‘Timid and Ungenerous Liberalism and Stupidly Unrelenting Toryism’

BRITISH PRESS COVERAGE OF MARTIAL LAW DURING THE IRISH WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

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Abstract

‘Treacy had stated to me that the only way of starting a war was to kill someone and we wanted to start a war, so we intended to kill some of the police whom we looked upon as the foremost and most important branch of the enemy forces which were holding our country in subjection. ... The only regret we had, following the ambush, was that there were only two policemen in it instead of the six we expected, because we felt that six dead policemen would have impressed the country more than a mere two.’[1]

The Irish War of Independence began on 21 January 1919 with an Irish Republican Army (IRA) ambush on a delivery of explosives escorted by two policemen. That same day, Dáil Éireann (the Irish republican parliament) met for the first time, mobilising both the political and military wings of the republican movement. After over two years of conflict, a truce took effect on 11 July 1921, leading to negotiations that resulted in the Anglo-Irish Treaty, signed on 6 December and ratified on 7 January 1922.

The war saw diverse tactics from both sides. The IRA relied on guerrilla warfare, including ambushes, attacks on rural barracks and assassinations. In response, British Crown forces conducted reprisal attacks and implemented martial law, internment and censorship. Martial law was declared on 10 December 1920 in four particularly affected south-western counties Cork, Kerry, Limerick, and Tipperary before being extended to Clare, Waterford, Kilkenny, and Wexford.

This thesis examines how the use of martial law was portrayed in *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian.* Employing text analysis and close reading, it explores stereotypes of the Irish and editorialisation to understand how these newspapers portrayed the policy. By analysing linguistic choices, recurring themes, and ideological underpinnings, this thesis investigates how newspapers shaped discourse of the conflict. Special attention is given to representations of Irish identity and nationalism, as well as British policy and Crown force violence. This analysis contributes to broader discussions on media influence, colonial discourse, and the press's role in perpetuating or challenging stereotypes.

[1] Statement by witness, Daniel Breen, ‘W.S 1739.’ (Roinn Cosanta, hearing on August 1958), Bureau of Military History 1913-1921, https://bmh.militaryarchives.ie/reels/bmh/BMH.WS1739.pdf.

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1. Introduction

1.1 Introduction

The Irish War of Independence (1919–1921) marked a critical phase in Ireland's struggle to end British rule. The conflict followed the 1916 Easter Rising and the sweeping victory of Sinn Féin in the 1918 general election, which saw republicanism displace moderate nationalism as the dominant ideology within wider Irish nationalism. Refusing to take their seats in Westminster, Sinn Féin MPs instead formed a republican parliament, the Dáil Éireann, and declared an independent Irish Republic. On 19 January 1919, Dáil Éireann opened for the first time. On the same day, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) killed two policemen in an ambush, marking the opening act of the conflict.

The war was fought by the IRA and British Crown forces, primarily the police force, known as the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC). The IRA adopted irregular warfare tactics, conducting ambushes, sabotage and targeted assassinations, particularly in rural areas where British control was weakest. As the war escalated and the RIC lost control of the rural west of Ireland it was supplemented by the Black and Tans and the Auxiliary Division, two distinct groups of World War I veterans recruited to bolster the depleted RIC. As violence escalated in 1920 the Crown forces, particularly the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries, became infamous across Ireland for conducting reprisal attacks. Reprisals were a form of collective punishment, indiscriminately attacking homes and businesses in villages, towns and cities across Ireland in retaliation for previous IRA attacks in the area.

The escalation of violence led to the proclamation of martial law on 10 December 1920 in four south-western counties, with the policy extended to another four later.[2] By applying a method of text analysis and close reading this thesis will analyse discourse surrounding martial law during the Irish War of Independence in two leading British newspaper, *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*. In particular the presence and mobilisation of anti-Irish stereotypes in both newspapers will be analysed, as well as how each newspaper editorialised martial law before and after its introduction.

Previous studies have analysed press coverage of the conflict in general, categorised various leading British newspapers in terms of their stance on the 'Irish question' at that point or studied *The Manchester Guardian* and its editor in more depth. None of these studies focus on a specific policy or

[2] John Ainsworth, 'British Security Policy in Ireland, 1920-1921: A Desperate Attempt by the Crown to Maintain Anglo-Irish Unity by Force', *The Australian Journal of Irish Studies*, 2001. P. 183.

aspect of the conflict.[3] This MA Thesis links ideological assumptions and stereotypical language to analyse representations of martial law, using a comparison of *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian* to highlight the effect of differing ideological backgrounds. As influential newspapers with distinct political identities, *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian* were chosen because they had the capacity to influence elite and public discourse about Britain's role in Ireland and elsewhere.[4] Focusing specifically on martial law provides a unique lens to study British domestic and imperial governance, press coverage and state power, contributing to broader discussions on media and conflict. By assessing how each newspaper interacted with pre-existing anti-Irish stereotypes and the effect this had on editorialisation, this thesis highlights the link between stereotypes and representation of policy in the press. The findings also have broader implications for media representation of state violence and emergency powers, as well as journalism in conflict settings, making this research relevant beyond its historical context.

This study has significant societal relevance, as it explores how press media shapes public perceptions of state violence, a topic that remains critical today. Just as *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian* presented differing narratives on martial law during this conflict, today's media publications play a key role in shaping discourse around government actions in times of crisis. This can be seen in coverage of the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, where narratives about state legitimacy, resistance, and military action vary widely depending on ideological leanings. Similarly, the use of emergency powers and state crackdowns, whether in response to far-right movements in Europe and the United States or in wartime contexts, continues to raise questions about press responsibility, political bias, and the justification of state control. By examining historical media representations of martial law, this research offers an insight into journalism's role in legitimising or challenging power.

[3] Ian Kenneally, *The Paper Wall: Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921* (Cork: Collins Press, 2008), Erin Kate Scheopner, '"Miserable Conflict and Confusion": Definitions and Understanding of the Irish Question in British Newspapers, 1917-21' (PhD, Goldsmiths, University of London, 2018), https://research.gold.ac.uk/id/eprint/25973/ and Katherine Evelyn Davies, 'The Manchester Guardian, C. P. Scott, and the Irish Question 1919-1922' (PhD, Sheffield Hallam University, 2021), https://doi.org/10.7190/shu-thesis-00432.

[4] Allan Nevins, 'American Journalism and Its Historical Treatment'. *Journalism Quarterly* 36, no. 4 (December 1959): 411–519. https://doi.org/10.1177/107769905903600403. P. 413-414.
In Katherine Evelyn Davies' thesis *The Manchester Guardian, C. P. Scott, and the Irish question 1919-1922*, Davies argues that *The Manchester Guardian* was a central voice in British Liberalism, particularly 'New Liberalism' despite a lower circulation than some contemporaries.

1.2 Research Questions

This thesis aims to answer the following research question:

How did *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian* use editorial discourse and anti-Irish stereotypes in their coverage of martial law during the Irish War of Independence, and what does this reveal about evolving British imperial narratives?

Four subsequent sub-questions will be asked in order to provide a clearer understanding of the coverage of each newspaper in relation to martial law:

1. What were the main political and military developments of the Irish War of Independence, and in what context was martial law introduced?
2. What were the origins of anti-Irish stereotypes in British press media, and how did these stereotypes develop as the relationship between Ireland and Britain progressed?
3. How did *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian* editorialise martial law, and what does this reveal about their portrayal of key issues, editorialisation of stereotypes and organisational stances on martial law as a solution to the Irish question?
4. How did *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian* employ anti-Irish stereotypes in their coverage of martial law during the Irish War of Independence?

In order to answer these sub-questions, Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 will each be dedicated to one sub-question. Chapter 2 of this thesis will provide a short historical overview of the conflict. In this chapter the main actors and organisations active will be introduced. This is essential to understand the context in which martial law was introduced and the effect that it had on the situation. Chapter 3 will outline the three main categories of anti-Irish stereotypes, as well as their origins and how they evolved throughout the 19^{th} century. In Chapter 4, editorials in each newspaper will be analysed, focusing on the frequency, portrayal, stereotyping and overall stance in editorialisation of martial law. Chapter 5 analyses how *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian* used each of the stereotypes outlined in Chapter 3 when discussing martial law in the Irish War of Independence. Chapter 6 consists of a comparative analysis of each newspaper's coverage of martial law during the Irish War of Independence, incorporating the two preceding chapters' findings. Conclusions will be made in Chapter 7.

By answering these sub-questions, this thesis will contribute to our understanding of how media discourse during the Irish War of Independence both reflected and reinforced Irish-British power dynamics, as well as how the stances of two newspapers both resulted from and contributed to stereotypes of the Irish. Furthermore, it will help illuminate the ways in which the coverage of martial law, an extreme form of state control, was portrayed in the British press through the lenses of identity and colonialism. Understanding these aspects is critical for comprehending the broader cultural and political ramifications of media coverage of conflict, and how such coverage continues to shape discourse on imperialism, nationalism, identity and conflict today.

The aim of this thesis is to analyse the evolution of British imperial narratives on Ireland by studying how each newspaper interpreted, justified, criticised or otherwise positioned the implementation of martial law in Ireland during the War of Independence. It will contribute to broader discussions on the role of the press in shaping public perceptions of state violence and emergency powers. The findings will provide historical insight into the interaction between journalism, identity, conflict and imperial authority. Press responses to martial law in Ireland can be compared to modern instances where emergency measures are justified or contested in the media, such as state crackdowns on political movements, security measures during conflicts and the suspension of civil liberties in times of crisis. This thesis offers a deeper understanding of how proprietorship, ideological affiliations and stereotypical beliefs influence newspaper coverage of contentious and in turn shape contemporary and historical perceptions of state policy and emergency powers.

1.3 Historiography

1.3.1 Martial Law in the Irish War of Independence

The most comprehensive work on the British strategy during the Irish War of Independence was published in 1975, 50 years ago and 54 years after the war ended. Drawing on a wide variety of primary sources, including private papers and communications of British political and military leaders, Charles Townshend tells the events of the conflict from the British perspective, with the actions of Irish nationalists discussed only as a backdrop to those of the British Government, Dublin Castle administration and Crown forces. Chapter V in *The British Campaign in Ireland* details martial law, its aims, limitations, public perception and ultimate successes and failures.[5] Townshend outlines the multiple failures of martial law. He argues it did little to reduce the effectiveness of the IRA due to a reorganisation of unit structure and tactics and because of the failure of large-scale searches. When

[5] Charles Townshend. *The British Campaign in Ireland, 1919-1921: The Development of Political and Military Policies*. Oxford Historical Monographs. London: Oxford University Press, 1975. Townshend has written extensively on British rule in Ireland, as well as in Palestine, Iraq and Transjordan.

discussing martial law, Townshend focuses on the military and internal political effects of the policy.[6] The main shortcoming of Townshend in relation to martial law is his discussion of reprisal attacks and their consequences.[7] According to Townshend, prior to martial law's proclamation military leaders believed martial law would be beneficial to the British in a variety of ways. First and foremost unity of command would mean errant police forces would be controlled by the military. Others included internment, heavier sentences and control of the press. Despite being the most important expected benefit, and despite the fact that the reprisals primarily conducted by police forces are a central feature of this and any study of the conflict, Townshend does not sufficiently link reprisals to martial law, either as the central cause or the most significant failure.

While most subsequent studies of British policy in the Irish War of Independence have built off of Townshend's work, several have stressed points which Townshend does not. One such work was John Ainsworth's 2001 article.[8] Ainsworth stresses the reactionary aspect of British security strategy during the conflict and the unintended consequences to each policy. Martial law in particular had been a reaction to the unintended consequences of the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act (ROIA), a measure which replaced a number of civil courts with courts-martial. While the ROIA led to a large number of internments and several executions, it failed due to the mobility of the IRA and the propaganda blunder which was the torture and execution of IRA Volunteer Kevin Barry.[9] Ainsworth, like Townshend, ignores the Irish, British and international opposition to the policy of reprisal attacks as a significant factor in the proclamation of martial law, citing IRA actions on Bloody Sunday and the Kilmichael ambush in November 1920 as the key events which triggered the proclamation of martial law.[10]

More recent research benefits from the disclosure of state and private documents in the 1990s and early 2000s, including documents from the RIC, British and Irish Administration officials and first-hand accounts of men and women who participated in the conflict in Ireland. This research vindicates earlier research in the conclusion that martial law was not successful. Michael Hopkinson, drawing heavily on archival material in Ireland and Britain, as well as archives in the USA and Australia, highlights that martial law, as with every policy during the conflict, was primarily a reactionary measure. In his book *The Irish War of Independence*, Hopkinson notes some successes which martial law saw which were not discussed in Townshend or Ainsworth's publications.[11] For example, Hopkinson cites the thousands of

[6] Ibid, P. 152-153.
[7] Reprisals saw members of Crown forces, primarily the Black and Tans and Auxiliary Division, burn homes and businesses, loot buildings and assault and kill civilians in retaliation for IRA attacks. The indiscriminate nature of these attacks, where the guilt of the parties attacked were not attempted to be proven, cemented bitter hatred of the police forces in Ireland and drew widespread condemnation throughout Ireland, Britain and the international press.
[8] Ainsworth, '*British Security Policy in Ireland, 1920-1921: A Desperate Attempt by the Crown to Maintain Anglo-Irish Unity by Force*,' P. 176–90.
[9] Ibid, P. 181-186.
[10] Ibid, P. 183.
[11] Michael Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 2002).

Irishmen interned in the months following martial law's proclamation, the capture of IRA commanders like Seán Moylan and the capture of papers belonging to Richard Mulcahy (then IRA Chief-of-Staff) as evidence of martial law's limited success. Furthermore, the Republican counter-state which had effectively ruled some parts of Ireland was seen to recede in the later stages of the war.[12] The limited successes of martial law discussed in Hopkinson's work does not, however, lead him to conclude that martial law was in itself a successful policy. Quoting several high-ranking British Army officers, including General Macready (British Army GOC in Ireland after April 1920), as well as histories of the Fifth and Sixth Divisions of the British Army, Hopkinson details the Army's belief that victory through purely military means could not be achieved through the chosen strategy. Their reason for this was limited resources, manpower and public support.[13] Hopkinson writes that the Army believed that military victory could only be achieved after extending martial law to all 26 counties of Ireland which were not to form the fledgling Northern Ireland and by abandoning large parts of Ireland to focus military power on a small number of strategically important locations. This proposed strategy would not have garnered sufficient political or public support, however, and so the preferred solution was to negotiate a peace. To underscore his point, Hopkinson writes that the final two months of the war saw by far the highest casualty rates for the British Army in the entire war, with 48 deaths between the start of May and the Truce (11 July).[14]

Hopkinson, like Ainsworth and Townshend, attributes the introduction of martial law primarily to IRA actions such as Bloody Sunday and the Kilmichael Ambush, giving insufficient weight to the role of British reprisals. This overlooks the fact that reprisals conducted before the imposition of martial law were a crucial factor in its introduction. Furthermore, while acknowledging the negative public reaction to official reprisals implemented under martial law and the military reaction of the IRA, Hopkinson fails to fully consider how these two policies were inextricably linked.[15]

Much research has been done on the long-term strategies of counter-insurgency, with British policy being one of the most debated subjects. The 20th century saw the end of European empires across the world as native populations could no longer be persuaded to accept imperialism, and the general public in imperial metropoles would no longer support the incredible levels of violence required to pacify an entire population. While research on the British strategy during the Irish War of Independence has largely been lacking in this context, some recent studies have been done to analyse the lessons to be learned from this conflict.[16] Colin Gray stated that the IRA was able to fight the war on their terms

[12] Ibid, P. 94-95.
[13] Ibid, P. 95-96.
[14] Ibid, P. 96.
[15]Ibid, P. 93
[16] George Pattison, '*The British Army's Effectiveness in the Irish Campaign 1919-1921 and the Lessons for Modern Counterinsurgency Operations, with Special Reference to C31 Aspects*' (The Cornwallis Group XIV: Analysis of Societal Conflict and Counter-Insurgency, Cornwallis Group, 2009), 88–103. P. 101.

because Michael Collins, the Director of Intelligence and leading strategist of the IRA, 'recognized brilliantly that the British center of gravity was the conscience of its liberal ruling class.'[17] Realising that less liberally minded powers of the time or past Englishmen like Oliver Cromwell would simply massacre the Irish as a whole to root out the IRA, Collins fought the Coalition Government of the day to a point where an imperfect peace deal could be negotiated as a stepping stone towards total Irish freedom. The study of British newspaper coverage offers a revealing snapshot of contemporary British attitudes toward the use of coercion in Ireland and by extension the colonies in general. By examining *The Times*, a paper closely aligned with the establishment, and the *Manchester Guardian*, a prominent voice of British liberalism, it is possible to observe how both conservative-establishment and liberal perspectives responded to the crisis.

1.3.2 British Press Coverage of the Irish War of Independence

Study of British press coverage of the Irish War of Independence is well established, with several important works being published in recent years. Scheopner's 2018 thesis studies the wider British press coverage of events in Ireland following the Easter Rising in 1916.[18] Detailing the press' coverage of the hardening of Irish nationalist opinion into Republicanism, the earlier phases of the War of Independence and the truce and treaty which ended the conflict, Scheopner groups British newspapers into four main categories. The four categories Scheopner details are as follows: 1) Government loyal papers were die-hard supporters of British policy and presence in Ireland; often owned by leading government members like the Prime Minister Lloyd George (owner of the *Daily Chronicle* after 1918) and Lord Northcliffe (who owned the *Daily Mail* but also, critically, *The Times*), these papers focused heavily on the restoration of law and order. 2) The partisan press supported a specific political party or ideology; these papers included *The Daily Herald* and *The Morning Post*. *The Herald* supported the Labour Party and Irish nationalism whereas *The Morning Post* was a conservative publication which was also staunchly unionist and supported the cause of Ulster unionism. 3) The pragmatic press referred to papers who offered cautious and measured reflection but generally supported the Government and prioritised the need for a constitutional solution to the conflict. They above all prioritised the need to maintain international support for British policy in Ireland. Often neutral and measured, this group prioritised the importance of the international opinion and the need for a solution to the situation. This category included papers like *The Daily Telegraph* and *Observer*. They differed from the final category by their general support for the Government.[19] 4) The final category were the settlement-focused papers. These papers were more than

[17] Colin S. Gray, 'The Anglo-Irish War, 1919–21: Lessons from an Irregular Conflict', *Comparative Strategy* 26, no. 5 (2007): 371–94, https://doi.org/10.1080/01495930701750208. P. 385.
[18] Scheopner, "*Miserable Conflict and Confusion": Definitions and Understanding of the Irish Question in British Newspapers, 1917-21*.
[19] Ibid, P. 28-31.

anything concerned with finding a solution to the settlement but differed from the previous category by not always supporting the Government; despite their devotion to finding a settlement and their mix of support and opposition for the Government, they were the least outspoken when it came to suggesting alternatives to Government policy. Both *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian* are included in this category, despite their opposing traditions of conservatism and liberalism.[20]

The inclusion of *The Manchester Guardian* and *The Times* in this category lends itself to this study. In analysing the coverage of two settlement-focused newspapers on their coverage of martial law, it is easier to highlight the influence of their conservatism and liberalism on their language, tone and stances. Moreover, Scheopner suggests that the proclamation of martial law was a result of pressure from the settlement-focused and pragmatic newspapers' demand for greater transparency in Government policy.[21] Scheopner does not focus heavily on martial law, rather focusing on the constitutional aspect of the Irish question as well as reprisal attacks. This thesis will build from Scheopner's research by analysing the coverage of martial law specifically. It will highlight the complex nature of the Irish question, showing how two seemingly distinct issues like martial law and reprisal attacks can become inextricably linked in popular and press thought.

