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Displaced Livelihoods in the Face of Armed Conflict: Survival in the Border Villages of Anuradhapura, Sri Lanka

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Dedicated to the internally displaced people in Sri Lanka; may they find their roots and be given the chance to rebuild their lives.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CFA	Cease Fire Agreement
DS	Divisional Secretariat Division
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GN	Grama Niladhari Division
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
INGO	International Non Governmental Organisation
KI	Key Informant
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
PRDP	Participatory Rural Development Project
RLF	Rural Livelihoods Framework
RS	Sri Lankan Rupees
WFP	World Food Programme

Figure 1: Map of Sri Lanka



Source: www.only-maps.com/sri-lanka-map.jpg

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

> *"The war is like a beggar's wound, it never heals. However some beggars are fond of their wounds as they provide their livelihood, so much so that they even fake wounds."*
>
> [Gamburd, 2004: 155]

The war in Sri Lanka has reduced its growth rate by 2-3% a year, costing the nation an equivalent of twice its 1996 GDP. While this leaves out the lived dimensions of the war, the macroeconomic picture reveals that resources that could have been used to develop social and economic programmes were channelled towards fighting the war. A micro analysis, through studies such as this, shows how people have adapted to the conditions of civil war, how its effects have been felt in different locations, and how income sources are not only lost but also gained. The war does not only destroy opportunities but also creates new ones [Winslow and Woost, 2004: 8-10].

This study investigates the livelihood strategies of displaced people living in regions bordering the war zone in Sri Lanka and how these contribute to wellbeing. It examines how communities and households in border regions and those who have moved into the regions utilise their situation and the available resources in their livelihoods strategies. Hence displacement and livelihoods are studied in the context of host and guest relations, but also resettlement in previous communities and relocation in new regions.

This research problem is analysed through the Rural Livelihoods Framework and some of its critiques, placed within the context of war and displacement. The framework attempts to understand the relationships amongst social actors by examining their access to assets, influenced by institutional elements that result in livelihood strategies. Critiques note that there is a need to also focus on structural elements and the existence of power relations that also affect access to resources.

The paper comprises 6 chapters. Chapter 1 is an introduction to the study. Chapter 2 establishes the context of the research and the region of the study. Chapter 3 sets out the research problem, the theoretical framework within which the problem will be analysed, a discussion of key concepts, and the significance of studying border

regions. Chapter 4 provides the research design, explaining the objectives, question and sub-questions and the methodology of the study. Chapter 5 discusses the research findings, which are presented in terms of the vulnerability context, the availability and access to assets, institutional influence, access and control over these assets and the resulting livelihood strategies and outcomes of the identified communities and households. Chapter 6 presents conclusions and possible policy recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

ARMED CONFLICT, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT AND LIVELIHOODS

The predominance of conflict in many regions has seen a growing focus on internal displacement. An integral aspect of this discussion that has been often overlooked is the way these people address and their abilities to adapt to their situation. This has denied them a voice and belittled their contributions to shaping and continuing their lives. The rise in instability and conflict globally has increased the number of internally displaced people (IDPs), with 25 million [Vincent, 2001: 1] people being internally displaced due to conflict.

IDPs are distinguished from refugees on the basis that the former group is confined within the borders of a country while the latter crosses borders and, as Banergee et al [2005: 13] observe, are never able to completely move away from the site of conflict. IDPs have been defined in the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as;

> *'persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border.'*
>
> Scope and Purpose, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998

2.1 BACKGROUND TO THE ETHNIC CONFLICT[1] IN SRI LANKA AND DISPLACEMENT

Sri Lanka gained independence from Britain in 1948.[2] Since then it has been viewed as a success story in the South Asian region due to its human development indicators; high literary, low infant mortality and the provision of public services. The period immediately after independence however marked the beginning of differences

[1] In the context of Sri Lanka, ethnic conflict refers to the issues of discrimination and minority position that arose after independence and the broader context while the war is considered a sub-sect of this. Hence in this study war refers to the armed conflict fought in the north and east of the county and ethic conflict refers to issues relating to the political dissatisfaction and discrimination of the Tamil community.

[2] Previously it was colonised by the Portuguese (1505-1658 AD) and the Dutch (1658-1796 AD).

amongst the Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority[3] caused by the growing competition for resources and the direction for an independent Sri Lanka. Given its majority position in the population this agenda was set by the Sinhalese and many post independence policies set by the state in relation to education and employment favoured the majority. Initially the Tamils responded within the fora of a democracy. Yet the lack of addressal by the political elite and the resulting economic decline in the country led to a growing political dissatisfaction amongst the Tamils, especially its youth. From this grew the agenda to establish a separate Tamil homeland; *Eelam*[4] that they believed would address the inequalities of the Tamils, which a larger Sri Lankan state was unable to do.

In 1983 the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) killed 13 Sinhalese soldiers in the North of the country, resulting in politically orchestrated ethnic riots perpetrated by the Sinhalese community against the Tamils, which erupted in the commercial capital Colombo. This event marked the beginning of the armed conflict involving two main actors; the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE.

The chronology of the conflict is patterned with military offences, heavy military expenditure[5], civilian attacks both within and outside the war zone, changes in the political environment, peace talks, a Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) facilitated by the Norwegians in 2001 and the more recent instability within the LTTE.

However the war and its effects have not been limited to these two ethnic groups. The claim to a Tamil homeland was declared initially by the LTTE for all Tamil speakers, including the Muslims, who speak Tamil as their mother tongue. This neutral stand did not prevent the Muslims, especially in the east of the country, from being affected by the war and subjected to violence, especially by the LTTE. The most significant incident in this regard occurred in 1990 when Muslims in the North of the country were expelled from their homes by the LTTE and forced to live as IDPs in different parts of the country.

Although the CFA has brought a temporary halt to the fighting the underlying tensions in the war region and the country at large have continued through sporadic

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[3] There are four main ethnic communities in Sri Lanka; Sinhalese 74%, Tamil 18%, Muslim 7% and Burgher 1% (of Portuguese, Dutch and British colonial decent).

[4] Geographically this would comprise the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka, which has been predominantly inhabited by Tamils.

[5] The National Budget 2006 denotes a 23% increase in defence expenditure [Cassim, 2005] indicating a possibility of the resumption of war.

occurrences of violence and killings.[6] The lack of a definite solution to the conflict has also resulted in the indefinite presence of the forces within the war areas preventing any sense of normalcy returning to the affected regions.

Displacement has become a contentious conflict-related issue that the country and recipient communities have had to grapple with. Many people continue to be displaced as a result of the conflict, despite the CFA, caused by fear and uncertainty. According to statistics provided by the Commissioner General of Essential Services 509,036 IDPs live with friends and relatives in the districts of Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Ampara, Puttalam, Anuradhapura, Kurunegala, Polonnaruwa, Colombo and Matale.[7] While IDPs share a common experience, they have differed based on their geographical location, ethnic background, interactions with NGOs, and relationships with the local population. In Anuradhapura, the effects of conflict-related displacement are particularly evident in the northern divisions, adjoining the Tamil areas. There are approximately 22,700 displaced persons in this district, of which 11,700 are expected to remain. A heavy military presence has also created a number of social problems including sexual and gender-based violence and female abandonment [Global IDP Database, www.idpproject.org, accessed on 16/06/05] but has also created avenues for prosperity.

Geographically, while the fighting was concentrated in the north and east regions, other regions, including those surrounding the war zone, have witnessed violence and destruction leading to mass civilian displacement, loss of life and infrastructure. They have been seriously affected and lives and livelihoods disrupted, albeit seeing much less of the destruction than the war zone.

Given these factors, the conflict cannot be considered a temporary crisis. Evidence suggests that it places livelihoods of rural households at considerable risk, in addition to the normal risks associated with changes in state policies, markets and environmental hazards [Korf and Silva, 2003: 2].

Furthermore, many IDPs continue to live miserable lives in the welfare centres. They have been quoted as being pawns in the war game and have been forced to live their lives as nomads, failing to benefit from welfare systems that are their right as citizens of Sri Lanka [Tilakaratne, 1993: 16-17].

[6] The most recent killing was of the Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgama in August 2005 that has been preceded by many other lower profile individuals.

[7] This comprises 14 of 25 districts in the country.

No doubt the conflict has brought untold misery to those affected. Yet it has also meant that ordinary people have had to adjust their lives to the constraints and opportunities that have arisen as a result of the war. In turn these adjustments become a part of the war and contribute to its reproduction [Winslow and Woost, 2004: 8].

At the community level IDPs face challenging environments and impose economic, environmental and security burdens on their hosts. Jacobson warns that displaced people should not be viewed as passive victims who depend on relief handouts. This fails to see the multiple ways they pursue livelihoods for themselves and contribute to the economic vitality of host areas [Jacobson, 2002: 96]. Host populations have been affected by forced migration, which has created considerable burdens and change to their lives [Brun, 2003: 22].

The pursuit of livelihoods in conflict areas is to be seen in terms of the availability, extent and mix of resources that people can access, the strategies they use to access and mobilise them and their goals and changing priorities. This is equally true in the contexts of populations that are displaced and those of their host communities. However, what tends to set displaced communities apart is their greater degree of vulnerability: They differ from their hosts in terms of the resources available to them, their livelihood goals, and their strategies to achieve them. Displaced people have to rely on new forms of networks and social organisation that form (or that they consciously build) as a result of having to cope with their loss of property, social dislocation and antagonism from local authorities and the host community [Jacobson, 2002: 99].

The relationships and context of guest and host relations and consequences for their livelihoods is only one angle in the story of displacement. Other contexts of whole populations who move and relocate their lives have to be considered as do the movement of original settlers who return to their dwellings once the situation has reached some level of normalcy. They also endure the threat of attack and further displacement.[8]

[8] See Chapter 4.3: Research Methodology for the classification of these categories in this study.

2.2 BORDERING[9] THE WAR ZONE: ANURADHAPURA

Anuradhapura is situated in the North-Central province of Sri Lanka (see Figure 1: Map of Sri Lanka) and has its northern and most of its eastern borders surrounded by the war zone. It is largely a rural/agricultural district with a predominantly Sinhalese population. While the district has been a receiving centre for IDPs from the war zone, its own population along the border has also been/continues to be in a state of displacement.

Undeniably the Tamils have been the most affected in the armed conflict. While this has led to an increasing focus on this community it has also shifted focus from other ethic groups living in affected regions. The Sinhalese, although the majority overall in the country form the minority in the war region as do the Muslim community and much of the influx of the Sinhalese and Muslim IDPs has been into the Anuradhapura district [Global IDP Database, www.idpproject.org, accessed on 16/06/05].

The conflict and (perceived) risk of attack, the influx of IDPs, the continuing presence of government armed forces, along with rapid population growth has been placing pressure on land and the demand for resources. Many farmers have had to turn to wage labour. They have also had to deal with problems of access to markets, and labour shortages due to out-migration to other parts of the country. The district has also seen an increase in social problems that have been blamed on the war, politics and unemployment. The threat to security has led to widespread disruption of life and livelihoods [CHA, 2003: 2-3].

Added to these factors there has been a destruction or change in community life and community structures within border villages as a result of the disruption caused by the conflict. However these communities, institutional fixtures and structures have had to evolve with the influx of IDPs from within other regions, and have adjusted to the resulting changes.

The border region has been classified as a space where war and peace are manifested in different ways. It has an economy of fear, cooperation and conflict; amongst the army, LTTE, villagers and other key figures. It is a place where enemies cooperate both for personal gain and the good of others. Villages have existed and ceased to

[9] The border region referred to in this study is an unofficial partitioning that divides the war zone (comprising mainly of the north-east province that includes state and LTTE controlled regions) and the areas on its edge [Rajasingham-Senanayake, 1999: 59-60]

exist, and consumed by the forests.[10] The border zones are ethnically and religiously heterogeneous and administered by the government, the LTTE and NGOs; civilians caught in the crossfire, trained to work in the civilian forces and villages/camps used as buffer-zones. The region is scattered with army camps, welfare centres and check-points that intermingle with both old and new settlement villages. Those who call the border region their home have been caught in the crossfire and traumatised. A hidden economy around the transportation of prohibited goods has also developed [Rajasingham, 1994: 10-11].

Had the war not taken place the development of the region would have been different as would have the evolution of income sources, many of which are dependent on the war economy. Much of the development that took place in the region before the war was in relation to irrigation and gaining self-sufficiency in rice production. It certainly is food for thought as to whether this region would have been of political interest had the war not taken place, would the state have seen it as important to engage in development activities beyond irrigation and rice production?

