

## **Copy and paste: EU CSDP missions and the local context**

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*An analysis of the factors in the local context that affect the success of EU CSDP missions*



Date: 28-06-2024

Name: Tess Huisman

Student number: 708105

First reader: Prof. dr. Markus Haverland

Second reader: Dr. Pieter Tuytens

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## **Abstract**

In 2003, the European Union launched its first CSDP mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ever since, the EU has initiated 37 missions and operations, both military and civilian. These missions showed mixed success records. Various scholars suggested that the underlying reason for this is that the EU has copied and pasted the model that was used for the mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina onto different contexts where it was not suitable, which implied that the local context is crucial for mission success. This thesis therefore aimed to identify which factors within the local context determine mission success. The thesis focused specifically on civilian missions. Based on academic literature, four factors were identified, which were formulated into propositions. Whether these factors affected mission success was studied based on co-variational analysis. In doing so, four case studies were selected and analysed based on desk research and one interview.

Based on the co-variational analysis, this study finds that the level of support for liberalism in the government and the presence of conflict were most influential with regard to mission success. A low level of economic development and the presence of internal security threats were less influential based on the co-variational analysis, but a more in-depth analysis of the missions showed that these factors did in fact affect mission success. Finally, the various factors in the local context are strongly interconnected and understanding of the local context in general is crucial for mission success.

## **Preface**

This master thesis titled 'Copy and paste: EU CSDP missions and the local context' represents the completion of the master International Public Management and Public Policy at Erasmus University. The process that has led to this final version was challenging but at the same time rewarding since I was able to study a topic of my choice more extensively. Throughout this process, I have encountered multiple obstacles, but I have also learned valuable lessons. First, I would like to thank my supervisor Prof. dr. Markus Haverland for his guidance and expertise, which have been important in the shaping of this thesis. Secondly, I would like to express my gratitude for my fellow students that were part of my thesis circle. Their feedback and our discussions have improved the quality of this thesis. Finally, I want to thank my friends and family for supporting me throughout the complete master programme.

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## List of abbreviations

Abbreviation	Definition
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EEAS	European External Action Service
EU	European Union
EUBAM	European Union Border Assistance Mission
EUCAP	European Union Capacity Building Mission
EUFOR	European Union Military Force
EUPM	European Union Police Mission
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNA	Government of National Accord
HDZ	Croatian Democratic Union
HoR	House of Representatives
IBM	Integrated Border Management
IS	Islamic State
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
SBS	State Border Service
SDA	Party of Democratic Action
SDP	Social Democratic Party
SDS	Serb Democratic Party
SIPA	State Investigation and Protection Agency
SJS	Somali Journalists Syndicate
SNSD	Alliance of Independent Social Democrats
TPP	Tayo Political Party
UN	United Nations
UPDP	Peace and Development Party

# 1. Introduction

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is an attempt by EU member states to respond to contemporary and future security challenges (Piechowicz & Szpak, 2022). An integral part of the CSDP are the EU's external missions and operations, which aim to provide for a more stable world and to contribute to a safer Europe. Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, has highlighted the importance of EU CSDP missions and operations: *“Our missions and operations are an invaluable pillar of European security and defence. Their work on the ground and across continents is the tangible example of the EU's action for global security”* (EEAS, 2021, p. 1).

The missions fall under the administration of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The first EU CSDP mission was launched in 2003, which entailed an intervention in the Western Balkan (Krentz, 2023). Since 2003, the EU has launched 37 missions and operations. Currently there are 24 ongoing missions, of which thirteen are civilian and eleven military. The civilian missions include assisting and training foreign police and military forces, but also engaging in state-building efforts. Some military missions are focussed on peacekeeping, whereas other missions are aimed to carry out smaller activities, such as policing or coast guard operations (Johansen, 2017). The missions are located in countries in Europe, Asia and Africa (EEAS, 2023).

Since the early 2000s, CSDP missions aimed to achieve stability rather than liberal peace. Liberal peace builds on the assumption that peace has to be combined with concepts such as democracy and free markets, in order to solve a wide range of socioeconomic and political problems (Paris, 2011; Richmond, 2006). In the case of the EU, the top-down approach implementing liberal peace was replaced with bottom-up methods to build resilience, while focusing on local capacities (Edmunds & Juncos, 2020). In its new capacity-building missions, the EU attempted to include concepts such as local ownership, civil society and participation. In reality, the adjusted approaches to peacebuilding nevertheless failed to take into account the local context (Richmond, 2009).

Criticism related in particular to the notion of the ‘European model’, which referred to the fact that the EU still built towards a capable state according to Western terms (Edmunds & Juncos, 2020). Merlingen and Ostrauskaite (2005) emphasize that the European model is based on European rather than local values and concerns. Furthermore, Korski and Gowan (2009) argue that the EU has copied and pasted the ‘Bosnian template’ to contexts that were unsuitable. The first EU CSDP missions in former Yugoslavic countries were deemed successful by EU

officials, which led them to think that the model could be successful in other countries as well. Within this template local officials relied on instructions from Brussels, which the Bosnians were willing to liaise with but officials in, for example, Chad were not. Furthermore, the state of security in BiH allowed the civilian staff to be unarmed, but in countries as Chad and Afghanistan this has led to the first deaths among EU staff (ibid.).

The missions thus showed a mixed record of success in terms of implementing their mandates, contributing to conflict resolutions, and supporting broader European policy goals like promoting multilateralism (Asseburg & Kempin, 2010). Scholars concluded that the local context has played a significant role in the outcomes of these missions (Asseburg & Kempin, 2010; Korski & Gowan, 2009; Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 2005; Richmond, 2009). Therefore, this paper aimed to assess what factors in the local context determine whether a civilian mission is successful or not. It specifically focuses on civilian missions since there is a lack of knowledge on civilian missions compared to military missions. The following research question was formulated: *Which factors in the local context of the host country determine the success of civilian EU CSDP missions?* Additionally, the aim of this research was to explain the factors that determine the success of civilian EU CSDP missions, in order to improve outcomes of future missions.

Determining what factors in the local context influence the outcomes of civilian missions is academically relevant, since it has not been studied much before. Most studies on this topic focus on institutional challenges to EU policy implementation rather than situational factors in the host country. Scholars emphasize that academic literature on factors in the local context is limited (Bayo, 2012; Kreps, 2010; Lundgren, Oksamytna, & Coleman, 2021; Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 2005). Furthermore, studies that focus on factors in the local context often do so in the context of peacekeeping missions rather than civilian missions.

This study is also of societal relevance. The insights gained from this research enable policy makers to enhance mission outcomes in two ways. First, they can better adjust existing and new mission programmes to the local context. Additionally, the generated knowledge provides a foundation for addressing local issues, reducing the impact of the factors that hamper mission success. Improvement of mission outcomes is beneficial for both host countries and the EU. Host countries benefit in terms of capacity-building whereas the EU benefits in terms of its diplomatic relations with third parties.

The thesis is structured as follows. The second chapter contains the theoretical framework, which also includes a short literature review. In this chapter, factors in the local context were identified and formulated into propositions. Next, the third chapter describes the

methodology that was used in this thesis. The empirical analysis is discussed in chapter four. The last paragraph of this chapter gives an overview of the missions in relation to the propositions. The limitations of this research and the conclusion on the research question are addressed in the fifth chapter. Finally, the policy recommendations are included in the final chapter.

## **2. Theoretical framework**

This chapter contains the theoretical framework. The chapter starts with a short literature review, followed by the factors in the local context that were derived from academic literature. Based on this, propositions were formulated.

### **2.1 Literature review**

This paragraph offers an overview of the existing academic literature that relates to the subject of this thesis. The first section of the paragraph discusses academic literature on measuring mission success. The second section includes existing literature on conditions that are crucial for mission success.

#### *2.1.1 Mission success*

Recent frameworks to assess mission success of foreign operations largely build on four pieces of academic literature. According to Bratt (1996; 1999), Diehl (1993) and Dixon (1996) mission success is largely determined by whether the peace goals of a mission formulated by the mission executor, such as the UN, NATO or EU, were achieved. However, Pushkina (2006) criticises this view by stating that previous authors fail to include justice goals. She adds that operational success also depends on whether the mission has contributed to an organisation's permanent goals. Peen Rodt (2012), building on Pushkina's model, added the concept of external success in order to address the notion that it is often unclear for whom the outcome is desired. This model includes both internal and external indicators. The previously discussed models and frameworks to assess mission success were mostly related to UN peacekeeping missions. Peen Rodt (2017) translated her own model into a model that specifically applies to EU missions.

