners such as India, understanding the puzzle of varying politicisation of EU trade agreement negotiations is highly relevant. This research aims to uncover the underlying mechanism and can thus improve the understanding of policy-makers in dealing with gridlocked trade policy.

1.4. Research outline

Following the introductory chapter, chapter two provides a literature review. Chapter three develops a theoretical framework of the conditions that contribute to politicisation. The research design will be presented in chapter four. Chapter five covers the results and discussion. Lastly, chapter six and seven will conclude with an answer to the research question, address limitations and provide recommendations.

2

Literature Review

2.1. Politicisation of EU trade agreement negotiations

The Lisbon Treaty increased the importance of trade as a foreign policy tool and opened it up to enhanced political discussion (García, 2018; Adriaensen, 2020). Combined with the highly salient TTIP and CETA negotiations, these developments ushered in a *"remarkable surge in research"* (Van Loon, 2020, p.325) on the politicisation of EU trade agreements. The academic focus on these two negotiations has led to the trend that EU trade politicisation is studied mostly in the context of those agreements (Hurrelmann & Wendler, 2024; Rosén, 2019; Hübner et al., 2017; Young, 2016; De Bièvre, 2018). These scholars agree that there are underlying factors that drive politicisation, which has been endorsed by those that have looked further to agreements such as ACTA and with MERCOSUR (Dür & Mateo, 2014; Gheyle, 2022). The existing literature shows patterns in the aspects of politicisation which scholars focus on. This can be divided along two dimensions, visualised in Figure 1. The horizontal axis represents different analytical frameworks, where articles on the left side focus on actor analysis, while the right side focusses on institutional analysis. The vertical axis represents the governance level. Here, studies are differentiated between those that focus on the supranational level and those that focus on domestic analysis. As can be seen, a larger number of articles are set in a supranational context. However, the fact that a reasonable number of articles also deals explicitly with the domestic context indicates that politicisation of EU trade also has a *bottom-up* dimension driven by member state parliaments and local civil society actors (Andrione-Moylan et al., 2024; Roederer-Rynning & Kallestrup, 2017). Furthermore, Figure 1 shows that most articles focus on one set of explanations, meaning they do not bridge the gap between institutional and interest-based factors or domestic and supranational factors.

The different quadrants represent clusters of common themes along the dimensions. In the first quadrant, articles deal with institutional conditions at EU level. Important themes include increasing regulatory depth of EU trade policy (Duina, 2019; Laursen & Roederer-Rynning, 2017), the strategic impact of the Lisbon Treaty, (Weiß, 2023), economic relations between the EU and trading partners (Young, 2016) and the role of inter-institutional dynamics between EU decision-making bodies (De Bièvre, 2018; Gheyle, 2022).

Figure 1

Literature map of articles and the aspects of politicisation they cover

Supranational

2

Eliasson & Garcia-Duran, 2020b
Young, 2019
Meunier & Nicolaidis, 2019
Rosén, 2019
Migliorati & Vignoli, 2022
Garcia-Duran et al., 2020
Buonanno, 2017
Dür & Mateo, 2024
Dür & De Bièvre, 2007
Dür & Mateo, 2014
Mancini, 2022
Wendler & Hurrelmann, 2022
Dür et al., 2024

1

Leblond & Viju-Miljusevic, 2019
Eliasson & Garcia-Duran, 2020a
Dür et al., 2020
Weiß, 2022
Laursen & Roederer-Rynning, 2017
De Bièvre, 2018
Duina, 2019
Young, 2016
Gheyle, 2022
Meunier & Czesana, 2019
De Bièvre & Poletti, 2020

Actor centred

Institutional

Tereszkiewicz, 2019
Andrione-Moylan et al., 2024
Hamilton, 2024
Maatsch, 2022
Gheyle, 2016
Young, 2017
De Ville & Gheyle, 2024
Moerland & Weinhardt, 2020
Andrione-Moylan et al., 2022
Steiner, 2018
Van Loon, 2020

Jančić, 2016
Gheyle & Rone, 2023
Hübner et al., 2017
Roederer-Rynning & Kallestrup, 2017
Hurrelmann & Wendler, 2024
Crespy & Rone, 2022

3

4

Domestic

Note. The position of articles in quadrants represents the authors qualitative judgement of their fit to the different dimensions and relative to each other.

The fourth quadrant overlaps with the literature on EU multi-level governance, as articles found here analyse the constraining effect of member state institutional power. This is discussed mostly in the context of CETA, in which national parliaments politicised the legitimacy of the negotiation and ratification (Hübner et al., 2017; Jančić, 2017). Building on this, Hurrelmann and Wendler (2024) and Crespy and Rone (2022) show that the conflict between domestic politics and EU interests is epitomised in the struggle over ratification, which has led to strategic politicisation of trade agreement negotiations.

A prominent research focus in terms of trade-policy actors is the role of the EP, clustered in the second quadrant. The EP is often discussed because of the increased decision-making

powers it gained after the Lisbon Treaty (Rosén, 2019). With this increasing role, it has also been theorised that the interface between the EP and interest groups has opened up avenues for politicisation (Mancini, 2022; Wendler & Hurrelmann, 2022).

The third quadrant is closely linked to literature on interest groups and public opinion. These articles stress the importance of interest groups at domestic level, who build influence to impact trade negotiations (Hamilton, 2024; Van Loon, 2020). Overall, the distinction as to whether interest groups drive or react to politicisation is not clearly delineated (Gheyle, 2016). Steiner (2018) does conclude that public perception of trading partner economies influences politicisation, echoing the earlier point about the importance of economic relations with trading partners.

2.2. Knowledge gap

Although the above points to a spectrum of conditions that have been linked to the politicisation of EU trade agreement negotiations, the existing literature is often restricted to a limited explanation in terms of factors that are examined simultaneously (De Bièvre & Poletti, 2020). Because of this, a knowledge gap as to the interaction of conditions driving politicisation remains. Rather than conceptualising these conditions as independent variables, they should be viewed in relation to their inherent complexity. This provides a more holistic perspective and opens the analysis of causality up to conjunctural inference (Mello, 2021). To this end, Meunier and Czesana (2019) as well as De Bièvre and Poletti (2020) have merged the various explanations into a research agenda with which this knowledge gap can be tackled. Their work shows that the dynamic driving politicisation is characterised by complex causality, and they hypothesize that *"necessary but not sufficient"* (De Bièvre & Poletti, 2020, p.246) conditions combine in varying ways, producing varying degrees of politicisation. This theory has not yet been tested and thus the relative importance of conditions is not clear. The next step in advancing the literature is to empirically examine the complex causation underlying this research problem, which will allow for a comparative assessment on the importance of certain conditions and enable the identification of possible combinations of conditions that are needed to cause politicisation.

3

Theoretical Framework

3.1. Conceptualising politicisation

Generally speaking, politicisation refers to the *"emergence of widespread political debates which unsettle the traditional permissive consensus"* (Hurrelmann et al., 2015, p.43) of formerly depoliticised processes (Bressanelli et al., 2020). To contextualise, politicisation entails the expansion of the political scope of conflict concerning institutions, public opinion or governance issues (Hutter et al., 2016). This happens in a multilevel context, both bottom-up, due to polarised national debates and divided electorates, as well as top-down, through power struggles at EU level (Haapala & Oleart, 2022; Schmidt, 2019).

The broadly referenced definition of politicisation stems from De Wilde (2011), who divides politicisation into three dimensions: An increase in salience of EU governance, a polarisation of opinion and an expansion of actors involved in EU affairs. As such, politicisation is conceived as a process (Beaudonnet & Mérand, 2019). This three-pronged definition has been interpreted differently by those who see actor expansion as an inherent element of increased salience or value public salience as most important indicator (Dür et al., 2024; Hutter & Grande, 2014). However, for this research, the widely accepted definition by De Wilde will be used. Theoretically speaking, the discussion of politicisation aligns broadly with post-functionalist EU integration theory (Grande & Kriesi, 2016), which recognizes the *"political mobilisation of mass public opinion as a constraining factor in EU politics"* (Börzel & Risse, 2018, p.84).

3.2. Conceptualising conditions driving politicisation

As presented in the literature review, the two main dimensions along which politicisation is discussed[1] produce several conditions that are proposed to be of influence. From this, four conditions emerge as structural drivers of politicisation. These will be conceptualised below and are presumed to influence politicisation through interacting in a complex causal process. Although the discussion of Figure 1 yields additional conditions, these are not identified as drivers of politicisation and are thus excluded from the conceptual model. The reasoning for this is presented in section 3.3.

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[1] Different analytical frameworks and different governance levels.

3.2.1. Involvement of the EP

For an issue to become politicised, it is crucial that it is tabled in the political system, as this enables an expansion of the issue scope (Wiesner, 2022). As a political actor, the EP's involvement in trade agreement negotiations stems from its role as co-legislator. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the EP's powers were limited and hence its influence was superficial (Adriaensen, 2020). With the treaty change, the EP gained veto powers under the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP) and consequentially expanded its influence over trade policy (Van den Putte et al., 2014). Coremans and Meissner (2018) illustrate that the EP purposefully combines administrative and political capacity to increase its policy influence, which has translated into an increasing assertiveness of the EP in trade agreement negotiations (Rosén, 2019). This assertiveness, as well as its role in mediating between societal interests and political decision-making, have led to a strong voice of the EP in the politicisation of some trade agreements (Mancini, 2022; Rosén, 2019; Siles-Brügge, 2013).

The EP is not a unified actor regarding trade policy, as its very nature dictates that it is a forum for different political views on trade (Migliorati & Vignoli, 2022; Basedow & Hoerner, 2024). In terms of institutional analysis, it is however often viewed as one. Therefore, this research aggregates the activity of individual MEPs to an overall involvement of the EP.

3.2.2. Decision-making competence

The Lisbon Treaty saw an authority shift in trade policy-making towards the EU and away from member states (Gammage, 2018). This has led to tension, manifesting itself most poignantly in the discussion on Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) (Siles-Brügge, 2017). An EU Court of Justice (CJEU) ruling concluded that agreements including foreign investment provisions are to be labelled *mixed agreements*, requiring ratification at EU and member state level (Meunier & Morin, 2017).

The impact of this on the politicisation of trade negotiations is multi-faceted. National parliaments have tried to use their power within mixed agreements to expand their scrutiny, leading to a mechanism dubbed *contentious market regulation* (Roederer-Rynning & Kallestrup, 2017). This leads to an expansion of issues that are subjected to multilevel contention, as national actors aim to reinstate popular sovereignty (Crespy & Rone, 2022). This is closely related to the concepts of *parliamentarisation* of EU policies by way of an *Europeanisation* of national administrations (Christiansen et al., 2014; Gheyle, 2019). These concepts entail the expansion of the scope of European issues into domestic politics. Granting veto powers to national arenas has complicated decision-making, as different attitudes to trade liberalisation exist throughout Europe (Gheyle, 2022; Hübner et al., 2017). This mutual disagreement increases the salience and

polarisation of negotiations (Young, 2017). Agreements that fall under exclusive EU competence are expected to attract less contestation as they face a lower ratification hurdle (Guimarães, 2022).