Ian Kenneally's book on newspapers and propaganda analyses the coverage of the War of Independence by a number of British and Irish newspapers. In his analysis of *The Times*, Kenneally highlights the role of owner Lord Northcliffe and Editor George Steed, and their influence on the stance of *The Times* on the situation in Ireland. Kenneally states *The Times* 'had been a traditional opponent of Irish aspirations towards Home Rule and had a long history of enmity towards leaders of Nationalism in Ireland…'[22] However, he writes that the oppositional stance towards Irish nationalism was altered by two things. First was the international geopolitical developments after WWI. After the war, the Paris Peace Conference and Woodrow Wilson's fourteen points demonstrated an international belief that things had to change politically in order to avoid a repeat of the violence. Steed himself attended the Paris Peace Conference in 1920 and had witnessed leaders of Sinn Féin canvassing American delegates for support for the Irish cause. Kenneally argues *The Times* was of the opinion that the USA was 'the future of humanity' and so was concerned about politically powerful Irish-America and future relations between the UK and the USA if the British were not seen to take a fair and just approach towards Ireland.[23] Secondly, Lord Northcliffe, the owner of *The Times*, and Prime Minister David Lloyd George had an antagonistic relationship. Northcliffe had been involved in the propaganda campaign during WWI and felt

[20] Ibid, P. 29.
[21] Ibid, P. 241-242.
[22] Ian Kenneally, *The Paper Wall: Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921* (Cork: Collins Press, 2008). P. 147.
[23] Ibid, P. 147-148.

that Lloyd George had been too lenient on Germany afterwards. Northcliffe was not longer to using *The Times*, probably the most influential paper at the time, to criticise the Lloyd George government.[24]

Kenneally concurs with Scheopner that *The Times* was primarily concerned with finding a settlement for the Irish question. He also agrees that *The Times* was more vocal than other settlement-focused papers in making suggestions for what a settlement could look like.[25] Kenneally argues that *The Times* was one of the first papers to grasp the significance of the reemergence of political violence in Ireland.[26] He goes on to detail how *The Times* attempted for a considerable period of time to distinguish between the IRA and moderates within Sinn Féin who were not proponents of violence, either resulting in or from a serious underestimation of the militant faction within the Republican movement and general public sentiment. [27] Kenneally's observes that *The Times*' opposition to reprisal attacks was so strong that the paper welcomed the proclamation of martial law in the hopes of that it would end the policy reprisals, despite having originally opposed the prospect of increased coercion.[28] This study will look at attempts by *The Times* to use stereotypical language and rhetoric to describe between hardline militant Republicans and moderate Nationalists in Ireland as well as the British Government and Crown forces in Chapters 4 and 5.

Kenneally's work on *The Times*' coverage of this conflict provides an important foundation to this study. By understanding the traditional position of *The Times* in relation to Irish nationalism it is easier to analyse how and why this position changed. This evolution of opinion speaks to *The Times*' uses of anti-Irish stereotypes during the conflict. Furthermore, Kenneally states that Steed placed no restrictions on his editorial writers and wrote many of them himself.[29] As a result the editorials analysed later in this thesis accurately represent the opinions of *The Times* itself.

Katherine Evelyn Davies' 2021 doctoral thesis specifically analyses *The Manchester Gurdian*, focusing on editorial coverage of the conflict and the influence of Editor C.P. Scott and his 'New Liberal' ideals. C.P. Scott was the long-serving editor of *The Manchester Guardian* from 1872 and became its owner in 1907. Closely linked to the Liberal Party, serving as a Liberal MP from 1895 to 1905, he used the paper to promote liberal causes such as civil liberties, Irish Home Rule, and women's suffrage.[30] Despite being a former Liberal MP Scott believed firmly in the press as the 'Fourth Estate', holding that independent newspaper ownership was essential to avoid the political entanglements seen in papers like *The Times*. This conviction set Scott apart from Lord Northcliffe, who had actively participated in

[24] Ibid, P. 148.
[25] Ibid, P. 149-153.
[26] Ibid, P. 4.
[27] Ibid, P. 153-154.
[28] Ibid, P. 159.
[29] Ibid, P. 152.
[30] Davies, *'The Manchester Guardian, C. P. Scott, and the Irish Question 1919-1922'*, P. 4-5 and 170.

wartime propaganda and used his press influence to support personal political ambitions. In contrast, Scott rejected a peerage and maintained *The Manchester Guardian*'s editorial independence.[31] Davies' thesis demonstrates how Scott's New Liberalism shaped the paper's coverage. Unlike *The Times*, whose opposition to Government policy may reflect Northcliffe's opposition to Lloyd George, Scott's critiques were principled rejections of coercion and violence. By the time of the Irish War of Independence, New Liberalism had developed into a statist and internationally oriented ideology that viewed the British Empire not as one of conquest, but as a global association with potential for positive influence.[32] Davies argues this informed his belief that the solution to the Irish question lay in granting Ireland the greatest degree of self-determination compatible with maintaining imperial unity.[33] According to Davies, the paper warned that severe implementation of martial law would only serve to increase support for republicanism within the Irish population, as the executions of leaders of the 1916 Easter Rising had done before. Any hopes that Scott and the paper held that martial law would have a positive effect ended when Crown forces burned down a large part of Cork city centre, the day after martial law was proclaimed.[34]

1.3.3 Anti-Irish Stereotypes

This thesis looks not only at newspaper coverage of martial law but looks closely at the role which anti-Irish stereotypes played in their coverage. The study of anti-Irish stereotyping has been ongoing for decades, beginning with groundbreaking studies of anti-Irish stereotyping from L.P. Curtis. Curtis published a in 1968 and another in 1971 arguing that race was the most significant factor in anti-Irish sentiment in Britain, with the ape-like representation of the Irishman attributed to the racialisation of evolutionary science.[35] Curtis' study of satirical images and political cartoons uses a range of primary sources from both British and American publications. Satirical magazines like *Punch* and *The Tomahawk* are studied, with particular attention given to *Punch*. Illustrated newspapers like *The Illustrated London News* are also included. Curtis' 1971 book was revised in 1997, including two new chapters on more recent scholarship on ethnic imagery and analysis of representations of the Provisional IRA during the Troubles. Curtis argues that caricatures of the Irishman were political propaganda based on pseudoscientific physiognomy and phrenology.[36] To Curtis, the Victorian ape-like portrayal of the Irish served to demonstrate the inferiority of the Irish compared to the British and influenced both public

[31] Ibid, P. 27-29.
[32] Ibid, P. 25-26.
[33] Ibid, P. 40-41.
[34] Ibid, P. 59-60.
[35] L. Perry Curtis, *Anglo-Saxons and Celts: A Study of Anti-Irish Prejudice in Victorian England, Studies in British History and Culture* (Bridgeport, Conn.: Published by the Conference on British Studies at the University of Bridgeport, 1968) P. 99-101 and L. Perry Curtis, *Apes and Angels: The Irishman in Victorian Caricature*, Rev. ed (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997). P. 21.
[36] Curtis, *Apes and Angels*, P. 3-24.

opinion and political debate, like late 19th century debates on Irish self-government.[37] Other scholars have reinforced Curtis' race-focused analysis of anti-Irish stereotypes.

Following the footsteps of Curtis, Richard Ned Lebow in his 1976 book on anti-Irish stereotypes in colonial policy, analyses a wide variety of primary sources to demonstrate how British colonialism, especially its racial ideologies, influenced the construction of national identity in both Britain and Ireland. Lebow draws from private papers like diaries and journals, parliamentary debates and papers, histories, pamphlets, travel and geographical media, newspapers like *The Times* and *The Morning Chronicle* in London and *United Irishman* in Dublin, and journals such as *Punch*, *Dublin University Magazine*, *Quarterly Review* and *Westminster Review*.[38]Lebow echoes Curtis, arguing that British policy in Ireland was primarily shaped by racialised thinking, with the Irish likened to colonial subjects outside Europe. He shows that in the 18th and 19th centuries, the Irish were often depicted by British politicians and writers as inherently inferior, violent and disorderly, traits supposedly shared with non-white peoples of Africa and Asia. He also shows that this comparison was not limited to British colonies, but was an almost uniform stereotype of native populations in all colonies.[39] Lebow stresses that these depictions went beyond ethnic or religious prejudice; they positioned the Irish as a different race within the British Isles itself.[40] This racialised representation, he concludes, enabled British policymakers to view Ireland not simply as a rebellious neighbour but as an internal colony requiring coercive control and civilising.

The most significant study of anti-Irish stereotypes which contrasts Curtis and Lebow's primarily racial explanation was published by Sheridan Gilley in 1978. Gilley puts forward a theory which claims that religion and class differences were more significant to British animosity towards the Irish, heavily criticising Curtis and Lebow's focus on racism.[41] Gilley argues that anti-Irish stereotypes were not inherently racial and were fluid responses to specific events or phenomenon like political violence in Ireland or mass immigration to Britain.[42] Gilley engages a wide variety of primary sources including historical and travel texts, parliamentary papers and debates, social and demographic documents and religious discourse and documents. While Gilley does engage with satirical cartoons like those found in *Punch*, he believes that Curtis relies too heavily on these sources. Gilley wrote that cartoons were not a figure of mainstream English opinion. He also argues that some of these caricatures became internalised by the Irish or even originated from the Irish.[43] Gilley outlines sectarianism as the primary othering factors of Irish immigrants in Britain. Allegiance to the Pope led to a British Protestant distrust of the

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[37] Ibid, P. 110.
[38] Richard Ned Lebow, *White Britain and Black Ireland: The Influence of Stereotypes on Colonial Policy* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1976). P. 115-133.
[39] Ibid, P. 103-104.
[40] Ibid, P. 40-41.
[41] Sheridan Gilley, 'English Attitudes to the Irish in England, 1780-1900', in *Immigrants and Minorities in British Society*, ed. Colin Holmes (London: Routledge, 1978).
[42] Ibid, P. 85 and 93-94.
[43] Ibid, P. 84.

Irish Catholic.[44] He also outlines issues caused by Irish immigration to England. Irish tendencies to work casual labour rather than the monotonous sort typical of industrial factory work was both desired by Englishmen who would profit from the abundance of casual labourers and criticised by working-class Englishmen who would suffer from this overabundance. Furthermore, hygienic conditions in Irish ghettoes lead Gilley to conclude 'it is not to be wondered at if so unlikeable a body was actively disliked.'[45]

D.G. Paz's 1986 article analyses cheap working-class periodicals in the mid-19th century.[46] Paz, like Gilley, argues that anti-Irish sentiment was not primarily a result of racism, scientific or otherwise, but sectarianism. Paz argues that Curtis' findings are skewed due to his overreliance of primary sources from the end of the 19th century, when the Famine, political violence and constitutional agitation had altered the British mindset British.[47] Paz writes that sentiment towards Catholicism was usually negative but sometimes admiring, although always stereotypical. He writes that sentiment towards the Irish was more mixed. He also finds that the periodicals cited rarely linked Irishness and Catholicism. Furthermore, the Irish were usually viewed in cultural terms, not racial.[48] Paz agrees with Gilley's contention that Victorians used terms like Celt or Anglo-Saxon as cultural identifiers, rather than racial denominations.[49] He writes that when the English gutter press wasn't being purposefully tolerant, it regarded Catholicism as encouraging despotism, opposing free institutions, bloodthirsty and persecuting. Catholic priests, especially Jesuits, were portrayed as 'wicked, scheming, implacable, greedy, cold, evil, sensuous, worldly-minded, expedient men, who constantly plotted to advance their Popish lust for power.'[50] Paz concludes that the scientific racialisation of anti-Irish stereotypes was overstated and oversimplified by Curtis.

Roy Foster's *Paddy and Mr Punch* uses a wide range of primary sources to study how Irishness was constructed in public discourse, satire and journalism. He again draws heavily from satirical publications like *Punch*, showing that while the magazine was often firmly anti-Irish in its early years and sometimes depicted Irishmen as simian creatures, it was no more obsessively anti-Irish than it was 'anti-medical students, or anti-politicians, or anti-income tax.' It also depicted English plebians with the same physiognomy as Irish.[51] Foster shows how English rhetoric surrounding the Irish was fluid, and became more hostile as the Famine and the rise of militant rhetoric in nationalist Ireland altered the relationship

[44] Ibid, P. 94.
[45] Ibid, P. 100.
[46] D.G. Paz, 'Anti-Catholicism, Anti-Irish Stereotyping, and Anti-Celtic Racism in Mid-Victorian Working-Class Periodicals', *Albion* 18, no. 4 (1986): 601–16.
[47] Ibid, P. 616.
[48] Ibid, P. 604.
[49] Ibid, P. 602.
[50] Ibid, P. 605.
[51] R. F. Foster, *Paddy and Mr. Punch : Connections in Irish and English History* (London, England ; New York, N.Y. : A. Lane, The Penguin Press, 1993). P. 174.

between Ireland and Britain in the mid-19th century.[52] Foster argues that British depictions of the Irish were complex and sometimes reflected deeper insecurities about the author and British society.[53]

Michael de Nie's *The Eternal Paddy : Irish Identity and the British Press, 1798-1882* analyses a wide variety of British press publications, from the 'quality' papers like *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian* to the much-studied *Punch*. Rather than arguing the primacy of race, religion or class in the formation of anti-Irish stereotypes, De Nie argues a pluralist explanation for Irish stereotypes, citing all three factors as components of the Irish image in Britain.[54] He argues that the prominence of each characteristic of the Irish image in Britain varies with contemporary political relations between Ireland and Britain, Britain and Europe, Roman Catholicism and British Protestantism, and the Irish minority in England and their English hosts. Furthermore, he argues that the hope of joining Britain and Ireland with the 1801 Act of Union was to Anglicise the Irish, but that this hope had dissipated by the 1880s and led to the Liberal Party's support for Irish self-government.[55] De Nie's pluralist framework for the construction of anti-Irish stereotypes will form the basis for this thesis' analysis of anti-Irish stereotypes. It is more effective than Curtis' racial model or Gilley's religious/class approach for analysing anti-Irish stereotypes in the British press as it accounts for the historically shifting and context-dependent representations used to serve varying imperial and political agendas.

G.K. Peatling's *The Whiteness of Ireland Under and After the Union* advanced the debate by reframing race as a fluid and contested concept.[56] By introducing the conceptual tools of whiteness studies into Irish historiography, Peatling challenged earlier frameworks by showing that despite the presence of racialisation of anti-Irish sentiment, the Irish were generally classed in the 'white' category.[57] He argued that anti-Irish sentiment was a result of ethnic, religious, and imperial factors.[58] This helped move the debate toward a more nuanced understanding of how Irish identity was constructed and contested across time and space. Scholarly work on anti-Irish stereotypes since the 1960s has explored how these portrayals varied throughout the 19th century and across media, including cartoons, newspapers, and political commentary. Curtis and Lebow emphasised the racialised nature of these depictions, while Gilley and Paz emphasised religious and class-based interpretations. Roy Foster offers a

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52 Ibid, P. 174-180.
53 Ibid, P. 294-296.
54 Michael de Nie, *The Eternal Paddy: Irish Identity and the British Press, 1798-1882*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004). P. 5.
55 Ibid, P. 3, 264-266 and 271-277.
56 G. K. Peatling, 'The Whiteness of Ireland Under and After the Union', *Journal of British Studies* 44, no. 1 (January 2005): 115–33. P. 115.
57 Ibid, P. 132.
58 Ibid, P. 124.

more fluid reading, and Michael de Nie provides a pluralist framework that accounts for the interplay of political, cultural, and ideological factors.

Peatling's more recent contribution draws on postcolonial theory to re-examine the roots of these stereotypes. In this context, the concept of race has been both central and contested with some scholars placing it at the heart of anti-Irish discourse and others contesting it or replacing it with the concept of whiteness. This thesis acknowledges these debates and henceforth will use the term ethnic rather than race to describe anti-Irish stereotyping, while still operating within de Nie's pluralist framework. This reflects the fluid and contested nature of racial categories, especially in relation to the Irish, whose supposed savagery was often linked to Celtic ancestry rather than a clearly defined racial identity.

This thesis is grounded in the three strands of historiography outlined above. Davies and Kenneally position *The Manchester Guardian* and *The Times* as key voices of British liberalism and the British establishment, making them reliable indicators of public and elite opinion. Curtis, Gilley, Paz, de Nie and others analysed the influence of ethnicity, religion and class in anti-Irish stereotypes in Britian. De Nie argues that the union between Great Britain and Ireland was originally intended to Anglicise the Irish, but developments in the 19th century led liberal Britain to conclude this was impossible. Hopkinson and Gray demonstrate that both British Army and IRA leaders recognised that maintaining Ireland's union with Britain by force would demand a level of coercion the British public would no longer tolerate. Within this context, this thesis examines how *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian* reported on martial law during the Irish War of Independence to trace how changing Anglo-Irish relations reshaped British tolerance for coercion, and how this shift altered both the content and function of anti-Irish stereotypes in press discourse.

