MDS 1999/2000 Th. 43
KK



Institute of Social Studies

Graduate School of Development Studies

Human Resources Management in Local Governments under Decentralisation in Uganda: What has Changed?

A Research Paper presented by

Mabonga Mike Wambi
(Uganda)

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for Obtaining the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
SPECIALISING IN EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR STUDIES

Members of the Examining Committee

Drs. Freek Schiphorst
Dr. Dele Olowu

The Hague, December 2000



Institute of Social Studies

Graduate School of Development Studies

Human Resources Management in Local Governments under Decentralisation in Uganda: What has Changed?

A Research Paper presented by

Mabonga Mike Wambi
(Uganda)

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for Obtaining the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
SPECIALISING IN EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR STUDIES

Members of the Examining Committee

Drs. Freek Schiphorst
Dr. Dele Olowu

The Hague, December 2000

This document represents part of the author's study programme while at the Institute of Social Studies; the views stated therein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Institute.

Research papers and theses are not made available for outside circulation by the Institute.

Enquiries:

Postal Address:
Institute of Social Studies
P.O. Box 29776
2502 LT, The Hague
The Netherlands

Telephone: -31-70-4260 460
Cables: SOCINST
Telex: 31491 ISS NL
Telefax: -31-7--4260 799
e-mail: postmaster@iss.nl

Location:
Kortenaerkade 12
2518 AX, The Hague
The Netherlands

Acknowledgements.

This piece of work would never have seen the light of the day were it not for the contribution of many people and organisations. Unfortunately due to space limitations, all can not be individually mentioned. Many a thank you to all but in particular, the following: Doctors Freek Schiphorst and Dele Olowu, for offering me the most inspiring guidance and supervision throughout the study. Iam indefinitely indebted to them.

To members of the Faculty Board for Employment and labour Studies (ELS), I say, my experience with you throughout my study programme was stimulating and familial. I will always live to remember every moment of our contact at the Institute. To Ms Tanya kingdon, that unfading and special friendly smile and unfailing assistance to me throughout the programme will forever be remembered. Of course, I would be selfish, if I do not mention the programme-mates of ELS. We always kept together and that experience will linger forever in my memory. To the Students and Welfare offices, thanks for having kept your doors open even at late hours.

To Misters P Bogere, R Manano, P Muhereza, E Mbahamiza and Ms A Ngoga in Uganda, my many a thank you for the rapid response in gathering the data, I always required at short notice. My heartfelt thanks specially go to Mr P Bogere, without whose last minute tireless efforts, I would never have made it to The Hague in August 1999.
I must equally and specially thank Ms JR Kisakye, Mr JR Lwamafa and Ms E Mwanje for having accepted me in their official capacities to pursue this programme at the time when I had just been transferred to a new workstation on promotion. To Ms E Kusasira, I will always remain thankful you for her having accepted to keep the fort running while I was away.

To the Dutch Government, my many thanks for awarding me the scholarship. Last and by no means least, my lovely regards to my wife Eunice and our two daughters Sharon and Hope for the patience and endurance for over one and half years of my absence. The beautiful cards and phone calls you sent and made at the most stressful moments always rekindled my hopes and enthusiasm. However, despite all the contributions and help, I solely remain responsible for any shortcomings in this work.

Dedications.

To my loving wife Eunice Mabonga

My two Daughters,

Sharon Namaemba

Hope Namaemba

AND The Wambi Family.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS.

ACRs	Annual Confidential Reports.
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency.
DEO	District Education Officer.
DES	District Executive Secretary.
DS	Decentralisation Secretariat.
DSC(s)	District Service Commission(s).
GOU	Government of Uganda.
HRM	Human Resources Management.
ICT	Information and Communications Technology.
KMS	Kilometres.
MOES	Ministry of Education and Sports.
MOFPED	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
MOLG	Ministry of Local Government.
NPM	New Public Management.
NPS	Nebbi Primary School.
PA	Public Administration.
PLE	Primary Leaving Examinations.
PM	Personnel Management.
PSC	Public Service Commission.
RFRs	Rural Feeder Roads.
TOT	Training of Trainers.
UNDP	United Nations development Programme.
UNEB	Uganda National Examinations Board.
UPE	Universal Primary Education.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 CHAPTER ONE 1

1.1 Introduction and Background 1

1.2 Statement of the Problem 1

1.3 Specific Objectives of the study 2

1.4 Practical Justification of the study 2

1.5 Scope, Methodology, Sources of Data, and Limitations of the Study 3

1.6 Organisation of the Paper 4

2 CHAPTER TWO 5

2.1 Introduction 5

2.2 New Public Management (NPM) 5

2.3 Human Resource Management 8

2.4 Organisation/ Job Design 9

2.5 Recruitment and selection 9

2.6 Performance Appraisal 9

2.7 Training and Development 10

2.8 Rewards 10

2.9 Communication 10

2.10 Personnel systems in Local government 11

2.10.1 Separate 11

2.10.2 Integrated 12

2.10.3 Unified 12

2.11 Other related Concepts 13

2.12 Decentralisation 13

2.13 Rationale for decentralising HRM to local governments 14

2.14 Pre-conditions for Successfully Decentralising HRM 15

2.15 Organisational structure 16

2.16 Local Government 16

2.17 Synthesis of issues and Analytical Framework constructed 17

3 CHAPTER THREE 19

A Historical Account of HRM in Local Governments in Uganda 19

3.1 Introduction 19

3.2 The Pre colonial Period 19

3.3 The colonial period 19

3.4 The Independence Era (1962-1967) 21

3.5 The Post 1986 period 22
3.6 The Two Case Studies: Mukono and Nebbi Districts 23
3.7 Mukono District 24
3.8 Nebbi District 25
4 CHAPTER FOUR 27
4.1 Introduction 27
4.2 Organisational structure 27
4.3 Recruitment and Selection 30
4.4 Performance Appraisal 32
4.5 Training and development. 33
4.6 Rewards 35
4.7 Communication 36
4.8 Service delivery 37
4.9 A case study of Nebbi primary school 44
5 CHAPTER FIVE 48
5.1 Introduction 48
5.2 Wrap up of the key findings and conclusions 48
5.3 The way forward 50
Annex A:Training, Induction And Skills Development Activities, 1993-1998 54
Annex B Showing the Expenditure of Nebbi District on Training (In Uganda Shillings) 56
Annex C: RFRs Constructed/Rehabilitated and Maintained by Nebbi District between 1993-1999. 56
Annex D: Showing the Level of Bridge Construction in Nebbi District 56
Annex E: Justification of indicators. 57
Annex F: Showing A Comparative Analysis of Quality of Education for Mukono and Nebbi Districts in 1999/2000. 57
Annex G: Showing PLE Results for Mukono District (1991-1999). 57
Annex H: Showing PLE Results for Nebbi District (1991-1999). 58
Annex I: Showing the Performance of Nebbi Primary School in PLE (1991-1999). 58

List OF figures, Graphs and Tables.

Figure 1. Training Trend in Nebbi District, 1994/1995- 1999/2000. 34.

Table 1. Roads Constructed in Mukono District between 1993/94-1996/97. 38

Figure 2. Comparison of Pupil-Teacher Ratio in Mukono and Nebbi Districts in 1993. 39

Figure 3. Comparison of Pupil- Teacher Ratio in Mukono and Nebbi Districts in 1999. 39

Figure 4. Comparative Performance of Mukono and Nebbi in PLE, 1991-1998. 40

Figure 5. Comparative Expenditure in Education and Feeder Roads Sectors, 1998/99. 43

Figure 6. Performance of Nebbi Primary School, 1991-1999. 45.

1 CHAPTER ONE

1.1 Introduction and Background

Global industrial restructuring caused by intense competition and the revolution in ICT has brought about changes in the world of work world-wide. Consequently all countries need to reform their policies in order to be competitive internationally. Uganda has not been an exception. The reforms that have been embarked on have focused on the economy, the public service and the local government system. The latter has been through decentralisation of functions, authority, responsibility and resources for the delivery of public services to local governments. It is in regard to this reform programme that the study is premised. The reform Programme has had several facets including democratic, financial, administrative, legislative, planning and managerial decentralisation. One of its underpinning objectives has been to free local managers from central constraints and to allow them develop organisational structures tailored to local circumstances (Decentralisation Secretariat, 1994:2).

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The success or failure of any organisation depends largely on the calibre of human resources it has. Human resources translate all the other resources into products. In recognition of this fact, Uganda decentralised Human Resources Management (HRM) to local governments in 1993 to support its overall decentralisation Programme. However, there is rigorous and wide spread on-going debate about the efficiency of decentralising HRM. The World Bank (1999: 108, 111, 122), for example, argues that decentralising HRM places local officials nearer to citizens who hold them accountable for their actions and performance. Secondly, locally based officials are at the vantagepoint of identifying vulnerable groups than central government bureaucrats. Hence, the need for government to decentralise both responsibilities and personnel. Local governments' ability to hire and fire their own employees enables them to pay better wages and attract competent employees whom they can further develop and invest in.

Wunsch and Olowu (1990:4,5), argue that African countries are on record for having very low numbers and calibre of employees at the local level. Consequently, this has a negative impact on the effectiveness of administration, as local problems are not understood well by remote central bureaucrats. HRM decentralisation is said to translate into more effective utilisation of human resources and has an effect on efficiency in service delivery. Critical of the impact of decentralisation, Prud'Homme (1989:208-11), contends that incompetent local officials lack the motivation to respond to local issues. Hence, central government

bureaucrats are better suited to offer efficient and effective services because they have better careers, diverse tasks and politicians don't interfere with their work. He further argues that decentralising HRM may heighten the level of rent seeking behaviour at the local level because, first, there are more opportunities for corruption at this level. Second, local politicians and bureaucrats are likely to face more pressures and demands from local interest groups. Third, local officials have more autonomy in action than their national counterparts and fourth, because auditing and monitoring at the local level is lax. Finally, the press at the local level is not vibrant to expose the level of corruption there.

Generally speaking, although some scholars urge caution in decentralising HRM, there appears to be consensus within the current debates to decentralise HRM as a vehicle for efficient and effective service delivery. Unfortunately, with the exception of Lubanga (1996, 1997) and Mbahamiza (1999), there appears to be a research lacuna about how Uganda is tackling HRM issues in this context. In particular, this is pronounced in relation to the impact of organisational structure on efficient and effective service delivery. In this context, the central question of this study is to find out whether organisational structures of local governments affect efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery. It is hypothesised that decentralising the management of human resources to local governments has led to better management of those resources and contributed to efficient and effective service delivery.

1.3 Specific Objectives of the study

The principle objectives of the study are twofold. First, to find out the impact of human resources decentralisation on performance and service delivery in local governments and secondly, to find out whether New Public Management (NPM) offers any solutions to problems identified in managing human resources by local governments in Uganda.

1.4 Practical Justification of the study

Decentralising managerial and administrative control of human resources within the local areas has been seen by the Ugandan government as a means of placing control in the hands of the local people and thus to enhance performance and responsivess of local officials to local needs. However, there are indications that despite the enabling legal framework that has been put in place under section 53 of the 1997, Local Governments Act, no local government appears to have made any to attempt to modernise its management system. Local governments consequently have structures, which are not responsive to the needs of their councils. This inevitably affects their staffing complements, management of human resources

and by extension the provision of efficient and effective service delivery. This study attempts to find out why this is so.

Recent studies of local government budgets by the Ministry of Local Government MOLG show that, up to 80% of the central government fiscal transfers to local governments is spent on staff salaries and only 20% is reserved for provision of services. The objective of decentralising HRM is that it would lead to efficient and effective service delivery. Local governments would align their structures to suit local needs and at the same time develop terms and conditions of service of their own to attract better staff. With the exception of routine inspection reports by the MOLG and studies conducted by Lubanga (1996 and 1997) and Mbahamiza (1999), there has been no independent and objective study of HRM in local governments in the context of decentralisation in Uganda. Moreover, Lubanga and Mbahamiza's work largely reflected their institutional position having been involved with the decentralisation reform program from its inception. Mbahamiza was District Executive Secretary (DES) for Kasese district. Particularly, their work did not grapple critically and in details with the questions on organisational structure and its impact on efficient and effective service delivery.

1.5 Scope, Methodology, Sources of Data, and Limitations of the Study

HRM, otherwise known also as personnel management (PM) in the context of decentralisation in Uganda, embodies different dimensions. For example, there is the structural/ organisational aspect, the recruitment, selection and confirmation aspects, the reward system, labour utilisation, personnel information systems, staff development dimension, management of terminal benefits also known as pension, career management and the performance appraisal dimension to mention a few. In view of this multi-dimensional nature of HRM, this study specifically focuses on organisational structure and its link to better performance in service delivery. Because the interconnected themes of recruitment, selection, reward, training and development, performance appraisal and communication have a bearing on organisational structure, they are also dealt with. The study is analytical and critical as well as comparative. The study uses both qualitative and quantitative research methods. Published and unpublished government documents were relied on heavily because primary data collection was not possible. Discussions with colleagues from Uganda at the Institute of Social Studies helped to enrich the study. Finally, the author's own experience of serving as an official with the MOLG, which co-ordinates the overall decentralisation programme, is also used.

Two districts, Mukono and Nebbi were selected as case studies. Mukono was selected because it was among the first 13 districts to be decentralised and is centrally placed and close to Kampala. Finally, it was created as a district from the highly centralised famous Buganda kingdom in the pre-colonial days. Nebbi district was selected because it was among the second batch of districts to be decentralised and represents a district distanced from Kampala. It also represents those districts that were segmentary societies in the pre-colonial times. Above all, the two districts had relatively more data, which could inform the study. The reasons advanced are important because location in terms of distance from the capital city affects recruitment of well-qualified personnel. Secondly, the districts, which were first to be decentralised fiscally, are considered to have built on that advantage to perform better than those decentralised later since they had better capacity to start the decentralisation programme. Historical factors help to explain why southern districts have better social infrastructure because of their first and early contacts with the colonial government and their easy access to Kampala. Scientifically, two case studies can not be taken as representative for all of Uganda. Rather, the idea is to analyse how these two local governments, which are located in different parts of the country and started their decentralisation programmes at different times are tackling HRM issues.

1.6 Organisation of the Paper

The paper is divided into five chapters. Chapter one provides the background information and statement of the problem for the study. Chapter two provides perspectives on the key concepts used in the study and places the whole study in a wider conceptual framework. Chapter three locates the study in a historical perspective. Chapter four provides the critical framework. Chapter five reflects on the viable and practical strategies that local governments can adopt to improve their performance. In summary, this chapter has sought to provide the background to the study. Uganda has embarked on reforming its public sector as a response to global changes in work organisation. One of the reforms, which is central to this study is decentralisation of power, responsibility and resources including personnel to local governments. However, decentralising PM in Uganda has not been systematically studied to provide critical insights hence the need for this study, which has its focus on organisational structure and its impact on efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery. Two departments in two districts, which are geographically distant from each other, are used to assess how they are tackling HRM issues. The study will now proceed to chapter two to unravel the key concepts, which inform it.

2 CHAPTER TWO

2.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to define the key concepts used in the paper and to locate the main problem of the study in the wider literature. The concepts of NPM, HRM, local government personnel systems, decentralisation, organisational structure and local Government are discussed. An analytical framework is developed at the end of the chapter in which emerging issues are synthesised.

2.2 New Public Management (NPM)

This section highlights the debate surrounding NPM and builds a link between NPM and HRM. Reforming public services has increasingly assumed new dimensions both at the national and local levels. Private management initiatives have become popular in the literature on public management (Osborne and Gaebler 1992, Farnham and Horton 1996) and are being pushed by the donor community for implementation by developing countries as a panacea to problems governments face. In this regard, NPM has become a trend since the late 1970s as a vehicle for improving efficiency and effectiveness in public service delivery. The new management approach has been driven by the resurgence of neo-liberalism. Governments have sought to reduce the size and costs associated with public services so that public services could be customer focused. The vehicles for achieving this are leaner and efficient organisations based on private sector models. Governments have approached this in two ways. First, they have adopted laws that emphasise privatisation, restructuring and market testing. The second approach has been the adoption of private strategies and techniques (Farnham and Horton 1996:315-316).

Advocates of NPM posit that traditional public administration (PA) is associated with sluggish decision making and inability to risk-taking hence the need for NPM. NPM is "a concerted program of public sector reform aimed at replacing bureaucracy by markets or contracts as far as possible and reducing the size and scale of the public sector" (Hughes 1998:1489). It refers to the latest art of managing people in the public sector with the view of achieving efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of public services in a changed political and economic context of the state (Farnham and Horton 1996:316). Management takes over from administration. Administration and management are different because while the former emphasises following rules and procedures, the latter, emphasises giving managers responsibility, resources, autonomy and authority to achieve results. Efficiency as used here means getting the same or more output with less inputs, the purpose of which is to determine

whether a programme is producing results or not. On the other hand, effectiveness means having a link between service outputs and outcomes. It refers to the realisation of the goal. (Rogers 1999:7, 71).

