"Ending terrorism; is nationbuilding the answer?"

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Abstract

Ending terrorism; is nationbuilding the answer?

Terrorism, in all its horrifying forms, has been in use for ages and counter-terrorism measures have existed nearly as long. From brutal repression to negotiating and from bombing to buying them off, anything believed to have any success has been tried. Since the turn of the millennium terrorism has taken on a much more global profile than previously exhibited. This has resulted in an equally large-scale counter-terrorism measure: nationbuilding. In this thesis the effectiveness of nationbuilding as an instrument in fighting terrorism is examined. This includes a preliminary overview of nationbuilding measures in Afghanistan and Iraq, two countries currently undergoing nationbuilding and analyses the resulting effect(s) on terrorism. Lastly an attempt is made to quantify the effects of these two missions on the global terrorism scene. The results show that, while initially unsuccessful, both countries seem to be adjusting to their newfound selves and that the number of incidents and fatalities of terrorist activity are slowly decreasing. On the international side the results are much more of a mixed bag, suffering from odd counting practices and discrepancies. Overall there seems to have been a large reduction in the number of incidents, but it is unclear if these really ever were part of global terrorism.

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Arwin

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

1. INTRODUCTION

Terrorism, the War on Terror, 9/11, the Taliban; very few people will not be familiar with these terms. Terror network al-Qaeda has become synonymous with religious fanaticism and Osama bin-Laden the personification of evil, bringing death and destruction to places previously thought impervious. While acts of terrorism have been occurring for ages, never has it had more impact than in today's world. Physical limitations like distance to target and time constrains are much less of a problem due to modern weaponry, instant global communication and the ease of travel. Information about building explosive devices or missiles is freely accessible on the Internet. And perhaps most importantly, global media coverage in combination with relatively new phenomena like blogging, YouTube and Twitter make every terrorist act, every suicide bombing or road-side killing a global event. There are those that argue that the effectiveness of terrorism as a way to further your own agenda (for example the unification of all Muslim countries under the Sharia or the withdrawal of foreign troops from 'your' country) is highly questionable, however, such rational arguments are unlikely to deter terrorist from committing terrorism. The effectiveness of terrorism as a tool or instrument to instill fear in a population has increased enormously and is now, more so than ever, a 'thing' that has to be dealt with.

When dealing with terrorism there are three basic ways. Number one: do nothing and hope for the best. By refusing to acknowledge there is a problem or disregarding it as someone else's' problem you don't have to deal with it. And while there might be a number of moral objections to that approach, without modern day technology it is a perfectly valid way of 'dealing' with terrorism. If terrorists do not have access to the information, technology or transportation required to commit terrorist activities in your country and your media has no way of accurately reporting on stories halfway across the globe, there is presumably not a whole lot to worry about. The second method of dealing with terrorism is engaging them in negotiation. By seriously talking to the group or organization, one could hope to eliminate the need for further fear inspiring violence. The downside of this approach is that it might be seen as 'being weak' by your own population and a sign to other organizations that terrorist actions are an effective way to get what you want (or at least have the possibility to seriously negotiate about your wishes). And if in the future your wishes change, you are likely to use terrorism again since it proved effective last time. In essence, by opening negotiations with a terrorist organization you open the door to more violence and additional acts of terrorism. This has been the number one reason of why very few countries will (openly) negotiate with terrorists. Often, the presumed objectives of terrorist actions are so far out of the realm of possibility for the targeted country –like removing all western influence from the Islam world- that there is simply no way to comply, even if you wanted too. This brings us to the third and most used approach, repress terrorism. Prevent terrorism by forcibly stopping them. This method might include cutting of financial support, destroying bases of operations, imprisoning operatives and of course the killing of terrorists. Yet, this too is not without its complications. Vague or non-existent international law makes it very hard to successfully prosecute suspected terrorists, even after you catch them. The morality of killing all (emphasize on: possible) terrorists is something that many believe to be absolutely wrong. Another very important reason why draconian measures against terrorists should be avoided is that it usually strengthens their case among the local population. An easy example of this is the Israeli airstrikes versus violent members of the Palestinian Hamas movement. While

they are often effective in killing their intended target, the collateral damage is 'unreasonably' large. This only increases frustration, anger and a sense of injustice amongst many regular Palestinians and it is this anger that might be (mis)used by terrorists.

More recently there has been a fourth and largely untested way of dealing with terrorism. Instead of directly interacting with terrorists, either by negotiating or killing them, the environment around them is changed. The environment is changed in such a way that terrorism can no longer take root in the country in question. An entire nation will be transformed in an attempt to remove the possibility for well-organized (global) terrorism. And maybe in doing so, remove the need for terrorism entirely. This fourth method is called nationbuilding and will be the main subject of this thesis.

1.1. PROBLEM ANALYSIS

It's been almost nine years since the United States, backed by, among others, the United Kingdom invaded Afghanistan to apprehend Osama bin Laden, the by then believed mastermind behind the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11 2001. (United States Central Command 2010) While there were some initial successes, like removing the Taliban from power (9 November 2001[1]), Osama bin Laden has been able to elude his searchers to this day. Following a new kind of foreign policy doctrine, some would describe as Democratic Realism, the decision was made to try and transform Afghanistan from a country forgotten by all but the warlords to a free democracy loosely based on western democracies. By doing so it was believed that Al-Qaeda and other terrorist elements lose their support, place of operation and perhaps even use for existing in the first place. Democratic realism has be summarized as: "… supporting democracy everywhere, but a willingness to commit blood and treasure only in places where there is a strategic necessity – meaning places central to the larger war against the existential enemy, the enemy that poses a global mortal threat to freedom" (Krauthammer, 2004). The focus of the ongoing mission gradually moved from the capture of Osama to rebuilding the country. With support from countries around the world a start was made to bring freedom and democracy to the country. Yet for all the effort put in, in money[2], political capital and sadly the many lost lives of soldiers[3], Afghanistan seems to have made only marginal progress towards being a free democracy. While being liberated from the crushing yoke of Islamic fanaticism preached by their former Taliban leaders should be seen as a large step in the right direction, the country as a whole is neither free nor democratic at this point. Interim president and now 'democratically' elected president Karzai's credibility is low at best due to rampant vote rigging in the last election and large parts of the country not being under the government's control. (Reuters, 2004) There are countless reports identifying corruption within the newly elected government. (GlobalSecurity.org, 2010) Furthermore, while many Al-Qaeda fighters, possibly including Bin laden, have been driven to the mountainous regions of the Afghan-Pakistan border video messages on Al-Jazeera indicate that the terrorist movement is

[1] The United Stated Central Command puts the defeat of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan at November 9 2001.
[2] The US had spent 300 billion dollar by the end of 2009 on operation Enduring Freedom. (Congressional Research Service 2009)
[3] There have been 1733 coalition military fatalities between October 2001 and April 2010 (iCasualties.org 2010)

invariably vital. Without diminishing the hard work many people from many countries around the world, including of course the bulk of the Afghan people, have put in, it would be fair to say that on the road to a free, peaceful and democratic Afghanistan there is still a long way to go.

On March 19 of 2003, the US backed by a coalition of the willing invaded Iraq after suspecting weapons of mass destruction (WMD). (United States Central Command, 2010) This next mission in the global war on terror had a double-sided objective. On the one hand it was finding and destroying the WMD and on the other bringing the one responsible for producing those WMD, and consequently lying about them to the international community, Dictator Saddam Hussein to justice. The coalition would finish what the US had, in retrospect perhaps mistakenly not done in the first Gulf war: remove Saddam Hussein from power. (Gordon & Trainor, 1995). Just 43 days after announcing the start of the war in Iraq, President George W. Bush told the nation "major combat operations in Iraq have ended." Former Dictator Saddam was captured on December 14, 2003 (Warchronicle, 2010). Unfortunately for the credibility of the US, the weapons of mass destruction were never found and rebuilding Iraq was left as the sole objective. While optimists view the decline in 'security incidents' from well over 1500 a week in the summer of 2007 to just under a 150 a week in early 2009 as a sign things are changing for the better (USCC, 2010), bombings, shooting and mayhem are still a daily occurrence and every year after the proclaimed victory more casualties were made as the year before. With 2009 sadly being the bloodiest (iCausulties.org, 2010). The new government has very limited power and virtually none outside of the capital. Their democratic legitimacy is questionable and there seems to be little good on the horizon. If things weren't worse enough already, the Iraq war seems to draw (religious) fanatics from all across the Islamic world to fight for the cause and in effect align terrorist 'forces'. The US has already stated that by 2017 there will be no US troops left in Iraq (Reuters, 2009) and with them the coalition. It seems highly unlikely that Iraq will be a free and democratic country before that time and quite frankly with the way it is going, there is as likely as not going to be a complete reversal of everything that has been accomplished up till them.

The lackluster results in the field of nationbuilding are subject of much debate and public support for both interventions is thinning with every casualty. If we however go back to the doctrine of Democratic realism, one can argue that supporting, with force if necessary, the spread of democracy to countries like Afghanistan and Iraq is essential in the fight against terrorism, the fight again Islamic fanaticism, the fight against the existential enemy. Perhaps a better explanation of why someone might have the right or even the duty to intervene in another country, to force it to lay down its arms and to transform into a free and democratic country is given by the fictional president of the US in the television series the West Wing. "We are for freedom of speech everywhere; we're for freedom to worship everywhere. We're for freedom to learn for everybody. And because in our time, you can build a bomb in your country and bring it to my country, what goes on in your country is very much my business. And so we are from freedom from tyranny everywhere, whether in the guise of political oppression, economic slavery or religious fanaticism." (The West Wing - Inauguration Over there, 2003)

However one might feel about this issue it is fair to assume that both current and ongoing interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan are to an extent based on the Democratic realism doctrine. Their effectiveness is hard to measure, but results pale in comparison to what the initiators had hoped for when they began their respective enterprises. While elections are being held and

increasingly security tasks are being transferred to local agencies and organizations, terror networks like Al-Qaeda in Iraq are flourishing and still gaining support throughout the Arab world. These results are unimpressive at best and downright terrifying at worst and with more and more (public) support fading one wonders about their usefulness and effectiveness and ultimately if we are actually winning the fight against the existential enemy. And using a bit of 'Bush-logic' if we are not winning the war on global terrorism, we are losing it.

1.2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Terrorism or acts of terrorism are nothing new. While the term terrorism wasn't used before the French revolution, its roots date back to perhaps even the first century after Christ[4]. However until recently terrorism was mostly a local issue. Examples include the IRA in Northern Ireland and the ETA in Spain. Nearly all their actions were limited to the 'contested' area or at the very least within the nation it was fighting. With the bombings of the WTC in New York this idea seemed to change. This new dynamic required new concepts of foreign policy and ideas on how to fight this new menace have surfaced rapidly, nationbuilding being one of them. Nationbuilding, many believe, is an excellent approach to reducing the advent of global terrorism and thereby increasing your own security. Yet for all the effort put in, there is little empirical evidence that is actually works, in essence – reduce terrorism. Therefore the why-question of this research is quite simple: Why is nationbuilding seen as the best cure for terrorism?

1.3. RESEARCH QUESTION

We have seen what the problem is; if one is to believe that nationbuilding is a cure for global terrorism, the lack of success in both Iraq and Afghanistan is disheartening, and why it is a problem; bluntly put, if we are not winning the fight against the existential enemy, we are losing it. 'Losing' meaning someone else (terrorists) winning and spreading their religious fanaticism and general hate of western culture across the globe. This leads us to the central research question of this thesis.

"Is nationbuilding an effective instrument in fighting terrorism?"

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4 "Among the earliest such examples were the Sicari and the Zealots, Jewish groups active during the Roman occupation of the first century Middle East. The Zealots', who generally targeted Romans and Greeks, killings usually took place in daylight and in front of witnesses, with the perpetrators using such acts to send a message to the Roman authorities and those Jews who collaborated with them – a tactic that would also be used by subsequent generations and would become known as terrorists" (Burgess, 2003).

1.4. ACADEMIC AND PRACTICAL RELEVANCE

Since both the mission in Afghanistan and Iraq are still in full swing, most of the research that has been done has focused on how to achieve success or at the very least improve the chance on success. The idea that nationbuilding is an effective tool against terrorism is a relatively new concept and has received relatively little attention thus far. This research project will jump into that void by not trying to improve nationbuilding efforts in itself, but rather to try and find an answer on if it is an effective tool in fighting terrorism. Practically speaking it is a question of resource allocation. If nationbuilding is an effective tool, then perhaps it would be wise to invest more in it. If however the effects of nationbuilding on terrorism are virtually non-existent, mostly temporal (i.e. a short-term fix for a long-term problem) or even counterproductive, than let's get out of the game while we are still ahead.

1.5. RESEARCH DESIGN

The design of this research is rather straightforward. We recognize an independent variable, nationbuilding and dependent variable terrorism, perhaps more accurately, the successful combating of terrorism.

1.5.1. UNIT OF ANALYSIS

This research focuses on terrorists and why nationbuilding might or might not prevent the acts that make them terrorists. Organized terrorist or terrorist groups have committed virtually all terrorists' actions of major consequence. Hence the focus of this research is not on the 'lone wolf' terrorist –although their impact should not be marginalized, but on terrorgroups like Al-Qaeda (in Iraq), Hezbollah and other internationally operating groups. The unit of analysis is therefore: terroristgroups.

1.5.2. OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS

In order to measure any effect, the theoretical definitions need to be operationalized into workable, measureable definitions. An operational definition is the concrete and specific definition of something in terms of the operations by which observations are to be categorized (Babbie 2004).

The effects of terrorism go beyond the immediate loss of life and destruction of property[5]. Often the by fear induced counter-terrorism policies further impair daily life and economic development. Many indicators used in previous studies have seriously limitations and to date there is no single way to assess the full impact of terrorist activities. To combat this problem, this research will try and combine several indicators ranging from purely statistical information such as the number of fatalities to much more subjective polling data on the feel and sense of security and government performance (one of the main priorities for any government is providing security (physically, mentally, economically and socially) to its citizens, therefore it

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[5] "The terrorist attack in Madrid on March 11, 2004 resulted in a sudden and substantial drop in the votes going to the reigning Partido Popular, so that it lost the election that it had looked virtually certain to win before. This loss has been largely attributed to the incompetent reaction on the part of the government to the attack" (Financial Times,p11, 2004).

stand to reason that ratings on government performance give an indication on how 'secure' the country is).

To measure *terrorism* this study will use the following indicators:

- Number of casualties accredited to (acts of) terrorism
- Number of terrorist incidents
- Poppy cultivation (Afghanistan only)[6]
- Ratings on local security and government performance (where available)

By combining all these indicators the validity of the indicator for the overall effects of terrorism is increased. The effects of terrorism are captured in many directions. This in turn makes it the most likely to measure what this research tries to measure, i.e. terrorism. The number of indicators used in the combined terrorism measurement provide for a higher reliability.

The operational definition of *nationbuilding* will be constructed of several indicators and conditions. Firstly there should be activity in at least three of the four priorities (security, political reform, economic reconstruction, strengthening legal institutions) defined by the Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction. These activities should be part of a larger plan, in essence: only if they are subparts of an overall strategy for the country or region or there are strong and well reported links between the individual programs will the activity qualify for nationbuilding. Secondly, while much of the operations can be locally managed, the overall strategy should be under foreign control. Internal parties trying to restructure the state form or judicial branch for example will not be considered nationbuilding. Since each of the four priorities may contain a plethora of actions, a specification is given below.

Security
Measures might include: foreign military presence, training of local security forces, law enforcement, providing support to its military, but also humanitarian security like return of refugees, fighting epidemics, fighting hunger.

Political reform
Measures might include: replacing the head of state, instating a different government or changing the state form, holding elections, building political parties, free press, civil society initiatives, and constitutional reform

Economic reconstruction
Measures might include: establishing a stable currency, proving a legal and regulatory framework in which local and international commerce can resume.

Strengthening legal institutions
Measures might include: separation of powers, electing / appointing new judges, founding of a 'supreme' court, war crime tribunals or truth commissions, rebuilding prisons, training legal staff.

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[6] Poppy cultivation has been regarded as the number one source of income for terror group al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

By operationalizing nationbuilding as above, will different people qualify the same mission, strategy or effort as nationbuilding? Mostly yes, the indicators are broad and easily applicable enough to have a high reliability. The validity or accuracy of this operational definition is fairly high as it is directly based on the definitions of the UN, US and several non-governmental organizations.

1.6. READING GUIDE

What's the problem, why it is a problem and what will this research try and explain or solve. That is what you can find in the first chapter. Chapter two will delve in the theories behind terrorism and its causes. In chapter three we will look at the current problems with terrorism in Afghanistan and if 'our' efforts in rebuilding the country are successful in stopping terrorism. Chapter four will do the same, but than for Iraq. Finally, chapter five will try and sketch a global picture of the state of terrorism and the effects of nationbuilding. Reading all the way through to the end will net you the conclusions.

2. TERRORISM, NATIONBUILDING & THEORIES

This thesis revolves around two variables, nationbuilding and terrorism. The independent variable, nationbuilding is the tool or instrument that is being used to try and transform both Afghanistan and Iraq. The reason why these two countries are being transformed is our dependent variable, successfully combating terrorism. This chapter will provide the reader with an explanation of both variables and explores theories that might give an insight into the causes or reasons for both terrorism and nationbuilding.