1.4 Sources and Methodology

1.4.1 Primary Source Criticism

The primary sources used in this thesis are articles, letters and editorials published in *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian* between 1 January 1919 and 1 January 1922, to include the conflict in its entirety. Focusing on articles published during the conflict ensures an examination of contemporary reactions, avoiding retrospective interpretations that may have been influenced by later political developments or shifts in public memory. Despite both being English newspapers, *The Times* and *The Manchester*

Guardian have been selected to represent conservative and liberal Britain due to their prominence in the press media of the factions of British society, as well as their position within the settlement-focused group of publications described by Scheopner.[59] *The Times* had a circulation of around 113,000 in 1921.[60] While lower than some contemporaries, *The Times*' readership were mainly from higher social classes.[61] Right-leaning newspapers in Britain also tended to be closely aligned with a political party, especially the Conservative Party.[62] The combination of this tendency with *The Times*' strong readership among upper class readers and ownership by Lord Northcliffe is why the newspaper has been chosen as the representative of the conservative, establishment-linked press for this thesis. Northcliffe, as founder of the *Daily Mail* and owner of *The Times*, revolutionised the press with sensationalist, populist content aimed at a broad readership. He wielded enormous political and cultural influence in early 20th century Britain, using his newspapers to shape public opinion on issues ranging from imperialism to war. He was a closely linked to the Conservative Party and the British establishment and a leading WWI propagandist, as discussed by Kenneally.

The Manchester Guardian has been chosen as the liberal counterpart due to its influence among British society and its position as a leading voice in 'New Liberalism.' *The Manchester Guardian*'s readership was significantly lower than *The Times* during the period of study, around 40,000 in 1910 rising to 47,000 in 1930.[63] Despite this, *The Manchester Guardian* enjoyed political influence that far outstretched its readership numbers due to the C.P. Scott's network, and crucially the paper's local, national and international readership.[64]

Editorials offer a unique insight into the organisational stance of newspapers, as they represent the perspective of the newspaper as a whole and its deliberate attempt to steer public opinion.[65] Newspapers are often vehicles for reinforcing or challenging dominant ideas.[66] Editorials are therefore a valuable lens for studying a newspaper's coverage of any divisive or controversial issue, as they offer insight into the publication's stance, which in turn gives an insight into the thinking and agenda of a major influencer in

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[59] *The Times* has been long considered one of the most significant voices of the British political establishment. See Allan Nevins, *American Journalism and Its Historical Treatment*, P. 413-414.
Davies' thesis *The Manchester Guardian, C. P. Scott, and the Irish question 1919-1922* argues that *The Manchester Guardian* was a central voice in British Liberalism, particularly 'New Liberalism' despite a lower circulation than some contemporaries.
[60] James Curran, Anthony Smith, and Pauline Wingate, *Impacts and Influences: Essays on Media Power in the Twentieth Century* (London: New York : Methuen, 1987), http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0651/86023813-d.html. P. 29.
[61] Martin Conboy and Adrian Bingham, *The Edinburgh History of the British and Irish Press, Volume 3: Competition and Disruption, 1900-2017* (Edinburgh University Press, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1515/9781474424943. P. 90.
[62] Ibid, P. 43.
[63] David Butler and Jennie Freeman, *British Political Facts 1900–1968* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1969), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-81694-1, P. 284.
[64] Davies, *'The Manchester Guardian, C. P. Scott, and the Irish Question 1919-1922'*, P. 251-252.
[65] Julie Firmstone, 'Editorial Journalism and Newspapers' Editorial Opinions', in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Communication*, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228613.013.803. P. 2.
[66] Dean Hardman, 'Political Ideologies and Identity in British Newspaper Discourse' (PhD, University of Nottingham, 2008) http://etheses.nottingham.ac.uk/601/1/Political_Ideology_and_Identity_in_British_Newspaper_Discourse.pdf.

public opinion.[67] Unlike standard news reports, editorials reflect the newspaper's leading journalists', editors' and proprietor's opinions, revealing biases, attitudes, and moral positions regarding significant topics.[68] As a result, Chapter 4 analyses editorials published by each newspaper in order to understand their organisational stance on martial law.

To collect relevant primary sources, I used The Times Archive and Newspapers.com to access The Guardian archive.[69] To identify articles discussing martial law during the Irish War of Independence, I performed a keyword-based search using 'Ireland' 'martial law' as search terms.

After retrieving search results, I meticulously reviewed each article to focus on articles where martial law was a significant topic rather than a passing reference, building a corpus of 130 texts (46 *Times* articles and 84 *Guardian* articles). This process allowed me to compile a corpus that includes news reports, editorials and letters to the editor. By relying on digitised archives, I was able to systematically track themes, stereotypical language, and editorial stances across a large body of material. Although my corpus contains 130 articles, only 57 are used, as many were brief or general news reports lacking analytical value.

When using digitised newspaper archives, one important limitation is that they are often subject to Optical Character Recognition (OCR) errors. OCR converts images of printed text into machine-readable text, which allows keyword searches. Faded text, unusual fonts or damage to the physical page can all contribute to misinterpretation, resulting in certain words being overlooked in searches, which results in whole articles being missed.[70] Faded text, unusual fonts and damaged or faded pages are all present in both *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*'s online archives.

The archives also use different formats for uploading material. *The Times* articles are archived individually so searches are very precise but can also lead to relevant articles being excluded from the search due to OCR errors. *Guardian* newspapers on Newspapers.com are archived as entire newspapers, so sifting through search results is more time consuming and can result in missed articles. To rectify these issues as best as possible, I manually reviewed all search results and articles at the edge of pages (which are more likely to be faded or damaged, leading to OCR errors) in both newspapers to ensure accuracy in my source collection.

[67] Firmstone, '*Editorial Journalism and Newspapers' Editorial Opinions*,' P. 3 and 9-10.
[68] Julie Firmstone, 'The Editorial Production Process and Editorial Values as Influences on the Opinions of the British Press Towards Europe', *Journalism Practice* 2, no. 2 (2008): 212–29, https://doi.org/10.1080/17512780801999378. P. 215-216.
[69] 'The Times Archive | The Times & The Sunday Times', accessed 16 March 2025, https://www.thetimes.com/archive, and 'The Guardian Archive', Newspapers.com, accessed 16 March 2025, https://www.newspapers.com/paper/the-guardian/5077/.
[70] Manika Lamba and Margam Madhusudhan, 'Exploring OCR Errors in Full-Text Large Documents: A Study of LIS Theses and Dissertations', *Library Philosophy and Practice*, 2023, https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/libphilprac/7824.

Due to the renaming of *The Manchester Guardian* to *The Guardian* in 1959, it will henceforth be referred to as *The Guardian*, apart from in footnotes and the bibliography.

1.4.2 Methodology

This thesis employs a dual methodological approach combining text analysis and close reading to examine how *The Times* and *The Guardian* discussed martial law during the Irish War of Independence. These methods enable a nuanced interpretation of editorial content and language.

After detailing the major actors and events of the Irish War of Independence in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 will break down de Nie's framework for analysing anti-Irish stereotypes by explaining the historical origins and 19th century application of all three aspects of these stereotypes: ethnicity, religion and class. These chapters aim to answer the first and second research sub-questions.

Chapter 4 answers the third research sub-question. After discussing the frequency with which each newspaper editorialised martial law, de Nie's framework is employed to assess the presence or absence of stereotypical language in editorials. In addition, close reading is conducted of relevant editorials to examine their tone and stance on martial law.

In Chapter 5, de Nie's pluralist framework of ethnicity, religion, and class is employed in detail to answer the fourth research sub-question. Using this framework, stereotypical representations of the Irish are analysed. This involves identifying language patterns and rhetoric that result from and reinforce ethnic, religious, or class biases.

2. The Irish War of Independence

The Irish War of Independence (1919–1921) was the culmination of decades of political agitation and militarisation. The modern phase of Anglo-Irish relations began with the Act of Union in 1801, which formally incorporated Ireland into the United Kingdom and dissolved the Irish Parliament. A nominally Irish administration known as Dublin Castle retained limited local authority.[71]

Throughout the 19th century, Catholic Emancipation (1829), the Great Famine (*an Gorta Mór* in Gaelic, 1845-1852), successive agrarian Land Wars and repeated disastrous armed uprisings increased support for constitutional nationalism.[72] Three Home Rule Bills (1886, 1893, 1912-14), supported by William Gladstone and later Herbert Asquith's Liberal Party, promised Irish self-governance as a Dominion within the British Empire, but all met staunch Unionist opposition. The third Home Rule Bill was passed after the Parliamentary Act of 1911 removed the House of Lord's veto.[73] Ulster's Protestant community, descended from 17th century settlers mainly from Scotland and northern England, bitterly opposed severing Ireland's link with Britain, led by Sir Edward Carson, the Dublin-born lawyer who effectively and successfully prosecuted Oscar Wilde for being homosexual when Wilde accused Carson's client of libel. In September 1912, nearly half a million Unionists signed the Ulster Covenant, swearing to resist Home Rule by any necessary.[74] After a period of forming small, local militias across Ulster, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) was formed in January 1913 and had 100,000 members by the end of 1913, with tacit support from senior British Army officers like Henry Wilson (Director of Military Operations at the War Office) and leading Conservative Party politicians like F.E. Smith.[75] Nationalists responded by forming the Irish Volunteers in November 1913.[76] Tensions peaked in 1914 with Unionist landing modern rifles at Larne in April 1914 and Nationalists landing older rifles at Howth in July 1914, the latter ending in British troops fatally firing on civilians.[77] This period of militarisation radicalised much of the public's opinion.

World War I (WWI) delayed Home Rule indefinitely. Many Irishmen enlisted, deepening national divisions. Under the Defence of the Realm Act 1914 (DORA), repressive controls expanded. In this

[71] Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence*, P. 4.
[72] Lawrence J. McCaffrey, *The Irish Question: Two Centuries of Conflict*, 2nd ed (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1995). P. 3-8.
[73] Marie Coleman, *The Irish Revolution, 1916-1923* (London: Routledge, 2013). P. 5-6.
[74] Ibid, P. 7-8.
[75] Coleman, *The Irish Revolution*, P. 8-9, Keith Jeffery, *Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: A Political Soldier* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), P. 115-116, and Jeremy Smith, 'Bluff, Bluster and Brinkmanship: Andrew Bonar Law and the Third Home Rule Bill', *The Historical Journal* 36, no. 1 (March 1993): 161–78, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X00016150. P. 164.
[76] Coleman, *The Irish Revolution*, P. 9.
[77] Alvin Jackson, 'Unionist Myths 1912-1985', *Past & Present*, no. 136 (1992): 164–85. P. 174, Charles Townshend, *Easter 1916: The Irish Rebellion* (Chicago: Penguin, 2006). P. 54, and Coleman, *The Irish Revolution*, P. ix

context, the Easter Rising began on 24 April 1916, led by the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Citizen Army (ICA, a smaller socialist-republican militia). Insurgents seized strategic positions in Dublin city and proclaimed an Irish Republic. The British responded with overwhelming force, including artillery. After five days of street fighting, the rebels surrendered. Between 3 and 12 May, 16 leaders, including Padraig Pearse and ICA leader James Connolly, were executed. Public opinion, which was initially hostile to the Republicans due to the destruction and loss of civilian life, shifted rapidly.[78] The executions elevated the rebels to martyr status and embedded the ideal of 'blood sacrifice' in the Irish republicanism. The sacrifice of members of the UVF at the Battle of the Somme served to cement blood sacrifice into the Unionist/Loyalist tradition. Both of these communities would frequently refer to their early 20th century martyrs during the Troubles in Northern Ireland (1969-1998).[79]

Sinn Féin, an Irish republican party founded in 1905 by Arthur Griffith, gained prominence after being wrongly blamed for the Rising. Sinn Féin won a landslide victory in the December 1918 general election winning 73 of Ireland's 105 seats. The Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP a moderate nationalist party formed in 1874 to secure Home Rule) was devastated, winning only six seats. Unionists won 23 seats mainly in Ulster. This represented a popular shift in nationalist Ireland to republicanism.[80] Sinn Féin MPs, adhering to a party policy of abstentionism, refused to attend Westminster and instead convened the First Dáil Éireann (the republican parliament, known as the Dáil) on 21 January 1919, proclaiming an Irish Republic. On the same day Irish Volunteers (which would soon become the IRA) conducted the unsanctioned Soloheadbeg Ambush, killing two RIC Constables. This is widely seen as the war's opening shot.[81] As the only MPs to take part in the Dáil were Sinn Féin and the IRA declared its allegiance to the Dáil as the legitimate parliament of Ireland, Sinn Féin effectively became the political wing of the Republican Movement and the IRA the military wing, despite being separate organisations.

In 1919, the Dáil built a parallel state, forming arbitration courts and an Irish Republican Police.[82] They focused on minor crimes and property disputes. In June 1920, the Dáil Courts replaced the arbitration system. The courts operated at parish, district, circuit, and supreme levels.[83] While Loan Drives saw success in Ireland and the USA Loan Drive raised over $5,000,000, Loan Drives in Britain and France raised a combined £11,719 and proposed tax schemes failed to materialise. The result was that the funds raised only financed a skeleton Government and many of the Dáil Ministries existed only for propaganda purposes. The distinction between the republican police force and the IRA was 'more

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[78] Coleman, *The Irish Revolution*, P. 18-29.
[79] Anne L. Reeder, *To Die a Noble Death: Blood Sacrifice and the Legacy of the Easter Rising and the Battle of Somme in Northern Ireland History*, Honors Project Macalester College, 2009, http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/history_honors/6.
[80] Coleman, *The Irish Revolution*, P. 40-44.
[81] Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence*, P. 25.
[82] Statement by witness, Simon Donnelly, 'W.S. 481.' (Roinn Cosanta, hearing on 24 January 1951), Bureau of Military History 1913-1921.
[83] Coleman, *The Irish Revolution*, P. 57-58.

theoretical than real,' and although the courts system saw the most success in the counter-state, this success was limited to local courts settling property disputes. By Autumn 1920 the courts system was experiencing significant issues and by the cessation of violence in July 1921, health and social institutions had collapsed, the void filled by religious orders.[84]

Throughout 1919, IRA barracks attacks escalated to ambushes and assassinations on Crown forces personnel. On 8 September 1919, British troops sacked Fermoy in reprisal for a soldier's death.[85] This was the start of an unofficial policy of reprisal attack, a form of collective punishment carried out by Crown forces in which villages, towns and cities were indiscriminately attacked in response to IRA activity. On 11 September 1919 the British government declared Dáil Éireann illegal.[86] The RIC abandoned isolated rural barracks in late 1919 and early 1920 as IRA attacks intensified.[87] To counter IRA activity, the British recruited former WWI soldiers as temporary recruits to the RIC, forming the Black and Tans, named colloquially after their mismatched uniforms.[88] From July 1920, they were joined by the Auxiliary Division (Auxiliaries), former WWI officers attached to the RIC as a distinct structure to conduct offensive counterinsurgency operations.[89] Both units soon gained notoriety for brutality. In March 1920 disguised policemen assassinated Cork's Lord Mayor Tomás MacCurtain. Later the retaliatory killing of Inspector Swanzy ignited sectarian pogroms in the town where he was shot.[90] This cycle of violence exemplified the culture of extra-legal violence that the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries were introduced into, as well as the tit-for-tat, attack-and-reprisal nature of the conflict. A coroner's inquest found Prime Minister David Lloyd George and several senior crown force officers, including Swanzy, guilty of wilful murder.

The summer of 1920 saw a sharp escalation in the unofficial policy of reprisals, following the deployment of the Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries. Small-scale arson attacks on creameries and local businesses were common, as well as the burning and looting of homes. Larger attacks and killings were less common but became massive propaganda weapons for Sinn Féin. Reprisals also created tension between General Macready, GOC of the British Army in Ireland, and Lieutenant-General Tudor, officially the Police Advisor but unofficially commander of the RIC, Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries and close affiliate of Winston Churchill. Private complaints by British military and political figures at the time lamented a lack of unity of command, with the Army viewing the police forces as excessively violent.[91] After Tuam on 20 July, the list of towns attacked by Crown forces includes but is not exclusive

[84] Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence*, P. 43-45.
[85] Coleman, *The Irish Revolution*, P. 68-69.
[86] Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence*, P. 40.
[87] Ibid, P. 47.
[88] Ibid, P. 49.
[89] Ibid, P. 50.
[90] Ibid, P. 109.
[91] Ibid, P. 66.

to Thurles, Upperchurch and Limerick later in July, Templemore in August, Balbriggan on 20-21 September, Ennistymon, Lahinch and Miltown Malbay on 22 September, Trim and Mallow on 27 September and 28 September respectively, Boyle, Listowel, Tralee and Tubbercurry in October, and Templemore, Ballymote and Granard in early November. The Sack of Balbriggan in September 1920 was widely publicised due to the town's proximity to Dublin. Black and Tans and Auxiliaries burned much of the town in retaliation for the killing of an RIC officer.[92]

In August 1920, the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act (ROIA) was passed, allowing internment and military trials, also banning inquests like the one that followed MacCurtain's murder.[93] Soon after, Kevin Barry, an 18-year-old IRA Volunteer, was captured during an IRA ambush on Crown forces, tortured in custody and hanged.[94] In October, MacCurtain's successor, Terence MacSwiney, died after 74 days on hunger strike, cementing the hunger strike as the primary weapon of 20th century Irish republican prisoners.[95] MacSwiney and Barry's deaths were major propaganda victories for Sinn Féin, with one newspaper reporting that virtually all of the male babies born in Ireland in the two days following Kevin Barry's hanging were named Kevin.[96] As pressure mounted due to the ROIA, the IRA formed Flying Columns, roaming units of around 25 fulltime Volunteers living off the land.[97] On 21 November 1920, Bloody Sunday saw coordinated IRA assassinations of 14 British intelligence officers in Dublin by an IRA a squad commanded directly by Michael Collins. That afternoon, Crown forces opened fire on a crowd at a Gaelic football match in Croke Park, killing 14 civilians. That evening, two IRA officers and a civilian were tortured and executed without trial in Dublin Castle. The civilian was a nephew of the Catholic Archbishop of Perth, who had been taking part in secret negotiations between the British and the IRA.[98] A week later, Tom Barry's West Cork Flying Column ambushed and killed 17 Auxiliaries at Kilmichael in the war's most decisive IRA victory.[99]

On 10 December 1920, martial law was declared in Cork, Kerry, Limerick, and Tipperary in December. It was extended to Clare, Waterford, Kilkenny and Wexford on 5 January 1921.[100] On 11 December, Cork city centre was burned by Auxiliaries following an IRA ambush, becoming the most infamous reprisal of the conflict. Shops and homes were looted and destroyed, and fire crews were attacked.[101] Under martial law regulations beginning on 1 January 1921, official reprisals replaced earlier

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[92] Ibid, P. 80.
[93] Ibid, P. 65.
[94] Ibid, P. 87-88.
[95] Coleman, *The Irish Revolution*, P. 71.
[96] Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence*, P. 88.
[97] Ibid, P. 72-73.
[98] Ibid, P. 89-91.
[99] Coleman, *The Irish Revolution*, P. 71, and Ainsworth, '*British Security Policy in Ireland, 1920-1921: A Desperate Attempt by the Crown to Maintain Anglo-Irish Unity by Force*,' P. 183.
[100] Ainsworth, '*British Security Policy in Ireland, 1920-1921: A Desperate Attempt by the Crown to Maintain Anglo-Irish Unity by Force*,' P. 183.
[101] Hopkinson, *The Irish War of independence*, P. 83.

unauthorised ones. Approximately 150 official reprisals would take place before the ceasefire in July.[102] Despite martial law, IRA activity escalated as 1921 progressed. On 19 March, Crossbarry saw the closest thing to a conventional battle in the entire conflict when Tom Barry's column evaded encirclement by what Barry claimed was over 1,200 British troops and 120 Auxiliaries.[103] The IRA claimed 30 British troops and three IRA Volunteers were killed, official British records claimed 10 British and six IRA fatalities.[104] On 25 May 1921, the IRA attacked the Custom House in Dublin, burning government records. Though symbolically significant, between 80 and 130 Volunteers were captured, damaging IRA strength in the capital.[105]

The Government of Ireland Act, passed in December 1920 and enacted in May 1921, formally partitioned the island.[106] The Northern Ireland Parliament was opened by King George V in June. Ironically, the first to receive Home Rule were the Ulster Unionists who had militarised Irish politics to oppose it. On 11 July 1921 a truce took effect, ceasing armed actions and paving the way for negotiations. The resulting Anglo-Irish Treaty, signed on 6 December 1921, established the Irish Free State as a self-governing Dominion, similar to the already accepted but indefinitely postponed Home Rule Bill. It fell short of full republican independence, and the Treaty split Sinn Féin and the IRA. Éamon de Valera, the President of Sinn Féin and the proclaimed Irish Republic, who had spent most of the war lobbying in the US, refused to endorse it. Michael Collins, the IRA Intelligence Director, leading Republican strategist and chief negotiator of the Treaty, called it a stepping stone. The Treaty was ratified by a narrow Dáil vote on 7 January 1922, setting the stage for the bitter Irish Civil War (1922-1923) fought by the anti-Treaty IRA and pro-Treaty IRA members who became the National Army and were armed by the British upon the establishment of the Free State.[107]

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[102] Coleman, *The Irish Revolution*, P. 86-87.
[103] Tom Barry, *Guerilla Days in Ireland* (Cork, Ireland : Mercier Press, 2013), http://archive.org/details/guerilladaysinir0000barr. P. 205.
[104] Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence*, P. 111-112.
[105] Ibid, P. 103.
[106] Coleman, *The Irish Revolution*, P. 99-100.
[107] Ibid, P. 101-106.