3.2.3. Regulatory scope

Since the late 1990's, international trade has been characterised by an increasing focus on preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and deep trade agendas (Baccini, 2019; Johns & Peritz, 2015; Kim, 2015; Mattoo et al., 2020). The EU has been a prominent exemplar of this changing trade policy (Freudlsperger, 2021). This has manifested itself in a focus on regulatory and investment issues, as well as an expansion of actors engaged in trade policy-making (Young & Peterson, 2006). From an early stage, the increased regulatory scope led to growing complexity. This made it more difficult to accommodate diverse interests and succumbed trade policy to intensifying political strife (Baldwin, 2006; Leblond & Viju-Miljusevic, 2019).

This deep trade agenda has been identified as a potential source of politicisation (De Bièvre & Poletti, 2020; Duina, 2019). A theoretical explanation embedded in economic sociology states that regulatory content manifests values external to existing cultural identities, which triggers opposition (Duina, 2019). Furthermore, non-tariff barriers, especially those aimed at far-reaching liberalisation of foreign direct investment (FDI), have greater implications for civic interests compared to traditional free-trade issues (Young, 2016). This has led to an increased degree of civil society mobilisation and has made their support or opposition to trade negotiations contingent on the regulatory content of the agreement (Dür et al., 2023; Winslett, 2016). As a result, EU trade policy has been destabilised (Freudlsperger, 2021).

3.2.4. Relative economic power

As bilateral agreements are different in their exact stipulations, the trading partner relationship plays a role in negotiations (Young, 2016). Here, a link has been drawn between economic size and the level politicisation (Duina, 2019). The importance of the relative economic power of EU trading partners as a condition for politicisation is closely linked to the role of the EU as market power (Damro, 2012). Gaining access to its large single market entices smaller trading partners to accept EU demands during trade agreement negotiations, thus granting the EU a large degree of bargaining power (De Bièvre & Poletti, 2020). In asymmetric negotiations favouring the EU, the chance that it is forced to make concessions on sensitive issues is low, which helps constrain contestation. This dynamic has been researched especially in relation to TTIP. The threat of lower US standards was perceived as such due to the perceived economic bargaining strength of the US (Eliasson & Garcia-Duran, 2020b). Contrarily, negotiations with Japan, economically smaller than the EU, were not linked to politicisation (Suzuki, 2017). These observations lead to the expectation that the degree of EU bargaining power in negotiations determines whether political and societal actors view a negotiation as a threat or an opportunity.

3.3. Excluded conditions

Meunier and Czesana propose two conditions that can be considered antecedent background conditions rather than drivers of politicisation. The first is the proposition that politicisation stems partly from a growing discontent with globalisation. While the emergence of anti-globalisation sentiments cannot be disputed (Dür et al., 2020), contestation of EU trade agreements "*focuses very much on concerns about the agreement itself*" (Young, 2017, p.915). Furthermore, opposition to globalisation spiked following the 2008 financial crisis and thus does not explain recent *differentiated* politicisation, as this research only considers trade agreements concluded from 2009 onwards. Similar reasoning is used for the role attributed to the rise of social media. This development started early in the 2010's, which places the trade agreements under consideration in a similar context. While social media has certainly decreased the barriers to mobilise against an issue, mass protests against the WTO Millenium Round in 1999 show that public salience can also achieved without being driven by social media (De Bièvre & Poletti, 2020).

The role of interest group influence is also excluded from the causal mechanism, even though the link between the actions of civil society organisations (CSOs) and politicisation was evident in protests against TTIP and CETA. However, it is difficult to discern whether interest group influence drives or responds to politicisation. On the one hand, politicisation of trade agreements is affected by resource mobilisation (De Bièvre et al., 2020), yet on the other, it has been shown that contestation usually emerges only after institutional framework conditions are present (Buonanno, 2017). Wonka et al. (2018) show that interest group influence in EU policy-making contributes little to politicisation, and when it does, it often does so in a responsive manner (Dür & Mateo, 2024). This warrants its exclusion as a driver of politicisation.

Lastly, domestic factors that go beyond the role of national parliaments in the decision-making process are not included as separate condition. A large share of domestic actor influence is reflected in the role of ratification requirements of agreements, as this is the primary tool used for contestation by member states (Crespy & Rone, 2022). Domestic interest group activity is also partially reflected in this, as national parliaments respond to their constituents' concerns and are thus prompted to contest a ratification (De Ville & Gheyle, 2024).

4

Research Design and Method

4.1. Suitability of fsQCA

To fully explain the complex causation behind the varying degrees of politicisation of EU trade agreement negotiations, a fsQCA approach was deemed the most suitable research design. This choice is elaborated below. For a full discussion on the background of QCA, see Appendix A.

QCA is a method centred around conjunctural causation, equifinality and causal asymmetry (Mello, 2021; Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). To analyse this, set theory is used to conduct structured analysis of the membership of cases in certain sets, which is then leveraged to determine if conditions, or combinations of conditions, are necessary and/or sufficient to produce an outcome (Mello, 2021). In contrast to the original crisp-set QCA (csQCA), which only allowed conditions to either be fully in or fully out of a set, fsQCA allows for fine-grained specification of degree of set membership (Ragin, 2008). This approach makes it a powerful tool for analysing complex social phenomena (Schneider & Wagemann, 2006).

The motivation for choosing QCA should primarily be driven by theoretical expectations of set-relations in the research puzzle (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). The complex process of politicisation delineated in the theoretical framework aligns well with this idea. Methodologically speaking, the fact that QCA is suited to medium-sized samples makes it an appealing choice. While a small-N case study would have allowed for valuable analysis of politicisation, it would have fallen short of the aim to comprehensively assess multiple EU trade agreement negotiations. While statistical methods such as regression analysis may also seem appealing, its core assumptions that variables are *independent* and can be aggregated to explain the outcome, misaligned with the theoretical assumptions of the research problem. Aside from its theoretical suitability, fsQCA also displays *"many of the virtues of conventional interval-scale style variables"* (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009, p.89) while retaining the inferential power of set-theoretic operations (Ragin, 2008), making it the preferred method.

4.2. Research design

4.2.1. Research process

QCA does not refer to independent and dependent variables but instead uses the idea of conditions and outcomes respectively. In this research, the conditions are: 1) EP involvement, 2) National ratification requirement, 3) Comprehensive Regulatory scope and 4) Relative economic power. The outcome is politicisation. Calibration is the process by which empirical information on cases is used to assign set membership scores on the conditions and outcome. This step entails the careful operationalisation of concepts as well as a theoretically driven decision on set membership levels (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Many variants of fuzzy sets exist, but their common trait is the establishment of empirical anchors for set membership by defining at what point a case is fully in (fuzzy score 0.95), fully out (fuzzy score 0.05) or neither in nor out (fuzzy score 0.5) (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). The 0.5 threshold, also called the point of maximum ambiguity, is crucial, as it presents a qualitative threshold for set membership. The manual method of calibration is used when assigning scores by hand (usually used for non-continuous fuzzy sets). The direct method assigns scores based on a transformation of numerical data into a fuzzy set score using a logistic function that fits the data between the three empirical anchors (Mello, 2021).

QCA analysis is built on the logic of Boolean algebra and its operations, namely logical AND (denoted as A*B), logical OR (denoted as A+B) and logical NOT (denoted as ~A) (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). Subset and superset relations are key tools to analyse the necessity and sufficiency of conditions in producing an outcome (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). This analytical step is aided by truth table analysis. A truth table *"represents the number of combinations that are logically possible with the selected numbers of conditions"* (Mello, 2021, p.127). The process of logical minimisation reduces the combinations of conditions to three different possible solution terms for sufficiency: The conservative, intermediate and parsimonious solution. Listed by decreasing complexity, these solution types differ in the way they treat logical remainders (Mello, 2021). Logical remainders are empty truth table rows, representing configurations that have not empirically occurred. This is related to the problem of limited diversity and can be combatted by making assumptions leading to easy or difficult counterfactual reasoning (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).

Lastly, QCA uses consistency, coverage and relevance as parameters of fit. Consistency is used to determine the extent to which the empirical evidence supports an assumed set-theoretic relationship. Coverage and relevance assess the relevancy of a condition in empirical terms (Mello, 2021). Overall, this research design ensures a back-and-forth between within-case complexity and parsimonious cross-case comparison (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009), which is visualised in Figure 2.

Figure 2

QCA Research Cycle

Note. Adapted from Qualitative Comparative Analysis (p.6), by P. A. Mello, 2021, Georgetown University Press.

4.2.2. Sampling

Case selection in fsQCA is mostly conducted based on a given population (sometimes with additional scope conditions) or purposeful sampling (Mello, 2021). Generally, the most important principle in case selection is ensuring homogeneity in the type of cases, while achieving maximum heterogeneity concerning the presence of conditions and outcomes (Berg-Schlosser & Meur, 2009). Another guiding principle is the ratio between cases and conditions. The literature suggests a ratio of four cases per condition in order to limit the number of logical remainders (Mello, 2021).

Considering this, the sampling proceeded as follows. Initially, scope condition sampling of the full array of EU free trade agreements was conducted. Multiple criteria were applied to narrow down the selection and ensure homogeneity in the type of cases. Firstly, 2009 was chosen as the lower limit for an agreement to be considered, as this marked the start of new trade policy-making under the Lisbon Treaty. Secondly, any ongoing negotiations were excluded. In a next step,

any asymmetrical trade agreements, such as the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (European Commission, n.d.) were excluded. From the remaining agreements, a final sample of 15 cases was purposefully selected, shown in Table 1.

Table 1

Selected cases

No.	Name	Status	Year
1	EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement	In force	2011
2	EU-Colombia-Peru Trade Agreement	Provisionally applied	2013
3	EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area	In force	2014
4	EU-Moldova Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area	In force	2014
5	EU-Georgia Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade area	In force	2014
6	EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)	Provisionally applied	2017
7	EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement	In force	2018
8	EU-USA Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)	Discontinued	2019
9	EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement	In force	2019
10	EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement [a]	In force	2019
11	EU-MERCOSUR Trade Agreement	Negotiations provisionally concluded	2019
12	EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement	In force	2020
13	EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI)	Negotiations provisionally concluded	2020
14	EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement	In force	2021
15	EU-New Zealand Trade Agreement	In force	2024

Note. [a] This EPA constitutes a symmetrical free trade agreement (DG TRADE, n.d.-a)

4.3. Operationalisation and calibration

4.3.1. Outcome: Politicised (POL)

The outcome of interest is defined as the outcome set *Politicised (POL).* As a concept, politicisation is a complex phenomenon to capture, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Different approaches have been undertaken, including textual analysis of online and print media (Dolezal et al., 2016; Tereszkiewicz, 2021), exploiting survey data (Roederer-Rynning & Kallestrup, 2017; Steiner, 2018), analysing political speeches (Hutter et al., 2016; Hutter & Grande, 2014) and conducting interviews with key stakeholders (Beyers et al., 2018). While these approaches carry merit, no primary method was found that was both suitable and feasible to carry out for the sample and method used in this research.