#### *2.1.2 Conditions for success*

As was emphasized by multiple scholars, academic literature on the impact of factors in the local context of the host country on mission success is limited (Bayo, 2012; Kreps, 2010; Lundgren et al., 2021; Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 2005). According to Ikenberry et al. (2003) there are dozens of contextual variables that affect the course of a mission, but knowledge on what are the most relevant or crucial contextual variables is minimal and, sometimes, contradictive. Some scholars have attempted to identify which conditions in the local context affect mission success. Their findings are shortly discussed in this paragraph and form the basis for the conditions that are identified later in this chapter.

Korski and Gowan (2009) addressed the question whether the EU is able to rebuild failing states. Factors that were deemed important include the size of the country, which was

found to be influential since it affects the logistical aspects of a mission, government corruption, organised crime rates and whether an armed conflict was happening in the country. Furthermore, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite (2005) mentioned similar limitations to EU capacity-building missions, but they noted that the EU implements liberal policies, which included consideration of the rule of law and civil liberties. Capacity-building missions may result in failure when the liberal approach does not match with government ideologies in the host country. Additionally, factors that were found by Kreps (2010) include the presence of an armed conflict and whether this conflict was identity-based, the number of casualties, duration of the conflict and the number of factions involved. Other factors included the level of economic development, measured in GDP per capita, a country's experience with democracy and the available loutable resources.

Barnett and Zürcher (2008) observed that military peacebuilding missions often succeed in ending violence, but do not remove the root causes of conflict in most cases. They aimed to describe what explains this failure by developing a bargaining model to explain peacebuilding outcomes. Finally, Tardy (2015) analysed several EU CSDP missions and placed them in the larger context of crisis management. Although the EU has been affected by major international developments such as the refugee crisis in 2015, EU member states have become less willing to invest in capacity-building missions. By placing the CSDP missions in the larger context of crisis management, Tardy (2015) aims to explain the reduced willingness to pay for capacity-building missions by EU member states. While discussing this, he mainly analyses factors in the local context that influence the outcomes of CSDP operations.

## **2.2 Economic development**

In academic literature one economic condition was identified, namely the level of economic development (Kreps, 2010). Economic development is considered relevant for two reasons. First, the financial state of the government is especially important because law enforcement and security institutions, including the police and border management, solely rely on government funding. If governments lack crucial funding in general, it is likely they also lack funding for their security sector (Rose-Ackeman, 2004). Secondly, a low level of economic development increases incentives for civilians to engage in criminal activities, which affects the overall state of security in a country (Kingston & Webster, 2015). In relation to economic development the following proposition was formulated:

*Proposition<sub>1</sub>: A low level of economic development within the host country decreases the success of EU civilian operations.*

### **2.3 Liberalism in the national government**

The second concept that affects mission success is the extent to which liberal concepts such as the rule of law and civil liberties are supported by the national government of the host country. Their support is important since EU missions implement policies that for example aim to improve the rule of law. Whether these ideas correspond with the host government's perspective affects the government's willingness to cooperate with the EU's operation and, thus, the success of the mission (Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 2005). Furthermore, a country's familiarity with liberal building blocks, such as civil liberties, affects the country's capacity to adopt more liberal policies that are implemented in the host country on behalf of the EU (Kreps, 2010). In relation to support for liberalism in the national government the following proposition is formulated:

*Proposition<sub>2</sub>: A low level of support for liberalism in the host country's national government decreases the success of EU civilian operations.*

### **2.4 Internal security threats**

Third, internal security threats affect mission outcomes since they disrupt the course of the mission. Internal security threats exist in different shapes and forms, and include organised crime, human trafficking, drugs trade, terrorism, insurgency, cybercrime and corruption (European Commission, n.d.; Korski & Gowan, 2009). According to Barnett and Zürcher, local elites are especially relevant since the outcome of missions is partly dependent on interactions with local elites (Barnett & Zürcher, 2008). The executors of the mission need to approach the local elites strategically, since they often pursue individual interests. In many cases, local elites are suspicious of foreign interference because they fear that they will lose some of their power (ibid.). Local elites can create multiple types of internal security threats. The following proposition was formulated:

*Proposition<sub>3</sub>: Internal security threats that involve local elites decrease the success of EU civilian operations.*

### **2.5 Presence of conflict**

In the literature review, some conditions are related to the presence of a conflict in the host country. In general, the presence of conflict affects the mission outcomes since it worsens general security in a country and it fosters distrust (Korski & Gowan, 2009; Kreps, 2010). The nature of the conflict also determines the extent of the impact (Brown, 1997). An example of the EU's involvement in the Palestinian territories, brought forward by Korski and Gowan

(2009), shows that the presence of conflict hampered EU involvement in this mission. The EU refused to recognise Hamas, which led to the conspiracy that the EU was training Fatah police. As a result, the parties involved were less willing to cooperate to achieve greater outcomes. The following proposition is formulated concerning the presence of conflict:

*Proposition<sub>4</sub>: The presence of a conflict within the host country decreases the success of EU civilian operations.*

### **3. Methodology**

This chapter gives insight into the methodology that was used to conduct this research. First, the research design is explained. The cases that were used to conduct the case study are discussed in the second paragraph. The third paragraph contains the operationalisation of the concepts from the theoretical framework. The chapter continues by giving an overview of the methods used for data collection and data analysis. Finally, the chapter concludes with a reflection on the reliability and validity of this study.

#### **3.1 Research design: Case study**

This study used a case study design, which is defined as “an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of a particular project, policy, institution, program or system in a ‘real life’” (Starman, 2013, p. 32). Within this design, a variety of data sources was used to analyse the research subject (Baxter & Jack, 2015). The case study design is relevant when the research question is of explanatory nature (Yin, 2003). For this thesis, a comparative case study was used in which a comparison was drawn between four missions.

More specifically, this research applied a co-variational case study design. This design is especially suited for small-N research and aims to provide evidence of co-variation between an independent (X) and dependent (Y) variable (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). The design is based on the logic that if there is a strong co-variation between two variables, causality is inferred. In other words, the design is used to prove that a factor has an effect based on empirical analysis. Furthermore, the method of case selection is crucial for the co-variational design. The design requires similarities on all variables other than the independent variable (ibid.). Although the co-variational analysis was leading in drawing conclusions, more in-depth information on specific missions was provided in order to prove causality.

#### **3.2 Case selection**

This paragraph further clarifies the process of case selection. The first section describes the selection criteria that were used to select missions. The second section gives an overview of the cases that were selected. For each of the selected missions, the duration, budget and amount of personnel is presented.

##### *3.2.1 Selection criteria*

To test whether the concepts from the theoretical framework affect mission outcomes, the included missions were carefully selected. This thesis used a selection of four cases. On the one hand, this amount ensures more robustness, reliability and generalisability than a case study

that includes only two cases. On the other hand, due to the limited timeframe and size restrictions of this thesis, it was not possible to include more than four cases.

Moreover, it was important that the selected cases were somewhat similar in terms of duration, personnel and budget size, since these served as control variables. There needed to be a certain amount of variation on the independent variables in order to assess whether these factors influenced mission success. Therefore, it was desired that the cases were situated in different regions. Pragmatic reasons, such as whether the mission took place more recently, were also relevant for case selection, because of the availability of data for each mission. To gain insight into the missions and the selection criteria, an overview of all missions was created. This overview is presented in Annex 1. Missions that were initiated after 2022 were not included in this overview, since it was too early to assess mission success for these missions.

### 3.2.2 Selection of cases

Based on the selection criteria, four out of the total 43 missions were included in the case study. An overview of the selected missions is presented in Table 1. All missions are civilian missions and have a duration of more than five years. Their annual budget generally lies between 25 and 50 million. Furthermore, the number of personnel varies between 90 and 250. EUCAP Nestor is an exception to this. Additionally, all missions also include a certain amount of local staff. The total amount of staff is displayed in the table, as well as the amount of local staff between brackets. The staff that was not local was provided by the involved EU member states.

<b>Mission</b>	<b>Type</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Annual budget (million)</b>	<b>Personnel (local staff)</b>
EUPM BiH (Bosnia and Herzegovina)	Civilian	9 years (2003-2012)	38	198 (200)
EUCAP Nestor (Somalia)	Civilian	12 years (2012-ongoing)	33	74 (29)
EUCAP Sahel (Niger)	Civilian	12 years (2012-ongoing)	26.3	77 (32)
EUBAM (Libya)	Civilian	9 years (2013-ongoing)	42.4	61 (30)

Table 1: Overview of selected cases

### 3.3 Operationalisation

This paragraph contains the operationalisation of the concepts that were discussed in the theoretical framework. An overview of the operationalisation is presented in Table 2.