Hood (1995:96) identifies seven core elements of NPM. The first is professionalism and discretion for achievement of results. Managers are given the personal responsibility for this and are held accountable. Second, goals, standards and measures of performance and targets are defined and set to enhance accountability. Third, emphasis is placed on output controls. Thus, resources are directed to areas where performance is measurable and results are stressed. Fourth, there is a shift from compartmentalisation to creation of separate corporate units sometimes known as "executive agencies". Fifth, greater competition is emphasised based on term contracts and public tendering procedures with the objective of lowering costs and enhancing better standards and quality. Sixth, private sector management practices and styles including flexibility in hiring, firing and rewards based on performance are adopted. Finally, greater discipline and parsimonious use of resources is emphasised. Initially, the emphasis in NPM was on efficiency and cost reduction. Later the focus was shifted to a concern for quality. This included an element of customer satisfaction. The emphasis on output means that the public as customers or consumers of public services has to be consulted whether the services meet their satisfaction.

Farnham and Horton (1996:30), contend that structural reviews are used as a means of bringing about continuous improvement. The aim is to breakdown monopolistic provision of services by local government departments to create leaner and flexible functional agencies. Restructuring also serves as a lever for private sector management styles such as contracting out, internal markets, which further boost competition and compel public services to adopt strategies and private sector techniques. This changed context of providing public services through private sector strategies has necessitated skilling of public service managers. It has also become imperative to change the culture and orientation of public service managers by training them in NPM techniques. There has been a shift from internal to external recruitment with emphasis on recruiting from the private sector. Personnel recruited from the private sector are offered personal contracts of appointment and are paid according to performance as the case is in the private sector. To hold them accountable, public service managers undergo periodic performance assessment by those above them. To overcome employee resistance to change and create behavioural change, public service managers have in turn adopted HRM techniques and strategies also imported from the private sector. These techniques are used

both on middle level managers and other employees. The new techniques include, flexible employment contracts, performance related pay, staff appraisal, training and development, direct communication among others. In short, HRM is one aspect of NPM and is relevant to NPM as a private sector initiative in as far as it stresses those features, which are common in the private sector.

However, NPM is not without its critiques. Schick (1998), for example, argues that NPM is not ideal for developing countries because of its emphasis on private sector techniques, which imply existence of developed markets. These, according to him are missing in developing countries. He therefore urges caution in adopting NPM, first, because developing countries are predominated by informal markets and secondly, the rule of law and contracts is undeveloped. He contends that the market system should be developed as a necessary precondition and along this, the use of reliable external controls. Similarly, Olowu and Adamolekun (1999:87), caution against wholesale adoption of HRM due to differences of culture and beliefs. They argue that wholesale implementation of management theories and techniques derived from a different setting is the prime reason for failure of developing countries to achieve organisational effectiveness and efficiency. This is evidenced from the failure of personnel systems based on the Weberian principles of bureaucracy and the growing orientation now towards the implementation of HRM strategies (Morgan 1997:31 and Corrigan et al. 1999:94-5). Ramaswamy (2000:220), has however, proved that HRM is not culture specific. This is because there is nothing culture specific about people getting access to better roads, better education facilities and services being delivered at a lower cost by managing people as humans through proactive measures.

Thus, three schools of thought prevail on the adoption of NPM and by extension HRM in developing counties. The first school is optimistic and urges full-blown adoption of NPM/HRM. The second school counsels creation of the necessary conditions first. The third school is cautious and recommends adoption and adaptation of relevant aspects of NPM and HRM suitable to local realities and conditions of developing countries. These differences are important in as far as they help to guide the adoption of NPM and hence HRM in developing countries. This study will dwell more on the HRM aspects of NPM.

To summarise, this section has explained the growing enthusiasm of NPM world wide as a private sector initiative that has been imported in the public sector to improve efficiency and effectivess in the design and delivery of public services. HRM is of relevancy to NPM

because it emphasises strategies that seek employee commitment. Secondly, it emphasises quality improvement as perceived by the consumers of public services. Thirdly, HRM seeks for cost effectiveness and quality improvement. Fourthly, training and development are seen as fundamental to achievement of current and future organisational goals. The fifth element relates to performance management with appraisal as a critical ingredient and devolution of decision making entailing employee involvement and improved communication methods. Finally, HRM is conceived as integral and strategic to corporate goals. All the aspects are within the parameters of what NPM seeks to achieve. To this end, it is worthy devoting the next section to an elaborate discussion of what HRM is and what constitutes it.

2.3 Human Resource Management

This section first discusses HRM from its definitional and conceptual perspective. It is followed by discussion of the changes that have taken place in personnel work as a result of adopting NPM and hence HRM. A brief discussion of what is constituted under HRM follows. This discussion is then linked to other inter-related concepts of local government personnel systems, decentralisation, organisational structure and local government.

HRM conceptually is controversial in its meaning and definition. It is defined as 'a distinctive approach to employment management which seeks to achieve competitive advantage through the strategic deployment of a highly committed and capable workforce, using an array of cultural, structural and personnel techniques' (Storey 1995:5). Most of the writers including Storey (1989) agree that there are many differences between HRM and PM. PM is by definition concerned with development of rules and procedures for the acquisition, utilisation and retention of employees (Siegel and Myrtle 1995:2). Olowu and Adamolekun (1999:86) provide a summary of three key issues about HRM and PM. First, HRM is a strategic function in as far as employees are seen as levers of change management. Two, HRM is integrated in the corporate strategy of the organisation in as far as it places the management of employees in the hands of line managers and not the personnel department. This strategic orientation means developing policies which focus on the individual employee, market based pay rates and hiring and maintaining the best employees (Purcell 1989:78). The third major difference is that application of rules, and procedures are discarded in favour of winning employees' commitment by focusing on organisational culture, devolution of responsibility to line managers and empowerment of employees.

Farnham and Horton (1996, 326-29), identify six major changes in the personnel function as a result of the shift from PA to NPM. First, personnel departments formulate policy and

operational units do the implementation within the ambits of the latter's devolved authority. Thus, there is increased managerial autonomy in PM. Secondly, HRM is used as a lever for integrating individual employees into the organisation. Employees are perceived as owners of knowledge and skills in which the organisation should invest. Thirdly, personnel departments serve as change agents. Fourthly, they perceive people as their customers and their major thrust is to monitor, administer and control employee costs. Sixth, personnel work becomes more of a strategic corporate concern. Finally, devolution of some personnel functions to line managers is made possible. These may include recruitment and selection, performance management, staff appraisal, staff development, performance-related pay and career advice. In their analysis of HRM in Africa, Olowu and Adamolekun (1999:87), identify six interconnected activities under HRM namely, organisation/ job design, recruitment/selection, appraisal, training and development, reward systems, and communication which this study finds useful. The implications based along that classification are as follows.

2.4 Organisation/ Job Design

Organisations emphasise hiring the required level of employees to minimise their cost. HRM seeks to create flatter, flexible, quality and customer focused organisations in order for them to be competitive globally. This means organisational and job redesignation plus employee involvement in the decision making process (Schuler 1995: 81-86).

2.5 Recruitment and selection

Recruitment becomes increasingly a line management function particularly in the design of the job and in the selection of staff who ultimately work with the line managers and report to them (Corrigan et al. 1999:97). This is necessary to enhance accountability because managers along with the chief executive are ultimately accountable for the performance of their staff. Once selected, short-term contracts are issued to enhance performance. Under HRM, each sub-unit has autonomy over recruitment of own employees and the determination of salaries and other terms and conditions of service. Unlike under HRM, in PM, the meritocracy principle is pursued and open competitive recruitment is emphasised.

2.6 Performance Appraisal

Performance appraisal as a systematic process of evaluating an employee's performance in contributing to the objectives of the organisation affects all the employees in the organisation from top management to junior employees (Olowu and Adamolekun 1999:97). It is used in the soft version of HRM as an integral approach of managing the employment relationship. Managers use performance indicators to evaluate their personnel to identify performance gaps and then invest in staff through training to achieve set goals. Under HRM appraisal is

used for purposes of staff training and as a lever for performance evaluation and performance rewards.

2.7 Training and Development

Training activities are designed to meet the objectives of, enhancing skills, knowledge and changing the attitudes of employees. Development is geared at the personal improvement of an employee (Weightman 1995:120). Training and development are therefore at the heart of HRM. Any organisation, which has a claim to practising HRM, must invest in the training and development of its employees. Training and development can help to improve quality through orientation and latest art of management procedures. Through training local politicians and civil servants appreciate each other's role (Muttalib and Khan 1992:221). In addition, due to the complex nature of managing services delivery at the local level, local managers require both pre-entry and in-service training. However, Olowu points out that in African local governments, training is skewed in favour of a few senior officials. (1992:66).

2.8 Rewards

Rewards are central to the concept of HRM because efficiency and effectiveness in an organisation has to be accompanied with specific reward systems. Performance based pay empowers managers to flexibly allocate resources as an incentive to bolster the morale of staff. Thus, the critical challenge is how to use performance-related pay and incentive systems. (Taylor 1992: 203).

2.9 Communication

Communication is categorised under two types by Marchington (1995:283). The first is down ward communication from management to staff. The second is upward communication from staff to management. Direct communication with individual employees on a wide array of issues is also designed to win their commitment and loyalty to organisational objectives (Ramaswamy 2000:193-4). Information and knowledge sharing is emphasised to win employee trust and commitment (De Sylvia 1997:23).

HRM is particularly important for local governments that have been given the autonomy to manage their own affairs. However, a critical appreciation of the concept of HRM would assume that local governments are familiar with these new strategies and techniques and have a supportive environment to put them in practise. In the case of Uganda, this may not be the case due to strong central government oversight in form of regulations and procedures characteristic of PM. This is not to suggest that the role of the central government is unnecessary because under decentralisation it has to regulate the conduct of local

governments to protect national priorities and interests against local politicians who left completely on their own can be harmful to decentralisation. It is important to note that HRM is a blue print, which offers many promises both to labour and management. It is more appealing particularly in its soft version because it promises commitment of workers to their work and organisation and hence improved performance. In practise however, HRM does not fully blossom in its ideal state as posited. Its adoption implies more hard work for employees. Reality thus reflects a blend of conventional PM practises and aspects of HRM. In this regard, it is important to highlight the various personnel systems that have normally been used in local governments world-wide.

2.10 Personnel systems in Local government

This section reviews the three personnel systems open to local governments. The three are namely, the separate, integrated and unified personnel systems (GOU: 1987:75).

2.10.1 Separate

Under the separate personnel system, local governments manage the human resource function from recruitment to retirement of their employees. There is normally an independent service commission for each local government to manage the local bureaucracy. The advantages are that the individual employee's loyalty is with the local government that employs him or her. Employees are aware that a career in the local government depends on their loyalty to that government. The local governments are in effect empowered to create and abolish offices as they deem fit and have the leverage in the monitoring and evaluation of local government performance. Training is designed to meet local needs (Lubanga, 1995:4). However, this system, if not well managed exacerbates nepotism, tribalism and other sectarian employment tendencies in local governments. Particularly, it may create problems for poor local governments to attract competent staff. Furthermore, less endowed and smaller local governments are said to be vulnerable because they do not offer local professional employees enough experience. Career prospects for local officials are also closed and this undermines their motivation. They are not transferable from one local government to the other and promotional opportunities are limited. However, it is an ideal type for affluent local governments that have ability to pay attractive salaries and provide a career for well-qualified technocrats. Finally, it is hard under the system to adopt and apply countrywide standards particularly because of the absence or weakness of trade unions or professional employee associations (Mushi 1992:36).

2.10.2 Integrated

Local government officials at senior levels under this system belong to the central public service but are posted to work in any local government. It guarantees mobility and career service for them as those working at the centre. It also guarantees similar conditions for all local government employees. However, it undermines local government autonomy, flexibility and creates dual loyalty i.e. to the local government under which local officials operate and the central government that pays them (Mawhood 1983:25). Junior employees are recruited and controlled by the local government. This system is said to dilute local democracy and to increase conflict between locally and centrally recruited officials. However, it is good for poor local governments that can not pay salaries and attract qualified professionals. Through this system the central government can exert its influence in decision making on local governments (Efange 1992:83)

2.10.3 Unified

Under the unified system, the local governments remain the employers of local officials who are, however, regarded as part of a nation-wide bureaucracy operating alongside the central civil service. There is normally one national institution such as the local government service commission which has the responsibility over hiring and firing plus transfer of senior local officials and determines their terms and conditions of service (GOU 1987:75). The overarching aim of this system is to avoid discrimination based on tribe and other sectarian tendencies already alluded to under the separate system and at the same time to enhance the loyalty of local officials to the local government (Mawhood 1983:18). It is said to be ideal for developing countries because poor local governments are supported to pay salaries. It also enables transfers of officials but is anti-local government autonomy and dilutes the concept of local government diversity (Mushi 1992:38).

It is worthwhile noting that in reality, no country adopts only one system in its purest form. Elements of the three find themselves in practise. In Uganda's case, the separate system has been adopted albeit with some modifications. This is because the central government still has a hand in the management of human resources in the local governments. For example, government still sets the salary structure and supports local governments through the unconditional grant system to pay salaries. Secondly, government has the responsibility over policy formulation and also offers regular guidance and routine inspection through line Ministries. Thirdly, the DSC, which is mandated to manage the human resources function in the local governments, has to be approved by the PSC upon nomination of its members by the district council. The PSC also co-ordinates and guides the DSCs in their operations. Fourthly,

the PSC is an appellate body for local government employees if employers violate their terms and conditions of service. Thus, the present arrangement has a mixed bag of attributes associated with the three personnel systems discussed above. Lubanga (1997:3) contends that this is tantamount to a hybrid personnel system. In this regard, it seems the flexibility of the hybrid and separate models are consistent with NPM because they separate policy formulation from implementation.

Corrigan et al. (1999:96), hold that there could be a turn-around of local government personnel systems if local governments adopted the following aspects. First, de-emphasising reliance on rules, procedures, and manuals when managing human resources. Secondly, disregarding central personnel systems in matters of industrial relations, recruitment, training and organising work. Thirdly, emphasising teamwork and elimination of hierarchies to enhance co-operation and flexibility at the work place. Fourthly, review of performance appraisal systems to emphasise performance and not personal traits. Fifthly, need to increase training opportunities and finally co-operation plus partnership with trade unions are essential. Similarly, Adams as cited in Sisson (1995:95), counsels four ways of delivering personnel activities. These are in-house agencies, internal consultancy, business within business and external consultancy. Under the former, some activities of the personnel department are cross-charged to other departments. In the Second, personnel department sells its services to the organisation or its units but managers have freedom to go elsewhere for better and cheaper services. In the third case, some activities can be vested in a semi-autonomous organisation with freedom to offer both external and internal services. In the last case, the organisation seeks outside consultancy for advice and assistance on industrial relations and HRM issues. This paper specifically relates the separate system to NPM because the system blossoms well under a decentralised framework and has been adopted by the Ugandan government.

2.11 Other related Concepts

This section brings to the discussion other concepts related to the concept of NPM as an approach to manage local governments.

2.12 Decentralisation

Decentralisation means different things to different people. Rondinelli and Wallis define it as entailing the transfer of the administrative function from the central government and its arms to other actors subordinate to it (1986:5). This implies that decentralisation can only be

effected by the central government to other agencies. However, decentralisation can also be between central government line ministries and within line ministries. On the other hand,

> Lexicographically, decentralisation means both reversing the concentration of administration at a single centre and conferring powers of local government (Smith 1985:1).

This means power and authority are dispersed from one concentrated point to multiple centres. For Adamolekun (1999:49), decentralisation infers deconcentration, devolution and delegation. In the first case, managerial and resource responsibilities are handed down to lower level agents of the central government, normally field based central government officials. In the second case, specific powers, functions and resources are devolved to lower level government units by the national government. In this case, politics is implied. In the last case, authority and managerial responsibility for certain activities are vested in the hands of organisations peripheral to the national government. Adamolekun's definition indicates the various forms of decentralisation. Decentralisation is thus about shifting of power, resources and authority from one to multiple centres. In this context, it refers to the transfer of power authority and responsibility over the management of human resources from the central government to local governments as a lever for better service delivery. Decentralisation comes in handy and relevant in this paper because under NPM, there is emphasis on devolving responsibility for operational decisions to line and lower managers by empowering them. Their empowerment means shifting PM to them.

2.13 Rationale for decentralising HRM to local governments

HRM decentralisation is said to be responsive because the community through its employees offers what people demand (Smith 1985:28). Hence, it is efficient in managing local affairs and providing local services. This is because of local knowledge and information, which are available to local officials. Local knowledge is a prerequisite for responsiveness and flexibility in determining local priorities.

