

Packs of Lone Wolves– To What Extent do the Narratives Exhibited in Far-Right Terrorist Manifestos Resonate with Contemporary Online Far-Right Discourse on Telegram?

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Introduction

On the 15th of March 2019 at 1:40 pm, an armed individual entered the Al Noor Mosque in Christchurch New Zealand. Over the course of the next hour and across two locations, this individual opened fire upon Muslims at Friday prayer, killing 51 people and injuring 89. The attacker, with no apparent links to any larger terror group and appearing to act alone was widely labelled as a ‘Lone wolf’ by global news organisations. Several other far-right murders have similarly been labelled as lone wolves in the media, such as Anders Breivik, the man who killed 69 people, mostly children in 2011, and Dylan Roofe, the perpetrator of an attack on a Charleston which killed 9 people. However, it is clear now that this term is not useful or even accurate as it widely misses the main point of attackers such as the Christchurch shooter. While these individuals may appear to act alone on the surface, it is quite clear that through various online methods, such as social media and messaging boards, so-called lone wolves share grievances with other people and groups, supporting and befriending like-minded individuals. These online spaces then provide a point of contact for collections of individuals who engage in further radicalisation, to the point of supporting and cheering on their so-called ‘lone wolf’ attacks when they happen¹. The individuals who carry out these attacks may appear disconnected from any organisation, but it is quite clear that through their online associations, they are deeply connected to groups of like-minded individuals, part of a feedback loop of radicalisation whereby they are radicalised online to take action and proceed to radicalise others through their actions.

The far-right has long had a home online, with a presence of neo-Nazi groups like Atomwaffen on some of the earliest online boards². However, the explosion of the internet age and the development of social media have only served to further the spread and proliferation of the far-right online. The Christchurch shooter, like several others, existed in an environment of online groups that radicalised him into extreme right-wing beliefs and encouraged him into action, actively cheering on his live-streamed killing spree online. Individuals like the Christchurch shooter and Anders Breivik are part of a trend of online radicalisation into an Islamophobic white supremacist ideology that transcends national borders. Both their manifestos and artefacts like the Christchurch shooter's weapons display several core points of confluence for

¹ Mark S. Hamm and Ramon Spaaij, ‘The Age of Lone Wolf Terrorism’, in *The Age of Lone Wolf Terrorism* (Columbia University Press, 2017), 1–12, <https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.7312/hamm18174-002/html>.

² ‘Atomwaffen Division’, *Southern Poverty Law Center* (blog), accessed 7 June 2025, <https://www.splcenter.org/resources/extremist-files/atomwaffen-division/>.

the global far-right, and particularly the online culture that they developed. The question therefore is how have these points of confluence been spread online in far-right groups, to what extent is there a core ideology spread across international borders and how do they differ nationally?

Research Question

To What Extent Do the Narratives Exhibited in Far-Right Terrorist Manifestos Resonate with Contemporary Online Far-Right Discourse on Telegram?

- *What are the consistent narratives expressed across terrorist manifestos?*
- *To what extent are these ideas represented in far-right online groups?*
- *What does the proliferation of far-right ideas, and regional changes say about the nature of contemporary far-right discourse globally?*

Theoretical Concepts

While this paper deals with several ideas and concepts, the throughline of the entire process comes down to examining discourse, establishing a narrative and effectively exploring established themes in one source base and applying it to another. It is in this way that this thesis is concerned primarily with narrative theory and discourse analysis. I intend to analyse themes in far-right groups based on the most extreme examples of far-right individuals and ideas, those shared by far-right terrorists. To explore these themes then across different Telegram groups across the globe I must approach this study with an aim to explore the emergent discourse not just in the main primary sources that I will be studying, but also in the manifestos of the killers who we are using to define the themes which are to be explored. Not only is discourse analysis important, but defining a narrative in both sets of source material is equally valuable.

The primary theoretical lens applied to the examination of far-right terrorists' material in my study is narrative theory. Narrative theory is an approach to historical research whereby historical events and sources are used as data that can be extrapolated into a story that we can understand. By doing so one can break down obtuse terminology and disparate events and ideas into something which can be more easily understood as a cohesive narrative. In the words of

Cebik in ‘Understanding narrative theory’³, applying narrative theory to historical analysis is what maintains history as more than ‘a variant of literature than being a disciplined investigation’. It is through this idea that I wish to examine the primary sources of far-right extremists, primarily the manifestos of right-wing terrorists such as Breivik, but also the physical historical evidence, such as the writing on the Christchurch shooter’s weapons. By analysing these sources through the lens of narrative theory, I can begin to form ideas of what the guiding principles are through disparate sources. The intention of my study then is to form the narrative of what connects these individuals and what is important to them into what I refer to as points of confluence. These points of confluence are essentially the narrative that is constructed by the subjects and sources, the far-right terrorists themselves. It is my intention then to use these points of confluence as themes for further investigation.

This further investigation then is my examination of far-right groups on the messaging app Telegram, a frequent haunt of far-right groups and individuals online. By using these themes, I can better analyse the source material online and perform a discourse analysis of far-right Telegram groups. While narrative theory lends itself to examining the previously mentioned sources, I intend to study the similarities and differences that occur online between far-right groups and individuals across different countries. The established points of confluence can be used as a jumping-off point for investigation of these groups, but it is the discourse, and the regional changes in it that I am interested in researching. By using these confluence points as themes, I can examine group attitudes to them and explore how prominently the discourse which appears in the manifestos features in far-right Telegram groups, where it is similar and where it varies. Discourse analysis is a vital approach for me to take regarding my source material and aims. As I wish to explore statements made around a select number of topics in different regions, discourse analysis is vital to understand the source material. Historical discourse analysis therefore is the most practical and useful way to analyse sources online, over time and by geographical location⁴.

These theoretical approaches sum up my hopes and ambitions for this study, as I wish to establish both a thematic and narrative background through the examination of far-right terrorists and then investigate the impact on far-right online communication. In this way, I can develop a historical base of knowledge while investigating emerging phenomena.

³ ‘Understanding Narrative Theory on JSTOR’, accessed 27 January 2025, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2505132>.

⁴ Laurel J. Brinton, ‘Historical Discourse Analysis’, in *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis* (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2015), 222–43, <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118584194.ch10>.

Literature Review

Examining the Far-Right is not a novel concept, ever since fascism first reared its ugly head in Italy, people have endeavoured to study its defining features, where it springs from and how it operates. Understanding the mechanisms of fascism, and how to spot it and describe it when it forms is a difficult task, with even a definition of fascism hard to pin down. Many have tried, with seminal papers like Umberto Eco's 'Ur-Fascism – Eternal Fascism: Fourteen ways of looking at a Blackshirt'⁵, providing some of the best ways we have of investigating this far-right phenomenon. Eco is so significant as he provides not only one of the best definitions of fascism but also does so by summarising the aspects of fascism into 14 distinct properties to identify fascist ideology. These aspects are highly useful, and echo as strongly today as much as they have throughout history, with examples like 'The cult of tradition' being central to fascistic belief. This is foundational, and important for any study of far-right action, as nostalgia is a feature of so many aspects of fascist ideology, such as family structure and xenophobia. The same can be true for several of Eco's other aspects of fascism, which resound strongly today, such as his point about 'Fear of difference', which is highly relevant today with immigration discussions, as well as the ever-present idea that the enemies of fascism are concurrently too strong and too weak. This underlines the core fears of fascism and is reminiscent of discussions today where certain groups are portrayed as being inferior, yet somehow still powerful enough to present an existential threat. While Eco provides us with an excellent basis on which to begin investigating the far-right with perspective in mind, it also shows us just how difficult it is to create a succinct definition of fascism. That said, this essay shows us how fascism and the far-right have been examined over the years, far from a new area of study.

Examining the far-right has always been a tricky task to perform, as the far-right themselves have been incredibly difficult to nail down as their ideology as Eco describes is based more on ideas of fear, machismo, and xenophobia than any real strong ideological backing. The task then is even more difficult when one considers that from the dawn of the information age, fascism has managed to proliferate like a virus through the halls of the internet and spread globally online through this medium. The example of far-right terrorists globally is one of the most pressing examples of this. Presenting a brutal example of the violent consequences of far-right ideology, there are several cases of far-right and neo-Nazi terrorists who have become

⁵ Umberto Eco, 'Ur-Fascism', The Anarchist Library, 22 June 1995, <https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/umberto-eco-ur-fascism>.

radicalised through participating in online groups across the globe. Although the far-right and fascists are mostly defined as nationalist movements, one can see characteristics of far-right groups being shared internationally in discourse among people and groups of shared ideologies. This paper seeks to explore these groups, and how shared this extreme far-right discourse is across different countries and socio-cultural spaces. In this effort, it is vital to examine studies previously carried out regarding the study of far-right international cooperation, online radicalisation, and the use of social media as a means of extremists connecting online. Therefore, it is important to examine the literature base and determine the consensus on right-wing extremism, global far-right points of confluence, and research in online far-right groups.

Even though the research for this paper is conducted online, it is also crucial to investigate the underpinnings of far-right international cooperation, and one paper which approaches this topic well is ‘The international cooperation of the populist radical right: building counter-hegemony in international relations’ by Wojczewski⁶, which analysed how far-right groups cooperate across national borders, and the role populism plays in these interactions. This paper introduces the idea that I will be delving into in my study, how groups and individuals that are separated geographically and purporting to be nationalists are so often joined in outlook and ideas and can often be seen supporting each other. Wojczewski makes the valid point that right-wing radicals, particularly in Europe, have a shared idea of being part of separate but related ‘Ethnocultural nations’ that are decaying, and can therefore ‘only restore their identity’ by pushing the narrative of ‘native people’ against ‘foreigners’. This paper makes the case that on the political level, there is a great deal of cooperation across European parties, and in many cases, these parties have joined into a ‘counter-hegemonic project’ based on culturally supremacist ideas. Wojczewski's paper is so relevant to mine as it helps set out a basis for this international cooperation that I can base my study on, specifically the basis upon which collaboration exists. This is an interesting consideration and something which will have to be contemplated as part of the framework of this paper, as there are already pre-existing political structures and relationships on which any study could be based.

As my research hopes to investigate international far-right links, it is important to evaluate the full broad consensus of the literature base on the basic principles. One paper which is key for

⁶ Thorsten Wojczewski, ‘The International Cooperation of the Populist Radical Right: Building Counter-Hegemony in International Relations’, *International Relations*, 13 January 2024, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178231222888>.

understanding the political landscape is Nina Obermeyer's paper 'Right-Wing Populism and the Rise of Internationalism in Europe'⁷. The observations made in this paper are incredibly relevant to our discussion as the author makes the point that the growth of far-right nationalism goes hand in hand with what they refer to as 'Anti-Internationalism'. This is an interesting consideration, as it could be seen to back the idea that right-wing nationalism is country bound, and not necessarily an international movement, but it reveals much more interesting ideas too. They find that while right-wing parties are consistently doing better and growing in popularity across Europe, support for closer international integration is also growing, seemingly a paradox. This paper is important to understanding the landscape, as it reveals one of the uniting factors for far-right populist groups, anti-globalisation and anti-internationalism. Therefore, when one grows, you can see an international growth of anti-internationalism, and vice versa.

While these papers may provide a framework for understanding relationships between nationalistic political parties, my focus is not on the electoral politics, but on far-right extremism online. In this regard, there is much evidence that the far-right is extensively entrenched in the darkest corners of the internet, and one of their most prolific haunts is Telegram. An excellent report which discusses this and is central to my decision to focus on Telegram was carried out by the ISD, analysing over 200 white supremacist Telegram channels⁸. This report 'A Safe Space to Hate', is a great first look at the congregation of extremism on Telegram, making the case that the messaging app which was intended for people who lived in countries with authoritarian regimes to organise and communicate has become one of the most popular places for far-right and white supremacist groups to communicate, share (mis/dis) information, and form increasingly radicalising circles. A Safe Space to Hate is important as it shows not only the centrality of Telegram for the proliferation of far-right ideas but also hints at these groups' interconnectivity and global nature. The content analysed was found to come from all over Europe, with support for far-right terrorists being frequently shared across international lines, and praise for far-right terror attacks in Norway and Germany coming from across Europe. This paper is also highly relevant due to the methods used, employing both network analysis of the 208 groups selected to map out the web of interconnected links, and a qualitative analysis where ISD researchers explored the 'themes and narratives' which appeared in these groups to gain a contextual understanding of these groups by exploring their

⁷ Nina Obermeier, 'Right-Wing Populism and the Rise of Internationalism in Europe', 1 September 2021.

⁸ Jakob Guhl and Jacob Davey, 'A Safe Space to Hate: White Supremacist Mobilisation on Telegram', ISD, 26 September 2020, <https://www.isdglobal.org/isd-publications/a-safe-space-to-hate-white-supremacist-mobilisation-on-Telegram/>.

content themselves. While this is an incredibly useful study in exploring and shining a light on far-right congregations on Telegram, it is limited by the fact that it is a single snapshot in time that focuses primarily on surface-level information. My study will attempt to address this shortcoming by comparing these far-right Telegram channels with historical sources of far-right extremism, terrorist manifestos, investigating what they have in common and where they may diverge.

Researchers have been highlighting the trend of the internet being used as a tool for the far right to spread globally, and one of the most fundamental examples is from Caiani and Kröll's 'The transnationalization of the extreme right and the use of the Internet'⁹. This paper is a great introduction to the ideas I wish to explore in my research and strongly supports the idea that far-right ideas are being spread globally online, conforming in approach and ideas. It also makes the case that the internet acts as a 'force multiplier' for this transnationalization, where like-minded people are increasingly radicalised. A relevant point raised by the paper is how easily these transnational far-right groups can go under the radar until they emerge offline to devastating effects. While this is a relevant point to make, it does fall short by missing the importance of far-right action as a factor in the spread of other far-right beliefs, and focuses entirely on interviews with far-right representatives, taking what they say on face value as the sources for their paper.

Other researchers have used Telegram as an effective source to explore the spread of far-right ideas, and one of the best examples of exploration of the global far-right through Telegram comes from the paper 'On the Globalization of the QAnon Conspiracy Theory Through Telegram'¹⁰. This paper is relevant as it explicitly looks at the spread of QAnon, the far-right all-encompassing conspiracy theory turned movement on Telegram. The authors of this paper make the point that Telegram is of great utility for exploring far-right groups online, particularly those concerned with conspiratorial thinking, as it serves as a refuge for the extreme on the internet. They explain that increased moderation on mainstream social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter led to an exodus of extremists such as those involved with QAnon, who

⁹ Manuela Caiani and Patricia Kröll, 'The Transnationalization of the Extreme Right and the Use of the Internet', *International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice* 39, no. 4 (2 October 2015): 331–51, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01924036.2014.973050>.

¹⁰ Mohamad Hoseini et al., 'On the Globalization of the QAnon Conspiracy Theory Through Telegram', in *Proceedings of the 15th ACM Web Science Conference 2023*, WebSci '23 (New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 2023), 75–85, <https://doi.org/10.1145/3578503.3583603>.

‘sought new online homes on less regulated platforms’¹¹ such as Telegram. By exploring the perceived toxicity of posts on Telegram, these researchers were able to identify areas of interest central to QAnon as a movement, as well as areas where the issue may be particularly bad globally. This study is useful as it shows the importance of Telegram as a tool of the far-right and how it adds to the globalisation of extremist ideas like QAnon. Therefore, by examining these things, this paper demonstrates the ability of researchers to use sites like Telegram to examine the sharing of far-right ideas online, the discourse around specific topics, and how that can change from country to country. This paper is unfortunately quite a surface-level exploration of the groups and doesn’t go into specifics of group activity or the context the communication exists in, leaving much to be desired.

One of the main inspirations for this study was the rise of cases of far-right violence globally which appear very similar in nature but are almost always attributed to so-called lone wolves. Understanding the degree to which far-right actors such as these could be linked across the world is one of the main goals of my paper, and so a study of this historical link in the literature is necessary. One of the best pieces from the literature base that addresses this idea is ‘Breivik’s Long Shadow’ by Graham Macklin and Tore Bjørgo¹². This paper deals with ideas of far-right influence spreading globally through the influence of high-profile far-right violence, in this case, the crimes of Anders Breivik. The author makes the point that while operationally the methods may be different, the inspiration throughout these attacks is consistent across several countries, from Norway with Breivik to the USA with Dylan Roofe, to New Zealand with the Christchurch shootings. This is an important piece of work for my study as it lays out some of the mechanisms these ideas are spread and confirms the idea that these ideas are spread internationally with direct inspiration being taken between the actors, such as the case of the Christchurch shooter who directly referenced Breivik and other far-right killers.

An important consideration when reviewing the literature is what the academic consensus is on what the areas of confluence and agreement are for global far-right discourse. Many in the literature point to the idea of identity as one of the main factors. One of the most important ways this has been established in the past is by examining the manifestos of far-right terrorists,

¹¹ Mohamad Hoseini et al., ‘On the Globalization of the QAnon Conspiracy Theory Through Telegram’, in *Proceedings of the 15th ACM Web Science Conference 2023*, WebSci ’23 (New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 2023), 75–85, <https://doi.org/10.1145/3578503.3583603>, 01.