[10] The border regions in Anuradhapura include *moist deciduous forest*, which is the most widespread in the dry zone. It has a mixed composition of vegetation and is a secondary forest that has developed in the last 400-500 years. The landscape is also characterised by savannah type vegetation and grasslands associated with moist conditions around abandoned irrigation tanks, river banks and water holes [Survey Department of Sri Lanka, 1988: 42].

CHAPTER THREE

DISPLACEMENT IN THE BORDERS OF THE CONFLICT ZONE

3.1 PROBLEM AND JUSTIFICATION

'A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, while not undermining the natural resource base' [Scoones, 1998: 5]. An integral characteristic of rural livelihoods is the maintenance of a diverse portfolio of activities and income sources maintained by rural households that involves and necessitates the development of social networks of kin and community. These networks enable them to secure and/or maintain the diversity they are looking for [Hussein and Nelson, 1998: 6]. The livelihood strategies that people adopt shape the lives they lead. The resources they can access and the ways they use them, which are governed by formal/informal institutions that help shape behaviour, can determine their existence. Situations of armed conflict are no different.

In a conflict scenario, civilian life does not cease, but civil populations have to find ways to survive in the face of increased vulnerability, which Warmington [1995] refers to as a condition/s which adversely affect/s people's ability to prepare for, withstand and/or respond to hazard. Such conditions lead to certain groups being more susceptible to disasters than others. It is more dynamic, capturing change processes as people move in and out of poverty [Twigg, 1998, 3 & 6]. Faced with vulnerability, the structure and sustainability of their livelihood strategy becomes that much more crucial because the choices they make cannot only improve their living conditions, but worsen them. Examining these strategies when studying livelihoods approaches is relevant because they provide policymakers with an insight into ground-level realities.

In examining a situation of armed conflict, the time dimension is crucial. There is the sudden disruption of existing livelihood strategies that necessitates the implementation of alternative mechanisms to ensure survival. People devise strategies, whether temporary or permanent, that can help them cope with the new realities that threaten their livelihood structure and stability. What happens, and their strategies for

dealing with it, may serve to improve their wellbeing or they may worsen their position and perpetuate poverty. Wellbeing includes material welfare; income and consumption patterns on the basis of access to resources, and non-material aspects such as capabilities, health, and networks [Forsyth, 2005: 757-759]. Poverty is defined not only to include consumption or income levels in meeting basic needs but also social, political and cultural factors that create barriers that inhibit access to resources and the usage of these resources in gaining an adequate livelihood [Kabeer, 1994: 138-142]. It includes examining vulnerability, security and understanding seasonality and shocks while pointing to the importance of assets as buffers, social relations, powerlessness, isolation and experiences of poverty [Brocklesby and Fisher, 2003: 186].

Displacement is an integral feature of conflict, forcing people to search for relatively safer and stable places. IDPs are thrust out of familiar patterns of existence into others that necessitate the development of alternative strategies. They emerge as a distinctive category and create new dynamics. A study of livelihood strategies in the face of war and its effects on the displaced is especially relevant today given the increased incidence of armed conflict, and its prominence as an integral part of rural reality in the developing world.

In Sri Lanka, the way livelihoods have been affected in the war region has also been different from those of people living along the edge of it. The war region, which spans most of the north and east regions of the country, has incurred massive destruction of infrastructure, mass displacement, inaccessible/unworkable mined land, the presence of the armed and rebel forces, all of which have affected livelihoods in a profound and fundamental way.

The border regions witnessed conflict, distress and destruction (but to a much lesser extent). They have been affected by the conflict and by the large presence of the armed forces, but they did not witness the large-scale destruction of war. They faced a continued threat of attack by the rebel forces, and their populations have been used as human shields by the armed forces during the height of the war, creating a sense of fear towards the forces. Their presence has affected the life situations of people in these regions, at times for the better and at times for the worse. The livelihood sources are affected by the temporary nature and longer-term consequences of many of them in relatively conservative rural communities.

3.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDYING BORDER REGIONS

My interest in studying the border regions stems from the distinctiveness of their experience and the need to better understand the impacts of war on neighbouring areas and their people. Initially, my interest was to look at the influence IDPs have on host communities and on the traditional livelihood strategies that are also influenced by geographical and climatic conditions. My time in the region made me realise that the situation of people, who have been living in the border areas and who have been much affected by displacement, also need to be discussed.

Overall, examining the situation of people in the border regions is an important angle of study because the dynamics of livelihood strategies that these people adopt are distinct from those in a war zone because they do not necessarily leave.

The study also attempts to contribute towards bridging the gap in the literature on livelihoods of these regions, where most of the work has concentrated on the conflict regions and has overlooked them.

3.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The research problem identified will be analysed using the Rural Livelihoods Framework (RLF), a qualitative approach that tries to understand relationships amongst social actors. Inspired by the capabilities and entitlements approach of Sen [1981, 1999], it claims to place people at the centre of the development process. The RLF [Scoones, 1998, Ellis, 2000, Chambers and Conway 1992, and de Haan and Zoomers, 2005] views people as dynamic actors, not as vulnerable and helpless victims, who adapt to trends and cope with the shocks imposed through external conditions.

According to Scoones, the key questions to ask in any analysis of sustainable livelihoods is; *'given a particular **context** (of policy setting [such as SAPs], politics, history, agro-ecology and socio-economic conditions), what combination of **livelihood resources** (different types of 'capital') shape the ability to follow what combination of livelihood strategies (agricultural intensification/extensification, livelihood diversification and migration etc.) with what **outcomes**? Of particular*

interest in this framework are the ***institutional processes*** *(embedded in a matrix of formal and informal institutions and organisations) that mediate people's ability to carry out these strategies and achieve (or fail to achieve) such outcomes'* [Scoones, 1998: 3].

Figure 2: A Rural Livelihoods Framework in Conflict



Source: [Korf, 2004: 277]

The RLF has been presented above diagrammatically. The wide conception of livelihood resources, which highlights a context where people's livelihoods can shift from being natural resource based to those based on a range of assets [Bebbington, 1999: 2022], include;

Natural Capital: The natural resources including land, water and other environmental resources, especially common pool resources.

Physical capital: The basic infrastructure, the production equipment and means which enable people to pursue their livelihood.

Human Capital: The labour available to households, which include the number of household members, time available to engage in income earning activities, the education and skills, and health status.

Financial Capital: The financial resources available to people, including savings, credit, remittances and pensions.

Social Capital: The social resources, including networks, memberships of groups, relationships of trust and reciprocity, and access to wider institutions of society.

Source: [Ellis, 2000: 32-37]

The framework enables an understanding of not only the way people deal with poverty but also how they perceive it and how these are related to their livelihood strategies [Bebbington, 1999: 2022].

Hussein and Nelson advocate examining the way rural people secure access to diversification opportunities via social networks [Hussein and Nelson, 1998: 24]. Social networks and people's ability to access them in a conflict situation help their re-establishment into a community. For displaced people, these networks deteriorate when they are forced to flee, and they are placed in a situation where they have to generate new links, and strengthen and alter previous ones.

Korf, in an analysis of war, livelihoods and vulnerability, has examined the way households cope with the increasing level of risk and uncertainty in the context of conflict, adjust their economic and social household assets for economic survival, and use their social and political assets as livelihood strategies. He highlights the opportunistic elements that conflict situations produce and observes that war can provide economic opportunities for some. His study highlights the fact that livelihood strategies are contextual and that they depend on the local political geography of the war [Korf, 2004: 276].

An institution refers to a set of formal (laws, contracts, political systems) and informal (norms, traditions, customs, value systems) rules of conduct that facilitate coordination, or govern relationships between individuals or groups [Kherallah, and Kirsten, 2001: 3-4]. North [1990] identifies them as the rules of the game and organisations as the actors who determine these rules [Sindzingre, 2005, 4].

Examining institutions helps the analysis of the power relations embedded in institutional forms, making contestation over institutional practices, rules and norms always important. Institutions are dynamic, being shaped over time. With the idea of influencing policy, authors like Brock have pointed to the centrality of institutions in livelihoods and policy making. She compliments the framework for its ability to bridge the gap between top-down and bottom-up, between the macro and micro [Brock, 1999: 9]. Institutions shape and influence behavioural patterns and oversee

the coordination between different actors. This determines who gains access and control over which assets. Institutions frame the entitlements of a household that determine the capability of a household to make a choice and derive certain livelihood outcomes. Hence entitlements are the outcome of the negotiations among social actors involving power relations and debates over meaning [Ellis, 2000: 9-10].

When institutions are weakened in times of violent conflict, households are exposed to risks and stresses, and shocks increase. Households may have a limited capacity to cope with the consequences of violence. The most vulnerable are those that have limited access to assets and limited ability to respond to that risk and uncertainty [Korf, 2004: 278]. Conflicts arise as a product of failed or absent institutions that hinder access to resources. In the context of the RLF, institutions can be perceived as undermining equitable distribution of resources in situations of conflicts where power is unequally distributed between the victims and the victimisers and institutions tend to serve the interests of the victimisers and not necessarily the victims.

In the context of conflict, strategies evolve over time, which are adopted by people to ensure a level of economic and social wellbeing and bring about some semblance of stability. While many authors have noted that in a non-conflict rural setting this is a difficult task, it increases within the context of armed conflict. Institutions that have been put in place to ensure smooth-flowing strategies may be destroyed, have to change and evolve as people have to come to terms with the conflict situation and with the disruption that goes with it. Secure livelihoods are linked to their ability to substitute amongst assets and activities and the low potential to do so makes livelihoods vulnerable.

However, one needs to go beyond material motives and gains and not simply stick to looking at livelihoods as the mobilisation and deployment of social and organisational resources in the pursuit of economic and environmental goals. De Haan and Zoomers also question the flexibility of the interchanges of capitals. They are still bound by property relations and configurations of power which play such a major role in inducing poverty in the first place. Although transforming structures, mediating processes, institutions and organisations appear in the livelihood framework, there is a tendency within livelihoods studies to downplay these structural features and to focus on capitals and activities [de Haan and Zoomers, 2005: 33]. In the context of this study to avoid such an analysis would limit the impacts that the political structure has

on displaced people in accessing their livelihoods. Taking note of power relations within communities becomes even more important if an analysis is meant to translate into policy alternatives and protection mechanisms.

Furthermore, the paths of change for individuals or households of one social class are related to that of others in other classes. In terms of poverty, this would mean giving attention to the livelihoods of the poor and non-poor, implying an understanding of poverty in relational terms. This enables an emphasis on social relations and the inequalities of power that influence these paths of change [Murray, 2002: 490].

An important element of livelihoods is sustainability. Yet Murray asks *'who defines sustainability, for whom and for what, by what criteria and over what timescale is it defined?'* [Murray, 2002: 492]. This angle is also significant at both macro and micro level policy formulation that address livelihood situations. For Scoones a livelihood is sustainable when it can *'cope and recover from stresses and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, while not undermining the natural resource base'* [Scoones, 1998: 5 and Brocklesby and Fisher, 2003: 186].

While the livelihoods framework professes to focus on people and their strengths it has been accused of doing the opposite, where the stress on assets and their transformation through livelihood strategies to strengthen livelihood security means missing human agency, practices and social organisation that form the foundations of people's livelihoods and community development [Brocklesby and Fisher, 2003: 194-195]. As O'Laughlin observes, the framework presents *'a very reduced vision of agency, power and history'* by placing class as a mere context and one institution amongst many and emphasis on individual agency rather than collective agency [O'Laughlin, 2002: 515].

Finally, the framework tends to assume continuity; where people develop strategies that are built on their past experiences. The relevance of this aspect becomes questionable in the context of conflict that is fractured and characterised by discontinuity.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH DESIGN

4.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The study aims to achieve the following objectives.

- To trace the effects of conflict on the rural livelihood strategies of people living in border regions of Anuradhapura, differentiating the experiences and strategies in varied contexts of displacement.
- To determine the sustainability of these practices for rural communities and households and to suggest policy recommendations.

4.2 RESEARCH QUESTION AND SUB-QUESTIONS

As such the study is envisaged to address the following **research question** and **sub-questions**.

What are the characteristics of livelihoods and wellbeing of displaced communities in the wake of the Northeast conflict in the border regions of Anuradhapura district, Sri Lanka?