If "managing human resources means acknowledging that humans in the organisation are the most important part of getting things done" (Weightman 1995:1), then decentralising HRM is justified as a vehicle for meeting the above goal. Local officials employed to work in the local governments logically should be accountable and responsible to the local people through their elected local leaders (Lubanga 1997:4). Personnel decentralisation thus, leads to reduction of costs and enhances outputs. Economies of scale are increased as a number of

public goods and services are increased and the efficiency with which the services are delivered at lower cost (UNDP 1993:75, Rondinneli and Cheema 1993:76). Decentralising the management of human resources is justified because field based officials are normally motivated due to the greater responsibility over the programmes they manage (Turner and Hulme 1997:157). Decentralising HRM also leads to work load reduction at the centre because central government officials will let go off routine making decisions and shoulder the responsibility for strategic level decisions. This improves the quality of policy and, as Lubanga (1997:7) contends, this translates into local capacity building and enhances personnel and institutional capacities and competencies. Hence, this serves as a boost for good governance and local accountability. These translate into efficient and effective service delivery. From an economic viewpoint, decentralising HRM leads to higher quality services as local officials design projects, which turn out to be more relevant and well maintained if there is community participation in their construction. Local entrepreneurs are helped by local officials to improve their profit margins (UNDP 1993:77). However, for HRM to thrive, some pre-conditions are necessary as discussed below.

2.14 Pre-conditions for Successfully Decentralising HRM

Personnel decentralisation requires appointment of local government officials on merit hence the need for legislation. This legislation should also protect the tenure and career of local officials by strengthening internal management systems (Lubanga 1997:8). Smoke and Olowu (1992:11), support some level of central government oversight as a measure of protecting basic national priorities from being placed in the hands of incompetent local officials and "unscrupulous" local politicians. The duo also warn against frequent transfers of senior officers, which can undermine continuity and by implication threaten improved service delivery.

Furthermore, the UN (1966), as quoted in Mbahamiza (1999:30), urges that the following are necessary conditions for a blossoming decentralised HRM system. First, there ought to be comparability of posts in terms of attractiveness as those of the central government and private sector to attract qualified staff. Secondly, open recruitment on the basis of nation-wide advertisements is necessary to attract a wide range of applicants. Thirdly, merit should be followed in selection and fourthly, there should be a guaranteed career service to act as a buffer against arbitrary disciplinary action. Fifthly, an open system allowing transferability across and between local governments is necessary. Sixth, in-service training boosts staff development and capacity building. Seventh, local civil servants ought to be loyal to the council they serve, but politicians should not interfere with their work. Eighth, effort and

good performance should be rewarded and finally sound industrial relations system is necessary. Critics of decentralisation, however, argue that decentralising human resources is not a green light to better HRM. This is due to shortages of trained manpower which means that incompetent staff run the affairs of local governments and this they argue can exacerbate relative poverty among people and poor local areas (Turner and Hulme 1997:1580). Secondly, the duo and Rondinelli et al. (1999:71) argue that much of the local government expenditures are ear-marked for personnel costs which are unrelated to service provision [and yet salaries remain so low].

2.15 Organisational structure

The concept of organisational structure serves to demonstrate how local governments have changed in scope and delivery of services due to the changing environment both from within and without. These environmental changes have led to changes in the organisational and management structures and processes of local governments. For example, political issues have come to the centre stage. Matters of professionalism, labour management and multiple service delivery mechanisms have also come in the limelight. Organisational structure describes the number of levels of employees in an organisation both managerial and non-managerial and how the decision making process is set up (Schuler 1995: 92). Organisational structure thus, depicts the way roles and functions are aligned to realise the goals of an organisation. Traditionally, organisational structures are potrayed in terms of organisational charts, job description and command of authority. This is closely associated with the classical management bureaucratic model of organisation (Pugh and Hickson 1996,). However, this model has its deficiencies, which are not reviewed here due to space limitations. Herzing and Ruyseveldt (1995:49), contend that "HRM and organisational structure should not be viewed in isolation. They depend on environment, industry and strategy". Thus, organisations structure themselves in such a way so as to achieve their objectives. The trend now is to decentralise. This facilitates the use of scarce resources for remuneration of a core number of well-trained, qualified and competent employees. However, decentralisation of functions does not mean direct delivery of all services in the context of a changing environment. Hence, the need for partners in this process.

2.16 Local Government

Local government is a multi-dimensional concept and derives its birth from the liberal political school of thought, which holds that human beings are at liberty to organise their lives as individuals but as they do so they meet obstacles, which require individual collective effort. Thus, as local inhabitants interact they yearn to meet basic economic needs and local

common problems, which require solutions that can be solved locally. This desire leads to the creation of local government. The other assumption is that different people living in different settlements have different problems, which require different solutions hence, the creation of different local governments (Muttalib and Khan 1982:2). Local government has been approached in several ways. The first perceives structures below the central government as local governments. The second is conventional and defines local government on the basis of five fundamental features i.e., locality, legality, autonomy, governmental character, plus participation and representativeness. These have ramifications for organisational structure and functions (Mushi 1992, 28-30). In the first sense, a local government's size should be as small as possible to reflect community involvement. In the second sense, it means that it is a body corporate, which can sue and be sued. Legally, it means that it is defined by law or constitutionally. In the third case, local government makes binding decisions within the confines of policy choices and law. It should also have resource allocative ability. In the fourth sense, it generates own revenue and hires and fires its own employees. In the fifth sense, it means discharge of its duties is vested in elected and appointed officials. The element of election implies community participation.

If local government is conceived as an organisation with the mandate to deliver local services to the local people, then in that capacity it is an employer. As an employer, Local government relies on its employees as the most critical resource in the provision of efficient and effective public goods to the local inhabitants (Desario et al. 1991:76). Conventional wisdom that services have to be delivered by the local government itself through its employees to achieve the best results has however come to be challenged (Corrigan et al. 1999:9).

2.17 Synthesis of issues and Analytical Framework constructed

A cursory survey of this chapter this far brings forth several critical issues on the subject of NPM orientation to local government. NPM is conceived as an approach geared at replacing administration with management hence an emphasis on creating responsible, resourceful and autonomous pool of managers with the authority to achieve results. Rules, regulations and procedures which are characteristic of PA are thus de-emphasised. The public service is compelled to reduce numbers and control expenditure. The drive is to achieve efficiency and cost effectiveness by concentrating on core functions and having a focused orientation towards customers. The major features of NPM are namely, emphasis on managerialism through private sector management styles. This means giving lower managers power, responsibility to manage by de-emphasising bureaucracy and red tapism as means of holding them accountable. Secondly, it means setting clear standards and measures of performance.

Thirdly, results are stressed rather than procedures hence emphasis on out put controls. Finally, there is emphasis on greater disciplinary use of resources.

In this context, HRM finds its way as an aspect of NPM because of the adoption of techniques and strategies such as flexible employment contracts, performance related pay, staff appraisal, training and development and employee involvement. Thus, HRM thrives very well under a NPM environment. Similarly because of emphasis on operational freedom for managers, a separate personnel system is ideal and assumes prominence in the context of devolved authority to local governments as employers. Local governments are empowered to create and abolish offices and to hire and fire their own employees. This devolved authority enhances accountability and responsiveness of local officials to local needs. In the same vein, organisational structures are made flatter and flexible to respond to environmental changes in the provision of services. This requires well-qualified and competent employees to implement organisational goals. This in itself emphasises hands on training, rewards, and explicit standards of performance subject to strict monitoring and appraisal. This is made possible when there is ease of information flow in local governments. Cognisant of the fact that NPM is a new approach to management of public services, it can be said that its application necessitates numerous changes entailing change in the legal framework, a clear delineation of roles, change of attitudes, an institutional set up, rewards, organisational set up among other changes. The next chapter will seek to place the study in a historical context.

3 CHAPTER THREE

A Historical Account of HRM in Local Governments in Uganda

3.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to locate the study and evolution of HRM in Uganda in a historical perspective. It is divided in six sections. Section one addresses the pre-colonial period and is followed by an analysis of the colonial period (1890-1962). The third section dwells on the immediate post independence period (1962-1967). The fourth section covers the period 1967 to 1986. The fifth section dwells on the post 1986 period. The final part of the chapter specifically analyses the situation in the two case studies of Mukono and Nebbi districts.

3.2 The Pre colonial Period

Before the advent of colonialism, the nation state known as Uganda today was a loose collection of ethnic groups at different levels of development. Buganda, Bunyoro, Ankole, Toro and, to some extent, Busoga had highly centralised systems of administration. Others like the Bamba and Bakonjo of western Uganda, Alur and Kakwa, of north-western Uganda, the Langi of northern Uganda and Bagisu of eastern Uganda were segmentary societies with no elaborate system of administration. Indeed, these differences, between the traditional segmentary form of administration and the more centralised traditional chiefly states during the pre-colonial period in Uganda, places a student of local government in an awkward position to generically analyse the state of the employment relationship in local authorities using a Uganda-wide lense (Sathyamurthy 1982:17). Thus, each local entity managed its own affairs in its own way.

3.3 The colonial period

Colonialism was formally launched in Uganda in 1890 when the British colonial agent F. Lugard signed a formal agreement with Kabaka Mwanga of Buganda. This was later to be followed with the signing of the Buganda agreement in 1900. The penetration of colonial administration thus, gained ground from the kingdom areas of Buganda and western Uganda and was gradually extended to other parts of the country. The structures created were similar and had the same objective namely, constructing 'a local government of a modern type and a civil service in the usual sense of the word' (Sathyamurthy, 1982:16-17). Thus, an integrated bureaucratic model of local government was created. In the initial phase of colonialism, the country was partitioned into four provinces. Within each province, there were a number of districts and within the districts, there were counties. Counties were further subdivided in sub counties and these were then divided in parishes. To achieve uniformity in administration, civil service chiefs appointed from the highly structured Buganda Kingdom were posted to

keep law and order, collect taxes and administer justice in the non-kingdom areas. By the dawn of the 1920s, there was an elaborate bureaucratic hierarchy established in all the local authorities. A number of ranks of chiefships were at work under the tutelage of the DC and within the framework of a career civil service. Selection of chiefs was based on merit and qualification. The chiefs were transferable to any part of the country. By the 1950s, the British type of local government bureaucracy had been established in all corners of the country.

The structure of local government under colonialism was generally based on a three-tier system. At the apex, was the governor who reserved all the powers in the country. He had direct contact with the home government at White Hall in London. By the 1950s, the Central Secretariat had been widened to encompass a number of technical service departments under the tutelage of Permanent Secretaries who were responsible for their activities. Each of the technical departments such as agriculture and veterinary had its own representative officer at the district level. The next level of administration was the provincial level. It was under the headship of the provincial commissioner who supervised the technical departments. This tier of administration was however abandoned in 1955 for unclear reasons. The third tier was the district under the DC who became the co-ordinator of the activities of the various field officers of the central government establishment in the district. As the central government officer, the DC was also charged with the responsibility for policy formulation. Civil service chiefs provided him with major administrative support. They were appointed, promoted, punished and dismissed by him until in mid 1950s when there was a policy shift (Sathyamurthy 1982:21).

By 1955, chiefs were instrumental in executing policies of the district council authorities. They were appointed on permanent terms and were paid salaries. This arrangement did not translate into better communication and harmonisation of the activities at the district level because of the parallel system of administration where field based central government officials were only answerable to their technical departments. It undermined any form of lateral communication, which was necessary to translate any input into effective and efficient service delivery (Lubanga 1996:48). Between 1949 and 1962 significant changes were introduced. It was recommended to devolve substantial powers to local authorities within the parameters of a unitary state by transferring various services from the centre to local governments. Local governments were to raise own revenue and were to be given qualified personnel on loan from the central government. The functions assigned to local governments

were namely, primary education, environmental protection, health and dispensaries, forests, water supplies, roads and agriculture extension work plus animal husbandry. It is noteworthy to state that devolution was varied and dependent on the political development of the local authorities at the time. In Buganda, with its well-developed system, the Appointment Committees appointed chiefs. In other parts, independent Appointment Boards were assigned this role (Lubanga 1996:48).

3.4 The Independence Era (1962-1967)

At the dawn of independence in 1962, local governments in Uganda thus had the right to hire and fire their own personnel. This arrangement was entrenched in the Constitution of 1962, where a separate personnel system was granted for the local governments, particularly in the kingdom areas like Buganda. In 1966, the Buganda monarchy was liquidated by the independent central government for reasons outside the purview of this study and a new Constitution put in place in 1967. A uniform system of administration was constituted the whole country over. Buganda was partitioned into four districts similar in structure and status with all other districts. Overall, Uganda was constituted into 18 districts, 109 counties, 596 subcounties and 3143 parishes (Sathymurthy 1982:24). Constitutional changes made in 1967 led to the erosion of the independent powers of the Appointment Boards. Their powers were reduced to those of being advisory to the Public Service Commission (PSC). The PSC in turn advised the President of Uganda who reserved the right to appoint all employees in the Public Service including Local Authorities' employees.

The discretionary powers of local governments to hire and fire their own employees were accordingly curtailed. Local governments became agents of the central government in implementing policies and programmes that were handed down from the centre. This situation meant that weak and poor local governments were exposed to the vagaries of competition with the central government for trained and experienced staff. Indeed, as Lubanga observes, the 1967 Local Governments Act 'had the unfortunate effect of shifting local level participation in decision making and eroding autonomy in action [of the local Authorities]" (1997:5). Between 1962 and 1970 when the Obote government was overthrown, it can be said that there was a swinging of the pendulum between a high level of decentralisation and centralisation. This gave way to different communication arrangements and interaction between field based local and central government officers. There was hardly room for central government officers at the district level to meet and integrate their activities. There was no room for horizontal communication and poorly trained officials at the local level had to work on instructions issued from the centre (Lubanga 1996:48).

This situation led to mal-administration at the local level and development efforts were not bearing any tangible results. In 1971, Idi Amin took over power. There was a move towards more centralisation. The district was left under the DC who in that capacity as the central government administrator in the field theoretically had many powers of an administrator but practically was an extended arm of the military regime. In 1972, a Decree led to an elaborate reorganisation of local government. Uganda was re-constituted into nine provinces and each was placed under a governor who was essentially a military attaché in all but everything. The relationship between the central government and local governments was overloaded with military might. This situation continued unabated until the military regime was ousted in April 1979. The assumption of power for the second time by Milton Obote in 1980 did not bring about any significant positive changes until he was overthrown again by the military in July 1985. The military regime was however itself short-lived as power was wrestled out of its hands in January 1986 by the National Resistance Movement (NRM).

3.5 The Post 1986 period

In 1987, the NRM set up a Commission of Inquiry to study the existing local government system and make appropriate recommendations. The Commission's observations were that: human resources management in local governments was in a deplorable state and incapable of delivering the services assigned (Mamdani et al. 1987:78). In particular, the following problems were singled out: Local governments had very high vacancy levels. They lacked the means to hire, retain and develop the human resources capable of delivering efficient and effective services to the public. Public confidence waned and people were unwilling to pay taxes to the local authorities as there was no link between tax payment and service delivery. Officials posted to work in the local governments were not responsive to local needs as they developed dual loyalty, to the central government that appointed and paid their salaries and to the local authorities with whom they worked directly. Staff discipline declined, as indisplined officers would not be held locally accountable for their omissions and commissions by the local authorities, in which they worked. They were instead rewarded with either a transfer to another local authority or even promoted and subsequently recalled to work in the central government.

Many employees served on temporary appointments until they left the service of the local authorities on retirement and in effect lost their terminal benefits. Besides, the existing profiles of local government employees were ill qualified and ill equipped to offer meaningful services to the people. Salary payments for staff were delayed for months and

even in some cases never appeared on the payroll. On the basis of the recommendations of the Mamdani report, a law was enacted in 1987, to reverse the centralised system of administration. However, as Lubanga (1996) observes, the law did not go far enough to reorganise the organisational set up. It only served to strengthen and perpetuate 'departmentalism and centralised administration'. Local governments had no control over the personnel who worked with them. All senior staff were employees of the central government who owed their allegiance to their respective line ministries at the headquarters. They were not obliged to follow any direction from the local political leadership. In short, the local governments were toothless to bite any errant officers who worked with the councils.

This state of affairs nevertheless provided lessons of experience and in 1993, a new law was enacted delinking all officers who were found to be working with local governments at the time of its enactment. The only exception was with the District Executive Secretary (DES) and his/her deputy who were still central government appointees. All employees became answerable to the local councils through the DES and not to the line ministries. In 1995, a new Constitution was enacted and the responsibility for hiring and firing all local government employees including the chief executive was vested in the DSC. This meant that Uganda reverted to the separate personnel system, which had been used in the initial years of independence. The constitutional provisions were put into effect under the 1997, Local Governments Act. Section 53 of the Act, empowers Local Governments to establish and abolish posts in their councils.

3.6 The Two Case Studies: Mukono and Nebbi Districts

The reasons for selection of these two districts have already been highlighted in chapter two. Mukono lies in the heart of Uganda and is near the capital Kampala. Nebbi on the other hand is far away from Kampala in the West Nile Region. Mukono was created from the powerful centralised Buganda kingdom that had the features of a modern state. At the advent of colonialism, Buganda became the first contact with the colonialist and in many ways reaped certain advantages, which were not available to other areas outside Buganda. Nebbi on the other hand, was to a certain extent a chiefly but less centralised and segmentary society. The northern areas have always felt marginalised in resource allocation since the inception of colonialism to date. It was incorporated in the Uganda State by the colonial regime. Direct communication between West Nile and the centre was minimal till the 1930s. Hence, this feature of a district outside Buganda was of interest for the study in the sense of finding out how its tackling HRM issues and services delivery under decentralisation.