2.1. TERRORISM

The dependent variable in this research is successfully combating terrorism. In order to examine this variable, it has to be stripped of the additional condition, the successful-part. What is left is terrorism, a relatively simple concept one would assume given the frequency of its use. Unfortunately this is hardly the case. If unknown or scarcely used before, the September 11 attacks have certainly raised the profile of terrorism to a universally known concept. Committing acts of terrorism is hardly a new phenomenon and even the term itself has been in general use since the French revolution (Carr, 2006). Its meaning has however fluctuated ever since the term was first used. Even today there is no commonly accepted explanation of what constitutes terrorism, as no widely acknowledged definition exists (Malik, 2000).

Simply by looking at two definitions, one taken from US Law code, the other from the non-governmental organization IPO (International Progress Organization) which consults the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations we can observe differences in approach, thinking and ultimately defining terrorism. According to the US law code: "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents (U.S.C. Title 22, Ch.38, Para. 2656f subsection d). The second definition, by an influential organization to the United Nations, defines terrorism as: an act carried out to achieve an inhuman and corrupt objective, and involving threat to security of any kind, and violation of rights acknowledged by religion and mankind (Yatullah Shaykh Muhammad 'Ali Taskhiri, 1987). That these definitions result in different outcomes on what counts as terrorism and what doesn't seems obvious; and that's just from two definitions. Work by Schmid (1983) found over a hundred proposed definitions of terrorism before 1983. To help combat this problem Professor Donna Arzt, director of the Center for Global Law and Practice at Syracuse University College of Law identified five fundamental elements that are virtually always part of any (proposed) definition.

- **Victims**: the victims of terrorism are usually specified as civilians or non-combatants, in order to differentiate terrorism from attacks on military targets, which are outright acts of war.
- **Targets**: the people who are the victims of terrorism are merely its direct targets. Most acts of terrorism have secondary or ultimate targets, usually the leaders of one or more governments. The victims are used by the terrorists to convey a coercive message to the targets.

- **Intent**: the intent of terrorism is either to intimidate or coerce a civilian population (presumably a larger group than that selected as specific victims), that is, to spread fear widely for its own sake; or to coercively influence or manipulate the conduct or policy of one or more governments (the ultimate targets) through the intimidation of civilians or non-combatants.
- **Means**: terrorism involves violence or the threat of violence (often described as "dangerous acts") against persons or property. Some definitions enumerate specific acts such as assassination, hostage taking, bombing, sabotage, cyber-terrorism, bio-terrorism, and hijacking or other violent acts against civil aircraft or other modes of public transportation. Post 9/11 legislation often adds mass-destruction under means.
- **Motivation**: while motivation is not usually a formal element of a crime, some definitions of terrorism specify that its acts are "politically motivated." The term "politically" is used in these contexts as an umbrella for a range of justifications, including ideological, religious, and nationalistic ones. (Artz, 2010)

Unfortunately these five elements cannot easily be combined into one comprehensive definition, a definition that also allows for flexibility on the number of elements that must be present. A second problem that presents itself is the lack of publicly accessible quantitative data about terrorism. The three major datasets available are all produced in the United States and are based on U.S. definitions of terrorism. This makes it very problematic to use any other definition, and thus, this report will use the definition given by the U.S. Law code: *Terrorism* means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. (U.S.C. Title 22, Ch.38, Para. 2656f subsection d) International terrorism is as above, but involving citizens or territory of more than one country. Usually the perpetrators and the targets stay roughly the same. An example of this is the terrorist attacks by the Lebanese Hezbollah movement against Israel. These attacks clearly involve more than one country, but it is always the same two countries. This brings us to a final and distinct form of terrorism: global terrorism. Although there is no solid definition of it, many observers agree that people involved in global terrorism operate around the world, unfazed by borders or sovereignty. Their goals are often on the scale of a different world order. This translates into attacks against different targets of different scales in different countries. It was global terrorism that prompted the Western world, with the United States in the lead to intervene in Afghanistan and Iraq. Therefore global terrorism is the most relevant form of terrorism for the purpose of this thesis. However, overwhelmingly the available literature does not make a distinction between these different forms of terrorism. The general reasoning being that terrorism in all it forms has the same type of motivation or logic behind it – regardless of the scale of the acts. For the purpose of this thesis the same assumption will be made.

These definitions and the databases based upon it are not free of criticism. The dataset includes search criteria like 'terrorist organizations', which seems natural, but is solely based on the U.S. State departments' list of foreign terrorist organizations. In itself this would not be a problem, if it wasn't for the fact that the State Department only labels organizations that "threaten the security of US nationals or the national security ... of the United States" as terrorist organizations" (US State Department, 2005). The obliquity of using this for an international dataset ought to be obvious. "This highly US-centric definition excludes very large numbers of

non-state groups in Africa and elsewhere that are guilty of perpetrating deliberate, politically motivated violence against civilians" (Human Security brief, p2, 2007). A second, perhaps even more important critique is one that can be made both in the abstract and practically. If the intentionally killing of civilians by non-state actors for political goals is in fact terrorism, as the definition suggests, aren't the hundreds of thousands of victims in Darfur, The DRC, Somalia and so on, terrorism victims? Strangely these accounts are usually referred to as 'war crimes' or 'crimes against humanity'. In Afghanistan, and even more so in Iraq the countless of deadly assaults on civilians by non-state actors are counted as acts of terrorism. This discrepancy in counting and labeling terrorists and victims of terrorism between the numerous wars in Africa and Iraq (primarily) goes entirely unexplained. (Human Security brief, p2-p6, 2007). Regrettably, there seems to be no other option than to use the U.S. definition, for it is the only definition that is backed up by quantative datasets.

2.2. CAUSES OF TERRORISM?

"Terrorism will only be defeated if we act to solve the political disputes or long-standing conflicts that generate support for it" (United Nations Secretary General, 2003). This excerpt is from a speech[7] of Kofi Annan, former Secretary General of the United Nations, that was delivered to heads of state at a conference on "Fighting Terrorism for Humanity: A Conference on Roots of Evil". It was certainly not the first time, but certainly a very clear way of articulating a changing way of thinking about terrorism and how best to counter it.

Terrorism has long been approached from purely historical perspectives. The reason or cause of acts of terrorism was only to be found by looking into the history and background of the country or people committing terrorism. They were the product of years of violent oppression, anarchist rule or even mental illnesses as noted by Lombroso who saw a connection between bomb throwing and pellagra[8] and other vitamin deficiencies among the maize-eating people of southern Europe (C. Lombroso, Les Anarchistes (Paris 1896), 184 et seq.). In 1977 it was Laqueur who summed up the general consensus about the causes of terrorism by saying that explanations that take into account more than a single case are either "exceedingly vague or altogether wrong." Crenshaw (1981) points out the one alternative approach accepted during this time, a political explanation that blames revolutionary ideologies like Marxism-Leninism or nationalism. Often supported by offering that individual psychopathology played a major role. In the decade that followed the political map of the world changed dramatically. And while the saneness of committing terrorist acts is still being debated by scholars, policy makers and experts, the believe that everyone who commits a terrorist act, even suicide bombers, is suffering from a vitamin deficiency disease or other horrible (mental) illness is outdated. In an attempt to clearly specify the cause(s) of terrorism, scholars around the globe have been researching links between terrorism and poverty, education, political freedom, social-economic position and psychopathology. This has led to new approaches and new schools of thought that can be arranged in several fashions. The first way of sorting the 'new' approaches to terrorism is

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[7] The entire speech can be accessed at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sgsm8885.doc.htm
[8] Pellagra is a vitamin deficiency disease most commonly caused by a chronic lack of niacin (vitamin B_3) in the diet.

along four major disciplines, 1: Political, 2: Organizational, 3: Psychological and 4: Multi-causal. The second way does not recognize these disciplines as independent schools, but rather recognizes root –and trigger causes of terrorism. This classification does not deny that reasons for terrorism might be political, organizational or one of the others. However, it does claim that there is never a single reason, but rather one or several dormant causes and a 'trigger'-event. This event might even be almost inconsequential, but just enough to tip the balance from non-violence to violence (terrorism in this case).

2.2.1. POLITICAL

A political approach to the causes of terrorism is in essence a search for environmental factors affecting the perpetrators of terrorism. This approach was adhered to by many researchers throughout the sixties and seventies, including for example Gurr (1970; 2006) and Ross (1996). According to this school of thinking the main causes of terrorism are poverty, inequality and oppression. However, Gurr did not find or set an absolute level or either definition as a precondition for terrorism. Rather, he described the problem with the term: relative deprivation. "The inability to obtain what is felt to be justified triggers feelings of frustration that ultimately facilitates the emergence of collective violence" (Transnationalterrorism.eu, 2008). Research from the other end of the economical spectrum, in essence, absolute poverty, indeed showed that poverty by itself couldn't explain a predisposition to violence. For example Kreuger and Laitin (2003) found that among countries with similar levels of civil liberties, poor countries generate no more terrorism as rich countries. Alesina et al. (1996) and Miguel, Satyanath & Sergenti (2004) put forth that negative economic growth or a poor economic climate lead to increased chance for civil conflict and political coups. This theory is further elaborated on by Abadie & Gardeazabal (2003); Frey, Luechinger & Stutzer (2004) and Sandler & Enders (2005). They put forth that the observed correlation between terrorism and national income cannot be interpreted as a measure of magnitude of the effect of economic variables on terrorism, because terrorism in itself may in turn affect economic prosperity. This last idea is not hard to imagine when thinking of a countries tourist industry. Acts of terrorism will usually lead to less tourism, partly due to negative travel advices from foreign governments; less tourism will lead to less economic growth and less economic growth may lead to more terrorism, which resets the cycle. The most compelling evidence comes from Abadie (2004) who explains that regression results show that after controlling for other country characteristics, including the level of political rights, fractionalization and geography, national income is not significantly associated with terrorism.

Going back to the original school of the political approach it was poverty, inequality and oppression that were believed to be the main causes of terrorism. The main concept to take away from the academic research on economic factors of terrorism seems to be relative deprivation or a felt economic injustice in society, usually supported by the prospect a further declining economic climate. Already hinted at by among others Kreuger and Laitin (2003) is the fact that civil liberties might indeed play a role in environmental causes of terrorism. However, it is Abadie (2004) that provides the most compelling evidence that economics is not the driving force behind terrorism. His work, based on a different data set as most of the preceding work, shows that in contrast to civil wars in Collier and Hoeffler (2004) lack of political freedom is shown to explain terrorism, and it does so in a non-monotonic way. Let's first look at the

different data sets. Most of the earlier scholarly work on the causes and effects of terrorism have relied on the number of incidents and casualties of terrorist attacks as "proxies for the level of terrorist risk" (Abadie, 2004). Assuming the data to be correct and complete, it is not hard understand that absolute numbers do not tell the entire story. Attacks equal in number of casualties might have entirely different outcomes, depending on media attention, fear, location etc. Since this debate would takes us back to the uncompleted search for a suitable universal definition of terrorism, it will suffice to say that numbers only are not the best way to represent terrorism. This was assuming the data to be correct. Unfortunately, this might not be the case. One of the most often used numeric datasets on terrorism, of the U.S. State Department, has had its quality questioned by Frey (2004), Krueger and Laitin (2004) and others. Ambiguity in definitions and virtually no transparency about the data collection are two of the apparent shortcomings. In an attempt to circumvent these shortcomings, Abadie (2004) uses terrorism risk ratings. He explains, "risk ratings are used by international investors to evaluate specific types of country risks." However, "terrorist risk ratings have obvious limitations. They provide only a summary measure of an intrinsically complex phenomenon." The World Market Research Center's Global Terrorism Index (WMRC-GTI) uses a combination of five factors: motivation, presence, scale, efficacy and prevention of terrorism to assess the terrorist risk of a country[9]. Using this different data set Abadie (2004) found that political freedom has a non-monotonic effect on terrorism. This result can be placed under the third 'pillar'; oppression, described by Gurr (1970; 2006) and Ross (1996). Countries with intermediate levels of political freedom are shown to be more prone to terrorism than countries with high levels of political freedom or countries with highly autocratic regimes. Perhaps the non-monotonic nature can best be presented visually (see figure 1). This result is consistent with the observed increase in terrorism for countries in transition from authoritarian regimes to democracies. In addition, the results show that certain geographic characteristics may favor the presence of terrorism.


Figure 1: Terrorism and political freedom (Abadie, 2004)

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[9] For a detailed explanation of the risk assessment see World Market Research Center (2003)

Before getting into the geographic factors brought up by Abadie (2004) and why they are relevant, we will shortly look at the fact that he brought up another item for discussion. Gurr (1970) sees a clear connection between collective violence and terrorism and Collier agrees that a connection appears to exist between civil wars and terrorism. Collier (2003) draws a link between civil war and terrorism by reasoning that civil war often provides territory that functions as safe haven for terrorist. Abadie seems to show otherwise. According to him, the link between civil unrest which often leads to collective violence or even a full-blown civil war and terrorism is not present. Perhaps it is best thought of in this way: a civil war certainly makes it easier for people engaged in terrorist activities to run their operation or even to 'settle' in the region, but that does not mean that civil war produces terrorists.

While the significance of the link between economics and terrorism is still being debated, few people disagree there is a connection between geography and terrorism. Abadie says: "It is well-known that certain geographic characteristics may favor terrorist activities" (2004). Difficult to access areas can offer safe haven to terrorist groups, facilitate training and create the possibilities of engaging in other often illegal activities to provide funding. Production of opiates is often one of the preferred methods of income. Finding and dealing with terrorists in these areas is often thwarted by natural barriers like mountainous terrain, tropical jungle or vast desserts.

2.2.2. ORGANIZATIONAL

The organizational school of thinking revolves around the idea that terrorism is a rational strategic choice. The conscious decision by an organization to use terrorism as an instrument in attaining their goals. A rational decision implies that before committing any act, all options are reviewed, analyzed and ranked in order of preference. If an external party is able to figure out the preference order of an organization it might be possible to predict what an organizations is going to do. Game theory is based on those rankings and sometimes used in academics to help 'predict' what is going to happen. The basic idea of game theory is using rankings (usually referred to as preference orderings) from two or more actors, and find the expected outcome when those actors interact. In our 'game' we recognize two actors: the government and the social (terrorist) group. Obviously, different governments and different social groups have different preferences. Most social groups would rather negotiate than using violence (and thus become a terrorist organization) and some governments prefer anything above being attacked by terrorists. However, this is not always the case. Many governments around the world would rather repress (usually by killing them) terrorists' elements, than negotiate with them and run the risk of looking weak. There are also terrorists that have no rational motivation; they will bomb your house, city or car out of revenge or anger even if a government is willing to negotiate. This difference between actors has led Clark, Golder & Golder (2008) to draw up a game between 'true-believers' who will commit terrorist's acts even if governments are willing to negotiate, 'reluctant terrorists' that prefer a peaceful resolution of a conflict, but will use terrorism if forced into that position and on the side of the government a "repressive governments" that will repress any social groups that might oppose them and "responsive governments" that are willing to enter into negotiations. Each of the above groups has a different preference ordering. Schematically those preference orderings can be represented like:

True believers: terrorist act (3) > negotiations (2) > being repressed (1)
Reluctant terrorists: negotiations (3) > terrorist act (2) > being repressed (1)
Repressive government: repression (3) > negotiations (2) > terrorist act (1)
Responsive government: negotiations (3) > repression (2) > terrorist act (1)
(*) = the relative value of an option; highest number = most preferred option.

The next step is constructing the basic game. We start with the first actor, the social group. In any situation they have two options, they either use violence or they negotiate. If they choose *violence* the game ends with a **Terrorist act**.

If the social group choices *negotiate* the game goes to the next actor, in our case the government. The government then has the choice between either *repress* (the social group), or *negotiate* (with the social group). The model below shows the second part of the game. Following the arrows, we find **Repression** and **Good faith negotiations** as outcomes of the government's actions.

Combining both sides of the model gives us the entire basic model. It shows the two actors, their choices and the three possible outcomes in bold. Additionally, the brackets will contain the relative value of that outcome for the actors. Value 'x' shows the value for the social group and 'y' shows the value of that outcome for the government. These values correspond to the preference ordering we made earlier.

Based on a game found in Bueno de Mesquita (p395-401, 2006).

The final step is adjusting the model for the different groups. Depending on the sort of actor the values for x & y change. The model below shows the 'game' for a repressive government and true believers.

violence → **Terrorist Act (3,1)**

Social group

negotiate → **Government** → **repress** → **Repression (1,3)**

negotiate → **Good faith negotiations (2,2)**

To solve this game or in other words, find the rational outcome for when these two actors interact we use backwards induction. This means, starting from the back and working your way through the model in reverse. In this case, the Government is the actor the most to the right (meaning the last actor to have a choice) and thus the actor we will start with. His/her options lead to either **Repression** or **Good faith negotiations**. To determine which of these is the more valuable choice, we look at the second number in the brackets behind the outcomes, 3 for **Repression** and 2 for **Good faith negotiations**. Since **Repression** is more valuable, the government will choose *repress*.

violence → **Terrorist Act (3,1)**

Social group

repress → **Government** → **negotiate** → **Repression (1,3)**

negotiate → **Good faith negotiations (2,2)**

This choice eliminates the option: **good faith negotiations**. In other words, no matter what the other group is doing, this government will always *repress*. The next step is for the social group. They have two choices: *violence* and *negotiate*.

violence → **Terrorist Act (3,1)**

Social group

negotiate → **Government** → **repress** → **Repression (1,3)**

If they pick *negotiate* the arrow goes to the government-box, which only has one option left – repress, which in turn leads to the game ending in the outcome: **Repression.** If they pick *violence* the game ends with the outcome **Terrorist act**. Looking at the values (first actor, so first

number in the brackets) for these two remaining possible outcomes of this scenario, it is clear the Social group will pick *violence*. The reason is simple, **Terrorist act** has a value of 3 for the Social group and **Repression** only has value 1. This choice will eliminate the outcome **Repression**. Which brings us to the final model.