<b>Concept</b>	<b>Definition</b>	<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Measured in terms of</b>
Mission success	To reach a favourable or desired outcome from an EU perspective	- Internal goal attainment - Internal appropriateness	Successful/partially successful/unsuccessful
Economic development	The level of welfare in the nation	- GDP per capita	High/medium/low

Liberalism in national government	The level of government support for a political ideology centred upon the individual, thought of as possessing rights against the government, including rights of due process under the law, equality of respect, freedom of expression and action, and freedom from religious and ideological constraint	Government support for: - Rule of law - Civil liberties	High/medium/low
Internal security threats	The presence of continuing criminal activities that rationally work to profit from illicit activities. Its continuing existence is maintained through corruption of public officials and the use of intimidation, threats or force to protect its operations	- Organised crime - Government corruption	Presence/absence
Presence of conflict	The presence of organised groups that are engaged in armed fighting	- (Non-)international armed conflict	Presence/absence

Table 2: Operationalisation of concepts

### 3.3.1 Mission success

To assess mission and operation performances, this study partly adopted the model that was introduced by Peen Rodt (2017). This model is illustrated in Figure 1. Peen Rodt defined success as follows: “success means to reach a favourable or desired outcome” (Peen Rodt, 2012, p. 380). Peen Rodt included both internal and external success in her model, but this study only focused on internal success. Internal success refers to whether a mission achieved the desired outcomes from an EU perspective. Internal success is further divided into two categories: *goal attainment* and *appropriateness*. Internal goal attainment refers to whether an operation has achieved the objectives that were set out in its mandate, but also whether it fulfilled the broader politicostrategic goals. Internal appropriateness evaluates how well the operational objectives were executed on the ground in terms of efficiency, timeliness and cost-effectiveness (Peen Rodt, 2017). The internal goal attainment and appropriateness were assessed based on combined information from various evaluation reports.




Figure 1: How to measure internal success in EU missions? (Peen Rodt, 2017)

### 3.3.2 Economic development

In this thesis economic development is defined as the level of welfare in a nation. To assess the welfare of a nation, the *GDP per capita* served as an indicator. Although the GDP per capita does not directly depict a nation’s welfare, it is a widespread measure to indicate the general wealth in a country (ibid.). To establish what is considered a low level of economic development, the classification of the World Bank was used. According to this classification, a GDP per capita below \$10,000 is considered as a low level of economic development. A GDP per capita between \$10,000 and \$25,000 signifies a medium level of economic development. Finally, a GDP per capita above \$25,000 is regarded as a high level of economic development (World Bank, n.d.-a).

### 3.3.3 Liberalism in the national government

This concept is defined as the level of government support for “a political ideology centred upon the individual, thought of as possessing rights against the government, including rights of due process under the law, equality of respect, freedom of expression and action, and freedom from religious and ideological constraint” (Blackburn, 2008). The liberal ideology stresses the importance of democratisation, human rights, rule of law, and free and globalised markets (Richmond, 2006). This concept is measured based on two indicators. The first indicator is the extent to which the dominant political party supports the *rule of law*. Additionally, the second indicator is the extent to which the dominant political party supports *civil liberties*, including freedom of expression and action, and freedom from religious and ideological constraint. The level of support is based on how (the leader of) the dominant party expresses themselves in the

media and their actions. The level of support for liberalism is based on whether the leaders of the national government support both or none of the aspects of liberalism.

#### *3.3.4 Internal security threats*

The definition for internal security threats that was used in this study is the presence of “continuing criminal activities that rationally work to profit from illicit activities. Its continuing existence is maintained through corruption of public officials and the use of intimidation, threats or force to protect its operations” (UNODC, 2018). One of the most occurring threats to internal security is *organised crime* (Korski & Gowan, 2009). This also included terrorist and extremist organisations in this thesis. The presence of organised crime in a country is generally strongly linked to the degree of *government corruption* (ibid.). Corruption involves “the abuse of public office for private gains” (Wei, 1999). Wei (1999) and Rose-Ackerman (2004) concluded that corruption hampers economic development by dissolving government funding. Although corruption does not completely match the definition of internal security threats, it is included as an indicator since it is closely related to organised crime.

#### *3.3.5 Presence of conflict*

There is little to no agreement among scholars on how to define conflict. This study followed the definition as proposed by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC, 2008). Both the EU and UN, as well as international humanitarian law have also adopted this definition. According to this definition there are two types of armed conflict. The first, *international armed conflict*, is described as “an armed confrontation between the armed forces of States” (EPRS, 2023). A *non-international armed conflict* is defined as “an armed confrontation between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within a State” (ibid.). These definitions do not include violence on a smaller scale such as riots, banditry or terrorist activities (UNDRR, n.d.).

### **3.4 Data collection and analysis**

The case study design that was used in this thesis incorporated two research methods. Although this study adopted a co-variational design, it also aimed to find evidence for causal links if they were inferred. In order to establish these relations, desk research was used to combine the independent variables with mission success. Additionally, an interview was conducted for the same reason. Each method is described more extensively below.

### *3.4.1 Desk research*

Desk research was used to gather knowledge on each of the indicators as described in the operationalisation. First, in order to establish whether a factor was present, among others, datasets from the World Bank, newspaper articles and academic papers were used to depict the local context. In order to link these factors to mission success, sources including evaluation reports published by the European Commission and independent research firms such as the Clingendael Institute and SIPRI were used.

### *3.4.2 Interview design*

Although the co-variational design does not require confirmation of causality, an expert was conducted in order to confirm the inferred causal relationships. This improved the strength of the claims made based on the empirical analysis. Sharon Beijer worked for the International Development Unit at Ecorys where she has, among other things, worked on CSDP related topics. Her main area of expertise was ensuring local contextual understanding in fragile and conflict-affected states and integrate that into development and humanitarian programming to prevent increased or new conflict. The interview adopted a semi-structured design, where a large part of the interview was prepared beforehand, but there was room for additional questions. The interview guide is included in Annex II.

## **3.5 Reflection on validity and reliability**

This paragraph contains a reflection on the validity and reliability of the research. The concept of validity consists of three types. First, in qualitative research, construct validity is relatively low. The concepts that were defined in the theoretical framework are abstract and cannot be measured directly. Therefore, indicators were selected in order to measure the concepts, but since these do not measure the concepts directly, measurement errors can be created (Smith, 2005).

Secondly, the internal validity of case study designs is relatively high (Messick, 1987). A crucial aspect for the internal validity is triangulation, which can be achieved in multiple ways, including researcher triangulation, method triangulation and source triangulation (Mathison, 1988). In this thesis there was no researcher triangulation, since it encompasses an individual thesis. Method triangulation was achieved to some extent by utilising both desk research and interviews. There was also source triangulation, since multiple sources were used in the desk research, including policy evaluations, government documents and newspaper articles.

The generalisability of the results is reflected in the external validity. The external validity of case study designs is generally low, since it focuses on specific contexts, making it harder to generalise findings to the broader population. The small sample size that is typical for the case study design also decreases generalisability of the design (Scholten, Tuut, Kremer, & Assendelft, 2004). Therefore, generalisability is a weakness of the design that was used in this research.

Furthermore, reliability refers to the repeatability and consistency of the research. In other words, reliability refers to random measurement errors whereas validity refers to systematic errors in measurement. Since case studies are very context-specific, it is difficult to replicate the case study in different contexts (Bartko & Carpenter, 1976). Specifically for this research, the documents that were used in the desk research are mostly secondary. The use of secondary data creates dependency on the objectivity and expertise of other researchers. This mostly relates to the weaker reliability of the data that was used.

## 4. Empirical analysis

This chapter contains the empirical analysis based on the desk research and the interview. The chapter is structured based on the four case studies. In each paragraph, the concepts that were defined in the operationalisation are discussed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the main findings.

### 4.1 EUPM BiH

As a result of the Dayton agreement, which ended the Bosnian War, the Bosnian soil and government is split up in two separate entities. The first entity is the Republika Srpska, where the Bosnian-Serbs are situated. The second entity is the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is largely populated by Bosniacs and Croats. The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was the first mission that was launched under the European Security and Defence Policy. The mission officially started in January 2003 and was supposed to cover a three year period according to its first mandate, which was extended multiple times (European Parliament, 2006). The main objective of the mission was to establish effective policing arrangements under Bosnian ownership in line with best practices from European and international practice.<sup>1</sup> In June 2012 the Foreign Affairs Council concluded that the mission was completed and reaffirmed its support for BiH's ambition to join the EU (European Council, 2012).