3.7 Mukono District

Mukono district lies in the central part of Uganda. It is sandwiched by Jinja district in the east, Kampala and Mpigi districts in the west, Luwero, Nakasongola and Kamuli districts Plus Lakes Kyoga and Victoria in the north and south respectively. The district has six administrative counties, 22 sub-county and five urban local governments, 700 parishes and 1503 villages respectively. Based on the 1991 population census, the district is projected to have a population of 1,128,500 people (2000). Of these, 206,802 are school going pupils. (Background, 2000:A38). The district maintains 1361 Kms of RFRs and has 68 Kms of railway line plus 378 primary schools.

To understand the evolution of Mukono as a district employer, one needs to have a clear grasp of the history of Buganda of which Mukono was part. Buganda had preferential treatment accorded to it as a province by the imperial government and because of this, other areas were jealousy because of its good social-economic infrastructure i.e. social services, communication, a cash economy and other material advantages that go with these. Many civil servants were Baganda and as Mafeje (1987: 27) says, the well-to-do families in these areas sent their sons to school to become civil servants. This advantaged position for Buganda triggered off a pendulum of actions that were later to shape the system of managing local governments in Uganda. As a measure of cutting Buganda to size, in 1967 the constitution was changed, curtailing the powers of subnational governments and increasing those of the central government as reflected in the appointment of local civil servants so that there was a direct relationship between the centre and the periphery. In 1972 when Idi Amin drastically reorganised the local government system Buganda was split up. The division of Buganda into districts did not only erase the name of Buganda from the Uganda scene, but also led to the birth of Mukono district in 1974. What this meant was that like any other district of Uganda, Mukono was brought into the fold of a wider centralised system of administration.

Mukono like any other district was financially, politically and administratively weak. It had no powers of hiring and firing its own personnel. Central government departments in the district were in disharmony and disintegrated. Yet there was a huge expansion of local government civil services plus field based central government bureaucrats (Davey 1971:85). Local services were poorly delivered due to resource constraints plus political interference. It was therefore a sense of relief for the district, when decentralisation was granted to manage its own affairs particularly its human resources. The key question however, is whether this sense of relief has been translated into better management of human resources and by

extension better service delivery, a question the study addresses in chapter four after reviewing the second case study of Nebbi district.

3.8 Nebbi District

Nebbi district lies in the West Nile part of Uganda. Its neighbours include Arua district in the north, Gulu district in the east, Masindi district and Lake Albert in the south and the DRC in the west. Administratively, the district is divided in three counties, three urban and 19 sub-county local governments plus 84 parishes and 1221 villages respectively (MOLG, 1998). Based on the 1991 population census, the district is projected to have a population of 435,000 people (2000), the school going population being 78,404 pupils. The district has no tarmac road. It has a total of 549 kms of roads, of which 442 are regularly and periodically maintained. The district has no railway line. There are 180 primary schools. In Nebbi before the onset of colonialism, the principle of heredity was used in the selection of chiefs. During the colonial period, this system was initially exploited to select favoured candidates. The meritocracy principle of selection was however, later super-imposed. Sathyamurthy (1982:18) recounts that in areas, which did not have a chiefly system before, civil service chiefs, were appointed by the DC based on qualifications. Thus, Nebbi was incorporated in a similar administrative arrangement and effectively, brought closer with the central and integrated Ugandan State.

However, unlike in Buganda and other parts where Baganda chiefs were appointed and posted to work, in Nebbi, indigenous chiefs were appointed. The chiefs became the conveyor belt for instructions and orders from the colonial state to the people in a situation where there had existed a completely decentralised system. The events that followed later in the history of Uganda equally affected the West Nile District of which Nebbi was a constituent part. In 1974, Nebbi in line with the 1992 Decree was created as a district. In a way, this was initially received as a sigh of relief by the Nebbi people because it was seen as a vehicle for improving their socio-economic infrastructure which had been heavily tilted in favour of the south in form of better roads, hospitals and schools. Little did they know that real power lay elsewhere in Kampala, as appointment of even an office messenger could not be done locally. This situation continued until the current decentralisation programme was launched where districts have the power over appointment and dismissal of all employees.

Before an analysis of the actual state of HRM in the two case studies is made, it is noteworthy, to underscore a few points here. First, the onset of colonialism, in Uganda brought an alien system of local government that was based on the bureaucratic model.

Services were delivered by central government personnel whose responsibility and accountability lay with the specialist parent ministries. The co-ordination mechanisms put in place, where the DC was meant to supervise field teams as well as serve as a communication bridge did not work out well. There was hardly any integration of the goals and activities of the various departments and this continued up to 1993. The second point to underscore is that efficiency and effectiveness depend largely on good quality of staff and attractive conditions of service for them in the local governments. These conditions were, however, not available since local governments did have direct say over matters of appointment and remuneration of local officials. All personnel related decisions were made by the central government. The third point is that the policy of transferring officers from one district to the other insulated them from being held accountable for their actions. Fourthly, the delivery of services was undermined by resource constraints particularly of a human nature, since local governments could not determine their structures, based on local realities. They did not have the resources and facilities to deliver their mandates.

To sum up, this chapter has attempted to make a cursory survey of personnel systems in local governments since the pre-colonial period. It has been established that the personnel systems introduced in local governments during colonialism were based on the British colonial system, which was bureaucratic. At independence, local governments had autonomy in matters personnel, this changed from 1966 when a new constitution was enacted. A highly centralised system was put in place, which undermined co-ordination and harmonisation of public programmes at the local level. In short, this chapter has served three Purposes. First, to place the study in a historical context, without which the reader may not have a clear understanding of the current trends in HRM in Uganda. Second, the two case studies highlight the point that pre-colonial Uganda was not homogenous. Different societies had different ways of addressing local common problems. The lumping together of heterogeneous societies by colonialism and imposition of a uniform centralised personnel system, which was maintained and sustained by subsequent governments, undermined the capacities of local people to respond to local common problems in diverse ways. In the next chapter, attention will shift to the analysis of the actual state of HRM in the local governments and how this could have affected delivery of public services.

4 CHAPTER FOUR

4.1 Introduction

This chapter is devoted to an analysis of NPM and HRM in local governments. It critically assesses the changes that have occurred as a result of decentralising HRM. The focus is on organisational structure and its relationship with the six core attributes of HRM as reviewed in chapter two and how these have impacted on efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery. Particular reference is made to the two departments of education and works as case studies in the districts of Mukono and Nebbi. A case study of one primary school is analysed to enrich the arguments.

From the outset, it is necessary to note the key generic features of personnel decentralisation in Uganda from a central cum local viewpoint. First, the terms and conditions of service for both local and central government employees are similar. All employees at the same grade level receive similar pay. Secondly, local governments are autonomous employers. The authority entrusted with hiring and firing local officials is the DSC. It is required to widely advertise all the jobs and recruit on merit. Fourthly, the law insulates the career and tenure of office for local officials. If arbitrarily dismissed or disciplined, they can seek legal litigation. The fifth aspect is that local officials are not transferable from one local government to the other. Transfer is only possible on an individual's initiative by applying for a vacant post in another local government. Sixth, the central government retains responsibility for policy initiation, standard setting, monitoring, inspection, technical advice and co-ordination of local governments. The PSC serves as an appellate body for aggrieved local government employees and also regulates guides and co-ordinates the DSCs. The central government also helps to pay salaries of all local government employees through earmarked funds in the block grant.

4.2 Organisational structure

Experience the world over has shown that successful reform effort blossoms when there is a balance between organisational and attitudinal changes. An essential prerequisite for personnel decentralisation is that local governments have the discretion to determine their structures. The institution for doing this is the district council as the elected arm of local government. Districts initially used devolution to reduce the number of departments from about 28 to between 6-9, following the enactment of the Resistance Councils (Local Governments) Statute and de-linking of field based officials to local governments in 1993 (Lubanga 1997:68). Mukono and Nebbi districts reduced their departments to eight each.

The objective was to align the structures to reflect the changed institutional set up in light of the devolution. Because the increase in responsibilities also led to an increase in the span of control for the chief executives of the local governments, there was a desire to harmonise this with the structures. The first wave of the reviews was guided by three objectives. First, was to rationalise the district councils' organisational structures. The second was to determine the 'optimum' staffing levels. Thirdly, it was to re–appraise departmental functions, key outputs to eliminate duplication and overlaps. The goal was to make local governments able to effectively use the human and other resources to achieve social and economic development.

The reviews were facilitated by the Ministry of Public Service (MPS) and MOLG and recommended standardised structures. The local government councils later adopted them with minor variations. All the departments were made accountable to the Councils through the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO). They were modified to make them more consistent with local needs and realities. The new structures created consequently led to the removal of 2177 employees nation-wide with exhausted potential and re-deployment of others between 1994 and 1995. Mukono and Nebbi districts displaced 113 and 21 employees respectively (DS 1995:23). However, in 1995, a new constitution was enacted giving additional responsibilities and functions to the local governments. A Local Governments Act was enacted in 1997 to give effect to the constitutional provisions. This means that the structures of the local governments required revision to make them consistent with these changes. Section 53 of the Act empowered local governments to create and abolish posts in their councils. However, this has not been done. First, local governments do not have the capacity both human and financial to accomplish this on their own and secondly, because of the old culture of dependence limiting local governments to innovate. Thirdly, local governments have not had the experience and exposure to new strategies and techniques such as NPM to deliver services since this had been the mandate of the central government.

Generally, following the 1994/95 reduction in the number of departments, some professional personnel were attracted to work in the districts because of improved conditions of service. Initially, the integration of departments led to better co-ordination and organisational development to support and improve efficiency and effectiveness. These changes are reflected in the shifting of staff control from line Ministries to local governments and establishment of institutions like the District Service Commission (DSC). The DSC for example reduced the vacancy ratios by advertising and recruiting new employees (Mbahamiza, 1999:84-5). Despite these improvements, problems still abound, namely, lack

of support by some central line ministries to districts, lack of transparency, low remuneration, inadequate capacity building and problems associated with recruitment of staff in peripheral councils (Lubanga, 1997:68).

A critical number of core issues also remain unexplained. First, while the number of departments was reduced significantly by mergers, this change to a large extent was more in form than in content. This is because a local bureaucracy with hierarchical structures was left intact. Furthermore, according to Mugabi (1999), 'sector analysis and approaches still dominate government programmes'.[1] Secondly, PM practices and procedures similar to those of the central government still prevail and these are built along what Haynes (1980) classified as the establishment model. The CAO through the personnel department together with the DSC has exclusive right over the personnel function with a few exceptions like filing the annual confidential reports (ACRs) delegated to managers.

Hence, in the NPM and HRM speak, there is no strategic orientation to managing of human resources as supported by the statement below,

> I have heard of instances where some District Service Commissions would like Chief Administrative Officers to attend their meetings on a regular basis. On the other hand, I have also received reports where some Chief Administrative Officers would like the District Service Commissions to brief them, the Chief Administrative Officers, about what is happening. What should be appreciated is that the Chief Administrative Officers are NOT members of The District Service Commissions. Consequently, they can not be expected to attend meetings of District Service Commissions on a **REGULAR BASIS**...The question of a District Service Commission **BRIEFING** a Chief Administrative Officer...**DOES NOT ARISE,** because a District Service Commission is **NOT ANSWERABLE** to the Chief Administrative Officer (Mitala 1998: 8)[2].

The point to underscore is that a clear delineation of roles between managers of local governments and the DSCs is emphasised so much that situations have arisen when the two sides have clashed over appointment of persons unacceptable to the management group.[3] The third issue relates to the nature of goods and services that local governments have to deliver directly and those they could opt out for privatisation, contracting out, private/ public partnership or out-sourcing. While the review reports rightly assumed some services such as road maintenance, cleaning, vehicle repairs and maintenance would be contracted out, many

[1] Mr Mugabi is Director of the Decentralisation Secretariat in MOLG. The Secretariat has the mandate to oversee and facilitate the implementation of Decentralisation in Uganda since its inception.
[2] Mr Mitala has been The Secretary Public Service Commission and is now The Deputy Head of Public Service and Secretary Public Service Reform Commission. Emphasis in original form.
[3] The cases of Apach, Tororo and Bundibugyo districts illustrate this (Lubanga 1997:49).

councils held on to direct delivery of most services even when they are not doing it well. The consequences of all these are diverse and include among others, many vacant positions and excessively high wage bills. This is even made worse by the fact that individual salaries are often below subsistence level. Two key points are worthy underscoring here. First, central government officials who carried out the reviews were influenced by their institutional perception in recommending structures that did not meaningfully change the way local governments were to manage the delivery of services in a changing environment. Secondly, neither the local government technocrats nor the local politicians had enough professional exposure to decide on what would have been better structures or service delivery options for their local governments. The structures and institutions created for local governments as they were, inevitably, have had a bearing on the themes of recruitment/selection, performance appraisal, training and development, rewards, communication and by extension to service delivery, subjects the study now refocuses attention on.

4.3 Recruitment and Selection

A major ingredient of personnel decentralisation is that local officials are answerable to local governments they serve and not otherwise. This means that each local government has a mechanism of recruiting its employees. To this end, recruitment and selection of all local officials is vested in the DSCs of the respective districts. Upon approval of the organisational structure of a local government by the district council, the CAO makes a submission for filling of vacant positions to the DSC which advertises the posts, shortlists candidates, interviews them and ideally selects the best. The names of successful candidates are then sent to the CAO for appointment and deployment. DSCs also have powers over confirmation, promotion, discipline, training and determination of the terms and conditions of service for local officials but within the purview of those generally accepted for the public service. In other words, DSCs have to follow procedures, regulations and guidelines of the Public, Health and Education Service Commissions when dealing with cases of traditional, health and education staff respectively.

There has been no independent, comprehensive and critical assessment of the performance of DSCs. However, some observers have noted that their performance can be rated as satisfactory (Lubanga 1997:23-30, Musisi 1997:6). The satisfaction is derived from the fact that first, the establishment of the DSCs helped to calm down the anxiety and fear among local officials about possible local political victimisation. Secondly, DSCs have been able to recruit staff to fill vacant posts and this has been helpful in eliminating temporary appointments and streamlining other appointments. On-the-job training for members of the

DSCs, issuance of guidelines and lessons of experience are reasons that explain the steady improvement of DSCs particularly in recruiting new staff (Lubanga1997: 24). A country-wide study by MOLG in 1999 rated most local governments as having 80% of their positions filled, which would be remarkable because prior to decentralisation most of them had vacancy levels of 80% as reported in the Mamdani report (Nkayarwa 1999:14)[4]. For example, prior to decentralisation, Mukono had 80% of its employees on temporary appointments and of these 50% did not have the qualifications for the jobs they held (GOU 1987:79). Despite this satisfactory performance of DSCs, they have encountered many problems ranging from resource constraints to political manipulation and lack of qualified personnel officers to assist them thereby undermining their work (Lubanga 1997 and Mbahamiza 1999:59).

The DSCs' have been black spotted for recruiting unsuitable staff and failing to take due regard to appointment on merit (Omuge 1997:4 and Musisi 1997:10).[5] They have also not seriously addressed the problem of temporary appointments. (MPS 1998:30). It is also difficult to recruit professional staff in most local governments particularly those in the periphery. For example, inspite of several advertisements, Nebbi has like others failed to attract qualified statistics, economics, agricultural extension, teaching and engineering professionals (Mugabi 1998). DSCs also face resource constraints although the central government has now accepted to directly fund them so that they can perform their work with minimum local political interference (Budget speech, 2000).

Cognisant of the above, it is not important to apportion blame. Rather, it is worth noting the importance of these as just symptoms of a much bigger problem relating to the question of whether local governments need to directly deliver all or most of the services they currently provide or not. Secondly, it is questionable whether in the wake of NPM and HRM and amidst resource constraints, DSCs should directly implement some of their activities such as recruitment and selection of teachers. Devolution of some personnel functions to managers and contracting out others remains open to bring about efficiency and cost effectiveness (Farnham and Horton 1996). In Uganda, although the law vests the power of control of all public servants in the district in the hands of the CAOs, they and their managers have no substantive power over the recruitment of their subordinates. This undermines the participation of managers in selection of officers with whom they work. There are, of course,

[4] Mr Nkayarwa is the Acting Director for Local Government Administration and Inspection in MOLG.

[5] Mr Omuge has been the Principal Personnel Officer for Soroti district and is now the CAO for the same district. Mr Musisi is the chairperson of Mukono district Council and the president of the Local Authorities Association of Uganda.

fears that vesting HRM in line managers could lead to a "spoils" system and poor management of the personnel function. This is in light of the findings of the Mamdani Commission, which implicated heads of department before decentralisation for abusing the system by employing unqualified persons to run the affairs of the councils. These fears however, need not arise if performance standards are set and enforced to hold managers accountable for their performance.

The establishment of DSCs was based on conventional wisdom of promoting neutrality, fairness, uniformity, equity, merit and impartiality of standards. However, this wisdom undermines the adoption of NPM and HRM in providing efficient and effective services. Finally, while the central government has taken over the financing of DSCs, this arrangement is likely not to be cost effective because it is extremely resource and time consuming and unless local government managers are proactively involved in managing people at work, the DSC may not cope with the work load. Secondly, it is one thing funding DSCs to do their work, but it is another attracting competent and qualified personnel to the councils if conditions and terms of service remain comparatively low with other sectors.