3. Paddy the Irishman

Stereotypes have been present in media publications for centuries. They have the power to uphold oppressive systems and marginalise communities in a society.[108] To contextualise the anti-Irish stereotypes analysed in subsequent chapters, this chapter examines the depiction of Irish identity in 19th century British media. By detailing the view taken of Ireland by British publications according to the pluralist framework outlined by de Nie, it is possible to link the views of *The Times* and *The Guardian* to prevailing British attitudes towards their closest and oldest colonial holding.

3.1 Origins and 19th Evolution of Irish Stereotypes in British Media

In the 19th century, British stereotypes about the Irish typically stemmed from three characteristics: ethnicity, religion and class.[109] De Nie argues that the prominence of each characteristic of the Irish image in Britain varies with contemporary political relations between Ireland and Britain, Britain and Europe, Roman Catholicism and British Protestantism, and the Irish minority in England and their English hosts.

3.1.1 Ethnic Stereotypes

Ethnic stereotypes of the Irish describe Paddy as violent and chaotic. The earliest British depictions of Paddy were written in the 12th century, describing the Irish as uncivilised savages who lived in the woods.[110] While some 18th century depictions of the Irish introduced the now typical drunken idiot, these less insidious representations were pushed aside during times of political crisis.[111] As European empires expanded in the 19th century, Western political and scientific circles sought to rank peoples and

[108] Arturia Melson-Silimon, Briana N. Spivey, and Allison L. Skinner-Dorkenoo, 'The Construction of Racial Stereotypes and How They Serve as Racial Propaganda', *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* 18, no. 1 (2024) https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12862.
[109] De Nie, *The Eternal Paddy*, P. 5.
[110] John Gillingham, 'Images of Ireland 1170-1600: The Origins of English Imperialism', *History Today* 37, no. 2 (1987): 16–22.
[111] De Nie, *The Eternal Paddy*, P. 6.

cultures.[112] Craniology and phrenology gave scientific cover to existing ethnic prejudices.[113] Anatomist Robert Knox, for example, denied ethnic amalgamation between Celts and Anglo-Saxons. [114] He likened the Anglo-Saxon to 'order, wealth, comfort,' and the Celt to 'disorder, riot, destruction, waste.'[115] Although Charles Darwin's work reaffirmed monogenism, the belief that all humans share a common origin, it reinforced rather than dismantled racial hierarchies. It stripped the supposedly uncivilised of their 'noble and primeval innocence.'[116]

These pseudo-sciences placed the Englishman at the top of a global racial hierarchy. Other Western Europeans and Americans followed, but always beneath him. Asians and Indians were labelled 'barbarians,' while 'savage' referred to Africans, Pacific Islanders, and sometimes the Irish. Though usually classed as Europeans, the Irish were ranked above Asians but below other Europeans.[117] The unique position of the Irish in this hierarchy is displayed by the British belief that the Irish alone had the possibility of Anglicisation.[118] This hierarchy legitimised older stereotypes of the Irish as violent and chaotic. As Curtis shows, political cartoons often depicted Paddy as a half-man, half-ape monster.[119]

3.1.2 Sectarian Stereotypes

Anti-Catholicism was central to British identity in the Victorian era. The priest's authority over the layman, his replacement of the father figure, and the Vatican's claim to religious supremacy led Protestants to distrust Catholic Ireland's loyalty to Britain and the Empire.[120] Political and religious leaders saw certain events as proof that Catholics could not be trusted. Anti-Catholic sentiment was also embedded in popular traditions like Guy Fawkes celebrations, which sometimes escalated into sectarian violence in Catholic areas.[121]

Many Britons believed their global dominance in commerce, governance, and intellect came from divine favour for Protestantism. By contrast, the Catholic Paddy was seen as dirty, gullible, stupid and loyal to a foreign, reactionary power seen as hostile to progress. This fed the belief that the Irish were easy targets for agitators, and that Britain's enemies found 'a willing and easily fooled audience among

[112] H. L. Malchow, 'Frankenstein's Monster and Images of Race in Nineteenth-Century Britain', *Past & Present*, no. 139 (1993): 90–130.
[113] De Nie, *The Eternal Paddy*, P. 7.
[114] Robert Knox, *The Races of Men: A Fragment* (London: H. Renshaw, 1850). P. 54.
[115] Ibid, P. 217.
[116] De Nie, *The Eternal Paddy*, P. 8.
[117] Michael D. Biddiss, *Images of Race*, New edition (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers Inc, 1979). P. 22.
[118] De Nie, *The Eternal Paddy*, P. 268.
[119] Curtis, *Anglo-Saxons and Celts,* P. 99-101.
[120] De Nie, *The Eternal Paddy*, P. 14.
[121] John Wolffe, *The Protestant Crusade in Great Britain 1829-1860* (Oxford University Press, 1991). P. 193.

the Irish people.'[122] The 1798 United Irishmen rebellion reinforced this view. When French military support was revealed, *The Times* alternated blame between Catholicism and the French Revolution. One correspondent's letter printed in the paper claimed 'all the popish servants were engaged to murder their masters on being assured that they should enjoy their houses and effects… It now appears that the fanaticism of popery is the most prominent feature in the rebellion, and that the papists meant to have had everything at their devotion.' The next day, the blame turned to the French.[123]

3.1.3 Class Stereotypes

The third key trait of the stereotypical Paddy is his class. Britain's view of Paddy's class was rooted in the ethnic stereotype that the Irish were less evolved, and the sectarian stereotype that God favoured Protestantism, bestowing scientific progress, industry, military strength, and cleanliness upon Protestant nations. While Britain saw itself as prosperous and prestigious, Ireland was viewed as impoverished and backward. With over 500,000 Irish in England and Wales by 1851, the Irish presence was highly visible.[124] According to de Nie, the British viewed the Irish as a reflection of themselves; a memory of what they had been and a warning of what they would become without continued cultural, scientific, and economic progress.[125] Furthermore, the Irish were seen as both a patient to be cured and a strategic weakness to be plugged. This sympathy for Ireland and hostility toward Irishness fused into what de Nie describes as a 'profound ambivalence,' but this thesis will refer to as a dual attitude.[126]

Britain's dual attitude towards Ireland meant long-term responses to the Irish question alternated between coercion and concession, aiming to Anglicise Ireland for her own sake. This thesis will label these policies as dual policies. The British response to the Famine is an excellent example of a dual policy. The perception of the Irish as dirty, lazy, and disloyal was deepened by the Great Famine. The British response placed the burden of improving conditions in the country on Anglo-Irish landowners and the Irish peasantry themselves. The aim was both to Anglicise the Irish and to ensure that Britain would not bear the financial burden of Irish poverty in the future. As Nally summarises, 'the Irish Poor Law was considered an engine for social development rather than simply a technique for controlling poverty… [it] addressed a degenerate public as well as an indigent pauper class.'[127] With this foundation, this thesis

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[122] De Nie, *The Eternal Paddy*, P. 17.
[123] 'The Affairs of Ireland,' *The Times*, 28th June 1798. From The Times Archive, and 'The Affairs of Ireland,' *The Times*, 29th June 1798. From The Times Archive.
[124] Lynn Hollen Lees, *Exiles of Erin: Irish Migrants in Victorian London* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979). P. 15
[125] De Nie, *The Eternal Paddy*, P. 22-24 and 269.
[126] Ibid, P. 24-25.
[127] David Nally, '"That Coming Storm": The Irish Poor Law, Colonial Biopolitics, and the Great Famine', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 98, no. 3 (2008): 714-741. P. 720.

examines press coverage of martial law, explicitly described by both *The Times* and *The Guardian* as a dual policy due to the accompanying and conditional offer of peace negotiations, to trace anti-Irish stereotypes and portrayals of the Irish in the coverage of a conflict which became a watershed moment in both Anglo-Irish history and British imperial history.

4. Martial Law Editorialised

This chapter aims to answer the third research question: how did *The Times* and *The Guardian* editorialise martial law, and what does this reveal about their portrayal of key issues, editorialisation of stereotypes and organisational stances on martial law as a solution to the Irish question? In order to answer this question the frequency, tone and overall stance on martial law in the editorial coverage of *The Times* and *The Guardian* will be analysed. Additionally, the use of stereotypical language discussed in Chapter 3 will be analysed.

4.1 Editorial Coverage in *The Times*

The Times published eight editorials on martial law, beginning on 26 January 1920. Coverage intensified with rising violence, with five editorials appearing after martial law was declared in December 1920 and January 1921. Editorialisation tracked key moments, particularly the proclamation of martial law and the burning of Cork in December 1920.

The first editorial on 26 January 1920 came over a year into the conflict, after the IRA campaign had forced rural RIC barracks to be abandoned. *The Times* saw martial law as the logical progression of British policy but opposed both prior strategy and martial law itself. It claimed there was no evidence 'that martial law would be one whit more effective than the present system in securing anything save the merest semblance of Irish peace.'[128] Using stereotypical language noted in Chapter 3, *The Times* labelled events of 1919 as 'political crime' and activists as 'extremists' and 'offenders.' While calling Ireland a 'domestic problem,' it emphasised imperial concerns such as taxation or troop withdrawal from garrisons elsewhere. Displaying the dual attitude discussed in Chapter 3, it argued 'ultimate consideration should be the peace and good government of Ireland,' placing coercion (the restoration of peace) before concession (good government).[129]

The next relevant editorial appeared on 26 July 1920, as reprisals began to escalate. *The Times* portrayed the situation as a watershed, with the Government forced to choose between repression and a lasting solution. Martial law was flippantly dismissed as 'costly and doubtful,' and alternatives were presented, aligning with Scheopner and Kenneally's view of *The Times* as vocal member of the

[128] 'The Scandal of Ireland,' *The Times*, January 26th, 1920. From The Times Archive.
[129] Ibid.

settlement-focused press.[130] The tone of this editorial was more critical of the Government and others in British society perceived as obstacles to peace. Notably, it described the Labour Party and Sir Edward Carson as placing the Government 'between Scylla and Charybdis.'[131] In Homer's *Odyssey*, these sea monsters symbolise a choice between two dangers and modern use of the phrase describes the subject as having to choose between two dangers.[132] While Carson and the Ulster Unionists were loyal Protestants, this comparison suggests that creed and loyalty did not exclude an Irishman from being portrayed as dangerous. Criticism of Sinn Féin and the IRA was more muted in this article, with *The Times* avoiding terms like 'savage' or 'barbarian,' omitting references to crime or immorality, and using 'outrage' only once to reference British militarist reactionaries. It sarcastically referred to Sinn Féin assuming 'the garb of a *de facto* government,' implying Dáil Éireann could only mimic British governance.[133] While seemingly stereotypical this was largely correct, as shown in Chapter 2.

A November 1920 editorial, focused on reprisals, followed criticism of the Prime Minister's infamous October 1920 speech in Carnarvon where he endorsed reprisals and committed to the partition of Ireland. The article juxtaposed his dismissal of moderate Irish suggestions with his call for moderate Nationalists to propose a settlement. *The Times* did not support martial law, noting it can 'only regularize, not obviate, the employment of naked force.' *The Times* disapproved of the Government's stance that talks would occur only after the IRA's defeat.[134] Like the July editorial, the November piece was highly critical of the Government and Crown forces. Though *The Times* conceded it may 'be politic to chastise Sinn Fein with scorpions,' it criticised 'the tyranny of an apparently irresponsible police force…' and press censorship, calling it 'a deliberate insult to the English Press and public.'[135] The paper concluded 'by their present methods the Government will never restore peace to Ireland.' Consistent with its settlement-focused position, *The Times* urged negotiation with all parties to halt violence. Its stance reflected both opposition to Irish nationalism and loyalty to law and order. Kenneally suggests its criticism of Government policy may have been influenced by Lord Northcliffe's personal conflict with Lloyd George. As in January, *The Times* portrayed the 'Irish problem' as a domestic matter with imperial consequences. Discussing 'the reverberations and repercussions of these events throughout the Empire and in foreign countries,' it emphasised the diplomatic damage caused by Irish discontent abroad and called the situation 'deplorably mismanaged.'[136]

[130] 'The Irish Outlook,' *The Times*, July 26th, 1920. From The Times Archive.
[131] Ibid.
[132] Marianne Govers Hopman, *Scylla Myth, Metaphor, Paradox* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). P. 232.
[133] 'The Irish Outlook,' *The Times*, July 26th, 1920. From The Times Archive.
[134] 'The Condition of Ireland,' *The Times*, November 8th, 1920. From The Times Archive.
[135] Ibid.
[136] Ibid.

On 11 and 13 December 1920, following the martial law proclamation and the burning of Cork, *The Times* published two editorials.[137] The first displayed a newfound support for martial law, stating that as well as stopping the 'criminal designs' of the IRA, it would 'be preferable to the existing system of indiscriminate and lawless reprisals.'[138] *The Times* criticised the Prime Minister's lack of clarity and Ministers' traditional short-term focus in Ireland, noting that 'the majority of the Irish people have seen only the iron hand of British administration.' Arresting moderates like Arthur Griffith was 'at best, a blunder' once talks were proposed.[139] Emotive language returned, referencing 'crime,' 'murder' and 'outrage.' Quoting the Prime Minister, Sinn Féin was described as 'the party or section which controls the organization of the policy of murder and outrage in Ireland.'[140]

The 13 December editorial was a shorter piece discussing the burning of Cork two nights previous. Again supportive of martial law, *The Times* cited Cork as proof that reprisals must be regulated. The article praised General Macready's supposed success in disciplining Army troops and urged that the RIC and Auxiliaries be placed under his command.[141] The tone was mostly neutral and factual. The most emotive terms were 'dastardly' attacks by Republicans and 'reckless' reprisals. Use of words like 'reckless' in this editorial and 'lawless' in the last indicated opposition not to indiscriminate reprisals or collective punishment in principle, but to their unregulated nature and suggested that British order should contrast Irish disorder as the Irish were supposed to reflect the British. Much of the article focused on how effective martial law could prevent unofficial reprisals, implying that restoring order applied to both Republicans and Crown forces.[142]

The final 1920 editorial on martial law was published on 20 December, ten days after the policy's proclamation. While primarily focused on amendments to the Government of Ireland Bill and optimism about its passage, *The Times* reiterated support for martial law, particularly General Macready's warning that Crown force indiscipline might result in the death penalty. The article repeated its call to unify Crown forces under Macready's control to focus 'solely upon the struggle with the political assassin.'[143] The tone was factual and optimistic, praising Lord Middleton and emphasising peace through disciplined martial law and the Government of Ireland Bill.[144] According to De Nie's theory, the absence of Irish stereotypes may reflect growing British confidence that the Government's dual policy would both restore law and order and result in good governance of Ireland.

[137] 'The Prime Minister on Ireland,' *The Times*, December 11th, 1920. From The Times Archive, and 'The Burnings at Cork,' *The Times*, December 13th, 1920. From The Times Archive.
[138] 'The Prime Minister on Ireland,' *The Times*, December 11th, 1920. From The Times Archive.
[139] Ibid.
[140] Ibid.
[141] 'The Burnings at Cork,' *The Times*, December 13th, 1920. From The Times Archive.
[142] Ibid.
[143] 'The Irish Bill,' *The Times*, December 20th, 1920. From The Times Archive.
[144] Ibid.