Sub-questions

- Has the armed conflict changed the livelihood strategies of IDP communities in border regions, and how has this affected their wellbeing?
- What are the dynamics of this change and to what extent have these areas been able to remain agricultural, or has there been a shift in livelihood strategies?
- What are the livelihood strategies adopted by these groups and how are they different/similar and why?
- Are these strategies desirable and/or sustainable?

4.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study uses both secondary[11] and primary data sources. The **secondary sources** were used to develop the primary data collection process and to substantiate the information collected. Thought pieces were reviewed to provide an analytical view on the situation of internal displacement in Sri Lanka. This analysis was also used to compare experiences in the border region with those in the war zone to substantiate the issues in the former region and build on the argument that both regions warrant attention. **Primary data** comprise case studies of three categories of displacement that were identified initially through key informant (KI) interviews that comprise household typologies within each. It was felt that although the RLF entails a household level analysis, the community representation is necessary as a result of the community diversity that exists in the border regions because communities are not homogenous entities. The community is not a homogenous unit but a dynamic mix of different groups, forces and attitudes, which needs to be noted when trying to understand vulnerabilities [Twigg, 1998: 7].

As the study attempts to capture the effects of conflict on livelihood strategies, the inclusion of a time dimension was crucial. Hence the development of livelihood strategies was plotted within three time periods/situations; pre-war (before 1983), during the war (1983-2001) and after the CFA (2001 to the present), in order to capture the changes and adaptations to livelihoods as a result of the period before the war, during the height of the armed conflict and in the current ceasefire situation.

The following section describes the field techniques used in the study. This approach was devised to gauge the existing information on the border regions in Anuradhapura and to select the sample sites. However, the lack of information had to be supplemented by snowballing on the information from the KI interviews when selecting the villages for the case studies and the households for the household typologies.

1. **DS Division Profiles** were undertaken for the border region in Anuradhapura including Padaviya, Kebithigollewa, Horowpathana, Medawachchiya,

[11] See Annex One: Secondary Data Sources

Mahavillachchiya and Notchchiyagama DS divisions and included demographic compositions, land ownership, cropping patterns, and forms of assistance.

2. **Key Informants**[12] helped identify community characteristic and issues, related to poverty, the availability of capital, and the gendered dimensions, to be addressed in the study.

3. **Displaced Community Categories**[13] were identified in this border region in relation to population movements. They are classified below.

Resettled communities: Whole villages displaced from within the border regions and settled in other places only to return to their original place of residence once the situation eased.

Relocated communities: People displaced from the war zone and have been living in welfare camps who have set up homes in areas surrounding the camp or on state owned crown land.

Mixed communities: Villages comprising original settlers and displaced people, from the district or the war zone, who have moved into border villages.

4. **Household Typologies** were used to capture heterogeneity within communities. These included female-headed households, male-headed households, relatively well-to-do households and poor households.

4.4 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

The small sample limits the scope of this study. The displaced categories provide only a snapshot of the situations in the border regions as it covers only one district that borders the conflict zone. Furthermore, due to language limitations it provides the experiences of one ethnic community. Nevertheless, this study provides an interesting insight into, not only the livelihood strategies in this border region, but the experiences of IDPs. Furthermore, externalities[14] within the region could have affected the responses.

[12] See Annex Three: List of Key Informants

[13] See Annex Four: Sampling and List of Selected Villages

[14] For instance, the killing of the Foreign Minster and the movements of the LTTE within the region.

CHAPTER FIVE

LIVELIHOODS IN ARMED CONFLICT: BORDER VILLAGES IN ANURADHAPURA

This section provides an overall insight into border regions and forms a basis for comparing livelihood strategies, armed conflict and displacement by mapping the vulnerability context, in the period before and during the war, and after the CFA. This is followed by the availability and usage of asset bases in strategising livelihoods and the institutional influences in the access and use of assets. These strategies will then be discussed in relation to the communities and household typologies identified in the study. The section will conclude by revisiting some of the critiques of the RLF, highlighting evidence from the study.

5.1 THE VULNERABILITY CONTEXT

The North-Central province[15] of Sri Lanka comprises two districts; Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa (see Figure 1: Map of Sri Lanka). As a region bordering the war zone, Anuradhapura's northern and eastern borders have been exposed to the threat of attack and gateways for the influx of people from the war zone.

The vulnerability context refers to conditions that adversely affect people's ability to prepare for, withstand and/or respond to a hazard. It also refers to the propensity of a society to experience substantial damage, disruption and casualties as a result of hazard [Twigg, 1998: 6]. An alternative perspective[16] to vulnerability sees disasters as a part of the development process of societies as unresolved problems arise from the development process. Hence there is a link between disasters and the nature of society. Relationships and structures determine why certain groups of people are more vulnerable to disasters than others, calling for structural changes and capacity development for greater protection against hazards [Twigg, 1998: 3].

[15] Sri Lanka is divided into the following Administrative Divisions; Province, District, Divisional Secretary's (DS) Division, and the Grama Niladhari (GN) Division, which is the smallest.

[16] As opposed to a dominant perspective that treats disaster as a one-off event in the normal path of development, where interventions are post-disaster and top-down, with weak links and little involvement of the victims in decisions making or implementation [Twigg, 1998: 2].

By the nature of its ecological zone (the dry zone)[17], Anuradhapura is prone to drought, resulting in a shortage of water resources for agriculture, animal husbandry and consumption. Efforts to mitigate effects of these conditions have been attempted for centuries, dating back to the 3rd century AD, with the construction of reservoir systems to store water for irrigated agriculture. Communities that depend on village tank systems are particularly affected by droughts[18] and Anuradhapura, where the landscape is dominated by the system of small tanks, has been identified by the Department of Social Services as being one of the most severely affected and vulnerable districts [Arachchi, 1998: 27-30].

The onset of the war compounded these conditions with a threat to security that also resulted in displacement within and the influx of people from conflict regions, increasing the pressure on resources. The ethnic nature of the conflict increased the tendency of IDPs to be drawn to the region as they relied on the security of their own ethnic group. The district has drawn Sinhalese and Muslim IDPs, who make up the major ethnic groups within the district. 1532 Sinhalese and 3548 Muslims were relocated in 2000 in Anuradhapura district [Provincial Planning and Services Department, 2004: 55] and Horowpathana and Medawachchiya have attracted the highest number of IDPs living external to welfare camps.

Table 1: Number of displaced households/people living away from Welfare Camps in border DS Divisions of Anuradhapura District 2003

DS DIVISION	NO. OF HOUSEHOLDS	NO. OF PEOPLE
Horowpathana	222	756
Medawachchiya	101	443
Nochchiyagama	47	206
Mahavilachchiya	54	239
Kebithigollewa	59	200
Padaviya	13	60
DISTRICT TOTAL	**974**	**3,635**

Source: [Provincial Planning and Services Department, 2004: 55]

[17] Sri Lanka has two major agro-ecological zones; the wet zone and the dry zone. The population density in the dry zone is low, with the concentration of populations being centred within land settlements under state established major irrigation schemes [IPS, 2004: 41]. Most rice and food crops, such as chillies, onions, tomatoes and soy are grown in this zone [Sanderatne, 2004: 3].

[18] The *Yala* cultivation season is the water-deficient and minor cultivation season, lasting from May-September when paddy (rice) cultivation is dependent on water reserves. The *Maha,* the major crop season, lasts from November-February [Arachchi, 1998: 34].

Table 2: Number of displaced people relocated in border DS Divisions of Anuradhapura District 1996-2000

DS DIVISION	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Horowpathana	-	-	31	96	132
Medawachchiya	70	138	84	62	06
Nochchiyagama	14	-	4	4	1
Mahavilachchiya	276	67	44	62	67
Kebithigollewa	-	406	410	365	76
Padaviya	-	-	-	383	156

Source: [Provincial Planning and Services Department, 2004: 56]

A discussion on the vulnerability context has to include poverty, its role and manifestations in terms of war and displacement. Historically, the rural sector has contained the majority of the poor due to structural weaknesses in the agrarian economy [Sanderatne, 2004: 1], a fact that also manifests itself in border regions.

The total poverty line for the North-Central province is RS. 931 [Vidyaratne and Tilakaratne, 2003: 14], and 32.5% of households in the province live under it [Vidyaratne and Tilakaratne, 2003: 15] as do 25% and 21.3% of the populations of Horowpathana and Medawachchiya respectively [Nanayakkara, 2005: 5]. This income perspective is further elaborated by respondents highlighting the multidimensional nature of poverty and the resulting heightened vulnerability posed by the situation of armed conflict.

In the border regions, poverty is linked to the lack of housing and space. The identification of these elements reveals the importance that people place on the availability of a place of residence when it has been lost due to abandonment and destruction. Poverty also inhibits education, not just in terms of quality, but also accessibility due to the war context. The war context exacerbates conditions of low nutrition, malnourishment, inability to access medical services and meeting basic food and clothing needs. Poverty is mainly highlighted at the household level where the rich are identified as being self-sufficient; implying their ability to manipulate the situation to their benefit. The poor on the other hand are financially dependent [Case studies].

The rich have the *option* of moving away from the region while many poor people are *forced* to live there because they cannot afford to move. The war being a cause of poverty is also stressed. IDPs are unable to emulate previous livelihoods, due to

regional differences and resource availability, making them more vulnerable and susceptible to poverty. Displacement does not discriminate between the rich and poor, but is seen to affect both groups. However, the rich are better equipped to deal with it because of their financial stability and networks [KI Interviews].

The war is also considered to have affected the rich and poor in similar ways; by reducing the quality of life, not just in terms of income but also in the manifestation of social problems related to alcohol, violence and abuses towards women. It is blamed for the increase in female-headed households who are considered poor and dependent on unsustainable forms of livelihoods, increasing their already vulnerable condition [KI Interviews].

Another study notes that in the war zone the poorer segments who remain in the region have many dependents including women, the elderly and physically handicapped [Silva, 2003: 262].

Table 3: Respondents' characterisation of poor and rich households in displaced communities

CHARACTERISTICS OF BEING POOR	CHARACTERISTICS OF BEING RICH
Natural capital	
• No access to land • Lesser extent/limited extent of owned paddy land	• Have arable land that they use for cultivation, especially paddy land • Have access to large amounts of land and property
Physical capital	
• Lacking appropriate/permanent housing/bad housing • Low quality housing • Lack access to consumer durables • Low access to facilities • Lack/less space	• Good housing conditions • Own vehicles • Have access to consumer durables • Adequate and vast amount of space • Transport facilities
Human capital	

• Lack finances to send their children to school and access to medical services • Lack sufficient food and clothing • Have a low consumption level • Basic needs of the members of the household are not met • Cannot afford to buy medicine when sick • Less meals (2 a day) • Children are malnourished • Live on a daily income • Consistent low level of income • Mainly engaged in wage labour	• Have the ability to send their children to school outside the district; in the main urban centre or other urban regions • Steady/high income sources • A number of people within the household have steady incomes • Steady jobs in the public sector, (which ensures a pension)
Financial capital	
• Indebted, get goods on credit • Don't get the opportunity to save/lack savings • Receive assistance from the government (*Samurdhi, pin-padi, janasaviya*)	• Are able to obtain bank loans • Do not receive any form of government assistance • Savings • Not in debt
Social capital	
• Have to ask money from others in order to survive • Live basic lives • Weak networks	• Able to access to land within the village • Do not need to be dependent on anyone/self sufficient and able to survive on their own resources • Have all conveniences

Source: Case studies

While there have been claims that the condition of the displaced in border villages has been relatively better as a result of a regular system of transport and communication [William, 2005: 266], this study is able to dispute this claim to a certain extent. The war seems to have increased vulnerabilities and changed the characteristics of poverty bringing in elements of space and security to complement other characteristics that have arisen with the ecological and economic conditions, structural inadequacies and power relations. Thus the situation in the border regions may not necessarily be better nor warrant less attention and development interventions.

5.2 LIVELIHOOD ASSETS IN THE CONTEXT OF DISPLACEMENT

5.2.1 THE EFFECTS OF THE ARMED CONFLICT ON NATURAL CAPITAL IN BORDER REGIONS

Sri Lanka has a land area of 6.55 million hectares with 84% of it state owned. The availability of land, especially for agricultural purposes that comprise the livelihood

of many of the peasant population, is severely threatened and is forcing more people to move out of agriculture into off-farm activities [IPS, 2004: 38]. While evidence suggests that most land in Anuradhapura district is owned by agricultural operators[19] (36.9% nationally) [Department of Census and Statistics, 2003: 11], it is based on usage rather than formal possession and property rights. Furthermore user and ownership rights are largely informal (traditional). Given that formal titles are not available to the majority in the rural sector, informal agreements and arrangement, which are mainly verbal agreements and include joint cultivation and share-cropping, are used instead [IPS, 2004: 48].