A comprehensive categorisation on this topic has been made by De Bièvre and Poletti (2020). They developed a four-level qualitative categorisation of the level of politicisation of trade agreement negotiations, divided into the following scores: 1) High, 2) Medium, 3) Low to medium and 4) Low. The categorisation is based on the three dimensions of politicisation[2], which are each scored dichotomously (yes/no). Politicisation is judged high if it scores yes on all dimensions. If an agreement scores yes on at least polarisation, it is judged medium. If it scores yes only on actor expansion and no on the other dimensions, it is judged low to medium. In case it scores no on all dimensions, politicisation is low. As this approach undertakes a qualitative categorisation instead of a fine-grained quantitative distinction, it matches the scope of this research while being meaningful enough to allow relevant analysis within the limits of a fsQCA design. Due to these methodological considerations, POL was measured based on this existing categorisation. It covers all cases except for 4, 5, 7, 14 and 15. These remaining cases were manually categorised by the author based on the same dichotomous categorisation rules used by De Bièvre & Poletti. The completed dataset can be found in Table 12 in Appendix C. Data was gathered from news reporting, policy papers and secondary literature. This is in line with the types of data sources used by De Bièvre and Poletti. Nevertheless, potential inconsistencies in the categorisation must be acknowledged, especially as this condition is measured qualitatively and is thus exposed to researcher bias. However, this was not expected to negatively influence the analysis, as a broadly correct categorisation still yields the intended analytical result. The categorisation was manually calibrated to a four-value fuzzy set, shown in Table 2.

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[2] Salience, polarisation and actor expansion.

Table 2

Operationalisation and calibration of POL

Operationalisation		
Indicator	**Description**	**Source**
Level of Politicisation	Attribution of level of politicisation	News reporting, policy papers, secondary literature

Calibration thresholds – Four value fuzzy set		
Label	**Empirical anchor**	**Score**
Full membership:	0.95	High
More in than out:	0.67	Medium
More out than in:	0.33	Low to medium
Non-membership:	0.05	Low

4.3.2. Condition 1: EP involvement (EP)

This condition was defined *EP involvement (EP)* and represents the amount of parliamentary activity surrounding a trade agreement negotiation[3]. Parliamentary activity is often approached through the lens of *parliamentary performance* or *legislative effectiveness* (Akirav, 2020; Schobess, 2022; Volden & Wiseman, 2014). Akirav has developed the most recent comprehensive framework for parliamentary activity, which assesses the introduction of bills, number of debates, parliamentary questions and submission of motions. In accordance with Akirav's framework, four aggregate indicators were defined. The own-initiative procedure (INI) has been included as a proxy for the introduction of bills, as MEPs cannot propose bills because the right of initiative is reserved for the Commission. However, under the Treaty of Maastricht, the EP was granted the legislative power to submit INI reports to the Commission, in which it can call for the submission of a legislative proposal. In the context of trade policy, it is a way in which the EP voices its opinion on trade agreements and urges the Commission to conduct the negotiations in a particular manner (Visart & Raube, 2024). The number of speeches was substituted by counting the number of plenary debates. This was done because Akirav's framework is concerned with individual-level MEP activity, whereas this research looks at aggregate activity of the EP.

The indicators were each scored according to separate criteria. Information on the scoring criteria per indicator can be found in Appendix B. The general rule that applied was that a higher absolute occurrence of an indicator corresponds to higher involvement of the EP. The indicators

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[3] The role of EP involvement is linked to endogeneity issues, as it can be seen both as a cause and effect of politicisation. Based on the conceptualisation of the condition in section 3.2.1, this research supports the theory that EP involvement mainly reflects purposeful influence as an actor in its own right, instead of behaviour as a responsive actor. Limitations to this approach are discussed in chapter 6.

were weighted based on Akirav's framework and converted to continuous fuzzy set scores using the thresholds in Table 3. Full membership was set at a score of 2.6 or greater, as this translates to achieving at least the second highest weighted score on each indicator. The crossover point was set at the median score. Non-membership was set at 0.6 or lower, as this corresponds to a score in which no INI was produced as well as a low score on the other indicators. Data was collected via the INTA documents database and the EP Open Data Portal (European Parliament, 2024a, 2024b).

Table 3

Operationalisation and calibration of EP

Operationalisation			
Indicator	**Weight**	**Description**	**Source**
INI	40%	The total number of own-initiative reports produced	INTA committee
Debates	25%	The total number of plenary debates	Plenary agenda
Parliamentary questions	25%	The total number of parliamentary questions	Plenary documents
Motions for resolutions	10%	The total number of motions for resolutions made in plenary debates	Plenary documents

Calibration thresholds – Continuous fuzzy set		
Label	**Empirical anchor**	**Score**
Full membership:	0.95	≥ 2.6
Crossover point:	0.5	= 2.0
Non-membership:	0.05	≤ 0.6

4.3.3. Condition 2: National ratification requirement (NAT)

This condition was defined *national ratification requirement (NAT)*. There are two types of ratification requirements for EU trade agreements. The simplest requirement is when a decision can be taken at EU level and only supranational EU bodies are involved in the decision-making process. The second scenario pertains to agreements in which decision-making by EU bodies is followed by the ratification of the agreement by all 27 EU member states along individual national procedures (García, 2018).

Full set membership indicates the presence of national ratification requirements for member states. Any mixed agreement has a set membership score of 0.95, while an agreement that is ratified solely at EU level has a score of 0.05. As the only two options are full membership

or non-membership, this dichotomous condition was calibrated as a crisp set. Crisp sets can be seen as the simplest version of a fuzzy set and therefore this calibration still suited the fsQCA design (Schneider & Wagemann, 2006). The data was obtained from the agreement texts available at EUR-Lex (Publications Office of the EU, 2024).

Table 4

Operationalisation and calibration of NAT

Operationalisation		
Indicator	**Description**	**Source**
Ratification requirement	Whether the agreement is ratified by EU bodies and national parliaments *or* only at EU level	Agreement text
Calibration thresholds – Crisp set		
Label	**Empirical anchor**	**Score**
Full membership:	0.95	Yes
Non-membership:	0.05	No

4.3.4. Condition 3: Comprehensive regulatory scope (REG)

This condition was defined *comprehensive regulatory scope (REG)* and measured the extent of regulatory commitments in trade agreements. The Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) database is the most comprehensive database on PTAs (Dür et al., 2014). The database includes a depth index, which aggregates seven indicators related to the depth of a PTA, namely: Full FTA (including full tariff elimination), standards, investment, services trade, procurement, competition and IPRs. This index was used as a measure for regulatory scope, as it covers the intended concept and presents a verified, extensive, and comparable data source. The deepest agreements fulfil all seven indicators. The lowest scoring agreements are shallow agreements that do not include substantial provisions. Indicator scores were converted to a continuous fuzzy. Full set membership was achieved if an agreement scores seven, while non-membership was achieved when an agreement scores zero. The crossover point was set at three.

Cases 8, 11, 13, 14 and 15 were not included in the database. For these cases, the author undertook indicator assessment through document analysis of the (provisional) agreement texts. The coding scheme provided by Dür et al. (2014) provides coding rules with which the indicators were scored, thus ensuring a consistent measurement. The coding rules are based on whether relevant chapters related to the indicator are part of the agreement. The resulting complete dataset can be found in Table 14 in Appendix C.

Table 5

Operationalisation and calibration of REG

	Operationalisation	
Indicator	**Description**	**Source**
Depth index	Index that measures depth of regulatory commitments across seven dimensions	DESTA database

	Calibration thresholds – Continuous fuzzy set	
Label	**Empirical anchor**	**Score**
Full membership:	0.95	7
Crossover point:	0.5	3
Non-membership:	0.05	0

4.3.5. Condition 4: Relative economic power (ECO)

This condition is defined *relative economic power (ECO)* and measures the bargaining strength of trading partners *vis-à-vis* the EU. Gross domestic product (GDP) in current US$ was used as indicator to measure economic power, as it is the most widely accepted measure for the size of a country's economy (Callen, 2017). To reflect lengthy negotiations processes, the average GDP for the negotiation period was used. GDP values for each year were obtained from the World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2024). In cases in which the trading partner represented a block of countries (e.g. MERCOSUR), the sum of the GDP of all countries in the trading block was used. The values were then transformed into a continuous fuzzy set. The 0.5 empirical anchor was set at the average EU GDP between 2009-2023, which was 15.3 trillion US$. This was chosen as threshold as a value larger than this indicates a larger economic size than the EU and hence more economic power, while a lower value indicates the opposite. The average GDP of the USA, as largest economy in the world, was used as 0.95 threshold. The average GDP of Moldova was used as 0.05 threshold, as this is the smallest economy from the list of cases.

Table 6

Operationalisation and calibration of ECO

	Operationalisation	
Indicator	**Description**	**Source**
GDP (current US$)	The average economic size of trading partners relative to the EU	World Development Indicators database

	Calibration thresholds – Continuous fuzzy set	
Label	**Empirical anchor**	**Score**
Full membership:	0.95	18.8 trillion US$
Crossover point:	0.5	15.3 trillion US$
Non-membership:	0.05	9.7 billion US$

4.4. Data collection and analysis

Data collection and analysis was carried out according to fsQCA best practices (Mello, 2021; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). The raw data was collected through desk-study methods and compiled into a data matrix, which served as a basis for the calibration. The data for POL and NAT was calibrated manually. The data for the remaining three conditions was calibrated using the direct method, which was executed through the open-source fsQCA 4.1 software package (Ragin & Davey, 2022).