¹² Graham Macklin and Tore Bjørgo, ‘Breivik’s Long Shadow? The Impact of the July 22, 2011 Attacks on the Modus Operandi of Extreme-Right Lone Actor Terrorists’, *Perspectives on Terrorism* 15, no. 3 (1 June 2021): 14–36, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27030880>.

as is the case in the study ‘Taking stock of far-right terrorism through manifestos: Glorification of identity’¹³. This paper is incredibly relevant to understanding global far-right discourse by compiling and examining the central factors across several manifestos written by right-wing terrorists. What they discuss as ‘Justifications’ in this paper gives a good idea of what may be central or connect people of extremist positions. This paper does this by asking the interesting question, ‘How do far-right terrorists portray their collective identity and justify acts of violence against out-groups in their manifestos?’. This is important to the understanding of the topic, as by understanding how identities are formed then one can start to forge an idea of what issues are central. In this manner, they found that across all manifestos studied, white identity was central. The most important emergent theme was a justification of violence through protecting the ‘white race’ from being ‘supplanted’ by non-white groups. This paper is vital to understanding core far-right ideas, in the most extreme setting possible.

Other academics have approached the idea of far-right internationalism similarly, analysing terrorist manifestos as a gauge for the modern right-wing consensus. One such study, ‘Defending the West: Cultural racism and Pan-Europeanism on the far-right’¹⁴ focuses on the manifesto of Anders Breivik for this purpose. This paper breaks down Breivik’s manifesto, analysing the core ideas and themes in the killer’s words as a ‘barometer of right and far-right political rhetoric’. They address some important points, reflecting similar ideas of a ‘clash of civilisations’ and pan-European and Western identity against a foreign other. This approach is interesting and useful; by using the words of such an extreme far-right figure, they gain a valuable insight into an ideology that can often be difficult to define and understand. By using the manifesto as a source in the way they have, one can better understand and begin to identify themes and key issues. However, paper is weakened not only by focusing on one manifesto but also by the author’s failure to connect it to any other real-world evidence, so while this is an interesting and valuable approach, it could be much improved by applying it to further research.

One paper that has contributed strongly to this area of study is ‘Online discontent: comparing Western European far-right groups on Facebook’¹⁵. This paper addresses the idea that far-right

¹³ Cenker Korhan Demir and Ömer Çona, ‘Taking Stock of Far-Right Terrorism through Manifestos: Glorification of Identity’, *European Journal of International Security* 9, no. 3 (August 2024): 398–416, <https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2024.8>.

¹⁴ Daniel Wollenberg, ‘Defending the West: Cultural Racism and Pan-Europeanism on the Far-Right’, *Postmedieval: A Journal of Medieval Cultural Studies* 5, no. 3 (1 September 2014): 308–19, <https://doi.org/10.1057/pmed.2014.19>.

¹⁵ Ofra Klein and Jasper Muis, ‘Online Discontent: Comparing Western European Far-Right Groups on Facebook’, *European Societies* 21, no. 4 (8 August 2019): 540–62, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2018.1494293>.

groups have been effective in the use of social media to gain access to wider audiences and spread hateful ideology. Focusing on Western Europe, this study uses network and discourse analysis to explore the reach and spread of right-wing, with a novel change of exploring country by country. This is a relevant and interesting turn in the literature as it acknowledges the dual nature of far-right extremism in ‘Western’ countries, being both internationalist in ideology, sharing themes with far-right groups globally, but remaining nationalistic in outlook. This paper is also valuable in identifying how discourse in online spaces changes from actor to actor, identifying changes when the source is affiliated with a political party or non-institutionalised online poster. The authors mostly focused on the political realm, but the distinction drawn between the party-aligned and non-institutional is valuable in how discourse can change based on interest and intention, an important distinction to make for any discourse analysis. This distinction also shows us the importance of these non-political actors in pushing the most extreme right-wing ideas, with the study noting how these actors are much more focused on issues like Islam, whereas political actors focus a lot more on issues like other parties. The paper does have some shortcomings, however, as although it examines discourse across Western European countries, noting their shared interests and viewing certain differences in how discourse is shared there, it does not explicitly make the point to examine regional differences in the discourse itself, focusing primarily on differences in political and non-political actors.

It is clear from the literature that there is a definite degree of sharing of ideas and information online by the far-right. The internet has allowed for the sharing of the most extreme ideas, and countless people have been radicalised by their participation in online far-right spaces. The literature is consistent on the importance of far-right discussions on apps like Telegram as refuges for the most extreme right-wing content and actors and as points of sharing information and ideas globally. The existence of far-right terrorists is one of the most significant examples of this kind of global far-right discourse, often demonstrated by their manifestos. People like Breivik and the Christchurch killer were radicalised into extreme right-wing beliefs, and despite living on opposite sides of the world, formed extremist identities that they used to justify their killing. There is certainly utility in using these examples as a barometer of far-right extremism, as has been done in the past, one can examine the words and ideologies of far-right extremists across different countries and identify themes and points of confluence. However, while this is an interesting exercise, it is perhaps more useful to use these themes as a starting point in the study of these online spaces where most of these far-right actors are radicalised.

Doing so will address some of the shortcomings of the literature, allowing me to form an idea of the most extreme far-right actors' views and examine current far-right groups through this lens.

Innovative Aspects

As established above, the study of the far-right is not a new or novel idea, nor is the study of online far-right groups and radicalisation. While the study of the online far-right is new and emerging, it would be inaccurate to say that this is an innovative aspect to my study. Where my study is unique is how I have combined several aspects of research on the far right to form one cohesive study, using narrative and discourse analysis to shed light on an often-obscure topic. My study, therefore, takes research methods which have been used in the past and extrapolates on them to provide a new understanding and insight into far-right discourse. I believe this to be a highly relevant addition to the literature base, as so often there is a disconnect in the understanding of far-right terror and the far-right groups which inspired them to action. Although the myth of the lone wolf has been challenged in recent years, not enough academic work has gone into exploring the connection between far-right terrorists, far-right online groups and the discourse that exists in this space. I believe this to be a vital addition to the literature base, addressing one of the greatest threats to the world today, as the far-right continues to emerge, become more dangerous and threaten all of us who believe in a fair democratic society. I believe this approach gives us a unique opportunity to examine far-right radicalisation and discourse in a way which has not been done before, allowing me the chance to add a unique perspective, considering the most dangerous aspects of far-right radicalisation, and examining what that means for the topic more broadly.

Firstly, the idea of far-right manifestos and artifacts such as weapons used by the killers as a way of establishing the most extremist position of the far-right has been done before, but I go a step further with this, establishing a narrative throughline of global far-right terrorism, and then further break that into themes, such as a focus on immigration, religion and racial identity. I then use this in what is a novel form of research, applying these themes to the online far-right groups which were central to their own radicalisation. By applying these themes to these groups, I form a framework of understanding of themes which can either be found in these groups, absent or changed in an important way. This is innovative in the field as work which has been done in the past has attempted to examine these groups purely in their online context,

or in conjunction with political aims. My study aims to contextualise the worst examples of far-right extremism through emerging global themes which have spilt out into real-world violence. By performing the study this way, I am also uniquely positioned to examine how global these themes are, and how they can change over time and geographical location. My real innovation then is forming a study which establishes a narrative of historical global far-right extremism and exploring how that meets the reality across the globe, how these ideas are spread, internalised and understood internationally.

Sources

To establish narrative themes and points of confluence of far-right extremists, I have selected sources written and produced by the extremists themselves. The main focus of my sources for the first chapter, therefore, is on the written sources produced by these far-right terrorists. This includes the manifesto written by Anders Breivik, ‘2083 A European Declaration of Independence’¹⁶, as well as the one written by the Christchurch shooter, ‘The Great Replacement’¹⁷ to include other material produced by the two individuals. My analysis of these figures and their beliefs will also include physical artefacts of relevance that they possessed, such as the weapons and equipment used by the Christchurch shooter, which contain several references and hints to their ideological positioning through the messages emblazoned across them. Breivik and the Christchurch shooter were chosen for study as in the field they represent two of the most prominent uses of manifestos to justify mass killings. Although many others have written and published writings prior to acts of far-right terror, the connections between Breivik and the Christchurch attacks are worthwhile studying, not only because of their similarities, but also because the attacks happened nearly a decade apart and can be used to cover changes in radicalisation and far-right discourse over this period. Breivik essentially established his type of attack as a feature of far-right terror, and the Christchurch shooter was directly inspired by him, stating his desire to perform a ‘Breivik style attack’¹⁸, and so I can use these two attacks as a way of exploring almost a decade of far-right discourse and online

¹⁶ Anders Behring Breivik, *2083 A European Declaration of Independence Book 3* (Lulu.com, 2018).

¹⁷ Brandon Tarrant. *The Great Replacement: Towards a New Society*. 2019

¹⁸ Graham Macklin and Tore Bjørgo, ‘Breivik’s Long Shadow? The Impact of the July 22, 2011 Attacks on the Modus Operandi of Extreme-Right Lone Actor Terrorists’, *Perspectives on Terrorism* 15, no. 3 (1 June 2021): 14–36, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27030880>.

radicalisation. These sources are the primary focus of Chapter 1 as I endeavour to establish narratives across the manifestos of Breivik and the Christchurch shooter.

As I wish to also explore the online nature of the discussed topic in Chapter 2, most of the rest of my sources will be drawn primarily from social media, principally from Telegram. As this paper intends to study radicalisation and extremism in online spaces, the focus will be on far-right nationalist groups on Telegram. Telegram is ideal for my purposes, being a place where far-right groups congregate online, and although its stated purpose is security and privacy, much information is shared in public ‘channels’ which allow me to be able to gain a wide understanding of beliefs, motivations and discussions without the need to even join the groups under false pretences. Any Telegram channel with a focus on the key themes outlined in the narrative analysis will be checked for appropriateness and either selected or discarded. I will be following the examples of other studies which have focused on Telegram as their main primary source material¹⁹. Therefore, I will search for groups using the Telegram desktop app’s search function and compile a list of any group that meets my selection criteria. While previous studies in Telegram have set out their own guidelines for considering a channel that is worthwhile investigating at 6 subscribers and 2 posts, this study will keep a stricter criterion, only considering posts from groups which have at least 500 channel members. The rationale behind this is that while the ISD study, which set the previous guideline, was focused on the existence of groups themselves, not necessarily the content of the group. If I wish to study group communications, I need groups which can be seen to be much more representative than simply having 6 members, which could lead to skewed sources and the potential for cherry picked non-representative examples. I concluded that 500 channel members would be an adequate number to consider the group representative of the sub-section of society that the far-right represents and slightly increased to give some security to my findings²⁰. That all considered, online sources of this nature do have certain drawbacks. Firstly, I will only have access to public groups and pages, and given the topic matter, that does cut out a great deal of what could potentially be very useful material. I do not expect this to significantly harm the research, much of this material is accessible online, and much can be learned from what exists

¹⁹ Mónica Simon et al., ‘Linked in the Dark: A Network Approach to Understanding Information Flows within the Dutch Telegramsphere’, *Information, Communication & Society* 26, no. 15 (18 November 2023): 3054–78, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2022.2133549>.

²⁰ Mumtaz Ali Memon et al., ‘Sample Size for Survey Research: Review and Recommendations’, *Journal of Applied Structural Equation Modeling* 4, no. 2 (25 June 2020): i–xx, [https://doi.org/10.47263/JASEM.4\(2\)01](https://doi.org/10.47263/JASEM.4(2)01).

publicly, including group public posts like text posts, memes, news articles and other related images and materials.

Methods

The focus of this part of the study is to establish themes and a narrative of belief across both manifestos studied, essentially attempting to draw throughlines through this material and mapping a path through the often disparate ideas shared within the manifestos themselves and between the two men. In this way, I will attempt to draw a narrative throughline between these terrorists, who are connected by method and inspiration, despite being located across the globe from each other, in Norway and New Zealand, respectively. Using their motivations and justifications of the actions, I will then draw themes and establish what the core uniting factors are for these far-right actors. This is done through an examination of the terrorist sources and the coding of broad themes which appear across them. These themes are then grouped into distinct categories, which I refer to in this paper as ‘points of confluence’.

Following the establishment of these themes, they will then be used to investigate global far-right groups online, primarily on Telegram. I aim to use these themes to see how accurate they are to the movements across the globe, where they are most prevalent and how accurate they are. Following this exploration, I wish to engage in a discussion of what this means for far-right discourse today, how impactful terroristic beliefs remain and what that means, and what new developments in the movement might mean for the future. Through the lens of these established themes, I also wish to view the regional differences in the global far-right, essentially where they agree and where they differ, taking special interest in regional variations in far-right rhetoric. This will be achieved by using the search function of Telegram, identifying groups which focus on far-right extremist ideas; however, I will also use shared links within the groups to access other related groups within the far-right Telegram ecosystem. My focus will be primarily focused on but not limited to groups which specifically focus upon nationally based organisations and channel, such as channels which specially focus on a part of Europe or the United States, but also on key groups within and across national boundaries to attempt to view the full spectrum of the online far-right.

Chapter 1 – The Last Templars

Breivik and the Battle for Europe

Following the Christchurch shooters' bloody spree, many commentators and news coverage of the event were quick to label the perpetrator a lone wolf, however, this label is not only highly misleading²¹, but also misunderstands the background, motivations and information ecosystem that led to this horror unfolding in Christchurch. While the Christchurch shooter himself admitted connection to no organisation, even stating ‘No group ordered my actions, I make the decision myself’²², it is clear from his other writings and actions that he believed he was acting in a long tradition, directly comparing himself to other ideologically motivated killers, both recent and from an imagined past. The Christchurch shooter may have acted alone, like so many others before and after him have, however, I wish to explore the ideological throughline which connects these killers. If we continue to view these individuals as lone wolves, then we miss entirely the nuances which allowed them to exist and spread their ideology to other individuals. This misunderstanding and detachment that exists between far-right killers and the ecosystem of radicalisation is widespread, and so I endeavour to connect the ideas presented by far-right terrorists. I hope to explicitly map the narrative of belief, as expressed through their statements, actions and inspirations, and establish an understanding of extremist-led far-right belief. To do this, I need to examine the primary source base available to us pertaining to the most extreme beliefs of the far-right, the manifestos of far-right terrorists radicalised online into bloody action. By doing so, I hope to develop a coherent narrative amongst the disparate and often contradictory sources so we can better understand the values and beliefs prominent in far-right circles, which can then be compared to contemporary far-right discourse.

²¹ Thomas J. Holt et al., ‘Loners, Colleagues, or Peers? Assessing the Social Organization of Radicalization’, *American Journal of Criminal Justice* 44, no. 1 (1 February 2019): 83–105, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12103-018-9439-5>.

²² Sandra Petersmann, ‘Christchurch: The Myth of the Lone Wolf Attacker – DW – 03/18/2019’, dw.com, accessed 24 March 2025, <https://www.dw.com/en/christchurch-the-myth-of-the-lone-wolf-attacker/a-47970011>.

There is a long history of extremists producing manifestos prior to attacks, and while this is not limited to far-right terrorists, it is highly common among extremists of that ilk²³. The blueprint, however, for what I explore here could easily be said to have come from the highest profile of all the far-right terrorist attacks, those carried out by Anders Breivik. Breivik is arguably one of the most influential of all the far-right terrorists of the 21st century, and studying and understanding his beliefs is essential for understanding how we got to where we are with far-right extremist discourse. Born the son of a diplomat to a wealthy but troubled family, Breivik had a difficult upbringing, but certainly nothing out of the ordinary for a middle-class child of divorce²⁴. Failing his way through life, it appears he became more and more radicalised, primarily online, being an avid reader of Stormfront²⁵, the Neo-Nazi online publication, as well as blogs by Neo-Nazis local Norwegian blogger Fjordman²⁶. He initially tried to pursue his extremist ideology and may have been further radicalised through his association with the Norwegian ‘Progress Party’, a right-wing anti-immigration party focused on the threat of Islam in Europe. However, this marked another failure for Breivik, and his political ambitions were shut down, as he was not selected to stand for election for the Progress Party. It is when we see Breivik’s darker motivations coming through, coalescing his intolerance, xenophobia and hatred into a plan to put his extremist ideology into action, and most importantly for my investigation, into words.

Before embarking on his acts of terror, Breivik set his ideas down in a manifesto, a book he called ‘2083 – A European Declaration of Independence’²⁷, through this manifesto, we can begin to gain an understanding of the driving principles of the man and the ecosystem he existed within. Released under an assumed name, Andrew Berwick, an anglicised form of his name, the title refers to the year in which Breivik believes a race war and coup d’états of non-compliant European governments will be complete. This book details his preparations for his attack, his motivations, but is also an invaluable resource for exploring the ecosystem of far-right beliefs, distilled into one man. It is so valuable as it is by Breivik’s admission not an entirely original piece of work, with much of it lifted from several far-right sources such as a man best well

²³ Fredrik Wilhelmsen, ‘When the Medium Is Not the Message: Breivik, Tarrant, and the Conceptions of History of Contemporary Right-Wing Extremist Lone-Actor Terrorists’, *Fascism* 11, no. 1 (21 January 2022): 109–38, <https://doi.org/10.1163/22116257-bja10025>.

²⁴ Alexandre Madore, ‘Anders Breivik: Terrorism, Strain Theory and Social Work’, *Potentia: Journal of International Affairs* 10 (15 October 2019): 50–61, <https://doi.org/10.18192/potentia.v10i0.4511>.

