OFFICIAL POLICIES FOR CIVIL DEMOCRATIZATION

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ABBREVIATIONS

- ANAP  Motherland Party (Turkey)
- CEECs Central and Eastern European Countries
- DISK The Confederation of Revolutionary Workers (Turkey)
- DP Democrat Party (Turkey)
- EC European Community
- EDT EU Delegation to Turkey
- EESC European Economic and Social Council
- ESCT Economic and Social Council of Turkey
- EU European Union
- FHRT Foundation of Human Rights in Turkey
- GSEA General Secretariat of EU Affairs (Turkey)
- HRA Human Rights Association (Turkey)
- IKV Economical Development Foundation (Turkey)
- IMF International Monetary Fund
- JCCs Joint-Consultative Committees
- NATO Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization
- OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
- PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party
- STGP Civil Society Improvement Programme
- TOBB Turkish Union of Markets and Chambers
- TUSIAD Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association
- UNICE Union of Industrialists and Employers’ Confederations of Europe
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1. Introduction

1.1. Statement of the Problem

The recognition of Turkey’s candidacy for European Union (hereafter EU) membership at 1999 Helsinki Summit had significant political consequences in Turkey. Objective implications of EU accession appeared in political agenda of the country within aspects of democratization. Following this period, civil society in Turkey has been increasingly getting involved in Turkey’s democratization and encounter with EU (Ugur, 2003).

This involvement is fostered from above officially by legal measures and policies implemented by Turkey’s governments as steps to fulfill the requirements of EU accession. In addition, EU bodies contribute to the process to sustain Turkey’s progress in EU Enlargement (Aras and Gokay, 2003). This involvement is exercised from below through participation of various civil society actors in democratization of Turkey with ranging motivations and activities for EU accession.

However, it is hard to address that civil society participation is fully exercised in democratization of Turkey despite the efforts in this encounter. This comes from different weaknesses and inadequacies in practice of the official actors – Turkey’s governments and EU bodies-. It can be said that, legal measures taken did not sufficiently provide channels for civil society to participate in democratization of Turkey.

Political relations between Turkey and EU date back to 1963 with an accession perspective following the Treaty of Ankara (Aras and Gokay, 2003). Despite this long history, official relations have always been challenged with an over-politicized agenda mainly around Turkey’s transition on what Oostlander (2003:45) called ‘the philosophy of the State’. Internal dynamics determining the nature of politics and civil society in Turkey have always been problematic against institutionalizing compatible grounds to sustain policy implications of EU Enlargement towards Turkey (Plenig, 1997; Rumsford, 2000).

However, motivations and policies of EU for Turkey’s accession also have contradictory points (Borowiec, 1999; Lagendijk, 2003). EU does not seem ready to
implement objective policies towards Turkey's progress in this encounter. Additionally, relations between Turkey and EU continued longer and more problematic mainly due to the political instabilities and unclear motivations from both sides (Cornell, 2001). This picture blurs the political agenda. Capable institutions have been missing for long periods to run the process. These internal and external dynamics surrounding this encounter process have weakening impacts on civil society participation in democratization of Turkey.

Also, the set of response from civil society in Turkey to EU encounter process is mainly from business-oriented actors with neo-liberal agendas such as Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (hereafter TUSIAD), Turkish Union of Markets and Chambers (hereafter TOBB) or Economical Development Foundation (hereafter IKV). Motivations of these actors focus on economic aspects of EU accession but remain isolated from civil attempts for democratization in Turkey.