The first step was the analysis of necessity. Analysis of necessary conditions should always take place separately and before the analysis of sufficient conditions, as this helps guide choices on minimisation of the truth table and the treatment of logical remainders (Mello, 2021). The primary measure of fit for necessity is consistency, which should be at least 0.9 (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Additionally, the parameters coverage and relevance were used to test possible necessary conditions for their theoretical relevance. They should not take values lower than 0.5 (Mello, 2021). As second step, the analysis of sufficiency was conducted. This was done by matching the cases to the possible causal combinations in the truth table rows. The calibrated data served as basis for the truth table, which was constructed and analysed using fsQCA 4.1. To proceed with analysis, a case frequency threshold for a combination to be considered relevant was established. As this research was conducted with a small number of cases, the threshold was one case per combination (Skaaning, 2011). For the analysis of sufficiency, consistency should be at least 0.75 for a combination to be included in the minimisation (Mello, 2021). Then, a treatment of logical remainders was conducted, after which the logical minimisation was performed. Lastly, the analysis of the non-occurrence of politicisation was conducted. In QCA, the occurrence and

non-occurrence of an outcome are not necessarily the inverse of one-another. Rather, they are asymmetric relationships and need to be analysed separately (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). Although the main aim of this research was to identify the conditions that lead to the occurrence of politicisation, analysing the absence of politicisation can help clarify the underlying dynamic as it sheds light on why differentiated politicisation takes place. This analytical step followed the same procedure as the analysis of politicisation.

4.5. Validity and reliability

One of the core tenets of QCA is its appreciation for causal complexity (Ragin, 1987). This makes it a suitable method for achieving internal validity, as the process of moving between in-depth case knowledge and systematic empirical comparison ensures grounded causal claims. Its focus on cases aids this aspect of validity, as analytical steps proceed in light of constant judgement of substantial case knowledge (Thomann & Maggetti, 2020). Limited diversity presents a challenge to internal validity in qualitative research (Ragin, 2008). By restricting the number of conditions to four, the number of logical remainders was decreased. By considering cases with and without politicisation as well as maximum heterogeneity across the conditions, skewed data was limited as much as possible. In fsQCA, construct validity is enhanced through correct calibration and robustness tests (Skaaning, 2011; Thomann & Maggetti, 2020). By carrying out these tests, the effect of varying the calibration and consistency thresholds on the solution terms was assessed. This improved the validity as it shed light on possible measurement error.

Although the ability to produce generalisations with fsQCA is less pronounced than through statistical inference, it does allow for modest generalisation (Befani, 2013; Ragin, 1987; Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). The medium-sized sample in this research seems small, yet it reflects almost the whole target population. This is a good measure for generalisability, which was further refined by adhering to the good practice of including scope conditions to guide sampling (Befani, 2013), thus improving external validity.

Two advantages of fsQCA are its replicability and transparency (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). The process of calibration is a way of formalising the data collection process. The well-defined set-theoretic analysis ensures replicability, as it is based on the unambiguous language of Boolean algebra. Choices that were made during the operationalisation, calibration and truth table analysis were meticulously documented, increasing the transparency. Although issues of replicability arose concerning the calibration of POL and REG, the procedure by which the datasets were completed was aligned as closely as possible to the original coding schemes.

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Results and Discussion

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This chapter analyses and discusses the results following the procedure laid out in section 4.4. A summary of raw data and information on sub-indicator scores can be found in Appendix C. The calibrated fuzzy set scores can be found in Appendix D.

5.1. Analysis of necessity

A condition can be judged necessary if it has a consistency of at least 0.9, as well as a coverage and relevance greater than 0.5. The results for the analysis of necessity are shown in Table 7. There are no conditions that fulfil these criteria, leading to the conclusion that there are no necessary conditions that need to be fulfilled for politicisation to take place. While this statement is true based on the parameters of fit defined in this research, it is worthwhile to add some nuance through a closer examination of the data.

Table 7

Results for analysis of necessity for outcome POL

Condition	Consistency	Coverage	Relevance
EP	0.89	0.52	0.67
NAT	0.94	0.46	0.56
REG	1.00	0.31	0.10
ECO	0.45	0.93	0.99

ECO has the lowest consistency value at 0.45. The high scores for coverage and relevance can be disregarded, as these are meaningless when the primary measure of consistency is not adequately achieved (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Contrary to ECO, NAT and REG show very high consistency scores of 0.94 and 1.00 respectively. One may be prompted to consider these necessary conditions, yet both the coverage and relevance of the conditions fail to surpass the 0.5 threshold and therefore the conditions should not be considered necessary. The reason for the low coverage and relevance, especially in the case of REG, is that most cases have the same set membership score. This implies that the condition is almost a constant, which decreases its

relevance as both cases with and without the outcome are members of REG. Therefore, REG can be called a *trivial necessary condition.* NAT behaves in a similar way, albeit less pronounced.

Table 7 shows that EP is the only condition that almost meets the criteria for a necessary condition. While one may be tempted to consider this 'close enough', this would lead to faulty conclusions about the necessity of the condition. This can be illustrated by visualising the set relationship between POL and EP using an XY plot. It is important to note that the diagonal does not represent a regression line. Rather, it divides the XY plot into areas two areas. For a necessary condition, all cases should fall onto or below the main diagonal (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).

Figure 3

XY plot showing distribution of cases and their set membership in POL and EP

Examining Figure 3, two cases fall above the main diagonal. Taking the example of CETA, it has equally high membership in POL as the case of TTIP, but a relatively lower membership in EP. In terms of judging EP as a necessary condition, cases like this are called a logical contradiction (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Furthermore, for a relevant necessary condition, cases should be clustered in the shaded areas in the bottom left and top right corner under the diagonal. While the Vietnam FTA and TTIP fit this description, cases such as the South Korea FTA are located further

to the bottom right. Taken together with the logically contradictory cases, this justifies disregarding EP as a necessary condition.

5.2. Analysis of sufficiency

5.2.1. Truth table

The truth table, seen in Table 8, contains all 16 possible causal paths contained in the data. Before proceeding with the logical minimisation, several analytical steps regarding analysis of the truth table were undertaken.

Table 8

Truth table

Path	EP	NAT	REG	ECO	POL	N	Cases [a]	Consistency
1	0	0	1	0	0	5	9, 10, 12, 14, 15	0.19
2	0	1	1	0	0	4	2, 4, 5, 7	0.32
3	1	1	1	0	0	4	1, 3, 6, 11	0.54
4	1	0	1	0	0	1	13	0.46
5	1	1	1	1	1	1	8	0.99
6	0	0	0	0	0	0	Logical remainder	N/A
7	1	0	0	0	0	0	Logical remainder	N/A
8	0	1	0	0	0	0	Logical remainder	N/A
9	1	1	0	0	0	0	Logical remainder	N/A
10	0	0	0	1	0	0	Logical remainder	N/A
11	1	0	0	1	0	0	Logical remainder	N/A
12	0	1	0	1	0	0	Logical remainder	N/A
13	1	1	0	1	0	0	Logical remainder	N/A
14	0	0	1	1	0	0	Logical remainder	N/A
15	1	0	1	1	0	0	Logical remainder	N/A
16	0	1	1	1	0	0	Logical remainder	N/A

Note. N denotes the number of cases that fit this path. [a] The names of the cases can be found in Table 1.

Firstly, the number of cases per path in column N was inspected. The frequency threshold was set at one, which meant that path one through five were considered. Of these, only one path has a consistency above the minimum threshold of 0.75, namely path five. Although such a truth table is not ideal in fsQCA due to the limited paths that result in the outcome of interest, common methods for alleviating this problem were not readily applicable. Usually, a researcher encountering limited diversity at this stage can opt to add cases or conditions (Mello, 2021). However, almost all EU trade agreements were already considered in the sample. The remaining

agreements[4] that were negotiated within the timeframe of this research, were not politicised (De Bièvre & Poletti, 2020). Therefore, adding these would not have increased diversity in the outcome. Adding a condition would have most likely exacerbated the problem due to the exponential growth of possible paths when adding conditions.

Lastly, the treatment of logical remainders was undertaken. As no necessary conditions had been identified and the logical remainders did not meet the frequency threshold, paths six through 16 were excluded from the logical minimisation.

5.2.2. Logical minimisation

The resulting logical minimisation yielded the conservative, parsimonious and intermediate solution terms, shown in Table 9. Solution consistency, like the consistency measures used earlier, indicates how much of the outcome can be explained by the specific path. Solution coverage refers to how much of the outcome is covered by the solution term.

Table 9

Solution terms for outcome POL

Path		Solution consistency	Solution coverage
Complex solution:	EP*NAT*REG*ECO	0.99	0.38
Parsimonious solution:	ECO	0.93	0.45
Intermediate solution:	EP*NAT*REG*ECO	0.99	0.38

To begin, the complex solution was analysed. This solution shows that only a combination of all four conditions under consideration (remembering that * signifies a conjunction) leads to the outcome. The solution consistency is near perfect with a value of 0.99, which can be explained by the fact that this solution only covers one case, namely TTIP. The coverage for the complex solution has a relatively low score of 0.38. This can be explained by scrutinising the ratio between uniquely covered and uncovered cases (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). As mentioned above, TTIP is the only uniquely covered case by this solution. However, TTIP is not the only agreement that was politicised. Uncovered cases are those that have higher than 0.5 membership in the outcome, but lower than 0.5 membership in the solution. This is the case for CETA, MERCOSUR and the Ukraine DCFTA, which all scored at least 0.67 on POL but are not covered by this solution path as they do not show a combination of all four conditions. Usually, the intermediate solution is the preferred solution term as it provides a desirable middle-ground between the complex and parsimonious solution (Mello, 2021). However, as explained in section 5.2.1, no counterfactual analysis was necessary and thus the intermediate solution yielded no different outcome to the

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[4] The Central America FTA and the Western Balkans SAA (DG TRADE, n.d.-b)

complex solution. This leaves the parsimonious solution, which states that the presence of ECO is enough for politicisation to take place. Compared to the complex solution, it has a similarly high consistency and a greater coverage score, which seem to qualify it as the preferred solution term. Closer scrutiny of the increased coverage score reveals an important caveat to this solution, which discredits its relevance. Aside from TTIP, the China CAI is the only other agreement that scores relatively high on ECO. Adhering to the logic of the parsimonious solution, the China CAI should then have at least a medium high score on politicisation. This, however, is not the case, which qualifies this case as a logical contradiction to the parsimonious solution.

Having done this, the analysis of sufficiency concludes with the finding that only a combination of high EP involvement, a national ratification requirement, a comprehensive regulatory scope and economic bargaining strength of the trading partner results in a politicised trade agreement negotiation.

5.3. Analysis of non-occurrence of politicisation

The main findings and parameters of fit of the analysis of the non-occurrence are summarised below. Full documentation can be found in Appendix E.

The analysis of necessity resulted in one necessary condition, namely the negation of ECO (denoted ~ECO). This means that the absence of relative economic power is a necessary condition for the absence of politicisation. With a consistency of 0.99 and coverage of 0.81, this condition seems to amply meet the criteria for a necessary condition. While this statement holds true, the relevance score of merely 0.47 shows that there are outliers to be noted. These can be seen in Figure 4 on page 27. While most cases lie on or close to the diagonal line as is to be expected with a necessary condition, three notable outliers are found in the bottom right corner. The location of these outliers could indicate that ~ECO is merely a trivial necessary condition. However, the fact that the consistency and coverage are very high justifies the conclusion that it is indeed a true necessary condition. As a consequence, ~ECO was deemed an *easy counterfactual* and included as directional assumption in the analysis of sufficiency (Ragin, 2008).