On 3 January 1921, as martial law took effect and official reprisals began, *The Times* again expressed its support. While of the opinion of the paper was that military momentum had begun to favour the Government, it claimed all moral authority had been lost due to reprisals. The Auxiliary Division was described as sleuth-hounds allowed to 'slip their leash,' and the Government had 'played with edged tools and played unskilfully.' It argued martial law from the beginning would have been better than 'indiscriminate official vengeance.'[145] This endorsement came with a warning. A number of houses were burned down in Midleton by Crown forces in an official reprisal, the reason given that the location of the houses meant the inhabitants must have had advanced knowledge of a previous IRA ambush. *The Times* questioned the assumption that if the inhabitants had such knowledge they could safely or timely warn Crown forces. The paper warned that martial law 'must not seem in any way a cloak for persistence in the old system' and insisted 'the element of justice should always be beyond question.'[146] The tone of this editorial was critical and doubtful, doubting both the legitimacy of martial law if misused and the Chief Secretary's optimism that there would be two working administrations within six months.[147]

The final editorial discussing martial law in *The Times*, published at the end of January 1921 as the IRA was showing no sign of defeat, was a stinging critique of the Government's policies. Although the IRA had forced drastic measures, *The Times* condemned the deployment and unchecked authority of the Auxiliary Division as 'monstrous.' Briefly referring to martial law, it questioned whether previous reprisals 'gained aught that a just and responsible administration of law, whether civil or martial, would not have secured?'[148] The tone of this editorial was emotive and critical. The Government had 'betrayed the highest traditions of the British nation' by shirking responsibility for reprisals and 'surreptitiously betrayed [the British public's] honour and their reputation' by obscuring the facts. Notably, the editorial referred to Republicans with unusual respect, acknowledging 'the resiliency of militant Sinn Fein, even under the most severe pressure.'[149]

4.2 Editorial Coverage in *The Guardian*

The Guardian published fifteen editorials on martial law between 22 December 1919 and 3 June 1921, showing a more frequent engagement with the issue. Coverage mirrored periods of heightened conflict or

[145] 'The Irish Outlook,' *The Times*, January 3rd, 1921. From The Times Archive.
[146] Ibid.
[147] Ibid.
[148] 'Suppressio Veri,' *The Times*, January 29th, 1921. From The Times Archive.
[149] Ibid.

new policy. Between December 1920 and February 1921, seven editorials appeared, showing a sustained focus on the subject.

The first editorial, published in December, was the only one in 1919. As violence escalated and the RIC lost ground and manpower, *The Guardian* argued that martial law had already been effectively implemented through the Defence of the Realm Act 1914 and would fail. The tone of this editorial was logical and critical, favouring British concessions to moderates. While using stereotypical language to call the IRA 'criminals' and 'murderous cranks,' *The Guardian* also showed a degree of understanding of their aims. Citing Padraig Pearse, the article stated that Irish Republicans welcomed severe British coercion, believing a state of total war would supplant moderate nationalist desires for Home Rule with 'a very different desire for complete and anti-English independence.'[150] The editorial referenced the 'Prussian governing spirit' which led to WWI Alsatian deserters aiding the British. It warned that Unionists, especially the *Morning Post*, were playing into Republican hands, writing 'the wild men of Sinn Fein and the wild men of fanatical Unionism are working hard together.'[151] The article portrayed the conflict as an imperial issue, arguing coercion harmed Britain's international reputation. It discussed how Irish emigration resulting from past British policy had influenced U.S. policy and American foreign policy treated the British with 'distant civility,' contrasting the positive imperial example of Canadian Corps during WWI. The Amritsar massacre had shaken British control over India and served as a warning of the risks of violent coercion.[152]

The next editorial, published in August 1920 amid the unofficial reprisal policy, followed a House of Lords debate on martial law. *The Guardian* opposed its imposition, asserting it was unjustified as civil courts could still function.[153] The editorial's tone was pointed and ironic at first, referring to the Bill for the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act and its sponsor, Lord Chancellor F.E. Smith, who had actively supported the UVF. *The Guardian* wrote 'the school of disorder in which he helped to teach has given us indirectly the Ireland that we see.'[154] Here, *The Guardian* flipped the usual stereotype of Irish disorder to criticise British policy, highlighting how pro-British agitators had once been supported by elements of the Conservative Party and Army. The tone became more analytical, arguing that the courts could sit but gathering evidence from communities that either supported the acts on trial or hated British rule more than the IRA was impossible. In these circumstances, courts-martial would only achieve more convictions by accepting lesser evidence.[155] By linking Smith's past involvement in Unionist paramilitarism with the contemporary turmoil, *The Guardian* highlighted the paradox of his role and equated British and Irish

[150] 'The Two Extremes,' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 22nd, 1919. From Newspapers.com.
[151] Ibid.
[152] Ibid.
[153] 'The Lords and Ireland,' *The Manchester Guardian*, August 10th, 1920. From Newspapers.com.
[154] Ibid.
[155] Ibid.

militarists. The editorial argued that Irish support for ‘political crime’ and animosity towards Britain complicated the conflict was a simple law and order issue.[156]

A *Guardian* editorial from September 1920 referred to martial law in its function as the rule of law for Army troops. After discussing several recent reprisal attacks, the paper questioned how soldiers could repeatedly use bombs against civilians when martial law, which they operated under, strictly regulated leaving barracks and the removal of weapons and explosives. *The Guardian* argued that effective enforcement of martial law on Crown forces could improve discipline, and undisciplined units should be removed. Policemen and soldiers involved in reprisals were described as ‘armed rioters’ and ‘mutineers,’ alluding to a stereotype of chaotic destruction typically attributed to the Irish.[157] The tone was one of pointed criticism. The editorial questioned the *Daily Chronicle*’s defence of reprisals, labelling it the ‘Government’s London apologist.’ Portraying the issue as imperial, *The Guardian* compared reprisals to German atrocities in Louvain, calling the practice ‘Prussianism.’ The editorial concluded that leaving undisciplined forces in Ireland would ‘complete the ruin of Ireland and to prepare instruments for that in England.’[158]

On 11 December, the day after martial law was proclaimed, *The Guardian* published an editorial expressing a mixed view of the Government’s dual policy. While it welcomed the offer of peace talks, the paper criticised their pairing with martial law, stating the Prime Minister was not ‘taking the right road, but, as any road is better than no road.’[159] The tone was sceptically hopeful. The paper supported the idea that martial law could regulate Crown force conduct and bolster Britain’s image in Ireland but warned that its overzealous application would encourage extremism and damage prospects of peace. *The Guardian* insisted reprisals must end, stating it would be ‘intolerable if in addition to the new martial law the lynch law hitherto prevailing’ should continue.[160] *The Guardian* described a key limitation to dual policy; if coercion was ‘violently and recklessly applied, [it would] prove completely destructive of the other’ element of dual policy. *The Guardian* argued that if the Dáil announced a truce, then the side of order would ‘then be the side of Dail Eireann,’ demonstrating the paper’s judgement was based on conduct rather than identity.[161]

Like *The Times*, another editorial followed on 13 December in the wake of the burning of Cork. *The Guardian* now stood in total opposition to martial law, declaring that it was ‘never more true than to-day that force is no remedy.’[162] Through critical and logical analysis, the editorial argued that drawing

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[156] Ibid.
[157] ‘Ireland or Belgium?’ *The Manchester Guardian*, September 30th, 1920. From Newspapers.com.
[158] Ibid.
[159] C.P. Scott, ‘Is it Peace?’ *The Manchester Guardian*, December 11th, 1920. From Newspapers.com.
[160] Ibid.
[161] Ibid.
[162] C.P. Scott, ‘Steps towards Peace,’ *The Manchester Guardian*, December 13th, 1920. From Newspapers.com.

lines on a map and proclaiming one side under martial law made no impact on the IRA, who crossed these lines easily and operated from rural hideouts or 'in the slums of cities.'[163] Given this reality of guerrilla warfare, combined with the belief that harsh measures would fuel militancy, *The Guardian* concluded martial law would fail to defeat the IRA. The Cork reprisals were cited as proof that martial law failed to curb Crown force violence. Therefore, the paper concluded that martial law would fail both objectives and called for the release of imprisoned Sinn Féin MPs for peace negotiations.[164]

The final *Guardian* editorial of 1920 responding to martial law was published on the same day as *The Times*' last editorial that year on the subject. It reacted to two directives in Ireland. The first was from General Macready, stating that anyone, civilian, police, or Army, in martial law areas would be subject to the death penalty for violating regulations. The second came from Dr Cohalan, the Bishop of Cork, denouncing IRA violence and denying the existence of a state of war. Though *The Guardian* no longer supported martial law, it welcomed Macready's directive and hoped for its effectiveness.[165] This short but hopeful piece cast Macready and Cohalan as moderate, reasonable figures working to end violence. By equating the authority and morality of a British General and a Catholic Bishop, the editorial underscored *The Guardian*'s priority of peace in Ireland, regardless of the peacemakers' religious denomination.

The first *Guardian* editorial of 1921 discussing martial law appeared on 20 January, weeks into its implementation and official reprisals. While reviewing the Labour Party's campaign for peace, the paper described martial law as 'a state of barely concealed war.'[166] This short editorial was critical of both Labour's inaction and the Government's policies. *The Guardian* noted that the Chief Secretary had repeatedly claimed the IRA were 'well in hand… and yet the state of Ireland steadily worsens.' The paper described the ongoing violence between the IRA and Crown forces as 'the awful regime of terror and coercion,' exemplifying its balanced criticism.[167]

The next editorial, on 24 January, discussed Éamon de Valera's return to Ireland from America. *The Guardian* reiterated its opposition to martial law, writing that official reprisals continued alongside unofficial ones. It doubted the Government's belief in coercion as a path to victory, calling public offers for negotiation 'no more than invitations to surrender.'[168] This editorial was balanced and critical, criticising both IRA violence and Sinn Féin's justifications as well as Crown force excesses and appeasement of Ulster Unionism to the detriment of peace. The paper described the situation as an 'exchange of barbarities,' and discussed the Catholic Church's opposition to the IRA campaign, warning

[163] Ibid.
[164] Ibid.
[165] 'Counterblasts to Murder,' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 20th, 1920. From Newspapers.com.
[166] 'The Labour Party as Moderator,' *The Manchester Guardian*, January 18th, 1921. From Newspapers.com.
[167] Ibid.
[168] 'De Valera's Manifesto,' *The Manchester Guardian*, January 24th, 1921. From Newspapers.com.

Republicans risked war with the Church.[169] This article, and the fact that it was an editorial, is therefore an excellent example of the nuance displayed by *The Guardian*, using traditional stereotypical language in a balanced manner and also displaying an evolution in attitude towards the Catholic Church.

Four editorials in February 1921 addressed martial law. The first, on 2 February, came a day before the Dromkeen Ambush killed 11 RIC men, signalling an increase in Crown force losses.[170] The editorial detailed the first execution under martial law. While not disputing its legality, *The Guardian* opposed martial law overall.[171] With reasoned criticism, the paper accepted that it was better than executing random civilians or an alleged militant's relatives, both legal under martial law, but doubted the policy's effectiveness.[172] The paper predicted martial law would exasperate tensions, a prediction vindicated as violence escalated. It described both the IRA and Crown forces as 'offenders,' claiming one side of the conflict was prosecuted according to severe law whereas the other acted 'scot-free.'[173] Though less severe than it could have been, martial law was portrayed as futile and unacceptable due to ongoing official and unofficial reprisals.

The next editorial addressed concerns that an execution had occurred before sentencing was formally promulgated, with similar actions feared in upcoming Dublin courts-martial. *The Guardian* insisted executions must be based on strong, publicly available evidence to satisfy justice. It questioned the guilt of three of the four Dublin defendants and warned that executing innocents would 'manufacture rebels' and be 'repugnant to justice.'[174] The tone of this editorial was cautious, with *The Guardian* highlighting the increased responsibility of courts-martial to provide a high standard of evidence and presuming that martial law had replaced unofficial reprisals to avoid greater unrest.[175]

The third February editorial, on 15 February, coincided with the third session of Parliament and the Upton Train Ambush, a failed IRA attack which killed at least six civilians.[176] The paper condemned martial law and the Coalition Government, which it described as a 'fundamental weakness' incapable of forming a 'consistent, or honest, or effective' policy. *The Guardian* stated that rather than martial law ending the 'lynch law' of reprisals, 'the two flourish gaily side by side.' It criticised the failure to suppress crime, arguing 'everywhere repression is met by outrage as outrage is followed by indiscriminate repression.' Portraying the issue as imperial, the paper warned of humiliating and

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[169] Ibid.
[170] Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence*, P. 121.
[171] 'A Martial Law Execution,' *The Manchester Guardian*, February 2nd, 1921. From Newspapers.com.
[172] Ibid.
[173] Ibid.
[174] 'The Dublin Courts-Martial,' *The Manchester Guardian*, February 8th, 1921. From Newspaper.com.
[175] Ibid.
[176] Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence*, P. 112-113.

politically damaging effects on Britain's reputation in the Anglophonic world, stating the policy was 'making the name of England stink in the nostrils even of our best friends.'[177]

The final February editorial, published on 26 February amid continued violence, addressed an appeal to the King's Bench concerning a court-martial. While not questioning the legitimacy of martial law, *The Guardian* opposed the ruling that courts-martial were not courts but committees formed to carry out necessary actions, thus empowered to 'create offences and inflict punishments unknown to the common law.'[178] The paper warned martial law endangered civilians' rights in both Ireland and Britain, suggesting that if Ireland could be 'delivered over' to military rule, the same could happen in England.[179] This evidences the stereotypical belief that Ireland reflected both a past version of England and a possible vision of what England could become if it abandoned its values.

Following February 1921, *The Guardian* published fewer editorials on martial law, with the final three appearing on 8 March, 30 April, and 3 June. March saw further escalating violence, showing the failure of martial law to defeat the IRA or end extra-legal Crown force killings. The 8 March editorial discussed upcoming elections in the new Irish jurisdictions, portraying martial law as an obstacle to democratic process. *The Guardian* stated that '[A]n election under martial law would be absurd.'[180] The tone was extremely doubtful. The paper doubted whether candidates would even stand in the South and whether a government could be viable under Sinn Féin's abstentionist stance. It argued that any resulting government would be powerless under London policy. Even if Home Rule were granted, *The Guardian* asked how it could coexist with martial law in six counties and 'quasi-martial law' in twenty, calling into question the legitimacy of a government 'which will be boycotted and spurned.'[181] Martial law was thus portrayed as a direct threat to peace and democracy in southern Ireland.

Violence continued throughout March and April, including Tom Barry's Crossbarry ambush and further reprisals. In this context, the 30 April editorial criticised military censorship in martial law areas, opposing this aspect of martial law. Juxtaposing the Chief Secretary's claim that the Government's 'sole desire… is to make known the real facts as to the condition of Ireland and to let the country decide' with censorship, *The Guardian* exposed the hypocrisy of such statements. It criticised the conduct of British warfare both inside and outside martial law areas. In rare ethnic stereotyping, the editorial stated that the Crown forces' military rule exceeded wartime conventions, 'with the great difference that the rules of civilised warfare do not apply in Ireland.'[182] This reflected a balanced critique, suggesting the IRA and Crown forces were equally responsible for the brutality. The editorial's tone was sharp and critical, using

[177] 'A Crucial Session,' *The Manchester Guardian*, February 15th, 1921. From Newspapers.com.
[178] 'The Powers of Courts-Martial,' *The Manchester Guardian*, February 26th, 1921. From Newspapers.com.
[179] Ibid.
[180] 'The Coming Irish Elections,' *The Manchester Guardian*, March 8th, 1921. From Newspapers.com.
[181] Ibid.
[182] 'The "Real Facts" About Ireland,' *The Manchester Guardian*, April 30th, 1921. From Newspapers.com.

the Chief Secretary's own words to underscore inconsistencies between public declarations and actual policy.[183]

The final editorial on martial law, published 3 June 1921, over a month before the Truce would end the war. It followed the Chief Secretary's parliamentary comments indicating potential escalation. *The Guardian* interpreted this as signalling increased coercion, a decision it strongly opposed. The paper envisioned a system of 'blockhouses, barbed wire, and concentration camps… to cover most of the country and would constitute an occupation so complete as to render retaliation difficult or impossible.'[184] This would involve detaining all military-aged males unable to prove they did not support Sinn Féin. *The Guardian* argued this policy would only work temporarily and would severely undermine future peace negotiations by disappearing or interning potential negotiators. The editorial offered moral and political objections to Government strategy, highlighting the Chief Secretary's admission of responsibility for reprisals, contradicting previous denials. The continued violence and British casualties in 1921 were cited as evidence of failure. While concluding this apocalyptic and highly critical editorial, *The Guardian* warned that increased coercion would be disastrous and sounded too ridiculous to be true but admitting that 'in the dealings of the Government in Ireland we have been forced to recognise that there is no absurdity which may not come true.'[185]

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[183] Ibid.
[184] 'A New Policy?' *The Manchester Guardian*, June 3rd, 1921. From Newspapers.com.
[185] Ibid.

5. Anti-Irish Stereotyping in *The Times* and *The Guardian*, 1919-1921

Building on the stereotypes delineated in the Chapter 3, this chapter examines their persistence and adaptation in the War of Independence. This chapter attempts to answer the fourth research sub-question: how did *The Times* and *The Guardian* employ anti-Irish stereotypes in their coverage of martial law during the Irish War of Independence?

5.1 Anti-Irish Stereotyping in *The Times*' Coverage

In the first year of the Irish War of Independence, martial law was only a significant theme in one *Times* article. From the beginning of 1920 discourse surrounding martial law in response to the IRA campaign increased. The first of these, the editorial published on 26 January, announced 'an official return of political crime in Ireland…'[186] Throughout the conflict a variety of words associated with traditional stereotypes such as 'savage' and 'barbaric' were repeated in relation to actions by the IRA. The words 'murder' and 'outrage' were most commonly used.[187]

The Labour Party, historically ambiguous but generally more sympathetic to Irish issues than the conservative elite who made up the bulk of *The Times* readership, used these traditional stereotypes in much the same way.[188] On 26 February 1920, before the real explosion of tit-for-tat violence and large-scale ambushes, *The Times* reprinted excerpts from a report from a Labour commission on Ireland, stating '[A]cts of violence are deplorably frequent in Ireland… they are the work of irresponsible extremists and form no part of the policy and programme of any organized body of Irish opinion.'[189] The supposedly abnormal frequency of violence in Ireland was blamed on an unorganised fringe deemed unfit for self-government. However, this overlooked the fact, shown in Chapter 2, that Sinn Féin had been active since

186 'The Scandal of Ireland,' *The Times*, January 26th, 1920. From The Times Archive.
187 'News in Brief,' *The Times*, February 20th, 1920. From The Times Archive, 'Labour's Policy for Ireland,' *The Times*, February 26th, 1920. From The Times Archive, 'Reprisals,' *The Times*, October 1st, 1920. From The Times Archive, 'Irish Disorders,' *The Times*, November 13th, 1920. From The Times Archive, 'The Prime Minister on Ireland,' *The Times*, December 11th, 1920. From The Times Archive, 'House of Commons,' *The Times*, December 14th, 1920. From The Times Archive, 'House of Commons,' *The Times*, December 15th, 1920. From The Times Archive, and 'Murder and Outrage in Ireland,' *The Times*, December 28th, 1920. From The Times Archive.
188 Gearóid Ó Tuathaigh, 'A Tangled Legacy: The Irish "Inheritance" of British Labour', in *The British Labour Party and Twentieth-Century Ireland: The Cause of Ireland, the Cause of Labour*, ed. Laurence Marley (Manchester University Press, 2016), P. 17–34, https://doi.org/10.7228/manchester/9780719096013.003.0001. P. 29.
189 'Labour's Policy for Ireland,' *The Times*, February 26th, 1920. From The Times Archive.