It should be clear that this scenario ends with the outcome **Terrorist act**. The social group simply gets more 'value' using *violence* than trying to *negotiate* with a repressive government.

Would this change if the government was not repressive, but instead responsive (willing to negotiate)? Before drawing a new game the preference ordering of both actors needs to be known. Schematically the new ordering looks like:

True believers: terrorist act (3) > negotiations (2) > being repressed (1)
Responsive government: negotiations (3) > repression (2) > terrorist act (1)

The model for the new game is as below.

Repeating the same process as before we start with the last actor's choices. *Repress* for outcome **Repression** with value 2 (remember: second actor, second number in the bracket) or negotiate for outcome **Good faith negotiations** with value 3. The government will choose *negotiate*. This eliminates **Repression** from the model. The Social group can now choice between *violence* for outcome **Terrorist act** with value 3 or *negotiate* for outcome **Good faith negotiations** with value 2. The social group still gets the highest value by choosing *violence*. This scenario will again end with a **Terrorist act**.

The first conclusion we can draw from these two games is that as long as the social group falls into the category of 'true believers' it does not matter if the government is willing to listen to them or not. They will always opt for violence, since it has the highest value (3) for them. A second, more sinister, conclusion is that governments might be right when claiming it is no use trying to negotiate with terrorists. The above scenarios distinctly show that trying to negotiate will not wield different results when dealing with 'true believers' and thus repression might be the better course of action. However, there are many people that argue that most terrorists are not true believers, but rather 'Reluctant terrorists.' Some refer to these kinds of terrorists as freedom fighters. Ideally they would negotiate and try and persuade governments to meet their

demands peacefully, however, they are willing to use violence when faced with repression. Clark, Golder & Golder (2008) place organizations like the IRA in Ireland and the Palestinian organization PLO in this category. To find the outcome of this new scenario we need the preference orderings.

Reluctant terrorists: negotiations (3) > terrorist act (2) > being repressed (1)
Repressive government: repression (3) > negotiations (2) > terrorist act (1)

This new scenario shows that the government will choose *repress*, because outcome **Repression** has value 3, whereas outcome **Good faith negotiations** only yield a value of 2. Removing **Good faith negotiations** from the model leaves the social group with the choice between *violence* leading to outcome **Terrorist act** and *negotiate* leading to outcome **Repression**. The social group, even though it would rather find a peaceful solution is 'forced' to pick *violence*, because a **Terrorist act** has a higher value (2) than **Repression** (1). This game too ends with a **Terrorist act**.

The fourth and final scenario is one where the Reluctant terrorists meet a Responsive government. Their preference orderings are as follows:

Reluctant terrorists: negotiations (3) > terrorist act (2) > being repressed (1)
Responsive government: negotiations (3) > repression (2) > terrorist act (1)

It is in this last scenario that the government will choose *negotiate*, because outcome **Good faith negotiations** has value 3. This removes **Repression** from the model, leaving the social group with the choice between **Terrorist act** and **Good faith negotiations**. The best choice is of course *negotiate*, since it leads to **Good faith negotiations** with value 3, while *violence* only

yields value 2. This is the only scenario that does not end with outcome **Terrorist act**, but rather **Good faith negotiations**.

Knowing all this, what about the frequent public statements of governments about how they deal or plan to deal with terrorism? Statements like: "The US government does not negotiate with terrorists" or "we will use every force necessary to stop these terrorists' attacks" After looking at the rational choice models above, one might wonder how successful such statements actually are in preventing terrorism. If the social group is question knows it is dealing with a reluctant government, a government not interested in negotiation, than even the reluctant terrorist will use violence. This brings us to one of the major observations by Clark, Golder & Golder (2008): every potential terrorist group will use violence if they know they are dealing with a repressive government. They argue that harsh language and bold patriotic statements about dealing with terrorism actually turns out to be counterproductive in many cases. Naturally this is not the entire story, as supporters of such statements will point out. They will claim that the idea that a government is willing to negotiate, willing to give in to certain demands of terrorist groups will only promote additional violent actions, because they know it works. Interesting about that idea is the fact that, if true, it would also confirm that terrorist actions are indeed a strategic decision. However, when you are willing to admit that terrorism is indeed a rational decision, than it becomes hard to deny that public statements against terrorism are counterproductive. Unfortunately the paradoxical nature of this line of thought is lost on many.

Another problem is the multi-layered nature of many terrorists' organizations. An attack might be carried out by a true believer. Someone from environments that have seen nothing but conflict or places where hope for a better future is perceived as folly. Sometimes these true-believers are 'bred' through indoctrination with 'sacred' teachings or recruited under false pretences. However, almost always they are being used as nameless 'soldiers' or even puppets by their leaders; people residing in the higher echelons of the organization. The level in the organization where plans are being made, funding to carry them out is found and the right people are selected. Also a goal or target needs to be found, then carefully examined and finally approved. The meticulous planning that went into the 9/11 (2001) attacks, the coordinated suicide attacks on the London public transportation system of 7/7 (2005) or the Madrid Bombings of 3/11 (2004) is impressive from an organizational standpoint. It is extremely unlikely that an organization without people versed in strategic thinking and planning could have made such plans. Getting together the right combination of people, expertise and funds is just not something a brain-washed or indoctrinated einzelgänger is capable of doing.

At a discussion at the Terrorism and Homeland Security Forum, Fernando Reinares[10] showed that the police investigation after the Madrid Bombings found that two terrorists who played a key role in the bombings had been members of the al-Qaeda cell established in Spain in the 1990s. He explained that: "the leader of the Spanish al-Qaeda cell attended a key meeting of North African jihadist groups in Istanbul in February 2002. That meeting, which occurred in the aftermath of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan to topple the Taliban regime and deny al-Qaeda a safe haven, led to a strategic decision by these groups operating in the Maghreb and Spain to launch renewed attacks. Members of those cells had received terrorist training,

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[10] Fernando Reinares - director of the Program on Global Terrorism in Madrid's Elcano Royal Institute

including instruction in using cell phones to trigger simultaneous explosions, in Afghanistan during the Taliban era" (Reinares, 2009).

Going back to the aforementioned critique about the rational choice model, the idea that negotiating with terrorists only leads to more terrorist attacks, we find an additional problem. What if the demands the organization is making are so far out of the realm of possibilities, so far beyond practical that compliance with their demands is just not feasible? Even a responsive government, one willing to negotiate has no other choice but to repress the terrorists. I don't think there is a single government in the world that is willing to abolish itself, willing to disband itself in order to meet the demands of another organization, terrorist or not. Obviously the best example of this is Israel and its 'unfriendly' neighbors. Quoting the late Ayatollah Khomeini, Iranian president Ahmadinejad said "The regime occupying Jerusalem must vanish from the page of time" (2005). The Lebanon organization Hezbollah, which reintroduced suicide attacks in 1983 (they were last used by the Japanese in WWII), has in their manifest the liberation of Jerusalem of the occupying force and the destruction of the Zionist state of Israel. (An Open letter – The Hizballah Program, 1988) And even though the English translation of the charter of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is subject of debate, no one is denying that in article 15 it calls for the elimination of Zionism in Palestine[11]. The two organizations and one nation above have shown in the past to directly or indirectly support violence against Israel. Targeting both the state Israel (usually its military) and the regular population there is no doubt that many of these acts are forms of terrorism. Their goal, as stated is the abolishment of the current state Israel. With those kinds of terms, what could the other party is this conflict (the state Israel) realistically offer that would satisfy such demands? History tells us that there is still no solution to this ongoing dispute, even though Israel has on various occasions shown to be willing to do far-reaching concession. At the eve of the Camp David talks in July 2000 the Israeli Barak government proposed a territorial settlement of a 95% withdrawal out of the West-bank and Gaza by Israeli forces. A report [12]claims that at the summit itself they offered an 88% withdrawal along with the partition of Jerusalem. To many this proposal was seen as more than reasonable. Being rebuffed in their efforts the Israeli government has no choice but to try and repress, as the alternative (more terrorist attacks) is even less desirable. And thus, Israel use brute force in an attempt to repress the terrorist forces demanding something they are unable (and obviously unwilling) to give. Unless both sides are willing to negotiate the violence and the subsequent repressing tactics are going to continue. Unfortunately this is exactly what we've seen in Israel for the last several decades.

So where does that leave us? History shows us that eventually negotiations are the only thing that's left. After years or decades of bloodshed and countless of innocent lives later both sides negotiate a peace settlement. This is what we've seen recently in Northern Ireland. In light of the rational approach, this tells us that the payoff and preference orderings of groups will likely change over time. Playing the same 'game' over and over again might lead to different results, because the parties playing have changed their values. It seems clear that at least some terrorist organizations are operating rationally. They use terrorism as a means to an end; a strategy.

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[11] 'The Zionist presence' is a common Arabic euphemism for the State of Israel, so this clause in fact calls for the destruction of Israel, not just the end of Zionism. (PLO Charter, 1969)

[12] Jerusalem Post | Breaking news (July 2007)

The organizational or rational approach is however not without its flaws and critics. While a rational choice analysis can be a powerful tool for discovering different forces and influences on a decision making process, by both a government and a terrorist organization, it cannot deal with the non logical response. Game theory gives a clear best-case scenario for all involved parties, but fails to take into account the idiosyncrasies that humans will think off. One of the problems that prevent a 'player' to make the most optimal decision is a lack of knowledge. This might be a lack of knowledge of the situation at hand or a general failure to grasp rational thinking (as that too is partly a learned skill). Victoroff (p17, 2005) points out that in addition to people not always acting rationally, the rational choice theory does not explain why very few individuals among hundreds of thousands in virtually identical positions become a terrorist. Crozier, a distinguished historian, journalist and strategist perhaps describes it best: ""Men do not necessarily rebel merely because their conditions of life are intolerable: it takes a rebel to rebel" (p9, 1960). Character and personalities vary and trying to use reason to explain and map the extraordinary variability and adaptability of humans is undoable. Victoroff continues by making a short but indispensable statement: "Passion often trumps rationality" (p17, 2005).

2.2.3. PSYCHOLOGICAL

If not rational thinking, but a predisposition toward becoming a rebel is a requirement, would analyzing and studying the internal drives of terrorists explain the phenomenon of terrorism? The psychological approach differs from the earlier two approaches in that it does not revolve around the act of terrorism itself. It is focused on the motivation of individuals that resort to terrorism. Personalities, beliefs and attitudes towards terrorism are examined by academics like Marc Sageman (2004). How are terrorists recruited? Do they have a 'career' as terrorist and how does one behave as terrorist? These are all questions that need to be answered in order to get to real causes of terrorism. Obviously there are several problems with collecting this data, as the group in question is not easily approachable and researchable. Many of the earlier studies therefore focused on shared characteristics of terrorist, profiles if you will. By extracting and identifying common traits, the hope was to extrapolate certain personalities.

As early as the 1960 and '70s have social scientist looked at the profile of terrorists. They found the typical terrorist to be a well-educated single male in his mid twenties. One of the studies found that members of 18 terrorist groups had an average age of 23.2 to 31.3. Most came from middle or even upper-class background and a form of college education was prevalent among the majority. (Russell & Miller, 1983). A study of almost 50 ETA members showed nearly identical results. (Clark, 1983) Halfway through the 1980's this profile changed. Most revolutionary anarchist groups in Europe were decimated and the US saw a lull in homeland terrorist activity. The new terrorist was a radical Islamic one. "The typical Palestinian terrorist of that later period was age seventeen to twenty-three, came from a large family with an impoverished background, and had low educational achievement (Strentz, 1988). Another change happened in the late 1990s and early twenty-first century. Instead of 'kids' terrorism had now become the business of professionals, married men approaching fifty and young women. (Rees et al, 2002). A horrible, yet appropriate example is the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. Many if not most had university degree's and are from middle class families and have middle incomes. For example: Mohamed Atta, one of the pilots, grows up in Egypt, in a middle class family. His father is an attorney and he and his two sisters attend

university. (McDermott, p10-11, 2005) Ziad Jarrah is from Lebanon. His mother comes from a wealthy family and his father is a mid-level bureaucrat. Before studying at a German university, he attends several private Christian schools. (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 4/19/2002; Mcdermott, p49-50, 2005) "Ahmed Alnami is from Abha, Asir Province. His family is one of government officials and scientists and his father works for the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. He attends university" (Daily Telegraph, 9/15/2002). A recent change was discovered by Rees et al (2002) and Wilkinson (2002) who have linked the recruitment of women suicide bombers to fact that al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade is one of the first secular groups fighting for Palestinian independence. This in shrill contrast to the notion that modern terrorists are indoctrinated by imam-spread religion based doctrines. However useful these results may be, they are still very socioeconomic concentrated as opposed to purely psychological. Scholars like Hubbard (1971), Ferracuti, and Bruno (1981) were among the first to venture into psycho analysis of terrorists. One of the largest studies was performed by the Ministry of Interior of West Germany between 1980 and 1983. After interviewing 250 terrorists it found that certain psychological factors were much more common that ought to be expected. 33 percent had had severe conflicts with parents, 25% had lost one or both parent before the age of fourteen and one in three had been in contact with the juvenile justice system. (Jäger, Schmidtchen, & Süllwold, 1981) They also claimed to have found two personality patterns common to terrorists. Unfortunately the study did not have a control group, nor were valid and reliable behavioral measures used. Crenshaw (1986) points out that excluding these none of the studies were conclusive. These shortcomings are sadly found in many projects. One of the largest, if not the largest study of psychological factors possibly associated with Islamic political violence was conducted by Barber (1999). He used data from "the Palestinian Family Study, a project involving 6,923 ninth-grade students in the West Bank and Gaza. Aggressivity and mood were measured with the Child Behavior Checklist" (Achenbach and Edelbrock, 1987). Regrettable is the fact that the questions about 'family values' and 'participation in the intifada of '87-'93 were weirdly formulated, undermining the conclusions drawn. All of this research falls into the top-down approach to analyzing the psychological aspects of terrorism. It's very closely associated to the political approach, as it tries to explain terrorist behavior in terms of how someone has became a terrorist. What mix of political, social, economical and perhaps even evolutionary circumstances shaped this person into the terrorist that he or she has become? (Wieviorka, 1993; 2004)

The other side of the psychological approach is "a bottom-up approach that explores the characteristics of individuals or groups that turn to terrorism" (Victoroff, p11, 2005). This includes the earlier mentioned notion that terrorists must be insane or at the very least psychopathic. To clarify what these terms mean in reality we have to look at the currently used multiaxial classification of behavioral disorders (in adults). These axes are best thought of as categories. On axis I we find several major clinical illnesses like severe depression and schizophrenia. Axis II refers to personality disorders, like antisocial personality disorder (APD). (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) Antisocial Personality Disorder is term that is used to describe "a pattern of remorseless disregard for the rights of others" (Victoroff, p12, 2005). A commonly used term until the mid-1950s to describe the disorder was psychopathy and later sociopathy. It is important to realize that *psychosis* implies a loss of sense of reality (like is common among people suffering from schizophrenia) and is observed primarily in axis I, but is NOT expected among axis II disorders. Psychosis is often referred to as *insanity* in the criminal

justice system, but this does not make insanity a behavioral science term. The relevant distinction between axis I (psychoses / insanity) and axis II (APD / sociopathy) is that a psychotic or *insane* person has lost most or all connection(s) to reality and does not know right from wrong, while a sociopath knows right from wrong and knowingly chooses wrong without his conscience intervening.

To date, there has not been any comprehensive study of axis I clinical disorders among terrorists. Yet, while the study was done without a control group, an empirical psychological study of left-wing German militants, members of the PIRA[13], FLN[14] and Hezbollah does not find any greater predisposition towards axis I disorders among terrorists. (Victoroff, p12, 2005) Instead, most literature that links clinical mental disorders to terrorism favors the remorseless personality type, sociopathy. (Taylor, 1988) Cooper (1977; 1978), for example, states "terrorists, like psychopaths, are ruthless outlaws and outcasts who adhere to an anomalous scheme of values out of tune with that of the rest of society" (Victoroff, p12, 2005). While it does seem obvious and common sense that people who willingly use violence against innocent people are anti-social (as sociopathy implies), there is no empirical data to support this claim.