The truth table analysis and logical minimisation resulted in two causal paths that are sufficient for the absence of politicisation, shown in Table 10 on page 28. The three solution terms all yielded the same conjunctions, which is why the solution terms are summarised into one. The solution term shows that a combination of no national ratification requirement, a comprehensive regulatory scope and no relative economic power *or* the combination of no EP involvement, a comprehensive regulatory scope and no relative economic power are sufficient combinations of conditions for the absence of politicisation. With a solution consistency of 0.95 and solution coverage of 0.77, this solution adequately explains the absence of politicisation. The only case not

covered by this is the South Korea FTA, which had both high EP involvement and a national ratification requirement but was not politicised.

Figure 4

XY plot showing distribution of cases and their set membership in ~POL and ~EP

Peculiarly, the presence of REG is considered a requirement in both conjunctions yet was also considered a requirement in the analysis for the presence of politicisation. This points to the issue of the behaviour of REG as a quasi-constant variable, outlined earlier. The obscuring behaviour this has is partly due to imprecise measurement, which is discussed in chapter 6. The two paths only differ on the first term. To dissect this difference, the path consistency, raw coverage and unique coverage measures were included. *"Raw coverage indicates how much of the membership in the outcome is covered by the membership in a single path; the unique coverage instead indicates how much a single path uniquely covers"* (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p.139). Despite its marginally lower path consistency, ~EP*REG*~ECO covers more of the outcome than ~NAT*REG*~ECO. This points to the higher relative importance of ~EP compared to ~NAT, which is confirmed by the higher unique coverage of the ~EP conjunction.

Table 10

Solution term for outcome ~POL

Path	~NAT*REG*~ECO	~EP*REG*~ECO
Path consistency	1.00	0.94
Raw coverage	0.54	0.66
Unique coverage	0.11	0.24
Covered cases	9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15	2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15
Solution consistency	0.95	
Solution coverage	0.77	
Uncovered cases	1	

Note. The rows 'covered cases' and 'uncovered cases' refer to the case numbers found in Table 1.

5.4. Discussion

The main findings show that there are no necessary conditions for a trade agreement negotiation to become politicised, while a combination of high involvement of the EP, national ratification requirements, a comprehensive regulatory scope and greater relative economic power of the trading partner is sufficient for politicisation to take place. In essence, this means that, while there is no necessary threshold condition that needs to be present, politicisation only takes place when a large number of structural conditions are simultaneously fulfilled. This implies that only deep trade agreements with the USA and China will become politicised, as they are currently the only two trading partners with similar economic might to the EU. This logic strongly aligns with observations during TTIP negotiations, where regulatory depth and the economic power of the US sparked fear of unchecked investment by US companies and the deterioration of EU standards (Young, 2016). The data on negotiations with China shows a low to medium politicisation. However, if the agreement were to have a truly comprehensive regulatory scope, this could possibly lead to greater polarisation, as issues such as the authoritarian repression of the Uyghur population would likely lead to norm contestation (Eliasson & Garcia-Duran, 2020a; Trebilcock & Poliwoda, 2023). Conversely, inspecting the agreements that did not show these structural conditions also seems to affirm the main findings. This is best illustrated by the Vietnam FTA, which, aside from having a deep regulatory scope, scored low on all other conditions. Despite human rights concerns and petitioning of the EP by NGOs, the agreement failed to spark widespread politicisation (Valero, 2020). Trade negotiations with the UK after Brexit, while presumed to be a contested issue, did also not result in significant mobilisation (Gallardo, 2020).

Although these case intricacies seem to align with findings of this research, an important outlier points to the limitations of this theory. The fact that CETA is not covered by the solution in section 5.2.2 does not only explain the low coverage of the findings, but also shows that the

findings are limited in their generalisability. Aside from TTIP, CETA is the only other negotiation that was fully politicised. Yet, it did not fulfil the criterion of relative economic power, thus contradicting the findings. An empirical explanation for this is the measurement of politicisation. As politicisation was measured categorically, fine-grained differences between the level of politicisation in TTIP and CETA negotiations were not identified. If these exist (e.g. in the form of differences in protest intensity, number of actors involved, etc.), a higher score for TTIP would alleviate some of the contradiction. However, as there is an academic consensus that both CETA and TTIP were highly politicised, the contradiction has more explanations than simply empirical issues. One explanation offered is the idea of issue linkage between investment provisions in TTIP and CETA, ascribing the dynamic of politicisation primarily to TTIP and the uproar it sparked over ISDS (Eliasson & Garcia-Duran, 2020a; Young, 2017). The idea that TTIP is the real source of politicisation which then reflected on CETA, as this was a near-identical negotiation, is supported by Gheyle (2016). These explanations build on the fact that there is not necessarily a quantitative, but a qualitative difference in the politicisation of TTIP and CETA. This idea is captured by the theory of *layered politicisation*. This specification of politicisation combines the existing three-dimensional definition of politicisation with institutional analysis, in which institutions are conceived as a composition of a narrative, a rule and a practice layer (Zimmermann, 2019). It states that actors can target certain layers of an institution, which disaggregates the black-box of institutional politicisation. With CETA, politicisation took place mainly in the ratification phase, in which national governments engaged strongly in discursive contestation, culminating in the Walloon parliament rejecting the deal (Hübner et al., 2017; Hurrelmann & Wendler, 2024). This corresponds to politicisation only of the narrative and practice layers, while TTIP opposition was focused on all three layers. A similar situation to CETA arose with the Ukraine DCFTA, in which a Dutch referendum prevented initial ratification (Teffer, 2016). Here too, the agreement, despite not fulfilling all conditions, resulted in politicisation (albeit less than CETA and TTIP). With MERCOSUR, the third case not covered by the findings, French national political dynamics driven by farmers afraid of dumping practices are leading to increasing politicisation (Zimmermann, 2024). Discussing these outliers shows how analysing the behaviour of national actors helps to explain why cases that are (partially) politicised can deviate from the solution presented in this research. This also contradicts the assumptions made about the omission of national actor involvement from the theoretical framework. The South Korea FTA, mentioned as notable outlier on several occasions, serves as an exemplary case. Whereas politicisation could have been expected due to its close correlation on condition scoring compared to other politicised agreements, it did not occur. Closer inspection shows that, although member state opposition driven by concerted lobby efforts of the EU's automobile sector risked polarisation, discursive

framing efforts as well as strategic concessions during the negotiation allowed the Commission to thwart the emergence of politicisation from the onset (Siles-Brügge, 2011).

The results also allow for a discussion of the relative importance of the individual conditions. Regarding the role of the EP, the expectation that its post-Lisbon role as veto player increased its importance in trade policy can be verified. The analysis of necessity for politicisation shows that high EP activity often corresponds with high politicisation. Oppositely, the absence of EP involvement is an integral part of the causal conjunction that explains most of the cases that are not politicised, highlighting the importance of the EP in the process of negotiations. The nature of the trading partner's economy also is a key determinant for a differentiated outcome in politicisation, especially when a deep trade agenda is being pursued. This can be seen when comparing TTIP to the Japan EPA, as both agreements have a comprehensive regulatory scope, yet the economic bargaining strength of the USA triggered greater protest due to its ability in leveraging economic access to secure regulatory concessions (Suzuki, 2017). Even though the importance of national ratification requirements only qualified as trivial necessary condition, it can still be considered an important factor. Its inclusion in the solution term for politicisation as well as the inclusion of its negation in the solution for the absence of politicisation serve as evidence.

QCA is often criticised on issues of inconsistency and sensitivity (Mello, 2021). To confront this challenge, robustness tests are an indispensable analytical step that should complement the analytical procedure (Skaaning, 2011). To this end, several robustness tests concerning changes in calibration and consistency thresholds were performed. These did not result in substantial changes to the solution terms and thus do not contradict the findings. Full documentation can be found in Appendix F.

6

Conclusion

This research embarked on a mission to unpack the politicisation of EU trade by answering the question "*Which conditions explain the varying degrees of politicisation across EU trade agreement negotiations between 2009 and 2024?".* This undertaking has shown that for politicisation to commence, the conditions of high EP involvement, a national ratification requirement, a comprehensive regulatory scope and relative economic strength of the trading partner must be fulfilled simultaneously. Although there is no truly necessary condition, only a fulfilment of all four conditions in conjunction is sufficient for politicisation to occur. Within this joint mechanism, a high involvement of the EP and a similar economic size of the trading partner stand out as defining characteristics. These conditions, aided by the controversiality of deep regulatory agreements and the expansion into national arenas due to ratification requirements, are what drive the politicisation of EU trade agreement negotiations.

This research provides a valuable contribution to the persistent discussion on why there is a varying degree of politicisation across EU trade agreement negotiations. Empirically, it develops a new and comprehensive dataset of outcomes and relevant conditions for all noteworthy EU trade agreement negotiations. The findings align with the institutional literature that focusses on the substantial effect of the Lisbon Treaty on EU trade policy-making (García, 2018). Although the data shows that the new-found policy-making powers of the EP and the increased contestation in national ratification processes coincide with politicisation, they do not guarantee its occurrence. Refined theories of politicisation such as *punctuated politicisation,* which states that politicisation only emerges in certain time periods (Hutter et al., 2016), or the aforementioned *layered politicisation* (Zimmermann, 2019), align more closely with the behaviour of the cases under investigation. These theories divide the overarching theory of politicisation into more nuanced theoretical frameworks, which can offer an improved specification of the reasons for differentiated politicisation. Theoretically speaking, this research leads to the conclusion that policy-makers should readily be able to predict the politicisation of negotiations, as only certain situations and trading partners fulfil the structural conditions outlined here. However, the discussion of the results has shown that the theoretical framework is not complete. This is illustrated by the fact that CETA is such a notable outlier to the solution. The results show that an analysis of structural conditions *only* does not suffice, as actors are required *"to move an issue into*

the political realm" (Young, 2019, p.1885). While this has been partially covered by accounting for the involvement of the EP, an incorporation of interest group theory can demystify why polarisation by supranational and national political elites occurs only selectively (De Bruycker, 2017). Aside from its implications for the importance of considering the behaviour of national actors, the discussion of the South Korea FTA points to the role of strategic choices by the Commission and their effect on politicisation. This warrants an examination of the purposeful behaviour of the Commission, which touches upon wider debates of supranationalism and inter-institutional bargaining in the EU. This is not accounted for in this research, but Commission responses such as separating agreements into trade and investment agreements as well as discursive efforts to reframe globalisation in order to combat politicisation show that this needs to be included in the analysis of varying politicisation (Garcia-Duran et al., 2020). Together with incorporating analysis of outside lobbying efforts, this would merge the institutional and actor-centred approaches that have thus far been largely detached from each other, enabling a more constructivist exploration of politicisation processes.