²⁵ Southern Poverty Law Centre, ‘Stormfront’, accessed 20 May 2025, <https://www.splcenter.org/resources/extremist-files/stormfront/>.

²⁶ Åsne Seierstad, ‘One of Us: The Story of Anders Breivik and the Massacre in Norway’, *Literary Hub* (blog), 16 April 2015, <https://lithub.com/one-of-us/>.

²⁷ Anders Behring Breivik, *2083 A European Declaration of Independence*, 2018.

known for being punched in the face on camera, Richard Spencer, as well as the aforementioned Fjordman, making it already a compilation of online far-right belief and discourse, that can be explored to understand much about far-right discourse. Fjordman, or Peder Jensen, another Norwegian, is a far-right blogger who has been highly influential in the proliferation of Islamophobic ideas in Europe, as stated by Paul Jackson in his article ‘The License to Hate’, Fjordman managed to operate ‘at the interface between Islamophobic populism and contemporary fascist terrorism’²⁸. This is very clear from the influence he had on Breivik, who Jackson argues took the words of Fjordman, which hinted towards violent action and made it a reality.

The guiding principle throughout the entire manifesto is an adherence to an idea that European Judeo-Christian identity is under attack by various means and enemies. Breivik is an interesting case here as his interpretation and the interpretation of those he cites in his manifesto appear to be that of a pan-European white identity. His nationalism is not centred wholly on his native Norway but instead seeks to reach out more broadly to like-minded white Christian Europeans, who he sees as being demographically and culturally under threat from two main forces, Muslims, and treacherous Leftists, who he believes allow the process to happen. This idea of pan-European white identity is described by Breivik as being rooted in a shared Judaeo-Christian cultural heritage, and curiously for a self-proclaimed Nazi, is not completely exclusionary of Jewish people or other previously described by Nazis as Untermenschen, such as Eastern Europeans, who he refers to as ‘Brethren’²⁹. That said, his focus is explicitly that of the great replacement theory, the extreme white supremacist idea that European and other white majority states are having their populations replaced by non-white peoples through a process of mass immigration and the encouragement of low birth rates³⁰. It is worth noting that the process that Breivik describes is closer to a more specific and niche great replacement myth, the Eurabia Theory. This myth is the brainchild of the British-Swiss author Bat Ye’or³¹, who coined the phrase to describe what she believed was ‘a secret project between European Politicians and the Arab world for the Islamification of Europe’³², making Europe into

²⁸ Paul Jackson, ‘The License to Hate: Peder Jensen’s Fascist Rhetoric in Anders Breivik’s Manifesto 2083: A European Declaration of Independence’, *Democracy and Security* 9, no. 3 (2013): 247–69, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48602828>.

²⁹ Anders Behring Breivik, 2083 *A European Declaration of Independence*, 2018, 563.

³⁰ Tahir Abbas, ‘The Great Replacement Theory’, in *The Routledge Companion to Terrorism Studies* (Routledge, 2024).

³¹ Bat Ye’or, *Eurabia- The Euro-Arab Axis* (Fairleigh Dickinson Univ Press, 2005).

³² Matt Carr, ‘You Are Now Entering Eurabia’, *Race & Class* 48, no. 1 (1 July 2006): 1–22, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396806066636>.

essentially an Islamic province which would be referred to as Eurabia. The nature of this myth is still replacement, but the focus is narrowed to a particular group, which is entering Europe with a particular goal: Muslims entering Europe in order to overwhelm and conquer it. This is the core of Breivik's frustrations and his guiding principle to rationalise his actions, reframing Muslim migration to Europe as an act of war which requires a quick and violent response before it is too late.

The focus, therefore, comes down to a struggle as Breivik sees it between the diametrically opposed Judeo-Christian Europe and the Islamic World. The Islamic World in these circles, and especially in Breivik's writing, appears to encapsulate everywhere from Morocco to the Caucasus, but mainly focuses on those immigrants he was exposed to in his childhood in Norway, with particular interest paid to Muslim majority countries like Pakistan³³. While Breivik describes his own attack as a pre-emptive act of war, he is clear that he believes the war has already begun, with frequent references to acts of violence supposedly carried out by Muslims both in Europe and in the Arab World. Breivik even lists crimes against Christians in the Middle East and elsewhere as an example of the opening salvo of this supposed war between two opposing factions, citing a 'Christian exodus from the Arab World'³⁴. The manifesto repeats this idea that it is Islam that is the real enemy, engaged in a zero-sum struggle for survival against Judaeo-Christian pan-European society in which only one can prevail. He argues that with inaction, white westerners will become extinct, or they can follow his plan of murderous action against Muslims as their only way of survival. It is important to note that under Breivik's maligned worldview, this is a historical struggle which he is only continuing. This is clear from the historical allusions throughout his writing, frequently referencing historic battles between Christian Kingdoms and Islamic Empires. One historically inspired belief of his is that Europe now stands at the same point as it did when the Ottomans invaded in 1683 and should respond accordingly³⁵. This is a common fixation of the far-right, who revere this date as a major victory³⁶. The title of the manifesto, 2083, is a reference to this battle, with Breivik claiming that they will claim victory over Marxists and Islam 400 years after this date. This interpretation of the past is central both to his ideology and his rationale for action, viewing himself as a continuation of the Knights Templar, surrounding himself in crusader

³³ Anders Behring Breivik, 2083 *A European Declaration of Independence*, 2018, 730.

³⁴ Anders Behring Breivik, 2083 *A European Declaration of Independence*, 2018, 443.

³⁵ Anders Behring Breivik, 2083 *A European Declaration of Independence*, 2018, 1413.

³⁶ Miloš Jovanović, 'Whitewashed Empire: Historical Narrative and Place Marketing in Vienna', *History and Anthropology* 30, no. 4 (8 August 2019): 460–76, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02757206.2019.1617709>.

imagery and even claiming to have been inducted to a group of people who revived the ancient Christian order, claiming rank and legitimacy as a Justiciar Knight Commander³⁷. This reverence for the Templars is common in far-right discourse, often used as inspiration for their violence towards Muslims³⁸.

Breivik does not only focus on Muslims, as should be clear from the victims of his attacks, but also on what he describes as leftists, Marxists and Multiculturalists. Prescribing levels of traitors³⁹, it's evident that Breivik blames a majority of this fictitious replacement on left-wing, socially progressive elements in European society. The themes which Breivik focuses on here essentially come down to two main issues, firstly their supposed complicity in what he sees as the Islamification of Europe, and secondly, what he refers to as the 'cultural suicide' of Europe through progressive social programmes. The first issue is the most relevant to the white genocide great replacement myths, as Breivik ties perceived leftists directly to supposedly planting Europe with non-white peoples, directly calling it 'state-sponsored ethnic cleansing combined with a bloodthirsty genocide committed by hate-filled, anti-white, racist immigrants'⁴⁰. It is also relevant to note, and evident from the last quote, which references the British Government in 2011, the Conservative Party, preceded by the centre-left party of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, that Breivik plays fast and loose with his definition of who these Marxist traitors are. Breivik appears happy to tar all those with positions of beliefs that he doesn't like with any of these definitions, and anyone seems open to being tagged with one of the three accusatory labels of Leftist, Marxist, or multiculturalist. These individuals, whom he believes have had a direct hand in propagating this attack on the west, are listed by Breivik as Class A traitors, the vilest of all criminals in his mind⁴¹. This is a continuation of popular far-right discourse, where leftists are often portrayed as traitors, and therefore legitimate targets⁴².

It is clear through the manifesto that Breivik takes issue with those whom he believes are propagating a decline of European values and weakening Europe from the inside, whether knowingly or not. Like many on the far-right⁴³, his hatred comes down chiefly to politicians,

³⁷ Anders Behring Breivik, 2083 *A European Declaration of Independence*, 2018, 1472.

³⁸ Ariel Koch, 'The New Crusaders: Contemporary Extreme Right Symbolism and Rhetoric', *Perspectives on Terrorism* 11, no. 5 (2017): 13–24, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26297928>.

³⁹ Anders Behring Breivik, 2083 *A European Declaration of Independence*, 2018, 770.

⁴⁰ Anders Behring Breivik, 2083 *A European Declaration of Independence*, 2018, 398.

⁴¹ Anders Behring Breivik, 2083 *A European Declaration of Independence*, 2018, 930.

⁴² Celine-Marie Pascale, 'The Weaponization of Language: Discourses of Rising Right-Wing Authoritarianism', *Current Sociology* 67, no. 6 (1 October 2019): 898–917, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392119869963>.

⁴³ Stefanoni, 'The Multifaceted Reaction in the Twenty-First Century: A New Stage in the Evolution of the Right', *Latin-American Historical Almanac*, 24 September 2022.

members of the media, and academics. Breivik writes at length about the complicity of academics, continuing a long trend of far-right anti-intellectualism⁴⁴. He believes that through these individuals, Cultural Marxism, as he describes, has taken root in Europe, although never explicitly clear what exactly is meant by this, the main understanding that can be taken away is Breivik's hatred of what he calls 'Multiculturalism'⁴⁵. Breivik calls multiculturalism the 'root cause of the ongoing Islamification of Europe'⁴⁶, and uses the term sporadically to describe a weakening of Christian values and an increased focus on socially progressive ideas around race and gender. Breivik repeats common far-right anti-intellectual beliefs⁴⁷ throughout the text, saying that 'racial egalitarianism' has replaced 'radical individualism'⁴⁸, repeating the idea that people like this are attempting to change society without the knowledge of the average person. Breivik states that through methods such as historical revisionism about issues like the crusades, anti-colonial bias in western history and engaging in negotiationism with non-white peoples and Islam, these people have weakened the foundations of European society and allowed it to grow degenerate, unable and unwilling to defend itself from Islamization. Breivik holds people of this description in such high importance that he labels them at the top of the list of focus targets for assassination of the kind he would later carry out, listing 'A and B traitors to be Focus targeted' as 'Cultural Marxist professors, leading anchor men/women of the cultural Marxist MSM, NGO leader's, professors/lecturers etc'⁴⁹. The central focus on these 'leftists' is significant when one compares Breivik's attitude towards them and his hatred of Muslims. Muslims, he believes, can be convinced to turn to Christian values, and in his plan, as laid out in the manifesto, would be permitted to convert to Christianity and remain in Europe. However, the same leniency is not afforded to these Cultural Marxists, whose only fate in Breivik's plan is to be eliminated.

One of the predominant focuses of the manifesto is directed towards his scorn for feminism and a hatred of all things female. In many ways, it is the woman who is the central flaw in European degeneration in the eyes of Breivik, and through a variety of means, he sees feminism as paving the way towards the destruction of European society. One can see this kind of

⁴⁴ Michael A. Peters, 'Anti-Intellectualism Is a Virus', *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 51, no. 4 (21 March 2019): 357–63, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2018.1462946>.

⁴⁵ Anders Behring Breivik, 2083 *A European Declaration of Independence*, 2018, 04.

⁴⁶ Anders Behring Breivik, 2083 *A European Declaration of Independence*, 2018, 09.

⁴⁷ Liz Montegary, 'Anti-Gender, Anti-University: "Gender Ideology" and the Future of US Higher Education', *Feminist Formations* 34, no. 3 (2022): 1–32, <https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/877730>.

⁴⁸ Anders Behring Breivik, 2083 *A European Declaration of Independence*, 2018, 31.

⁴⁹ Anders Behring Breivik, 2083 *A European Declaration of Independence*, 2018, 942.

discourse in far-right circles often, with sex, gender and race frequently entangled⁵⁰. One of the main ways in which Breivik combines these ideas is through the feminist movement's strives for bodily autonomy, specifically through birth control and readily available abortion services. Breivik sees this as being part of his idea of societal suicide, as he believes women asserting control over their own bodies to be a crucial part of replacement, lowering birth rates among Europeans and allowing immigrants to out-reproduce native white populations. This is crucially important to his belief system, listing contraceptive pills 'allowing 500,000 annual abortions'⁵¹ as one of the key crimes of his cultural Marxist enemy. Breivik extends his scorn also to women seeking a more established place in the workplace, describing this too as furthering declining birth rates in Europe. By choosing to delay having children and instead focusing on careers, Breivik sees women as abandoning their role as mothers and producers of European children. In many ways, Breivik's analysis of women is reminiscent of unfortunately widespread manosphere ideas⁵², and he rants sporadically throughout the text about the upset in what he sees as the natural patriarchal order of things. This extends to ideas about parenting losing its disciplined edge, with men's position reduced to 'infantilised' in the face of 'promiscuous' liberated women⁵³, to the detriment of children and families. He appears obsessed with the idea that this is one of the main roots of what he sees as societal degeneration of the West, and in his eyes, the only way to deal with this is to 'reestablish' the patriarchy. This essentially then means removing women's agency totally, establishing essentially enforced monogamy through handmaid's tale style breeding facilities, where the state replaces the husband⁵⁴. The defining characteristic of all of this is a burning hatred of women and the desire to do violence towards them. This is clear from an assertion from a section of the text titled 'Killing Women on the field of battle – directly or indirectly'⁵⁵, in which Breivik claims that most 'cultural Marxists' are women, and therefore anyone following his formula must be

⁵⁰ Josef Barla and Sophie and Bjork-James, 'Introduction: Entanglements of Anti-Feminism and Anti-Environmentalism in the Far-Right', *Australian Feminist Studies* 36, no. 110 (2 October 2021): 377–87, <https://doi.org/10.1080/08164649.2022.2062668>.

⁵¹ Anders Behring Breivik, 2083 *A European Declaration of Independence*, 2018, 773.

⁵² Kathryn Hopton and Susanne Langer, "'Kick the XX out of Your Life": An Analysis of the Manosphere's Discursive Constructions of Gender on Twitter', *Feminism & Psychology* 32, no. 1 (1 January 2022): 3–22, <https://doi.org/10.1177/09593535211033461>.

⁵³ Anders Behring Breivik, 2083 *A European Declaration of Independence*, 2018, 361.

⁵⁴ Anders Behring Breivik, 2083 *A European Declaration of Independence*, 2018, 391.

⁵⁵ 'Anti-Feminism and Misogyny in Breivik's "Manifesto"', accessed 18 April 2025, <https://www-tandfonline-com.eur.idm.oclc.org/doi/epdf/10.1080/08038740.2011.650707?needAccess=true>.

⁵⁶ Anders Behring Breivik, 2083 *A European Declaration of Independence*, 2018, 933.

comfortable killing women, showing even deeper levels to his misogyny with the addendum ‘even very attractive women’⁵⁷.

It is through these ideas that Breivik would convince himself that he had to act to stop the processes he believed were occurring in Europe before it was too late, utterly justifying his terrorism through these delusions. The act that this supposed Justiciar of the Knights Templar would settle on did not see him attacking what he believed to be the ancient enemy of Europe, his great Muslim Menace. Instead, Breivik settled on the bombing of the government quarter of Oslo, killing 8 and injuring over 200 people, and an attack on a Labour Party camp on Utøya island, where he murdered 69 people, mainly children, all while screaming ‘You will die today Marxists’⁵⁸. This attack was the bitter conclusion of this rhetoric, as Breivik completely justified his actions to himself through the reasons outlined in his manifesto. To Breivik, all of his issues tie together, and even though he is inconsistent as to the level to which he believes these issues to be a coordinated plan or not is never quite clear throughout his writing, what is clear is that he treated it as if it is regardless. Under this logic, progressive social policy is almost of equal importance to mass migration and worthy of the same response. Even though he called his actions pre-emptive, it is quite clear that Breivik was already operating under the belief that Europe was already under attack, and that his actions were not only justified but necessary. Breivik would not die in his attempt, being captured by police at the end of his spree and admitted to both the Oslo bombing and the killing spree on Utøya, standing trial the following year. Through this trial and the media circus that accompanied it, the world got to know Anders Breivik for the first time, as a pudgy-faced bald man entered the courtroom and gave a straight-armed clenched-fisted salute. Breivik would be given the maximum sentence available in Norway and remains in prison to this day despite repeated appeals. Even though the war which Breivik hoped to precipitate through his action never came, he has had a major impact on the radicalisation of others, and none more so than being the inspiration for Brenton Tarrant, the Christchurch shooter.

⁵⁷ Anders Behring Breivik, *2083 A European Declaration of Independence*, 2018, 933.

⁵⁸ ‘Breivik Describes Hunting down Panicked Teens - CBS News’, 20 April 2012, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/breivik-describes-hunting-down-panicked-teens/>.

This is Not Us – The Christchurch Shooter and The Mainstreaming of Radical Ideology

In the years that followed Breivik's attacks and imprisonment, several far-right attacks took place in the style of Breivik; however, the most significant of these, both in terms of method, impact and media attention, is undeniably the attack carried out by Brenton Tarrant, better known as the Christchurch shooter. Following the lionisation and dissection of Breivik as a character in the public eye, much effort has been spent in the attempt not to repeat that mistake with Tarrant, and so I will not dwell on the man himself here, only the extremist beliefs which led him to commit mass murder. If Breivik was inspired by Stormfront and Fjordman, then Tarrant was inspired by the next generation of that movement. A regular and active poster, particularly on 4chan⁵⁹, Tarrant was deeply involved with online extremist groups and culture, and the nature of his radicalisation and his beliefs are incredibly relevant to my study of the history of right-wing terrorist beliefs, as well as how that translates to online radical content. Despite claiming influence and instruction from nobody to carry out his attacks, Tarrant, through his writing and court appearances, shows massive reverence for Breivik. The extent to which their respective ideologies cross over is fascinating, and exploring this is highly relevant to my goal of exploring the shadow of these individuals on contemporary right-wing groups. Although New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern was clear with her statement that 'this is not us'⁶⁰, the task remains to understand where Tarrant's motivations came from, what his justifications were, and what the ideological underpinnings of his gruesome attack are.