#### 4.1.1 *Economic development*

Although the Bosnian War ended in 1995, the consequences of the war were still of high influence on the economic state of BiH. After the rapid decrease in GDP during the Bosnian War, the GDP started increasing again after the end of the war. However, in 2003, the GDP per capita was at only 60 percent of pre-war levels (Bieber, 2006). Figure 2 shows the development of the Bosnian GDP per capita between the start of the mission in 2003 and the end of the mission in 2012. During the first five years of the EUPM mission, the Bosnian economy started developing, but this came to a stop due to the economic crisis in 2008 (World Bank, n.d.-b). Since Bosnia's GDP per capita remains under \$10.000 for the duration of the mission, economic development is considered low.

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<sup>1</sup> Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP




Figure 2: GDP per capita - Bosnia and Herzegovina (World Bank, n.d.-b)

Despite an increase in economic development, the underdeveloped state of the Bosnian economy affected mission outcomes. Economic underdevelopment and donor fatigue mainly caused problems in the execution of the mandate (Grevi, Helly, & Keohane, 2009). The State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) and the Border Police, two mission priorities, remained understaffed and under-resourced for the entire duration of the mission. This was caused by an overstretched state budget due to high demands related to post-war reconstruction of the country (ibid.).

#### 4.1.2 Liberalism in national government

Until 2006, the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) was the largest party in the Republika Srpska. This party was known for its nationalism, conservatism and separatism. In the 2006 elections, they lost their position to the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD). When this party was elected it stood for confederalism and pro-Europeanism, but during their terms the party became progressively more nationalist and conservatist (European Parliament, 2015).

Furthermore, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had three dominant parties. The Party of Democratic Action (SDA) stands for Bosniac nationalism, conservatism and anti-islamism. Another ethnic party is the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ BiH), which promotes Croatian nationalism, conservatism and Christian democracy. The third dominant party is a non-ethnic party, the Social Democratic Party (SDP). This centre-left party stands for social democracy and pro-Europeanism (European Parliament, 2015).

Especially the SNSD and the HDZ have expressed criticism on liberal institutions. These parties mainly had problems with the implementation of the rule of law. They were especially opposed to the installation of international judges in the BiH court, as well as the establishment of prosecutors targeting those involved in organised crime and corruption in the Prosecutor's office (Ruge, 2020). Furthermore, Bosnian law provides for freedom of speech and expression, but the government did not always respect this. For example, the law prohibits hate speech, but politicians, especially from parties in the Republika Srpska, used this law to silence critical opponents and media (US Department of State, 2011). However, this outcome needs nuancing since the SNSD and HDZ are only a part of the national government. Other parties, such as the SDP support the rule of law and protection of civil liberties (European Parliament, 2015).

Since some of the dominant parties support the rule of law and civil liberties and some parties do not, the level of support for liberalism in the national government is considered medium. However, no evidence was found that this hampered the EU CSDP mission in BiH. Government officials posed barriers for the EUPM mission, but this was believed to be motivated by their corrupt ties with organised crime organisations rather than ideological disagreement. More on this is discussed in the next paragraph.

#### *4.1.3 Internal security threats*

After the war, organised crime was able to revive and even increased since those involved in organised crime managed to secure high level positions (Schroeder & Friesendorf, 2009). This problem was especially prevalent in the Republika Srpska (Grevi et al., 2009). The smuggling and trafficking of people, drugs, arms, fuel, timber and cigarettes was common during and after the war (Schroeder & Friesendorf, 2009). Later, crime types, such as organised burglaries and robberies, and vehicle theft, were more prevalent (Brady, 2012). In contrast with organised crime in other countries, organised crime in BiH was locally organised. Crime organisations were relatively small and operated mostly on a local level (ibid.).

Furthermore, the Dayton Agreement prescribed complex administrative mechanisms, which created an opportunity for government officials to abuse their power in public office (Divjak & Pugh, 2008). The Bosnian police functioned adequately and transparently to a certain extent, as long as their work did not interfere with the activities and interests of local elites (Petrovic, 2019). Both local civilians and international officials stated that corruption was still deeply embedded in the Bosnian judiciary and public administration, and in law enforcement agencies, especially at the local level (Bečiverić et al., 2013; Petrovic, 2019).

EUPM failed to achieve results in fighting corruption, mainly due to the resistance from local authorities (Fakiolas & Tzifakis, 2019). Various Bosnian policy-makers displayed fierce resistance against EUPM officials and activities. These policy-makers often used law enforcement to benefit politically and economically. This was similar for law enforcement and police activities carried out by Bosnian officials, whose activities were challenged when organised crime interests were impinged (ibid.). Instead of seeking cooperation in addressing organised crime in the interest of their country, politicians either blamed the international community for the problems in BiH or sought its support for their own agendas. This dynamic has undermined consensus-building and prohibited the establishment of necessary reforms (Grevi et al., 2009; Petrovic, 2019).

#### *4.1.4 Presence of conflict*

During the mission, no armed confrontation was taking place. The Dayton Agreement ended the Bosnian War in 1995. To oversee the implementation of the Agreement, the military mission EUFOR Althea was launched in 2004 (Petrovic, 2019).

#### *4.1.5 Mission success*

EUPM was successful in achieving its operational goals (EEAS, 2012b). The mission was to some extent successful in institution building, particularly on a smaller scale (Fakiolas & Tzifakis, 2019). The mission contributed for example to the establishment of the Ministry of Security. It also supported the strengthening of the State Border Service (SBS) and SIPA, but these organisations remained under-resourced and understaffed because of a lack of government resources (EEAS, 2012b; Grevi et al., 2009). Moreover, the mission played a significant role in drafting and implementing legislation, educating law enforcement agencies, recruiting of staff, and providing essential financial support. Additionally, to enhance community involvement in the reform process, several initiatives for police reform were implemented (Petrovic, 2019). However, these successes were largely achieved on the local level. Law enforcement bodies at the central level remained fragmented. They had weak jurisdiction with regard to fighting organised crime and corruption, and establishing public order and respect for the rule of law (Fakiolas & Tzifakis, 2019).

Furthermore, EUPM was relatively successful in its internal appropriateness. The mission objectives were mostly achieved efficiently, although corruption posed some barriers to implement the necessary reforms (Grevi et al., 2009; Petrovic, 2019). Since EUPM was the EU's first CSDP mission there were no exiting procedures developed yet. This caused challenges in terms of efficiency and cost-effectiveness getting off the ground (Petrovic, 2019).

In conclusion, EUPM BiH was a successful mission. Although the low level of economic development and presence of internal security threats posed some challenges, EUPM was able to carry out its mandate in an efficient and cost-effective way. Finally, there was no conflict ongoing at the time, although the war that ended in 1995 has affected the economic and political state of the country significantly.

**4.2 EUCAP Nestor/Somalia**

The European capacity-building mission in the Horn of Africa was launched in July 2012. Initially, the mission was operational in Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Seychelles and Tanzania, but after a review in 2015 the EU decided to continue the mission only in Somalia (Peen Rodt et al., 2019). The mission’s objective is to assist the development of a self-sustainable capacity for continued enhancement of their maritime security including counter-piracy, and maritime governance in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean States.<sup>2</sup>

*4.2.1 Economic development*

The Somalian economy has developed slightly over the years, but the country has failed to ensure significant growth in its economy. The GDP per capita, as shown in Figure 3, has increased slightly, but the overall GDP per capita remains low. With a GDP per capita under \$10,000, economic development is considered low.




Figure 3: GDP per capita – Somalia (World Bank, n.d.-e)

<sup>2</sup> Council Decision 2012/389/CFSP

For a large part, EUCAP Somalia revolved around training local forces. The result of the low level of economic development in Somalia was that the institutions that received EUCAP training did not dispose of the necessary equipment and training facilities. Examples of equipment that were insufficiently provided for were boats and weapons. Because of this, the Somali forces were unable to take full advantage of the EUCAP training (Peen Rodt et al., 2019). Furthermore, the transfer of knowledge and capacities that was provided by the mission was not sustainable, again as a result of lacking government resources. One of the EUCAP Nestor officials described: *"when you train somebody they pass it on to others in their organisations. If there are no buildings, no operation centres, no schools, there is nothing to maintain this knowledge"* (Peen Rodt et al., 2019, p. 58). Additionally, the mission was focussed on preventing piracy from a security perspective, but the lack of economic development kept giving people incentives to turn to piracy to make ends meet: *"If you only stop the boats on the water, it doesn't prevent them from getting into the boats"* (S. Beijer, personal communication, June 6, 2024). Therefore, the impact on piracy reduction turned out to be lower than anticipated.