This notion is undermined by considering that many terrorists are regarded as heroes and/or respected freedom fighters within their group or even entire social environment. Post (2004) sees a distinction between nationalist-separatist terrorists and revolutionary terrorists. For a nationalist-separatist its environment often views him or her as fighting for their freedom, for their social welfare. The support that members of groups like the ETA receive from the local population is tantamount to collaboration and should be taken as a clear sign that these terrorists are not lone-wolfs or antisocial. More evidence showing the opposite of what was expected comes from Della Porta (p158, 1988) who found that among 1214 Italian militants, 74 percent of new recruits had one or more friends in the organization before joining and 42 percent had more than seven before joining. Even though there is no well defined line between antisocial and prosocial, it does appear that a network and shared social values are part of the recruitment process of terrorists groups. Then there is also plenty of evidence that many suicide bombers with allegiances to for example the Palestinian Hamas have done so out of altruistic reasons. Their families would often receive financial compensation as reward for their sons (and daughters sometimes) dying as martyr. The BBC reported[15] in 2003 that families of suicide bombers had received up to 25,000 dollars from the Palestinian Arab Liberation Front (PALF), a local pro-Iraq group. While these studies do not conclusively show that terrorists are prosocial, the notion that nearly or all terrorists are antisocial or outcasts of society appears implausible at best. Victoroff (p14, 2005) framed the conclusion best by saying that: "Ferracuti's (1982) formulation regarding the relationship between insanity and terrorism might equally apply to the relationship between sociopathy and terrorism: sociopaths may sometimes be among the terrorists, but terrorists are not, by virtue of their political violence, necessarily sociopaths."

Crenshaw (p386, 1986) pointed out that while terrorism may not result from a specific psychological condition, it is not unlikely that "the decision to join a terrorist organization is not

[13] Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)
[14] Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN)
[15] BBC News - Thursday, 13 March, 2003(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2846365.stm)

influenced or, in some cases, even determined by (subconscious) psychological motives." This is basically saying that even though there is no clearly distinguishable psychological disorder common among terrorists, they may exhibit "identifiable psychological traits" or may have been influenced by identifiable environmental factors. Hereafter you will be able to find five possible psychological explanations of such possible traits or influences. These come from political scientists, sociologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists and deal with innate versus acquired aggression as cause of terrorist behavior.

Identity theory

Young people with a (severe) lack of self esteem and a strong need to "consolidate their identities" (Olsson 1988) might be much more easily persuaded to engage in terrorist activities or join terrorist organizations. Victoroff (p22, 2005) explains that while very little research exists in this area, the little that does exist seems to point toward what Olsson called consolidating their identities. "Taylor and Quayle (1994) reported that many became politically violent, seeking a sense of purpose and self-worth" Victoroff (p22, 2005). Unfortunately, no controlled empirical study testing the identity theory on young terrorists exists to date.

Narcissism theory

The line of reasoning behind this theory stems from a departure of classical ego psychology of Freud by Psychoanalyst Heniz Kohut (1972; 1978) who developed self-psychology. The idea behind self-psychology is emphasizing the needs that an infant has for caring responses to develop normally. A lack of maternal empathy might lead to damage to the self-image –so called narcissistic injury. Shaw (1986) and later Pearlstein (1991) hypothesized that this personality deficit, which could lead to narcissistic rage is a plausible explanation of how young people are set on a path toward terrorism. Concrete scientific evidence supporting this theory is not available at present.

Paranoia theory

Post (1998, 2004) proposes a rather comprehensive, psychological formulation of terrorist behavior, mainly aimed at the explanation of how terrorists are able to commit (mass) murder. He postulates that a prominent feature of terrorist psychology is projection; a rather infantile defense mechanism that assigns unwanted internal feelings to an external object. Growing up with a "damaged self-concept" that "idealizes the good self and splits out the bad self" (Victoroff, p23, 2005). Persistence of this infantile phase through adulthood is believed to be at the root of what Klein called "paranoidschizoid position" (Robins & Post, 1997). This paranoid position fuels the terrorist with doubt, suspicions and accusations that justify violent acts against his victims, believing those acts to be self-defense. "The zeal of the torturer; the alacrity of the killer, represents his eagerness to destroy the devalued and disowned part of the self" (Robins & Post, p146, 1997). Further research, using validated measures of paranoia, will have to demonstrate the accuracy of this theory.

Humiliation-Revenge theory

Internal pressure for revenge after having been the victim of humiliation by an oppressor has often been thought of as explanation of terrorist behavior. A study in 2004 combining neuroimaging and psychological studies found that individuals will punish "social transgressors" even when it is costly to the punisher. (de Quervain et all, 2004) This behavior was driven by:

"deep subcortial brain activity that may have overruled the more rational cortex" (Victoroff, p23, 2005). In other words, revenge or the will to punish might be such a powerful motivator that it can overrule rational though, even to the point where it becomes prohibitively costly to the punisher. This plausible theory helps to explain how revenge might be motivating violent acts, even though very little strategic benefit is likely to come of it. However, no conclusive research has been published to date.

Absolutist/Apocalyptic theory

"Mass destruction as a path toward replacing the corrupt world with a pure new social order" (Victoroff, p25, 2005). Lifton (2005) gives an account of the Aum Shinrikyo cult and several other apocalyptic groups that operate according to this believe. Victoroff elaborates by stating "apocalyptic groups exhibit absolutist moral polarization, idealization of a messianic figure, and impaired reality testing, imagining vast conspiracies of evil" (p25, 2005). The seductive appeal of absolutist moral thinking on young adults with weak identities seems plausible. 'Black-and-white' thinking makes it easier to justify violent acts against the 'other-side' especially when it is coupled with dehumanizing[16], psychic numbing[17] or isolation of affect[18]. Again it remains to be seen if this theory can be confirmed by solid scientific research. For now it remains a plausible psychoanalytic interpretation.

2.2.4. MULTI-CAUSAL

Instead of finding a cause or reason for terrorism within a single school of thought, the multi-causal approach underlines the presence of multiple causal connections. Incorporating elements from political, sociological, economical and psychological approaches, the multi-causal approach hopes to find the cause of terrorism. Among the many scholars who favor this approach are Long who wrote: "single-factor explanations overlook the fact that terrorist behavior is an interaction between individual psychology and external environment" (1990). Kimhi & Even stating that: ""most researchers tend to agree… that suicide terror is a multi-factorial phenomenon. The various explanations for suicide terror include personal and group motives, environmental conditions, and their interactions" (2004) and Moghadam, who wrote: "suicide attacks are best understood when analyzed on three levels of analyses: an individual level, an organizational level, and an environmental level" (2007). On the relationship between suicide terrorism and 'regular' terrorism[19] this study will consider them as one and the same phenomenon. Both Crenshaw (2000) and Mohadam (2007) feel that a in contrast to regular terrorism a model that tries to conceptualize the roots of suicide terrorism must include an explanation for self-sacrifice and martyrdom. Yet, this study proposes that such a clear distinction does not exist. While suicide bombers will 'achieve' martyrdom with greater certainty, terrorist killed by their enemies hands are just as likely to be labeled as martyrs. Also, as is explained in the section

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[16] A psychological process whereby opponents view each other as less than human and thus not deserving of moral consideration. (Michelle Maiese, July 2003, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/dehumanization)

[17] A reduced emotional responsiveness associated with exposure to traumatic events (Lifton, 2005)

[18] Isolation of affect results in separating one's feelings from an idea or event. Separating one's feelings prevents a person from being hurt while dealing with an otherwise stressful event. This may be common in cold-blooded murders, in which the person does not demonstrate remorse when conducting a distressing and despicable action. (Clinical Review, 2010)

[19] Terrorism in which the perpetrator's death is possible, sometimes even highly likely, yet not required for the attack to occur.

about the humiliation-revenge theory, it is likely that the cost of terrorist actions on the perpetrators themselves (or at least to some of them) does not weight heavily, even to the point of self-sacrifice.

The multi-causal approach suffers from a for the moment unsolvable contradiction. By including so many factors and employing such a broad spectrum of possible explanations the multi-causal school offers the least direct insight into the underlying causes of terrorism. Also if we assume that factors on several different levels, like for example those proposed by Moghadam (2007) - individual, organizational and environmental- are ultimately responsible for terrorism, there will need to be found and assigned relative weight to those different levels and factors in order to judge their influence adequately. However, the multi-causal approach is likely to be the most 'correct' explanation of the causes of terrorism. Today's world has over a billion people living on under a dollar and 25 cents a day[20] –poor by any measure. Yet very few turn to terrorism. According to the latest FreedomHouse report (2010) 47 out of the 194 countries are not free. The 2,333,869,000 people living in these countries, while obviously under some form of oppression, do not all turn to violence or terrorism. And although good estimates of how many people have psychological problems are scarce (as many remain undiagnosed throughout their lives), I'm fairly certain they far outnumber the total number of terrorists. Therefore it seems practical to claim that in order to find the causes of terrorism, one has to look beyond a just a single explanation.

These four disciplines are not the only way of identifying and classifying the causes of terrorism. As stated earlier in this chapter, work by Crenshaw (1981) does not recognize these schools, but instead sees a difference in the type of cause: root or trigger. The conceptual difference between these two ways of classifying –disciplines vs. root & trigger- lies in the fact that the root & trigger approach recognizes a process, whereas the four schools of thought do not. An oversimplified explanation of this difference can be found below. The organizational, political, psychological and even the multi-causal approach all identify a condition (or several) and once that condition is fulfilled you are a terrorist or you are about to become a terrorist. If terrorists are poor, ill educated and repressed than a person who fits these three conditions is a terrorist. The root & trigger approach changes this by saying: you need condition a, b & c fulfilled and then a 'trigger' is needed –a last straw. This changes the dynamic from passively meeting criteria to a process of how one gets to be a terrorist.

2.2.5. ROOT AND TRIGGER CAUSES

Many people, not only from the United States, but also worldwide, remember the bizarre presidential election of 2000, between the Republican Governor of Texas, George W. Bush and the Democratic Vice President. By early evening on Election Day it becomes clear that the 25 electoral votes of Florida will determine the winner. After conceding to Bush at approximately 3 am, Gore retracts his concession after having learned of the states mandated automatic recount of the votes. The already razor-slim lead of Bush is further reduced to around 300 votes (out of the nearly 6 million cast). Due to an unusually large amount of third-party votes in several counties a manual recount of 1.8 million votes in requested. What follows is a 'court battle' going

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[20] The Worldbank puts the numbers of poor people (who live on under $1.25 a day) for the year 2005 on 1.373.690.000 (Worldbank, 2010)

all the way up to the US Supreme Court, where a final discussion is handed down to reverse the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida to allow for manual recounts. The 5-4 split ruling in favor of reversing the decision is unsurprisingly along party lines. "The decision generated enormous controversy. Those objecting to the ruling assert that the Supreme Court, and not the electorate, has effectively determined the outcome of the presidential election" (Info Please, 2007). On January 20th 2001, more than two months after the election, George W. Bush is sworn in as the 43rd President of the United States. Analysis later showed that it is likely that Bush had not been declared the winner if it had not been for a huge number of people disallowed to vote for mistakenly being identified as criminals.[21] Confusing 'butterfly' style ballots in an overwhelmingly Democratic districts and of course the US Supreme Court voting along party lines to "uphold a decision of Florida Secretary of State, Kathleen Harris who has been sharply criticized because she worked for the Bush campaign, and thus had a direct conflict of interest" (Irene Dieter, 2003). While the last words hadn't been spoken about the election, the controversy had not led people to mass riots, plundering or worse. Several years later it would be little more than a joke to most, even to those who had been actively involved. In An Inconvenient Truth, a documentary on Al Gore's travels and efforts to educate people about global warming, he starts the introduction with: "I am Al Gore; I used to be the next President of the United States." Peter Rainer (2006) Now try and picture these events in an African country where tribal rivalries have never been fully 'solved' however good economic growth and stability have been the trend for three decades.

After the results of the Kenyan presidential election of December 27, 2007 were made public, it took just 15 minutes for the country –which has seen relative peace and stability for several decades- to plunge into crisis. (NY Times, 12/31/2007) Election officials reported election fraud and rigged votes. Yet one might have expected that a country that has been one of the very few success stories on the African continent would not revert back to crisis just so rapidly. The following days the international media reported on the tragic events still developing. "A mob torched a church sheltering hundreds of people fleeing post-election violence, killing up to 50 people - including many children" (The Sydney Morning Herald, 1/2/2008). "Witnesses described seeing two people pulled from cars and stoned to death, while another was burned alive in a minibus" (USA Today, 1/29/2008). While there has been little debate on whether or not these actions were terrorism, it is not hard to argue that at least some of them were tantamount to terrorism.

While very grim, the above two scenarios serve as excellent example of how comparable situations might result in funny one-liners in one country and violence in another. Without claiming that these two scenarios are identical and that there is nothing more to it, it does seem reasonable to argue that both deal with questionable presidential election results. Obviously one might point to the difference in circumstances and context and rightfully so. In this section we make the distinction not between organizational or psychological causes, but rather between root causes and trigger causes. Root causes are those factors that facilitate terrorism in the long run. One might think of a foreign occupation or oppression by a dictator. These conditions do not

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[21] Prior to the election, 94,000 voters were removed. This is legal if someone has been convicted of a felony, but as it turns out, 97 percent were innocent and should not have been removed. The list of voters denied the right to vote was overwhelmingly Democratic and half were minorities (Kelly, 2002)

automatically translate in terrorism, but can almost always be found after analyzing a terrorist attack. Crenshaw (1981) labeled this category as *preconditions*. On the other end of the spectrum are trigger causes. These are events that immediately precede terrorist actions. These are usually very concrete and should be seen as the last straw, the event that prompted acts of terrorism. Obviously this is a very diverse set of possible causes, but example might include: an attack (physically or verbally) on your subgroup or culture, peace talks, a coup d'état and of course events that call for revenge (like contested elections). Crenshaw (1981) labeled these trigger causes *precipitants.* In an effort to classify the most common root and trigger causes the Transnational terrorism, security and the rule of law team (2008) has compiled a list based on their occurrence in popular academic literature. For both root and trigger causes they identify the top five causes and rank them according to their specificity (with the most general first)

Root causes
1. Rapid modernization and urbanization have been found to have a strong correlation with ideological terrorism (but not nationalist terrorism) (Crenshaw, 1981). Countries that have achieved incredible economic growth in very little time, often via natural resources, shed social patterns, which suddenly seem obsolete. These are sometimes replaced with more radical ideologies.
2. Lack of democracy, civil liberties and the rule of law have a non-monotonic correlation with domestic terrorism. Countries with intermediate levels of democracy and civil liberties often lack the capacity (or the will) to exercise territorial control. Terrorist organizations eagerly exploit the potential power vacuum.
3. Previous political violence may soften up the ground for future violence and terrorism. In a society where political violence has become such a common occurrence that many, especially young, people don't know any better, it is likely to that their readiness to support or commit terrorism is much higher.
4. Repression by foreign occupation or colonial powers has given birth to countless of nationalist terrorist organizations. In fighting for freedom they often employ terrorist means, yet frequently enjoy sizeable support among the local population.
5. Discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or religion is the most common cause for ethno-naturalist terrorism. Prolonged discrimination against large (minority) groups in society often leads to their increased willingness to use violent means to achieve a higher degree of social equality.

Trigger causes
1. (Provocative) events that call for revenge are often quoted as direct cause. Examples include police brutality or contested elections.
2. Little or no possibility for political participation facilitates the emergence of groups. The most obvious example is being shut out of an election, either by not being allowed to vote or 'your' candidate is not allowed to be elected.
3. Concrete grievances among a part of the population. Government policies clearly targeted at particular parts of a population might provoke or illicit violent behavior.
4. Importance of belonging to a strong group for identity development is especially critical to young people from unstable backgrounds and in uncertain times.

5. Peace talks, especially in situations where multiple groups were involved, might lead to increased social tension and violence if not all groups are willing to negotiate. This is often the case in civil wars.
(TTSRL, p18-20, 2008)

2.3. NATIONBUILDING

Nationbuilding is the independent variable in this research. While, perhaps, slightly less ambiguous, equally complex as terrorism. Nationbuilding is not a new concept either, according to Ottaway (2002) just looking at the political map every century after the fall of the Roman Empire should be prove that nationbuilding has been around for quite a while. She identifies the three types of nationbuilding with the most lasting impact on the modern world, nationalism, colonialism and post-World War II reconstruction. Nationalism is what formed most European countries that exist today. The theory was that each nation, embodying a shared community of culture and blood, was entitled to its own state. In order for this to idea to work, stronger nations willing to make room for new ones, relatively competent governments and somewhat homogenous populations were required. During the colonial ages, overwhelmingly European powers meddled in governmental structures, culture and politics and often replacing them with newly 'invented' countries and leadership. The most successful nationbuilding ever undertaken was the post World War II reconstruction of West Germany and Japan. Unfortunately the conditions under which it took place can't be found anywhere in the current global theatre. While destroyed and forced to surrender, both Germany and Japan had strong state traditions and competent civil servants. Their broken countries and defeated populations still shared the same cultural identity and mostly ethnicity.

Fast forward sixty years and former United Nation Secretary-General Kofi Annan claims that "the events of September 11 should make everyone realize that when organizations like the Taliban are allowed to violate the rights of their individual citizens, they become a menace not only to their own people, but also to their neighbors and indeed the world." He goes on by saying that "This will require us to look beyond the framework of states," and "focus, as never before, on improving the conditions of the individual men and women who give the state or nation its richness and character" (Kofi Anan, 2001). Even though he did not expressively call for a nationbuilding mandate it his statements do appear to be an eloquent way of justifying the idea behind nationbuilding.