1905 and the wider nationalist movement had established its own parallel parliament, courts, and associated media independent of British institutions in Ireland and not only were they organised, but elected.[190] Furthermore, the IRA was highly organised, particularly in the south-west (which would become the martial law area) and had associated women's and youth organisations.[191] Labour's distinction between militants and the wider movement echoes the misunderstanding of the militancy of the Republican movement by *The Times* described by Kenneally.[192]

Months later in June, as the cycle of IRA attacks and Crown force reprisals escalated, another article further demonstrated a Labour Party ambiguity toward issues outside of Britain. While criticising the repressive measures of the British government in Ireland, Sydney Webb (1st Baron Passfield) was quoted saying that a state of martial law already existed with 'the police armed, and every kind of arbitrary suppression and interference.' He went on, however, to demonstrate the patronising colonial language and ethnic ranking outlined by de Nie and others, arguing that it 'was bad enough to have those things happening in Egypt and India. When they happened so near home it meant that our liberties in England were also being attacked. What was done in Ireland today could be done in England tomorrow, and would be done.'[193] Not only were Indians and Egyptians less important than the Irish, but the predominant reason against the use of coercion in Ireland was the even worse likelihood that it would be used in England next. Subsequently a July editorial wrote that the Labour Party and Sir Edward Carson, who both opposed the Government's policy for opposing reasons, as placing the Government 'between Scylla and Charybdis…'[194] As discussed in the previous chapter, this metaphor disregarded religion and loyalty to the Crown, portraying Irishmen as dangerous when opposing the Government, even when the opposition comes in the form of pro-British agitation.

A more severe example of anti-Irish rhetoric came in an article describing how 'men of action' in Ireland were criticising British inaction. Published on 28 July 1920, it coincided with the explosion of reprisal attacks by Crown forces. The 'special correspondent' outlined the belief that effective martial law would require a Cromwellian Irish policy (Oliver Cromwell's policies resulted in a conservative estimation of 15-20% of Ireland's population dying),[195] including burning whole towns and floggings. The reason why this was impossible was not immorality or illegality, but that the Liberal and Labour parties in England would not allow it and so true martial law in Ireland would require English revolution. The situation was not as dire as others claimed, as one anonymous source said, 'no matter what happened

[190] Coleman, *The Irish Revolution*, P. 45-63.
[191] Joost Augusteijn, 'Accounting for the Emergence of Violent Activism among Irish Revolutionaries, 1916-21', *Irish Historical Studies* 35, no. 139 (2007): 327–44. P. 328-329
[192] Kenneally, *The Paper Wall*, P. 153-154.
[193] 'Labour Party Congress,' *The Times*, June 25th, 1920. The Times Archive.
[194] 'The Irish Outlook,' *The Times*, July 26th, 1920. From The Times Archive.
[195] Pádraig Lenihan, 'War and Population, 1649-52', *Irish Economic and Social History* 24 (1997): 1–21. P. 21.

in outlying parts of the country, it was only Irishmen destroying one another without any menace, now that foreign war was over, to England's security.'[196] This article reflected the stereotype of Irish hierarchical inferiority by suggesting that violence in Ireland was less significant than English security. It also evidenced a British establishment realisation that, as observed by de Nie, liberal Britain had given up on the Anglicisation of Ireland and would not support the extreme violence which had subjugated Ireland in the past.

The most scathing criticism of the Irish is found in a letter from Lord Hugh Cecil, published two months after the proclamation of martial law and amid the resulting escalation of Crown force losses. Cecil described the conflict as 'a recurrence of a moral disease which has prevailed in Ireland from time to time at least for the last 160 years, and by which murder is judged to be a legitimate form of political agitation.' To Cecil, the support from the population given to the various manifestations of militant Irish nationalism over the centuries was caused 'partly from a tradition of lawlessness, partly from a sympathy with the object of the agitation, partly from cowardice, partly from cruel indifference. Sometimes the grievance has been religious; occasionally (as now) political; but most often agrarian. Whatever the grievance, the criminal symptoms of the disease have been just the same.'[197] This passage draws on multiple ethnic stereotypes, portraying the Irish as inherently lawless, cowardly, and cruel. Cecil's language portrays Irish nationalism as a hereditary moral failing, describing political violence not as a response to grievance but as a recurring symptom of national degeneracy.

While the overt sectarianism of the 19th century outlined by de Nie and others had largely subsided by the time of the War of Independence, in Cecil's letter quoted above we also see open criticism of the Catholic Church. After thinly praising the Church for raising the standard of chastity in Ireland, he wonders 'what they have done in the last hundred years to make it possible for the Irish to be, some of them so cruel, and some of them so cowardly as they are.' Cecil summed up his thoughts on the Catholic Church. 'It is not the theological errors of Rome that stand against it in the minds of reasonable men so much as its lamentable moral record. Who that reads day by day the accounts of what happens in Ireland, who that turns over the pages of the history of Ireland in the past, but must often ask: Where is the Christian influence of the Church? Are these the results of the evangelization of Ireland by a Christian priesthood? If indeed Christian Churches are to be judged by their fruits, terrible must be the condemnation of the Irish Roman Catholic Bishops and priests.'[198]

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[196] 'Ireland and Sinn Fein,' *The Times*, July 28th, 1920. From The Times Archive.
[197] 'Irish Crime,' *The Times*, February 14th, 1921. From The Times Archive.
[198] Ibid.

As late as 1918, there were Irish Protestants who doubted Catholic loyalty to the Crown.[199] By the time of the Irish War of Independence, however, the Vatican realised the development of a practical dependency on the British Empire. The Church relied on the British to enable the spread of Catholicism and to protect Church holdings globally, particularly after WWI. As Rafferty argued, the Empire provided more opportunities for Irish Catholics to thrive than the UK.[200] *The Times* themselves wrote that one 'force [for peace] is the Roman Catholic Hierarchy.'[201] Despite some support from individual priests, the hierarchy of the Church in Ireland had set itself in opposition to Sinn Féin and the IRA by refusing to recognise the Dáil.[202] This was partly because it was 'known to be profoundly distressed by the present campaign of murder.' A number of decrees excommunicating any IRA members involved in armed actions 'shows how deeply the Roman Catholic Church has been moved…'[203] *The Times*' publication of Cecil's anti-Catholic remarks, contrasted with its own portrayal of the Church as a force for peace, highlights the evolving attitude toward Catholicism, which had taken root to varying degrees among different members of British society.

Cecil's letter aside, one traditional stereotype related to Catholicism endured in *The Times*. In several articles the various political movements in Ireland were portrayed as pawns, willing or otherwise, of foreign agitators. A letter to the Editor in July 1920 related a story of a source's encounter with a German officer in the north of Ireland in 1914. The reader believed that the crucial mistake was allowing and assisting gunrunning and the organisation of the UVF in order to resist Home Rule by force. The reader stated that the German had been sent to Ulster to report on the situation, as 'the German General Staff quite expected that we should be fully occupied with Irish civil war… They hoped we should then be unable to exercise much strength in opposing Germany, even if we decided to come in at all.'[204] This article shows that Protestant Irish Unionists were not immune to the accusations of being a dupe that were outlined by de Nie, despite their denomination and loyalty to the Crown.

In the flurry of articles relating to martial law in Ireland immediately following its proclamation in December 1920, one article interestingly accused not only foreign money (assumedly donations from Irish Americans) but also former Liberal Prime Minister Herbert Asquith of meddling in Irish politics. A quote from Andrew Bonar Law, leader of the Conservative Party, enabler of the UVF and later Prime Minister, ironically claimed 'Mr Asquith is certainly as responsible as any living man for the present position of affairs in Ireland. There never was in the history of Ireland such provocation as that which has

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[199] Oliver P. Rafferty, 'The Catholic Church, Ireland and the British Empire, 1800-1921', *Historical Research* 84, no. 224 (May 2011): 288–309, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2281.2010.00556.x. P. 307.
[200] Ibid, P. 306-309.
[201] 'A Truce for Ireland,' *The Times*, July 28th, 1920. From The Times Archive.
[202] Coleman, *The Irish Revolution*, P. 84.
[203] 'A Truce for Ireland,' *The Times*, July 28th, 1920. From The Times Archive.
[204] 'Ireland,' *The Times*, July 27th, 1920. From The Times Archive.

taken place. It has been a deliberate attempt, subsidized by foreign money, to force the people of the United Kingdom to do by conspiracy and murder what they do not want to do.'[205] This quote shows that not only had the stereotype of the Irish serving as disloyal pawns of foreign powers endured, but that the Englishman was not immune from accusations of being that power.

As outlined in Chapter 3, class stereotypes of Ireland and the Irish in British society led to a dual attitude of sympathy and disgust for the Irish. This dual attitude resulted in dual coercive-concessionary policies, aimed at Anglicising Ireland for her own benefit. This dual attitude was frequently expressed in *The Times*.[206] One article from May 1920, shortly before the escalation of reprisals and over six months before the proclamation of martial law, explicitly stated 'a dual policy was agreed upon… to be a more tolerant regime for the Irish people as a whole while the Executive is engaged in an attempt to stamp out the criminal conspiracy in its midst.'[207] Following the Government's declaration of martial law paired with overtures for peace negotiations in December 1920, *The Times* summed up this iteration of the dual policy by saying '[O]ne face looks smilingly towards a peace of negotiation, the other frowns on crime and insists that there can be no real peace until it is under lock and key.'[208] In the same period, *The Times* printed the opinion of respected Irish moderate nationalist MP T.P. O'Connor who described the policy as a 'blend of timid and ungenerous Liberalism and stupidly unrelenting Toryism.'[209] These articles illustrate how *The Times* echoed and legitimised the long-standing British dual attitude and policy. By portraying coercion and concession not as contradictory but as complementary strategies while also reprinting O'Connor's criticism, *The Times* reinforced the notion that the Irish required both discipline and guidance to become more Anglicised but opposed Lloyd George's version of dual policy. This position is in line with the ideology and proprietorship of the paper.

Also resulting from Paddy's class, de Nie's idea that the British viewed the Irish as a reflection of themselves was shown. *The Times* juxtaposed the British against the Irish by detailing Irish militarism as criminal, treacherous or savage. In October 1920, months after reprisals began to terrorise rural Ireland, we see a new trend begin as comparisons with the IRA were utilised in order to criticise the British Government and Crown forces in Ireland. Describing reprisals as 'a particularly reprehensible form of lynch law,' one letter to the Editor argued 'republican crime and outrage are bad enough, but they are not improved by sporadic acts of murder and arson committed by the guardians of the law,' referring to Crown forces. In the view of *The Times*, 'no civilised army would allow its troops' to act this way. This letter presented martial law as a remedy not to IRA violence but to Crown force violence.[210] The author

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[205] 'Mr. Bonar Law's Wrath,' *The Times*, December 11th, 1920. From The Times Archive.
[206] 'News in Brief,' *The Times*, February 20th, 1920. From The Times Archive.
[207] 'To Fight the Terror,' *The Times*, May 19th, 1920. From The Times Archive.
[208] 'New Irish Policy,' *The Times*, December 11th, 1920. From The Times Archive.
[209] 'The New Irish Policy,' *The Times*, December 13th, 1920. From The Times Archive.
[210] 'Reprisals,' *The Times*, October 1st, 1920. From The Times Archive.

implied that murder and savagery were to be expected of the Irish, but that better standards were expected of civilised British institutions.

In tandem with growing criticism of the Government and Crown forces, another trend saw *The Times* refer to the Republican movement with increasing respect. Once it was clear that the British could not militarily defeat the IRA and would have to negotiate with Sinn Féin, descriptions of the two organisations became more respectful. Late January 1921, almost a month after martial law's implementation and amid ongoing military proof that the policy was not defeating the IRA, *The Times* wrote the 'resiliency of militant Sinn Fein, even under the most severe pressure, its resolution and audacity, confute the popular estimate of the Irish character, and must indicate to thinking people the strength of the new spirit which animates the Irish nation.'[211] After the truce this respect was displayed again, with one article discussing '[C]ommander T.B. Barry, I.R.A., who has been appointed liaison officer for the martial law area.'[212] The use of the words Commander and liaison officer to describe the IRA Commander at Kilmichael and Crossbarry contrasted heavily with the nameless murderers and criminals discussed earlier. This is also the first and only time in this corpus in which *The Times* gives the IRA its proper acronym rather than incorrect or formerly used names like 'Irish Volunteers' (the original name of the organisation when it conducted the Easter Rising in 1916) or 'Republican Volunteers' (a name it never used).[213] In showing the IRA any form of respect as a fighting force *The Times* avoided the inference that the British Army and police institutions had been fought to a stalemate by a disorganised group of savages. By confuting 'the popular estimate of the Irish character,' the inability to defeat the IRA prompted a re-evaluation of the Irish, challenging entrenched colonial narratives and stereotypes. This marks a moment where the loss of British control over the physical conditions forced an alteration of the symbolic narrative. By adopting more respectful language *The Times*, a key voice of the British establishment, implicitly conceded that the Irish were no longer a peripheral, naturally subjugate population in need of civilising, but political actors with effective organisation. This rhetorical shift signalled a departure from the ideological foundations of British rule, as the language of superiority and paternalism reluctantly gave way to one that considered parity and eventual negotiated withdrawals from the colonies.

[211] 'Suppressio Veri,' *The Times*, January 29th, 1921. From The Times Archive.
[212] 'Irish Peace Talks,' *The Times*, July 19th, 1921. From The Times Archive.
[213] 'Irish Negotiations,' *The Times*, January 1st, 1921. From The Times Archive, and 'Suppressio Veri,' *The Times*, January 29th, 1921. From The Times Archive.

5.2 Anti-Irish Stereotyping in *The Guardian*'s Coverage

In the corpus of articles selected for this study *The Guardian* twice overtly acknowledged ethnic stereotypes of the Irish. In August 1920, with the escalation of reprisals, the paper wrote that the majority of British MPs incorrectly believed their duty was to apply 'a temporary strait-waistcoat to a dangerous madman' and that whoever is advising the Government that 'they are dealing with a race of genial, placable, temporarily deranged T. P. O'Connors is misinforming them.'[214] Rather than using the traditional stereotypes of the Irish as dangerous or unable to form a coherent political objective in order to criticise Irish nationalism, *The Guardian* explicitly used these stereotypes to criticise British understanding of Ireland. Immediately following the proclamation of martial law and the burning of Cork, *The Guardian* made its second overt acknowledgement of stereotypical Paddy. Desmond MacCarthy, a prominent Anglo-Irish contributor to *The Guardian* was who was descended from Gaelic Chieftains, wrote of the British policies in Ireland which contributed to certain aspects of stereotypes.[215] Rather than inability to govern as an inherent flaw in the Irish, MacCarthy described British policy in Ireland as 'a game which always enables her afterwards to laugh at their divisions and to treat the Irish as an unreasonable race who know not what they want.'[216] MacCarthy implied that any truth found in the stereotypical view of the Irish as unable to govern themselves was a result of a purposeful British policy designed to divide the Irish which both removed nationalist Ireland's ability to form a coherent political movement and allowed British writers and politicians to poke fun at this inability.

In the rare instances when terms associated with ethnic stereotypes were employed as criticisms of the Irish, they were applied in a balanced manner, criticising specific actions rather than perpetuating bias. On 14 December 1920, four days after the initial proclamation of martial law in Ireland, *The Guardian* published an article detailing the reprisal attack on Cork. *The Guardian* described the incident as 'the most revolting bout of crime and counter-crime, outrage and counter-outrage, yet carried out in Ireland.' The article went on to criticise the 'repulsiveness of such orgies of savagery and counter-savagery.'[217] Other examples of balanced criticism described the war as 'exchange of barbarities' and disputed martial law and reprisals, stating 'crime does not justify crime outside the ethics of savagery.'[218]

[214] 'The Dangers of the Coercion Bill,' *The Manchester Guardian*, August 10th, 1920. From Newspapers.com.
[215] MacCarthy was a prominent Anglo-Irish literary critic and descendent of Irish Chieftains.
[216] Desmond MacCarthy, 'England's Policy in Ireland,' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 15th, 1920. From Newspapers.com.
[217] 'The Cork Competition in Crime,' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 14th, 1920. From Newspapers.com.
[218] 'De Valera's Manifesto,' *The Manchester Guardian*, January 24th, 1921. From Newspapers.com, and 'A New Policy?' *The Manchester Guardian*, June 3rd, 1921. From Newspapers.com.

The Guardian's criticism demonstrated Scott's New Liberal ideological stance, condemning IRA and Crown force violence rather than repeating ethnic stereotypes of the Irish.

Rather than savage or barbarian, terms like 'wild' and 'youthful' were common labels applied to the IRA.[219] This patronisingly implied excessive passion rather than moral inferiority. Although 'wild' carries some of the same connotations as savage or barbarian, it is less extreme, suggesting an overzealous nature rather than nefariousness. In May 1921, when it was clear that martial law had only altered the strategies of the IRA rather than defeating the organisation, *The Guardian* published an article arguing that coercion had done nothing to dissuade Ireland from the 'idealism that calls the youth of Ireland to the criminalities of murder and arson gilded with the glory of war for liberty.'[220] This quote was an example of the nuanced opinion of the conflict held by *The Guardian*, setting themselves apart both from support for the IRA's guerrilla war and from the stereotypical view of the Irish.