#### *4.2.2 Liberalism in national government*

Somalia is a federal state, which consists of two levels of government: the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States (EUAA, 2022b). Between 2012 and 2024, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected twice as the President of Somalia (Hujale, 2022). Mohamud served as the leader of the Peace and Development Party (UPDP), which is characterised by conservatism, nationalism and its pursuit of Islamic democracy (Ingiriis, 2022). Mohamud's primary goal was to ensure peace and to establish a united Somalia (Ali, 2022). The latter put civil liberties under pressure. Personnel of federal and state security forces were accused of committing several abuses, such as unlawful and arbitrary killings, and imprisoning political opponents. Mohamud made some effort to target those who committed the abuses, but also dissolved the Judicial Service Commission, which decreased the necessary security for civilian judges to carry out their jobs (US Department of State, 2023). Furthermore, Mohamud has made efforts to reduce press freedom, for example by freezing assets of the Somali Journalists Syndicate (SJS) (Jama, 2024). Overall, Mohamud displayed a low level of support for liberalism in the national government of Somalia.

Between 2017 and 2022, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, also known as Farmaajo, served as the President of Somalia. The Somalian, who grew up in the US, established the Tayo Political Party (TPP). This party was known for its liberal ideology, together with its civic nationalism, progressivism and environmentalism (Walsh & Dahir, 2021). Farmaajo embraced

the liberal values of the rule of law and protection of civil liberties. He implemented multiple transformative measures resulting in economic reforms, improved security measures, nation-building efforts, transparency and anti-corruption policies and infrastructure development (Mujahid, 2023). Farmaajo's level of support for the liberal institutions is described as high. Since Mohamud and Farmaajo were both Somalian presidents during EUCAP, the level of support for liberalism in the national government is characterised as medium.

Mohamud was very positive about the EUCAP mission since it made efforts to reduce piracy off the Somali coast, a serious threat to peace and stability in Somalia (EEAS, 2011). Furthermore, Farmaajo's liberal stance encouraged the EU to invest an additional €28 million in order to support socioeconomic recovery (EEAS, 2017). The views from Farmaajo and Mohamud have most likely not hampered mission success, since they both supported the mission. Furthermore, Mohamud's approval of the mission was more related to other considerations than the liberal ideology.

#### *4.2.3 Internal security threats*

Organised crime in Somalia was mostly centred around three 'organisations', which were somewhat connected: Al-Shabaab, piracy and clans. First, terrorist organisation Al-Shabaab threatened the internal security of Somalia (Center for Preventive Action, 2024). After Al-Shabaab declared allegiance to Al-Qaeda in 2012, international involvement resulted in the decrease of Al-Shabaab's influence. The organisation is part of a larger transnational criminal organisation, which is financed through corruption, extortion and illicit trafficking (Chesson, Oliveira, Reichenbach, & Wagner, 2017). Secondly, piracy caused problems off the Somali coast, which included the hijacking of ships and taking crew members hostage in return for ransomware. The attacks reached its peak between 2008 and 2014. The attacks continued after this period, but to a lesser extent (Paravicini, Jonathan, & Hassan, 2024). Third, Somalian politics were largely impacted by a number of influential clans, which are centred around five large clan families. They are especially influential in rural areas and their main goal is to protect their community (EUAA, 2022a). In order to ensure their safety, clans negotiate agreements with other organisations, among which Al-Shabaab and piracy organisations (Chesson et al., 2017).

Furthermore, organised crime organisations had close ties to business and political elites, which resulted in high levels of corruption within the Somali (local) government (ibid.). Al-Shabaab's ties to elites are one of the main causes that it is difficult to eradicate the organisation (Chesson et al., 2017).

Since the EUCAP mission is primarily focussed on eradicating piracy from Somalia, especially organised crime in the form of piracy affected the success of the mission (S. Beijer, personal communication, June 6, 2024). These organisations generally had close ties to local government elites and clans. Corrupt elites and clans benefit from or are involved in piracy activities and prevented that the mission had a significant impact on piracy in Somalia (Bueger, 2015). Furthermore, corruption and organised crime also created problems with regard to law enforcement. Problems included, for example, the capturing and transferring of suspects. Some suspects managed to escape custody. It is suspected that guards were involved in their escapes (ibid.).

#### *4.2.4 Presence of conflict*

Somalia has faced conflict in the form of armed confrontation for years. Between 2007 and 2011, Al-Shabaab became more prominently present in Southern and Central Somalia, but their pledge of allegiance to Al-Qaeda sparked the interest of Western countries. With help of the international community the Federal Government of Somalia was established. The Federal Government is still at war with Al-Shabaab, although the organisation is not as prominent as it once was (BBC, 2024). EUCAP was mainly focussed on maritime capacity-building and is mostly situated around the coastal cities in the north of the country, where piracy occurs most. The conflict is mostly present in the south (Hogendoorn, 2017). Despite the presence of conflict on Somalian soil, conflict is considered absent in this thesis, since it does not take place in the same area as the mission.

The conflict in Somalia did affect the EUCAP mission indirectly and has resulted in a high degree of instability. This caused widespread poverty, economic underdevelopment and pushed Somali's towards organised crime organisations (ibid.). Therefore, the ongoing conflict has indirectly affected mission success of EUCAP Somalia.

#### *4.2.5 Mission success*

With regard to its internal goal attainment EUCAP Somalia was relatively successful. To achieve its objectives as set out in its mandate, EUCAP offered advice, mentoring, and training in three areas of expertise: legal, maritime, and policing. The training and advisory programs have successfully met operational goals related to the transfer of skills and knowledge. However, the mission failed to make an impactful contribution to the reduction of piracy in the region, which was one of the EU's strategic objectives for this mission (Bueger, 2015; Rodt et al., 2019).

Furthermore, EUCAP Somalia was unsuccessful in its internal appropriateness. With regard to efficiency, the approach of ‘soft’ capacity-building was not the most efficient way to meet operational objectives since the basic equipment was not provided for. Additionally, later evaluations of the mission show that the training efforts were not sustainable as they were not implemented in the education programmes of maritime staff (Rodt et al., 2019).

Overall, EUCAP Somalia was partially successful. The low level of economic development mostly affected mission success since the lack of services challenged the impact of training sessions. Furthermore, internal security threats caused inefficiencies because corrupt elites managed to secure key positions. The presence of conflict was of limited impact since the mission took place in a different territory than the conflict. Finally, the medium level of support for liberalism in the national government appeared not to be of influence on the mission outcomes.

### **4.3 EUCAP Sahel/Niger**

The European capacity-building mission in Niger is one of two missions that are part of the EU’s strategy for enhancing security and development in the Sahel region, the other mission being EUCAP Sahel Mali (EEAS, 2020). The mission faced legal and practical difficulties in the starting phase, which resulted in an 18 month delay. The mission was launched in July 2012, but the coup in 2023 has put an end to the mission (Perreur-Lloyd, Hublé, Jakobsen, & Mattfolk, 2018). The overall objective of the mission is to support the capacity-building of the Nigerien security actors to fight terrorism and organised crime.<sup>3</sup>

#### *4.3.1 Economic development*

Niger belongs to the poorest countries in the world. As shown in Figure 4, the GDP per capita fluctuates slightly, which mostly had environmental causes such as droughts, soil degradation, pollution of the Niger river, the shrinking of Lake Chad, sand intrusion and deforestation (Afifi, 2011). Since the GDP per capita is structurally below \$10.000, economic development is considered low.

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<sup>3</sup> Council Decision 2012/392/CFSP




Figure 4: GDP per capita – Niger (World Bank, n.d.-d)

The low level of economic development has caused a lack of government resources, which has affected mission success directly. For example, the EU provided materials for the EUCAP mission such as laptops, but there was no electricity supply and internet connection to make the laptops operational (Perreur-Lloyd et al., 2018; van der Lijn et al., 2024). Furthermore, the operation centres did not dispose of communication material, such as radios or walkie-talkies, which forced the Nigerien forces to communicate via unsecured means. The government also lacked the resources to repair damaged material, such as vehicles, printers or computers (ibid.).

#### 4.3.2 Liberalism in national government

Nigerien politics are characterised by coup d'états, which are inherently not liberal since they are non-elected governments that are mostly autocratic and have no respect for the rule of law or civil liberties (Connors, 2019). In 2010, the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy (CSDR) overtook power from the Tandja administration through a coup in order to restore democracy. Elections in 2011 resulted in the installation of Mahamadou Issoufou as head of state (Al Jazeera, 2023). Issoufou was part of the Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism. This party promotes values of social democracy (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, n.d.). Issoufou emphasised the importance of respect for the rule of law and civil liberties during his term and eventually received the Mo Ibrahim Prize for his achievements in African leadership (Campbell, 2019). Although the Nigerien constitution ensures freedom of speech, government officials have threatened and harassed journalists. There were also reports

of civil society activists being arrested by the government (US Department of State, 2020). These violations by the government mostly occurred when the national security was threatened by non-state violent groups. In these situations, the government applied more extreme measures (van der Lijn et al., 2024). The level of support for liberalism in the national government is considered as medium.