The United Nations has been using the following definition of nationbuilding: the process of establishing civic order and governmental functions in countries that are emerging from a period of war or other types of upheaval (2003). A slightly different approach is taken by Ottaway (2002), "the goal of nationbuilding should not be to impose common identities on deeply divided peoples, but to organize states that can administer their territories and allow people to live together despite differences." Of course both leave ample room for different interpretations and or methods. According to the bipartisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, there is a need for a framework wherein a cohesive and strategic international response can be formed. However, the commission does recognize that the main priorities of any

nationbuilding mission can best be captured within four policy areas, namely: security, political reform, economic reconstruction and strengthening legal institutions. (Play to Win, 2003)

Unfortunately there is hardly literature to be found that deals specifically with why nationbuilding could be considered a tool in fighting terrorism. While it is true that several policy makers have reasoned that this might be the case, there is virtually no academic research on the subject. Krauthammer, an essayist, columnist and commentator on United States politics says: "… the spread of democracy is not just an end but a means, an indispensable means for securing American interests. The reason is simple. Democracies are inherently more friendly to the United States, less belligerent to their neighbors, and generally more inclined to peace. Realists are right that to protect your interests you often have to go around the world bashing bad guys over the head. But that technique, no matter how satisfying, has its limits. At some point, you have to implant something, something organic and self-developing. And that something is democracy" (Krauthammer, 2004). While the prose has eloquence, the underlying facts are more ambiguous. Especially considering that terrorism is not confined to undemocratic states, think of the Basque ETA movement in Spain, nor do autocratic regimes produce the most terrorist[22].

In the 2007 report: The beginner's guide to nationbuilding, by the RAND corporation a set of rather straight forward principles is laid out. They identify the main objective of nationbuilding as making violent societies peaceful and while economic development and political reform are important instruments, they are not the first priority. Public security and humanitarian issues have to come first. Basic needs like having food and shelter are vital. No amount of money will make people care about political parties when they have nothing to eat. Six priorities are identified as critical to be successful in nationbuilding. They are: security, humanitarian relief, governance, economic stabilization, democratization and development. Ideally activities in these categories should not be initiated sequentially, but in parallel with each other. The U.S. Congressional Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction identifies slightly different priorities, but their framework works from the same basic principles. Security is paramount, but political reform, economic reconstruction and strengthening of legal institutions are equally important to be successful in these endeavors.

Research by the same RAND Corporation has found that on average you need between 10 and 20 soldiers per 1000 inhabitants to secure an internally divided country. This number goes down the more able the local government is or becomes at securing their own territory. (International) Police provides a more local form of security and should be no less than 1 officer for every 10000 inhabitants if their primary mission is training and monitoring and no less than 1 per 1000 if they are responsible for proving primary safety. Unfortunately the other categories are more problematic to define, as there are simply no meaningful statistics on how much aid is enough or how strict the rule of law has to be to be successful.

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[22] The country with the lowest value of the WMRC Global Terrorism Index 2003/4 is North Korea, a highly autocratic regime.

3.AFGHANISTAN

At one point among the richest countries in the known world, Afghanistan and its people have seen mostly hardship the last several decades. Currently it is one of the fronts in the US's global war on terror. Before examining the current nation-building efforts and their possible effects, we will turn our attention to a short history of the country and how it became a terrorist's safe heaven.

3.1. FROM BRONZE AGE TO TALIBAN

Throughout its history the region currently known as Afghanistan has seen its fair share of turmoil, uproar and rebellion. However, this could be said for countless of places across the globe. What makes the region unique is its fierce and successful resistance to outside rulers. Examples of this extraordinary resistance, even over thousands of years, can be found ever since the first urban centers arose in the region –somewhere between 3000 and 2000 BC. By the middle of the 6th century BC the region of Aryana[23] was under the control of the Persian Empire and about 300 years later (around 330 BC) by the Greek / Macedonian ruler, Alexander the Great. Both reigns were plagued by tribal revolts. With the demise of their empires and the several others that followed, Arabs from the Arabian Peninsula were able to seize power. Within 300 years of the Prophets' death, Afghanistan had become the center of Islamic power and civilization in the known world. This lasts until Genghis Khan conquers most of East Asia and assimilates the entire region in the Mongol Empire. His raids leave many cities in ruins and more importantly, destroys almost all irrigation systems –resulting in once fertile soil turning into permanent deserts. Yet again an exemption has to be made for the mountainous tribes of the southern regions of Afghanistan. Even at the height of the Mongol Empire, stretching from Eastern Europe to China and the Middle East – the largest contiguous empire in the history of the world, the mountain tribes were able to evade conquering. The Durrani Empire, formed by the 'founding father' of Afghanistan, Ahmad Shah Durrani[24] in 1747, struggles with almost continuous uprisings. After his death, his son is forced by tribal turmoil to establish Kabul instead of Kandahar as capital, but internal revolt continues to trouble the empire until its final collapse in 1823. Not long after, Afghanistan lies at the heart of the Great Game[25]. During the first Anglo-Afghan war (1838-1842), the British initially install a 'puppet-king' but ongoing rebellion, forces the British to reconsider their occupation of Afghanistan. While marching out of Kabul, their king is assassinated and roaming bands of Afghans slaughter all but one of the retreating British[26]. After the second and third Anglo-Afghan wars the 'war-weary' British were forced to

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[23] Aryana comes from Aryans, the speakers of the parent language of the Indo-European languages
[24] Ahmad Shah Durrani was born as Ahmed Khan Abdali and known as Ahmad Shah Abdali before being elected as the new head of state (the election took place at Khandahar) (Encyclopedia Britannica, Afghanistan, 2010)
[25] Afghanistan had become a pawn in a rivalry between imperial Britain and tsarist Russia over political ideology and commercial interests that Rudyard Kipling termed the "Great Game." (Encyclopedia Britannica, Afghanistan, 2010)
[26] 4500 British troops and 12.000 dependants were slaughtered during their retreat back to a fort in Jalalabad. William Brydon, an assistant surgeon is the only person to survive the 140km retreat to the fort. (Encyclopedia Britannica, Afghanistan, 2010)

relinquish all control over Afghanistan[27]. Yet, by the time World War II engulfs much of the continent; Afghanistan remains neutral and does reasonably well. In the aftermath of the war, there are free elections and a relatively free press in the country. After several revolts Soviet forces invade the country on Christmas day, 1979. Resistance to this the new Soviet-installed government keeps spreading and by mid-1980s more than half of the country is no longer under the governments' control, but rather in the hands of guerilla leaders. Going by the name of *mujahideen*, these Pakistan based guerillas gain a fearsome reputation for their fighting prowess. Supported by the production and smuggling of narcotics, as well as arms and financial backing from the United States, Saudi Arabia, Iran and China they are able to inflict substantial damage to their opponents. Finally in April of 1988 an agreement is reached that provides for the full withdrawal of the soviet army. The war would leave nearly 5 million people displaced, most of who had fled to Pakistan or Iran and between 700.000 and 1.3 million death. Soon after, the mujahideen are able to take Kabul, 'liberate' Afghanistan and declare the Islamic State of Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the new interim government is unable to withstand the increasing tensions from re-emerging differences between the various groups now that their common enemy (the communist influence) is gone. It doesn't take long before the fighting continues and over the next two years, the country slips into chaos. Outside of Kabul the country is ruled by warlords and their militia's generating income by producing narcotics, extortion, kidnapping, demanding taxes and transit a.k.a. 'safe passage' fees.

Partly in response to the situation a 'new' faction emerges in 1994, the Taliban.[28] These mujahideen identify themselves as religious students and make it their mission to disarm the country, end lawlessness and enforce Islamic law (the Sharia) on a united Afghanistan. Their initial successes, especially in the region of Kandahar, are brought about by military skill in combination with support from local populations desperate to put an end to lawlessness. In little under two years, the Taliban control much of the country and are able to take Kabul in the fall of 1996. What little is left of the government and several other opposing clans are forced to retreat to the mountains in a small part of the country's territory in the north. Their initial appeal quickly fades as the enforcement of fundamentalists' rules of behavior become stricter. Women are suddenly no longer allowed to attend school or work outside their homes, must wear *burkas* and cannot be escorted by men not related to them. Men are forced to pray five times a day and cannot trim their beards –ever. In accordance with the Sharia, the punishment for theft is the amputation of the hand and murder, adultery and drug dealing become punishable by death. Their laws and practices attract worldwide condemnation and only three countries recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan[29]. They are linked to several groups smuggling narcotics across the world and are accused of harboring and training militants, most of whom were holdovers from the Soviet occupation. Several training camps of one of those organizations, established in the aftermath of the Soviet era by Saudi expatriate Osama bin Laden is the target of U.S. cruise missiles in response to the 1998 terrorist bombings of their

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[27] Afghans commemorate this day by proclaiming August 19, 1919 as Independence Day. (CIA, Worldfactbook, 2010)
[28] While the Taliban seemed to emerge out of nowhere, they have long been part of the religious establishment living in the shadow of other military, political, and economic groups. They were known for inflicting heavy losses on the British in the third Anglo-Afghan war and fought alongside other Mujahideen during the Soviet occupation. (Kawun Kakar, Institute for Afghan Studies,Fall, 2000)
[29] Only the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia formally recognize the Taliban Government.

embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The organization and its leaders openly support the Taliban regime and support their fight against the former government and its allies (the Northern Alliance) in the northern most reaches of the country. According to U.S. officials the Afghan based organization "connects and coordinates fundamentalist Islamic terrorist groups around the world" (Shroder, 2009). Refusal by the Taliban to extradite the leader of the organization, whom was being accused of planning violent acts and organizing a global terrorism network, led to UN sanctions against the regime in 1999 and 2001. Regrettably, that same year the organization became universally synonymous with terrorism and its leader the most sought after person in the world. Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda were about to reach for the lime-light.

The day is September 11, 2001, the United Nations International Day of Peace. Sometime between 8:14 and 8:20 am (all times are EDT) American Airlines flight 11 out of Boston, Massachusetts is hijacked. Twenty minutes later, at approximately 8:40 am United Airlines flight 175, also out of Boston Massachusetts is hijacked. It isn't much later than a quarter to nine in the morning as the first hijacked plane crashes into the north tower of the World Trade Center in New York tearing a gaping hole in the building and setting it afire. While the tower burns, two more planes are hijacked, American Airlines flight 77 out of Washington Dulles International Airport and United Airlines flight 93 out of Newark, New Jersey. Just after 9:00 am the second hijacked airliner hits the south tower of the World Trade Center and explodes. American Airlines flight 77 hits the West side of the Pentagon within an hour of being hijacked. At 10:05 am, after a little over an hour of being hit, the south tower of the WTC collapses, filling the streets below with a massive cloud of dust and debris. The only remaining hijacked plane in the air at this point, United Airlines flight 93, goes down in Somerset Country, Pennsylvania, after what is believed to be a passenger up rise. The north tower of the WTC, which has been burning for well over 90 minutes collapses at 10:28am. In the hours that follow it is confirmed that the terror network run by Osama bin Laden is connected to what is now known to be a terrorist attack against the United States. That same evening, in his address to the nation, President Bush stated that "the U.S. government will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed the acts and those who harbor them" (CNN, 2001). The final death toll of the '9/11 attacks' is 2985, including 343 firefighters and 60 police officers. (M. Elsis, 2002 & CNN, 2001)

3.2. OVERTHROWING THE TALIBAN AND REBUILDING THE COUNTRY

The next morning, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld instructs a team to prepare a mission brief on credible military options. Ten days after the attack the President is presented with several viable options and it is decided to prepare a full mission analysis. "Planning involved not only an evaluation of the enemy situation, but also the history of military operations in Afghanistan and the political and military situations across the region" (Global Security, 2010). Simultaneously, through diplomatic channels the request or more accurately, *demand*, for the Taliban to extradite Osama bin Laden is made. Strengthened by the refusal of the Taliban's supreme leader Mullah Muhammad Omar to do so and armed with the mission analysis, President Bush directs combat operations to start early October.

On October 7, 2001 the self-proclaimed war on terror begins with Special Forces teams from the United States, United Kingdom and Australia and aerial bombings on Kabul. Within a few days most al-Qaeda and Taliban training sites are destroyed and the Northern Alliance resumes its offensive north of Kabul, this time supported by the Special Forces. Gradually they are able to drive the Taliban out of their fortified positions and by early December, they are forced to give up their last remaining stronghold, Kandahar. It is believed that many al-Qaeda fighters retreated to well-supported and well-protected cave systems in the Tora Bora region close to the Pakistan border. Meanwhile an interim administration is formed by several anti-Taliban groups that would hold power until a transitional government could be convened. During this time an international peace keep force is responsible for maintaining law and order throughout the country. (Encyclopedia Britannica - Afghanistan, 2010)

Nearly nine years after the start of combat operations in Afghanistan, and approximately eight years after removing the Taliban from power, there are close to 150.000 foreign troops active in Afghanistan. The lion's share of the troops come from the United States, operating under NATO flag, the rest is part of U.S. operation Enduring freedom. During these years there has been a constant effort to transform Afghanistan away from the Taliban-run, economically broken and democratically defunct country to a more or less modern democracy. A democracy capable of providing reasonable stability, peace and security for its people and fellow countries. Especially the last part, providing a stable, peaceful and secure country in the world community is essential, for it is the main reason 'we' (the international community) did anything in Afghanistan after killing as many terrorists we could find, destroying their bases of operation and removing the regime that harbors them. To get an understanding of what has been done to achieve this goal a short overview of foreign-led activities in Afghanistan is provided. Since there has been a coordinated[30] effort for several years and there have been ventures in all directions[31] of nationbuilding as identified by the Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction it is safe to classify these efforts as nationbuilding.

Whilst the original military operation was planned and operated by the U.S. the majority of military personal currently in the country works under UN mandate. Security Council resolution 1386,4 put the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in charge of the international military operation and selected the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to be in charge of international civic activities. The military troops still operating under direct U.S. control are mainly tasked with fighting insurgencies and putting down resistance.

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[30] The first year of the Afghan reconstruction saw numerous problems, both with overall U.S. strategy and in the on-the-ground coordination of U.S. and international relief efforts. Essentially, there was no overall plan or comprehensive strategy for the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. (Fukuyama, 2005)

[31] Security, political reform, economic reconstruction and strengthening of legal institutions (Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction)

3.2.1. SECURITY

Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) is responsible for security sector reform. The project is led by the UNDP working under UNAMA. "Different countries fund different areas of programming: Japan funds DDR[32], the United States and Germany fund police training, the United Kingdom funds anti-drug trafficking efforts… and the United States funds reform of the Armed Forces" (Caramés and Sanz, p18, 2009). The new Afghan National Army was established in December 2002, with the help of the U.S., U.K. and France and by late 2007 it was slowly being able to operate without U.S. or ISAF forces and consisted of nearly 70.000 soldiers not half a year later. To improve the quality of the officers and their military leaders, a National Military Academy modeled after the United Stated West Point military academy, New York was built and the two institutes exchange knowledge and provide for visiting lecturers. In addition nearly 175 private contractors have been hired to help mentor and train personnel at the Afghan Ministry of Defense. And to provide future employees a new $200 million Afghan Defense University (ADU) is built outside Kabul. To further strengthen the Afghan military, several military bases have been constructed around the country. An example is the forward operating base near Farah, close to the border with Iran that will house 2000 soldiers and is provided with a mentoring team led by the U.S. (Caramés and Sanz, p17-18, 2009)

Obviously not all of these developments were started right away and others have taken several years to complete. In order to still provide military security there has been a large foreign military force in the country to combat insurgencies and provide stability. The initial deployment was just a few thousand men, but overall deployments have been increasing for every year. There are currently just over a 100,000 troops in country; a number that is expected to rise by another 30,000 to 40,000 by the end of this year. The majority of these are from the United States, operating under ISAF command.


Figure 2: US & Coalition forces in Afghanistan (Belasco, 2009)

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[32] Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration programs have become key security components of post-war rehabilitation and central to the United Nations peacekeeping operations in the last 20 years. (Caramés and Sanz, 2009, p8).

An important aspect is not the absolute number of troops in the country, but rather the force level, or the number of soldiers for every 1000 inhabitants of Afghanistan. If by the end of 2010 all additional troops have arrived, there will be almost five soldiers for every 1000 Afghans, a stark increase over the 0.44 soldiers in 2002.