4.4 Performance Appraisal

The concern for out puts and outcomes counsels that each department is given measurable and achievable targets based on work plans. This in turn means that employees are evaluated in relation to the quality and magnitude of their outputs. The focus then is on constraints to employee efficiency and productivity. This then flows into performance improvement schemes such as training, promotion, and provision of equipment, direct communication with employees. Decentralising HRM has cut off the bureaucracy associated with the system of performance appraisal and handed this over to local officials (1999: 63-6). Local governments however, still face resource constraints to procure the ACR forms. In Moroto district for example, staff have to pay for the forms before their supervisors assess them. Consequently this has culminated into low response from staff to fill the forms. Many employees are consequently not confirmed in their appointments (Dragulu 1999:34).


The Monitor newspaper of 21/9/2000 also quotes Kamuli district workers petitioning their union, against poor HRM practises in the district. Besides, the performance appraisal system in local governments is inhibitive in a number of ways. Firstly, performance is not linked to measurable achievable outputs and is not related to pay. Secondly, appraisers do not have adequate training in performance appraisal. The system also lacks objectivity and feedback to employees is not given. (Muhereza 1999:54-61). Performance appraisal is seen as a tool for

enhancing future organisational performance and winning staff commitment. In this light, the major weakness of the present appraisal system lies in the fact that outputs of service delivery in local governments are not measured. Consequently, the basis for an objective assessment system collapses because neither departments nor managers are held accountable for their performance. Secondly, because pay is not related to performance, employees at the same grade are rewarded the same regardless of their performance and this undermines motivation. This is due to the conventional bureaucratic regulations and structures, which impede cost effectiveness and change. Efforts to introduce ROM have not yet been put into practise in the local governments (Polidano 1999:6).

4.5 Training and development.

Since the collapse of the Local Authorities School at the then Uganda Institute of Public Administration, most of the training for local governments employees has been handled by government departmental Institutions till recently. There was also no co-ordination for training, because local governments had no qualified personnel and funds to manage the training function. Following the decentralisation of personnel management, many stakeholders and observers agree that local governments' capacity can be enhanced if a massive training programme is conducted to upgrade their human resource potentials and capability for an effective and efficient decentralised system of local governance (MOLG 1998:9). In light of this, MOLG plus other stakeholders have conducted a lot of training as reflected at annex A. This being a nation wide programme, both Mukono and Nebbi have benefited. This training has gone a long way to address the basic needs of the local governments' personnel and thereby contributed to improved service delivery. Some districts on their own, using local resources, have also organised training as figure 1 below and annex B show in the case of Nebbi district.

Figure 1



The numbers of personnel trained were not available. The expenditure in figure 1 shows that it overshot the estimates. However, the deficits were met from supplementary funding derived from the unconditional grant. The trend has steadily improved from Ug Shs 15 million in 1994/95 to Ug Shs 35 million in 1999/2000. This is encouraging because there was no training organised by districts like Nebbi before decentralisation.

Despite the good efforts devoted to training, there are still many gaps to address. First, training is still insufficient. Local officials at the district, and particularly at the sub county level, are not equipped with some of the basic skills necessary for planning and managing service delivery (MOLG 1998:11). Secondly, seminars and workshops have been seen as benefiting only a few people (Nkayarwa 1999:6). Thirdly, the training of trainers (TOT) course which was envisaged to produce graduates who would be used to train others within the local governments has not achieved this purpose (Ashaba 1997:5-6)[6]. Fourthly, it has been observed that the working culture and incentives in the local governments are not conducive to improved performance (DANIDA 1999). Hence, training alone is not helpful. Fifth, the training that has been conducted has been largely supply driven. Local governments do not have the capacity to initiate training based on their own local needs. This is also due to the fact that the identification of training needs through a performance monitoring system is lacking. Sixth, the training offered especially the TOT has not yet been properly evaluated to assess its impact. Seventh, the co-ordination of training programmes is still inadequate

[6] Mr. Ashaba was head of training division in the DS in MOLG in 1997.

leading to senior local officials hardly being in their duty stations for work. The Local Government Training Committee is yet to have its impact felt. Lack of co-ordination thus, heightens the risk of overlaps and repetitions of training. Finally, training has been donor driven and this has raised questions about sustainability. The government approach to this is rather ambiguous as this statement illustrates,

> Local governments should solicit resources for such training from the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, donor agencies, sector ministries and conduct such training with the help of national training institutions and government (The Republic of Uganda: 1999:66).

Generally speaking, training in Uganda and local governments in particular is more problematic. This is due to the absence of a national training policy that can be translated into a strategy to guide investments in training and skills development. The situation is compounded by the absence of private/ public/ individual participation in shaping decisions on training. Neither local governments nor government can sustainably go it alone or with donors in funding training as South Africa has come to realise[7]. This far the focus of the analysis will now shift to the issue of rewards.

4.6 Rewards

Rewards constitute an important ingredient to efficiency and effectiveness of an organisation as it is a basis for satisfactory conditions of service for local officials. First, adequate remuneration in the context of a well-planned career structure is necessary for recruiting and retaining well-motivated personnel. Such employees, given appropriate training and subject to clear monitoring are unlikely to abuse their employers' trust. Well-compensated employees have less incentive, and less need to offend. On the contrary, badly compensated employees have no incentive to remain honest. In today's context, many local government employees face severe temptations. Poor pay still remains a big problem inspite of the high wage bills. For example, excluding wages for teachers, Nebbi district's wage bill takes 47% of the district budget. The figure for Mukono is 28% (MOLG, 1999:78,82). Yet the average and lowest paid local government employee earns US$ 100 and US$ 47 respectively per month.

The point to emphasise is that inspite of the increasing wage bill for local governments, the salary structures are rigid and provide low incentives. Employees are not rewarded for

[7] South Africa has drafted and adopted a comprehensive skills development strategy which was widely debated by all stakeholders. The strategy has six components dealing with information for strategic planning, system of learnerships, employment services, enhancement of training provision, intermediaries and national co-ordination plus funding for skills development. See http://www.polity.org.za/govtdoc5/green_paper/skills.htm/#foreward. 22/3/2000.

performance. Although the review of the structures and eventual retrenchment of some employees was expected to make some savings that would be channelled back to improve the pay of existing employees, this has not been the case. This has as Omuge (1997:30) would have it, 'affected the morale and attitude of civil servants towards decentralisation [due to the failure to pay] a living wage'. The poor reward systems have translated in three major and interrelated problems. First, a number of local governments have remained in the hands of poorly qualified and poorly motivated employees (Ashaba 1997:6). Secondly, there are many vacancies even when local governments have the capacity to pay. For example, Nebbi has failed to recruit the required number of graduate agricultural officers. Out of 14 posts only two have been filled although funds for salaries are available. The district has also been unable to attract a qualified graduate engineer. It opted to train the supervisor of works who has just completed an undergraduate course in engineering. However it is doubtful whether he will stay should better opportunities for him become available. The third point relates to the increase in the level of rent seeking behaviour in the local governments, which is closely, although not exclusively related to low reward systems to local officials. A quick look at the disciplinary cases in Mukono district reveals that 78% of them are related to embezzlement of funds (Kasimbazi 1998:3).

The current approach by government to the salary problem in local governments seems to be to review their structures again (Budget Speech, 2000:20). However, what has just been said reinforces the argument made earlier that there is need for government and local governments in particular to reflect on their competencies with the view of contracting-out and out-sourcing some functions where possible. This would lead to retention of a core number of employees whom they can pay well through performance related pay. This would at the same time mean training managers from being direct service deliverers to being policy advisors, contract managers and inspectors. This new arrangement would counsel performance standards and a new performance appraisal system and training plus a new system of communication to which we now turn.

4.7 Communication

Before decentralising HRM, a vertical system of communication prevailed. Field based junior officers had direct links with their parent line ministries. Decentralising HRM has to some extent addressed this problem. The merging of related departments has meant that all communications outside the district go through the head of department and then the CAO. The approach to extension work for example, has been changed. All officers in the production department integrate their out-reach activities. This has meant multi-skilling and

the response of a number of districts has been warm as illustrated above in the case of Nebbi (training). However, communication problems in the local governments especially between district based staff and those based in rural areas still prevail as Omuge aptly says,

> We have also experienced a tendency for field staff to feel isolated from their departmental colleagues at the district headquarters because contacts with their supervisors are confined to the past receipt of instructions and scaring queries which has resulted into misunderstanding of the decentralisation policy and loss of motivation (1997:11).

Indeed, this example serves to underscore two points. First, it reflects a behavioural and psychological problem, which normally accompanies any decentralisation programme (Rondinelli 1999:68). It may therefore require a lot of training to change attitudes both at the district and central government levels. The second point relates to the counsel of NPM and HRM. Under NPM, organisations are mission driven. To achieve these, managers are given standards and performance measures, which they have to achieve in an environment of devolution. For managers to achieve these, they have to nurture and win the commitment of employees. Employees are rewarded for their performance. Performance gaps are addressed through either training or tooling. This approach has not yet been practically embraced in local governments, and therein lies the problem to possible poor performance hence inefficiency and ineffectiveness in service delivery, a subject that gets the next attention.

4.8 Service delivery

Various scholars have argued that service delivery ought to take consideration of issues related to production, provision, co-production and human resource substitute mechanisms (Olowu 1990; Torrington 1995). Accordingly, decentralising HRM would lead to efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery. In the department of Works, the structure was reviewed with the view of contracting out maintenance of RFRs. Wastage of local governments' resources was reduced due to less transaction costs involved e.g. travelling to headquarters to follow up issues. These resources were made available for service delivery i.e. monitoring, without reference to anybody at the centre. There was thus focus on core competencies in the Works department. The primary duty for departmental staff is to set standards, monitor progress and manage contracts. In Mukono district as a result of contracting out, 1361 Kms of RFRs have been opened and are regularly and periodically maintained. The length of 48 Kms were worked on in the first 2-3 years of decentralisation as table 1 illustrates.

Table 1 Roads constructed by Mukono district council between 1993/94 and 1996/ 1997.[8]

Road	Length (KMs)
Kawomya- Senyi	10
Galiraya- Kawongo	12
Bugereka- Kasawo	22
Namataba- Kanyogoga	22
Total length	48

Source: Musisi 1997:5

- Desegregated data for all the 1361 Kms were not available.

Similarly, the district rehabilitated 19 sub county headquarters and also constructed a new one. 52 schools were constructed in 9 sub counties, while 36 health units out of 51 were rehabilitated (Musisi 1997:6). These have to some extent helped to improve the social as well as economic condition of the people of Mukono. In the case of Nebbi district, a length of 442 Kms of RFRs have been opened up and are maintained on routine and periodic basis since the district was decentralised as annex C shows. It has also been able to erect bridges across difficult cross points on the roads as shown at annex D. It is quite remarkable that both Mukono and Nebbi have been able to upgrade the status of their RFRs because prior to decentralisation both districts had a very poor state of RFRs. Mukono maintained only 205 Kms with difficulty. Likewise, Nebbi district maintained only 96 Kms of RFRs (MOLG, 1999). The improvements in the RFRs network has resulted into increased intra and inter district trade in both districts. The improved roads have eased access to markets for farmers and traders and this has helped to boost the local economy of the two districts and hence contributed to poverty eradication efforts in the country. Thus, the fact that the two districts were able to upgrade their RFRs network from a very poor and narrow base supports the argument that services are being delivered in this sector.

However, in the education sector, a different picture emerges using the indicators of pupil/teacher ratio and performance in PLE[9]. Figures 1 and 2 below give a clear comparative and graphic picture of the situation.

[8] 18 words in table.
[9] Justification at annex E

Figure 2.[10]




Figure 3.





Figure 2 shows that in 1993, the ratio of pupils per qualified teacher was 52:1 in the case of Mukono district and 62:1 in Nebbi district. Similarly, the ratio of pupils per teacher in the same year in Mukono was 45:1 while in Nebbi it was 53:1. This was far below the recommended national standard of 40 pupils per teacher. In figure 3, the ratio of pupils per teacher in Mukono was 146:1 in 1999. In Nebbi's case, this was 192:1. In the same vein, the ratio of pupils per teacher in Mukono was 73:1, while in Nebbi it was 86:1. This shows that the quality of education in both districts has been on the decline, although at a huge rate in Nebbi compared to Mukono. Lack of trained teachers is an indicator of either low investment in teacher training or unwillingness of trained teachers to stay in a profession or to stay in a

[10] Details at annex F. Pup/QTr represents the ratio of pupils per qualified teacher. Pup/Tr. represents the ratio of pupils per teacher regardless of whether the teacher is qualified or not. In Uganda, a teacher who is qualified should have undergone a 2-3 year training course after four years of secondary education.

particular district. Thus, quality determines pupils' performance hence literacy. Indeed graph 4 below supports this strand of argument.

Figure 4.



In Mukono, out of 11503 pupils who sat for primary leaving examination (PLE) in 1992[11], 2590 or 23% of the total passed. In 1998, out of 14180 pupils who sat for PLE, 6419 passed thus representing 45% of the total. In Nebbi, out of 2933 pupils who sat for PLE in 1992, only 372 passed representing 13% of the total. In 1998 out of 3509 pupils who sat for PLE only 481 passed representing 14% of the total. As annex F also shows, in both districts, there has been a cumulative increase in the number of pupil enrolment over the years. In the case of Mukono, this was accompanied with an increase in the number of schools but there were a constant number of trained teachers. Nebbi district had the number of schools decreasing from 185 in 1995 to 180 in 1999. The number of teachers remained low. The pupil/teacher ratio has been increasing in both districts due to the increasing population and hence enrolment in school and due to the introduction of UPE in 1997.

The picture that emerges from the two districts shows steady improvement in the number of passes in PLE for Mukono compared to the stagnant performance of Nebbi district. However in both districts, there is a huge rise in the pupil/ teacher ratio, which is an indication of poor quality of education. Historical and managerial factors explain this trend. Historically, Mukono benefited from the good social infrastructure due to its central position. As explained in chapter three, the colonial government established its rule from Buganda where Mukono falls. Good schools were established to serve the education needs of children of Baganda

chiefs. Mukono has therefore been able to attract good teachers in public schools because there are facilities such as housing which attract teachers unlike in Nebbi. Parents are also involved in management of schools in Mukono because they are relatively educated and rich compared to Nebbi. Hence, these affluent parents value the importance of education for their children. They contribute funds and actively participate in school affairs. The funds are used as top up to salaries of teachers. Good pay keeps teachers motivated and hence helps to improve the performance. In fact if one examined the performance of schools from the peripheral parts of Mukono where parents involvement is minimal, similar results as those of Nebbi are likely to come out. There are also a number of good private schools for children of the affluent working middle class parents who work in Kampala but reside in Mukono. These schools contribute to Mukono's relatively good performance in PLE. Manday correctly says that many parents now prefer to send their children to private schools because there is no effective teaching in government schools[12] (The Monitor 16/11/2000)

Nebbi's poor performance is also attributed to its historical disadvantage as a peripheral district and to poor management practises associated with many of the government owned schools in the district. From the statistics at annex F the number of pupils to trained teachers is 134549 to 701. The majority of teachers are thus untrained, poorly paid and lack the motivation and team work as expressed by a World Bank official, (P Murphy) who was quoted deploring the low quality of education due to lack of teachers (The Newvision 20/10/2000).

From a management viewpoint, the vacancy levels for teachers are high in both districts as annex F shows. This is attributed to the bureaucracy involved in the recruitment of teachers and their access to the payroll. Currently, each school is allocated a staff ceiling by the MOES based on the number of pupils enrolled in the school. The head teacher then requisitions for appointment of teachers on a specified form, which goes through the offices of the District Education Officer (DEO), the CAO and the DSC for verification and endorsement. If the form is unacceptable, it is sent back to the head teacher through the same channels. If it is accepted, the DSC arranges for advertisement of the post.[13] The recruitment and selection takes about six months before a teacher receives the appointment letter. To be eligible for appointment, a teacher must provide supporting documents namely, academic

[11] 1992 was the year prior to effective decentralisation in 1993. Annexes G and H show details on performance of the two districts. Candidates who pass in grade one and two are considered as having passed and proceed to the next class level.
[12] Mr F Manday is the acting Commissioner for Education in MOES.
[13] Normally when there are fewer or only one post to be advertised, this is stayed for economic reasons.

certificates and testimonials issued by Uganda National Examinations Board (UNEB), certificate of registration issued by MOES and teaching certificates issued by Makerere Institute of Education. These documents on average take over eight months to get upon release of primary teachers' results. When the teacher is finally recruited, access to the payroll is another nightmare. The process starts with the teacher filling a pay change report form, which is provided by the district authorities. Verification and endorsement of the form goes through the offices of the head teacher, the DEO, the CAO, and MPS and finally Computer Services Department in Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MOFPED). If the form is rejected at any of these points, its sent back to the teacher. If the form is accepted, the teacher's name appears on the payroll.[14]

These bureaucratic processes have led to the following problems. First, head teachers are compelled to recruit unqualified teachers to cope with the workload. Secondly, qualified teachers are not recruited in time because of late acquisition of relevant documents. Head teachers' role in recruitment of teachers is limited only to the submission of requisition forms. This leads to poor working relationships because often misunderstandings between the newly posted teacher and the head teacher arise compelling head teachers to maliciously delete teachers off the payroll (Sezi, 1999:15). Thirdly, failure for teachers to access the payroll in time creates desperation amongst them. For example, in April 1999, 590 teachers are said to have personally travelled to MPS to take their forms. (Sezi 1999:27). This means that no effective teaching goes on in the schools.