New elections in 2021 again caused instability, which eventually resulted in a military coup in 2023 by members of the presidential guard, led by General Omar Tchiani (Al Jazeera, 2023). The leaders of the coup, backed by Russian assistance, ordered the termination of EUCAP Sahel in Niger. EU personnel left Nigerien soil by early 2024 (van der Lijn et al., 2024). The EUCAP mission in Niger focussed partly on human rights in the training sessions. The Nigerien authorities generally supported the protection of civil liberties, but this was compromised by an increasing number of attacks from terrorist organisations (van der Lijn et al., 2024). Therefore, the Nigerien government was in some cases not willing to adopt legislation necessary for the long-term success of the mission (Perreur-Lloyd et al., 2018). Aligning with government priorities proved to be important for mission success: *“if the government changes and their priorities and perception of you as a mission change, then you literally have no leg to stand on”* (S. Beijer, personal communication, June 6, 2024). Also in the field of strategic advice EUCAP officials had frequent meetings with members of the government in order to gain more support. Shared liberal values made them more receptive to EUCAP proposals. However, colonial ties made that some members of government viewed the EUCAP proposals as ‘dictation’, which led to the partly approval of proposals, but in order to achieve sustainable results full approval was needed (van der Lijn et al., 2024).

#### *4.3.3 Internal security threats*

The extremist groups that were present in Niger were mostly groups that originated in other countries and expanded across the Nigerien border (S. Beijer, personal communication, June 6, 2024). These groups included Islamic State (IS) and Boko Haram (Wilén, 2022). In order to finance their activities, these terrorist organisations engage in illicit activities including trafficking in weapons, drugs, motorcycles, and fuel, as well as cattle rustling, artisanal gold mining, and poaching (Assanvo, 2019). Another form of organised crime that is common in Niger is human smuggling. Niger has an important position as transit country for migrants travelling from West-African countries to North-Africa and Europe, but since Europe has meddled in the border security in Niger, it has become more difficult for migrants to cross the northern borders and human smuggling has increased (Raineri, 2018).

Moreover, corruption is widespread in Niger. The extremist organisations in Niger have infiltrated police and security forces. Additionally, the widespread poverty in Niger caused various forms of corruption. First, government officials in the lower levels are involved in petty and bureaucratic corruption. This mostly involves small amounts of money that are acquired through bribery. High level government officials are often involved in grand corruption, misusing the state's resources. Secondly, the natural resources in Niger, oil and uranium, have caused corruption among business elites (Chêne, 2017).

The presence of several terrorist organisations in Niger has hampered EUCAP mission success. First, EU staff that was employed in Niger worked under unsavoury circumstances. They also faced attacks by terrorist organisations. The security threats caused great difficulties filling all positions, resulting in large shortages of personnel. The mission was therefore not able to operate in full capacity (Perreur-Lloyd et al., 2018). Second, in areas where terrorist organisations were active there was mutual distrust between security forces and local civilians. Security forces were suspicious of involvement in terrorist organisations, whereas local civilians were hesitant to communicate with the forces out of fear for reprisals from the terrorist organisations (van der Lijn et al., 2024). Finally, the security threats in the border regions made it difficult to transport the necessary material to these areas (ibid.).

#### *4.3.4 Presence of conflict*

During the mission there was no armed confrontation on Nigerien soil, although six out of Niger's seven neighbours had conflicts in their territory. Violent groups have expanded beyond Niger's borders, but the impact of this was discussed in the previous paragraph (Clingendael Institute, 2024).

#### *4.3.5 Mission success*

With regard to internal goal attainment the mission was partially successful. The mission in Niger included non-executive tasks such as training security forces and advising the higher government. EUCAP Niger achieved some improvement when it comes to training Nigerien forces in order to address terrorism and organised crime. However, progress was limited and proved not to be sustainable since the necessary equipment and basic services were not present in Niger (Perreur-Lloyd et al., 2018). Furthermore, the government prioritised addressing internal security threats and was therefore not willing to adopt all necessary legislation to ensure mission effectiveness (ibid.).

Moreover, EUCAP was not successful in terms of its internal appropriateness. The mission faced insufficient training of staff members, lacking resources and a lack of specialised

knowledge. Additionally, the amount of staff was limited due to the internal security threats in Niger. This caused operational inefficiencies and resulted in delays (Perreur-Lloyd et al., 2018; van der Lijn et al., 2024).

In conclusion, the mission in Niger was partially successful. The lack of resources, caused by the low level of economic development, as well as the presence of internal security threats, has hampered mission success. Additionally, the moderate support for liberalism within the national government did not seem to influence the mission's outcomes as other considerations were prioritised. Finally, there was no conflict present during the mission.

#### **4.4 EUBAM Libya**

The European Border Assistance Mission in Libya was launched in the wake of the Arab Spring (Højstrup Christensen, Ruohomäki, & Peen Rodt, 2018). While the Libyan authorities faced challenges to domestic security, the EU was constructing a mission to support the Libyan authorities to develop capacity for enhancing the security of Libya's land, sea and air borders in the short term and to develop a broader IBM strategy in the longer term.<sup>4</sup>

##### *4.4.1 Economic development*

The Libyan economy was heavily affected by the conflict that has been raging in the country since 2011. As shown in Figure 5, until 2016, the GDP per capita decreased. In 2016, a UN-backed government was installed. Although this government faced heavy opposition, political and economic stability was achieved to some extent, resulting in an increase of the GDP per capita. (BBC, 2023). This period of stability ended in the second half of 2018, when various groups engaged again in violent conflicts (Center for Preventive Action, 2023). The GDP per capita was below \$10.000 for the largest part of the mission. However, it also exceeded this value a two times. Overall, Libya is considered as having a low level of economic development.

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<sup>4</sup> Council Decision 2013/233/CFSP




Figure 5: GDP per capita – Libya (World Bank, n.d.-c)

Evidence with regard to economic development is limited. Libya suffered a loss of income from the oil production, resulting in water and fuel shortages, and power cuts. This has caused social unrest, affecting the overall state of security in Libya (EEAS, 2021b; S. Beijer, personal communication, June 6, 2024). However, no evidence was found that the economic state of Libya directly affected mission success.

#### 4.4.2 Liberalism in national government

The control over Libya was split between the internationally recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli and the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk. Additionally, extremist, jihadist and tribal groups controlled other smaller parts of the country (Mamo, 2018). EUBAM was only supported by the GNA (EEAS, 2021b). Therefore, this section focuses on support for liberal values within the GNA only.

The head of the GNA, Fayez al-Sarraj, was not related to any political party, but acted independently (Mamo, 2018). Human rights continue to be under pressure in Libya. Although the GNA said to support the protection of civil liberties to some extent, gross violations of international humanitarian law occurred on a large scale. These violations remained unpunished, since criminal courts did not function properly (EEAS, 2021b). Furthermore, al-Sarraj said that progress in civil liberties and the rule of law can only be achieved if security and political stability are achieved. Al-Sarraj uses these objectives to justify his current

violations of these rights (Libyan News Agency, 2017). The level of government support for liberal values in Libya is considered low.

The GNA continuously de-prioritised the rule of law, by upholding their non-functioning criminal courts. This led to informal settlements between the GNA and other actors. Therefore, the mission was not able to interfere in the ties with other actors, especially in the south of the country. Essential adjustments were rejected by the GNA because of their shifting priorities as a result of the war (EEAS, 2021b). Although evidence is limited, the low level of support for liberalism in the national government has hampered mission success.

#### *4.4.3 Internal security threats*

The political instability and the lack of state authority allowed organised crime to thrive in Libya after the Arab Spring in 2011. Illicit markets have grown during this period. First, the large oil reserves in Libya have resulted in fuel smuggling. Large networks to smuggle the fuel across Libyan borders were created (Wintour, 2024). Secondly, drug smugglers used Libya to store illegal narcotics, such as cocaine and hashish (Herbert, 2023). Third, the large number of migrants that attempted to cross the border led to human smuggling, which especially increased after the refugee crisis in 2015 (ibid.).

After the Arab Spring, the weak state structure and lack of checks and balances allowed corruption to increase unchecked (Sawani, 2018). A penal code and other legalised frameworks were installed in order to deal with corruption. However, the authorities that were tasked with monitoring compliance of these measures were inefficient and their impact on corruption remained limited (Sawani, 2018).

Since organised crime organisations infiltrated the Libyan government, officials of the GNA pursued different interests. When the mission was launched, various fractions of elites tried to influence the mission to be adapted to their interests. On top of this, EUBAM tried to include the local authorities, resulting in certain tribes and crime organisations being incorporated into the Libyan army's command structure. This approach granted those actors a dominant position in tribal conflicts, which further undermined the stability of the security sector (Højstrup Christensen et al., 2018). Furthermore, the presence of organised crime groups in parts of the country made it impossible for EUBAM to operate in these territories (ibid.). The internal security threats have thus affected mission success.