The most striking ideological strain that Tarrant shares with Breivik is something which is at the core of both of their beliefs: an obsession with Islam, and a belief that white populations are actively being intentionally replaced. This is a central issue to Tarrant, who even went as far as to name his manifesto, written prior to his attacks, 'The Great Replacement'⁶¹, a clear endorsement of the conspiracy theory so central to contemporary far-right belief⁶². Similarly to Breivik, Tarrant also focuses on a fanatical obsession with Muslim populations in his home of New Zealand and worldwide, and his take on the Great Replacement myth is similarly more

⁵⁹ Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, Chelsea Daymon, and Amarnath Amarasingam, 'The Christchurch Attack Report: Key Takeaways on Tarrant's Radicalization and Attack Planning', n.d.

⁶⁰ Sahar Ghumkhor, 'The Hypocrisy of New Zealand's "This Is Not Us" Claim | New Zealand Attack | Al Jazeera', 20 March 2025, <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/3/20/the-hypocrisy-of-new-zealands-this-is-not-us-claim>.

⁶¹ Brenton Tarrant, 'The Great Replacement', 2019.

⁶² Mattias Ekman, 'The Great Replacement: Strategic Mainstreaming of Far-Right Conspiracy Claims', 6 May 2022, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/13548565221091983>.

focused on the Eurabia Conspiracy theory. This is abundantly clear from the first lines of his manifesto, writing ‘It’s the birthrates’⁶³ three times in succession. Tarrant espouses constantly pro-natalist beliefs, a far-right idea focused on declining birthrates of certain populations and the increase in others⁶⁴ and appears utterly central to his ideology and rationalisation for killing. Pronatalist ideas appear to have become a cornerstone of replacement ideology, and are used to push xenophobic heteronormative discourse⁶⁵. It is telling how pervasive this ideology is within his belief system, as he quickly follows up by stating that mass deportation isn’t sufficient to solve his perceived fear of white annihilation. This shows a pervasiveness in the ideology; the great replacement in the eyes of individuals like Breivik and Tarrant is not something which they want solved solely by repatriation,⁶⁶ but also focuses heavily on the replacement rates of reproduction in white populations. Tarrant pushes these ideas throughout the text, and similarly to Breivik, relates the idea that through the process of ‘Sub-replacement fertility’⁶⁷ and mass migration is pushing white populations are being pushed to extinction, railing that it is ethnic replacement, cultural replacement, racial replacement and white genocide⁶⁸. Tarrant’s hatred of Muslims and focus on them as the group of migrants central to his conspiratorial beliefs is ultimately clear from his choice of victim in his mass killing spree, a series of mosques full of worshippers at Friday prayer.

One interesting point in Tarrant’s manifesto is that despite his burning hatred for Muslim migrants and heinous acts, he openly says that he does not entirely blame them for the situation he believes is unfolding across the globe. Similarly to Breivik, Tarrant blames European society for his perceived woes, stating ‘Expecting immigrants to assimilate to a dying, decadent culture is laughable’⁶⁹. This is an interesting turn as, despite murdering scores of Muslims at prayer, he does not see their culture necessarily as inferior or degenerate, quite the opposite, viewing Muslims and Islamic culture as something admirable. Tarrant even goes as far as to juxtapose Islamic culture as ‘strong, dominant and rising’⁷⁰ with ‘elderly, decaying, degenerate’⁷¹

⁶³ Brenton Tarrant, ‘The Great Replacement’, 2019, 01.

⁶⁴ Diana Garvin, ‘Reproductive Health Care from Fascism to Forza Nuova’, *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 47, no. 1 (September 2021): 129–65, <https://doi.org/10.1086/715228>.

⁶⁵ Claire Rasmussen, ‘Fertile Ground: The Biopolitics of Natalist Populism’, *ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies / ACME : Revue Internationale de Géographie Critique / ACME: Revista Internacional de Geografía Crítica* 22, no. 3 (2023): 1069–92, <https://doi.org/10.7202/1102113ar>.

⁶⁶ Brenton Tarrant, ‘The Great Replacement’, 2019, 08.

⁶⁷ Brenton Tarrant, ‘The Great Replacement’, 2019, 09.

⁶⁸ Brenton Tarrant, ‘The Great Replacement’, 2019, 01.

⁶⁹ Brenton Tarrant, ‘The Great Replacement’, 2019, 04.

⁷⁰ Brenton Tarrant, ‘The Great Replacement’, 2019, 04.

⁷¹ Brenton Tarrant, ‘The Great Replacement’, 2019, 04.

European culture. This is an interesting distinction, as he does not appear to focus on what most on the far-right do about Muslim immigrants, which is typically cultural and biological differences⁷², but instead on the idea of them as a major demographic group and therefore a threat.

The core of this essentially appears to be that Tarrant, akin to Breivik, views relations between Muslims and people of European descent as part of an age-old battle which has been continuing since the Middle Ages. This is a theme which appears throughout the text, with a misrepresentation of history central to Tarrant's beliefs, mostly in the form of crusader imagery. The manifesto is littered with references to 'the invader'⁷³, which Tarrant uses to refer to Muslim migrants, and he equates their presence in Europe and elsewhere with a military operation of which the countries 'invaded' are unable to deal with. Tarrant also refers to the siege of Vienna⁷⁴, the battle between the Holy Roman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on one side and the Ottoman empire on the other, which is viewed as the halting point for Ottoman expansion into Europe and commonly referenced by right-wing figures⁷⁵. His use of this language continues a trend in far-right discourse of militarising and politicising language used about immigration, framing migrants as invaders and their actions as a direct threat to local populations.⁷⁶

Tarrant's references to historical examples like this do not stop with his manifesto; he also adorned the very weapons with which he carried out his gruesome crimes with many similar references to figures from his ahistorical memory of a crusading Christian past, all the way to more contemporary references⁷⁷. The diverse sampling of history is striking, with several examples of Christian European figures engaging with Muslim enemies throughout the years. Tarrant inscribed on his weapon the name of Charles Martel, the Frankish leader who warred against the Muslim Kingdoms of southern Europe, most famously at the battle of Tours, another example of a battle from history held up to be a turning point in Muslim kingdoms' ambitions

⁷² Caterina Froio, 'Race, Religion, or Culture? Framing Islam between Racism and Neo-Racism in the Online Network of the French Far Right', *Perspectives on Politics* 16, no. 3 (September 2018): 696–709, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592718001573>.

⁷³ Brenton Tarrant, 'The Great Replacement', 2019, 06.

⁷⁴ Brenton Tarrant, 'The Great Replacement', 2019, 06.

⁷⁵ David Farrell-Banks, 'Crossing Borders and Building Walls in Right-Wing Uses of the Past', *Anthropological Journal of European Cultures* 30, no. 1 (1 March 2021): 104–13, <https://doi.org/10.3167/ajec.2021.300107>.

⁷⁶ Berta Chulvi et al., 'Politicization of Immigration and Language Use in Political Elites: A Study of Spanish Parliamentary Speeches', *Journal of Language and Social Psychology* 43, no. 2 (1 March 2024): 164–94, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927X231175856>.

⁷⁷ 'Buffalo Shooter's Weapons Covered in White Supremacist Messaging | ADL', accessed 10 June 2025, <https://www.adl.org/resources/article/buffalo-shooters-weapons-covered-white-supremacist-messaging>.

on European territories. Similar examples come in the form of Cyrillic text and the year 1770, a reference to a Russian naval victory over the Ottoman empire against the odds, as well the writing referencing Sebastiano Venier twice on his equipment, a Venetian admiral who defeated the Ottomans at sea and dealt a blow to their ambitions in Europe. This view of history is twisted to fit the narrative of a constant state of war between the Islamic world and Europe. This becomes clearer when one considers the more contemporary references inscribed on Tarrant's weapons, such as references to far-right ideology and, most strikingly, other far-right terrorists. Tarrant emblazoned one of his weapons with the phrase '14 Words', a reference to the mission statement of white supremacist terrorist David Lane 'We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children'⁷⁸. Similarly, Tarrant includes the name of Alexandre Bisonette, someone who clearly influenced Tarrant, having themselves attacked a mosque. These references are topped off with more topical allusions, such as to a UN compact which was intended to crack down on illegal migration, and a reference to the Rotherham grooming gang scandals in the UK where a group of Pakistani men were found to have sexually assaulted over 1000 children over the course of two decades. This shows how disparate historical ideas and contemporary references are forced into these narratives of white genocide and replacement by the far-right, forming different ideas and events into a cohesive narrative which allows them to spread counterfactual ideas to radicalise themselves and others.

Part of this narrative that Tarrant internalised and regurgitated is hatred for a 'degenerate'⁷⁹ European society, which facilitates the processes of white genocide that Tarrant believes is taking place. Blaming the degeneration of European society on 'weak men'⁸⁰, Tarrant rants about the idea that a lack of strength has put Europe in a disadvantaged place where it can be exploited. This weakness, as Tarrant sees it, comes down to ideas of openness, diversity and tolerance being weakening forces in Europe which have and will continue to herald its downfall. One central idea in the text is that 'Diversity is weak'⁸¹, a sentiment elaborated on and repeated throughout. Tarrant subscribes to the idea that any group of racially diverse people is inherently weakened and uses the examples of Brazil and South Africa as racially diverse nations, which despite this and other advantages struggle, calling South Africa a 'Bloody

⁷⁸ 'David Lane', Southern Poverty Law Center, accessed 23 April 2025, <https://www.splcenter.org/resources/extremist-files/david-lane/>.

⁷⁹ Brenton Tarrant, 'The Great Replacement', 2019, 04.

⁸⁰ Brenton Tarrant, 'The Great Replacement', 2019, 02.

⁸¹ Brenton Tarrant, 'The Great Replacement', 2019, 02.

Backwater'⁸². Tarrant essentially believes that any kind of diversity is harmful, stating 'they all turn on each other in the end'⁸³. This counterfactual reading of national strength and diversity is followed by the idea that China, which in reality is a highly diverse nation composed of multiple native ethnicities, is poised to become the leading nation globally, due to its lack of diversity. His conclusion then is that European nations need to 'reclaim' their sense of identity, to keep their languages and sovereignty and to reject diversity utterly.

Tarrant also pursues these ideas of diversity further, claiming that a lack of centralised religion in Europe and an obsession with the 'cult of the individual'⁸⁴ has led Europe down a path where it is weaker and stands in the face of opponents who are united under culture and faith. This too extends to sexual politics, claiming that a lack of proper family units has led to degeneration and weakening of society, as well as his longstanding issue with birthrates. Overall, he rages against the idea of celebrity and lack of role models, bemoaning the debauchery of modern celebrities and politicians, comparing them to hedonistic Roman emperors, claiming they worship 'all that is foreign, poisonous and subversive'⁸⁵. This comes down to what he calls 'suicidal nihilism'⁸⁶, and the idea that multicultural societies are, in essence, weak, hedonistic, debaucherous, and doomed for failure. Like Breivik, Tarrant's ideas are inconsistent, incongruent and on some occasions, directly contradictory. This is exemplified by both men's burning hatred for Islam being a guiding principle for them, both stressing how it will be the end of European culture and values, yet both men hold a grudging respect for the principles of Islam. Tarrant talks at length about the strengths of Islam, especially when compared to 'decadent' European culture, yet he still views Muslims as the ultimate enemy.

Points of Confluence – What appear to be consistent themes?

Inconsistent and contradictory beliefs and statements are a feature of both manifestos; their views are hard to pin down, yet despite this, there are trends and themes which proliferate throughout their thinking and beliefs. Although both men vary on certain issues, core themes clearly appear from my examination of their manifestos. The most consistent belief throughout both is a focus on the great replacement myth, and general discussion about 'white genocide'.

⁸² Brenton Tarrant, 'The Great Replacement', 2019, 02.

⁸³ Brenton Tarrant, 'The Great Replacement', 2019, 02.

⁸⁴ Brenton Tarrant, 'The Great Replacement', 2019, 03.

⁸⁵ Brenton Tarrant, 'The Great Replacement', 2019, 03.

⁸⁶ Brenton Tarrant, 'The Great Replacement', 2019, 04.

This is really the seminal issue which both Breivik and Tarrant focus on, Tarrant going as far as to title his manifesto ‘The Great Replacement’ and Breivik mentioning it constantly. This is absolutely an overarching theme which is central to the radicalisation of these killers and the justification of their actions. It may take many forms throughout their texts, but the essential ideas pushed by these men boil down to the idea that white European populations are under attack, being replaced primarily by Islamic populations. Centrality of this idea is indisputable, and in many ways, it serves to inform the other beliefs expressed by the two men in question, both in their own writings, but also in the writings of their influences, like Fjordman, Richard Spencer and other online far-right figures which both men viewed as influencing their ideological journeys. Long has this been a rallying point for the far-right, allowing a plethora of issues to be twisted into a racial framework, reframing historical and political discourse to place white populations as the victims⁸⁷. There is little deviation at all from this idea between the two men, and although they apply it differently in their writing at times, the core theme remains the same.

A connected but distinct theme which is consistent across both texts is the idea of Islam as the enemy of white European society, specifically connected to the Eurabia theory, both Breivik and Tarrant focus primarily on conflict with Muslim populations. This idea of a continuous war between Muslims and Christians is very consistent between the two texts, with both killers surrounding themselves in imagery related to this idea, Breivik with his claim to be a continuation of the Knights Templar, and Tarrant with his constant references to the history of conflict between Christian and Islamic empires. That said, this is something which too is incredibly inconsistent even within the individual manifestos themselves, Tarrant for example makes references to the Hagia Sophia and Turkey often, stating them to be a continuation of Christianity’s long-time foe, but in other places spreads his ideas of the enemy to all Muslims, even non-Turkic ones. Regardless of how they identify their perceived enemy, however, what is consistent is that Muslim people are at the centre of the supposed downfall of the West, diametrically opposed to Christian Europe. Muslim populations are then linked to former Muslim empires regardless of origin, completely to suit the circumstances required by Breivik or Tarrant. Similarly, while hatred towards Muslims and fear of being outnumbered by them is

⁸⁷ Xinyi Zhang and Mark Davis, ‘Transnationalising Reactionary Conservative Activism: A Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis of Far-Right Narratives Online.’, *Communication Research & Practice* 8, no. 2 (1 July 2022): 121–35, <https://doi.org/10.1080/22041451.2022.2056425>.

consistent over both texts, both men display an apparent grudging respect for Islamic culture, in ways viewing it as enviable in comparison to contemporary European culture.

This envy for Islamic fundamentalism and what they see as cultural cohesiveness is highly related to the next emergent theme, a view that European culture is degenerate and dying. This belief is shared by both killers in their writings, and while their reasoning is diverse, it appears to boil down to similar issues, which appear consistent with their inspirations. Both men express the belief that progressive cultural movements are deeply destructive, referring to them as cultural suicide and degeneracy. The main gripes held by Breivik and Tarrant relate mostly to a perceived weakening of patriarchal control, from the family to the state level. This is consistently mentioned throughout both texts, with both men lamenting at length about how they see the growing place of women in society as a fatal blow to European culture. They reason that they this is weakening men by empowering women, emasculating them, and ultimately serving to abandon the traditional nuclear family structure, leading to further cultural deterioration. Their issues with women go further, as they view women having children less and later to have an apocalyptic impact on birth rates, which they see as a vital part of their replacement ideology. Their ideas of cultural deterioration do not end there, as both men, in different ways, point to Europe's apparent abandonment of religion as being one of the biggest causes of its apparent downfall. While Breivik claims to be explicitly religious and Tarrant only to live by Christian values, both see this move away from religion as a move towards 'degenerate' behaviours which ultimately weaken European populations, leaving them disorganised, divided and weak.

A clear theme across the manifestos of Breivik and Tarrant is an identification of a treacherous enemy within, the leftists who they believe are ushering in these changes to Europe. Not convinced that demographic changes in Europe are a result of geopolitical factors such as wars, normal population changes and migration to wealthy centres, the two terrorists in focus are much more inclined to believe and push the narrative that leftist enemies of Europe are orchestrating these changes to align with their own beliefs. For Breivik, this means the aforementioned 'Cultural Marxists' and 'Multiculturalists', with these views being shared by Tarrant, presenting something much more offensive to them than even their hated Islamic 'invaders'. This is the crux of much of their thinking, and most of their entire great replacement ideology revolves around the idea of leftists, both intentionally and unintentionally, opening the door for the degeneration of society and the influx of non-white Muslim migration into Europe. These people are consequently despised in their ideology, granted the title of 'Class A'

traitors by Breivik, who warrant nothing but death, a sentiment shared by Tarrant. This is a central point of their ideology, giving them a convenient enemy in their twisted narrative whom they can point to for all their perceived societal ills.