Table 4: Number and percentage of agricultural operators and agricultural holdings[20] in district and DS Divisions in 2002

OPERATORS BY OWNERSHIP OF LAND	A'PURA NUMBER	% OF NO.	H'PATHANA NUMBER	% OF NO.	M'CHCHIYA NUMBER	% OF NO.
Not owning any land	18,223	12.4	422	6.3	48	0.5
Owning only homegarden[21]	43,501	29.5	949	14.1	2,990	32.3
Owning homegarden and other land	73,980	50.3	5,240	77.7	6,011	64.9
Owning other land only	11,513	7.8	117	1.7	217	2.3
Total	**147,217**	**100**	**6,748**	**100**	**9,266**	**100**

Source: Adapted from Table 1 and 1.20, [Department of Census and Statistics, 2003: 11 and 31]

[19] An agricultural operator is the person responsible for operating the agricultural land and/or livestock. He/She may carry out the agricultural operations by himself/herself or with the assistance of others or simply direct day-to-day operations. It is important to note that the operator need not necessarily be the owner of land or livestock and also that mere ownership does not entitle a person to be considered as an operator. This means that a person may attend to all the work needed to cultivate a land or tend livestock but will not be considered the operator, if there is someone else directing day to day work on the holding. It also means that a person may supervise the work in a holding appearing for all purposes to be in charge of the operations of the holding, but if there is someone else who is giving day to day directions, he/she does not become the operator [Department of Census and Statistics, 2003: 6].

[20] A holding refers to all land and/or livestock used wholly or partly for agricultural production and is operated under one operational status and situated within one DS Division. A holding may consist of one or more parcels, the operator does not have to own the land, the land does not have to be operated legally, the holding may consist of only crops, only crops or livestock and livestock, the land does not have to be large in size and the holding may consist only paddy, only highlands or both [Department of Census and Statistics, 2003: 2].

[21] A homegarden refers to a piece of land that has a dwelling and is used for cultivation, largely for home consumption [Department of Census and Statistics, 2003: 2].

The war has affected the exercise of property right due to its informal nature and people are unable to prove land ownership, increasing the tendency to encroach on state/abandoned land. This has affected resettled communities who return to their lands and are faced with encroachers who demand proof of ownership. Further, when the displaced move into mixed communities, they most often have to take what they are offered. This may not necessarily be usable land. There were reports [KI interviews] of Muslims being offered land in the forests which inhibited their use of other resources such as water and firewood. Host communities have also benefited by selling land to IDPs, while others have resorted to encroaching on state land.

This also means that the problem of landlessness is serious within the district (nationally 27% of peasants deemed landless) [IPS, 2004: 38] leading peasant farmers to encroach onto state land. 77% of Sri Lanka's population is rural [IPS, 2004: 39] and the pressure to earn a living from the land in these areas has resulted in its exploitation.[22]

Agricultural land comprises land used for paddy, and permanent and temporary crop cultivation. The agricultural sector contributes 21% to GDP and covers 24% of land in the country [IPS, 2004: 39]. This is no different in Anuradhapura, with a large extent of the land being used for agriculture.

Table 5: Number and extent of holdings and homegardens by District and DS Division 2002

AREA	AGRICULTURAL HOLDINGS		HOMEGARDENS	
	NUMBER	EXTENT (ACRES)	NUMBER	EXTENT (ACRES)
Horowpathana	324	70.6	306	65.7
Medawachchiya	624	118.4	576	108.4
Anuradhapura	26,351	4,491	23,099	3,739.9

Source: Adapted from Table 14.1, [Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2003: 79]

In Anuradhapura, including the border regions, land use patterns comprise *chena* (slash-and-burn) cultivation, paddy cultivation in low lying areas, and permanent/semi-permanent systems of highland farming on homesteads and

[22] 24.7% of the rural population lives below the poverty line [Department of Census and Statistics, 2004: 3].

homegardens. Annual/semi-permanent/permanent crops are grown on these plots as well as housing farmers' dwellings [Arachchi, 1998: 37].

Table 6: Percentage of land use pattern by District and DS Divisions 2002

LAND USE	A'PURA (%)	H'PATHANA (%)	M'CHCHIYA (%)
Urban area	0.2	0.0	0.1
Forest and wildlife reservations	29.6	52.6	12.7
Shrub, grasslands and swamp	19.1	19.6	12.5
Paddy irrigated	16.3	11.3	12.4
Paddy rain-fed	1.6	1.7	2
Paddy, other	0.8	0.1	1.9
Homestead gardens	11.7	6.3	17.7
Chena	10.9	2.7	32.8
Water bodies (tanks and reservoirs)	7.6	5.2	7.1
Other	2.3	0.6	0.8
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**

Source: Adapted from Table 1.1 and 1.3, [Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2003: 7 & 8]

However, access to natural resources in the border regions changed with the onset of war and has become limited, especially land, water and forests. Before the war they had ample access to land, water and forests as well as granite, sand, medicinal plants, fruits and honey from the forests, clay, and cane reeds. Forestry produce was sold in markets and medicinal shops in town. The dependence on forest produce is seen as an alternative income source. Security issues then affected their ability to access these resources [Case studies]. The sustainability of this strategy needs to be examined along with the dependence on forestry produce that increases the pressure on the resource.

Land is of high importance to people in this region given its large agricultural focus and their heavy dependence on it. They note that their present access to natural resources has worsened or not changed in comparison to before the war. Access to natural resources has been much easier for original settlers, who knew the region and had more control over resources, than displaced people within the mixed communities. Access has changed for communities who have been more mobile and have been relocated to new regions. Relocated communities and those displaced within mixed communities have received land of poor quality or at a higher elevation or away from

water sources. While this has worsened livelihood conditions for some it has also improved it for others. For instance, host communities have been able to rent or sell land and increase their income bases [Case studies]. The lack of natural resources for poor households needs to be reiterated here because it involves issues of networks and control that richer households have better access to. This compounds the situation of the poor and compromises their livelihood strategies.

Table 7: Respondent rating of access to natural resources in comparison to access before the war by displaced community category

RATING	MIXED COMMUNITY %	RELOCATED COMMUNITY %	RESETTLED COMMUNITY %	TOTAL %
Better	0	5	15	7
Worse	66	95	20	60
The same	34	0	65	33
Don't know	-	-	-	-
Don't remember	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	**100 (15)**	**100 (20)**	**100 (20)**	**100 (55)**

Source: Case studies

Changes in resource access are also attributed to the lessening of land extent and quality, lacking paddy land that formed their cultivation base, and the inability to use the full extent of their land. Even though land access has not changed for resettled communities to the extent it has for others, they are faced with problems of inaccessibility, overgrowth or merging with the forest [Case studies].

The land that people had access to before the war was used mainly for paddy cultivation, livestock management and settlement. While many had to abandon their land as a result of the war, some gave out their property on rent to Tamil people living in the region. Others minimised their cultivation of the land that they lived on and abandoned their paddy land, which was situated away from their homesteads. Although the CFA has enabled them to resume cultivation of the land, many note that this cultivation has not returned to the level that was previously practiced [Case studies].

The reduced access to natural capital is reiterated in studies in the war zone, where people who lived in camps could not cultivate land due to its scarcity and absence of irrigation facilities. This resulted in residents looking for wage labour, although

limited, on nearby farms and construction sites whilst others resorted to foraging in the forests [Silva, 2003: 251-252].

Access to water in the border regions was easier before the war because settlements were situated in proximity to water bodies. Furthermore, the authorities ensured the maintenance of these systems, which was not possible with onset of the war and the resulting situation of uncertainty and insecurity [Case studies].

Table 8: Respondent rating of access to water sources before and during the war and after the CFA

RESPONSE	BEFORE THE WAR	DURING THE WAR	AFTER THE CFA
Easily accessible	95 (57)	9 (3)	37 (22)
Difficult to access	5 (3)	91 (29)	63 (37)
Don't know	-	-	-
TOTAL	**100 (60)**	**100 (32)**	**100 (59)**

Source: Case studies

Similarly, access to water was generally difficult for displaced communities, who moved into settlements because it was controlled by their hosts as it was for relocated communities, who were sometimes settled in areas away from water sources. The situation of insecurity created a fear in people and this prevented access, even if there was no actual threat. Insecurity also meant that the time when they could access water was limited; access being possible only during the day. After the CFA, accessibility to water has become easier for some with the commencement of rehabilitation of sources and increased security. Nevertheless, land placement continues to impact accessibility [Case studies].

5.2.2 EFFECTS OF THE ARMED CONFLICT ON PHYSICAL CAPITAL IN BORDER REGIONS

Before the onset of the armed conflict, the dry zone was regarded as a region that could be developed to incorporate a growing national population and create a region that could add to the creation of a self-sustaining system of paddy cultivation. The Land Development Ordinance in 1935 [Survey Department of Sri Lanka, 1988: 94] provided the necessary framework for the development of major irrigation settlement schemes and the beginnings of a realisation of this vision. However, in a war condition the ability of people to improve their livelihoods also rides on the

availability and condition of physical capital. The opinion on the attempts to do this it is indicative of the effects of war on livelihood strategies.

Table 9: Respondent opinion if there have been attempts to improve the livelihoods in the region before and during the war and after the CFA

RESPONSE	BEFORE THE WAR	DURING THE WAR	AFTER THE CFA
Yes	93	40	98
No	7	60	2
Don't remember	-	-	-
TOTAL	**100 (60)**	**100 (60)**	**100 (60)**

Source: Case studies

The war resulted in reduced attempts to improve livelihood conditions in the border regions due to the lack of security, forced mobility and camp settlement during most of the period before the CFA. Before the war, settlement policies ensured that much of the improvements focused on irrigation and road development. While road development seems to have continued during the war period, others diminished. However, after the CFA there have been increased efforts to improve irrigation facilities and provide electricity [Case studies].

Table 10: Respondent rating of types of physical capital accessible to communities before and during, and after the CFA (Multiple Response)

TYPE OF IMPROVEMENT	BEFORE THE WAR %	DURING THE WAR %	AFTER THE CFA %
Irrigation	96	5	78
Road development	67	38	91
Electricity	6	5	30
Agricultural machinery	39	14	26
Agricultural programmes	12	9	9
Pipe borne water	2	24	11
Irrigation wells	4	9	22
Constructing building	2	-	2
Housing schemes	2	9	15
Village development programmes	-	5	2
Transport facilities	-	5	4
Small business initiatives	-	-	2
TOTAL	**229**	**124**	**291**

Source: Case studies

Irrigation development enabled the cultivation of a larger land area, improved water access and enabled cultivation in both seasons. Road development resulted in improved transport facilities for the village and enabled the transportation of their crops/agricultural produce to the market and reduced their dependence on middlemen. Nevertheless poor transportation facilities and road conditions are noted as issues that continue to disrupt their livelihoods. This mainly affected poor and female-headed households who face high transaction costs when accessing physical capital. This contributes further to their heavy dependence on middlemen in selling their crops. Further, any development initiative towards physical capital that was implemented during the war was claimed to be unsuccessful because of the instability and the physical destruction that comes with war [Case studies].

During the war, improvements to livelihoods are considered useless because of the insecurity and destruction, necessitating an adaptation to their strategies, which did not necessarily improve their standard of life in the border regions. Presently, their inability to use all their means of production, which is caused by the lack of insecurity, fear of attacks and the lack of a peaceful solution results in their living conditions remaining in limbo [Case studies].

The impact of the conflict on the improvement to livelihoods is further illustrated through more personal reasons. Relocated communities constantly noted the involvement of the LTTE in the destruction of their property and livelihood sources. Their land had to be abandoned or their vehicles were seized by the rebels. People involved in livestock management had to sell their stocks to prevent them from being destroyed at the hands of the rebels and to salvage some of their investment. The presence of the army in the border regions is seen as much less threatening with regards to physical capital and is looked to for support in the development or reconstruction of physical capital, where they are viewed as a resource rather than a bane [Case studies].