6.1. Limitations

The fsQCA approach presented a suitable method for analysing the occurrence of politicisation, as its inherent regard for causal complexity allowed for a comprehensive comparative analysis without losing sight of the distinctiveness of individual circumstances. However, this approach was not without methodological limitations. Empirically speaking, the issue of limited diversity is apparent through the presence of a large number of logical remainders. Partly due to the fact that there are simply not an abundant number of cases, this problem is magnified by the presence of *clustered remainders*, which describes a situation of path-dependent change (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). This is the case with REG and its behaviour as quasi-constant condition. Because of the evolution of deep trade agendas and the EU's preference for next-generation agreements, almost all agreements under consideration have a comprehensive regulatory framework. This creates skewed set membership. In order to capture the essence of REG and properly differentiate different cases, a more comprehensive conceptualisation is needed, as the DESTA depth index is too superficial. As an aggregate measure, it conceals the nuances in regulatory depth that do in fact exist across agreements. Furthermore, the condition could be conceptualised more broadly to encompass not only legal implications of the agreement, but also target macro-economic aspects such as trade imbalances. This could capture the effect of regulations on sectoral interests and give an insight into when and why lobbying activity takes place, paying tribute to the idea that strategic actor behaviour influences politicisation (De Bièvre & Poletti, 2020). The importance of domestic interests is highlighted by Van Loon (2020), which could provide a fruitful starting point for expanding the idea of regulatory importance.

The use of GDP to measure ECO, although valid, was a rather rudimental measure. Conceptually, the large economic size of the EU may be offset by certain sectoral economic imbalances, shown by protests of the automobile industry during the South Korea FTA negotiations or by the beef industry during MERCOSUR negotiations (Elsig & Dupont, 2012; Junker & Heckelei, 2012). Extending the conceptualisation of ECO to account for this would disaggregate the indicator and explain why a smaller economy can still have economic bargaining power *vis-à-vis* the EU.

Lastly, the issue of endogeneity in the involvement of the EP muddled the clarity of whether this condition was a cause or effect of politicisation. Although the data shows signs that the EP behaves as an actor in its own right, the internal validity of this indicator can be questioned as it considered aggregate activity only. This could be specified by considering EP activity only in early stages of negotiations, as civil society contestation usually took place only in latter stages (Mancini, 2022). This way, a distinction between the two facets of EP behaviour can be made. Furthermore, negotiations took different amounts of time, which is not reflected in the aggregate data. This created artificial higher scores for longer negotiations, which could be controlled for by normalising the indicator scores.

Despite the efforts that were made to theoretically substantiate the operationalisation of concepts and make transparent the data collection and calibration procedures, fsQCA is inherently prone to researcher bias. This was an issue in the measurement of POL, although the effect was limited. The agreements that had to be added all had a low politicisation score, thus not substantially impacting the analysis of the outcome. Nonetheless, such issues threaten the construct validity, which is why an integration of this method into a multi-method framework would provide additional validation of the results (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).

7

Recommendations

Based on the discussion of results and limitations, several recommendations can be made. In an effort to refine QCA methodology in its application to the varying politicisation of EU trade agreement negotiations, temporal QCA provides a method by which the sequence of various conditions can be disaggregated (Mello, 2021). Within the ongoing discussion on validity of QCA studies, a two-step QCA approach can alleviate the limitations imposed by limited diversity (Schneider & Wagemann, 2006). Extending the methodology by complementing an initial fsQCA analysis with in-depth process-tracing of notable cases or statistical techniques can improve both internal and external validity (Thomann & Maggetti, 2020). Conceptually, the discussion of results showed that the role of agency should be incorporated into the theoretical framework. This can be implemented both bottom-up, focussing on when and why CSOs mobilise, or top-down, examining why political elites act selectively in different ratification processes and agreements. Considering the first option, work on the drivers and success factors of outside lobbying in the EU provides fruitful insights, as this can shed light on the actor expansion dimension of politicisation (De Bruycker & Beyers, 2019). For the second option, a differentiated approach to the behaviour of member states during negotiations may be promising. Investigating if, and why, different member states and national actors selectively oppose trade agreements can provide a better understanding of the drivers of politicisation and help determine if politicisation occurs on an EU-wide basis or along national issues. For both avenues of future research on agency, the idea of framing is important and relates closely to the way in which deep regulatory agreements are perceived (Young, 2017). Therefore, employing discursive analysis to accommodate a constructivist perspective is also recommended.

The most pressing consequence of politicised negotiations is a gridlock in the conclusion of new trade agreements. TTIP has shown that this can eventually lead to a discontinuation of negotiations, resulting in strained trade relations. Based on the findings of this research, negotiations of deep and comprehensive agreements with economic counterparts are most at risk of becoming politicised. Negotiations with smaller partners, such as currently underway with Thailand, can presumably be concluded along the usual process. However, the process for ongoing negotiations with upcoming economic rivals such as India should be evaluated and adjusted, as the economic rivalry factor has proved to play such a threating role in its mobilising potential. To

limit contestation, particular attention should be paid to anticipating and accommodating national actor preferences. Furthermore, the Commission should strive to promptly and fully incorporate the EP in the legislative process of ongoing negotiations, as this ensures a balanced relationship between the institutions and counteracts opposition by the EP. The early-doors involvement of the EP in the post-Brexit negotiations with the UK can serve as an example (Mancini, 2022).

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Appendices

Appendix A: QCA background information

Background information

In order to justify the selection of QCA as the most suitable research approach, it is important to understand what QCA entails and how it can be situated in social science research. The method was introduced by Charles C. Ragin in his book *The Comparative Method* (Ragin, 1987) and stems from the comparative school of thought developed by John Stuart Mill (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). QCA was developed in an effort to provide a more formalised way of conducting case-oriented comparison (Ragin, 2005). Concisely summarised, *"QCA is a comparative case-oriented research approach and collection of techniques based on set theory and Boolean algebra"* (Marx et al., 2014, p.115). In practice, this means that QCA is a very suitable method for answering questions of causal complexity, in which cases are regarded as a combination of conditions (Mello, 2021). It sees systematic comparison as the cornerstone of empirical sciences, yet recognizes the complicated nature of social science phenomena by allowing for conjunctural causation, equifinality and causal asymmetry (Mello, 2021; Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). To achieve this, set theory is used to conduct structured analysis of the membership of cases in certain sets (e.g. membership in the condition set "strong civil society" and outcome set "democratic stability") and use this to determine if conditions, or combinations of conditions, are necessary and/or sufficient to produce an outcome (Mello, 2021). This approach makes it a powerful tool for analysing complex social phenomena (Schneider & Wagemann, 2006).

QCA is sometimes described as a middle-way between quantitative and qualitative methods, integrating the advantages of case-oriented approaches and variable-oriented methods (Ragin, 1987). Indeed, Ragin initially developed the method for the analysis of medium-sized samples (Ragin, 2000), providing an alternative to small-N case study and large-N quantitative methods. However, it is fundamentally a case oriented method and relies on intricate case knowledge in all research phases (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009). As such, it is a holistic approach in which a constant dialogue between theory and cases is critical to preserve within-case complexity (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). This is one of the aspects that sets it apart from quantitative methods such as regression analysis. While it preserves some of the strengths of such methods through its ability to analyse a larger number of cases and by ensuring replicability through its structured analysis (Rihoux, 2003), it is not concerned with measuring the net-effect of independent variables (Ragin, 2008). Ragin criticised these conventional quantitative social science research

methods for assuming that independent variables can be truly independently specified and relying overtly on correlation (Ragin, 2008). QCA, then, corrects for this by assuming the presence, and coexistence, of multiple causal paths and allows for modest generalisations without resorting to vagueness and imprecision (Ragin, 1987).

Initially developed for macro-level studies mainly in political science (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009), this still relatively new method has undergone significant evolution, evidenced by exponential growth in its use during the last 20 years (Mello, 2021; Roig-Tierno et al., 2017). While multiple variants of QCA now exist, the most important distinction is that between crisp set QCA (csQCA) and fuzzy set QCA (fsQCA). QCA was developed initially as a dichotomous method, in which case membership was divided into full membership or no membership (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Criticism of this simplification of empirical information led to the development of fsQCA, in which partial set membership is allowed (Ragin, 2000) and quantitative and qualitative assessment is combined to introduce fine-grained differentiation between relevant and irrelevant variation (Mello, 2021).

Rationale for fsQCA

Having delineated QCA as a research approach, the next step is to justify why QCA in general, and fsQCA specifically, was deemed the appropriate research method. Not withholding epistemological preferences, the motivation for choosing QCA should primarily be driven by theoretical expectations of set-relations in the research puzzle (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).

Considering this, QCA's sensitivity to causal complexity is very compatible with the theoretical framework of this research. The literature describes possible causes for politicisation across EU trade agreement negotiations in terms of necessity and sufficiency, while already taking into account the notion of equifinality (De Bièvre & Poletti, 2020). This speaks to the concept of multiple conjunctural causation, something QCA is specifically designed to facilitate (Rihoux, 2003). Schneider and Wagemann (2012) show that set theory is a very common way of structuring arguments in the social sciences. The theoretical framework presented in this research echoes that structure. QCA also accommodates the deductive nature of this exploratory research, as it is a *"powerful tool for theory testing"* (Rihoux, 2003, p.355). The theoretical expectations formulated in the theoretical framework can be evaluated, but the inherent iterative element of QCA ensures that the current limited understanding of how and when politicisation of trade agreement negotiations occurs is accounted for. Overall, the outcome-centred general research question that this research aims to answer resonates well with the core assumptions of QCA research (Mello, 2021).

Methodologically speaking, the fact that QCA is suited to medium-sized samples makes it an appealing choice. While a classical comparative case study would also have allowed for a deep

dive into the mechanism underlying politicisation, it would have been limited to a small-N sample. Apart from questions about the theoretical suitability of statistical analysis, its requirement of a large-N sample excluded it from consideration for this research. A further methodological advantage of QCA is the process of calibration. This ensures a meaningful qualitative judgement of the variables based on external, theoretically grounded, criteria (Ragin, 2008). This process leads to a better understanding of meaningful variation in the data (Mello, 2021). Furthermore, this process means that both quantitative and qualitative data can be used (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012), which is especially useful when measuring complicated concepts such as politicisation.