It is clear then that the manifestos laid out by these vile killers contain ideas that are often inconsistent, self-contradictory and wildly drawn from a misunderstanding of history, yet despite this, a coherent narrative does emerge under investigation. Both Breivik and Tarrant were radicalised into similar ways of thinking with a belief system that allowed them to come to the same bloody conclusion, and it's quite clear that their motivations and rationalisations for these actions come from a similar place. While drawing on different ideas at times, the broad strokes of their radicalisation and rationalisation are similar enough to see emergent themes in their respective manifestos. This is interesting, as it means that two of the most infamous far-right mass killers had similar paths to radicalisation, and justified their attacks on civilians in similar ways, feeling that their beliefs were enough to rationalise gruesome murder. This is more significant when one considers that Tarrant and Breivik did not inhabit environments that were necessarily analogous, as mentioned previously, Breivik grew up and lived in Norway, while Tarrant lived across the globe in New Zealand, yet their beliefs are incredibly similar. These themes then could possibly be important to the most extreme aspects of far-right discourse, and deserve to be explored further, their prominence, how universal they are and whether they remain as relevant now as they were to Breivik and Tarrant.

Chapter 2- Packs of Lone Wolves

Are the Themes Exhibited in The Terrorists' Manifestos Widespread in Online Far-Right Groups?

Following my analysis of the themes and ideas which form a narrative in the manifestos of terrorists, it is clearly worth investigating further how widespread these narratives are and indeed how relevant they remain. While Breivik in 2011 focused his attention on the far-right blogs of Fjordman and Richard Spencer, and Tarrant in 2019 was a prolific 4chan user, my focus for analysing contemporary far-right discourse is placed on one of the contemporary bastions of far-right discourse, the channels of Telegram. Telegram is an app established specifically with the goal of providing secure communications but has quickly become a home of the most extreme content on the internet following a tightening of community guidelines on traditional social media such as Facebook and Twitter. While secure communication is the name of the game on Telegram, they also operate public-facing channels which can be viewed and joined by any user. It is through these channels that one can learn the most without any level of subterfuge, as they're open to the public and searchable with keywords within Telegram's search function. Despite being public channels with no sense of security or difficulty to access them, much information is shared, including communication, links to other like-minded groups, memes and text posts. It is from these that I can examine the themes previously explored within the terrorist manifestos, as well as whatever other related information may exist within these groups. By doing so, I can explore the extent to which the views, motivations and ideas of the most extreme examples from the far-right, those of Breivik

and Tarrant, are shared amongst the online far-right of today. The groups chosen for examination come from across the world, and in many ways are highly interconnected, sharing links to pages for similar groups in different countries and areas who share their beliefs. While the message is often obscured in subterfuge, behind dog whistles and humour, I believe it remains valuable for investigation, as by comparing the network of online far-right groups on Telegram, we can learn much about how consistent beliefs and views are across the globe.

Global Great Replacement – The Far-Right North Star

The clear underlying theme in both manifestos that really stood out was adherence to the myth of the great replacement theory, and its relevance in contemporary online far-right discourse should be investigated. This far-right conspiracy theory, propagated in different ways and for many years, served as a north star for both terrorists, and so its prevalence today is something which should be thoroughly explored. In many ways, it can be seen as a panacea for all other right-wing conspiracy theories, which can absorb other conspiracy theories, launder them through its circular logic and come to the same conclusion as was first desired. My first port of call when investigating these groups, when comparing them to the writings of Breivik and Tarrant, would be to examine how this theme holds up in their own parts of the world. Norway has a long history of far-right activity, being the Scandinavian Nordic homeland of Nazi mythmaking. Neo-Nazi groups and extremist organisations have long found a home here and other Scandinavian countries and are well represented in online far-right circles, to include Telegram.

Allusions to replacement ideology are common among posts made in Nordic and other Scandinavian Telegram channels, ranging from explicit references to more subdued references harkening back to better days and a sense of pan-European identity. One such Telegram channel ‘Nordic Resistance Movement’⁸⁸, an openly neo-Nazi group, makes consistent references to the great replacement myth and white genocide. Consistently since 2019, this group has railed against what they see as the replacement of ethnic Nordic people across Norway and Sweden, promoting posts of activists protesting ‘The replacement of Swedish People’⁸⁹ and holding banners Sweden with the message ‘STOPPA FOLKUTBYTET’, or as the post on Telegram

⁸⁸ ‘Nordic Resistance Movement’, n.d., <https://t.me/nordicresistancemovement>.

⁸⁹ Nordic Resistance Movement, ‘Nest 5 Fight against the Replacement of the Swedish People in Filipstad’, *Telegram*, 28 September 2019, <https://t.me/nordicresistancemovement/119>.

elaborates in English, ‘Stop the Population Replacement’⁹⁰. This kind of rhetoric is consistent throughout their channel, explicitly stating at one point after their domain was taken down that the same people responsible for the loss of their website are ‘working on racially replacing us from our homelands’⁹¹. Not all references to replacement ideology are so explicit, with much more subtle references to replacement throughout other groups. Norway is no exception to this, with one group, ‘Active Club Norway’⁹², ostensibly a page promoting self-improvement through fitness and martial arts training, Active Club Norway is truly a far-right page whose real focus is the strengthening of white Norwegian men in preparation for a race war. While they do not explicitly state the great replacement or any ideas of white genocide, they perpetuate the idea that groups of nationalists need to be ready, both in terms of fitness and combat readiness for future struggles.

References to replacement ideology is not something which is unique to Nordic Telegram groups and are also commonplace in Tarrant's home of New Zealand. Many similar far-right Telegram groups also engage in the action of both overtly stating and alluding to the conspiracy theory that white populations are being replaced, even ironically in a white settler colonial society such as New Zealand or Australia. One such group that openly espouses explicit replacement rhetoric is another so-called Active Club, the ‘Southern Rangers Active Club’⁹³. This group similarly uses fitness and martial arts training as a basis for their group, encouraging other group members to train, become fitter and more physically capable, all the while spreading extreme far-right white nationalist ideology. A prime example of a direct call to action with regard to the great replacement theory can be seen in this Telegram channel. Related to their theme of physical fitness and activity, they write ‘Get active or get replaced’⁹⁴, a clear call to action based on the fear of the great replacement myth. This kind of sentiment is consistent throughout the group's messaging, alluding constantly to the need to maintain physical fitness and martial readiness to fend off their enemies and defend an imagined glorious

⁹⁰ Nordic Resistance Movement, ‘Banner Action in Borlänge Members and Activists from Sweden’s Nest 5 Hold a “Stop the Population Replacement” Banner Action in Borlänge, Dalarna County’, *Telegram*, 24 April 2021, <https://t.me/nordicresistancemovement/1087>.

⁹¹ Nordic Resistance Movement, ‘As You Might Have Noticed, Our Websites Are Currently under Attack from the Same Forces That Have Labeled Us Terrorists, Taken Our Bank Accounts and Are Working on Racially Replacing Us in Our Homelands. But Rest Assured, This Is Just a Minor Setback on Our Path to Total Aryan Victory. Hail Victory!’, 9 July 2024, <https://t.me/nordicresistancemovement/2993>.

⁹² ‘Active Club Norway’, *Telegram*, n.d., <https://t.me/Activeclubnorway>.

⁹³ ‘Southern Rangers Active Club’, *Telegram*, n.d., [@SouthernRangers](https://t.me/SouthernRangers).

⁹⁴ Southern Rangers Active Club, ‘S.R.A.C. Have Been Active over This Past Month. Have You? Get Active or Get Replaced Contact Us Now!’, *Telegram*, 10 December 2024, [S.R.A.C. have been active over this past month. Have you? Get Active or Get Replaced Contact us now!](https://t.me/SouthernRangers/S.R.A.C.have.been.active.over.this.past.month.Have.you?Get.Active.or.Get.Replaced.Contact.us.now!)

past, stating, ‘Our people’s glory is not behind us. Get out there and get active’⁹⁵. This kind of rhetoric is commonplace in New Zealand based far-right groups, such as the Channel ‘Hail Zealandia’⁹⁶, which frequently displays posts evoking nostalgia for a misremembered past, and commenting on how demographic change has impacted it, frequently posting old photos of New Zealand from the 20th century with captions such as ‘Just admit it, white New Zealand was better’⁹⁷. These pages strongly reinforce ideas of replacement to their audiences, presenting them with a sense of loss, all while offering themselves as the alternative.

This adherence to the myth of a Great Replacement of white populations is not limited to the homes of Breivik and Tarrant and appears commonplace across Europe and the United States, featuring often in far-right groups globally. Far-right activity in the United States has been a topic of much discussion this past decade, coming really into prominence at the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, where a plethora of right-wing groups came together to demonstrate. Neo-confederates, Klansmen, religious right members, and other representatives from the emergent alt-right formed a blisteringly angry protest, which led to the death of counter-protester Heather Heyer⁹⁸. This was something of a turning point for recent American far-right movements, forging many which still exist today. One such group was Patriot Front, who often use its Telegram channel⁹⁹ to promote its members' actions, including protests, graffiti and hanging provocative signs. It is through these actions that an adherence to replacement beliefs can be seen. While their messaging follows usual themes for American groups of all kinds, references to the founders and revolutionary war slogans like ‘United we stand, divided we fall’¹⁰⁰, many of the banners and slogans they spread across the US and share on their channel contain replacement sentiment. Examples of this are quite subtle from this group, with

⁹⁵ Southern Rangers Active Club, ‘Many Nationalists Believe That We Are Men among the Ruins of Our Own History. We Have Now as Ever, the Power to Create New Art, and Music for Our Culture. Our Enemies Know Only How to Destroy, so We Must as a Morale Duty to Our People, Create. Our People’s Glory Is Not behind Us. Get out There and Get Active. Southernrangers@tutamail.Com <https://t.me/Antithule> <https://t.me/Chchlegion>’, *Telegram*, 19 January 2025, <https://t.me/SouthernRangers/128>.

⁹⁶ ‘Hail Zealandia’, *Telegram*, n.d., <https://t.me/HailZealandia>.

⁹⁷ Hail Zealandia, ‘Just Admit It. White New Zealand Was Better.’, *Telegram*, 27 September 2024, <https://t.me/HailZealandia/94>.

⁹⁸ Nicole Sganga and Reports for All Shows, ‘What to Know about Charlottesville’s “Unite the Right” Rally Civil Trial - CBS News’, 19 November 2021, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/charlottesville-unite-the-right-rally-trial-what-to-know/>.

⁹⁹ ‘Patriot Front’, *Telegram*, n.d., <https://t.me/PatriotFrontUpdates>.

¹⁰⁰ Patriot Front, ‘@PatriotFrontNews » Activists from Network 7 Placed a Banner, Posters, and Donated to a Food Pantry in Richford, Vermont. us Read the PF Manifesto: Patriotfront.Us/Manifesto/’, *Telegram*, 20 March 2025, <https://t.me/PatriotFrontUpdates/22698>.

references to defending ‘American Blood’¹⁰¹, and frequent assertions that America needs to ‘Deport invaders’¹⁰². These kinds of nativist assertions are common in American groups, referencing the idea of replacement without explicitly doing so.

That said, other groups have no problem with openly stating their belief in the great replacement theory. This is seen most strikingly in the Telegram channel for NOVA, a US-based white nationalist group with the stated aim to create ‘a nation within a nation’, as they believe the US has abandoned its original purpose¹⁰³. This group has no issue with blatantly discussing their belief in great replacement ideology, openly marching with banners with the message ‘Mass deportations now’, directly tying this to it, saying their members were advocating ‘for our people in the face of total replacement’¹⁰⁴. Replacement is a core issue for NOVA, as they attempt to use statistics from Texas demographics to demonstrate their ideas, claiming it is ‘Ground zero for the great replacement’¹⁰⁵, and using this as a call to action.

Under Siege – Islamophobia and The Global Cabal

If the great replacement myth is the main focus of Breivik and Tarrant, then surely second place must fall to their obsession with Islam, Muslims and their migrations to Europe and elsewhere. This too is something which appears to have kept its relevance in online groups, although the level to which islamophobia is the main focus of many far-right groups isn’t quite as consistent, at least when compared to what can be seen in the manifestos of the far-right terrorists. That said, it is still common to see references to Islam in far-right groups, and is especially prevalent in groups based in Europe and the UK, where the idea is that Islam, and by definition, Muslims are inherently dangerous, painting them as violent, backwards and unfit for living in European society. One of the most common examples for this is the many references to the Rotherham Rape Gangs. This can be seen periodically in the Telegram channel for Britain First¹⁰⁶, a

¹⁰¹ Patriot Front, ‘@PatriotFrontNews » Activists from Network 3 Placed Posters in Aspen, Colorado. us Visit Our FAQ Section: Patriotfront.us/#faq’, *Telegram*, 12 April 2025, <https://t.me/PatriotFrontUpdates/22803>.

¹⁰² Patriot Front, ‘@PatriotFrontNews » Activists from Network 7 Placed a Banner in Springfield, Massachusetts. us Visit Our FAQ Section: Patriotfront.us/#faq’, *Telegram*, 12 April 2025, <https://t.me/PatriotFrontUpdates/22836>.

¹⁰³ ‘National Organization for Vital Action’, Odysee, accessed 3 May 2025, <https://odysee.com/@NOVA:e5>.

¹⁰⁴ NOVA, ‘In Honor of Texas Independence Day, NOVA TX Community Members Advocated for Our People in the Face of Total Replacement. Remember the Alamo and Get Involved!’, *Telegram*, 6 March 2025, <https://t.me/NOVANow/43>.

¹⁰⁵ NOVA, ‘Texas Has Been Ground Zero for the Great Replacement. Your State Is next. Get Involved.’, *Telegram*, 4 March 2025, <https://t.me/NOVANow/41>.

¹⁰⁶ ‘Britian First’, *Telegram*, n.d., <https://t.me/BritainFirst>.

prominent far-right group born from the British National Party and explicitly anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant¹⁰⁷, who have posted videos referencing Rotherham and what they call the ‘rape jihad of our country’¹⁰⁸. Britain First consistently use this case as a justification for islamophobia, usually under the guise of protecting women and getting ‘Justice for grooming victims’¹⁰⁹. The Rotherham case, while a real and horrific series of crimes, is used to justify hatred of Muslims and immigration as a whole, using the pretences of the crime and applying them elsewhere. They do this by making broad statements about the government’s inability and unwillingness to address Islamic groups, labelling them as ‘Islamist Gangs’¹¹⁰ and promoting ideas like the recording of the ethnic background of criminals involved in the abuse of children¹¹¹.

One of the most pervasive ideas held about Islam and Muslims within far-right groups is the idea that Muslims form a parallel society where they do not fall under the same scrutiny as other citizens. This is often related to another fear spread by the far-right, the idea that Muslim populations wish to spread Sharia law¹¹² to Western nations. This is commonplace in the aforementioned British groups, which make consistent references to the implementation of Sharia law in the UK, with Britain first often posting about how it is being practiced in certain parts of the country, protesting alleged ‘Sharia courts’ in London¹¹³, claiming that this ‘barbaric’ practice is already being carried out. Another common use of Sharia law is to push the idea that Muslims are actively trying to implement Sharia law in European countries, subverting the law of the land, with examples of channels sharing videos supposedly of Muslims in Germany stating their preference for Sharia law, and making the claim that as part of demographic changes, it will replace German and European law¹¹⁴. Germany is a common flashpoint for

¹⁰⁷ ‘Britain First: What You Need to Know | ADL’, 29 November 2017, <https://www.adl.org/resources/article/britain-first-what-you-need-know>.

¹⁰⁸ Britain First, ‘Here We Go Again, It’s Never Ending, the Rape Jihad of Our Country, yet We’re “Islamophobic” to Oppose It’, *Telegram*, 8 May 2019, <https://t.me/BritainFirst/458>.

¹⁰⁹ Britain First, ‘Justice for Grooming Victims! Day of Action Today in Rotherham.....’, *Telegram*, 24 August 2019, <https://t.me/BritainFirst/2573>.

¹¹⁰ Britain First, ‘So It Continues. The Authorities Will NEVER Do Anything to Upset the Islamist Gangs Responsible!’, *Telegram*, 30 January 2022, <https://t.me/BritainFirst/21524>.

¹¹¹ Britain First, ‘Rotherham Grooming Scandal: Priti Patel Says Police Must Record Ethnicity of Child Abuse Suspects. A Step in the Right Direction.’, *Telegram*, 30 December 2021, <https://t.me/BritainFirst/20953>.

¹¹² ‘Sharia | Definition, Law, & Countries | Britannica’, 29 April 2025, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/sharia>.

¹¹³ Britain First, ‘BRITAIN FIRST HOLDS FLASH DEMO AT SHARIA COURT IN EAST LONDON TO LAUNCH CAMPAIGN Britain First Has Launched a New National Campaign against Islamist “Sharia Courts”, Starting in East London’, *Telegram*, 24 June 2024, <https://t.me/BritainFirst/35283>.