The armed conflict has resulted in the deterioration of public facilities in the border regions, especially schools and hospitals, which have had drastic effects on those who access these facilities [Case studies]. Such access is expected to have affected poor and female-headed households more as a result of additional costs that are incurred in accessing these facilities despite them being free.

Non-conflict related impediments include the drought conditions and problems related to wild animals, especially elephants, which destroy their crops and kill villagers. Farmers are unable to protect their crops because they are unable to keep watch at night on plots that are situated at a distance [Case studies].

5.2.3 HUMAN CAPITAL IN BORDER REGIONS AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARMED CONFLICT

Anuradhapura boasts high levels of literacy levels, [23] with most reaching an educational attainment that is just below primary education.[24] The low educational attainment points to the quality of educational facilities available in the border regions. They have suffered as a result of the war, in terms of infrastructure, teaching staff and resource availability. This, coupled with low security, has resulted in parents sending their children away to pursue their education in other regions. The local brain drain and the large agricultural focus are echoed in the occupational structure mainly involving semi-skilled labour. It also highlights the tendency of the younger generation to move away from their agricultural heritage.

The educational attainment amongst the older generations in rich and poor households is less than a primary education while it appears to increase amongst the younger generation. The educational attainment of female-heads of household is low.

Source: Case studies

This indicates that although education has been disrupted as a result of the war there is an effort to gain an education, possibly with the aspiration of moving to better places and improving livelihoods.

In terms of income sources, most rich households cultivate their own paddy land, and this is supplemented by other members of the household having steady employment in the armed forces, [25] private sector employment [26] and wage labour. [27] In poor

[23] See Annex Six: Data Tables

[24] Primary education is reached upon successful completion of the GCE Ordinary Level examination, secondary education upon completion of the GCE Advanced Level examination and tertiary upon completion of a first degree.

[25] Vocations mentioned include the police, navy, army and as homeguards.

[26] Vocations mentioned include garment sector, clerical work, teaching, sales reps, driver etc.

households, although many mentioned that they have steady incomes, such as working as homeguards,[28] in the Middle East or in garment factories, these are their sole income sources. They are not supplemented by an income from paddy land but from wage labour, which is inconsistent.

Source: Case studies

The necessity to depend on many sources of income arose even before the war for ecological reasons but intensified during the war. Diversification of their income sources occurred with the inclusion of wage labour (brick work, labour on fields and *chena* farms, sand dredging) to supplement income from paddy cultivation, selling trees on their property, becoming homeguards or soldiers, and setting-up small businesses to supply commodities to the army [Case studies].

Furthermore, income insufficiencies during the war were addressed by shifting to other forms, such as wage labour, using savings and/or pawning jewellery. Another strategy was for more members of the household, including children, to find work. People who had left their land behind rented it out to others if they could for a monthly rent. Before the war, they were able to depend on their kin networks for financial help but this reduced with the onset of war as many were in the same situation and lacked financial resources [Case studies]. This shift to include dependence on other sources external to the household has also made social networks important in income generation, indicating the importance of looking outside the household in an analysis of livelihoods.

Many feel that the change in their income sources would be affected by a solution to the war. Despite establishing their homes in the border regions, they still want to return to their original settlements and resume their previous livelihoods. On the other hand, they realise that income sources that arose as a result of the war, such as homeguards and business opportunities, would be affected [Case studies]. Hence the high dependency on the war economy in these regions brings about mixed feelings about a solution, knowing that on the one hand they can return, but also being left with a sense of uncertainty and losing what they have established thus far.

[27] Working on paddy fields, people building the houses in the village, chena farming by assisting in the clearing and burning, cultivation and harvesting, working in shops, construction sites in town, providing labour to repair infrastructure, such as roads etc.

[28] This refers to villagers who are trained by the army to provide protection for the village.

In her research in border zones, Rajasingham-Senanayake found that the war had created a hidden economy of profit, power and protection, while Woost found that military employment had been added to the income earning means of (poor) rural households. People have claimed that the war has become less about ethnicity and more about the politics of profit and a daily struggle to make a living, expressing concerns that an end may never be reached because of the few who get rich and the many who have become dependent on it [Winslow and Woost, 2004: 10-11]. Any solution should be sought on the basis of providing a stage for people to engage in activities that they are used to and did successfully before their life situations were thrown into disarray.

Furthermore, a large proportion of their earned income has been utilised for food, indicating the shift from dependence on farming produce to commodities with the start of the war. Rich households met their food insufficiency during the war by using savings, food rations, crop produce, and selling livestock and other possessions to buy food from the city [Case studies]. However, this was a short-term strategy as such resources would have diminished.

Poor and female-headed households were more dependent on relief provided by NGOs[29] and on relatives for their food. They also supplemented their livelihood by engaging in wage labour (which took them away from the village), or selling livestock and jewellery. Their dependency on relief and relatives continues even after the CFA. People also engage in alternative livelihoods to meet their food needs, such as livestock management and small scale businesses [Case studies].

There is some contract farming in the region. For instance in Medawachchiya Muslim businessmen from the town provide farmers with inputs and use their labour in exchange to sell the crops. Similarly, Muslim businessmen encourage villagers to rear livestock for meat. Sometimes the villagers are allowed to keep a part of the stock, depending on the agreement

Source: Field Notes

[29] Many respondents inquired as to whether this was a religious survey and if we had come to the area with the intention of conversion. This is an issue the area, and also highlighted in the KI interviews, where pressures of conversion are placed on communities in return for assistance. An organisation that was mentioned specifically was World Vision [Field Notes].

During the war, IDPs received ration cards whilst living in welfare centres and this continues for some, although the quality and quantity of these rations is questioned. However, levels of food security were affected when people had to change their sources of income. A notable income in this case is that of fisher-folk. Relocation has been a key factor that has affected the ability to become food secure, which has affected the availability of human capital. Added to this, the lack of natural capital influences food security, especially affecting displaced and relocated communities whose access is more limited to begin with.

MIGRATION: LEAVING THE BORDER REGION FOR GREENER PASTURES

The tendency to migrate in search of work mainly arose as a result of the war and the ensuing insecurity. Although the strategy to leave seems to be reducing after the CFA, it is still a prevalent strategy of livelihood diversification.

Table 11: Respondent opinion on if there has been a tendency to leave the village to find work before and during the war and after the CFA

RESPONSE	BEFORE THE WAR	DURING THE WAR	AFTER THE CFA
Yes	-	43 (26)	30 (18)
No	100 (60)	57 (34)	70 (42)
TOTAL	**100 (60)**	**100 (60)**	**100 (60)**

Source: Case studies

During the war, migration was mainly a strategy adopted by rich households because the income earned from their chief source, paddy, had fallen. Many shifted their livelihoods to other sources as a result of the war economy. Migration was seen as an option that ensured the safety of children. For poor households, the dependence on migration increased with the reduction in the demand for semi-skilled labour within the region [Case studies].

A previous study undertaken in the war zone indicates a reduction in the proportion of youth population, especially males, due to out-migration while women tend to find work abroad as housemaids despite difficulties of producing the necessary documentation, such as birth certificates and passports [Silva, 2003: 250, 259].

LIVELIHOOD OPTIONS OF DISPLACED WOMEN[30] IN THE FACE OF ARMED CONFLICT

The dynamics of gender relations change in the context of war and both genders have had to adjust and take on new roles and responsibilities. Women have been victims but also beneficiaries and perpetrators. Women who have been left destitute by the war have turned this victimisation into means of survival and income sources for their dependants [Palmer, 2002: 24]. However, displacement has also resulted in them gaining more authority and mobility within their families and communities, mainly amongst the Sinhala and Tamil women while Muslim women have been reported to face more segregation. [Rajasingham-Senanayake, 1999: 65].

Although economically and educationally women in the district are noteworthy,[31] the situation of those who are displaced is somewhat more arduous. Traditionally, women work in agriculture, *assisting* men rather than being seen as *working alongside* them. The war has resulted in women's positions within the households and community changing with women being viewed as saviours of the family at a time when the male members have been unable to fill that role. There has also been an increase in the number of female-headed households [KI Interviews].

The traditional role of women, as the protector of the household, has changed and the family unit destroyed as women have been drawn into *unscrupulous* activities[32] involving free association between the sexes and prostitution with armed personnel [KI Interviews]. Yet women who have been drawn into *unacceptable* activities are not stigmatised because they are financially better-off [Field notes].

Men have had to accept the change in women's position, albeit unwillingly, especially when it comes to controlling finances [KI Interviews]. Gamburd refers to it as *'a crisis of masculinity'* in his study of a village in Southern Sri Lanka, where women had taken over as breadwinners. He claims that the men were ashamed to do women's

[30] While it is noted that gender includes both men and women this study tries to determine the situation of women in the border region not just as victims but also as beneficiaries. This notion is based on the much documented views that women have been traumatised and abused by actors within the conflict, especially the army, but at the same time they have also used this as a means of livelihood and support for their families.

[31] See Annex Six: Data Tables

[32] Activities that were mentioned include increased relationships amongst youth, youth having affairs with armed forces, and elopement.

work and find it hard to accept their inability to provide for their families without the income of their wives. He also notes that such feelings have led men to take on more *'masculine'* work such as in the armed forces [Gamburd, 2004: 160].

Hence women have gone from being income receivers to income earners, dependent to independent, increasing their double-burden of earning an income and housework. While the dependence on the army in this manner means that women have found alternative income sources, they are limited in their sustainability in the event of the army personnel being transferred or an ultimate solution to the conflict [KI Interviews].[33]

5.2.4 ACCESSING FINANCIAL CAPITAL IN THE BORDER REGIONS IN THE FACE OF ARMED CONFLICT

Within border regions, people who are classified as being rich are the local businessmen, moneylenders and landowners cultivating paddy land and/or owning livestock. The war included homeguards and employment in the forces to this group as well, not only because of the steady income but also social influence that came with these positions. Those heavily dependent on wage labour and have to support dependents such as young children, the sick, disabled and the elderly classify as the poor as do many female-headed households. As such, the poorer segments of these communities are more dependent on financial assistance, which is a pattern that existed even before the war as a result of the ecological conditions in the region.

At times of financial need, the poor could depend on the moneylender who would give them loans at high interest rates rather than the local banks who needed collateral [Case studies and KI interviews]. These informal loans were taken against their land, which they are more susceptible to lose in most cases and could possibly increase with a war situation. When people have to leave their dwellings as is the case in displacement such informal agreements become redundant and make the debtors more vulnerable to losing their land or other assets.

When loans are secured they require a number of guarantors and are quoted high interest rates, placing their property such as a land and livestock as collateral. The

[33] There were claims that prostitution has lessened in the villages after the CFA as women started going to the town to earn money [Field Notes].

inability to pay draws them into more debt and increased levels of dependence on sources having more money [KI Interviews].

Table 12: Respondent opinion on if there has been access to credit before and during the war and after the CFA

TYPE OF HOUSING	BEFORE THE WAR	DURING THE WAR	AFTER THE CFA
Yes	75	29	97
No	25	71	3
TOTAL	**100 (60)**	**100 (58)**	**100 (59)**

Source: Case studies

However, with the onset of the war, NGOs[34] have also made credit schemes available in the form of group/personal loan schemes that can be accessed for agricultural activities [KI Interviews]. This has given people the option of moving away from the dependence on moneylenders but whether it ensures that they can hold onto their assets is questionable due to the inability to pay. Thus residents also rely on informal groups saving mechanisms such as the *sittu*[35], religious bodies, and relatives.

Table 13: Recipients of government relief in the drought affected areas of Anuradhapura District, and Horowpathana and Medawachchiya DS Divisions 1997

AREA	POPULATION SELECTED TO RECEIVE DROUGHT RELIEF (%)	FAMILIES RECEIVING *SAMURDHI* STAMPS (%)	FAMILIES SELECTED TO RECEIVE DROUGHT RELIEF (%)	FAMILIES RECEIVING DRY FOOD RATIONS UNDER THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME
Horowpathana	10.8	29.3	24.7	4.2
Medawachchiya	77.3	82.2	66.7	1.3
Anuradhapura district	20	52.1	20.4	1.5

Source: Department of Social Services, Kachcheri, Anuradhapura [Arachchi, 1998: 29]

Before and during the war, respective governments have tried to implement relief programmes to mitigate the effects of climatic conditions on the livelihoods of this region. These have been in the form of food subsidies, guaranteed price scheme and fertiliser subsidies. Consumer food subsidies have included rice ration programmes

[34] CARE, Sarvodaya, FORUT, SEWA Lanka were some loan institutions mentioned.