Taking these theoretical and methodological considerations into account, fsQCA presented the most suitable research method. QCA allows for the comparative assessment of the conditions that are thought to contribute to the politicisation of EU trade agreement negotiations. As a QCA variant, fsQCA has *"many of the virtues of conventional interval-scale style variables"* (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009, p.89) and allows for fine-grained specification of degree of membership, while retaining the inferential power of set-theoretic operations (Ragin, 2008). This allowed for a thorough examination of the research question.

Appendix B : Indicator scoring for EP

Table 11 shows the scoring system that was used to determine the scores for each indicator of EP involvement. The total score was converted to a continuous fuzzy set using the calibration thresholds outlined in Section 4.3.2. The legislative periods 1999-2004, 2004-2009, 2009-2014, 2014-2019 and 2019-2024 were considered. With regards to the questions and motions, the plenary sessions preceding the negotiations and during the negotiations were considered. Questions submitted after negotiations were concluded were also considered in case they pertained to the ratification and implementation of the agreement. The raw data categories were defined based on the distribution of the collected data. This was done in order make a reasonable qualitative distinction between high and low use of the respective legislative tool.

Table 11

Indicator scoring for condition EP

Indicator	Weight	Raw data categories	Score	Weighted Score
INI	40%	0	0	min 0, max 1,6
		1	2	
		≥ 2	4	
Number of debates	25%	1	0	min 0, max 1
		2	1	
		3	2	
		4	3	
		≥ 5	4	
Parliamentary questions	25%	≤ 9	0	min 0, max 1
		10 – 29	1	
		30 – 49	2	
		50 – 99	3	
		≥ 100	4	
Motions for resolutions	10%	0	0	min 0, max 0,4
		1 – 3	1	
		4 – 6	2	
		7 – 9	3	
		≥ 10	4	
		Total weighted score:		**min 0, max 4**

Appendix C : Data

The tables below show the data that was collected for the conditions POL, EP, REG and ECO. For EP, REG and ECO, the raw numerical data was processed in order to arrive at the final data that was used for calibration. For the condition NAT, the agreement texts were analysed in order to determine the ratification requirement, and no further data processing was undertaken. For the outcome POL, the existing classification by De Bièvre & Poletti (2020) was complemented by the author and no further data processing was undertaken either.

Table 12

Raw data POL

No.	Case	POL			
		Dimensions			**Level of politicisation**
		Salience	Polarisation	Actor expansion	
1	EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement	No	No	No	Low
2	EU-Colombia-Peru Trade Agreement	No	No	Yes	Low to medium
3	EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area	No	Yes	No	Medium
4	EU-Moldova Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area	No	No	No	Low
5	EU-Georgia Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade area	No	No	No	Low
6	EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)	Yes	Yes	Yes	High
7	EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement	No	No	No	Low
8	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)	Yes	Yes	Yes	High
9	EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement	No	No	No	Low
10	EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement	No	No	No	Low
11	EU-MERCOSUR Trade Agreement[a]	No	Yes	Yes	Medium
12	EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement	No	No	No	Low
13	EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI)[a]	No	No	Yes	Low to medium
14	EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement	No	No	No	Low
15	EU-New Zealand Trade Agreement	No	No	No	Low

Note. [a] Categorisation was altered to reflect developments since original categorisation was published by De Bièvre & Poletti in 2020.

Table 13

Raw data ECO

No.	Case	ECO		
		Start negotiation	End negotiation	Average GDP (current US$)
1	EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement	2007	2009	1.054.631.657.661
2	EU-Colombia-Peru Trade Agreement	2007	2010	364.693.271.884
3	EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area	2008	2014	160.971.426.697
4	EU-Moldova Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area	2010	2014	8.599.004.822
5	EU-Georgia Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade area	2010	2014	15.731.385.381
6	EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)	2009	2016	1.668.814.059.967
7	EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement	2015	2017	10.875.644.154
8	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)	2013	2019	18.955.196.104.286
9	EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement	2010	2014	287.339.461.820
10	EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement	2013	2017	4.897.753.647.036
11	EU-MERCOSUR Trade Agreement	2000	2019	2.018.178.662.417
12	EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement	2012	2015	220.502.317.705
13	EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment	2014	2020	12.563.374.736.303
14	EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement	2020	2020	2.697.806.592.294
15	EU-New Zealand Trade Agreement	2018	2022	228.240.372.763

Table 14

Raw data REG

No.	Case	REG							Depth index
		Indicators							
		full_fta	standards	investments	services	procurement	competition	iprs	
1	EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
2	EU-Colombia-Peru Trade Agreement	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
3	EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
4	EU-Moldova Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
5	EU-Georgia Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade area	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
6	EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
7	EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
8	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
9	EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
10	EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
11	EU-MERCOSUR Trade Agreement	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
12	EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
13	EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	4
14	EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
15	EU-New Zealand Trade Agreement	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7

Table 15

Raw data EP

No.	Case			INI			Debates			Parliamentary questions			Motions for resolutions			Total weighted score
		Start negotiation	End negotiation	Raw data	Score	Weighted score	Raw data	Score	Weighted score	Raw data	Score	Weighted score	Raw data	Score	Weighted score	
1	EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement	2007	2009	1	2	0,8	5	4	1	52	3	0,75	4	2	0,2	**2,75**
2	EU-Colombia-Peru Trade Agreement	2007	2010	0	0	0	3	2	0,5	47	2	0,5	1	1	0,1	**1,10**
3	EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area	2008	2014	2	4	1,6	6	4	1	51	3	0,75	16	4	0,4	**3,75**
4	EU-Moldova Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area	2010	2014	1	2	0,8	3	2	0,5	13	1	0,25	7	3	0,3	**1,85**
5	EU-Georgia Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade area	2010	2014	1	2	0,8	3	2	0,5	13	1	0,25	7	3	0,3	**1,85**
6	EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement	2009	2016	0	0	0	4	3	0,75	178	4	1	16	4	0,4	**2,15**
7	EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement	2015	2017	1	2	0,8	2	1	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	**1,05**
8	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership	2013	2019	3	4	1,6	4	3	0,75	369	4	1	23	4	0,4	**3,75**
9	EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement	2010	2014	0	0	0	2	1	0,25	17	1	0,25	0	0	0	**0,50**
10	EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement	2013	2017	0	0	0	5	4	1	58	3	0,75	6	2	0,2	**1,95**
11	EU-MERCOSUR Trade Agreement	2000	2019	2	4	1,6	6	4	1	157	4	1	8	3	0,3	**3,90**
12	EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement	2012	2015	0	0	0	3	2	0,5	30	2	0,5	3	1	0,1	**1,10**
13	EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment	2014	2020	1	2	0,8	5	4	1	27	1	0,25	0	0	0	**2,05**
14	EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement	2020	2020	1	2	0,8	2	1	0,25	12	1	0,25	2	1	0,1	**1,40**
15	EU-New Zealand Trade Agreement	2018	2022	1	2	0,8	3	2	0,5	20	1	0,25	2	1	0,1	**1,65**

Appendix D: Calibrated sets and fuzzy set scores

Table 16

Measurement and calibration of outcome and conditions of EU free trade agreements

No.	Case	POL		EP		NAT		REG		ECO	
		Data	Fuzzy score	Data	Fuzzy score	Data	Fuzzy score	Data	Fuzzy score	Data	Fuzzy score
1	EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement	Low	**0.05**	2,75	**0.98**	Yes	**0.95**	7	**0.95**	$ 1.054.631.657.661,28	**0.06**
2	EU-Colombia-Peru Trade Agreement	Low to medium	**0.33**	1,10	**0.13**	Yes	**0.95**	7	**0.95**	$ 364.693.271.884,15	**0.05**
3	EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area	Medium	**0.67**	3,75	**1.00**	Yes	**0.95**	7	**0.95**	$ 160.971.426.697,45	**0.05**
4	EU-Moldova Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area	Low	**0.05**	1,85	**0.42**	Yes	**0.95**	7	**0.95**	$ 8.599.004.821,59	**0.05**
5	EU-Georgia Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade area	Low	**0.05**	1,85	**0.42**	Yes	**0.95**	7	**0.95**	$ 15.731.385.380,86	**0.05**
6	EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)	High	**0.95**	2,15	**0.68**	Yes	**0.95**	7	**0.95**	$ 1.668.814.059.967,39	**0.06**
7	EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement	Low	**0.05**	1,05	**0.12**	Yes	**0.95**	7	**0.95**	$ 10.875.644.154,32	**0.05**
8	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)	High	**0.95**	3,75	**1.00**	Yes	**0.95**	7	**0.95**	$ 18.955.196.104.285,70	**0.96**
9	EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement	Low	**0.05**	0,50	**0.04**	No	**0.05**	7	**0.95**	$ 287.339.461.820,35	**0.05**
10	EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement	Low	**0.05**	1,95	**0.47**	No	**0.05**	7	**0.95**	$ 4.897.753.647.035,86	**0.11**
11	EU-MERCOSUR Trade Agreement	Medium	**0.67**	3,90	**1.00**	Yes	**0.95**	7	**0.95**	$ 2.018.178.662.416,74	**0.07**
12	EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement	Low	**0.05**	1,10	**0.13**	No	**0.05**	7	**0.95**	$ 220.502.317.704,71	**0.05**
13	EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI)	Low to medium	**0.33**	2,05	**0.56**	No	**0.05**	4	**0.68**	$ 12.563.374.736.303,40	**0.37**
14	EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement	Low	**0.05**	1,40	**0.22**	No	**0.05**	7	**0.95**	$ 2.697.806.592.293,86	**0.08**
15	EU-New Zealand Trade Agreement	Low	**0.05**	1,65	**0.32**	No	**0.05**	7	**0.95**	$ 228.240.372.762,87	**0.05**

Appendix E : Output for analysis of non-occurrence

Output analysis of necessity

```
Analysis of Necessary Conditions

Outcome variable: ~POL

Conditions tested:
      Consistency    Coverage
~EP    0.660094      0.936085
~NAT   0.551174      0.954472
~REG   0.095775      1.000000
~ECO   0.985915      0.814585
```