Disbursement of funds to run the schools is also rigid and bureaucratic. A capitation grant based on the number of pupils enrolled in the school is sent on a monthly basis from the MOFPED on recommendation of MOES. However, the funds remitted to the school have strings attached that the head teacher has no flexibility to allocate the money based on local school needs. Rules and regulations also do not allow teachers to teach in more than one school because they would be considered as earning more than one-salary from the same employer.


This far, it is important to make some remarks. First, it is correct to say that given the current capacity of the local governments and the pay levels for primary teachers, it is not attractive for well qualified teachers to teach in government schools particularly those located in distant

[14] The average monthly salary for a grade three teacher is US$ 47 (MPS, 1999).

districts. This is not to say that there are no qualified teachers but the poor terms and conditions of service do not attract them. Secondly, the DSCs lack the capacity to promptly respond to the staffing needs of the schools. This is worsened by the lengthy procedures the recruitment process goes through. Many schools are in dire need of qualified teachers and yet they lack the flexibility to recruit. Accessing the payroll after the teachers are recruited is yet another problem. (The Monitor, 7/10/2000).

Comparatively, given the level of financial resources that have been committed to both the RFRs and education sectors, there is evidence to show that the former has performed relatively better than the latter as figure 4 below shows,

Figure 5.



From figure 5, it can be discerned that in 1998/1999 financial year, Mukono spent about 2.2 billion Ug Shs on education compared to 0.34 billion on RFRs. Similarly, Nebbi district spent 0.24 billion on education compared to 0.14 billion on RFRs. It is worthy noting that both sectors are government priority programme areas. If this can be used as a measure of performance, the Works Department has performed relatively better. This is because of Contracting out of service delivery which is possible in the roads sector since it is easier to make quick profits by private entrepreneurs than in the education sector. However, good management is a prerequisite. This far, its prudent to demonstrate how one school operating in similar circumstances has been able to steadily improve its performance in Nebbi district because of good management practises, operational freedom and teamwork.

4.9 A case study of Nebbi primary school


Nebbi primary school (NPS) was established in 1918 as a private missionary school located in Koch-Pamoli sub-county and operated as a grade two school. It was relocated to Nebbi Town council in 1936 when the colonial government took it over as a government school and elevated it to grade three level. It qualified as a primary seven school in 1958. The school is thus 82 years old. Before 1997, the school had 12 teachers and this number was raised to 20 in 1997 due to the introduction of UPE. All the teachers were qualified then. The school had 10 classrooms and 1254 pupils in 1997. The pupil/teacher ratio was thus 63:1. The staffing ceiling for the year 2000 is 25 teachers but only 23 are in place. Three of these are not qualified. One of the unqualified teachers is undergoing in-service training. There are 14 classrooms and 1493 pupils are enrolled in the school (Nebbi district report, 2000). The current pupil to qualified teacher ratio is 75:1 reflecting a general deterioration pattern as in the whole district and country.

This school like the other 180 schools in Nebbi district had a history of poor performance in PLE. In 1997, the current head teacher, Mr Okwonga, fresh from an in-service diploma course, introduced a number of changes (The Newvision 16/10/2000). A series of meetings between parents and teachers were introduced and the central issue during these meetings was improvement of the standard of education in the school in particular reference to PLE. These meetings culminated in the formation of a separate association for parents with pupils in primary seven. Parents were willing to contribute funds to run the school and monitor the utilisation of the extra contribution towards teaching. The association also lobbies with reluctant parents to pay their contributions and seeks to counsel errant pupils.

The third change was a one-hour pre and after school lessons for primary six and seven pupils. The fourth change has been the introduction of monthly printed examinations, unlike in other schools, where pupils first encounter printed examinations in PLE. The head teacher provides his teachers with other things, which would otherwise compel them to be out of school during normal working hours. For example, teachers are served with tea and lunch at school. Exchange and sharing of internal examination papers with friendly schools in Kampala, Mukono, Mpigi, Jinja and Iganga districts has also been introduced in the school. Revision papers are procured using the school's funds. Extra classes have also been introduced during holidays and pupils rest for a short period. The aim is to help them complete the school syllabus in the first and second terms and to devote third term to revision.

The facilities provided to teachers at school have enhanced their concentration and contributed to competition amongst them to ensure that the subjects they teach emerge as the best in PLE. Teachers who produce the best results are given some financial package as a pat on their backs. The teachers are also highly motivated to teach because of the top-up on their salaries that they get from parents' contributions. All these efforts have contributed to a corresponding steady improvement of the school. For example, in 1998 and 1999, NPS contributed 47% and 31% of the overall first grade passes of Nebbi district respectively. Figure 5 below and annex I show the performance of the school since 1991.

Figure 6



From figure 5, the school's performance has leaped from 60% of the passes in PLE in 1996 to 86% in 1999 due to introduction of good management practises. The level of failures has equally dropped significantly. Ungraded results have been falling though they slightly increased in 1998. This is attributed to the number of pupils who registered for PLE but did not sit for the examination. The number of candidates for PLE has been falling and reasons for this are diverse and outside the scope of this study.

This case helps to underscore a number of points. First, it shows that if management of schools can be placed in the hands of qualified and competent managers, who have a vision for their schools, there can be a turn around in performance. Secondly, qualified, well-paid and motivated teachers are a prerequisite to improved performance. Thirdly, teamwork and

partnership between the head teacher, teachers and parents is a key to improved performance as Okwonga aptly says,

> Without a collective planning and consistent teamwork from dedicated teachers and parents, the head teacher can not succeed in anything (Newvision 16/10/2000).

Fourthly, operational freedom accompanied with resources contributes to good performance. Fifthly, this case shows the importance of target setting as reflected in the agenda of pupils in the school having to finish their classes early to concentrate on revision work in term three. Quality control has been effected through regular consultative meetings between the school management and parents to review performance and improve. Finally, financial constraints have been overcome through co-production where parents contribute to the financial needs of the school. A critical appreciation of the remarkable performance of NPS would however warn against being over optimistic about placing management of schools in the hands of school managers who may not have the same vision as Mr Okwonga had. In this regard, it is necessary to take into account institutional support that can be offered to schools with poor management.

From the analysis of the performance of the Works and Education Departments in both Mukono and Nebbi, the following conclusions can be drawn. First, lack of staff is predominant in both Mukono and Nebbi. Secondly, there is limited autonomy granted to the districts and particularly to head teachers to manage and control teachers. Hence, in reality decentralisation has not occurred in the primary education sector compared to RFRs. Thirdly, there are no measures of performance and standard setting on which performance can be assessed in both departments. Fourthly, the wage bills for primary schools are high, yet salaries remain low. Operational funds remitted to schools are inadequate and this is compounded by the conditions attached. Fifthly, quality control is lacking in the local governments. Finally, service delivery is generally poor in the education sector for both districts.

To summarise, this chapter has established that decentralising HRM led to the review of the district structures in the nascent years of decentralisation but these structures have not been revisited following the devolution of more functions to local governments. The initial district reviews contributed to harmonisation and integration of departmental activities. Hence, this has led to relatively efficient and effective service delivery in those sectors that adopted modern management strategies. This helped to address the otherwise enormous personnel

requirements that would not be available to deliver those services. Secondly, it is also established that the management of human resources in local governments as vested in the DSCs helped to alleviate the interim problems of decentralising PM. However, lack of resources and bureaucratic procedures have undermined the efficiency and effectiveness of the DSC. It has also been established that due to decentralisation of HRM, local governments are interested in human resources issues although in the conventional PM sense of the word. Training has relatively improved as the case of Nebbi shows. There is also some improvement in performance appraisal and communication. Through better management strategies and techniques the performance of NPS has been turned around. This ought to be of interest to the government authorities both at the national and local levels. In the next chapter, a cursory survey of the major findings of this study, conclusions and recommendations will be made to prepare the ground for the way forward.

5 CHAPTER FIVE

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the main findings, conclusions and recommendations of the study. The study sought to find out the impact of organisational structures on efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery in local governments. The central thesis of the study was that decentralising HRM leads to efficient and effective service delivery. The guiding framework for the study was derived from NPM and HRM. The study has revealed that decentralising HRM was a step in the right direction. However, decentralising HRM without clearly defining standards on which personnel can be evaluated and involving line managers proactively may not translate into efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery. The road ahead is still bumpy and a lot more has to be done by the local governments themselves with the support of the central government to step up the level of services delivery.

5.2 Wrap up of the key findings and conclusions

This study has established that the essence of NPM is devolution of HRM to departments, agencies and managers. It marks a great shift from a management culture embedded in rules to one embedded in performance. The focus is to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in productivity. Local governments are given autonomy to hire and fire their own employees in a more flexible way to meet performance goals. This enhances their responsibility and accountability. It also enables greater creativity in pay structures with the view of cost containment to achieve results. In practise, however, this has not been the case in Uganda. This is because, while the foregoing works well under a regime of NPM and hence HRM, in Uganda, PA and hence conventional PM still reign. The over-centralisation of power and responsibilities for managing local affairs by the colonial government left little viable mechanisms for local governments to learn from lessons of experience and deliver better services to their constituents. The subsequent post independence governments did not do much either to invest in local institutions by decentralising managerial decision making to local governments. The situation left local governments as mere conduits for government directives.

The parallel structures of central government departments delivering services without any form of local accountability created a situation of duplication and overlap in implementing programmes. Neither was there room for any form of lateral consultation and harmonisation with the view of delivering co-ordinated services, nor was there a focus on customer satisfaction. Since 1986 Uganda has embarked on a wide spectrum of public sector reforms.

Central to these reforms has been the decentralisation of power, responsibilities and resources for delivery of services. Particular focus has been given to PM as a cornerstone of the overall decentralisation programme. The transfer of power, responsibility and authority to local governments to hire and fire their own employees initially led to an immediate review of the district structures to make them consistent with local needs and realities. This study has established that, the district reviews initially helped to reduce duplication and overlap and this has helped to contribute to efficiency and effectiveness. Services are quick and more professional in some departments since there is minimal reference to the centre by staff responsible for service delivery. Bearing in mind the concerns of NPM and HRM, this study has also established that within the parameters of central government regulations and laws, local governments have in some instances adopted new ways of service delivery such as contracting out. The establishment of the DSC as an autonomous institution to hire and fire staff initially helped to allay the fears of existing local officials. With cautious optimism, we can conclusively say that decentralising HRM has contributed to improved service delivery in local governments.

Despite the achievements made so far, the transitional arrangement from a centralised to a decentralised HRM system is still a tenuous one. The new organisational structures and working environment based on rules, regulations and procedures have been introduced in a situation where the capacity of the local governments is still weak. By capacity we mean the ability for local governments to foresee and influence change. With the few exceptions, local governments have held on direct delivery of services.[15] This has inevitably generated profound management challenges to them as the evidence from the education sector shows. To function well local governments would require a core team of well-qualified, motivated and well-paid managers who can contribute innovatively and creatively to improved outputs and outcomes. Most of the present personnel in the local governments are inadequately equipped and resourced to turn around the situation. The focus on quality and customer orientation has not yet been embraced as a key ingredient of accountability. The absence of standards on which local governments can be judged for their performance has not helped to make local governments competitive. Strong central government oversight in sectors like education has curtailed local governments' freedom to think of other ways of delivering those services. To this end, we can safely say that NPM and HRM are still at arm's length.

[15] RFRs maintenance, vehicle repair and maintenance, revenue collection from markets and to some extent cleaning and maintenance of hospital compounds as recommended in the district review reports have been contracted out in most districts.

The local government sector particularly for distant districts like Nebbi is a very labour intensive sector. Local governments being service institutions, their effectiveness and efficiency depend heavily on the productivity and motivation of their employees. The present pay system does not guarantee these attributes inspite of the overblown wage bills. Wages and salaries account for 80% of the local governments' recurrent expenditure. Therefore low pay levels remain a central problem and are the single most important explanation for failure of local governments to attract better-qualified personnel to work with them. Further restructuring of local governments without due regard to the key question of what services should be delivered directly by them may not yield any positive results in the medium and long term. In short, the problems facing local governments under a decentralised management regime can be categorised under six sub headings. Thus, predominance of lack of qualified and incompetent staff, rigidity in service delivery i.e. lack of enough discretion and autonomy, weak supporting institutions, inadequate funding, lack of standards and hence no target setting and absence of quality controls.

5.3 The way forward

Analysing the slow adoption of new ways of delivering personnel services in East Africa, Taylor (1992) argues that the absence of a blossoming private sector in these countries was the reason for the slow or lack of adoption of private sector initiatives in the public sector. In the context of the advances made in ICT, this argument can not be seriously sustained. Rather, the problem of public institutions in these countries has been the strong central government grip that denies subordinate institutions to stand on their own, make mistakes and to learn from lessons of experience. This is not to undermine the role of the central government but rather to emphasis the need for a central-local relationship that is beneficial to both. Against this background, the following recommendations are made for improving HRM in local governments.

First and foremost, it is absolutely necessary to appreciate that decentralising HRM effectively is an evolutionary process given the history of over-centralisation of power and responsibility in Uganda. Hence, the process should not be expected to render itself to quick fixes. There is need for a supportive work culture, appropriate staffing levels, structures and institutional incentives as well as sanctions, the tool kits which NPM and HRM can amply provide.

- It is suggested that performance standards are urgently required for evaluation of local governments. Since decentralisation, there have been no national set benchmarks on

which local governments can be assessed for their performance. This is made worse by the absence of a vibrant civil society to hold local governments accountable. Setting a national standard will therefore encourage better HRM practises and hence enhance accountability, responsiveness and hence efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery as posited by NPM. Equally important is the need for quality control in local governments through regular surveys such as the national service baseline survey, which was piloted once and has never been published. This will help service providers to find out opinions of their consumers with the view of improving.

- The policy of equal pay for the same grades of personnel requires to be revisited to make it performance oriented. This will help to attract better-qualified personnel to the local governments and help address problems associated with rent seeking behaviour. It is recommended that the implementation of ROM be expedited.
- A cash limited fiscal system that curtails local governments to sustain over-blown organisational structures plus a system of incentives and disincentives of rewarding innovative councils that adopt modern management systems is a plausible way forward. Statutory limitations on local government expenditures on wages can also be explored as means of enhancing efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery. This means that they will out-source, and contract in those services they can not directly provide (Lubanga 1996). This can help address staffing constraints related to failure to attract qualified staff. In the same vein, it may be prudent for government to introduce a special allowance for teachers who accept to teach in remote areas of the country. Similarly, to address the shortness of teachers in schools and thereby improve the quality of education, flexible working hours could be introduced in schools so that teachers commute to different schools. This means that salaries need not be centrally determined. Similarly, this would imply that budgets would be devolved to schools without any strings attached. The role of the central government would be to define the minimum pay for all categories of staff as a buffer against exploitation.
- Sustainable training and staff development needs of the local governments will only be possible if there is a coherent national policy on training that paves the way for a training and skills development strategy at the national level. It seems the way South Africa has approached this area could be a matter of interest for the Ugandan government policy makers. In the case of local governments, it is suggested that training should address the training needs already identified by them. Staff development and training sections of local governments should be strengthened in terms of qualified personnel and more resources.

Training of central government officials about decentralisation ought to be revisited for them to appreciate the changed context.

- Unity in diversity is of utmost importance for the future blossoming of HRM in local governments. They need to be given the opportunity to decide on their own what they require to deliver services. This will generate innovation, creativity and competition amongst the local governments. They should be left to learn from lessons of experience. In this context, it is recommended that the DSC be restructured and strengthened into a policy-making institution on HRM. Its other roles would include setting standards, offering support services such as inspection, monitoring, training and etc. Actual implementation of activities like recruitment of teachers could be delegated to operational units such as schools. Head teachers would thus be given training in HRM to recruit qualified teachers. However, what is important is that this will possibly make work more attractive. An attractive work environment is a prerequisite for improved performance.
- Other options for delivering services especially in the education sector may have to be sought where this is possible. Possibilities may include the voucher system, joint management of primary schools that were initially church owned and the involvement of many actors in the provision of primary education. Under the voucher system, eligible pupils are issued with claim forms for school fees. They are free to join any school of their choice. The school to claim for payments from government uses the voucher. This enhances competition because pupils join better performing schools. Poorly performing schools lose out on pupils and hence funding. They are compelled to seek for better ways of improving performance. This again implies relaxing central controls. In short, effective devolution is required in the education sector.
- More efficient and effective management of local governments is only part of the problem of improved effectiveness. It is equally important to mobilise communities, individuals, community organisations, NGOs etc to take a more proactive role in delivering certain services rather than leave them out as only passive recipients and actors. This role would include financing some services through various mechanisms like contributions in kind. This can result into more efficiency and accountability.
- The role of the central government as spelt out in the law needs to be stepped up. Local governments require more guidance, training and nurturing to achieve their goals.
- Finally, these recommendations imply that local governments would adopt a private sector management regime if they are to deliver improved services and convince the public that decentralisation has brought good results. However, the changes as recommended if not well perceived and implemented can create new contradictions and

problems. What is required then is to strike a balance between what is possible and what is not based on local realities and needs. This will require patience, understanding and nurturing from all stakeholders. In here, then, lies the need for the central government to provide more guidance, training and mentoring based on mutual and genuine understanding of the needs of local governments and their constituents.