[35] This refers to informal group saving schemes mainly amongst women, which involves a periodic contribution in cash or kind by each member that is in turn given to each member of the group.

(1942) in addition to healthcare, education and poverty alleviation programmes such as the *Samurdhi* and *Janasaviya*. This was limited to families that had an annual income of SLRs. 3600 in 1978 and replaced by the food stamps programme in 1979. This in turn was replaced by the *Janasaviya* programme in 1989 that provided a monthly grant for 2 years. This also included a forced saving component. This was transformed into the *Samurdhi* programme and includes consumption and non-consumption components [Sanderatne, 2004: 8-10 and Case studies].

Another form of assistance that entered into this portfolio after the CFA is remittances, which are used for more long-term activities such as housing renovations and construction [Case studies]. This is consistent with the findings that reveal migration from Anuradhapura took place mainly during the war period.

Other studies in the war zone show similar trends; residents are dependent on government remittances and many have had to abandon previous occupations because of the lack of security and inputs. People also had some access to remittances from members away from home, welfare payments and other jobs in trade and services [Winslow and Woost, 2004: 10].

Dependence on government assistance is claimed to have created dependence amongst IDPs, who are said to find it easier than trying to gain their own living [KI interviews]. This is too harsh a conclusion to make. People need to be given solid opportunities if they are to make it on their own and this has not been the case in the border villages. For years, they have been disadvantaged and denied any development opportunities beyond infrastructural development that would facilitate the growth of other regions and with the onset of war have been caught in the middle of warring factions. Hence they have had to make do with any opportunity that has come their way be it in building their livelihoods or ensuring their survival.

5.2.5 EVOLVING SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE FACE OF ARMED CONFLICT

The interaction between violent conflict, political economy, and social capital has been examined previously [Rajasingham-Senanayake, 1999, Goodhand and Hulme, 2000 and Winslow and Woost, 2004]. Social capital is believed to improve and enable society to function by allowing people to coordinate their actions and activities. In this

regard, war zones were looked at as having a negative effect on the development of social capital. Yet studies done in Sri Lanka by Goodhand and Hulme indicate otherwise. They found that varied networks were mobilised, created and sustained to deal with the conflict. Traditional sources of social capital have become more important in some areas and civil society organisations in others, indicating that people have *'found ways to cope and progress'*. They also note that not all social capital is positive and claim that the conflict entrepreneurs can create *'anti-social'* capital, more specifically in widening the divide between ethnic groups [Winslow and Woost, 2004: 12-13].

ENGAGING THE ARMED FORCES IN BORDER REGIONS

The border regions have become heavily dependent on security forces in their vicinity, which are largely Sinhala in composition, for their survival [Silva, 2003: 263-264]. There has also been a heavy military presence of the armed forces around many of the camps and the resettlement villages, especially in the border areas. According to the authorities, the purpose of settling people near and around army camps was to protect them. However, there have been allegations that the army used some of these villages as human shields because in some areas the civilians surround the army camp rather than vice-versa [Cohen and Deng 1998: 376 and KI Interviews].

There is reluctance amongst respondents to admit that the army presence has negatively affected their lives. However, the losses are attributed to widows/female-heads of household and female youth in the village. The soldiers have introduced the youth to substance abuse, and affiliations and harassment [Case studies]. The war has been used as a means of perpetrating other acts of violence, such as dispute killings and personal vendettas [Gamburd, 2004: 162]. Hence, already vulnerable segments of the population have been exploited by the forces due to their destitution and desperation.

The beneficiaries of the army presence have been local businessmen selling their goods and villagers who receive support during public events, such as building roads, funerals etc and providing security [Case studies].

NETWORKING IN BORDER REGIONS

Although the war has seen many people leave the border regions in Anuradhapura it has also attracted people or made them remain. People have been drawn to the region due to the inability to return to their homes that have been taken over by others or armed forces/LTTE, or had been destroyed, existing kin networks in the region, familiar/similar environment, and the provision of some educational facilities for children. Others have remained because of familiarity, inability to leave ancestral land and income sources, and lack of an alternatives [Case studies].

Leaving a part of the family in the village while others leave in search of employment and safety is another strategy. Those who remained also ensured the protection of their assets from other ethnic communities [Case studies].

What is more, resources that allow people to access their livelihoods lies mainly in the hands of local businessmen and middlemen. They control the access that people have in selling their crops, which is further compounded by the poor road and infrastructural conditions. Rich people in the village are mentioned as wielding financial control and able to give out loans, holding land as collateral. These people are able to gain control over these resources because they are not contested, given their social position, and are able to intimidate the poor. Having political links is seen as an advantage in undertaking illegal activities, such as felling trees in the forests and dredging sand, rather than improving access to resources. Similarly, the presence of the army is also seen as advantageous although there is a note of fear and distrust as well. The weight that the army pulls in the community is even transferred to families that have members serving in the army or as homeguards, who try to use it to their advantage [Case studies].

Further, support systems were strained during the war and tend to centre on immediate and extended family. Yet the greater dependence on NGOs, village organisations and neighbours has tended to increase as the war subsided [Case studies]. This points to the importance of maintaining networks at the community level at times of crisis. This further highlights the need to move away from the household analysis promoted by the RLF when examining livelihoods.

Lastly, the war in Sri Lanka is based largely on ethnicity. Ethnicity refers to identities and social groupings primarily within immigrant societies [Silva, 2003: 246]. The

basis of ethnicity in the conflict is also important in the context of displacement and in accessing livelihoods. People tend to perceive their own ethnic group as an important aspect of coping, which leads to the enhancement of intra-group solidarity and inter-group hostility, showing that the war has been able to promote ethnic consciousness and create a polarisation amongst ethnicities [Silva, 2003: 263].

5.3 INSTITUTIONS IN BORDER REGIONS

Livelihood strategies are influenced by institutions, which govern the behaviour between actors, and determine access and control over resources. This frames the entitlements households and determines their ability to make a choice when devising livelihood strategies. This in turn requires coordination, and rules that govern this coordination emerge as institutions. They can arise intentionally or spontaneously, and be formal or informal and are influenced by power relations.

According to Bastian and Bastian, conflicts are not apolitical events of violence but have strong links with society during peaceful times. Many civil wars are described as complex political emergencies that are expressions of existing social, political, economic and cultural structures. They are ethnicised, involve loyalties to particular groups or antipathy towards another within the same state [Korf, 2002: 33]. This is evident within the border regions as well. People have been able to build allegiances with the army in order to ensure their safety and access to livelihoods. Within the context of risk and insecurity agriculture has no longer been able to provide for their needs, and they have had to shift to alternative sources that stem largely from the armed forces. This has been with regards to the provision of security within the village or to the establishment of small businesses that depend on the forces for business. Nevertheless, the antipathy towards the forces is also evident in their view that their socio-cultural environment has been disrupted. Furthermore, the fear for the LTTE resonates when they indicate that they do not want to lose their property in the war region to other Tamils or to having already lost it to the LTTE before settling in the border region.

Institutions evolve with the change in the distribution of power and adapt to the present power distribution. This makes it necessary to understand the bargaining power of various social groups to understand effective institutions [Korf, 2002: 34].

This is most evident in the case of women in the border communities who have been able to use their position of victimisation to a certain extent to ensure some benefit to themselves and their dependents. Nevertheless, the poor, (female-headed households included) have felt the change in the power balance to further isolate them within the larger community structure. They are still controlled by their past controllers (local businessmen, moneylenders and politicians) but now have also to contend with external forces such as the army. Power imbalances have occurred with regard to the access to natural capital as well, where once informal property rights worked. Their constant movement has resulted in a situation of uncertainty, undermining previous agreements. Informal agreements are becoming harder to hold.

Thus in conflict situations, power asymmetries favour militant actors at the cost of civilised actors and institutions, where threat and fear superimposes political and social institutions. Conflict entrepreneurs (political actors legitimised by the rule of force and violence) can play a key role in determining resources [Korf, 2002: 34].

Trust in agencies and local institutions is also important as it creates a mental backing, for those who seek their support, a sense that they are not alone at a time of need and does not necessarily have to end when the war is over [Korf, 2002: 35]. While this may necessarily be true in the war zone given the large focus, it does not prove to hold for the border regions. There seems to be a disconnection between the authorities at the ministerial level and the local government in these regions, and the element of trust is not visible when residents speak of agencies and local institutions. The former do not necessarily realise the magnitude of the situation in these regions in terms of vulnerability and deprivation while the latter are faced with resource constraints.

Village level politics and local development projects need to be taken into account. There is a struggle for resources and control of resources. People living in a village setting are not a homogenous and peaceful entity [Korf, 2002: 35]. In the case of the border regions, this has proven crucial. There is a sense that all have been affected by the war in some way, yet there is also a realisation that it has been at different levels. The differing access to resources within communities has meant that people have been able to deal with the conflict and displacement in divergent ways. The fact that people start out at different levels by virtue of this heterogeneity and are thrown into risk situations with this *'baggage'* is relevant when trying to gauge the effects of risk situations to the vulnerability and wellbeing.

It is clear that even the local institutions within communities need to be able to take this heterogeneity into account. The war effects have changed these associations while some have even become redundant. Of these, the most consistent has been Farmers' Associations[36] that have existed throughout along with Funeral Associations, Youth Organisations, and Community Based Organisations. On the other hand, those institutions that continue are corrupt and members the lack of commitment [Case studies].

Some were claimed to have been established merely to facilitate the provision of aid during the war rather than facilitate community development. However, even these have been manipulated to the benefit of those in power. On the other hand, some credit the war for creating an enabling environment for the establishment of these institutions. Within mixed communities, they have also been able to create a sense of tolerance amongst host and guest communities by creating a collective consciousness and sense of acceptance. However, the lack of efficiency is attributed to political divides that lead to the lack of participation by villagers in these associations [KI Interviews]. This also points to the influence that institutions have on behaviour between groups within these communities.

Prior to the war, development initiatives were undertaken by the state apparatus through local government bodies and divisional secretariats. While the state presence continued through the local government bodies the war also saw the emergence of NGO involvement, both foreign and local.

The Participatory Rural Development Project (PRDP) is a project carried out by the government with foreign assistance using village labour to improve infrastructure in the area.
WFP/FAO also provided food rations; milk food, lentils and sugar during the war in return for labour on tank reconstruction and infrastructural development projects.

Source: Field notes

In the event of local disputes, various mechanisms are approached; formal and informal in nature. These institutional elements are relevant because disputes range

[36] Activities include obtaining agricultural inputs in bulk, marketing of crops and obtaining credit facilities for farmers. Their role in farming activity varies as do their strength and dynamism [Saneratne, 2004: 7].

from land access, control over resources, marital disputes and household spats [Case studies] and also reflect power relations that are passed onto the control of resources.

The war has created an environment that has turned people against each other and hence this lack of trust has undermined informal institutions, such as village elders, religious leaders within the dispute resolution mechanism. As a result, people tend to rely more on formal mechanisms such as the court system and the police [KI Interviews]. This is relevant because the tendency within conflict zones per se is to turn to informal mechanisms such as religious and community bodies [Zackariya and Shanmugaratnam, 2002: 5] but in the border regions there appears to be a preference to turn to the legal systems, especially to address more legal issues related to property.

Finally, the need to move away from focusing on capitals to the hold that power and property relations have on controlling access to capital and focus more on structure [de Haan and Zoomers, 2005: 33] is stressed in the light of this study. The political structure within the border environment is crucial, not just in the attention of state authorities but also at the more local level of the communities. The community structures and the control wielded by the people within these structures is testament to this. The displaced within mixed communities would have better access to resources depending on their relationship with their hosts and how far and when the latter was willing to give them room to establish themselves. The conditions of the poor still seem to be controlled by the more affluent, despite their similar experiences of displacement.

5.4 LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES OF DISPLACED COMMUNITIES AND HOUSEHOLDS

The study shows that displacement has resulted in communities and households developing numerous livelihood strategies. An aim of the study was to determine if the strategies adopted by these communities and household differed within their categorisations. While clear-cut differences are hard to establish, what is certain is that the access to different types of capital does differ for these communities and household based on their position in society. While access has been and continues to be easier for some, it has been and continues to be difficult and uncertain for others. A clear example in this regard has been in terms of accessing natural capital, especially

land. This section presents the strategies of these communities and households in surviving in the border regions.