Output analysis of sufficiency

```
**********************
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
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File:  /Users/justus/Documents/EUR/Master/Courses/Thesis/4. Data/Calibrated data/Data_fsqca
format.csv
Model: ~POL = f(EP, NAT, REG, ECO)
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---
consistency cutoff: 0.867606
                   raw        unique
                 coverage   coverage   consistency
                 ---------- ---------- ----------
~NAT*REG*~ECO    0.538028   0.113615   1
~EP*REG*~ECO     0.660094   0.235681   0.937333
solution coverage: 0.773709
solution consistency: 0.946039


Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~NAT*REG*~ECO: 9 (0.95,0.95),
  12 (0.95,0.95), 15 (0.95,0.95), 14 (0.92,0.95),
  10 (0.89,0.95), 13 (0.63,0.67)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~EP*REG*~ECO: 9 (0.95,0.95),
  7 (0.88,0.95), 2 (0.87,0.67), 12 (0.87,0.95),
  14 (0.78,0.95), 15 (0.68,0.95), 4 (0.58,0.95),
  5 (0.58,0.95), 10 (0.53,0.95)

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*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
**********************

File:  /Users/justus/Documents/EUR/Master/Courses/Thesis/4. Data/Calibrated data/Data_fsqca
format.csv
Model: ~POL = f(EP, NAT, REG, ECO)
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---
consistency cutoff: 0.867606
                   raw        unique
                 coverage   coverage   consistency
                 ---------- ---------- ----------
~NAT*REG*~ECO    0.538028   0.113615   1
~EP*REG*~ECO     0.660094   0.235681   0.937333
solution coverage: 0.773709
solution consistency: 0.946039


Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~NAT*REG*~ECO: 9 (0.95,0.95),
  12 (0.95,0.95), 15 (0.95,0.95), 14 (0.92,0.95),
  10 (0.89,0.95), 13 (0.63,0.67)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~EP*REG*~ECO: 9 (0.95,0.95),
  7 (0.88,0.95), 2 (0.87,0.67), 12 (0.87,0.95),
  14 (0.78,0.95), 15 (0.68,0.95), 4 (0.58,0.95),
  5 (0.58,0.95), 10 (0.53,0.95)
```

```
***********************
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
***********************


File:  /Users/justus/Documents/EUR/Master/Courses/Thesis/4. Data/Calibrated data/Data_fsqca
format.csv
Model: ~POL = f(EP, NAT, REG, ECO)
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey


--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---
consistency cutoff: 0.867606
Assumptions:
~ECO (absent)
                  raw        unique
                coverage    coverage    consistency
                ----------  ----------  ----------
~NAT*REG*~ECO    0.538028    0.113615    1
~EP*REG*~ECO     0.660094    0.235681    0.937333
solution coverage: 0.773709
solution consistency: 0.946039

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~NAT*REG*~ECO: 9 (0.95,0.95),
  12 (0.95,0.95), 15 (0.95,0.95), 14 (0.92,0.95),
  10 (0.89,0.95), 13 (0.63,0.67)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~EP*REG*~ECO: 9 (0.95,0.95),
  7 (0.88,0.95), 2 (0.87,0.67), 12 (0.87,0.95),
  14 (0.78,0.95), 15 (0.68,0.95), 4 (0.58,0.95),
  5 (0.58,0.95), 10 (0.53,0.95)
```

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Appendix F : Robustness tests

The first test, aimed at verifying construct validity, was to change the calibration thresholds of the conditions. This was done for the conditions EP and ECO, as these were based on fine-grained continuous data and changing calibration thresholds made a meaningful difference in set membership. Changing the calibration thresholds for NAT and REG would not have made theoretic sense. For EP, the 0.95 threshold was changed from 2.6 to 1.6, the 0.5 threshold was changed from 2.0 to 1.2 and the 0.05 threshold was kept the same at 0.6. For ECO, the 0.95 and 0.05 threshold were kept the same, but the 0.5 threshold was reduced by about 90% to 1 trillion US\$. Liberalising the thresholds for both conditions quite drastically did not lead to different complex and intermediate solution terms. Furthermore, it only led to a different parsimonious solution for the test with the new ECO calibration, which changed from only ECO to a full conjunction of all four conditions. This adds to the explanatory leverage of the conclusions from the original analysis of sufficiency for politicisation, as the solution term now covered not only TTIP, but also CETA and MERCOSUR, thus uniquely explaining three out of four cases with medium to high politicisation.

The second test was a change in consistency threshold preceding the logical minimisation. Instead of the standard QCA threshold of 0.75, the threshold was placed at 0.54. Only exceptional instances should lead to a threshold lower than 0.75, and while the lowering of the threshold was in this case not theoretically justified, it contextualises the sensitivity of the results (Mello, 2021). This change led to a complex and intermediate solution term of EP*NAT*REG and a parsimonious solution term of EP*NAT, covering cases 1, 3, 6, 8 and 11. While this solution term is different to the one derived in section 5.2.2, it is also clear that it contains a logical contradiction and thus should be treated with caution. Case 1, the EU-South Korea FTA, scored low on politicisation and should in theory not be covered by the solution term. This points to an important caveat with this alternative solution term and shows that lowering the consistency threshold is not valid, thus corroborating the choices made that led to the initial results.

In the original analysis of sufficiency for politicisation, the logical remainders were excluded from logical minimisation on theoretical grounds. A robustness test in which all logical remainders were included yielded the same solution terms, which confirmed the initial assumptions about counterfactual reasoning.

Another common robustness test is the addition or omission of cases (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). As explained in section 5.2.1, adding cases would not have added meaningful information to the analysis. Omitting cases was also not considered, as this research aimed to cover the full bandwidth of EU trade agreement negotiations. It would also have exacerbated the problem of limited diversity.

Output robustness test EP

```
compute: EP1 = calibrate(EP,2,1.2,0.6)

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*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
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File:  /Users/justus/Documents/EUR/Master/Courses/Thesis/4. Data/Calibrated data/Data_fsqca
format_robustness EP.csv
Model: POL = f(NAT, REG, ECO, EP1)
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1
consistency cutoff: 0.994012
                      raw        unique
                   coverage    coverage    consistency
                   ----------  ----------  ----------
NAT*REG*ECO*EP1    0.381609    0.381609    0.994012
solution coverage: 0.381609
solution consistency: 0.994012

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term NAT*REG*ECO*EP1: 8 (0.95,0.95)

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*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
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File:  /Users/justus/Documents/EUR/Master/Courses/Thesis/4. Data/Calibrated data/Data_fsqca
format_robustness EP.csv
Model: POL = f(NAT, REG, ECO, EP1)
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1
consistency cutoff: 0.994012
          raw        unique
        coverage    coverage    consistency
        ----------  ----------  ----------
ECO     0.450575    0.450575    0.92891
solution coverage: 0.450575
solution consistency: 0.92891

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ECO: 8 (0.96,0.95)

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*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
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File:  /Users/justus/Documents/EUR/Master/Courses/Thesis/4. Data/Calibrated data/Data_fsqca
format_robustness EP.csv
Model: POL = f(NAT, REG, ECO, EP1)
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1
consistency cutoff: 0.994012
Assumptions:
NAT (present)
REG (present)
                      raw        unique
                   coverage    coverage    consistency
                   ----------  ----------  ----------
NAT*REG*ECO*EP1    0.381609    0.381609    0.994012
solution coverage: 0.381609
solution consistency: 0.994012

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term NAT*REG*ECO*EP1: 8 (0.95,0.95)
```

Output robustness test ECO

```
compute: ECO1 = calibrate(ECO,18.8e12,1e12,9.8e9)

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*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
***********************

File:  /Users/justus/Documents/EUR/Master/Courses/Thesis/4. Data/Calibrated data/Data_fsqca
format_robustness ECO.csv
Model: POL = f(EP, NAT, REG, ECO1)
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---
consistency cutoff: 0.857595
                      raw        unique
                    coverage   coverage   consistency
                    ---------- ---------- ----------
EP*NAT*REG*ECO1      0.622988   0.622988   0.857595
solution coverage: 0.622988
solution consistency: 0.857595


Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term EP*NAT*REG*ECO1: 8 (0.95,0.95),
  11 (0.54,0.67), 6 (0.53,0.95)


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*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
***********************

File:  /Users/justus/Documents/EUR/Master/Courses/Thesis/4. Data/Calibrated data/Data_fsqca
format_robustness ECO.csv
Model: POL = f(EP, NAT, REG, ECO1)
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---
consistency cutoff: 0.857595
                      raw        unique
                    coverage   coverage   consistency
                    ---------- ---------- ----------
EP*NAT*REG*ECO1      0.622988   0.622988   0.857595
solution coverage: 0.622988
solution consistency: 0.857595


Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term EP*NAT*REG*ECO1: 8 (0.95,0.95),
  11 (0.54,0.67), 6 (0.53,0.95)


***********************
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
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File:  /Users/justus/Documents/EUR/Master/Courses/Thesis/4. Data/Calibrated data/Data_fsqca
format_robustness ECO.csv
Model: POL = f(EP, NAT, REG, ECO1)
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---
consistency cutoff: 0.857595
Assumptions:
                      raw        unique
                    coverage   coverage   consistency
                    ---------- ---------- ----------
EP*NAT*REG*ECO1      0.622988   0.622988   0.857595
solution coverage: 0.622988
solution consistency: 0.857595


Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term EP*NAT*REG*ECO1: 8 (0.95,0.95),
  11 (0.54,0.67), 6 (0.53,0.95)
ECO1: 8 (0.95,0.95),
  11 (0.54,0.67), 6 (0.53,0.95)
```

Output robustness test consistency threshold

```
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*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
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File:  /Users/justus/Documents/EUR/Master/Courses/Thesis/4. Data/Calibrated data/Data_fsqca
format.csv
Model: POL = f(EP, NAT, REG, ECO)
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1
consistency cutoff: 0.544715
                raw         unique
              coverage    coverage    consistency
             ----------  ----------  ----------
EP*NAT*REG     0.825287    0.825287    0.612628
solution coverage: 0.825287
solution consistency: 0.612628


Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term EP*NAT*REG: 1 (0.95,0.05),
   3 (0.95,0.67), 8 (0.95,0.95), 11 (0.95,0.67),
   6 (0.68,0.95)

***********************
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
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File:  /Users/justus/Documents/EUR/Master/Courses/Thesis/4. Data/Calibrated data/Data_fsqca
format.csv
Model: POL = f(EP, NAT, REG, ECO)
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1
consistency cutoff: 0.544715
              raw         unique
           coverage    coverage    consistency
          ----------  ----------  ----------
EP*NAT      0.825287    0.825287    0.612628
solution coverage: 0.825287
solution consistency: 0.612628


Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term EP*NAT: 1 (0.95,0.05),
   3 (0.95,0.67), 8 (0.95,0.95), 11 (0.95,0.67),
   6 (0.68,0.95)

***********************
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
***********************


File:  /Users/justus/Documents/EUR/Master/Courses/Thesis/4. Data/Calibrated data/Data_fsqca
format.csv
Model: POL = f(EP, NAT, REG, ECO)
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1
consistency cutoff: 0.544715
Assumptions:
                raw         unique
              coverage    coverage    consistency
             ----------  ----------  ----------
EP*NAT*REG     0.825287    0.825287    0.612628
solution coverage: 0.825287
solution consistency: 0.612628


Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term EP*NAT*REG: 1 (0.95,0.05),
   3 (0.95,0.67), 8 (0.95,0.95), 11 (0.95,0.67),
   6 (0.68,0.95)
```