#### 4.4.4 Presence of conflict

Since the Arab Spring, Libya has continuously faced armed confrontation between governmental authorities and organised armed groups. The Second Civil War took place during the EU mission between 2014 and 2020. Multiple actors were involved in this armed conflict. The two main actors were the HoR on the one side, and the GNA and different militias on the other side, forming the Libya Shield Force (LSF). Other parties involved were jihadist groups, including IS (Center for Preventive Action, 2023).

The ongoing conflict in Libya has affected the course of the mission greatly. First, Libya lacked a central state structure and was, by some described as, ‘stateless’. There was therefore no central authority that EUBAM could partner with: *“If you want to improve their border management, with whom are you going to cooperate, who are you training, who are you giving money to? If those people change every few months, or if they are fighting among themselves, then what you do with your mission has little impact”* (S. Beijer, personal communication, June 6, 2024). The mission sided with the GNA, but as a result it was only possible to launch the mission in the territory that was controlled by the GNA. Furthermore, the south of Libya was declared a military zone, making it impossible for the mission to expand its focus (EEAS, 2021b; Højstrup Christensen et al., 2018). Second, the conflict flared up again in 2019. EUBAM officials were forced to leave Tripoli and executed the mission from Tunis. However, unable to interact with civil society on the ground, the mission was not able to reach its full potential (ibid.).

#### 4.4.5 Mission success

The EUBAM mission failed in terms of internal goal attainment. EUBAM focussed on border assistance, although there was an impactful conflict taking place on Libya’s own soil. Threats to state authority not only came from external actors, but also from internal actors. None of the operational and strategic goals of the mission were achieved, partly due to the highly ambitious objectives that did not match the situation in Libya (Højstrup Christensen et al., 2018).

Furthermore, the mission was not cost-effective, nor efficient or carried out in a timely manner. The mission was relocated to Tunis out of security concerns, which meant that the mission could not be carried out on the ground. Scheduling tele meetings proved to be difficult due to limited electricity and internet in some parts of the country. This also created coordination problems in the execution of the mission (EEAS, 2021b).

Overall, EUBAM Libya was unsuccessful. The presence of conflict and internal security threats have made successful execution of the mission nearly impossible, especially because the

mission could not be executed in the full Libyan territory. The low level of government support for liberal values has hampered mission success as well. Finally, the low level of economic development caused social unrest in the country, which in turn affected Libya’s internal security.

**4.5 Main findings**

The paragraphs above discuss the concepts for each of the case studies. Table 3 shows the co-variation table and gives an overview of the case studies in relation to mission success. In the following, each proposition is discussed.

Mission	EUPM BiH	EUCAP Somalia	EUCAP Niger	EUBAM Libya
Economic development	Low	Low	Low	Low
Liberalism in government	Medium	Medium	Medium	Low
Internal security threats	Present	Present	Present	Present
Presence of conflict	Absent	Absent	Absent	Present
Mission success	Successful	Partially successful	Partially successful	Unsuccessful

*Table 3: Co-variation table*

*Proposition<sub>1</sub>: A low level of economic development within the host country decreases the success of EU civilian operations.*

The level of economic development was low in each country. No co-variation was detected between economic development and mission success. Strictly looking at co-variation, P1 is rejected. However, it needs acknowledging that the empirical analysis showed that a low level of economic development is reflected in a lack of government resources. The unavailability of government facilities and services ensured that the impact of capacity-building training was limited. The importance of economic development was also emphasised by the expert: “Missions often focus on capacity building, but there must be some basic foundation to build on” (S. Beijer, personal communication, June 6, 2024) Furthermore, a low level of economic development reflected poverty among the population. This pushed the population towards alternative, often criminal, ways of making a living.

*Proposition<sub>2</sub>: A low level of support for liberalism in the host country’s national government decreases the success of EU civilian operations.*

The level of government support for liberalism was considered medium in BiH, Somalia and Niger. In Libya, it was considered low. Since EUBAM Libya was unsuccessful, there is co-variation between the level of government support for liberalism and mission success.

Therefore, P2 is confirmed. The empirical analysis showed that a higher level of support for liberal values can lead to the generation of additional funding and it made host governments more receptive to EU proposals. The analysis however also showed that decisions to be supportive of EU proposals also involve other considerations, as was illustrated by the case of Mohamud's support for EUCAP Somalia. In other cases, liberal values were supported by the government, but deprioritised. Therefore, prioritisation of liberal values is also an important factor within this concept. In addition, government support in general proved to be important for mission success.

*Proposition3: Internal security threats that involve local elites decrease the success of EU civilian operations.*

Furthermore, internal security threats were present in each country and no co-variation between internal security threats and mission success could be detected. Therefore, P3 is rejected based on the co-variational analysis. However, the analysis also showed that the presence of organised crime organisations threatened the overall security in a country, which made certain parts of the country inaccessible for mission staff. Security threats also made it harder to attract mission staff and caused distrust between staff and civil society. Moreover, widespread corruption made it difficult to break existing patterns because they are perpetuated by local elites that are mostly related to organised crime organisations.

*Proposition4: The presence of a conflict within the host country decreases the success of EU civilian operations.*

Conflicts, as they were defined in this thesis, were not present in the selected countries, except for Libya. Since Libya was also the only unsuccessful mission, co-variation between the presence of conflict and mission success was detected. Therefore, P4 is confirmed. In the Libya case, the presence of the conflict was of great influence on mission success since EUBAM could no longer be executed on Libyan territory as a result of the conflict.

## **5. Discussion and conclusion**

This chapter discusses the limitations of the study and attempts to formulate an answer to the research question. Recommendations for future research are discussed in the final part of the chapter.

### **5.1 Discussion**

This study contains limitations, especially due to pragmatic reasons. First, the thesis aimed to establish causal relationships between the factors in the local context and mission success. This proved to be more difficult than initially anticipated. The design that was used in this study was based on the logic that if there is a strong co-variation between two variables, causality is inferred. Confirmation of these relationships was not necessary for the co-variational design, but was pursued in order to make stronger claims in this thesis. The evaluation reports and interview were most useful in confirming these relationships, but in some cases it was hard to prove that a factor had actually affected mission success. One of the reasons for this was that not all information on the mission was declassified. Another reason was the limited number of interviews. The expert had a more overall view over the missions and missed detailed knowledge on the missions in some areas. Therefore, causal relationships needed to be carefully reviewed.

Secondly, case selection depended strongly on pragmatic considerations. When assembling the information for the mission overview in Annex 1, for each mission was checked how many evaluation reports were available. Generally, more documents were available for recent missions compared to the older missions. The availability of written documentation and timeframe of the mission were therefore decisive considerations with regard to case selection.

Finally, the operationalisation of concepts caused some problems with construct validity. Economic development was based solely on the GDP per capita, but in reality the services and equipment that were provided for the mission turned out to be most influential. The GDP per capita and provision of services are related to each other, but other indicators might have been a better fit. Additionally, internal security threats were assessed in terms of presence and absence. However, these threats are present in many countries to some extent. Different conclusions might have come forward if this factor was also measured in terms of low, medium and high.

### **5.2 Conclusion**

This paragraph answers the research question of this thesis: *Which factors in the local context of the host country determine the success of civilian EU CSDP missions?* In order to provide an

answer to this question, four factors were identified and formulated into propositions. The factors included the level of economic development, the level of support for liberalism in the national government, the presence of internal security threats and the presence of conflict. In order to test the propositions, four missions were selected as case studies, including EUPM BiH, EUCAP Nestor/Somalia, EUCAP Sahel/Niger, and EUBAM Libya. The propositions were assessed based on the empirical analysis of these case studies. In the following, a concrete answer to the research question is formulated.

Based on the empirical analysis, the level of support for liberalism and the presence of conflict have proven to be important factors in relation to mission success. The propositions linked to these concepts were therefore confirmed. The other propositions on economic development and internal security threats were rejected, but this conclusion should be approached with caution. Although there was no co-variation detected for these concepts, the more in-depth information on each mission showed that these concepts were both of high influence on mission success. Additionally, factors in the local context were strongly interconnected, which makes it difficult to attribute mission success to distinct factors (S. Beijer, personal communication, June 6, 2024). This was also illustrated by the Libya case, which was the only case that scored the ‘worst’ option for each of the concepts and was the least successful mission at the same time.