In terms of access to land the displaced that have been relocated continue to retain ownership of their lands; some even earn an income from renting it. Many amongst the three communities have resorted to abandoning their paddy land and cultivating only their highland, which is situated near to their homestead. Yet this is not seen as a long term strategy as many expressed the desire to return and resume the cultivation of all their land.

Access to natural capital is also dependent on the extent of social capital where rich households have been able to gain an income from selling their land to other IDPs. Weak social links amongst the poor have meant that they have had to make do with the resources they are given and not necessarily influence the process of natural capital allocation by the authorities.

The reduction in the extent of cultivation also resulted in households shifting to alternative forms of income generation. Employment in the forces both locally and nationally has led to the diversification of income within rich households and helped them maintain their grip on resources. The poor have had to turn to wage labour in the event of war to supplement their meagre income from the land. In mixed communities, the influx of IDPs has meant that wages have dropped because labour has become more available. The tendency and pressure for women and children to earn a living has increased as well. For many who have lost income earning members such changes would seem permanent, and this is evident in female-headed households.

Migration is highlighted as a popular strategy; be it for safety or income generation. This nevertheless points to the ability to migrate, and most often it is rich households that can afford the move. An alternative has been that only a part of the family migrates, usually the younger members, leaving the elders and possibly the sick and disabled behind to ensure that their ancestral property is not lost. Such a strategy does not ensure the improvement of the wellbeing of the members left behind as those who leave may not necessarily be able to support them due to urban pressures and costs. Hence vulnerabilities may still continue amongst them while the wellbeing of those left behind may not improve either.

Previous work in conflict regions indicates that those who are economically and socially better-off have moved to safe areas and been integrated into mainstream society. The poor have suffered the worst consequences of displacement. There also seems to have been the compulsion amongst IDPs to become ethnically clannish for security and survival, sometimes enhancing segregation and inhibiting their integration within the social mainstream [Silva, 2003: 261 and Goodhand and Hulme, 2000: 396]. It seems as if their own ethnic groups provide them with a sense of security and protection.

The conflict has generated a hidden economy and new identities, which has been claimed to be particularly true for border areas. These regions have become *'de facto ethnic enclaves and embittered identity politics'* [Rajasingham-Senanayake, 1999: 58].

Nordstorm, who studied the conflict from the context of the border, termed the war as a *'dirty war'* where non-combatant populations are targeted to control the political process through the construction of a culture of terror. Drawing from this Rajasingham-Senanayake suggests that the war has resulted in the emergence of new patterns of socio-political organisation that will have long term repercussions on peace [Rajasingham-Senanayake, 1999: 59]. This is evident in this study as well. The presence of the armed forces and the political system have created a sense of dependency amongst the population for security, livelihood creation and sustenance and one that will have serious implications in the event of a solution to the ethnic conflict.

Hence the conflict has given rise to a new elite; armed forces personnel and their families and soldiers in the higher ranks have profited from the hidden economy of corruption [Rajasingham-Senanayake, 1999: 60]. The study also indicates that families and individuals try to use this position in accessing resources within the community. This only enforces their previous control, as landowners and businessmen, over resources as their position within the community structure is further embedded. Tensions within mixed communities have been known to arise, where the poorer segments of the host population feel that the displaced receive more assistance than they deserve, have oversupplied wage labour and increased local rents. This can be double-sided; because wealthier displaced people have been able to rent houses from their hosts, even buy their land and integrate into the local life and economy.

The option of returning to their previous homes has conflicting sentiments as well. Those who have built their lives in their present surroundings, have married and started to raise families prefer to remain whilst others, particularly those whose livelihood is derived from the land prefer to return home. Hence reiterating that displacement has possibly most affected those who depend on land and who have found it difficult to integrate into the local economy due to the scarcity of land. On the other hand what do they return to; dilapidated housing, facing others who have moved into their homes, landmines? Many do not wish to return as a result of fears of security and further trauma [Rajasingham-Senanayake, 1999: 64].

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The study provides an insight into livelihood strategies of displaced communities in border regions of Anuradhapura and traces the effects of conflict on these strategies. In doing this it determines the sustainability of these practices for rural communities and households. It has examined the availability of asset bases for IDPs, and the institutional and structural forces that determine their access while highlighting some ground level realities in the border regions.

This section presents some conclusions that can be drawn from this study and resulting policy recommendations. It also uses aspects from the study to further elaborate on the RLF. The study enables conclusions and policy recommendations at the state and community levels in relation to conflict induced displacement and livelihoods in the border regions.

Sovereignty has to be promoted as responsibility, where a state has the right to claim sovereignty only so long as its responsibilities of providing protection and assistance to its citizens are met [Cohen and Deng 1998: 6]. This study reiterates that the state cannot ignore the border regions and are bound to ensure its prosperity, physical security and human rights. This does not leave it with simply the need to provide adequate infrastructural mechanisms for communities to prosper in this region, but also to take into account their realities and aspirations that have been moulded by the conflict.

The Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement bring together the legal norms applicable to the internally displaced and point to gaps in all areas of their protection. They offer standards against which not only governments but also rebel groups can be held accountable to the people whose lives have been destroyed. They reflect the needs and rights of the displaced, and the duties and obligations of states as well as standards that enable the international community to hold governments accountable [Cohen and Deng, 1998: 6-7]. These principles highlight the need for state involvement and will. This study has shown the apparent disconnection between the central institutions that have been instated in the capital to address issues related to the conflict and the ground-level local government bodies that operate in the border

regions. Much of the focus of the central institutions is on the war zone, in terms of relief and reconstruction, and statistics. While on the other hand, the local government bodies are constrained financially. This indicates the urgent need to revisit state priorities to ensure the inclusion of the border regions, commencing from feasibility and needs assessments to overall reconstruction and development efforts similar to those in the war zone. The border regions need to be treated as war zones and assisted in a similar manner by the central authority and other organisations.

Despite the lack of attention from the authorities the people in the border regions have moved on and built some livelihood for themselves in this war environment. Their wellbeing however depends on the manner in which these are made sustainable or how the process of transition into other forms of livelihoods takes place. The state cannot ensure this single-handedly and should look to engage civil society actors and even the private sector, all of whom have a stake and interest in the development of the region. Initiatives should contribute to the wellbeing of these people and enable the sustainability of their livelihoods. Furthermore, existing structures can be used to facilitate this process because the region has moved on despite the war and institutional mechanisms have prevailed. The political will is as important as the availability of resources to ensure improved levels of wellbeing and prosperity to the communities and the border regions as a whole.

Issues of proof of ownership of assets, unauthorised occupation of both state land and individually owned land, destruction of property and infrastructure, are a part of the realities of IDPs. Addressing these issues becomes even more crucial and urgent when they are tied to people's livelihoods, which ride on their very existence. In this regard, regional and local power structures should be analysed and counter balances towards their effects should be built in as well. This becomes even more timely in the context of IDPs expressing the desire to return to their lands should a peaceful solution be reached.

Undoubtedly the war has affected all ethnic communities in the country. While ethnicity has been the main cause of the war but it is also a key factor in its solution. Undeniably, minorities have been severely affected by the war, but these minorities are not only the Muslims and Tamils but also the Sinhalese minorities in the war region. Displacement needs to be addressed at the regional level and not at the ethnic level. Being in the midst of war but also on its outskirts has adversely affected some

people and led to the prosperity for others, and ethnicity is not the only factor that needs to be considered in a solution.

Furthermore, the poor bear a huge part of the burden of the war and in this region the effects of poverty seem to have been exacerbated with the war creating new forces of suffering and trauma. Here the situation of women cannot be glossed over as a mere result of the war nor can the resulting social consequences. This then begs the question as to why one of the poorest regions in the country, home to vast numbers affected by the conflict, has been left out and almost ignored in attempts to reduce poverty in the country. Furthermore, the politicisation of the war has created situations of prosperity and forces that could possibly work to perpetuate the war for their benefit.

From the theoretical angle, while examining the availability of assets and the transformation of livelihood strategies it is also possible to include insights into human agency, practices and social organisation, thus moving somewhat away from the conventions of the RLF [Brocklesby and Fisher, 2003: 194-195]. This study does point to initiatives of vulnerable groups, such as women and the poor, which indicates the usage of their agency to overcome existing deprivations.

At the community level, development needs to be based on the understanding of what communities are already engaged in, their cultural norms and what they want for themselves, their social structures and their integral vulnerabilities [Vincent, 2001: 4]. The strategies that have evolved over the defined period have seen change, and this change has been necessitated by the war conditions. We will not know how these regions would have evolved had there been no war but we can hypothesise that to a certain extent the political will may not have emerged beyond ensuring the sustenance of vote banks. The war economy has created a culture of its own and people have had to adapt within this culture in order to survive. Hence development within this context is going to affect those who have prospered from the war in the border regions; from the local homeguard to the war lords and politicians. The need to maintain steady income sources is stressed and many note that although the war has resulted in the creation of some income sources, the sustainability within a peaceful solution is questionable; be they selling goods to the forces, homeguards or prostitution.

This takes the discussion back to the issue of sustainability. The livelihood strategies that have been developed by the displaced communities in the border regions may not be considered sustainable nor desirable by state standards but have evolved over a period of two decades or more and been moulded by the people in situations of desperations and destitution. Yet how sustaining they are in ensuring that the displaced people and their future generations are able to live in peace, move out of poverty, and improve their wellbeing is severely questionable but warrants urgent attention.

The sustainability of livelihoods is also dependent on its susceptibility to cope and recover from stresses and shocks without undermining natural resource bases [Scoones: 1998: 5]. This study reiterates this point made within the livelihoods approach as well. The natural resources were always stretched given the ecological conditions in the region. The situation of insecurity not only limited access to natural resources but also placed a strain on the extent that was being and continues to be used in strategising livelihoods, endangering its sustainability.

Lastly, on a cautionary note, the results of the current Presidential Elections and the increase in defence spending in the National Budget for 2006 will also have a bearing on the situation within the region, with the political will being polarised in terms of peace or war.

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ANNEXES

ANNEX ONE: SECONDARY DATA SOURCES CONSULTED

The following is a listing of the sources of secondary data that were reviewed in this study.

- ***National level data:*** Department of Census and Statistics, Central Bank of Sri Lanka
- ***Relevant studies:*** World Food Programme's Community Food Security Profiling focusing on 'settled' communities in the conflict zone (including border villages in Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa)
- ***Local research institutions:*** MARGA institute, Rice Research and Development Institute (RRDI), Horticultural Crop Research and Development Institute (HORDI), Hector Kobbekaduwa Agrarian Research & Training Institute (ARTI), Sri Lanka Agribusiness
- ***Non-governmental organisations and universities:*** Social Scientists Association, Centre for Policy Alternatives, International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Centre for Poverty Analysis, International Centre for Red Cross, United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)
- ***Government sources:*** Ministry of Relief Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, External Resources Department, Divisional Secretariats in Anuradhapura
- ***Policy documents:*** Framework for Poverty Reduction for Sri Lanka, Regaining Sri Lanka: A vision and strategy for accelerated development, Economic Policy Framework of the Government of Sri Lanka, National Framework for Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka.

ANNEX TWO: LIST OF DS DIVISIONS IN ANURADHAPURA BORDERING THE CONFLICT ZONE

The following table indicates the Grama Niladhari (GN) Divisions[1] within each of these border DS Divisions.

Table A: Border DS and GN Divisions used in the selection of the sites for the study

DS DIVISION	GN DIVISION	DS DIVISION	GN DIVISION
Kebithigollewa	Gonumeriyawa	**Nochchiyagama**	Kukulkatuwa
	Kunchuttuwa		Ittikulama
	Halmillawetiya		HUnuwilagama
	Kanugahawewa		Katupathwewa
	Herathhmillewa		
Padaviya	Bisokotuwa	**Mahavilachchiya**	Mannaram Junction
	Buddhangala		Thathirimale
	Parakrampura		Dematamalgama
	Elikimbulagala		Nelumvila
	Miathreepura		Sandamaleliya
	Abhayapura		
	Urewa		
	Mahasenpura		
	Balayawewa		
Horowpathana	Dutuwewa	**Medawachchiya**	Kidawarankulama
	Wagollakada		Prabodhagama
	Maradanmaduwa		Puhudivula
	Rathmale		Paranahalmilewa
	Welangahaulpatha		Anekattiya
	Parangiyawadiya		Periyakulama
	Diyathithawewa		Yakawewa
	Demataweva		Thammenne Elawal

Source: Anuradhapura Districts, Census of Population and Housing 2001, Department of Census and Statistics

[1] Village administrative area

ANNEX THREE: LIST OF KEY INFORMANTS

The following table indicates the Key Informants who were interviewed for the study.