In their coverage of martial law in this conflict, *The Guardian* made little reference to the Catholic Church itself. In one editorial, the author wrote of the outrage felt by the hierarchy of the Catholic Church in Ireland and mentioned how several leading officials had denounced the IRA and its campaign. *The Guardian* also saw the risk 'that Sinn Fein might find itself at war not only with the British Government but – which would be far more serious – the Catholic Church.'[221] It is clear to see from this quote that *The Guardian* had begun to view the Church as a possible intermediary or a potentially powerful ally in the fight against the IRA. When detailing the concessionary aspect of the December 1920 dual policy, *The Guardian* alluded to a distrust of Father Michael O'Flanagan. Correspondence from O'Flanagan as well as the Galway County Council to the Government featured in the announcement of the dual policy. The article referred to the skill with which the Prime Minister presented the Galway council as a 'graceful and sagacious convert from the grosser errors of Sinn Feinism … with Father O'Flanagan hovering more doubtfully in the middle distance, yet pleasantly distinguished from some of his associates by his courage, his friendly temper, and his high personal influence and authority.'[222] The lesser depiction of Father O'Flanagan in the House of Commons was unlikely to be related to his vocation as an ordained Catholic priest, however, as O'Flanagan was the Acting-President of Sinn Féin. The only other mention of the Catholic Church in a *Guardian* article regarding martial law was discussion of the critical letter from Lord Cecil to the editor of *The Times*. In their summary article, *The Guardian* spoke neither for nor against Cecil's condemnation of the Church, simply labelling his criticism as his 'remedies.'[223]

[219] 'The Labour Party as Moderator,' *The Manchester Guardian*, January 18th, 1921. From Newspapers.com and 'The "Real Facts" About Ireland,' *The Manchester Guardian*, April 30th, 1921. From Newspapers.com.
[220] 'Possibility of Peace in Ireland,' *The Manchester Guardian*, May 31st, 1921. From Newspapers.com.
[221] 'De Valera's Manifesto,' *The Manchester Guardian*, January 24th, 1921. From Newspapers.com
[222] 'Premier's New Irish Policy,' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 11th, 1920. From Newspapers.com
[223] 'Lord H. Cecil's Ways to Irish Peace,' *The Manchester Guardian*, February 15th, 1921. From Newspapers.com.

As shown in the Chapter 3, stereotypes of the Irish as disloyal to the Crown resulted from their Catholicism.[224] Historically, Britain had seen Irish loyalties as being divided between London and Rome.[225] When *The Guardian* did mention the loyalty of Irishmen, they wrote from the perspective that many Irishmen held; that Irish loyalty was to Ireland first. Desmond MacCarthy discussed the ability of the British to compel, through coercion or bribery, Irishmen to betray their countrymen and nationalist movements. He wrote 'for hundreds of years the Irish have been a subject race. They have the faults of a subject race. You may succeed in compelling them to betray men whom they love, but in their hearts they will hate you all the more for their own weakness… though they themselves were cowards they hope their children will not be. That is a fact that a statesman would take into consideration.'[226]

In terms of class-related stereotypes of the Irish, the presence of a dual attitude towards the Irish was clear in *The Guardian*'s coverage. In January 1920, after the conflict had escalated beyond the control of the RIC but before the reprisal or martial law policies, *The Guardian* quoted Lord French, saying 'leniency and generosity are to be expected, so be it; but no one will deny that order must first of all be restored in Ireland.'[227] Immediately following from the declaration of martial law in December 1920, *The Guardian* described the now official dual policy of the Government in several articles.[228] An eloquent description of the dual policy wrote '[S]word and olive-branch, if not actually flourished alternately, had each its turn of more conspicuous display, though at no point was either allowed to become completely hidden.'[229] This quote shows a grandiose element to the attitude. Whether truly believed or simply propaganda, *The Guardian* presented an image that British coercion was necessary and their concessions noble. A few days later, the same metaphor was used to clarify that the Government's policy was in no way new but only solidified in explicit policy. 'The Irish policy of the Government has not entered upon a new phase, as there has been some disposition to hope, but upon a franker phase... Only, the sword has this time the appearance of being wreathed in olive leaves.'[230] The dual policy in Ireland was outlined again in May 1921. This time without the grand metaphor, *The Guardian* wrote that for years 'there have been two conflicting and naturally destructive policies operating in the government

[224] Gilley, *English Attitudes to the Irish in England, 1780-1900*, P. 94, Paz, *Anti-Catholicism, Anti-Irish Stereotyping, and Anti-Celtic Racism in Mid-Victorian Working-Class Periodicals*, P. 605, and de Nie, *The Eternal Paddy*, P. 14.
[225] De Nie, *The Eternal Paddy*, P. 14.
[226] Desmond MacCarthy, 'England's Policy in Ireland,' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 15th, 1920. From Newspapers.com.
[227] 'Lord French on Irish Crime,' *The Manchester Guardian*, January 24th, 1920. From Newspapers.com.
[228] C.P. Scott, 'Is It Peace?' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 11th, 1920. From Newspapers.com, 'The Premier's Irish Statement,' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 11th, 1920. From Newspapers.com, and 'Government's Double Policy in Ireland,' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 11th, 1920. From Newspapers.com.
[229] 'Premier's New Irish Policy,' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 11th, 1920. From Newspapers.com.
[230] Desmond MacCarthy, 'England's Policy in Ireland,' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 15th, 1920. From Newspapers.com.

of Ireland. Civil control, leaning towards moderation and toleration, fights with military control, which means naked force.'[231]

The Guardian made several comparisons between British military and state officials and Irish Republicans which clearly demonstrated the reflection stereotype discussed in Chapter 3. Similar to *The Times* post-October 1920, when reprisals were in full flow, comparisons with Irish militants served as a tool to criticise the Government and Crown forces or to highlight perceived hypocrisy in British justifications for violence. Writing after the burning of Cork, one article stated that the Government's theory that Republicans may have burned Cork 'is as if, when some bad Irish landlord was murdered in the foul days of the old land war by an undetected assassin, some flippant Irish member had suggested that the murder was the work of an organisation of Irish landlords.'[232] *The Guardian* referred to the Land War of the late 19th century, during which violent and non-violent tactics seen during the War of Independence were used as part of a campaign of agrarian agitation, to evoke the strong emotions still felt over a highly contentious period in Irish history.

Writings in *The Guardian* showed that the British did not just view reflections of themselves in Ireland. *The Guardian* often used the Prussians as a standard of unacceptable wartime behaviour that the British should consistently surpass.[233] While criticising the introduction of martial law, Desmond MacCarthy highlighted the existence of militarists in the British Government 'who believe only in violence; they correspond to a group within Sinn Fein. During [WWI], as it happens, no men were more vehement in denouncing Prussianism; subsequently they forced us into war with Russia, dictated the Irish policy of reprisals, and did their best to wreck the League of Nations. The Prime Minister surrendered to them over Russia, over Ireland, and at Versailles… They are the men who will make the world-power of England loathed and ultimately the dismemberment of the Empire, which they love, probable.'[234] MacCarthy explicitly equated militarists within the British Government with both Irish republican and Prussian militarists, portraying the conflict as a confrontation between military reactionism and liberal values.

[231] 'Possibility of Peace in Ireland,' *The Manchester Guardian*, May 31st, 1921. From Newspapers.com.
[232] 'The Cork Competition in Crime,' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 14th, 1920. From Newspapers.com.
[233] 'Irish Courts-Martial Sentence,' *The Manchester* Guardian, September 24th, 1919. From Newspapers.com, 'The Two Extremes,' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 22nd, 1919. From Newspapers.com, 'Ireland or Belgium?' *The Manchester Guardian*, September 30th, 1920. From Newspapers.com, and 'Un-English Methods in Ireland,' December 17th, 1920. From Newspapers.com.
[234] Desmond MacCarthy, 'England's Policy in Ireland,' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 15th, 1920. From Newspapers.com.

6. Martial Law in the English Press: A Comparative Analysis

6.1 Editorial Coverage: Stereotyping, Frequency, Tone and Stance

The year in which each newspaper took to begin editorialising martial law in Ireland did not result in equal understandings of the Irish situation. *The Guardian's* first editorial displayed an impressive understanding of IRA objectives, writing that hardline Republicans hoped to provoke 'Zabernism' and 'Amritsarism' from Crown forces.[235] In contrast, *The Times'* first editorial acknowledged rising violence and Government failure but revealed less awareness of nationalist Ireland's determination. While sceptical of martial law's ability to end violence, *The Times* proposed involving moderate nationalists in the discredited Dublin Castle administration. The paper's suggestion of reform to an almost totally rejected administration reflected its conservatism and general support for governmental authority.[236] This furthers Kenneally's argument that *The Times* underestimated both militant influence in nationalist Ireland by showing the paper also underestimated republicanism within nationalist Ireland.

After these initial editorials, *The Times* published one editorial in July and one in November 1920, while *The Guardian* published one in both August and September.[237] Serious attention to martial law arose only when reprisals dominated headlines. Following martial law's proclamation in December 1920, *The Times* published five editorials from 11 December to 29 January, ending the paper's editorialisation of the topic.[238] *The Guardian*, however, wrote three editorials in December, two in January, four in February, and one each in March, April and June, reflecting a sustained interest in both the dual policy's implementation and its political, legal and humanitarian impacts, consistent with its liberal values.[239]

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[235] Zabernism refers to the militarist German control of Zabern in Alsace-Lorraine. One incident in 1913, in which the German military insulted the local population and repressed resulting protests, led to widespread protesting across Germany, debates on the military's power within German politics, and the deterioration of relations between Alsace and Germany. The result of these deteriorating relations are discussed in *The Guardian*'s editorial.
Amritsarism refers to the Jallianwala Bagh massacre, where locally recruited regiments of the British Indian Army were ordered to fire on peaceful protesters who could not escape. The official death toll range was 379 with 1,200 wounded, Indian estimates are much higher. British rule in India was severely damaged by this event, with many moderate Indians becoming nationalists. See Derek Sayer, 'British Reaction to the Amritsar Massacre 1919-1920', *Past & Present*, no. 131 (1991): 130–64. P. 131.
'The Two Extremes,' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 22nd, 1919. From Newspapers.com.

[236] 'The Scandal of Ireland,' *The Times*, January 26th, 1920. From The Times Archive.

[237] 'The Irish Outlook,' *The Times*, July 26th, 1920. From The Times Archive, 'The Condition of Ireland,' *The Times*, November 8th, 1920. From The Times Archive, 'The Lords and Ireland,' *The Manchester Guardian*, August 10th, 1920. From Newspapers.com, and 'Ireland or Belgium?' *The Manchester Guardian*, September 30th, 1920. From Newspapers.com.

[238] 'The Prime Minister on Ireland,' *The Times*, December 11th, 1920. From The Times Archive, 'The Burnings at Cork,' *The Times*, December 13th, 1920. From The Times Archive, 'The Irish Bill,' *The Times*, December 20th, 1920. From The Times Archive, 'The Irish Outlook,' *The Times*, January 3rd, 1921. From The Times Archive, and 'Suppressio Veri,' *The Times*, January 29th, 1921. From The Times Archive.

[239] C.P. Scott, 'Is it Peace?' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 11th, 1920. From Newspapers.com, C.P. Scott, 'Steps towards Peace,' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 13th, 1920. From Newspapers.com, 'Counterblasts to Murder,' *The*

In early editorials, *The Times* employed stereotypes depicting the IRA as a criminal, savage group terrorising the RIC and civilians. As the war progressed, it joined broader media condemnation of reprisals.[240] Three of its first four editorials featured stereotypical portrayals of the Irish as unruly or violent, though these were less extreme than some examples in their general reporting, suggesting editorial moderation. Later editorials became more critical of Government strategy while cautiously supporting martial law, displaying the paper's Northcliffe-owned, conservate and establishment-linked position. The reduction of stereotypes later indicated recognition of Irish resilience and echoed the idea that British views of the Irish reflected Britain's self-image.

Out of the 15 *Guardian* editorials covering the topic, only the first employed stereotypical language to criminalise the Irish. The four subsequent editorials used conventional stereotypes to critique British actions. The fourth editorial displayed the dual attitude towards the Irish, arguing for a separation between the different types of Irish Nationalist which implied a need for both coercion and concession. In five editorials *The Guardian* applied stereotypes of the Irish to equate the IRA and British Crown forces, offering criticism by suggesting moral parity in their actions. In one editorial, the hierarchy of peoples was evident, as *The Guardian* warned that repressive measures in Ireland could potentially be extended to England, implying a priority of English liberties over Irish. Overall, *The Guardian*'s complex editorial strategy utilised stereotypes more frequently than *The Times* mainly to underscore the moral and practical consequences of British policy, aligning with Scott's New Liberal stance that opposed imperial coercion while maintaining a paternalistic tone towards subject populations.

Editorial tones varied over time. Before December 1920, *The Times* criticised both Government inaction and ill-advised actions but did not support martial law. With its proclamation, *The Times* adopted a supportive stance on martial law and coverage became more neutral.[241] The tone of editorials became critical again in its final two editorials. While still supporting martial law, it condemned reprisals as dishonourable.[242] *The Times* concluded 'however laudable their ultimate aim, they have callously and deliberately sought it by disgraceful means.'[243] *The Guardian's* tone ranged from logical and reasoned to sarcastic and ironic, particularly in exposing contradictions like F.E. Smith's support for martial law

Manchester Guardian, December 20th, 1920. From Newspapers.com, 'The Labour Party as Moderator,' *The Manchester Guardian*, January 18th, 1921. From Newspapers.com, 'De Valera's Manifesto,' *The Manchester Guardian*, January 24th, 1921. From Newspapers.com, 'A Martial Law Execution,' *The Manchester Guardian*, February 2nd, 1921. From Newspapers.com, 'The Dublin Courts-Martial,' *The Manchester Guardian*, February 8th, 1921. From Newspaper.com, 'A Crucial Session,' *The Manchester Guardian*, February 15th, 1921. From Newspapers.com, 'The Powers of Courts-Martial,' *The Manchester Guardian*, February 26th, 1921. From Newspapers.com, 'The Coming Irish Elections,' *The Manchester Guardian*, March 8th, 1921. From Newspapers.com, 'The "Real Facts" About Ireland,' *The Manchester Guardian*, April 30th, 1921. From Newspapers.com, and 'A New Policy?' *The Manchester Guardian*, June 3rd, 1921. From Newspapers.com.
[240] Kenneally, *The Paper Wall*, P. 22-42.
[241] 'The Burnings at Cork,' *The Times*, December 13th, 1920. From The Times Archive, and 'The Irish Bill,' *The Times*, December 20th, 1920. From The Times Archive.
[242] 'The Irish Outlook,' *The Times*, January 3rd, 1921. From The Times Archive, and 'Suppressio Veri,' *The Times*, January 29th, 1921. From The Times Archive.
[243] 'Suppressio Veri,' *The Times*, January 29th, 1921. From The Times Archive.

despite past support for Unionist paramilitaries.[244] The paper also questioned the Chief Secretary's claim to transparency amidst censorship, doubting the sincerity of policy and policymakers.[245]

The Times' Government criticism reflected its position as a Northcliffe-owned, conservative publication. Its opposition to reprisals did not signal support for Irish self-determination or anti-imperialism. Opposition to specifically unofficial reprisals while still supporting martial law (which legalised and regulated official reprisals) shows that *The Times* was not opposed to coercion, just unregulated coercion. Criticism focused on the damage to British honour, not Irish suffering. *The Guardian*, driven by Scott's New Liberalism, offered more analytical and sustained critique. It wrote of the immediate and long-term limitations of severe coercion, warning that limited martial law would not hinder the IRA's mobility while full enforcement would bring unacceptable political costs.[246] Initial support for martial law was quickly withdrawn, illustrating *The Guardian's* New Liberal ideology. By criticising both IRA and Crown force violence, *The Guardian* opposed coercion while supporting civil order and imperial cohesion. Properly administered martial law would have been preferable to indiscriminate reprisals but the coexistence of martial law and reprisals was unacceptable.

The Times usually portrayed the conflict as a domestic matter with international consequences, particularly in the USA.[247] *The Guardian* saw it as a national issue for Ireland and an imperial one for Britain. Both acknowledged the influence of the global Irish diaspora, with *The Guardian* also referencing Canada's WWI contributions.[248] *The Guardian* displayed its New Liberal ideology when it, rather than the establishment-linked *Times*, emphasised imperial consequences.

Both newspapers acknowledged militarists on both sides as primarily committed to armed struggle.[249] While *The Times* tended towards law and order, *The Guardian* portrayed the conflict as a struggle between militarist reactionism and liberal reform, presenting Ireland as a theatre in a broader conflict between conservatism and liberalism.[250] Furthermore, *The Guardian* warned that martial law jeopardised peace and democracy not only in Ireland but in Britain itself. Following the December 1920 proclamation, the burning of Cork was cited by *The Times* to justify martial law. *The Guardian* initially acknowledged martial law might end reprisals but cited Cork to argue the opposite.[251] As a result, *The*

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244 'The Lords and Ireland,' *The Manchester Guardian*, August 10th, 1920. From Newspapers.com.
245 'The "Real Facts" About Ireland,' *The Manchester Guardian*, April 30th, 1921. From Newspapers.com.
246 'The Two Extremes,' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 22nd, 1919. From Newspapers.com.
247 'The Scandal of Ireland,' *The Times*, January 26th, 1920. From The Times Archive, and 'The Condition of Ireland,' *The Times*, November 8th, 1920. From The Times Archive.
248 'The Two Extremes,' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 22nd, 1919. From Newspapers.com, 'Ireland or Belgium?' *The Manchester Guardian*, September 30th, 1920. From Newspapers.com, and 'A Crucial Session,' *The Manchester Guardian*, February 15th, 1921. From Newspapers.com.
249 'The Irish Outlook,' *The Times*, July 26th, 1920. From The Times Archive, and 'The Lords and Ireland,' *The Manchester Guardian*, August 10th, 1920. From Newspapers.com.
250 Desmond MacCarthy, 'England's Policy in Ireland,' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 15th, 1920. From Newspapers.com.
251 'The Burnings at Cork,' *The Times*, December 13th, 1920. From The Times Archive, and C.P. Scott, 'Steps towards Peace,' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 13th, 1920. From Newspapers.com.

Guardian maintained a near-constant opposition to martial law, while *The Times* evolved from resistance to reluctant support. *The Times* hesitance to support martial law reflected establishment reluctance to treat the conflict as a war rather than a crimewave.[252]

All three *Times* editorials published before December 1920 opposed martial law. After the dual policy's proclamation, the paper supported it. Previously, it had condemned reprisals and doubted martial law's capacity to restore order without excessive cost. After martial law's proclamation, it used reprisals like Cork's burning to justify the policy.[253] *The Guardian*, in contrast, maintained its opposition throughout. For both papers, the catalyst for change was reprisal attacks associated with the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries.