Equally important to military security it a well trained and equipped police force, able to provide general safety and law & order. As early as April 2002 Germany, within a UNDP framework (LOFTA[33]), took the lead for rebuilding the police sector. Together with representatives of the Afghan government they calculated that the national police would need to have a force of approximately 62000 people, including uniformed -, border -, highway –and counternarcotics police. The first order of business was rebuilding the National Police Academy in Kabul to train new officers. An additional eight training centers were created to train 'regular' police. Several governments of the coalition forces contributed individual equipment[34] and unit equipment[35]. Private contractors were attracted to provide teachers and trainers. In 2005 the new academy in Kabul graduated its first class of 251 police officers, of which 15 were female. (Office of Inspector General, p5-7, 2006) More broadly LOFTA works on institutional development, procurement, maintenance and operations of (non-lethal) police equipment, rehabilitation of police facilities and remuneration of uniformed personnel (UNDP, 2010)

Additionally the United Kingdom is the primary sponsor of the counternarcotics program and coordinates the collective efforts in this area through the Counternarcotics Task Force in Kabul. Reducing the production and trafficking of opiates has real security benefits, especially in more rural areas. Of course, it is not just a matter of enforcement. To provide long term alternative there is a lot of work being done in the area of livelihood development. (Office of Inspector General, p5-7, 2006) Equally important to these rural areas or really anywhere outside of the major population hubs is the construction of decent (asphalt) roads. This will allow the government to effectively extend its reach into these areas, for example into the Nangarhar province. A relatively small province, east of Kabul and bordering Pakistan, known for its difficult terrain and harsh conditions in winter. (RAND, pXIX , 2010)

Working from a different angle to improve long term security for the Afghan people, primary schools all over the country have been rebuilt. They are also provided with study materials, teachers (or more accurately: support for teachers from Afghanistan itself). All in an effort to reduce the pool of potential recruits for the Taliban and other insurgencies. Obviously, this measure is also part of economic restructuring, as a more literate workforce leads to higher productivity and faster economic growth and will benefit Afghanistan immensely several years from now. (RAND, pXIX , 2010)

3.2.2. ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION

The third focus area of nationbuilding is all based around improving the economic condition of the country. This includes providing aid, as well as developing a framework that provides the

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[33] Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (UNDP, 2010)
[34] Uniforms, handguns, boots etc..
[35] Communication equipment, vehicles, mobile command centers

country with the right tools to grow their economy in the intermediate to long run. Countries all around the world, sometimes directly, other times through UN programs have provided Afghanistan with huge amounts of aid. A large percentage of this has been donated by the coalition members, with the U.S. donating the most[36]. A quick look at the figure below shows that in the

**Net official development assistance (ODA) received by Afghanistan**

Figure 3: Net ODA Afghanistan (Worldbank, 2010)

years prior to 2001, the average yearly flow of official development aid into the country was about 174 million US dollar a year. By 2008 it had risen to 4865 million or 4.8 billion US dollar. While aid can do a lot of good, there have been numerous studies[37] that show that foreign aid is usually a 'mixed' bag. Without good institutions, a solid economic network (financial institutions like banks, macroeconomic planning agencies and stock markets) and developing the countries own economy, aid is an entirely short-term solution. Especially the lack of good institutions makes ODA less effective for reconstruction. The Afghanistan government simply lacks the capacity to manage and disburse these amounts of money. A more meaningful statistic might be the funds that countries spend on their efforts in the country. In the figure below we find the funds appropriated by the United States for the entirety of their efforts. A portion of this (in the early years approximately half and from 2006 and on about a fifth) is disbursed as ODA. The rest is used to finance projects in Afghanistan directly ('bypassing' the central government).

US Appropriated Reconstruction funds for Afghanistan

Figure 4: Appropriated US reconstruction funds (SIGAR, 2010)

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[36] In fysical year 2008 the USAID budget for Afghanistan was 1,621 million dollar (USAID, 2010) – appendix I

[37] Djankov, Garcia & Reynal showed that "foreign aid often has a negative impact on democratic processes of developing countries and economic growth" (2006). Similarly, Calderón, Chong & Gradstein find that "aid by itself does not appear to have a statistically significant effect on inequality and poverty reduction" (p20, 2006)

Revitalizing Afghanistan's rural economy is also critical to the country's long-term economic growth. Providing farmers with alternatives to growing poppies has proven to be very hard. However, orchards are found to be a solid long-term investment, which is why the Alternative Livelihood Program sponsors the construction of dozens of them throughout the country. In addition, nearly 15% of arable land has been provided with new irrigation systems that should also improve the livelihood of millions of livestock. Next to the revitalizing of rural Afghanistan there are many pushes for providing and facilitating the reemergence of industry. The construction of several industrial parks will help provide mechanisms for adding value to products inside Afghanistan rather than in bordering countries like Pakistan. "The government, with World Bank funding, will provide the infrastructure for the park, including paved roads, protection walls, water and sewage systems, independent power supply (both generation and distribution), and daily maintenance of public roads, internal streets, common areas, and parking lots. Once the basic infrastructure is in, the business owners will construct their facilities inside the park" (RAND, p74, 2010). That developments like these also provide jobs to thousands of unemployed men –former combatants- is a very welcome benefit.

None of these projects can succeed in the long run without an infrastructure to support them, which is why it is a major policy area for the coalition partners.. As seen before, a better road system allows the army, police and other security related organizations better access to difficult to reach regions. Yet roads are also vital for improving trade. Sponsored mainly by USAID, more than 1677 kilometers of roads have been revitalized and modernized to improve mobility of local farmers and tradesmen. Along the same lines there has recently been a major push in proving Afghans with access to reliable, low-cost electricity. Current facilities, like the Kabul Power Plant and Kajaki Dam are being rehabilitated in order to provide at least 20 percent of the population with power through 2010. (USAID, 2010)

3.2.3. STRENGTHENING OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS

After so many years of lawlessness and mismanagement the judicial sector of Afghanistan has been nearly decimated. Thíer observes, "every aspect of a functioning judiciary is presently absent" in Afghanistan (2004, p2). The new Afghan constitution provided a solid basis and was a good first step, but without physical infrastructure and well-educated judges and lawyers progress remained very slow. The judicial sectors, more so than others, has been adversely affected by a lack of coordination, especially in the early years. The large number of 'players' in the field have prevented the formulation of a singular course towards a better sector overall. (Thíer, 2004)

Nevertheless, progress has been made. Under supervision and supported by funds of the UNDP several programs have been initiated to help address numerous difficulties. Think of the hundreds of justice professionals in the country that have not been able to practice law for years under the Taliban. It is essential that their understanding of the law is revitalized and brought up to date. Especially when you consider the many profound changes that have been instituted by the new Afghani government. The CLE (Continuing Legal Education) is one of these programs available to judges and lawyers in several provinces to improve their understanding and knowledge of changes to the law. "Some of the topics reviewed in the CLE were the Afghanistan

penal code, criminal traffic laws, civil procedures, violence against women, deeds, land disputes and how to conduct a fair trial" (USAID, 2010).

None of these changes have a large impact of the daily life of many Afghan's if access to justice is not widely available at the local level. That is why the European Commission and Italy are providing funding for the Access to Justice at the District Level Project. Its aim is enhancing the citizen's capacity to claim their rights. Activities include training if local justice officials, seminars to raise awareness among community and religious leaders, rebuilding local justice facilities and educating students about theirs and their parents rights. (UNDP, 2010)

3.2.4. POLITICAL REFORM

Afghanistan has rarely been a stable democracy. When examining their history it is filled with violent power handoffs, rivaling clans and foreign intervention. While this sounds horrible (and it probably was), something like this could be said for most countries and definitely for European countries (there's a reason both World Wars started around a conflict in the Eurozone). However, population density, power balance, geography and likely a dozen of other factors eventually led to what we have now. In Afghanistan this evolution hasn't really happened. The autonomous tribes, especially in the inhospitable regions of the country, have proven to be willing to fight for their autonomy and what's more, shown to be able to effectively do so. Alexander the Great, quite possible the greatest general ever to live, was unable to fully conquer the region and control the mountainous tribes. The British, with their 'advanced technology' were not able to do so either. Governments of the country have for the most part been unable to persuade these tribes to give up their resistance. After removing the Taliban from power there have been countless of efforts aimed at increasing the service level of the government. If the government can provide enough incentive (like safety, healthcare, education, economic prosperity etc..), these tribes too will eventually be assimilated into the population of Afghanistan. Additionally, in a open democracy, they would be able to 'do something about it' if the direction of the government no longer coincides with their wishes. And so, the creation of a stable, service providing, democratic government of Afghanistan has been at the top of the list of things to do for the coalition partners.

Established by the UNDP, the Afghan Interim Authority Fund was created to pay for the most critical civil-service projects. Within six months, most government buildings had been restored to a workable state, salary payroll was re-established and equipment procurement was re-initiated. In the policy area, drafting a new constitution was vital to further enhance the position of the government. By the end of 2003 the new document had been drafted and it was adopted as the new constitution of Afghanistan in early January of the following year. Several months later and with heavy support of the UNDP presidential elections were held and an independent election commission was established to facilitate the parliament and provincial council election in 2005. The first elected parliament in just over three decades relied on help from the UNDP to staff their offices, train personal and provide tools (like digital archives for newly created documents and digitization of old legislation). (UNDP, 2010)

The entirety of actual services and support provide to all levels of government is longer than this thesis will allow, but a quick overview ought to include: "(1) Policy advice and technical support; (2) Strengthening capacity of institutions and individuals (3) Advocacy, communications, and public information; (4) Promoting and brokering dialogue; and (5) Knowledge networking and sharing of good practices" (UNDP, 2010).

3.3. ANALYSIS OF TERRORISM PATTERNS IN AFGHANISTAN

Above is a rudimentary cross-section of activities in Afghanistan that are executed, supported, funded and/or planned by coalition members. Primary coordination is provided by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and security is handled by the International Security Assistance Force. Nevertheless, several organizations like USAID and humanitarian NGO's are operating independently (although usually in close cooperation with UNAMA projects). Moreover, a not inconsiderable United States military force is still active in the country (acting under Operation Enduring Freedom). Have all these efforts made any noticeable difference in Afghanistan and more importantly have there been any changes in the terrorist threat in and emanating from the country? Based on information gathered by the Global Terrorism Database[38] the number of terrorist incidents in Afghanistan has risen dramatically. This trend continued until 2007 at a maximum of 283 incidents a year. Recently the number of incidents has been declining. These are incidents that meet the three terrorism criteria of the Global Terrorism Database, namely the act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal, there must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims and the action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities [39]. However, included are incidents where there was or still is a certain ambiguity about meeting all three.


Figure 5: Terrorist Incidents 2001-2008 (GTD, Start, 2010)

Therefor it is possible that the actual number of incidents is slightly lower, because the current numbers might include mislabeled criminal offenses. Nonetheless, the distinctiveness of the trend represented here makes it unlikely that mislabeling could be responsible for all of it.

Civilian fatalities from these attacks have been somewhat steady at between two and four per incident, while the number of injured has fluctuated from as little as two (in 2003 & 2005) to as

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[38] The Global Terrorism Database is an open-source database including information on terrorist events around the world from 1970 through 2008. Its advisory board includes people from five different U.S. universities and several terrorism experts. (GTD, 2010)

[39] "The act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the admonition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants)" (GTD, 2010).

much as nine (in 2001). The last three to four years has seen an increase in deadliness and in number of fatalities caused by terrorist incidents.

Another important indicator of terrorist activity, at least in Afghanistan is the poppy cultivation. Income from opiate production and smuggling has been the number one source of income for illegitimate groups in Afghanistan for ages. During the reign of the Taliban in Afghanistan the average yearly volume of poppy cultivation was about 68,000 hectares. (UNDCP, 2001) Except for 2001, what would become the last year of the rule of Taliban in the country. International pressure finally led Mullah Mohammed Omar (the Taliban Supreme Leader) to collaborate with the UN to end the heroin production. By declaring the growing of poppies to be un-Islamic and strict enforcement the opium poppy cultivation dropped over 90% (from 82,172 hectares to 8000 hectares). To date this is one of the world's most successful anti-drug campaigns. (UNDCP, 2001) A year later this positive trend had been entirely reversed and would continue to rise for several years. In 2007 the poppy cultivation was at a record high of 193,000 hectares.

Figure 6: Poppy Cultivation (Ha) in Afghanistan

While the variables above are not without ambiguity, they are based on facts. And although it is entirely possible to argue about whether or not an attack meets all terrorism criteria, there is no discussion about the fact that an attack or an incident actually took place. However, as we've previously touched on, terrorism is more than just facts. A small widely published incident might have a significantly larger impact than an unpublished but much more deadly attack. In order to capture a small fraction of these highly subjective effects of terrorism, this research will include polling data[40]. In other words, data gathered by asking people how they feel or thing about certain topics. By asking a great number of people you might get a sense of how a community or country feels about issues like security, faith in government and so on.


Figure 7: Ratings on local security (ABS News, 2009)

[40] The polling data was gathered by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research for ABC News, BBC and ARD in the first two weeks of January 2009. Number of interviews: 1534, coverage: full national. (ABC News, 2009) accessed at: http://csis.org/publication/public-opinion-trends-afghanistan

On the question of how people perceive their security, only 55%, down from 72%, have a positive stance towards their local security. Correspondingly, 42% of the people now feel negatively about their local safety. (ABC News, 2009)

When asked about how they feel about the direction of Afghanistan as a whole, 40% of the correspondents felt that Afghanistan is going in the right direction. Yet almost equally, 38% of the people feel that the country is going in the wrong direction. (ABC News, 2009) The last variable based on polling data we will use is the rating on the performance of the government of Afghanistan. In 2005, just after the elections for the National Assembly the performance of the central government was at 80%, just three years later this had dropped to 49%. (ABC News, 2009)


Figure 8: Ratings on country's direction (ABC News, 2009)


Figure 9: Ratings on Government performance (ABC News, 2009)

What do these numbers tell us about the whole picture? Are there any correlations between the number of troops, funds provided to the government of Afghanistan and the number of terrorism casualties? What about the poppy cultivation and the number of terrorist incidents? One would expect that if the production of opiates is a large source of income than a reduction in the poppy cultivation would reduce the number of incidents. Perhaps there is no correlation; perhaps the various terrorist elements in the country do not rely on poppy cultivation for their income? Unfortunately, statistical analysis is not very useful when the sample consists of seven,

eight or even nine observations. In our case, these would be the number of years; 2001 through 2010. "..for a correlation to be acceptable one should normally test around 100 participants.." (Brace, Kemp, Snelgar, p80, 2003). With an n-value of just eight, we have to be very careful with possible correlations. Also note that a correlation does not imply causation. In any correlation there might be other variables that explain the association between the two variables measured.

Overall there has been an increase in terrorist incidents for the first five to six years of 'liberating' Afghanistan from the Taliban. As a result more people got killed or were injured by terrorist acts. It wasn't until 2007 that there was an actual improvement in comparison to the year before, but both the number of attacks and their deadliness is still 50 to 60 times higher than before the war. This does however coincide with the earlier discussed theory stating that its intermediate levels of political freedom that are most prone to terrorism. (Abadie, 2004) What's unusual about the rapid increase of the number of incidents is that is seems to grow at almost the same rate as the number of US & Coalition troops in the country and the amount of money donated and spend. Up till 2007, which for the moment seems to be a turning point the, the government of Afghanistan had received over 15 billion dollar in development aid from various donors and the US had spent over 28 billion dollar on the reconstruction efforts. On top of this hundreds of millions of US dollars had been spent by the other coalition partners. However counterintuitive these trends seem –more troops and more money somehow translating into more incidents and more casualties- it is possible to give a possible explanation.

Afghanistan has been ravaged by war for nearly three decades. Its final ruler before the Western intervention, the Taliban, did little to help bring the country into the 21st century. If anything, they tried to revert the scarce progress made. What the Taliban did have was control over local leaders, usually by means of coercion (initially local populations were easily persuaded as the Taliban promised improvements over the previous period off total lawlessness). Excluding the northern part of the country, they had a tight grip on the general population. When the Taliban were removed from power at the end of 2001 and foreign forces were concentrated in Kabul a power vacuum was created. Even though a new interim government was quickly set up and work on rebuilding army, police, government institution and other institutions commenced swiftly, it took several years before these new institutions had reached a capacity required to administer the entire country. And while foreign troops did their best to provide some security and stability, Afghanistan is just too big a country[41] to be able to secure with 20,000 (2002), 30,000 (2004) or even 40,000 (2006) troops. Perhaps more importantly is not the number of absolute troops, but rather the force level. In 2007 there were still only two soldiers for every 1000 Afghan citizens[42]. This lack of control allowed organizations and local warlords previously kept in check by the Taliban to operate in the way they did before, i.e. violently. Add to this that the Taliban, once regrouped, resumed its fight against the coalition forces and the new government, using guerilla tactics and acts of terrorism[43]. The lack of government or really, any control, over the country might also explain the abrupt increase in poppy cultivation. However

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[41] Afghanistan is 652,230 sq km, almost double the size of Germany. (CIA Worldfactbook, 2010)

[42] After WWII, there were over 100 soldiers per 1000 German citizens and in Kosovo this number was around 30 per 1000 (Rand, 2003)

[43] In 2002 to 2004 there were 121 confirmed acts of terrorism committed by the Taliban (Global Terrorism Database, 2010)

another possible explanation of this might be that by committing terrorist acts, groups like al-Qaeda and the Taliban (re)gain power and control over the country. And since they have not shown considerable (moral) objections to growing 'illegal' opiates in the past, the local population uses the opportunity to start cultivating poppies again to increase their own income. Whatever the exact explanation, a correlation between terrorist incidents and poppy cultivation seems logical. Using SPSS, a significant positive correlation is found between the number of terrorist incidents and poppy cultivation ($r=0,897$, $n=8$, $p<0,001$, one-tailed). Keep in mind that with a very small sample ($n=8$) the analysis is far from conclusive. It is also too early to tell whether or not the downward trend that started in 2007 will continue and possible decrease to the point where the production of opiates and the associated criminal problems with producing and smuggling drugs is no longer a factor in Afghanistan. For the moment it seems to be going the right way.