In summary, while there is relatively improved service delivery by the local governments under decentralisation, their management of the employment relationship is still typically Tayloristic and fits very well Haynes' description of the establishment model (1980). NPM and HRM are yet to be embraced in their true sense but as the Chinese say, for every journey of a thousand miles, there is always the first step to make and Uganda has done that.

Annex A: Training, Induction And Skills Development Activities, 1993-1998

	1993			1994			1995			1996			1997			1998		
	Duration (days)	No. of Courses	No. of Participants	Duration (days)	No. of Courses	No. of Participants	Duration (days)	No. of Courses	No. of Participants	Duration (days)	No. of Courses	No. of Participants	Duration (days)	No. of Courses	No. of Participants	Duration (days)	No. of Courses	No. of Participants
I SENSITISATION																		
Ministerial Sensitisation	1	19	413	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	N/A	N/A	N/A
District Sensitisation	2	5	654	2	24	1,654	2	4	398	-	-	-	1	3	210	2	5	301
Sub-county Sensitisation	2	330	23,467	2	274	25,115	2	67	10,489	2	59	4427	-	-	-	2	70	8653
Trainers Sensitisation	2	1	44	2	1	23	2	1	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	38
Municipal Councils	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	9	280	2	7	552
Radio Sensitisation	-	-	-	-	294	-	-	-	-	15 min/week	6 Languages	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
II SPECIALIST ORIENTATION																		
District Service Commission	-	-	-	2	10	194	-	-	-	2	1	82	-	-	-	-	-	-
Local Government Tender Boards (Induction)	-	-	-	2	7	216	-	-	-	3	4	204	3	4	156	-	-	-
Local Government Budget Management Workshops	-	-	-	2	13	566	2	29	1,913	2	32	1,074	-	-	-	-	-	-
Budgets and Financial Management (District)	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	13	190	2	5	372	-	-	-	-	-	-
Decentralisation Implementation Review Workshop	3	1	114	3	1	156	3	1	118	3	1	256	2	1	217	2	1	404
	1993			**1994**			**1995**			**1996**			**1997**			**1998**		
	Duration (days)	No. of Courses	No. of Participants	Duration (days)	No. of Courses	No. of Participants	Duration (days)	No. of Courses	No. of Participants	Duration (days)	No. of Courses	No. of Participants	Duration (days)	No. of Courses	No. of Participants	Duration (days)	No. of Courses	No. of Participants
III SKILLS DEVELOPMENT																		
Training of Trainers	5 wks	1	30	5 wks	1	30	5 wks	1	30	5 wks	2	47	5 wks	2	91	5 wks	1	40
Accounts Technicians	-	-	-	9 wks	1	33	9 wks	4	289	9 wks	3	164	9 wks	3	114	9 wks	1	35
Personnel Officers Induction	-	-	-	2days	1	34	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Chief Administrative Officers' Induction	-	-	-	-	-	-	3days	1	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Local Government Finance Officers	-	-	-	-	-	-	30 days	1	28	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1	55
Internal Auditors	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5 wks	1	30	-	-	-	-	-	-
Human Resource Management	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3 mths	1	29	3 mths	1	29	3 mths	1	34
Payroll Management	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 day	13	163	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Trainers Review Workshop	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3 days	1	23	-	-	-
Planning Manual Users	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4 days	1	34	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lower Local Governments Financial Management Induction of Trainers	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	130	7,011	2 days	275	18,111	-	-	-	-	-	-
Administrative Law Course	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	42 days	1	62	42	1	58	-	-	-
Records Management	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7 days	7	104	3	5	25	-	-	-
Engineering Assistants	-	-	-	-	-	-	92 days	1	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Road Inspectors	-	-	-	-	-	-	92 days	2	46	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

	1993			1994			1995			1996			1997			1998		
	Duration (days)	No. of Courses	No. of Participants	Duration (days)	No. of Courses	No. of Participants	Duration (days)	No. of Courses	No. of Participants	Duration (days)	No. of Courses	No. of Participants	Duration (days)	No. of Courses	No. of Participants	Duration (days)	No. of Courses	No. of Participants
Review Planning guidelines	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5 days	1	25	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pilot RES Kabarole	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17 days	1	70	-	-	-	-	-	-
Film Media Script	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3 mths	1	N/A	-	-	-	-	-	-
Radio Listenership Survey	-	-	-	-	-	-	30 days	1	1,300	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Materials Production	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 yr.	8 (P)	7000 copies	1 yr.	14 (P)	7,550	6mths	2(P)	2000 copies	8 mths	13 (P)	55,520
Evaluation of Training Programmes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6 mths	1	N/A	-	-	-	-	-	-
Induction of District Speakers and Deputies	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	90
Clerks to Council	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25	1	52
Customised Spreadsheets	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3 wks	5	167
Planning Workshops	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2wks	1	55
Budget Desk Workshops	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1	59

Source: Kisakye 1998

- **N/A - Not Applicable**
  (P) - Produced Materials

Annex B Showing the Expenditure of Nebbi District on Training (In Uganda Shillings)

Year	Estimates (000)	Actual expenditure (000)
1994/95	15,000	17,500
1995/96	15,000	20,000
1996/97	20,000	25,700
1997/98	20,000	35,000
1998/99	30,000	36,000
1999/2000	30,000	34,000

Source: Personnel department Nebbi district.

Annex C: RFRs Constructed/Rehabilitated and Maintained by Nebbi District between 1993-1999.

FROM	**TO**	**LENGH (KMs)**
Goli- Paidha	Arua border	60
Wadelai	Pawor	06
Pakwatch	Wadelai	40
Panyimur/Nyakage	Pakwach/Paj	44
Goli	Erussi	20
Ayuda	Pakadha	10
Pakadha	Jagokoro-Nyapea	29
Agwok - Kuowinyi	Wadelai	40
Parombo- Aworo	Panyamuri	29
Nyagekai	Dei	10
Acwera	Erussi	22
Nyaravur	Parombo	18
Pakadha	Padea	10
Zombo	Zeu	16
Zeu	Warr	18
Jangokoro	Arikpa	20
Nebbi - Gweko	Erussi	35
Erussi	Parombo	15
TOTAL		**442**

Source: Nebbi District Report.

Annex D: Showing the Level of Bridge Construction in Nebbi District

Year	**Number**	**Comments**
1995/96	6	Initially timber decked now concrete
1997/98	2	Initially timber decked now concrete
1998/99	8	Two concrete decked, six new ones
2000/2001	5	To be concrete decked.

Source: Nebbi District report.

Annex E: Justification of indicators.

Efficiency in the education sector can be assessed on the basis of multiple indicators namely, total number of schools constructed and maintained, pupil enrolment, pupil drop out, average school and class sizes, pupil to teacher ratio, quality of teachers i.e. number of pupils per qualified/ unqualified teacher. For want of data, the pupils/teacher ratio, pupil/class ratio plus level of passes are used as indicators respectively to assess efficiency and effectiveness. This is because lack of trained teachers may reflect either low investment in teacher training or unwillingness of trained teachers to stay in the profession or in a particular district. Quality of teachers is a determinant of pupils' performance and hence literacy. The level of passes also reflects the quality of teachers in a particular district. Performance in the works department is assessed by showing statistics of what the situation in terms of rural feeder roads (RFRs) was before decentralisation and what it is currently in the local governments

Annex F: Showing A Comparative Analysis of Quality of Education for Mukono and Nebbi Districts in 1999/2000.

District	Schools	Ceiling	Filled	Vacant	Trained	Untrained	Enrolled	Pup/Qtr	Pup/Tr.
Mukono	590	4575	3331	1244	1666	1665	241412	146:1	73:1
Nebbi	180	2149	1557	592	701	856	134549	192:1	86:1

Source: Uganda National Council of Children, UNEB, and Nebbi District Report

Annex G: Showing PLE Results for Mukono District (1991-1999).

Year	NUM sat	Grade 1	Grade 2	Grade3	Grade 4	Grade x	Grade U
1991	7134	1595	3156	644	1030	377	709
1992	11503	535	2055	2434	5263	-	1216
1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1994	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1995	9980	1300	2916	1263	2017	707	2384
1996	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1997	11667	1204	3885	1596	2213	389	2769
1998	14180	1280	5139	6974	9929	-	4251
1999	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: Uganda National Examinations Board.[16]

[16]Grade X and U represent incomplete and ungraded results respectively. Dash shows no data available.

Annex H: Showing PLE Results for Nebbi District (1991-1999).

Year	**NUM Sat**	**Grade 1**	**Grade2**	**Grade3**	**Grade 4**	**Grade x**	**Grade U**
1991	2456	178	1037	311	550	118	380
1992	2933	27	345	533	967	260	1061
1993	2428	23	279	292	582	175	1077
1994	2550	17	302	284	539	215	1193
1995	2450	16	281	278	719	168	1156
1996	2470	21	335	278	627	56	1153
1997	3253	77	583	489	990	93	1061
1998	3509	30	451	456	1028	205	1339
1999	3623	60	728	438	1102	115	1184

Source: Uganda National Examinations Board

Annex I: Showing the Performance of Nebbi Primary School in PLE (1991-1999).

Year	Num. Sat	Grade 1	Grade 2	Grade 3	Grade 4	Grade X	Grade U
1991	98	9	62	3	7	3	4
1992	92	3	24	10	33	7	14
1993	141	5	34	30	32	7	33
1994	80	5	35	11	11	8	10
1995	110	6	41	21	28	4	10
1996	98	6	53	17	11	3	7
1997	89	12	53	11	11	1	1
1998	92	14	54	13	6	5	0
1999	86	19	55	4	7	3	0

Source: Nebbi District Report.

References

Adamolekun L (1991),"Promoting African Decentralisation". *Public Administration and Development*.11: 285-291

Adamolekun L (1999), "Decentralisation, Sub-national Governments, and Inter-governmental Relations, in his *Public Administration in Africa*. Colorado: Western Press. 49-67

Akpan P (1990), "Local Government Structure as A Spatial Framework for Rural Development in Nigeria". *Public Administration and Development*. 10: 263-275.

Alford J (1993), "Thinking About the Demise of Public Service Boards in CommonwealthAnd State Governments". Gardner M (ed.), *Human Resource Management and Industrial Relations in the Public Sector*. South Melbourne: Macmillan.

Alford J (1993), "Towards A New Public Management Model: Beyond "Managerialism"And its Critics". *Australian Journal of Public Administration*.52, (2): 135-148.

Armstrong P (1995), "Limits and Possibilities for Human Resource Management in an Age of Management Accountancy". Storey J (Ed), *Human Resource Management: A Critical Text*. London: International Thomson Business Press.

Armstrong P (1995), "Accountancy and Human Resource Management'. Storey J (Ed), *Human Resource Management: A Critical Text. London*: International Thomson Business Press.

Ashaba A (1997), *Challenges in Capacity Building*. A paper presented at the Fourth Review of the Implementation of the Decentralisation Programme at the International Conference Centre on 5th-6th May 1997, Kampala.

Ashton D and Felstead A (1995), "Training and Development". Storey J (Ed), *Human Resource Management: A Critical Text*. London: International Thomson Business Press.

Aucoin P (1990), "Administrative Reform in Public management: Paradigms, Principles, Paradoxes and Pendulums". *Governance, An International Journal of Policy and Administration*.3, (2): 115-137.

Bailey S (1999), *Local Government Economics: Principles and Practise*. Basingstoke: Macmillan Limited.

Barnes M J (1994), *Uganda- Progressing Towards Democratic Accountability through Decentralisation?* Masters of Development Studies. The Hague: unpublished.

Barret I (1992), "Management and Motivation: A view from the Caribbean". Baker R (Ed), *Administration in Small and Island States*. Connecticut: Kumarian Press.

Bayley L (1979), *Local Government: Is it Manageable?* Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Blunt P (1990), "Strategies for Enhancing Organisational Effectiveness in the Third World". *Public Administration and Development*. 10: 2999-313.

Boyne G (1992), "Local Government Structure and Performance: Lessons from America?" *Public Administration*. 70:333-357.

Brans M (1992), "Theories of Local Government Reorganisation: An empirical Evaluation". *Public Administration*. 70: 429-451.

Buntz C (1983), "Meeting the Challenge of Productivity Improvement" Agranof R (Ed), *Human Services on A Limited Budget*. Washington DC: International City Association.

Carter N (1991), "Learning to Measure Performance: The Use of Indicators in Organisations". *Public Administration*. 69: 85-101.

Cherry N (1993), "Performance Management: The Challenge of the 1990s". Gardner M, (Ed), *Human Resource Management and Industrial Relations in the Public Sector*. South Melbourne: Macmillan.

Clegg, Stewart R, Eduardo Ibarra-Colado & Luis Buero-Rodriquez (1999), Global Myths that changed the World' in their *Global Management: Universal Theories and Local realities* 1-16. London: Sage.

Cliffe L (1977), "Penetration and Rural Development in the East African Context" in their *Government and Rural Development in East Africa. Essays on Political Penetration.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Cochraine (1991), "The Changing State of Local Government: Restructuring for the 1990s" *Public Administration*. 9: 281-302.

Cohen J (1995), "Capacity Building in the Public sector: A Focused Framework for Analysis and action". *International Review of Administrative Sciences*. 61: 407-422.

Commonwealth Secretariat (1995), *From Problem to Solution: Commonwealth Strategies for Reform*. London: Commonwealth secretariat.

Conyers D (1983), "Decentralisation: The latest Fashion in Development Administration?" *Public Administration and Development*. 3: 97-109.

Conyers D (1990), "Strategic Issues in Development Management: Learning from Successful Experience. Part II". *Public Administration and Development*. 10: 289-298.

Corrigan P, Hayes M and Joyce P (1999), *Managing in the New Local Government*. London: Kogan Page Limited.

Curtain R (1993), "New Job Structures in the Public Sector: Intent, Process and Outcomes," Gardner M (Ed), *Human Resource Management and Industrial Relations in the Public Sector*. South Melbourne: Macmillan.

DANIDA (1999), *Draft Review Report: Support to the Decentralisation Reform. Phase II: 1997-2001, Government of Uganda*. Kampala: unpublished.

Davey K (1971), "Local Bureaucrats in East Africa" *Journal of Administration Overseas*. X (4): 268-279.

De Silva S (1997), *The Changing Focus of Industrial Relations and Human Resource Management*, Geneva: International Labour Office.

De Silva R (1997), "Managing Human Resources: Personnel Administration in Local Government". Gorgan J (Ed), *Handbook of Local Government Administration*. Newyork: Marcel Dekker.

Decenzo D and Robbins S (1999), Human Resource Management. Newyork: John Wiley and Sons.

Desario J et al (1991), *Management of Human Resources in Local Government*. London: Sage Publications.

Dragulu V (1999). *Inspection Report on Moroto and Kotido Districts*. Kampala: unpublished.

Drain G (1966), *The Organisation and Practise of Local Government*. London: Heinemann.

Economic and Employment Growth in South Africa
http://www.polity.org.za/govdoc5/green_papers/skills.htm/#foreword. 22/3/2000.

Efange P (1992), *Training and Development of Local Government Personnel*, A paper Presented at the Senior Policy Seminar on Decentralising and Strengthening of Local Government in African Countries held in Banjul, The Gambia from 27-31, July 1992.

Farnham and Horton S (1996), *Managing People In the Public Services*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Goldsmith A (1999), "Africa's Overgrown State Reconsidered: Bureaucracy and Economic Growth", World Politics. 51: 520-46.

Government of Uganda (1987), *The Resistance Councils and Committees Statute*. Entebbe: Uganda Printing and Publishing Corporation.

Government of Uganda (1993), *The Local Governments (Resistance Councils) Statute*. Entebbe: Uganda Printing and Publishing Corporation.

Government of Uganda (1997), *The Local Governments Act*. Entebbe: Uganda Printing and Publishing Corporation.

Government of Uganda (1998), *Report of the National Forum on the Implementation of Decentralisation*. Held from 18-19 May 1998 at the International Conference Centre, Kampala.

Gray A and Jenkins B (1995), "From Public Administration to Public Management: Reassessing A Revolution?". *Public Administration*. 73: 75-99.

Green S (1998), "Strategic Management Initiatives in the Civil Service: A Cross-Cultural Comparison". *International Journal of Public Sector Management*.11: 536-552.

Guest D E (1995), "Human Resource management: Its Implications for Industrial Relations and Trade Unions'. Storey J (Ed), *Human Resource Management: A Critical Text*. London: International Thomson Business Press.

Haynes R (1980), *Organisation Theory and Local Government*. London: George Allen and Unwin.

Herzing A and Ruyseveldt (1995), *International Human Resource Management*. London: Sage Publications.