Alternative strategies to increase civil society participation in democratization of Turkey in EU encounter process are searched within four steps of analysis. The first step is finding out the nature of Turkey's politics and democracy which determines the state of civil society in the country. In that sense, chapter two assesses the nature of politics and democracy and the state of civil society in Turkey. Chapter three is the next step of analysis discussing theoretical background of political potentials and limits of civil society in relation to democratization by referring to historical and current debates in modern political thought and development theory. Chapter four is the next step of analysis assessing the nature of EU's motivations and policies for civil society in its most related common policy areas of social and regional policies. Chapter five arrives to the fourth step of analysis to find the practice of the State and EU bodies to increase participation of civil society in democratization of Turkey in EU encounter process. It also examines the response of different segments of civil society in Turkey to democratization in EU encounter process. Finally, the research arrives in chapter five to conclude alternative strategies for Turkey's governments and EU bodies to increase civil society participation in democratization before the conclusions of the research in chapter six.
1.2. Justification

Many authors define civil society rising in public space apart from the State. Liberal pluralist motivations see civil society politically neutral with the potential of pulling the State out from public space in a manner proportion (Nagle and Mahr, 1999). There are historical arguments proposing civil society to spread democratic essence and exercise in a society. Jorgensen (1997:36) defined civil society as “organised activities by groups or individuals either performing certain services or trying to influence and improve society as a whole, but are no part of government or business.” However, civil society is subjected to various limitations in terms of its own nature and the public space it shares with the State (Fine and Rai, 1997). Roebeling (2002:211) claimed that there are ‘shifting power dynamics’ between ‘the state, the market and civil society.’

In that sense, an emphasize on pluralist essence of civil society does not necessarily lead to an end of ‘democratization’ since civil society itself is a space of articulating interests, competition and conflict (Petras, 2002; McDonald, 1997; Strange, 1994). The composition of any civil society is a product of social struggle (Bieskart, 1999:37). For that reason, any consideration of civil society vis-à-vis democratization has to remind the relations and interactions with other segments of civil society, the State, the nature of politics and power in the given context. Jorgensen (1997:39) related democratic potentials of civil society to the ‘history and political forces of society and the overlapping roles of these actors, sharing the public space.’

1.3. Research Objectives

Main objective of this research is to shed light on how to transform civil society in Turkey into more active, responsive partners of democratization within the opportunities EU offers (or should offer) in Enlargement process. It is likely to be that, Turkey’s encounter with EU will lead to democratization only after a qualified increase in participation of civil society in the process. This requires new political attitudes, higher levels of awareness and motivations from all actors involved. In that sense, main objective of this research can be derived as follows:
1. search and define alternative strategies for Turkey's governments and EU bodies to increase participation of civil society in democratization of Turkey in EU encounter process

However, the context of Turkey's encounter with EU brings very complex, problematic and multi-dimensional dynamics to the research problem. Additionally, there are long-lasting multi-disciplinary debates on civil society itself. Hence, further objectives parallel to the processing of the research are necessary to meet the main objective of this research properly:

2. define and evaluate the nature of politics and democracy in Turkey and the state of civil society

3. define and evaluate political potentials and limits of civil society in relation to democratization

4. define and evaluate the approaches, motivations and policies of EU towards civil society

5. define and evaluate the practice of the State and EU bodies for civil society participation in democratization of Turkey in EU encounter process

6. define and evaluate the response of various segments of civil society in Turkey to democratization within EU encounter process

1.4. Sources of Data and Methodology

Studies on civil society, democratization, international relations, politics and power are taken as sources of data. Articles in newspapers, journals and the media about Turkey, EU and their encounter and publications of civil society actors and official bodies involved in different levels of the process are studied.

Discourse and content analysis are used as the main methodologies of this research. Comparative analysis is another appropriate method for discussing claims on civil society and democratization in the literature and for comparing different
experiences of former Enlargement countries and Turkey within the nature of their politics and EU encounter periods.

1.5. Scope and Limitations
There is a scope on the nature of politics and democracy in Turkey since political potentials of civil society and democratization processes are context-specific. Another scope is on studies that relate politics and power into the content of civil society since a departure from liberal pluralist views on civil society has been found essential for this research. Supporting and promoting civil society does not necessarily mean democratization.

The lack of clear political motivations and efficient implementations in this encounter can be justified by political terms. So, it is acknowledged that the official documents and declarations may be limited to assess the problematic of civil society participation in democratization of Turkey in EU encounter process.