The polling data on the direction of Afghanistan and the performance of the government is likely not very meaningful. While it might display the current feeling amongst the Afghan population, the sample is much too small to draw any kind of conclusion, other than that many people are less positive and value the governments performance lower than four years earlier. Additionally the initial sample was taken right after the elections for the National Assembly and a year after the presidential elections, before people were truly familiar with the new government. The Wall Street Journal (2010) shows that out of the last 12 US Presidents, only one ended his presidency with a higher approval rating of his job performance then when he took office[44].

For the moment the frequency and deadliness of terrorist acts in Afghanistan appear to be going down. However, they are still well above pre-2001 levels. If the current trend persists it will easily take several more years before the number of terrorist incidents is back at the level of 2001-2002. The reduction of terrorist activity might very well be due to the increase in US & Coalition forces, but it wasn't until there were at least two soldiers for every 1000 Afghan's in combination with the increasing capacity of the newly trained army and police forces that any the frequency of attacks stopped increasing. What is more, over 30 billion US Dollar had been spent on the reconstruction of Afghanistan prior to the decrease in terrorist incidents in 2007. In the following years another 20 billion US$ has been spent already and the number of troops have continued to climb (nearly at five soldiers per 1000 Afghans now). Nine years after the start of combat operations in Afghanistan the amount of money spent on reconstruction projects and the boots on the ground might finally be sufficient to institute real positive change in the war torn region. At the moment there is little more than a downward trend and it remains to early to tell whether or not that trend will continue over the next several years. If so, it might be true that the initial increase in incidents can be explained by the increase in political freedom (going from very little political freedom under the Taliban to intermediate levels of political freedom under the administration). Additionally there is no way of knowing what will happen when the coalition forces withdraw, until of course they actually withdraw. Nationbuilding has certainly had its effect on Afghanistan, but it might not be proven effective or ineffective versus terrorism and more importantly global terrorism until several years from now.

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[44] President Clinton had a job approval rating of 55% when he took office in 1993 and 63% when he left office in early 2001(Wall street Journal, 2010, accessed at: http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-presapp0605-31.html)

4. IRAQ

Home to some of the oldest civilizations in the world, Iraq's cultural history stretches back a mind boggling 10,000 years. The written word, the earliest known legal system and the first cities all arose there –in the Mesopotamian kingdoms of old. (TIME, 2003)

4.1. FROM MESOPOTAMIA TO WMD AND BEYOND

Close to the mouths of the Tigris and the Euphrates is where in 4500-3100 BC the first settlements start transforming in real towns. In the town's local temple, usually the city center, the Sumerian priests develop a system of handwriting that will allow them to keep accurate accounts. One the earliest known works of literature is based on a local Sumerian ruler, Gilgamesh. The city, over which he ruled, Uruk, was the largest city in the world at the time and is featured throughout ancient literature. Despite its grandness Uruk is soon eclipsed by the nearby city of Ur, famous for its ziggurat and the home of Abraham (according to the Bible).

You will never find that life for which you are looking. When the gods created man they allotted to him death, but life they retained in their own keeping.

~The Epic of Gilgamesh

For over 1,500 years Babylonia was the central power in Mesopotamia, although during that time the city has been destroyed several times. Yet, each time Babylonians are able to use trade or military power to retain their position. In 605 BC Nabopolassar is succeeded by his son, who would become the most famous ruler of Babylon, Nebuchadnezzar. In his reign of over forty years he is responsible for the destruction of Jerusalem (as described in the Bible) and the creation of the Hanging gardens of Babylon, one of the Seven Wonders of the Ancient World. "The successors of Nebuchadnezzar on the throne of Babylon are less effective. They have the misfortune to be close neighbors of the greatest empire-builder to have emerged by this stage in history" (Gascoigne, 1994). The independence of Mesopotamia ends when the Persians overrun Babylon in 539 BC. The region is nothing more than a province to the Persian Empire. This sad truth would remain so for nearly 1,000 years. After the Persians, it's the Greeks that control the region. During the Greek reign, the city of Babylon makes its last 'claim to fame' for it is the place where Alexander the Great, aged 32 dies. After the Greeks, it's the Parthians and then the Sassanians who control the region. It is the Arab Muslim invasion in 750 AD that finally puts the region back into play as the center of an empire. (Gascoigne, 1994)

At the heart of that empire lays Baghdad, the place where Islam outgrows its Arab roots and establishes itself as an international religion. It is during these 150 years that Mesopotamia briefly regains its former glory as the center of one of the largest empires in the ancient world. The luxury and enchantment of Harun al-Rashid's Baghdad (late 8th century) is inspiration for one of the most famous works of Arabic literature – Thousand and One Nights. The caliphate is now at its largest state and Harun enjoys international fame. One of the biographers of Charlemagne writes: "With Harun-al-Rashid, king of the Persians, who held almost the whole of

the east in fee, always excepting India, Charlemagne was on such friendly terms that Harun valued his goodwill more than the approval of all the other kings and princes in the entire world, and considered that he alone was worthy of being honored. He dispatched to Charlemagne costly gifts, which included robes, spices and other marvels of the Orient. A few years earlier Harun had sent Charlemagne the only elephant he possessed, simply because the Frankish king asked for it" (Thorp, 1969). In 1638 the region is definitely taken by the Turks and it is incorporated into the Ottoman Empire. In the decades preceding World War I, the British become more active in the region, trying to protect their trading routes to India and the East. (Facts-About, 2010) The region would remain dormant until the demise of the Ottoman Empire in WWI. (Gascoigne, 1994)

At the end of WWI, the League of Nations gave the United Kingdom a mandate for the region. The regions of Baghdad and Basra were combined to form a single country, the Kingdom of Iraq. When in 1926 Mosul was added, the boundaries of the modern Iraqi state were formed. The British ruled the region though a client ruler and appointed Sunni Arab elites to government and ministry offices. (Tripp, 2000) In 1932 the British mandate ended and Iraq was granted independence. After the government gets overthrown in 1941, the United Kingdom promptly invades Iraq for fear that the new government would end oil supplies to the Western nations based on their support for the Axis powers. After WWII, there a half dozen coups, until finally Saddam Hussein assumes the presidency in 1979. He immediately arrests and kills political opponents and adapts a dictatorial style of governing. He decides to capitalize on the disorder of the Iranian revolution and within a year of becoming president Iraq invaded Iran. In the eight-year war that followed nearly one million people were killed and both sides had engaged in chemical warfare. Several western powers supported Iraq with arms and expertise in chemical, biological and nuclear weapon capabilities. In 1981 Israel destroyed an Iraqi nuclear reactor that would later be revealed as part of a secret plan to produce 'dirty bombs.' The war ended without victory as both sides simply gave up of exhaustion. Saddam was burdened by massive debts and after pleading for financial help he turned his attentions to Kuwait and asserted that they were stealing Iraqi oil. As soon as his armies had recovered enough he invaded Kuwait, despite warnings from the International community. In response, UN allies, led by the United States, launched operation Desert Storm, successfully reversing the occupation of Kuwait, but they did not remove Saddam from power. Under the terms of the UN resolution ending the war, Iraq was obligated to destroy all stockpiles and development facilities of nonconventional weapons. To verify, a UN inspection mechanism was created. A whole series of sanctions, mostly economic, ensued, because of Iraq's insufficient compliance. Reports of chemical agents were consistent, yet not accurate enough to warrant action. Until in 1998 it was discovered that Iraq was weaponizing VX[45]. Iraq abruptly ended cooperation with the inspectors, but despite sporadic allied bombing raids, no coordinated effort was made to destroy the VX or return the inspectors to Iraq. The economic sanction impoverished many Iraqi and in 1995 the UN Security Council allowed Iraq to export limited quantities of oil to pay for food and medicines. Instead money was diverted into weapon development. Additionally Saddam offered cheap oil to foreign

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[45] VX is a highly lethal nerve agent; a toxic liquid that penetrates the skin or lungs to disrupt the nervous system and stop respiration; in combat VX gas is deployed by detonating a container over the target area and can persist in the environment up to several weeks after release (Princeton University, 2008)

politicians willing to help his regime. Saddam Hussein openly supported Palestinian suicide bombings and was known to sponsor several Palestinian terrorist groups in return for support. He also allowed the Ansar al-Islam group, affiliated with al-Qaeda to operate from northern Iraq. (MidEastweb, 2003)

After the 9/11 attacks of 2001, it gradually became clear that the US intended to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein from power. In his State of the Union Address on January 29, then President Bush labels Iran, North Korea and Iraq as the axis of evil. After President Bush asked for multilateral action against Iraq in September 2002, Iraq promptly offered to cooperate with new weapons inspections. However the Bush administration had already begun preparing for war. Allegations against Iraq were made that they had links to Osama bin Laden and his terror organization, was actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program and had substantial quantities of biological and chemical weapons in clear violation of UN resolutions. In October of the same year, the U.S. Congress passed the Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq and in November, the UN Security Council passes UNSCR 1441, "a final opportunity for Iraq to comply with disarmament obligations" (CNN,2002). UNMOVIC after reentering the country found no evidence of WMD, but was unable to verify Iraq's declarations with regards to WMD. (CNN,2003) After the deadline of the resolution passed it became clear a second resolution, one authorizing military actions, was not going to receive the required supported in the Security Council. Nonetheless, President Bush made a speech giving Saddam Hussein and his sons 48 hours to leave Iraq.

4.2. TIME'S UP AND RECONSTRUCTION

Somewhere between 90 minutes and 2 hours after the new deadline passes the sound of air raid sirens were heard in Baghdad. "At 9:34 PM EST on March 19, 2003, United States and United Kingdom forces consisting of 40 cruise missiles and strikes led by 2 F-117s and other aircraft began conducting military operations against the state of Iraq designed to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction and to remove the Iraqi Regime from power" (GlobalSecurity, 2010). Despite some early setbacks Baghdad was taken in three weeks. While the Americans fortified their hold on the city looting and destruction were widespread. Later it became clear that several thousand tons of explosives had disappeared from the Ansar al-Islam base, presumably into the hands of Iraqi resistance. Even thought the capital had been taken, there was fighting throughout Iraq, with the most intensive fights in the northern parts of Iraq. "On the 26th day of combat operations, a US Marine Corps task force captured Tikrit, bringing the last major bastion of the Hussein regime under Coalition control" (GlobalSecurity, 2010). With all of the major Iraq cities under coalition control, work is started to restore utility and police service to the cities. Engineers' main priority is to restore electricity throughout Iraq. In order to curb looting joint patrols with Iraqi citizens are undertaken. Meanwhile Special Forces teams continue searching for high level officials of Saddam's regime and evidence of WMD. President Bush declared the war to be over on May 1, 2003. Despite efforts to form an Iraqi provisional government, internal rivalries forced the coalition to appoint an interim government instead.

After a UN Security resolution[46] recognized the legitimacy of the interim government a timetable towards Iraq self-governance was laid out –to be achieved in June 2004. (MidEastweb, 2010)

In the reconstruction plans for Iraq, made some time before the start of the war, the coordination and primary responsibility lays with USAID through the Department of Defense. USAID works in close coordination with the United Nation, Coalition partners, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, NGOs and the private sector to implement its goals. There are four primary goals formulated: 1) restore essential infrastructure, 2) support essential health and education, 3) expand economic opportunity and 4) improve efficiency and accountability of government. (GlobalSecurity, 2010)

As with Afghanistan there has been a reasonably clear goal and a coordinated effort in rebuilding and reforming the country. Again several projects or efforts will be highlighted and grouped along the four identified pillars of nationbuilding.

4.2.1. SECURITY

One of the first tasks of the coalition was providing a secure and stable environment for the reconstruction efforts to commence. Since the start of combat operations there have been thousands of mostly U.S. troops in the country. In the first year there were nearly 70,000 troops in the country. In the years that followed that amount more than doubled. Moreover, it is important to take note of the difference in geopolitical region between Iraq and Afghanistan. With few places as volatile as the Middle East, there are a lot more troops in theater as there are around Afghanistan. Report vary between different branches of the U.S. government, mostly because there has been U.S. military presence in the region for a long time and there is no clear understanding on which you do or do not count as part of the Iraq mission. Nonetheless, the most conservative reports put at least another 40,000 troops in theater in 2008. During the first two months of the invasion the United Kingdom provided another 46,000 troops and the first three years they maintained an annual average of around 10,000 troops in theater. (Ministry of Defense, 2010) If these troops are included in the force level (soldiers per 1000 inhabitants) for Iraq, we find that for the first three years it was on average 7.3 while for the entire mission it is only slightly lower at 7.2 soldiers per 1000 Iraqi. In Afghanistan the highest the coalition forces have reached to date is around 3.5, so Iraq more than doubles it. (Belasco, 2009) To further enhance security, the majority of reconstruction funding has gone to rebuilding, training and equipping the Iraqi Security Forces. (Tarnoff, 2009)

While the Iraqi Security Forces were unable to independently operate throughout 2004 and 2005, the first hand over of military responsibility from the U.S. to Iraqi control was able to take place in the summer of 2006. With intensive training and leadership development an additional 12 governorates were transferred to Iraqi control. Starting from 2009, the security of all Iraqi provinces is under Iraqi control. President Obama aims to end combat operation in Iraq by August 31, 2010 and begin pulling out by the end of 2011. (Reuters, December 11, 2009)

[46] UN Security Resolution 1511 on Iraq (MidEastweb, 2010) http://www.mideastweb.org/1511.htm

Figure 10: US/UK troops in Iraq and theater (Belasco, 2009)

More basic security at the everyday level is provided by the new Iraqi police force. Iraq's police had to be reformed and 'filtered' for members of the former Ba'ath party. In practice this meant largely hiring an entire new police force. As of this writing the new force consists of just over 9,000 personnel and does continues patrols of Baghdad alongside US troops. This is also done by the US to "seem less like an occupational force" (USAID, 2010). For Iraq another matter of concern is the vulnerable infrastructure of the oil & gas industry. In order to protect these, the US has provided significant support to physically secure these sites. Measures include "the use of biometrics, construction of security perimeters, lighting and communications improvements, establishment of exclusion zones for pipelines, and enhancements to the forward operating bases used by the Iraqi army to protect infrastructure" (Tarnoff, 2009)

4.2.2. ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION

Despite decades of repression and mismanagement the Iraqi people have not forgotten their entrepreneurial roots. To aid these people set up new business, develop new initiatives and provide basic utility as secure banking and loans USAID has developed several initiatives. The Tijara program supports nine Iraqi-owned microfinance institutions with training, technical assistance and capacity building expertise. In addition the Iraqi Company Bank for Guarantees was established to help develop profitable lending possibilities for banks nationwide. None of these institutions or initiatives would be able to provide adequate service if it wasn't for trained professionals. The Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance (VEGA), a consortium of 14 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) supported by USAID has specialized in training essential business skills throughout the private sector. They have also provided technical assistance to startup businesses and help access and use market information. In the 18 months after starting in the summer of 2004, they had trained well over 2000 Iraqi's in business basics or specific courses. Awarded nearly $3 million in grants to approximately 320 small and medium-sized

enterprises nationwide and trained several business case managers to be able to provide regional services. A lot of effort has gone into setting up the Iraqi Financial Management Information System (IFMIS), which is designed to track financial information from markets to budget compilations. In early 2006 it has been able to replace to manual system that had been used since 1960. (USAID, 2010)

While also part of political reform, USAID has been helping the Iraqi government pass several privatization laws. This was done to remove the burden of the nearly 500 state-owned enterprises from the national budget and help improve efficiency and effectiveness. Additionally technical assistance was provided to the Privatization Committee to reduce redundancy and help facilitate a transparent process. Another project is focused on reconnecting Iraq with the international markets and has already established the Iraq Stock Exchange to attract foreign direct investments. (USAID, 2010)

The Iraqi government has been provided with large quantities of official development aid (ODA). Prior to 2003, Iraq received on average $200 million annually. (World Bank, 2010) After the invasion this was multiplied tenfold to just over $2.2 billion. Two years later this had increased with factor ten again to a


Figure 11: Annual ODA received by Iraq (World Bank, 2010)

staggering $22 billion before 'stabilizing' on approximately $9 billion. However, as has been discussed earlier, a more important figure than ODA is likely the amount of money spend on projects by the 'nationbuilders' first and foremost this is the United States.


Figure 12: US assistance to Iraq

60

The graph does not include ODA and shows US spending had reached about $48 billion dollar in just five years. This is almost identical to what has been spent in Afghanistan, despite the difference in number of years (2003 versus 2001). In addition to the U.S. the international community funds its projects through the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq. As of December 2008, 25 donors had provided the fund with close to $2 billion.

4.2.3. STRENGTHENING OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS

Iraq needed a judicial institute that would be able to transparently and fairly try Iraqi nationals accused of crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes and other extremely serious offenses committed during the reign of the Ba'ath party. Set up by the Coalition Provisional Authority and reaffirmed by the interim government it has been responsible for trying Saddam Hussein, 'Chemical Ali' and dozens of other former senior officials in the Ba'athist regime.

In contrast to Afghanistan Iraq's judicial system and institutions had survived the nearly quarter century long reign of Saddam. However, impartiality and justice was often subordinate to party interests. To counter these problems a lot of work was done by coalition partners to help with retraining judicial professionals and implement improvements like digital archiving systems and updated standardized procedures.