6.2 Mobilisation of Stereotypes: Ethnicity, Religion and Class

When considering the traditional stereotypes of the Irish, it is clear that by the time of the Irish War of Independence both newspapers refrained from overtly hostile language which had characterised British media portrayals of the Irish in the 19th century.[254] Using ethnic stereotypes previously used to denigrate the Irish population, *The Times* mobilised centuries of ill-feeling to shape reader opinion against Irish Republicans. In almost exclusively reserving words like 'savage' and 'barbarian' for the Republican movement, *The Times*' writing aligned with its conservative, establishment-linked position.[255] Although initially opposed to martial law, such language justified increased coercion against a subhuman enemy incapable of logic or negotiation. In printing the opinions of sources, 'special correspondents,' and readers, *The Times* and sometimes *The Guardian* amplified anti-Irish opinion. By printing Lord Cecil's view that the IRA campaign was 'a recurrence of a moral disease which has prevailed in Ireland from time to time at least for the last 160 years,' both newspapers reflected a belief that Irishness caused symptoms like assassination, rioting and sabotage.[256]

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[252] Coleman, *The Irish Revolution*, P. 97.
[253] 'The Burnings at Cork,' *The Times*, December 13th, 1920. From The Times Archive, and 'Suppressio Veri,' *The Times*, January 29th, 1921. From The Times Archive.
[254] De Nie, *The Eternal Paddy*, P. 270-271.
[255] 'The Scandal of Ireland,' *The Times*, January 26th, 1920. From The Times Archive, 'News in Brief,' *The Times*, February 20th, 1920. From The Times Archive, 'Labour's Policy for Ireland,' *The Times*, February 26th, 1920. From The Times Archive, 'Reprisals,' *The Times*, October 1st, 1920. From The Times Archive, 'Irish Disorders,' *The Times*, November 13th, 1920. From The Times Archive, 'The Prime Minister on Ireland,' *The Times*, December 11th, 1920. From The Times Archive, 'House of Commons,' *The Times*, December 14th, 1920. From The Times Archive, 'House of Commons,' *The Times*, December 15th, 1920. From The Times Archive, and 'Murder and Outrage in Ireland,' *The Times*, December 28th, 1920. From The Times Archive.
[256] 'Irish Crime,' *The* Times, February 14th, 1921. From The Times Archive and 'Lord H. Cecil's Ways to Irish Peace,' *The Manchester Guardian*, February 15th, 1921. From Newspapers.com.

The Guardian generally addressed ethnic stereotypes from a New Liberal perspective. Rather than subtly referring to stereotypes to exploit them, *The Guardian* disparaged them, arguing that the IRA campaign was an unjustified result of an understandable desire for autonomy and generations of British misrule, not ethnic inferiority.[257] When using stereotypical language, *The Guardian* balanced it by criticising both IRA and Crown forces. The newspaper often worded labels like 'savage,' 'crime or 'outrage as 'savagery and counter-savagery,' 'crime and counter-crime, outrage and counter-outrage,' suggesting terms criticised violence and legality, not Irish republicanism.[258] This reflected a belief that savagery was no more typical of the Irish than of the British. Although *The Guardian* sometimes used language reflecting a hierarchical view of non-Europeans, its choice to describe British actions as 'savage' marked a significant departure from the 19th century belief in British civility.

Traces of sectarian stereotypes were subtler but remained in *The Times*. What is clear is that views of the Catholic Church improved. Both newspapers acknowledged the Church's opposition to the IRA and its potential as a peace-making force, contrasting 19th century hostility.[259] For *The Times,* trust in the Church did not equate to trust in the Irish. As discussed in Chapter 3, Irish Catholicism resulted in perceived disloyalty to the Crown. For a paper tied to the conservative British establishment, this disloyalty remained central. *The Times* referenced third-party sponsors of Irish nationalism, especially the British Liberal Party and Irish America, and discussed German exploitation of pro-British agitation in Ulster in 1914, forgetting Conservative and British Army support for that agitation.[260] *The Guardian,* in contrast, did not subtly suggest Irish disloyalty but addressed the issue directly and with nuance. Desmond MacCarthy wrote that Irish national aspirations and British policy meant 'the Irish people as a whole are as much behind the acts committed by men on their side as Englishmen support, by sanctioning passively and refusing sympathy to the victims, the murders which their own armed forces commit in Ireland.'[261] This shows *The Guardian* viewed Irish disloyalty as loyalty to Ireland, not to Rome.

Of two major class-based British beliefs about Ireland, one was a patronising dual attitude that Britain must enforce law and order while helping the Irish Anglicise to an Anglo-Saxon standard. This led to the Act of Union and over a century of coercive-concessionary policy. Both papers reflected this

[257] 'The Dangers of the Coercion Bill,' *The Manchester Guardian*, August 10th, 1920. From Newspapers.com, Desmond MacCarthy, 'England's Policy in Ireland,' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 15th, 1920. From Newspapers.com.
[258] 'Irish Coercion in England,' *The Manchester Guardian*, November 2nd, 1920. From Newspapers.com, 'The Cork Competition in Crime,' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 14th, 1920. From Newspapers.com, 'De Valera's Manifesto,' *The Manchester Guardian*, January 24th, 1921. From Newspapers.com, and 'A New Policy?' *The Manchester Guardian*, June 3rd, 1921. From Newspapers.com.
[259] 'A Truce in Ireland,' *The Times*, July 28th, 1920. From The Times Archive, and 'De Valera's Manifesto,' *The Manchester Guardian*, January 24th, 1921. From Newspapers.com.
[260] 'Mr. Bonar Law's Wrath,' *The Times*, December 11th, 1920. From The Times Archive, and 'Ireland,' *The Times*, July 27th, 1920. From The Times Archive.
[261] Desmond MacCarthy, 'England's Policy in Ireland,' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 15th, 1920. From Newspapers.com.

duality, but *The Guardian* acknowledged its contradictions.[262] While *The Times* emphasised coercion more, as evidenced by its continued support for martial law, *The Guardian* altered its stance once it became clear martial law would not end reprisals.[263] *The Times* summarised this primacy of coercion: '[O]ne face looks smilingly towards a peace of negotiation, the other frowns on crime and insists that there can be no real peace until it is under lock and key.'[264] The second belief was that the Irish reflected the British. Both newspapers used this idea to criticise Government and Crown forces. *The Guardian*, invoking the 19th century Land War, highlighted the hypocrisy in condemning Irish violence while excusing, condoning or covering up Crown force excesses.[265] Similarly, *The Times* criticised the policy of reprisals by comparing the violence of Crown forces with the IRA, who were supposed to be nothing like the civilised and disciplined British institutions.[266]

Crucially, while *The Guardian* consistently used perceived differences to critique British actions, *The Times*' portrayal shifted significantly during the conflict. It began referring to Irish Republicans more respectfully, once it became clear Britain could not defeat the IRA without unsustainable coercion.[267] To keep calling the IRA a 'small but highly-organized and desperate minority' would mean admitting the Empire's core security apparatus was ineffective in defeating such a group. *The Times* admitted that the British inability to defeat the IRA 'confute[d] the popular estimate of the Irish character.' This evidenced the fact that anti-Irish stereotypes are as fluid as Anglo-Irish relations. By writing of a 'new spirit which animates the Irish nation,' *The Times* did not admit that past stereotypes were incorrect.[268] Rather than establishment Britain gradually realising that the Irish were not inferior to them, it portrayed the Irish as having evolved, or Anglicised, to a higher standard. Nevertheless, *The Times* departed from the entrenched portrayal of the Irish as so inferior that their only hope was London stewardship. This marked a watershed moment in British discourse, where political and military reality forced a re-evaluation of discourse towards imperial subjects from *The Times*, an authoritative conservative British establishment voice.

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262 'Possibility of Peace in Ireland,' *The Manchester Guardian*, May 31st, 1921. From Newspapers.com.
263 'To Fight the Terror,' *The Times*, May 19th, 1920. From The Times Archive, 'New Irish Policy,' *The Times*, December 11th, 1920. From The Times Archive, C.P. Scott, 'Is It Peace?' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 11th, 1920. From Newspapers.com, 'The Premier's Irish Statement,' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 11th, 1920. From Newspapers.com, 'Government's Double Policy in Ireland,' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 11th, 1920. From Newspapers.com, 'Premier's New Irish Policy,' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 11th, 1920. From Newspapers.com, Desmond MacCarthy, 'England's Policy in Ireland,' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 15th, 1920. From Newspapers.com, and 'Possibility of Peace in Ireland,' *The Manchester Guardian*, May 31st, 1921. From Newspapers.com.
264 'New Irish Policy,' *The Times*, December 11th, 1921. From The Times Archive.
265 'The Cork Competition in Crime,' *The Manchester Guardian*, December 14th, 1920. From Newspapers.com.
266 'Reprisals,' *The Times*, October 1st, 1920. From The Times Archive.
267 'Irish Peace Talks,' *The Times*, July 19th, 1921. From The Times Archive.
268 'Suppressio Veri,' *The Times*, January 29th, 1921. From The Times Archive.

6.3 The Changing Imperial Landscape

In its editorials, *The Guardian* demonstrated an understanding that limited martial law could not succeed against guerrillas who could move freely across arbitrary boundaries or blend into native populations. With limited repression ineffective and severe repression untenable, *The Guardian* concluded that purely militarist strategy had no possibility of achieving the desired result and that concessions must be made. In Hopkinson's book General Macready and other high-ranking British officers were shown to have realised this shift privately.[269] *The Guardian*'s tendency towards concessionary measures was likely influenced by Scott's New Liberal belief that the Empire worked as a global partnership. This explains *The Guardian*'s opposition to both coercion and Irish republicanism compared to *The Times*' opposition to Irish nationalism and unregulated coercion. As a New Liberal and firmly non-revolutionary paper, *The Guardian* believed in granting concessions to the Irish not as a challenge to imperial stability, but to preserve it. It did not support Sinn Féin and the IRA's ultimate goal of an Irish Republic. Consequently, it advocated for granting as much autonomy to Ireland as possible, so long as it did not jeopardise Britain.[270] The realisation that the Irish could not or should not be coerced into loyalty to the UK while also realising that this fact did not mean that they could not be convinced to participate in the Empire showed a far more nuanced understanding of the Irish psyche and imperial power in *The Guardian* compared to *The Times*. As the war progressed and it became evident that Britain could not achieve victory through military force alone, *The Times*' interaction with stereotypes and their acknowledgement of a supposedly 'new spirit' animating the Irish indicated a realisation of the changing circumstances. *The Guardian* had reached this conclusion much earlier, and their first editorial on the issue displayed a greater understanding of guerrilla strategy and Irish resilience than was shown in any *Times* article in this corpus.

The Guardian recognised that Republican militarists actively sought to provoke excessively repressive policies from the British government. By doing so, Republicans aimed to generate domestic and international support for their movement. This implied an earlier understanding of a fundamental limitation of imperial power in modern geopolitics. An imperial power cannot militarily defeat a nationalist movement if the entire population is committed to resistance due to the political and economic cost of the coercion required to defeat such a movement. Unlike earlier periods, when imperial powers could use extreme coercion or outright ethnic cleansing to crush resistance, these measures had become politically untenable. As news of British actions reached regional, national and international audiences, excessive coercion became increasingly difficult to justify. The evolution of guerrilla warfare, combined

[269] Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence*, P. 95-96.
[270] Davies, *'The Manchester Guardian, C. P. Scott, and the Irish Question 1919-1922,'* P. 39-41.

with shifting public attitudes towards coercion, fundamentally altered the relationship between imperial powers and their colonies, a reality recognised by senior British officers like General Macready during the Irish War of Independence. This realisation shaped insurgency and counterinsurgency strategies throughout the 20th century, as lessons from every theatre informed asymmetric warfare in subsequent theatres. Consequently, events in other conflicts influenced Britain and the Provisional IRA's approach when insurgency returned to Ireland with the Troubles. This cyclical process saw insurgency and counterinsurgency strategies continually refined and reapplied across decades and continents.

The Guardian displayed an understanding of the changing circumstances of imperial rule very early in the Irish War of Independence, probably without fully grasping the long-term consequences. *The Times* showed a limited understanding but evidenced a more important development in the discourse surrounding the Irish in British print media. While de Nie outlines that the mere continuance of Irish resistance to Anglicisation throughout the 19th century led liberal Britain to abandon Anglicisation and support Home Rule, this thesis shows that the abandonment of the Anglicisation project by establishment Britain came only when the British were no longer militarily capable of subjugating the Irish to their goals and was communicated through a limited and begrudging respect of the IRA.

7. Conclusions

This thesis has shown that coverage of the Irish War of Independence did not just report events but also challenged the cultural, political and military justifications given for these events. Through close reading and comparative analysis of *The Times* and *The Guardian*, this thesis traced the evolving role of stereotypes as active tools of imperial narrative. Their transformation, rejection or reinforcement was driven not only by events on the ground but by ideological differences, competing visions of British identity and the distinct political objectives of newspaper proprietors. At the heart of these changes lies the tension between stereotypes and empire. Stereotypes of the Irish as violent, uncivilised, treacherous and politically immature were historically mobilised to justify British rule in Ireland. They rendered British governance in Ireland as both necessary (for Britain, but more importantly for Ireland) and noble. By the early 20th century, these stereotypes faced growing challenges. Journalism became a site where these challenges were evaluated, with *The Times* and *The Guardian* diverging in their adherence to traditional stereotypes at several points.

Perhaps the most entrenched stereotype saw the Irish as ethnically or culturally inferior. This stereotype was not rejected but recalibrated. *The Times*, in line with its conservative and imperial tradition, initially cast the IRA as savage criminals. This was not a static portrayal. As the IRA proved resilient and militarily effective, continued reliance on the uncivilised criminal stereotype implied that the British state was incapable of defeating an underdeveloped enemy, an implication which damaged imperial prestige. The paper responded by introducing a narrative of Irish evolution. To *The Times*, Irish nationalism had not always been a legitimate political movement, but was becoming one. This subtle shift did not reject the stereotype outright but re-modelled it through a narrative of conditional respectability consistent with Anglicisation. In contrast, *The Guardian* offered a more substantial challenge to ethnic stereotyping. Portraying the conflict as the result of British misrule rather than Irish inferiority, it dismantled the idea that the Irish were inherently disloyal or violent. Instead, the paper portrayed Irish nationalism, not republicanism, as a legitimate political movement.

The long-standing colonial stereotype that Ireland's Catholicism was a source of Papist treachery or the tendency to act as a geopolitical pawn for Britain's enemies also evolved as result of political and military developments. While *The Times* continued to discuss divided Irish loyalties, both newspapers recognised the Catholic Church as a stabilising force. To *The Guardian* in particular, the idea that Irish loyalty was to Rome was rejected and replaced with a recognition that nationalist Ireland's loyalty was to Ireland, and this loyalty lay at the root of resistance.

Class-based stereotypes of the Irish as socially and politically underdeveloped, requiring both coercion and concession, remained more consistent. Both newspapers reproduced this colonial logic, though in different ways. *The Times* expressed it by prioritising the coercive element of dual policy. This was aligned with its broader ideological position as a significant voice of the conservative British establishment. *The Guardian*, while more critical of Crown force violence and while acknowledging the contradictory nature of a coercive-concessionary dual policy, retained a paternalistic tone. While it opposed the excesses of Crown force violence, it did so in defence of a more sustainable imperial legitimacy. In both papers, stereotypes remained vehicles for maintaining a hierarchical relationship between British, Irish and non-European peoples.

A critical element in this discourse was proprietorship. The evolution of stereotypes was influenced by the personal agendas and political objectives of newspaper owners. *The Times*, despite its establishment position, was influenced by Lord Northcliffe's personal animosity towards Prime Minister Lloyd George. Northcliffe used *The Times* to undermine Government credibility, especially regarding reprisals. His paper's criticism of policy was therefore tactical rather than moral, designed to discredit a government he opposed while still upholding the broader principles of imperial rule. In contrast, C.P. Scott's proprietorship of *The Guardian* was more ideologically consistent. Grounded in New Liberalism, Scott's editorial line opposed state coercion and championed civil liberties, even in the face of IRA violence. His paper did not support Sinn Féin's goals but demanded consistency, legality, and transparency in British policy. For *The Guardian*, the Empire would benefit if it self-enforced its professed ideals, a logic that contradicted martial law and reprisals.

Despite both *The Times* and *The Guardian* expressing concern over martial law, reprisals remained the primary focus of press attention. Martial law discourse was inextricably linked to reprisals, often discussed not as a policy to combat the IRA but to combat the excessive violence of Crown forces. Despite Bloody Sunday and the Kilmichael Ambush being commonly cited as the reasons for martial law's imposition, this thesis has shown that reprisals featured more in justifications for martial law, at least in *The Times* and *The Guardian*. Each newspaper cited the same reprisals as evidence to argue differing conclusions related to martial law. This exemplifies the contested discourse of conflict and politics, where the same events are recontextualised to support competing narratives, shaping public perception through selective representation.

This thesis ultimately reveals that journalism during the Irish War of Independence played a central role in managing the discourse surrounding colonial, irregular conflicts and emergency powers. Newspapers were not neutral observers but active participants in shaping how conflict was understood, legitimised or condemned. Through their deployment and transformation of stereotypes, both *The Times* and *The Guardian* acted as a gauge for future historians studying the relationship between imperial and ideological narratives and political reality. Crucially, these newspapers also helped define the moral boundaries of state power. By scrutinising martial law and reprisals, the politicians who introduced them and those politicians' motivations, they shaped public perceptions of imperial and military legitimacy. The shifting editorial tones exemplify the press's function as a measure of elite and public opinion and as a site of ideological confrontation. Discourse surrounding emergency powers is not fixed but negotiated, and journalism is one of the central arenas in which negotiations took place.

This study is not without limitations. The reliance on two newspapers overlooks the broader spectrum of media representations available during this period. While in this particular study archival material from *The Times* and *The Guardian* are readily available and accessible, other publications may not be. While every effort has been made to minimise bias and personal opinion in this study, total objectivity is impossible in a study of such controversial issues. Consequently, while the insights gained from this analysis are valuable, they must be contextualised within a wider scope, with critical scrutiny of sources, assumptions and conclusions applied.

The findings from this study have important implications for future research on media representations during periods of conflict. An interesting potential study which arises from this thesis is the period between 1900 and 1919. By studying the period when stereotypes in British media became less overtly hostile and more subtle, a greater understanding of the causes and effects of this process can be achieved. Scholars can expand this framework by incorporating a wider array of media sources, including Irish Nationalist/Republican or Irish/Ulster Unionist publications and foreign press to offer a more comprehensive understanding of how narratives are constructed in various contexts. Incorporating different forms of sources, like private communications, official documents or popular media would result in a less one-dimensional study. Audience reception studies analysing how different populations interpreted media portrayals would provide valuable insight into the media's societal impact.

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