¹¹⁴ Britain First, ‘German Islamists Demand Sharia Law and Say That Germany Will Turn into an Islamic State in 20 Years. If Current Immigration and Demographic Trends Continue, This Nightmare May Become a Grim Reality.’, *Telegram*, 14 January 2024, <https://t.me/BritainFirst/33500>.

discussions of this nature, frequently appearing in Telegram groups with the accusation that the Muslim populations there wish for an overthrow of the democratic systems and the implantation of Sharia law, with channels like Monitor Invasion¹¹⁵ sharing ‘reporting’ on marches in Germany, falsely claiming the march is ‘fake asylum seekers’ demanding an Islamic caliphate and Sharia law in Germany¹¹⁶. Alike Breivik and Tarrant, these pages are keen to paint this picture of Islam as backwards and barbaric, using Sharia law as a brush with which to tar all Muslim immigrants with, and providing reasoning to reject their presence in Europe. This is seen clearly from how they present Sharia law on their channels, sharing images and videos of extreme practices in Muslim majority countries and presenting them as the norm for all Muslims¹¹⁷.

The overall dehumanisation of Muslims, Islamic practices and fearmongering along these lines feeds into the overall theme of invasion. Like Breivik and Tarrant, far-right groups on Telegram are obsessed with the idea that European countries are in the process of an active invasion, primarily by people from Muslim majority countries. Posts of this nature vary, from text posts and news articles to videos of busy European and Anglophonic cities showing non-white people usually going about their business, presented in such a way as to shock viewers with the lack of white faces in the crowd¹¹⁸. These kinds of posts seek to create an impact by juxtaposing a European country with large numbers of non-white people, changing what is often an innocuous scene into something which is intended to be viewed as threatening. This kind of tactic is seen clearly in a post which shows a large number of Muslims at prayer in Norway, with the caption ‘This was once the land of the Vikings’¹¹⁹, directly comparing a large group of Muslims with an idealised past. Posts of this nature go out of their way to other the people depicted in them, referring to them not as crowds of people or young men, but often in language as explicit as ‘invaders’¹²⁰. This is most often in reference to people from Muslim

¹¹⁵ ‘Monitor Invasion’, *Telegram*, n.d., <https://t.me/MonitorInvasion>.

¹¹⁶ Monitor Invasion, ‘#Germany DE| Muslim Immigrants in Germany Are Calling for an Islamic Caliphate and Sharia Law. Are the Germans Prepared to Prevent the Goals of Fake Asylum Seekers from Being Realized?’, *Telegram*, 16 January 2025, <https://t.me/MonitorInvasion/530>.

¹¹⁷ Tommy Robison News, ‘Listen to the Screams of the Eight Year Old Girl as She’s Dragged Away from Her Family by Her New Fifty Year Old Husband, This Is Sharia Law’, *Telegram*, 1 February 2025, <https://t.me/TommyRobinsonNews/44496>.

¹¹⁸ Monitor Invasion, ‘Bamako? Algiers? Kabul? Not at All. It’s in France. It’s in #Nice. Smile, You Are Replaced.’, *Telegram*, 21 October 2024, <https://t.me/MonitorInvasion/89>.

¹¹⁹ Michael Jaco • Mike Jaco, ‘This Is Norway. This Was Once the Land of the Norwegian Vikings. This Is Norway Today’: 4 April 2025, <https://t.me/MikeJaco/10579>.

¹²⁰ Monitor Invasion, ‘Spain ES| Maghrebi Invaders, Driven Back from a Nightclub in Spain, Took down the Street Lights and Attacked the Club’, 20 October 2024, <https://t.me/MonitorInvasion/85>.

majority countries, who are referred to as ‘false asylum seekers’¹²¹. This kind of rhetoric is common, and tied often to military invasion, just like in the writings of the two far-right killers, with channels framing actions of other far-right groups protest as actions against the ‘migration invasion’, often in reference to migrant small boats, with the rallying cry ‘Stop the boats’¹²². This positioning of migrants as invaders is furthered by the framing of the individuals as potential enemy combatants, regularly being described as not as migrants fleeing war-torn countries or people seeking a better way of life, but as ‘military aged men’¹²³.

While it is clear that a hatred of Muslims is common, as are attempts to paint them, their religion and their culture as backwards and other from European society, it is also relevant to note that the individuals depicted in these ways are not exclusively Muslim, or even necessarily from Muslim majority countries. The focus of these videos primarily comes down to the shock factor of an absence of whiteness or the idea that what the person is viewing is a significant departure from what they’re used to thinking of as Europe, and so because of this, any image of a non-white individual can be used for these purposes. Common examples of this are anger towards black Africans, with no mention of religion, but executed out similarly, with a video of dark skinned men, and a statement ‘You don’t believe this but this is Düsseldorf, not Lagos.’¹²⁴. This kind of discourse is common across Europe and is often seen in French groups and discussions about French demographics in these Telegram channels. The focus is often on Africans from former French colonial territories, who are characterised as migrants, regardless of background. The people represented in these posts are referred to in derogatory, dehumanising language, such as being referred to as ‘The usual suspects’, and accused of ‘parasitic behaviour’¹²⁵. Here too one can see allusions to the invasion narrative, framing migrants as part of a war which must be fought, with groups questioning ‘Is France strong enough to win?’¹²⁶. This is an

¹²¹ Monitor Invasion, ‘#Portugal PT| A Man Riding a Motorbike Shows Us Lisbon, a City Now Invaded by False Asylum Seekers from Pakistan and Bangladesh. What Do You Think Is It Crucial to Stop This Invasion in Europe?’, *Telegram*, 20 October 2024, <https://t.me/MonitorInvasion/84>.

¹²² Tommy Robinson News, ‘The British Public, Sick of the Migration Invasion of the Country, Rightfully Concerned about Their Children’s Future’s, Descend on Dover to Tell the Government ‘Stop The Boats!’’, *Telegram*, 27 April 2025, <https://t.me/TommyRobinsonNews/60354>.

¹²³ Tommy Robinson News, ‘Mirroring the Invasion of Europe, the Invasion of the USA Is Military Aged Men, Not “Poor Refugees” as Portrayed by Government’s and Mainstream Media.’, *Telegram*, 18 July 2023, <https://t.me/TommyRobinsonNews/49637>.

¹²⁴ Monitor Invasion, ‘Germany DE| You Don’t Believe This but This Is Düsseldorf, Not Lagos.’, *Telegram*, 16 October 2024, <https://t.me/MonitorInvasion/60>.

¹²⁵ Monitor Invasion, ‘#France FR| The Usual Suspects in France Want to Travel Using French Taxpayers’ Money. Truly Parasitic Behavior.’, *Telegram*, 14 January 2025, <https://t.me/MonitorInvasion/525>.

¹²⁶ Monitor Invasion, ‘#France FR| Is France Strong Enough to Win?’, *Telegram*, 8 December 2024, <https://t.me/MonitorInvasion/318>.

interesting departure from the beliefs of Tarrant and Breivik, who focused almost entirely on Muslims as the invaders and the great enemy, as it appears that anyone non-white is fair game for discrimination, and labelling as an invader in contemporary far-right discourse online. The true nature of this hatred for anything other than white European can be seen in how one French group even takes note of what they call a “Frenchman” of Bosnian origin,¹²⁷ murdering a Muslim man and using this as an excuse to attack multiculturalism.

If Muslims are not always the main antagonist of the narratives told by these online far-right groups, then one can often detect another, and while different to the narratives of Breivik and Tarrant, it matches older far-right narratives, Jewish people as the ultimate enemy. Far-right channels on Telegram are rife with antisemitism, and references to Breivik’s idea of pan-European Judeo-Christian culture are few and far between. Much more common are outright antisemitic beliefs, which many channels espouse to cover a massive variety of issues and ideas. This line of thinking is exemplified by the popular Telegram group ‘No BS it’s the Jews®’,¹²⁸. The channel name alone already reveals so much about the group, they regularly share news stories, memes and commentary on a plethora of topics, but routinely come to the same old idea, that they should blame Jewish people and a supposed global cabal for all of it. This channel epitomises just how far antisemitism and illusions to a great Jewish conspiracy can be used for the far right, covering all kinds of ills they wish to blame on one group. No BS it’s the Jews are happy to blame Jewish people for almost all their woes and frequently accuse a Jewish conspiracy of being anti-white¹²⁹, and plotting to ruin Western nations¹³⁰. The extent to which groups like these are willing to is boundless, with one post from this channel stating that both sides of the political divide in the US are in on this cabal, even accusing the incredibly right-wing Donald Trump of being bought and paid for¹³¹. Anything from Covid-19 to

¹²⁷ Arnaud Robert, ‘Douce France. Un “Français” d’origine Bosniaque, Fan de Jeux Vidéos et Au RSA, Assassine Un Musulman. La Société Multiculturelle, c’est Bien Gentil Sur Le Papier, Mais Dans La Réalité, c’est Un Vrai Cauchemar.’, *Telegram*, 28 April 2025, <https://t.me/arnaudrobert/32473>.

¹²⁸ ‘No BS It’s the Jews®’, *Telegram*, n.d., https://t.me/No_BS_NewS.

¹²⁹ No BS it’s the Jews®, ‘Hey, Donald Puss... Address Anti-Whitness’, *Telegram*, 27 November 2024, https://t.me/No_BS_NewS/186834.

¹³⁰ No BS it’s the Jews®, ‘JFK Lost His Life Bc He Called out the Zionist Plot and Planned on Breaking up the CIA and Mossad. Not the Bay of Pigs, nor Mafia..... Research Him Wanting to Scrap the Israeli Nuclear Program.....’, *Telegram*, 5 April 2025, https://t.me/No_BS_NewS/200921.

¹³¹ GuidoAndEscanor, ‘You Can’t Steal a Rigged Election. You Can’t “Drain the Swamp” When You’re the One Restocking It with Bigger, Fatter Creatures. You Can’t Absolve Yourself from Responsibility for the Kosh-19 Shot When You Funded It, Rushed It, Marketed It, and STILL Refuse to Condemn It. You Can’t Claim to Be Downsizing Government When All You’re Really Doing Is Swapping out Bureaucratic Stooges for Palantir’s AI-Driven, Predictive Policing Surveillance State. You Can’t “Fight the Deep State” When Every Advisor, Cabinet Member, and Donor in Your Circle Is a Zionist, Banker, or Intelligence Asset. You Can’t Pretend to Be “for the People” While Cutting Trillion-Dollar Checks to Big Pharma, Greenlighting Lockdowns, and Pumping

immigration can be blamed on Jewish influence, with No BS it's the Jews summarising 'International jewry is the greatest threat to humanity'¹³². These beliefs are not only commonplace in explicitly antisemitic groups like the ones discussed but also proliferate throughout other groups. These groups easily tie ideas of a Jewish conspiracy together into other beliefs they hold, dismissing a report about the far-right conspiracy theory of white-genocide occurring on the farms of South Africa, simply because it was a Jewish organisation that wrote it, stating 'Says the ADL Jew pedos'¹³³. This is a clear departure from the themes established in the manifestos, but not necessarily a surprising or new development. Many of the accusations against Jewish people have existed for centuries, and in many ways are continuations of Nazi propaganda, and the dense history of neo-Nazism since then.

Traitors in Our Midst- Leftists as the Enemy

If Breivik and Tarrant believed that white genocide and great replacement is the goal, and Muslim immigration to European nations was the method, then they absolutely believed that, at very least, the facilitators of this were European leftists, and this theme is consistent in contemporary far-right discourse. Just like how a supposed Jewish conspiracy is used as a scapegoat for any ill, so too are leftists hounded as a bogeyman. This is clear from how Telegram pages use the left as a moral punchbag in their posts, likening them to any kind of cruelty, in cases directly blaming them for the perceived great replacement they believe is underway, in one such case under a post of a homeless child an Irish page remarked 'The worst

Endless Cash into mRNA. That's Not Fighting for Freedom—That's Selling the People out, One Injection at a Time. You Can't Say You're "Bringing Manufacturing Back" When You're Simultaneously Rolling out the Fourth Industrial Revolution to Automate and Replace the Entire Workforce. You Can't "Break up the Globalist System" When You're Accelerating Its AI Control Grid, CBDCs, and Biometric Surveillance. You Can't Claim to Be a Free Speech Warrior When Your Biggest Legislative Move Was Pushing Antisemitic Laws Criminalizing Criticism of Israel. You Can't Say You're against the Establishment When You Keep Hiring It, Funding It, and Expanding Its Powers. And Everybody That Voted for This Is Just as Guilty as the Bastards Who Built It. You Cheered It on. You Excused It. You Justified Every Betrayal with Mental Gymnastics Worthy of an Olympic Gold. Now Look at the Mess You're in—Your "Savior" Didn't Drain the Swamp, He Restocked It. He Didn't Fight the Beast, He's Building Its Infrastructure. And You? You Didn't Resist. You Consented. Kind of How the Libs Just Bow down to Authority. You're Not a Patriot. You're an Accomplice.', *Telegram*, 4 March 2025, <https://t.me/GuidoAndEscanor/42486>.

¹³² No BS it's the Jews®, 'I'm Fucking over the Kosher Theatre. I'm so Fucking Sick of the World Bootlicking the Jew. Whether It's the Marxist Left Jew, or the Zionist Right Jew - Both Are Revolting Embarrassments. International Jewry Is the Greatest Threat to Humanity. FUCK This Jewish Bullshit', *Telegram*, 5 February 2025, https://t.me/No_BS_NewS/196541.

¹³³ Patriots Eire IE, 'Says the ADL Jew Pedos', *Telegram*, 24 April 2025, <https://t.me/patriotseire/64432>.

part of it all? The left thinks Irish kids like this deserve it'¹³⁴. Any kind of conspiracy theory or crime can be and is attributed to the vague notion of the left in these far-right groups. Leftists are often accused of attempting to curtail the personal freedom of people, attacking freedom of speech through a variety of means, such as the 'weaponisation of fact-checking'¹³⁵, essentially holding 'leftists' in suspicion for attempting to maintain a level of truth in discussion. It is clear then that the idea that leftists are traitors and therefore an enemy is something which contemporary far-right discussions have maintained in recent years, and is a broad brushstroke that can be applied anywhere if the need arises for them. This is clear by how even centre-right politicians such as those in the American Democratic party are often labelled as traitors, with broad claims made about them by the far-right, usually accompanied with threats of violence and assertions that the left is inherently a danger¹³⁶. Leftists are often painted as inherently treacherous, and in painting this picture, they can then be blamed for these perceived societal ills¹³⁷, and so following this logic, they are happy to lump anything leftist and progressive in with this apparent treacherous danger.

As seen in the writings of Breivik and Tarrant, hatred for progressive ideas and movements is commonplace in far-right Telegram groups and is often blamed for the weakening of European society and therefore leaving Europe open to everything they fear. Due to this, progressive ideas are treated with suspicion and quite often open hatred. This can often be attached to leftist ideas of social welfare, liberal ideas about sex and gender and obviously, progressive attitudes to immigration. Welfare is often a sticking point in far-right groups, and one of the main reasons it appears in these groups is by linking it to both migrants and racial minorities. This is exemplified prominently by the page 'ZoomerWaffen'¹³⁸, which at different times has done both things, explicitly referring to social benefits as 'migrant welfare'¹³⁹, and making the claim that government jobs are just another form of welfare in response to an article stating that the

¹³⁴ Patriots Eire IE, 'This Is the Future for Tens of Thousands of Irish Children Now That They Are to Be Replaced by Ukrainians. The Worst Part of All? The Left Thinks Irish Kids like This Deserve It.', *Telegram*, 22 March 2022, <https://t.me/irishpatriots/2575>.

¹³⁵ Michael Jaco • Mike Jaco, 'Fact Checkers Should Be Prosecuted. New COVID Censorship Bombshells Expose the Far-Left's Weaponisation of Fact-Checking', *Telegram*, 1 April 2025, <https://t.me/MikeJaco/10566>.

¹³⁶ Michael Jaco • Mike Jaco, 'They Are Talking Seriously about Ending the US Constitution. Which Party Is Really Dangerous?', *Telegram*, 6 October 2024, <https://t.me/MikeJaco/9490>.

¹³⁷ ZoomerWaffen, 'Panic at the FBI as Thousands of Treacherous Leftist Agents Are Heading for the Unemployment Lines', *Telegram*, 24 February 2025, <https://t.me/zoomerwaffenx/3125>.

¹³⁸ 'ZoomerWaffen', *Telegram*, n.d., <https://t.me/zoomerwaffenx>.

¹³⁹ ZoomerWaffen, 'Shitlibs Who Happily Spend Half a Trillion a Year on Migrant Welfare Are All of a Sudden Worried about the Cost of Deporting Their Brown Voters. Simply Not Housing & Feeding Them Will Pay for the Cost of Deportation', *Telegram*, 10 November 2024, 'ZoomerWaffen', *Telegram*, n.d., <https://t.me/zoomerwaffenx>.

Black American middle class was built by federal jobs¹⁴⁰. In this way, a positive thing like social welfare to prevent the worst excesses of poverty is reframed into a tool of the left to steal money from the working class to give to migrants and others who the far-right view as undeserving. This message is then driven home by the sharing of stories and anecdotes meant to show how unfair the situation is, often comparing the state of a ‘native’ family or person to that of a migrant. This can be seen in the channel ‘Late Stage Ireland’¹⁴¹ where a salacious story of ‘an Algerian with Kalashnikov rifles’ is given a house over locals¹⁴², and the poster complains how no consideration is given to the safety of locals, or the fairness of the market. This really, in essence, sums up the far-right obsession with leftist and progressive politics, the far-right claim that it is unfair, benefits migrants and ultimately makes the country weaker, more vulnerable and more dangerous for its citizens.