Throughout Iraq efforts were undertaken to increase the accessibility of justice at the local level. In other areas local projects have been undertaken to encourage dialogue between different identity groups, especially engaging youth and women. The objective: to develop constructive conflict mitigation approaches right into local communities. (USAID, 2010)

4.2.4. POLITICAL REFORM

After the removal of Saddam and his party from power a Coalition Provisional Authority was formed. After which an Iraqi interim Government was appointed that would act as a caretaker government until the Iraqi Transnational Government was installed after election in early 2005. Its main function was to draft a new constitution for the country. At the request of the new temporary government USAID provided substantial support to the constitutional drafting committee, providing more than a dozen international constitutional experts. Via consultations, seminars, workshops and vast amounts of information and briefings of key issues such as federalism, women's rights and the relationship between religion and state, they were able to draft a new constitution. Elections at the end of the same year finally produced the first and current permanent government of Iraq. (USAID, 2010)

In order to built and help maintain effectiveness of Iraqi public administration USAID's program Tatweer helps develop national capacity. Working with 17 ministries and executive agencies the aim of the program is to help them become better at what they do. Priorities include strategic planning, fiscal management, project administration, HR solutions, communications and of course information technology. "USAID understands that good governance is an important component of sustainable development. USAID programs emphasize more transparent and accountable governance at national and local levels, strengthening the rule of law and respect

for human rights, promoting legitimate and competitive elections and political processes, strengthening civil society, and developing free and independent media" (USAID, p9, 2009) To date, nearly 2,000 out of the 70,000 civil servants have been trained to be trainers at their own departments or locals. This will help provide the long term sustainability of the knowledge and expertise required to run complex organizations without outside help. (USAID, p9, 2009)

The local governance Program is yet another example of a project aimed at improving the capacity and quality of the service provided by local government institutions. In this case, especially those that operate in a region where provincial government is minimal. Specific tasks include the strengthening and facilitating local government in budget formulation, oversight and administrative duties. (USAID, 2010)

4.3. ANALYSIS OF TERRORISM PATTERNS IN IRAQ

Have these measures, these efforts been successful in curbing terrorism in and originating in Iraq? Again, based on information gathered by the Global Terrorism Database the number of terrorist incidents in Iraq has risen quite drastically. From 60 incidents in 2003 to a zenith of 923 terrorist acts in 2007. As a result from 2003 to 2008 almost 18,000 Iraqi have died from targeted attacks. For these fatalities all three terrorism criteria[47] were met. 2008 saw a significant decline. According to Worldwide Incidents Tracking System this decline, although less rapidly continued through 2009 and appears to do so for 2010 as well. (NTCT, 2010)


Figure 13: Terrorist incidents in Iraq

Things are looking up in Iraq. Terrorist incidents are down, fatalities are down and U.S. troops are expecting to start decreasing soon, so big is the confidence in the retrained and reequipped

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[47] The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal, there must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims and the action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities (GTD, 2010)

Iraqi Security Force. President Obama expects that beyond 2011, about 55,000 U.S. troops will remain in theater, but that active involvement in Iraq is up to the Iraq government. (Reuters, December 11, 2009) It is widely believed that the much higher force level has made enough difference to be thinking about withdrawing the majority of foreign troops from Iraq. If that is indeed the case, it should be noted that this has also come at a substantial higher cost, both in human life and funds. According to iCasulties.org there has been 4733[48] military fatalities as opposed to 1984 in Afghanistan, even factoring in the extra years of the Afghanistan mission. On the financial side, the U.S. has spent just as much on Iraq as in Afghanistan on reconstruction alone (excluding ODA), again in two years less.

Another process that ought to be mentioned here is the 'Sunni Awakening' throughout 2007. Several thousand people, almost all of the Sunni men, have joined anti-al-Qaeda initiatives. These efforts are supported by arms and funds from the U.S. and by the end of 2007 several crushing blows had all but turned any chance the organization has in Iraq. While on a smaller scale, similar events have taken place among the Shi'a population. The Human Security report elaborates: "AQI, while far from being completely crushed, had suffered a stunning defeat— politically as well as militarily. Hated by both the Shia and Kurdish communities and having deeply alienated its former Sunni allies, there appeared little prospect that Osama bin Laden's Iraqi affiliate would be able to make a comeback" (p17, 2007). All in all, if the reduction in terrorism incidents and fatalities keeps continuing and the Iraqi government is able to provide a secure and stable environment, than nationbuilding could be called successful. However, as in Afghanistan, it might take several years before this entire nationbuilding effort can be called successful or not.

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[48] Out of 4733 military fatalities, 4415 or 93% have been U.S. soldiers (iCasualties.org)

5. TERRORISM WORLDWIDE / GLOBAL TERRORISM

While humanitarian factors might have helped persuade allied governments to help the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and political reasons have gone a long way with reluctant allies, the main reason for both interventions lies in security. The 'government'[49] of Afghanistan did not only tolerate, but outright support terrorists operating in their territory. Terrorists responsible for bombing embassies in several countries, attacking the United States and (indirectly) involved with the bombings in Madrid and London. In response the Western world went to Afghanistan and fought the terrorists and the regime that supported them. Besides killing or capturing as many as possible, an attempt was made (and still is being made) to rebuild the country to prevent terrorists from ever operating out of Afghanistan again. Through nationbuilding Afghanistan ought never to become a breeding ground for terrorist activity again. Similarly Iraq's leader Saddam Hussein was seen as an international menace, meddling with weapons of mass destruction and touting strong anti-western sentiments. In response the western world went in, captured Saddam and destroyed his party. To prevent future troubles from this country and to have a stable, somewhat democratic and perhaps even friendly government in this volatile region of the world a nationbuilding effort was commenced.

Has terrorism worldwide gone down? Yes and no. This contradiction comes from the unusual practice of counting deadly assaults against civilians by non-state armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan as terrorism. This was explained earlier in the section on terrorism in chapter two. In a nutshell, there is a large discrepancy between counting terrorism in Iraq/Afghanistan and the rest of the world. In recent years, civilian victims of deadly assaults in Iraq and Afghanistan have been labeled victims of terrorism, whereas the thousands of civilians being killed in the many civil wars in Africa have not been counted as terrorism victims. "Over the past 30 years, civil wars in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Bosnia, Guatemala, and elsewhere have, like the war in Iraq, been notorious for the number of civilians killed. But although much of the slaughter in all these cases was intentional, politically motivated, and perpetrated by non-state groups—and thus constituted "terrorism" as conceived by MIPT, NCTC, and START[50]—it was almost never described as such" (Human Security Report, p10, 2007). Furthermore, many of these killings in Africa go unreported as they take place in regions where there is no international presence or reliable local institutions. This skews the data enormously.

Without taking the above oddities into account, all three datasets report a rather dramatic increase in terrorism fatalities globally. Starting in 2001 from the al-Qaeda attacks on the WTC and rising steeply from the 2003 invasion of Iraq. According to these statistics the world has actually become more dangerous and increasingly people are killed in terrorist incidents around the world. This assessment of the situation seems to coincide with the general consensus that the threat of terrorism has indeed increased worldwide. However, as explained this approach

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[49] As noted earlier, the Taliban, while clearly in control, were not the official government of Afghanistan. They were the ones that took over the government.
[50] MIPT, NCTC, and START are the available datasets.

has several serious shortcomings. Unfortunately it is not possible to include data from any African (civil) war that counts the intentional killing of civilians by non-state actors as terrorism. And if we can't include those African victims that ought to be labeled as terrorism victims according to the definitions used by the three datasets, the only other option is to exclude Afghanistan and Iraq from the equation, as their reported terrorism numbers are incompatible with the rest of the world. The picture presented now is entirely different. The number of incidents has gone down dramatically since the end of the Cold War and has on average remained more or less stable from 2001 and on.


Figure 14: Number of terrorist incidents worldwide (excl Iraq & Afghanistan) (GTD, 2010)

Fatality wise, the picture is less positive, but not as dramatic as some people would have you believe. Based on the NTCT dataset the number of fatalities form terrorism has been rising steadily from 2005 until 2009. Unfortunately the dataset does not include statistics form before 2004. It's too early to say anything definitive about 2010, but if the first three months of the year give any indication about the rest of the year there could be a nearly 25% reduction of fatalities.


Figure 15: Global terrorism fatalities (NTCT, 2010)

The above graphs and numbers give an idea of the total number of terrorism incidents and fatalities around the world. The difference between this and global terrorism is that global terrorism implies terrorism that operates on a global scale, like terror network al-Qaeda, whereas the graphs show the sum of all terrorism incidents. Here is where the difficulties start, while many people would go along with classifying al-Qaeda operatives as global terrorists, there is no generally accepted definition. And without a

66

definition or a very clear set of guidelines/rules there is no datasets that tracks these incidents. Thus, there is no hard data on global terrorism. Perhaps we could look at international terrorism to get a feel for it (terrorism involving citizens from more than one country)? The NTCT dataset has the criteria 'foreigner' (as in -the incident was committed by a foreigner). Including Iraq and Afghanistan we find that there has been an increase in the number of deaths, but the total number is much lower than what was shown in the global fatalities graph (average yearly fatalities between 2004 and 2009: 132). Due to the short period over which data is available (2004 through 2009) and the 'low' number of deaths the margin of error is too large to say anything useful. For example, the peak in 2008 was caused by two fairly deadly attacks. The first one was in Chad where 160 civilians, 1 diplomat and 1 child were killed in armed attack by the United Front for Democratic Change (the group has its roots in Chad close to the Sudanese border. While some members of the group are not Chadian, this hardly qualifies as international terrorism, let alone global terrorism. The second deadly attack in 2008 was in Pakistan where a suicide bomber from the Lashkar i Jhangvi (a local militant organization) detonated his vehicle at the Mariott Hotel in Islamabad. Again, this is not really international terrorism, while the suicide bomber might not have been Pakistani, the organization he was affiliated with was. (NTCT, 2010) The ambiguity shown here exemplifies the difficulty of labeling incidents correctly. This makes it even less likely that international terrorism is a good indicator for global terrorism. Lacking a good definition there seems to be no way of telling when an terrorist incident graduates from 'regular' terrorism to global terrorism.

Since objective data is absent, is there anything subjective to be said? Several countries have a terrorism threat index, a scale on which different colors represent the risk (or lack thereof) of a terrorist attack. Usually these are also linked to specific action from government agencies. One such threat index is the United States Homeland Security Advisory System. It was introduced in 2002 and "is used to communicate with public safety officials and the public at-large through a threat-based, color-coded system so that protective measures can be implemented to reduce the likelihood or impact of an attack" (Homeland Security, 2010). This system (and almost all other systems of equal functionality operated throughout the world) does have several severe limitations. There are no published criteria for the threat levels, making it impossible to verify or judge is accuracy. A task force by the Department of Homeland Security itself found the system in its current form out of date and proposed several changes to improve it. (HSAS Task Force, p5-9, 2009)

When looking at the historical overview we find that the level has changed 17 times since 2002. It has never been green or blue and 16 out of the 17 changes were between yellow and orange. Only on August 10, 2006 was the threat level raised to red (severe). This tells us that the United States has been under elevated or higher threat from terrorism ever since the measure was introduced. While this is not an implausible assumption, it could also very well be that the connection between actual risk from global terrorism and this index is rather weak. The problem is that global terrorism remains impossible to measure.

Figure 16: Homeland Security, 2010

6. CONCLUSION

Nine years after the initial incursion into Afghanistan and seven and a half after toppling the dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein and after losing nearly 5000 soldiers and having spent almost immeasurable amounts of money in these regions it remains uncertain what the outcomes are.

There is little doubt that there have been coordinated efforts in both Afghanistan and Iraq to rebuilt the country and more importantly to reform the country to prevent the necessity for future such undertakings. Since there are very few countries that have hands-on experience with these kinds of enormous undertakings and those that have, have found that each and every one of them was unique, it is little surprising that not everything has gone according to plan. Not enough troops to provide security, wrong tactics to fight inner city battles with insurgents that might have little concern for collateral damage, too little money or a lack of coordination; all of those have plagued recent efforts. However, that there was some kind of plan or idea behind the whole operation is vital; a plan that went beyond war and reconstruction. That plan is nationbuilding.

The problem with nationbuilding is the immensity of the task. We have seen that the seven to nine years that we –the western world- have been in Iraq and Afghanistan there has been progress. Perhaps there has even been enough progress that their respective governments are slowly able to replace the foreign nationbuilders with local people. However, at the moment it is still too early to tell whether or not 'we' have been successful at reforming both countries. And it is entirely likely that no one will be able to tell if these interventions have been successful for decades. Afghanistan has had several periods in its history where it was doing considerably better than it is today. During and in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, Afghanistan had free elections and free press. The country was also reasonable prosperous. On the other hand, the people of Afghanistan also have a long tradition of fighting for independence; independence from Genghis Khan, Persia, the British, the Soviets and so on. There is no way of knowing if these people, especially those still living in tribal communities in the mountains, are willing to accept their own governments' authority. The fact that neighboring country Pakistan is not the most stable country in the region and their continuous internal struggles with Islamic extremist organizations does not bode well for the stability of Afghanistan. There have however been undeniable successes on the counter-terrorism front. Even though Osama bin Laden has not been captured and it remains unlikely he will be in the short term, terror organization al-Qaeda has been crippled and lost its base of operation. The Taliban has been reduced to troublesome insurgents, as opposed to the former 'sugar-daddy' of terrorist organizations. Of course, security wise there are still many concerns, and the situation is some regions remains precarious. However, these problems are mostly local issues and pose no threat to the international community at large. Additionally, if Afghanistan and its government –aided by the rest of the world, keeps working on increasing its capacity to deal with security matters and is able to keep growing the economy, continues the process of institutionalizing legal reform, education improvements and does so democratically, it is highly unlikely that the Taliban, al-Qaeda or any other terrorist organization will ever be able to gain foothold in Afghanistan again.

If at all possible the stakes for the Iraq intervention were even higher than in Afghanistan. Not only did Iraq provide support for several terrorist elements within and outside its borders, but the former government itself also used terror as instrument in controlling the population for several decades. Iraq also just happens to be in one of the most volatile geopolitical regions of the world and the reasoning behind intervening/invading in the first place was questionable. This has led to less worldwide support and greater resistance. Nonetheless improvements have been made. Obviously Saddam Hussein has been removed from power and his party has been abolished. The current government seems reasonably stable, but is still adjusting to its new role. One of the more positive developments is on the security front. More and more are Iraqi forces able to administer their own territory, removing the need for large contingencies of foreign troops in the country. One of the biggest security concerns of a few years back, al-Qaeda in Iraq is no longer able to pose a serious threat to the country. With the impending withdrawal of most foreign troops the real test for Iraq is still to come –will the government be able to successfully deal with the remaining security problems? If the political will is there, and at the moment that seems to be the case, the country has increasingly the capacity and the capability to do so effectively. Economically, Iraq has more possibilities to increase their prosperity than most countries, yet for now it is unclear if the new elite will be able to handle the responsibility. The signs are encouraging, but as explained in the section on root and trigger causes of terrorism, sometimes very little can be enough to set a chain reaction in motion. Violence within the country is decreasing (while still being higher as pre-intervention) and overall the country or its citizens pose little threat to the international community.

On the international front there have not been any attack like the 9/11 attack ever since, the 9/11 attacks. Unfortunately, this does not mean it could not happen again. The situation in both Afghanistan and Iraq is still fragile. Al-Qaeda has lost a lot of its financing and people and is unlikely to be able to reform a global terrorism network. However, their influence, while diminished, is still present through splinter cells throughout the world. These cells have a limited and usually indirect link to al-Qaeda and operate independently. That we have not seen a new major attack might just be a matter of time. Even so, the terrorist threat emanating from Iraq and Afghanistan has been reduced. And while both countries still struggle with terrorist elements within their territories, they lack the capabilities to operate on a global level –for now.

Does this make nationbuilding an effective instrument in combating terrorism? For the moment and without including global terrorism, as it has been shown to be too elusive to capture in this thesis, the answer has to be: *perhaps*. The current trends in Afghanistan and Iraq do indicate that things are improving, but there is still a way to go before they will able to deal with their problems with terrorism independently. Nationbuilding, as undertaken in Afghanistan and Iraq, has been shown to have detrimental effects on the countries in the short term. After the initial wars were 'over' it took several years before there was any kind of improvement and there is no way of telling whether or not these improvements will last. Assuming that the recent encouraging developments continue, it might be that, given enough money and the political will to be actively involved in a country for several decades, nationbuilding can be successful in combatting terrorism. However, at this time, this is too big an assumption to make.

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APPENDIX I

USAID Afghanistan Obligations: FY 2008
(in millions of USD)

Strategic Communications (ESF) $0 0%

Democracy/Governance (including Civil Society) $143 9%

Support to GIRoA/Cross-cutting $24 1%

National Solidarity Program (NSP) $75 5%

Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) $70 4%

State PRT (ESF) $0 0%

PRTs (including Civilian Assistance Program - Leahy) $115 7%

Cash for Work $0 0%

Economic Growth $76 5%

Water $16 1%

Power $237 15%

Roads $274 17%

Alternative Development $176 11%

Agriculture (including Environment) $56 3%

Food Assistance $10 1%

IDPs $0 0%

Program Support $16 1%

Health $113 7%

Education $99 6%

Rule of Law $31 2%

Elections $90 6%

Figure 17: APPENDIX - USAID, 2010