### **5.3 Recommendations for future research**

Besides the recommendations for future research that were already mentioned in the discussion, this section gives additional concrete suggestions for future research. First, in this thesis, mission success was assessed from an EU perspective. However, the model by Peen Rodt (2017) also includes an external dimension, where the perspective of the host country is taken into account. This could offer interesting insights on what is considered mission success and how this was affected by the local context. Furthermore, this thesis relies for the largest part on desk research. Including interviews on a larger scale adds more depth to the research. It would be interesting to conduct interviews with officials that actually worked on the ground.

## 6. Recommendations

The conclusions that were drawn from the empirical analysis imply that some adjustments should be made to mission programmes in order to enhance mission success. In the following of this chapter, some policy recommendations are discussed.

Although the proposition on economic development was rejected, the lack of government services played a large role in mission outcomes. In the cases of Somalia and Niger, training efforts were less effective and not sustainable because the necessary equipment was not provided for. Therefore, the EU should add ‘hard’ capacity-building in cases where essential equipment is not available (Rodt et al., 2019). This way training is more effective and also more sustainable for the longer term.

Secondly, this thesis concluded that the presence of conflict is crucial for mission success. The mission in Libya showed that it is hardly possible to execute a successful mission when a conflict is present. A civilian mission should therefore always be preceded by a military peace-building mission in case of conflict in order to create favourable circumstances for the execution of the mission (Højstrup Christensen et al., 2018).

Additionally, concepts that were discussed in this thesis are complex and solving these issues requires long-term solutions. EU CSDP missions should therefore have longer but more specific mandates. The expert pointed out the following: *“It can be that the mandate is too large and the mission isn't equipped to solve the problems it's supposed to address. Also, CSDP missions usually have a limited timeframe. The countries where these missions take place are very complex and have numerous issues, so the mandate needs to fit within the country's development trajectory and there must be enough time to implement it”* (S. Beijer, personal communication, June 6, 2024). To adequately respond to the needs of the host country and simultaneously take into account the potential of the mission, it is important to narrow down the mandates on the one hand, and extend the length of the mandate on the other hand.

Finally, the local context proved to be crucial for mission success, but understanding is lacking: *“More importantly, an understanding of African contexts was not systematically set as a prerequisite, leading to miscommunication, lack of attention to detail and lack of knowledge of local expectations—and sometimes of local prejudices”* (van der Lijn et al., 2024, p. 51). Since each mission operates in a different context, mission staff should receive country-specific training before they start working on the mission.

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## Annex I: Overview of EU CSDP civilian missions

<b>Mission</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Annual budget (million)</b>	<b>Personnel (local staff)</b>
EUPM BiH (Bosnia and Herzegovina)	9 years (2003-2012)	38	198 (200)
EUPOL Proxima (North Macedonia)	2 years (2003-2005)	15	169 (0)
EUJUST Themis (Georgia)	1 year (2004-2005)	2	10 (0)
EUPOL Kinshasa (DR Congo)	2 years (2005-2007)	4.3	23 (0)
EUPOL COPPS (Palestinian territories)	19 years (2005-ongoing)	8.3	102 (42)
EUSEC (DR Congo)	10 years (2005-2015)	5.3	51 (25)
EUJUST/LEX (Iraq)	8 years (2005-2013)	3.2	30 (0)
AMM (Indonesia)	1 year (2005-2006)	15	125 (93 ASEAN)
EUBAM Rafah (Palestinian territories)	18 years (2005-ongoing)	3.9	10 (8)
EUPAT (North Macedonia)	1 year (2005-2006)	1.5	29 (0)
EUBAM (Moldova/Ukraine)	18 years (2005-ongoing)	11.1	112 (111)
EUPOL (Afghanistan)	9 years (2007-2016)	35.8	386 (182)
EUPOL (DR Congo)	7 years (2007-2014)	6.9	53 (9)
EU SSR (Guinea-Bissau)	2 years (2008-2010)	2.8	21 (13)
EUMM (Georgia)	15 years (2008-ongoing)	24.8	334 (111)
EULEX (Kosovo)	15 years (2008-ongoing)	115.2	1496 (753)
EUCAP Nestor (Somalia)	12 years (2012-ongoing)	33	74 (29)
EUCAP Sahel (Niger)	12 years (2012-ongoing)	26.3	77 (32)
EUBAM (Libya)	10 years (2013-ongoing)	42.4	61 (30)
EUAM (Ukraine)	9 years (2014-ongoing)	29.5	165 (161)

EUCAP Sahel (Mali)	9 years (2015-ongoing)	36.5	132 (75)
EUAM (Iraq)	6 years (2017-ongoing)	32.4	84 (34)

*Sources: (Collantes Celador, 2009; Dobrescu, 2015; EEAS, 2012a; Grevi et al., 2009; Homan, 2007; Palm, 2010; Peen Rodt, 2011, 2014; Perreur-Lloyd et al., 2018; Rodt et al., 2019; Sweeney, 2018; Tardy, 2015; Tartir & Ejdus, 2018; Wolff & Peen Rodt, 2007)*

## Annex II: Interview guide

Date: XXX

Present: XXX

### *Introduction*

This interview is part of the master thesis on the success of civilian CSDP missions, and which factors in the local context of the host country affect the success of the mission. Specifically, this thesis aims to answer the following research question: *Which factors in the local context of the host country determine the success of civilian EU CSDP missions?* Based on existing academic literature, four factors were identified and formulated into propositions. In order to test the propositions, four missions were selected as case studies, including EUPM BiH, EUCAP Nestor/Somalia, EUCAP Sahel/Niger, and EUBAM Libya. The interview starts with questions about EU CSDP missions in general, followed by more in depth questions on the missions.

Before we start the interview, do you have any questions about the content of the research or this interview?

1. Could you briefly introduce yourself and specify how your work is/was related to CSDP missions?

### *General*

Although each CSDP mission has different objectives, some missions are viewed as more successful than others. In this thesis, mission success is assessed based on two criteria: (1) whether the mission reached its operational goals, and (2) whether this was achieved in an efficient, cost-effective and timely manner.

2. Keeping these criteria in mind, what generally causes missions to be unsuccessful? *This does not necessarily have to be related to the local context.*
3. To what extent does the local context in the host country play a role in mission success?
4. What aspects of the local context do you deem most important for mission success?
5. Do you have some concrete examples of how the local context has affected mission success?

### *EUPM BiH*

The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the first mission that was launched under the European Security and Defence Policy. The mission was launched in 2003 and concluded in 2012. The main objective of the mission was to establish effective policing arrangements under Bosnian ownership in line with best practices from European and international practice.

6. Could you describe your knowledge on the course of the EUPM mission?
7. To what extent would you describe the mission as successful?
8. With regard to the local context, what were the biggest bottlenecks of the mission?
9. Do you have some concrete examples from this mission of how the local context has affected mission success?

### *EUCAP Nestor/Somalia*

The European capacity-building mission in the Horn of Africa was launched in July 2012. Initially, the mission was operational in other countries in this region as well, but after a review in 2015 the EU decided to continue the mission only in Somalia. The mission was renamed to EUCAP Somalia. The mission's objective is to assist the development in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean States of a self-sustainable capacity for continued enhancement of their maritime security including counter-piracy, and maritime governance.

10. Could you describe your knowledge on the course of the EUPM mission?
11. To what extent would you describe the mission as successful?
12. With regard to the local context, what were the biggest bottlenecks of the mission?
13. Do you have some concrete examples from this mission of how the local context has affected mission success?

### *EUCAP Sahel/Niger*

The European capacity-building mission in Niger is one of two missions that are part of the EU's strategy for enhancing security and development in the Sahel region, the other mission being EUCAP Sahel Mali. The mission was launched in July 2012 and is still ongoing. The overall objective of the mission is to support the capacity-building of the Nigerien security actors to fight terrorism and organised crime.

14. Could you describe your knowledge on the course of the EUPM mission?
15. To what extent would you describe the mission as successful?

16. With regard to the local context, what were the biggest bottlenecks of the mission?
17. Do you have some concrete examples from this mission of how the local context has affected mission success?

#### *EUBAM Libya*

The European Border Assistance Mission in Libya was launched in the wake of the Arab Spring. While the Libyan authorities faced challenges to domestic security, the EU constructed a mission to support the Libyan authorities to develop capacity for enhancing the security of Libya's land, sea and air borders in the short term and to develop a broader IBM strategy for the longer term.

18. Could you describe your knowledge on the course of the EUPM mission?
19. To what extent would you describe the mission as successful?
20. With regard to the local context, what were the biggest bottlenecks of the mission?
21. Do you have some concrete examples from this mission of how the local context has affected mission success?

#### *Concluding*

22. Do you have any recommendations for sources to use when assessing mission success and whether contextual factors have affected mission success?
23. Are there any issues that were not touched upon in this interview, that you would like to mention?