One of the most consistent and striking themes in Breivik’s manifesto was his incessant focus on gender, consistently returning to the idea of female liberation as a core factor in what he saw as the degeneration of European society, a sentiment often shared in the far-right channels of Telegram. Consistent references to the idea of European society failing due to moving away from patriarchal structures, both politically, socially, and in the home. These ideas are absolutely consistent in the channels studied, with a great focus being put on family values and the role of men and women in society, both in what they see as societal ills and their future idealised societies. The role of sex and gender is deeply important to these groups, with frequent references to manliness and toughness as a part of common ideology. This idea is very pronounced in the aforementioned active clubs, which stress the idea of physical fitness and combat readiness, not just for defence as mentioned earlier, but also for more ideological purposes. This is clear from quotes seen shared on these pages attached to athletic looking men sporting neo-Nazi tattoos, like one from Active Club Dietsland¹⁴³, an Ultranationalist white-supremacist group based in the Low Countries, who shared the quote from Ernst Jünger ‘As long as we have a youth that stands for all that is strong and manly, our future is assured’¹⁴⁴.

¹⁴⁰ ZoomerWaffen, ‘Government Jobs Turn out to Be Just Another Form of Welfare for Our Burdens’, *Telegram*, 23 February 2025, <https://t.me/zoomerwaffenx/3107>.

¹⁴¹ ‘Late Stage Ireland’, *Telegram*, n.d., <https://t.me/OrlaredChan>.

¹⁴² Late stage Ireland, ‘As Irish Families Find It Difficult to Get a Home, Politicians Throw Free Houses and Welfare at Economic Migrants Who Lie to Gain Entry. An Algerian with Kalashnikov Rifles Walks into Free Housing in Convoy, Co Donegal. It’s Not Fair (or Safe) for Irish Youth.’, *Telegram*, 19 October 2023, <https://t.me/OrlaredChan/8632>.

¹⁴³ ‘Active Club Dietsland’, n.d., <https://t.me/activedietsland>.

¹⁴⁴ Active Club Dietsland, “‘As Long as We Have a Youth That Stands for All That Is Strong and Manly, Our Future Is Assured’ -Ernst Jünger”, *Telegram*, 22 June 2024, <https://t.me/activedietsland/155>.

In a similar way to how, in their ideology, men are supposed to display masculine qualities, so too are women constrained into ‘feminine’ roles. This appears in the source material most prominently in terms of discussions about families, and the online far-right quite often share their opinions of where a woman’s position is. This is shared particularly in groups often focused on religion that are connected through ideology and sharing of links to other far-right groups. The ideas shared almost all come back to the idea that women should be in the home, subservient to their husbands and producing children. Ideas like this shared on Telegram frequently, similar to the manifestos suggesting that women’s emancipation has been a negative thing all around, even for women, suggesting that raising children and homemaking is a much more fulfilling life, and that finding a career is not a path women should go down¹⁴⁵. This idea of women entering the workforce and fighting for equality with men being a negative thing is common, with posts commenting that paid work is not the only worthwhile thing for women to be doing, stating that the world will collapse without female homemakers¹⁴⁶. The family then is seen as sacred in these groups, and any kind of deviation from this is viewed with suspicion, and often hatred, as shown in one post showing ‘Family day’ in Belgrade, with the poster stating ‘This is the Europe we want’¹⁴⁷. This is consistent with the writings of Breivik and Tarrant, who wrote at length about the position of women as homemakers, having children and leaving the workforce to men being essential, and that any attempt to change this should be viewed as an attack on traditional European values and strength.

While gender is incredibly important to Breivik and Tarrant, as well as the far-right groups of Telegram, one issue of progressive social politics, which is not mentioned in the manifestos, which is incredibly common in online far-right groups, is discourse surrounding Trans people. This is very consistent across the Telegram channels studied, with hatred towards trans people and other LGBTQIA+ people being incredibly common sources of anger and hatred. A common theme seen across Telegram posts mentioning trans folk is an apparent desire to

¹⁴⁵ Catholic Traditional Forward, ‘Children Bring Far More Lasting Joy than Any Career Could Have, Anything You Can Buy or Do, Anywhere You Could Travel, and Any Amount of Money You Make. Too Many Women Seek for Temporary Happiness in This World Rather than the Deep, Lasting Joy of Bearing and Raising Children’, *Telegram*, 10 April 2025, [Active Club Dietsland](https://t.me/activeclubdietsland), “‘As Long as We Have a Youth That Stands for All That Is Strong and Manly, Our Future Is Assured’ -Ernst Jünger”, *Telegram*, 22 June 2024, <https://t.me/activedietsland/155>.

¹⁴⁶ Catholic Femininity, ‘Women Today Are Taught That Work That Is Paid Is the Only Worthwhile Work. It’s Not True. Being a Wife, Mother, and Homemaker Aren’t Paid Positions but without Them, Nations Collapse as We Are Witnessing Today. Our Value Doesn’t Come from a Paycheck. It Comes from God Alone’, *Telegram*, 4 June 2024, <https://t.me/tradcathfem/1019>.

¹⁴⁷ Britain First, ‘Family Day in Belgrade. Traditional Family, Christian Values, Love of Country and Respect for Traditions. This Is the Europe We Want.’, *Telegram*, 27 July 2024, <https://t.me/BritainFirst/35597>.

protect vulnerable groups, such as women and children. This is seen in posts which directly attack the community on the basis that they perceive them as being a danger, with one post directly stating ‘Gender ideology is a pedo’s fantasy’¹⁴⁸. This is a common trope used to attack trans people, labelling them as dangerous, mentally ill, with hidden intentions of violence against the population, frequently tying the debate to sexual assault, and by so doing inferring that the leftist activists who support trans rights also support the assault of women and children¹⁴⁹. This is consistent throughout discussions of trans people in online far-right groups; they are consistently framed as being dangerous threats to society, and so anyone who supports trans people, by their logic, also supports harm against vulnerable people. The idea that trans people simply existing is part of some kind of globalist plot is also consistent in these groups, with posts questioning legislation on accepting trans people as criminalising ‘disagreement with trans ideologies’¹⁵⁰. So what can be seen across the board is misinformation spread about trans people, and the associated processes like gender affirming care to make it seem brutal¹⁵¹, and the people dangerous, all the while linking the community to leftists who are then also associated with all of these lies and pervasions. This is a core issue for many in these far-right groups, and despite being absent from the manifestos of Tarrant and Breivik, it forms one of the most pronounced reasons for hatred of leftists on the far-right.

All these ideas essentially boil down to the one principle, a pronounced belief held in far-right online circles that leftists by various means present a threat to society, just like what was present in the manifestos of Breivik and Tarrant. The mechanisms discussed, while updated from the times of writing of the respective terrorist manifestos, still hit familiar themes, that through a

¹⁴⁸ Traditional Britain Group, ‘A Pedophile Is Allowed to Continue Working with Children at the Location of the UK’s Only Gender Clinic. Read That Again, Then Ask Yourself Why They Want to Keep Kids Looking Prepubescent with Puberty Blockers. Gender Ideology Is a Pedo’s Fantasy. Read about the Pedophilic Roots of the Trans Movement in Our Article’, *Telegram*, 20 April 2024, <https://t.me/TraditionalBritainGroup/20398>.

¹⁴⁹ Students Against Tyranny - UK, ‘James Blessent Has Been Charged with Eight Counts of Sexual Abuse. His Victims Include His Own Son and Daughter. His Children Subsequently Called the Police. Meanwhile, “Trans-Activists” Have Defended Blessent in the Comments, Condemning the Bloomington Police Department for Not Censoring “Transphobic” Remarks on Their Press Release. Blessent Has Agreed to Be Housed Alone in Prison as This Is the Safest Option for Him.’, *Telegram*, 13 August 2024, <https://t.me/studentsagainsttyrannyofficial/11845>.

¹⁵⁰ Ireland - The Irish Channel, ‘What Are the Irish Justice Ministers True Motives? Is It a Coincidence That Helen McEntee Is Bringing in Legislation That Criminalises Disagreement with Trans Ideologies and Also Sneaks in a New Definition of “Gender” Which Can Only Help Promote the Whole Concept of Gender Transformation and the Need for so-Called “Puberty Blocker” Drugs Please Share ! Share ! Share !’, 13 May 2025, https://t.me/Irish_channel/25547.

¹⁵¹ Ireland - The Irish Channel, ‘Tucker Carlson Takes On “Trans, Inc” Genital Mutilation and the Transgender Issue Tucker Carlson Talked to Chris Moritz about Genital Mutilation and the Transgender Issue’, *Telegram*, 5 October 2023, https://t.me/Irish_channel/24581.

process of progressive measures, leftists weaken and endanger Western/European society. Breivik mainly focused on the role of women and an obsession with the field of sociology, and while the role of women is still important to the online far-right, other mechanisms have changed to fit the times, such as the insertion of the trans community as a threat. That said, the general principle remains the same, and comes to the same conclusion, that by an adherence to progressive policies, leftists are actively a threat to families, traditional patriarchal society and what they perceive as the natural order of things. Similarly to Breivik and Tarrant, the contemporary online far-right are often inconsistent on the idea that the left are doing the things they accuse them of intentionally or not, with many insinuations that it is a coordinated plan to attack them and Western values¹⁵², but this is not always the case. Many posts, like the ones discussed above, simply attack the left based on their values, holding them to be incompatible with their own beliefs about what Europe ought to be. This all then relates to the ideas of cultural degeneration¹⁵³, that by these processes, Europe is weakened, and its people are softened. The accusations are disparate and are difficult to pull into coherent themes, but in this lies their effectiveness online. Similarly to how Jewish people are treated, it is convenient to use the bogeyman of the left as a scapegoat for anything the far-right takes issue with, allowing them to tie the left to the most vicious crimes such as paedophilia accusations, cultural degeneracy, and just like we see with Breivik, an overall idea that through these processes of creating a progressive society, Europe is left weaker and more vulnerable.

¹⁵² Save Europe ⚡ ⚡, 'The German Government Allocates More Money to Combat "Right Extremism" than to Fight Islamic and Left. Last Year, the Federal Government of Germany Spent 2.3 Million Euros to Fight Left Extremism. This Is Only a Tenth of What the Government Has Been Allocated to Support Projects against Right Extremism: 22.5 Million Euros. 15.5 Million Euros Were Aimed at Projects against Islamic Terrorism, Which Is 68.8% of the Amount Aimed at Combating the Right. According to the Publication, Almost Exclusively Left Organizations Will Benefit from This. In Addition, the German Government, It Turns out, Also Finances Left Extremists. Thus, since 2019, German Ultra -Ultralov's Hateaid, Which Claims That She Has Been Fighting "Hatred on the Internet" and "Far -Right", since 2019 Has Received about 4.7 Million Euros from the State of Taxpayers' Money.', *Telegram*, 23 October 2024, <https://t.me/defendeurope8814/336>; Late stage Ireland, 'Fair City Latest: Ferg Has Been Pinning Anti-EU Flyers to the Gym Notice Board, the Absolute Maniac, and He Has a Whole Duffle Bag Full of Them. You Can Make out the First Line or Two: "Stand up against the LEFTIST EUROPEAN SUPERSTATE Which Subjugates Private Citizens for the Benefit of BIG PHARMA and the Elite BIG BANK CARTEL — Irelandwillrise.Ie" RTÉ Have Produced Cringe Rap That Feels More Authentic.', *Telegram*, 25 August 2023, <https://t.me/OrlaredChan/8269>.

¹⁵³ Britain First, 'This Is What Liberals/Leftists Mean by "Cultural Enrichment"? The West Has Gone from the Genius of Shakespeare to This...', *Telegram*, 21 January 2024, <https://t.me/BritainFirst/33585>.

Chapter 3 – International Nationalism- Universality of Far-Right Belief Across the Globe

What Does the Spread and Localisation of These Ideas Mean for Contemporary Far-Right Discourse?

It is clear then from the evidence provided online far-right discourse has shifted and changed since Breivik and Tarrant carried out their attacks, but the most relevant points have remained consistent throughout the years. While certain hot topic issues have boiled to the surface at various points over the years, the central messaging has managed to remain consistent. This consistency is not only visible over time, but we can also learn much about the plasticity and malleability of fascism by how well far-right ideas have spread over the globe. This is clear from my chosen terrorist sources, Breivik and Tarrant, separated by thousands of miles, yet arriving at the same ideology and conclusions of action. There is something about the nature of fascism that far-right ideas can proliferate across massive spaces, as evidenced also by my online sources, which came from a wide variety of channels based throughout the globe, with different cultural backgrounds and political realities, yet all come to similar ideas. People from across the world with very different backgrounds, sharing far-right ideas, is a very strange idea to consider, essentially forming an international solidarity based on nationalism. The question now, then, is what does this tell us about the nature of the far-right and fascism as an ideology? How can we reconcile the idea that these groups are incredibly xenophobic, closed-minded and primarily concerned with national and ethnic self-preservation and hatred of others with the fact that they are deeply linked internationally, clearly share ideas, discussion points and in the most extreme examples, ape each other's terrorist attacks, professing deep solidarity with other like-minded people across the globe? What is it about the nature of the far-right that allows their ideas to be so malleable?

The Great Other

Consistent throughout my investigation of both the terrorist manifestos and the global network of Far-Right Telegram channels is the idea that they are under the existential threat of some

great enemy. This is almost ubiquitous across the sources studied, and the level to which this is applicable across a multitude of backgrounds is fascinating. This is highly important in understanding how these ideas spread, as the idea of a vague and shifting enemy in the discourse is so universal and flexible that it can be applied to any group or situation where it is desired. One angle to view this explicitly from is the extent to which the Great Replacement myth has become such a central theme across almost all far-right discourse, both historically and in contemporary movements. The Great Replacement myth is such a frequent touchstone of the far-right because it internalises these ideas, which can be applied so widely to whoever wishes to adopt it. This so-called theory relies on the idea that a group of people are being targeted and replaced by others, and importantly, by people who the original group of people see as being different and other to their own group.

In this way, an enemy other is identified in opposition to their own group, usually, who they are primed to believe is inferior or less civilised, but simultaneously posed to threaten them through a variety of means¹⁵⁴. We can understand this mechanism then as a blank cheque which can be filled in and cashed by whoever needs a convenient threat to their ingroup, as the ingroup and the other can be changed at will to suit the situation. This was clear from my sources, like the change from the thinking of Breivik and Tarrant, who focused almost entirely on Muslim populations as the great other, to contemporary discussions where the other changed depending on the conditions of the local environment. Through this mechanism, the far-right routinely move the goalposts when and where it is advantageous to do so. Breivik and others focus primarily on Muslims, but in France, which has many immigrants from their former African colonies, the focus is placed on them despite many coming from Christian countries in sub-Saharan Africa, which have been heavily influenced by France. While the groups studied in this paper may not all share the same specific goals, they are widely diverse with often dramatically different backgrounds and local contexts, yet they can all use the same kind of rhetoric and ideas. All of them can diagnose issues within their societies and can identify an outgroup upon which to apply their twisted fascist ideology.

¹⁵⁴ Nancy Ettlinger, 'Far-Right Transnationalism, Digital Affordances, and the Specter of a New Geopolitics', *Human Geography*, 25 February 2025, 19427786251318633, <https://doi.org/10.1177/19427786251318633>.

International Nationalists

Another example of the universality of contemporary far-right belief is how the groups studied apply the very broad idea of nationalism to themselves and others as a way of leaning into far-right ideas at home while fostering international support and solidarity for each other. Nationalism in these groups can be used as a point of pride, one can often see the idea that it is not a bad thing to take pride in one's own country¹⁵⁵, and this is used as a catch-all justification for far-right talking points. National pride and nationalism are not only something which can be completely universal, but also something which the far-right can support in others without diminishing their ideas of nationalism. This can be often seen with certain national groups supporting other nations in their assertions of national pride, often using the success of other far-right movements to further their own beliefs and strengthen their cause. This was very clearly present in the case of the Brexit referendum in the UK, where, following a vote to leave the EU, many far-right nationalist figures across Europe used the opportunity to congratulate the UK and reassert their own nationalistic ambitions. This idea is exemplified by a quote from Frauke Petry, then leader of the AFD in Germany, who declared following the result that it was time to 'Mobilise all nationalist forces across all borders to forge a Europe of fatherlands'¹⁵⁶. This illustrates how these forces view each other and act, as separate but connected entities, fellow travellers working together on their road to a divided future.

International nationalism may seem like an oxymoron, but the connection between these groups is something which is very real and understandable, they seek international allies for support in their national issues and support other like-minded individuals. They do not openly wish to be involved with other national causes, but the level of solidarity and support is shocking, as epitomised by a connection between the Nationalist Party in Ireland and the Italian far-right group Casaggi, where one of the speakers explained 'Our separate & distinct languages are what clearly mark & define us as unique peoples of Europe. Essentially, we are similar, but not the same', following this with 'We, as Irish Nationalists, cannot save the Italian people, nor can

¹⁵⁵ Britain First, 'GB BRITAIN IS AN ANCIENT NATION WITH A GLORIOUS HISTORY GB The Indigenous British People Have Lived in These Sacred Islands for Millennia. The Achievements of Our Ancient Ancestors Are Astonishing, but Are Almost Always Forgotten or Downplayed. The Truth Is, the British Nation Has a Glorious and Noble History Which Is Replete with Staggering Achievements, Victories against All Odds and Towering Acts of Genius and Inventiveness That Are Unmatched. In This Video, Party Leader Paul Golding Visits Ancient Sites Such as Stonehenge, Silbury Hill, Avebury and Cheddar Gorge, to Outline the Amazing Story of Our Ancestors. This Video Will Fill You with Pride That You Are Part of Such a Glorious and Prodigious Nation.', *Telegram*, 12 January 2021, <https://t.me/BritainFirst/13230>.