- Additional Secretary, Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
- Academic, University of Colombo
- Medawachchiya Grama Sevaka for Periyakulama GN Division
- Family Rehabilitation Centre Officer
- Social Services Department Officer, Rambewa DS Divisional Office
- Social Services Department Officer, Nawagama Palatha Central Divisional Secretary
- Village head of Parangiyawadiya village, Horowpathana DS Division
- Grama Sewaka, 151 Diyathithaweva GN Division, Horowpathana DS Division
- Village elder and previous Village head, Welangahaulpatha, Horowpathana
- Social Services Officer, Mahavilachchiya DS Division, Thanthirimale GN Division, Thanthirimale village
- Rehabilitation Division Officer
- Samurdhi Officer, 148 Wellangaha ulpatha GN division, Horowpathana DS Division
- Child Protection Officer, Medawachichiya DS Division
- NGO, President, Farmers' Association, Yaka Weva, Medawachichiya DS Division
- Head Homeguard, 49 Periyakulama GN Division, Medawachchiya DS Division

ANNEX FOUR: SAMPLING AND LIST OF SELECTED VILLAGES

Two villages were selected for each of the above categories. It was attempted as much as possible to select villages in a manner that covered the heterogeneity of livelihoods in the district. Furthermore a food insecurity index[2] was used in the selection of the GN divisions for the study and represented high and low levels of food security.

Table B: Sampled DS Divisions, GN Divisions and Villages

DS DIVISION	FREQUENCY	GN DIVISION	FREQUENCY	VILLAGE	FREQUENCY
Horowpathana	30	148 Wellangahaulpatha	13	Wellangahaulpatha	13
		151 Diyathiththaweva	2	Diyathiththaweva	2
		149 Parangiyawadiya	5	Parangiyawadiya	5
		Demataweva	10	Demataweva	10
		TOTAL	**30**	**TOTAL**	**30**
Medawachchiya	30	49 Periyakulama	15	Periyakulama	3
				Katukeliyawa	7
		50 Yakaweva	10	Maha Siyambalagaskada	3
				Yakaweva	7
		43 Prabodhagama	5	Kanagahaweva	2
				Prabodhagama	8
TOTAL	**60**	**TOTAL**	**30**	**TOTAL**	**30**

Source: Case studies

Table C: Displaced community category spread in sampled villages and DS Division

DISPLACED CATEGORY	NAME OF VILLAGE	DS DIVISION
Mixed community	Wellangahaulpatha	Horowpathana
	Kanagahaweva	Medawachchiya
	Prabodhagama	Medawachchiya
Relocated community	Diyathiththaweva	Horowpathana
	Parangiyawadiya	Horowpathana
	Periyakulama	Medawachchiya
	Katukeliyawa	Medawachchiya
Resettled community	Demataweva	Horowpathana
	Maha Siyambalagaskada	Medawachchiya
	Yakaweva	Medawachchiya

Source: Case studies

[2] See Annex Five: Food Security Index

From each village 10 households were selected that represented these characteristics. In each village of the first two displaced categories, 3 households each of rich and poor and 2 households each headed by female and male heads of household were selected. From the third displaced category 5 original settlers and 5 displaced settlers were interviewed. In addition 2 female headed households, 2 male headed households and at least 2 relatively richer and poor households were interviewed within this categorisation.

Table D: Household typology[3]

HOUSEHOLD TYPOLOGY	FREQUENCY
Rich household	16
Poor household	20
Male-headed household	12
Female-headed household	12
TOTAL	**60**

Source: Case studies

[3] In addition to this classification, the mixed community also included a host (10) and displaced (10) household categorisation.

ANNEX FIVE: FOOD SECURITY INDEX

The Vulnerabilty of GN Divisions to Food Security was developed by the WFP-Sri Lanka that presents a map of spatial variations. It was based on secondary data analysis and covers all DS Divisions including those in the Northern and Eastern provinces.

Food security is defined here as 'the access by all people at all times to enough food for an active, health life, while food insecurity is defined as the limited or uncertain availability of nutritionally adequate and safe foods or limited or uncertain ability to acquire acceptable foods in socially acceptable ways' [DCS & WFP, 2004: 3].

Table E: Vulnerability of border GN Divisions in Horowpathana and Medawachchiya (2004)

Level of vulnerability: 1 – Most vulnerable, 2 – More vulnerable, 3 – Less vulnerable, 4 – Least vulnerable

DS DIVISION AND GN DIVISIONS	LEVEL OF VULNERABILITY
HOROWPATHANA	
Dutuwewa	2
Wagollakada	1
Maradanmaduwa	2
Rathmale	3
Welangahaulpatha	1
Parangiyawadiya	3
Diyatittawewa	3
MEDAWACHCHIYA	
Kidawarakulama	3
Prabodhagama	3
Puhudivula	2
Paranahalmilewa	2
Anekattiya	3
Periyakulama	1
Yakaweva	2
Thammenne Elawal	1

Source: [DCS & WFP, 2004]

ANNEX SIX: DATA TABLES

1. LIVELIHOOD ASSETS: NATURAL CAPITAL

Table F: State and Private Sector Land distribution in Sri Lanka (1982)

CATEGORY	SHARE (%)
State owned land of which	**84**
Large inland waters	18
Forests and forest reserves	33
Agricultural land of which	27
Lease under Land Development Ordinance	13
Under Land Reform Commission	06
Tree crop plantations	04
Under Mahaweli project	02
Swarnabhoomi grants[4]	02
Other	02
Privately owned land	**16**
Total area	**100**

Source: Adapted from Table 4.3 [IPS, 2004: 40]

Table G: Sectoral land use in Sri Lanka

LAND USE	DISTRIBUTION (%)
Urban area	0.3
Forest and forest plantations	32.9
Scrub, grasslands and swamp	7.5
Paddy irrigated and bunded rice	11.6
Homestead gardens	14.9
Chena[5] or rain fed crops	18.8
Major plantation crops	11.9
Minor export crops and other plantations	1.8
Unused	0.3
TOTAL	**100**

Source: Adapted from Table 4.4 [IPS, 2004: 41]

[4] This involves a free-hold title subject to regulatory state controls [Survey Department of Sri Lanka, 1988: 94].
[5] The vernacular term used for slash and burn agriculture.

Table H: Degree of Prevalence of Different Forms of Property Rights in Rural Areas of Sri Lanka

TYPE OF RIGHT	RURAL SECTOR
Ownership right	
Formal	Low prevalence
Informal	High prevalence
User rights	
Formal	Low prevalence
Informal	High prevalence

Source: Adapted from Table 4.10 [IPS, 2004: 48]

In the absence of formal property rights in the rural areas, people take part in informal arrangements such as joint cultivation; known locally as *thattumaru*[6] and *kattimaru*[7] and also share-cropping, known locally as *ande*[8] cropping. Such arrangements are biased in favour of the landowner and subject to the whims of the individuals involved [IPS, 2004: 49].

2. LIVELIHOOD ASSETS: HUMAN CAPITAL

Table I: Literacy levels of population aged 10 years and over by District, DS Division level and sex

DISTRICT, DS DIVISION AND SEX	TOTAL		LITERATE		ILLITERATE	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Anuradhapura District						
Male	308,225	100.0	283,719	92.0	24,506	8.0
Female	296,021	100.0	262,857	88.8	33,164	11.2
Total	**604,246**	**100.0**	**546,576**	**90.5**	**57,670**	**9.5**
Medawachchiya DS Division						
Male	16,256	100.0	15,131	93.1	1,125	6.9
Female	16,325	100.0	14,620	89.6	1,705	10.4
Total	**32,581**	**100.0**	**29,751**	**91.3**	**2,830**	**8.7**

[6] A system of rotational cultivation which has as its main purpose is to prevent the further subdivision of the operational unit in paddy whilst allowing a family member to retain a tenancy with family land. Cultivation is adjusted amongst several owners to meet the scarcity of land and could be within a particular year or season. Because the periodical rotation could vary from once is five to seven years the cultivator is forced to be a member of several *thattumaru* rotations simultaneously to ensure some access to land.

[7] Similar to the above system except that it guarantees that several joint owners can cultivate some parcel of land at any time. Cultivators rotate a number of parcels of land amongst themselves and they can vary in size and quality from year to year.

[8] Sharecropping agreements can range from a fixed share, equal sharing to differential sharing of both inputs and product.

Horowpathana DS Division						
Male	11,338	100.0	10,343	91.2	995	8.8
Female	11,370	100.0	9,968	87.7	1,402	12.3
Total	**22,708**	**100.0**	**20,311**	**89.4**	**2,397**	**10.6**

Source: Anuradhapura Districts, Census of Population and Housing 2001, Department of Census and Statistics

Table J: Educational attainment of population aged 5 years and over by District, DS Division level and sex

DS DIVISION AND SEX	ALL ATTAINMENTS	EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT												
		No schooling	Attending year 1	Passed year 1-3	Passed year 4-5	Passed year 6-8	Passed year 9-10	O/L	A/L	Below degree level but above A/L	Degree	Post graduate diploma	Post graduate degree	Not stated
Anuradhapura District														
Male	345,416	14,538	5,122	38,758	44,959	75,478	82,512	53,165	20,322	285	3,022	38	152	7,065
Female	331,672	24,241	4,805	38,048	40,900	63,314	74,174	54,446	22,788	338	1,975	36	77	6,530
Total	**677,088**	**38,779**	**9,927**	**76,806**	**85,859**	**138,792**	**156,686**	**107,611**	**43,110**	**623**	**4,997**	**74**	**229**	**13,595**
Medawachchiya DS Division														
Male	18,394	782	280	2,114	2,295	3,722	4,569	3,125	1,001	10	114	3	2	377
Female	18,260	1,392	236	2,153	2,192	3,451	4,048	3,274	1,053	7	51	-	3	400
Total	**36,654**	**2,174**	**516**	**4,267**	**4,487**	**7,173**	**8,617**	**6,399**	**2,054**	**17**	**165**	**3**	**5**	**777**
Horowpathana DS Division														
Male	13,056	760	241	1,719	2,069	3,242	2,654	1,302	480	6	51	1	2	529
Female	13,064	1,143	208	1,927	2,068	2,853	2,453	1,357	459	8	34	-	-	554
Total	**26,120**	**1,903**	**449**	**3,646**	**4,137**	**6,095**	**5,107**	**2,659**	**939**	**14**	**85**	**1**	**2**	**1,083**

Source: Anuradhapura Districts, Census of Population and Housing 2001, Department of Census and Statistics

Table K: Employed population aged 10 years and over by District, DS Division level, main occupation and sex

DS Division and sex	All occupations	Legislators, senior officials and managers	Professionals	Technicians and associate professionals	Clerks	Service workers and shop and market sales workers	Skilled agricultural and fishery workers	Craft and related workers	Plant and machine operators and assemblers	Elementary occupations	Private business owners	Occupation unidentifiable or inadequate and armed forces
Anuradhapura District												
Male	200,370	1,680	5,247	7,325	3,952	14,960	99,326	14,908	7,648	20,649	9,555	15,120
Female	85,436	622	7,526	2,184	3,212	3,281	48,282	5,656	2,345	5,980	1,904	4,444
Total	**285,806**	**2,302**	**12,773**	**9,509**	**7,164**	**18,241**	**147,608**	**20,564**	**9,993**	**26,629**	**11,459**	**19,564**
Medawachchiya DS Division												
Male	10,536	49	238	262	249	1,440	4,224	748	426	1,386	80	1,434
Female	4,786	18	328	74	120	99	2,715	562	135	393	14	328
Total	**15,322**	**67**	**566**	**336**	**369**	**1,539**	**6,939**	**1,310**	**561**	**1,779**	**94**	**1,762**
Horowpathana DS Division												
Male	7,536	55	201	199	87	381	5,014	365	174	340	312	408
Female	3,001	20	229	77	53	34	2,150	96	14	82	53	193
Total	**10,537**	**75**	**430**	**276**	**140**	**415**	**7,164**	**461**	**188**	**422**	**365**	**601**

Source: Anuradhapura Districts, Census of Population and Housing 2001, Department of Census and Statistics