2. Politics, Democracy and Civil Society in Turkey
The nature of politics and democracy in a given context is the ground for the state of civil society. Therefore, in the first section of this chapter the nature of politics and democracy in Turkey is examined. Later, the chapter proceeds to next section assessing the state of civil society in Turkey.

Considerations of the nature of politics in Turkey should avoid the danger of sticking to Eurocentric interpretations of modernization and democracy. Specific nature of Turkey’s transformation and the alternatives to improve civil society participation in democratization on the way to EU can be understood best in that way. The nature of a political transition away from authoritarianism determines the way civil society groups can influence the political system that follows (Goetz and Hassim, 2002:325).

2.1. The Nature of Politics and Democracy in Turkey
Turkey has risen from the demise of the Ottomans following the end of the World War I with politics of building a new State and most importantly a new society. It was based on the ideology commonly called Kemalism from the founder of Turkey.
The new State had the concrete mission of ‘nation-building’ in the context of the collapse of Ottoman order in the region. It has risen following the victory at the War of Salvation from Greek, Italian, French and British occupants after Ottoman’s collapse. In that sense, unity in Turkish national identity was found central for building the new nation-state (Hann, 1997; Ergil, 2003; Yashin, 2001). The model was actually derived from European experience of modernization at the rise of nation-states.

However, modernization was not something new for the country. The calls for modernizing the political order were present and lively since the 1850s and contained an area of deep political struggles mainly around growing Turkish nationalism and a variety of different proposals (Mardin, 1969). The new Republic furthered suitable conditions for implementing the project of building the modern nation-state with Turkish national identity. From the beginning of their modern statehood the Turkish authorities were desperate to promote a new homogenized identity for a new ‘Turkish’ nation (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, 2001:75).

Another concrete measure was the issue of Islam in politics and public life. Secularism was the second wing of Kemalism to build modern Turkey. Secularization was furthered by abolishment of Caliphate and many other measures most of which were radical transitions deeply inspired by the Enlightenment ideals of Europe. The complete separation of religion from the day-to-day administration of the State and the subordination of religious affairs to the priorities of the secular government represented a radical departure from the organization of public and private life under the Ottoman Empire (Bozdogan and Kasaba, 2000:4).

Bringing all these changes in Turkey’s different context and tradition brought protective instincts to the new Republic. Gellner (1994:199) called the heritage of Kemalism in Turkey as ‘conscientious and sometimes ferocious guardian’. Heper (1990:608) claimed that state bureaucracy with its deep role in Turkey’s politics has created state-elites who ‘emphasized on law and order, considered themselves responsible for modernizing Turkey by emulating the Western superstructure, ...and were therefore very sensitive to issues of national unity and territorial integrity.’
However, looking at post-1950s period is necessary to assess the evolution of Turkey's politics since the context is very dynamic and changes rapidly. Turkey shifted to multi-party democracy in 1946. Landslide victory of Democrat Party (hereafter DP) in the second multi-party elections in 1950 brought a shift for controlling state power from the 'appointed bureaucrats' or 'state-elites' of the single-party period to the 'elected teams' of the new party. Turkey passed through major changes in DP regime between 1950 and 1960.

It became a member of the Council of Europe, the OECD, and in 1952, NATO. Turkey was generally welcomed by Western countries as an important asset in the fight against communism due to its geopolitical position (Kubicek, 1998:162).

The period was accompanied by liberalization and industrialization. DP was leaning on entrepreneurs and middle-class rising in big cities. However, this time dominancy of state-elites shifted to 'political-elites'. The attempt was to substitute the state-centered policy with a party-centered one (Heper, 1990). Owen (2001:97) claimed that, 'DP extended two new avenues of patronage to their supporters and potential clients: a system of protective tariffs and quotas to be used selectively to favor particular interests and individuals, and their successful program of opening up Turkey's rural areas by means of roads, electricity and new forms of transport. New forms of relations with the State were developed in terms of patronage and corruption. Mardin (1969:280) claimed that 'the State has always provided economic opportunities to its higher level employees' adding 'the best way to succeed in the private sector in Turkey is to start as an employee of the State.'