¹⁵⁶ David Motadel, 'Nationalist Internationalism in the Modern Age', *Contemporary European History* 28, no. 1 (February 2019): 77–81, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777318000863>.

Casaggi hope to rally the Irish nation to its banner. But in our fight against this globalist tyranny, we stand united. Our struggles will be fought separately, together.’¹⁵⁷. This goes far in explaining how these beliefs are so universal; they recognise differences themselves, but focus on uniting factors, and see in each other the same extreme nationalist beliefs. These beliefs can spread internationally because their ethnonationalist ideas are not mutually exclusive with their beliefs about other nationalities, and so don’t impact their willingness to engage with other ethnonationalist groups. Modern far-right ideas then clearly do not inspire any significant kind of animosity between other far-right groups globally, and can be changed to suit the local environment where it exists, so far-right discourse can move fluidly across national borders.

Beast of Many Faces

An important point here is that it is not just the ideology itself which is malleable enough to shift and change to suit different local contexts, but so too can one view the shifting changes in aesthetics and character to suit the environment the ideology is being applied to. We can see this from how different groups apply similar ideas to similar contexts but change how it is presented to suit their national environment. For these nationalistic ideas to work across different countries, far-right groups often change how they are presented to their local population, piggybacking on preexisting ideas and national tropes to make their message more appealing to their own native populations. This is particularly clear in a movement which has gained a lot of attention over the past year, the growing and emergent Irish far-right. Ireland wouldn’t be a typical candidate for far-right activity, having been a colonised country itself until just over 100 years ago, with ongoing colonial disputes in the north of the country. Until recently, very little in the way of immigration or historical far-right parties, and was dominated by a rotating pair of centre-right parties with little ideological difference between them aside from their positions in the civil war. It is interesting, then, as an example of how the Irish far-right internalised far-right discourse into their country's unique history. Unable to claim descent from great empires which dominated others like the British and the French, the Irish far-right draws heavily on a more ancient past, presenting it in a way which is similar to how the history

¹⁵⁷ Anonymous, ‘Óige Náisiúnach Delegates Address Meeting of Italian Nationalist Group Casaggi’, *The National Party* (blog), 16 March 2024, <https://nationalparty.ie/oige-naisiunach-delegates-address-meeting-of-italian-nationalist-group-casaggi/>.

of Nordic countries revered in far-right circles, reaching back into their pagan past and revering their symbols and history¹⁵⁸.

The real malleability of fascist far-right aesthetics is exemplified by how the great replacement myth is changed to suit the local Irish context. As a country with no great imperial past to look back on as a source of nationalistic pride, the Irish far-right instead looks back on their domination at the hands of the British Empire and the resistance to it. The great replacement is then reframed to evoke colonial memory, renamed ‘The Great Plantation’¹⁵⁹. Through this memory of British domination of Ireland and intentional population changes employed by the British through the plantation of Ireland are linked to contemporary ideas of the great replacement theory, with any and all immigrants tied into this overarching belief and referred to as ‘planters’¹⁶⁰. This encapsulates so much of what is important about how far-right discourse changes and adapts over national borders, as it can be picked up, moulded and used by groups from such varying backgrounds, and made to fit their national identity.

In a similar way, it can be noted throughout the process of my investigation that far-right ideas proliferate in a similar way through varying groups to match an ever-wider audience, shifting their focus where necessary while still maintaining the same core ideas. This is clearly evidenced by the wide variety of channels which came up through my research, with widely different focuses. The most striking examples of this idea are the prevalence of active clubs in the far-right online scene. As mentioned previously, far-right active clubs are health and fitness groups who promote physical activity and martial arts training, but with a strong focus on national and racial identity. These clubs form an international interconnected network of far-right, white supremacist, neo-Nazis¹⁶¹, using their health and fitness both as a way to spread far-right ideology through MMA gyms and other organisations, but also pushing the ideology through the act of fitness itself, viewing it as an integral part of their white supremacist ideology. These groups push great replacement ideas and often very explicit neo-Nazi iconography along side a desire to maintain ready for violence, weaving their ideology into their activity. This is significant as it shows how far-right ideas can be moulded easily to fit

¹⁵⁸ ‘Clann Éireann – Coming to a Town Near You! – Clann Éireann’, 14 June 2024, <https://clanneireann.ie/tales-of-the-diaspora-from-clann-eireann-to-the-world/>.

¹⁵⁹ Irish Patriots, ‘The Great Plantation Is under Way. We Are Being Actively Replaced. At Least Thomas Sheridan Will Be Happy.’, *Telegram*, 29 May 2024, <https://t.me/irishpatriots/2573>.

¹⁶⁰ Irish Patriots, ‘The New Planters’, *Telegram*, 13 July 2025, <https://t.me/irishpatriots/5654>.

¹⁶¹ ‘Active Club Network | ADL’, 1 October 2023, <https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/active-club-network>.

these aesthetics, which are then, in turn, used to radicalise more people into their movement. It can be seen then that MMA and sport have been central to this, where the ingroup/outgroup model of the far-right is easily applicable to a gym setting¹⁶², where far-right ideas are spread and encouraged.

The ability of far-right ideas to find a home just as easily in the hyper-masculine atmosphere of an MMA gym as they do in online ironic meme culture is significant. This was clear from my investigation and exemplified by several groups who range from being focused on religion, to alternative medicine, to groups that seek a younger audience by appealing to Gen-Z culture. One such group featured prominently in my investigation, ZoomerWaffen, and encapsulates this idea clearly even through their name, a reference to the neo-Nazi terror organisation Atomwaffen, but combined with the slang term for gen-z, Zoomer. The difference between ZoomerWaffen and the network of active clubs is stark. The active clubs focus on very serious ideas, stoic philosophy and self-improvement through physical exercise, where ZoomerWaffen shares ironic memes¹⁶³ heavily influenced by Gen-Z humour and culture. That said, the ideology at the very core of these groups remains incredibly similar. Both share neo-nazi symbols, the ZoomerWaffen icon itself is an SS deaths head logo, both share replacement ideology, and both share explicit white supremacist statements. This is important in understanding contemporary far-right discourse and the share of the ideology online, as it goes to show how pervasive it can be, fitting in as well with serious white nationalist MMA fighters as it does with ironic teenagers. Contemporary far-right ideology is so malleable not just in terms of national identity, but also in identities within these societies, permeating through what we may view as traditional and non-traditional spaces for extremist political beliefs.

Living in the Past

There appears then to be one real guiding principle that allows far-right ideology to be so appealing to such a wide range of people and social groups, as much internationally as between groups on the national level, and that is the appeal that it has to a sense of nostalgia. Nostalgia is a constant throughline across all the primary sources studied, from the terrorist manifestos through to the most obscure Telegram channels and so understanding the importance of nostalgia is highly important to understanding the growth and spread of this ideology. Nostalgia

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¹⁶³ ZoomerWaffen, *Telegram*, 4 May 2025, <https://t.me/zoomerwaffenx/5171>.

can be seen as having two forms, positive and negative, with the positive being a longing for an imagined idealised past, and the negative being a selective memory which emphasises forgetting of past events¹⁶⁴. Often, the far right perform a mixture of both forms, to create a narrative of the past which suits them and their ideology as much as possible, longing for a past that never existed. This is present the entire way through my research, where almost every source studied engages in this in one way or another. Breivik and Tarrant are very guilty of this, constructing idealised versions of the past in their writings, and claiming this idealised culture is under attack. This can be clearly evidenced from their callbacks to crusaders and European kingdoms of old, holding them up as heroic without ever considering the facts of the situation. By referencing the glory of the siege of Vienna¹⁶⁵ without any kind of attempt to critically look at the facts, they engage in this kind of nostalgia where the truth doesn't matter, only the feeling it evokes does. This reliance on nostalgia is also highly common throughout the far-right channels on Telegram, across the board of almost every kind of group studied. Active clubs routinely engage in this behaviour by appropriating imagery associated with European warrior culture, drawing on the Roman Empire¹⁶⁶ and medieval knights¹⁶⁷ to reinforce their beliefs about fitness, fighting and Europe. Nostalgia appears as a driving force through the length and breadth of far-right online content, from former colonies longing for the days of white minority rule¹⁶⁸, to pages dedicated to sharing 'White apologia' of fascist imagery intercut with old images of idealised European society¹⁶⁹, nostalgia remains a powerful driving force.

Overall, it's clear one of the main features of contemporary far-right discourse is its malleability, its ability to change and shift to fit the desired environment. Through following a basic ingroup/outgroup formula like what can be seen in immigration and replacement narratives, far-right discourse can be applicable across a wide variety of contexts and can find its home across the globe in various different national environments. From imperial powers to post-colonial nations struggling with national identity, far-right ideas can still find a home, a group which can appear threatened, and a group which they can blame as the aggressor,

¹⁶⁴ Julian Göppfarth, 'Activating the Socialist Past for a Nativist Future: Far-Right Intellectuals and the Prefigurative Power of Multidirectional Nostalgia in Dresden', *Social Movement Studies* 20, no. 1 (2 January 2021): 57–74, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2020.1722628>.

¹⁶⁵ Brenton Tarrant, 'The Great Replacement', 2019, 6; Anders Behring Breivik, 2083 *A European Declaration of Independence*, 2018, 86.

¹⁶⁶ Active Club France, 'Would You?', *Telegram*, 30 July 2024, <https://t.me/ActiveClubFrance/1356>.

¹⁶⁷ Active Club France, 'BE Verviers Greetings from Active Club Dietsland (Https://T.Me/Activedietsland) !', *Telegram*, 31 July 2024, <https://t.me/ActiveClubFrance/1357>.

¹⁶⁸ Hail Zealandia, 'Just Admit It. White New Zealand Was Better.', *Telegram*, 27 September 2024, <https://t.me/HailZealandia/94>.

¹⁶⁹ White Apologia, 'Mussolini', *Telegram*, 23 May 2025, <https://t.me/WhiteApologia/4405>.

regardless of the facts. Through this process, any country can look at its history and find a rich cultural tapestry there which is somehow threatened by the changing status quo of the day, and far-right ideology can fit in as the answer, a panacea for any ill anywhere. It is clear too that this does not just take place across national lines, but within the nations themselves, with a similar mechanism taking place. Across several different generations, social groups and people of many persuasions, far-right ideology can find a home. The far-right have no issue holding solidarity for like-minded individuals in other groups, may they be of different nationalities professing similar nationalistic beliefs, and act in a way where a rising tide lifts all boats, openly supporting fellow nationalists internationally. The underlying theme through all of this seems to be a great sense of nostalgia for a past which may never have even existed, a false idea where conditions were better for their group, freedoms unimpeded and agency for them and their own was greater, now dashed aside to their expense and the benefit of the outgroup, whoever that may be. The key then is that contemporary far-right discourse is malleable, an ideology which plays on feelings of nostalgia, coupled with a regret for what they may have lost, and a fear for what more they stand to lose, a sentiment carried through from Breivik, all the way through Tarrant, to the current day.

Conclusion

Although in recent years the myth of the lone wolf has been challenged, the memory of Breivik and the Christchurch shooter unfortunately remains as examples of extremists acting alone, unique and solitary individuals who were unstable and took extreme action. It is clear however that this is not the case; these individuals were openly and directly inspired by others, not just in their beliefs, but in their actions. To refer to them as lone wolves simply misses the point and ignores entirely the looming leviathan of far-right belief that exists, scarcely hidden under the water. It can be clearly evidenced how, although Breivik and Tarrant are unique examples by the fact that they are some of the few who took their vile ideology to its bloody conclusion, their beliefs are far from unique, and in many ways are entirely representative of far-right online discourse. Almost all the issues by which the two murderers justified their actions through their manifestos are not the ramblings of insane people, as so often it is portrayed, but a reflection of beliefs widely held on the most extreme corners of the internet. What is more worrying still is the fact that I have witnessed the ability of this discourse to change and adapt to the environment where it is applied, all while maintaining its insidious and dangerous core. My research has shown the wide appeal of far-right discourse, that it is clearly adaptable globally, as seen by how the main themes expressed by the killers are witnessed across groups globally, changing to meet their local environment, dropping what doesn't suit them and picking up and adding what does to maximise the attractiveness of the ideology where necessary. Not only this, but it is adaptable enough to suit different contexts within and across national boundaries, just as at home in an MMA gym as it is an ironic meme page. Far-right belief is clearly something which is malleable enough to comfortably be used by the most extremist, like Breivik in Norway, and work perfectly with his own issues, as it does for someone across the world who lives under a completely different set of circumstances.

This field of study is still in its infancy, and there is still much to be learned from exploring the far-right online. In any future research of this nature, I would recommend coupling the qualitative narrative and thematic analysis of Telegram groups with what previous studies have done, a network analysis of the far-right groups. I believe that this, in conjunction with the kind

of study I carried out, would yield very interesting results, as by doing this, a researcher could track the level of cooperation between groups and gain a better understanding of how these ideas move through them. By pairing our understanding of the changing nature of far-right discourse with an empirical study of group communication, you could stand to gain a more detailed understanding of the group dynamics that exist. My study has explored how the discourse changes between these groups and how connected their ideas are despite the apparent differences, but by approaching it in this manner, you would have the benefit of network mapping to view these connections in one place. Future research on far-right extremism could also go more in depth on the terrorists themselves, and although this was not the intention of my study, learning more about the actual online boards and environments that Breivik and Tarrant took part in could prove valuable, with a potential study mapping their online posts, with their manifestos, and indeed their actions.

The 21st century has seen rapid social change, and little of it for the better. Although we started this century with renewed confidence in the free market liberal democratic system, the years following have done much to shake people's beliefs in what Fukuyama once called 'The End of History'¹⁷⁰. The market crash of 2008 and the subsequent economic downturns, of which we have barely recovered from, have led to a kind of cynicism for the current global order, and much of what we have seen since has been a reaction to this. Falling living standards, stagnating wages and an ongoing housing crisis across much of Europe and the West have left many people feeling worse off now than they ever have. It is in this environment that we are now witnessing a turn towards the right; left-wing politics has failed to find consistent success, and in its absence, people look more and more towards other options. Individuals like Breivik and Tarrant are the most extreme examples of this turn, people who have entirely bought into the most extremist far-right ideas and allowed themselves to believe that the world stands on the brink of destruction, and their actions were the only things that could turn the tide. Unfortunately, these individuals are far from isolated examples, and extreme far-right thought is rife in the darkest corners of the internet, able to proliferate globally. It seems now that it is up to all of us to stand watchful against this ideology, to remain aware of its presence, how attractive it can be to so many, and to stand against it where we can.

¹⁷⁰ Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History?', *The National Interest*, no. 16 (1989): 3–18, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24027184>.

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Britain First. 'GB BRITAIN IS AN ANCIENT NATION WITH A GLORIOUS HISTORY GB The Indigenous British People Have Lived in These Sacred Islands for Millennia. The Achievements of Our Ancient Ancestors Are Astonishing, but Are Almost Always Forgotten or Downplayed. The Truth Is, the British Nation Has a Glorious and Noble History Which Is Replete with Staggering Achievements, Victories against All Odds and Towering Acts of Genius and Inventiveness That Are Unmatched. In This Video, Party Leader Paul Golding Visits Ancient Sites Such as Stonehenge, Silbury Hill, Avebury and Cheddar Gorge, to Outline the Amazing Story of Our Ancestors. This Video Will Fill You with Pride That You Are Part of Such a Glorious and Prodigious Nation.' *Telegram*, 12 January 2021. <https://t.me/BritainFirst/13230>.

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Pharma, Greenlighting Lockdowns, and Pumping Endless Cash into mRNA. That's Not Fighting for Freedom—That's Selling the People out, One Injection at a Time. You Can't Say You're "Bringing Manufacturing Back" When You're Simultaneously Rolling out the Fourth Industrial Revolution to Automate and Replace the Entire Workforce. You Can't "Break up the Globalist System" When You're Accelerating Its AI Control Grid, CBDCs, and Biometric Surveillance. You Can't Claim to Be a Free Speech Warrior When Your Biggest Legislative Move Was Pushing Antisemitic Laws Criminalizing Criticism of Israel. You Can't Say You're against the Establishment When You Keep Hiring It, Funding It, and Expanding Its Powers. And Everybody That Voted for This Is Just as Guilty as the Bastards Who Built It. You Cheered It on. You Excused It. You Justified Every Betrayal with Mental Gymnastics Worthy of an Olympic Gold. Now Look at the Mess You're in—Your "Savior" Didn't Drain the Swamp, He Restocked It. He Didn't Fight the Beast, He's Building Its Infrastructure. And You? You Didn't Resist. You Consented. Kind of How the Libs Just Bow down to Authority. You're Not a Patriot. You're an Accomplice.' *Telegram*, 4 March 2025. <https://t.me/GuidoAndEscanor/42486>.

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