Hicks U (1961), *Development From Below*. Oxford: Clarendon press.

Hood C (1991), "A Public Management for all seasons?" *Public Administration*.69: 3-19.

Hood C (1995), "The New Public Management" in the 1980s: Variations on Theme". *Accounting Organisations and Society*. 20 (2/3): 93-109.

Humes S and Martin E (1969), *The Structure of Local Government*. The Hague: International Union of Local Authorities.

Iles P and Salaman G (1995) "Recruitment, Selection and Assessment" Storey J (Ed), *Human Resource Management: A Critical Text*. London: International Thomson Business Press.

Islam N (1993), "Public Enterprise Reform: Managerial Autonomy, Accountability and Performance Contracts". *Public Administration and Development*. 13: 129-152.

Jorgensen J (1990), "Organisational Life Cycle and Effectiveness Criteria in State Owned Enterprises: The Case of East Africa". Jaeger A and Kanungo R (Eds.), *Management in Developing Countries*. London: Routledge.

Kajubi W (1987), "The historical Background to the Uganda Crisis, 1966-86" Wiebe P and Dodge C (Eds.), Beyond Crisis: Development issues in Uganda. Kampala: Makerere University.

Kasimbazi B (1998), *A Report on the Inspection of Mukono, Iganga and Bugiri Districts-DANIDA Out-Reach Programme*. Kampala: unpublished.

Kaul M (1996), "Civil Service Reforms: Learning from Commonwealth Experiences". *Public Administration and Development*.16: 131-150.

Keep E (1989), "Corporate Training Strategies: The Vital Component?". Storey J (Ed.), *Perspectives on Human Resource Management*. London: Routledge.

Kessler I (1995), "Reward Systems" Storey J (Ed), *Human Resource Management: A Critical Text*. London: International Thomson Business Press.

Kiltgaard R (1997), Cleaning up and Invigorating the Civil Service". *Public Administration and Development*. 17: 487-509.

Kinnie N (1995), "Human Resource management and Changes in Management Control Systems". Storey J (Ed), *Human Resource Management: A Critical Text*. London, International Thomson Business Press.

Kisakye J (1998), *Current Status of the Implementation of Decentralisation in Uganda*. A Speech Delivered at the Review Workshop for DANIDA Decentralisation Reform, Phase II at Hotel Equatoria on 18th/2/1998.

Kisubi M (1999) "Uganda: Country Profile". Adamolekun (Ed), *Public Administration in Africa.* Colorado: Westview Press.

Langseth (1996) "Civil Service Reform: A General Overview". Villadsen and Lubanga (Eds.), *Democratic Decentralisation in Uganda*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

Langseth P (1995), "Civil Service Reforms in Uganda Lessons Learned" *Public Administration and Development*. 15: 365-390.

Leemans A (1970), *Changing Patterns of Local Government*. The Hague: International Union of Local Authorities.

Legge K (1989), "Human Resource management: A Critical Analysis". Storey J (Ed), *Perspectives on Human Resource Management*. London: Routledge.

Legge K (1995), "Human Resource management: Rhetoric, Reality and Hidden Agendas" Storey J (Ed), *Human Resource Management: A Critical Text*. London: International Thomson Business Press.

Litvack J, Ahamed J and Bird R (1997), *Rethinking Decentralization in Developing Countries*. Washington DC: The World Bank.

Lubanga F (1995), *Local Government Reforms in Uganda: Status and Trends, a paper* Prepared for the Commonwealth Secretariat: unpublished.

Lubanga F (1996), "The Process of Decentralisation" in their *Democratic Decentralisation in Uganda*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

Lubanga F (1997), *Human Resources Management and Development in Local Governments in Uganda in the Context of Decentralisation*. A Paper prepared for the Commonwealth Secretariat: unpublished.

MacCourt W (1999), *Human Resource Management in the Public Service: Its Practise and Relevance to Public Reformers in South Africa.* http://www.man.ac.uk/idpm/hrwp8.htm 4/5/2000.

Mafeje A (1977) "The legitimacy of the Uganda Government in Buganda" Cliffe L (Eds.), Coleman, Doornobos M, *Government and Rural Development in East Africa. Essays on Political Penetration*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Mawhood P (1983), "Decentralisation: The context and the Practise" in his *Local Government in the Third world: The Experience of Tropical Africa*. Newyork: John Willy and sons.

Mayne J and Zapico-Goni E (1999), *Monitoring Performance in the Public Sector: Future Directions from International Experience*. New Brunswick and London: Transaction.

Mbahamiza E (1999), *Decentralising Human Resources Management in Uganda: A case Of Kasese District Local Government*. Masters of Development Studies. The Hague: unpublished

Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development (2000), *Public Expenditure Review Meeting Budget Framework Paper 2000/01 to 2002/03*. Kampala: unpublished.

Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (1999), *Background to the Budget 1999/200.* Kampala: unpublished.

Ministry of Local Government (1995), *Status Report on Implementation of the Decentralisation Program for the period, 1 January- 30/June/1995*. Kampala: unpublished.

Ministry of Local Government (1996), *Status Report on Implementation of the Decentralisation Program for the period, 1 April- 30/June/1998*. Kampala: unpublished.

Ministry of Local Government (1996), *Status Report on Implementation of the Decentralisation Program for the period, 1 January- 31/march/1996*. Kampala: unpublished.

Ministry of Local Government (1996), *Towards Stronger Financial Management in Ugandan Local Government*. Project Document. Kampala: unpublished.

Ministry of Local Government (1998) *Analysis of District and Urban Councils Budgets For 1997/98 financial year*. Kampala: unpublished.

Ministry of Local Government (1998), *Local government Development Program (LGDP) Component 1: Operationalising the Role of Ministry of Local Government under Decentralization.* Project document. Kampala: unpublished.

Ministry of Local Government (1998), *Status Report on Implementation of the Decentralisation Program for the Period, 1st July- 31/December/1998*. Kampala: unpublished.

Ministry of Local Government (1998), *Status Report on Implementation of the Decentralisation Program for the period, 1 January- 30/June/1998*. Kampala: unpublished.

Ministry of Local Government (1999), *Analysis of District and Urban Councils Budgets For 1998/99 Financial Year.* Kampala: unpublished.

Ministry of Public service (1998), *A Report of An Inspection Carried Out in Luwero District on 16th-17th October 1997*. Kampala: unpublished.

Ministry of Public Service (1999), *Circular Standing Instruction No2 of 1999: Salary Structure for the Financial Year 1999/2000*. Kampala: unpublished

Mintzberg H (1993), *Structure in Fives. Designing Effective Organisations*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

Mitala J (1998), *The management of District Service Commissions and Local Government*. A Paper Presented at the Annual Decentralisation Review Workshop Held on 18-19 May 1998 at The International Conference Centre, Kampala.

Morgan D (1997), "Structural Arrangements in Local Government: Organising for Effective Management". Gorgan J (Ed), *Handbook of Local Government Administration*. Newyork: Marcel Dekker.

Morgan G (1997), *Images of Organisation*. London: Sage Publications.

Muhereza P (1999), *Performance Improvement in Uganda Public Service in the Era of Reform. A study of the Reward and Performance Management Systems*. Masters of Development Studies. The Hague. Unpublished.

Mushi S (1992), Strengthening *Local government in Africa. Organisational and Structural Aspect.* A paper presented at the Senior Policy Seminar on Decentralising and Strengthening of Local Government in African Countries held in Banjul, The Gambia from 27-31, July 1992.

Musisi K (1997), *Achievements, Shortcomings and the Way Forward of Decentralisation in Uganda: The Views of A practitioner*. A Paper Presented at the Decentralisation Implementation Review Workshop Held from 5-6 May 1997 at the International Conference Centre in Kampala.

Muttalib M and Khan M (1982), The Theory of Local government. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Private Limited.

Mugabi G (1998), The *Challenges of Decentralisation in Uganda*. A Paper Presented at the Review Workshop for DANIDA Decentralisation Reform, Phase 11, at Hotel Equatoria on 18/2/1998.

Nebbi district (2000), *Report of the Performance of the District in 19992000 Financial Year*. Nebbi: unpublished.

Nkayarwa T, (1998), *Inspection Report of Jinja District*. Kampala: unpublished.

Nkayarwa T, (1999), *Poverty Action Fund (PAF)*. Kampala: unpublished.

Office of the Prime Minister (1999), *Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme (NURP) District Profile Study Vol. 11 part 111. The West Nile Region, Arua, Moyo, Nebbi and Adjumani Districts*. Kampala: unpublished.

Olowu D (1988), *African Local governments As Instruments of Economic and Social Development*. The Hague: International Union of Local Authorities.

Olowu D (1992), *Central- Local Relationships*. A Paper Presented at the Senior Policy Seminar on Decentralising and Strengthening of Local Government in African Countries held in Banjul, The Gambia from 27-31, July 1992.

Olowu D (1995), "The Failure of Current Decentralisation Programs in Africa: Institutions and Self-governance in Africa" in their *The Failure of the Centralised state: Institutions and Self Governance in Africa*. San Francisco: ICS Press.

Olowu D (1999), "Public Service Delivery". Adamolekun (Ed), *Public Administration in Africa*. Colorado: West View Press.

Olowu D and Adamolekun L, (1999), "Human Resources Management". Adamolekun (Ed), *Public Administration in Africa*. Colorado: West View Press.

Osborne D and Gaebler T (1992), *Reinventing Government: How the New Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector*. Newyork: Plume.

Ostrom E (1996), "Crossing the Great Divide: Co-production, Synergy and Development". *World Development*.24 (6): 1073-1087.

Pinto R (1998), "Innovations in the Provision of Goods and Services". *Public Administration and Development*.18: 387-397.

Polidano C (1999), *The New Public Management in Developing Countries, Public Policy and Management*. Working Papers No13- November 1999, Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester, http://www.man.ac.uk/idpm/ppm_wp13.htm. 1/5/2000.

Polidano C (2000), "Measuring Public Sector Capacity". World Development. 28 (5): 805-822.

Prud'homme R (1995), "The Dangers of Decentralisation". The World Bank Observer. 10 (2): 201-20.

Pugh D (Ed) (1997), Organisation Theory, Fourth Edition. Selected Readings. London: Penguin Books.

Pugh D and Hickson D (1996), Great Writers on Organisations. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company.

Purcell J (1995), "The Impact of Corporate Strategy on Human Resource Management" Storey J (Ed), *Human Resource Management: A Critical Text*. London: International Thomson Business Press.

Purcell J and Ahlstrand B (1995), *Human Resource Management in the Multi- Divisional Company*. Newyork: Oxford University Press.

Ramaswamy E (2000), *Managing Human Resources*. London: Oxford University Press.

Ramaswamy E, (1997), "Evaluating Human Resources Management", in his *A Question of Balance,* 138-41. Delhi: Oxford University press.

Rao M and Rao S (1995), *Organisational Design and Structure*. Delhi: Kanishka Publishers.

Reuvid J (1999), *Managing Human Resource Services*. London: Kogan Page.

Rogers S (1999), *Performance Management in Local Government: Financial Times*. London: Pitman Publishing.

Rondinelli D and Wallis J (1986), "Assessing Decentralisation Policies in Developing Countries: The Case for Cautious Optimism". *Development Policy Review*. 4: 3-23.

Rondinelli D, McCullough J and Johnson R (1999), "Analysing Decentralisation Policies in Developing Countries: A Political Economy Framework". *Development and Change*. 20 (1): 57-87.

Rothwell S (1995), "Human Resource planning". Storey J (Ed), *Human Resource Management: A Critical Text*. London: International Thomson Business Press.

Schick A (1998), "Why Most Developing Countries Should Not Try New Zealand's Reforms". *The World Bank Research Observer*. 123-31

Schuler R, (1995), *Managing Human Resources*. Newyork: Minneapolis/Saint P West Publishing company.

Sezi P (1999), *Draft Report of the Inter-Ministerial Task Force on Improving Payroll Management and Resolving the Problems of Accumulation of Salary Arrears in the Public Service*. Kampala: unpublished.

Sezi P, (1997), "Reaffirming the values of Professionalism in Public Administration: the Ugandan Experience". *International Review of Administrative Sciences*. 63: 377-382.

Shafritz J, Reccicci N, Roenbloom D and Hyde A, (1992), *Personnel Management in Government: Politics and Process*. Newyork: Marcel Dekker.

Siegel G & Myrtle S (1985), *Public Personnel Administration*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Sisson K (1995), "Human Resource Management and the Personnel Function" Storey J (Ed), *Human Resource Management: A Critical Text*. London: International Thomson Business Press.

Smith B C (1995), *Decentralisation: The Territorial Dimensions of the State*. London: Allen and Unwin.

Smoke P and Olowu D (1992), "Determinants of Successful African Local Government: An Over view". *Public Administration and Development*.12: 1-17.

Stanyer G (1976), *Understanding Local Government*. London: Martin Robertson.

Storey J (1989), *Perspectives on Human Resource Management*. London: Routledge.

Taylor H (1992), "Public Sector Personnel Management in Three African Countries: Current Problems and Possibilities" *Public Administration and Development*. 12: 193-207.

The Monitor Newspaper
http://www.monitor.co.ug/news.php3?record_number=10&show=Upcountry 2/10/2000.

The Monitor Newspaper
http://www.monitor.co.ug/news.php3?record_number==3&show=City 6/9/2000.

The Monitor Newspaper
http://www.monitor.co.ug/news.php3?record_number=1&show+Upcountry 7/10/2000.

The Monitor Newspaper
http://www.monitor.co.ug/news.php3?record_number=6show=Upcountry 9/10/2000.

The Monitor Newspaper
http://www.monitor.co.ug/news.php?record_number=7&show=Upcountry 21/9/2000.

The Monitor Newspaper
http://www.monitor.co.ug/news.php3?record_number=47&show=Editorial 7/6/2000.

The Monitor Newspaper
http://www.monitor.co.ug/news.php3?record_number=23&show=National 21/9/2000.

The Monitor Newspaper
http://www.monitor.co.ug/news.php3?record_number7&show=National 21/9/2000.

The Monitor Newspaper
http://www.monitor.co.ug/news.php3?record_number=18&show=National 19/6/2000

The Monitor Newspaper
http://www.monitor.co.ug/news/php3?record_number=48&show=Editorial 9/8/2000.

The Monitor Newspaper
http://www.monitor.co.ug/news.php3?record_number=712&show=Upcountry 19/6/2000.

The Monitor Newspaper
http://www.monitor.co.ug/news.php3?record_number=48&show=Upcountry 16/11/2000.

The Monitor Newspaper
http://www.monitor.co.ug/news.php3?record_number=34&show=Upcountry 16/10/2000

The Monitor Newspaper
http://www.monitor.co.ug/news...record_number=811&sow=Headlines 18/7/2000

The Monitor
Newspaper,http://www.monitor.co.ug/news.php3?record_number=18&show=national 19/6/2000.

The Newvision http://www.newvision.co.ug/10_20_st6.htm. 20/10/2000.

The Newvision Newspaper, http://www.newvision.co.ug/06_13_st5.htm. 13/6/2000.

The Newvision Newspaper, Kampala 16/10/2000.

The Republic of Uganda (1987), *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Local Government System*. Kampala: unpublished.

The Republic of Uganda (1994), *Civil Service Reform Programme Restructuring Report: Mukono District*. Kampala: unpublished.

The Republic of Uganda (1999), *Human Resources Management Manual for Local Governments*. Kampala: unpublished.

The Republic of Uganda (2000), The *Budget Speech.* Kampala: unpublished.

The World Bank, (1993), *Skills for Productivity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The World Bank, (1999), *World Development Report*. Washington DC: The World Bank.

Thomas P (1996), " Beyond the Buzzwords: Coping With Change in the Public Sector". *International Review of Administrative Sciences*.20: 5-29.

Torrington D (1989), "Human Resource Management and the Personnel Function". Storey J (Ed), *Perspectives on Human resource Management*. London: Routledge

Torrington D (1995) "Human Resource Management and the Personnel Function" Storey J (Ed), *Human Resource Management: A Critical Text*. London: International Thomson Business Press.

Townley B (1995) "Selection and Appraisal: Reconstituting Social Relations?" Storey J (Ed), *Human Resource Management: A Critical Text*. London: International Thomson Business Press.

Turner M and Hulme (1997), *Governance, Administration and Development: Making The State Work*. West Hartford: Kumarian Press.

Uganda National Council of Children (1994), *Equity and Vulnerability: A situational Analysis of Women, Adolescents and Children in Uganda*. Kampala: unpublished.

Villadsen S (1996), "Decentralisation of Governance an Overview" in their *Democratic Decentralisation in Uganda*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

Weightman J (1995), *Managing Human Resources*. Bombay: Jaico Publishing House.

Wunsch J (1991), "Institutional Analysis and Decentralisation: Developing an Analytical Framework for Effective Third World Administrative Reform" *Public Administration and Development* II: 431-451.

Wunsch J (1991), 'Sustaining Third World Infrastructure Investments: Decentralisation And Alternative Strategies" Public Administration and development. 11: 5-23.

Young K (1996), "Rethinking Local Government? Some Evidence Assessed" *Public Administration* Vol. 74: 347-367.