Tensions between state-elites and political-elites to control Turkey's politics ended dramatic. Turkey witnessed the first military coup in 1960 which Heper (1990:609) claimed as an 'effort by the intellectual-bureaucratic elites and their allies in the military to rebureaucratize the government.' The new constitution increased state intervention back in the economy. But most importantly, the nature of politics in Turkey witnessed a deep, persistent fragmentation following the first democratic elections held in 1961.
A dynamic leftist movement emerged in the agenda of Turkey for the next two decades. Youth movements of the 1960s and 1970s accompanied by labor organizations such as The Confederation of Revolutionary Workers (hereafter DISK) pursued their political struggle actively. They were responded by various right-wing movements of Turkish nationalism and political Islam. Turkey was deeply polarized until 1980 when military intervened to democracy once again and changed the political frame this time very sharply. The motivation of the military was to revive the State that was eroded by the lack of intermediary structures and over-polarized political environment of the country (Heper, 1990).

However, cleaning the political space of the last two decades cost a lot against democracy with deep oppressions and human rights banned. Military intervention of 1980 and its 1982 Constitution have been deriving the basis of the authoritarian tendency in Turkey's politics until present with emphasizing on the authority of the State.

However, the significance of the 1980s is not only 1980 military intervention and the authoritarian nature it brought to Turkey's politics. Following the first democratic elections in 1983, a new party, ANAP won a clear-cut victory. Their biggest advantage was to appear as a new party on a recently vacuumed political space. The coalition of politicians that had come together to form ANAP in the first place brought with it constituencies among a variety of religious, nationalist and regional groups which gave it a wider appeal than its competitors (Owen, 2001:100).

In that sense, the 1980s is the decade of single party in power which Turkey would miss again from 1991 until 2002. ANAP resurrected Turkey-EU relations that were interrupted one year after 1980 military intervention. It has also driven Turkey into neo-liberal policies. However, neo-liberal policies increased political efficiency of many business-oriented organizations such as TUSIAD or TOBB while labor organizations were keenly suppressed with anti-democratic measures remained from the military rule.
In addition, party politics was gradually homogenized within 1980s on basic issues such as economics. In Turkey, the external context of the post Cold War era has influenced the domestic sphere in such a way that the traditional “left-right divide” on economic issues has progressively dissolved and the principal political parties have converged on broadly similar, if not identical, platforms involving the desirability of a market oriented economy (Balim, 1995: Int.).

In the 1990s, political agenda in Turkey changed once again radically by deep-seated problems on national identity and secularism. Increasing terrorist activities of PKK polarized the political space in Turkey. Official response to crisis was oppressive and anti-democratic. Kurdish movement has been seen as the expression of economic and social discontent, and the action of a small terrorist group (Kushner, 1997:224). As Erguder (1995:69) stated ‘the use of terrorism in articulate political demands’ and ‘the efforts to combat terrorism’ unfortunately emphasized coercive and authoritarian policies of the State.

Turkey witnessed once again rising tensions, short-lived coalitions, ‘deepening state’ and decreasing participation in representative democracy. Turkey-EU relations were often shocked by problematic grounds of human rights violations and anti-democratic policies of the State. However, in the same period, EU and Turkey started their Customs Union at 1995 that was already scheduled in 1963 Ankara Treaty. This carried the issue of EU accession back into political agenda of the country.

However, Turkey was still far from discussing democratization. Increasing success of Islamist parties in the elections mobilized disturbances of the military. Political system was blocked between the coalitions of Islamist Welfare Party and center-right and secular parties. Welfare Party either did not follow democratic attitudes in public. Prime Minister Erbakan’s sharp statements like defining how the country will pass to Islamic law did not help reducing the great disturbance and unrest in the country. Finally, he had to quit the office in 1997 after an open warning from the military on their commitment to protect secularism.
In the sum, the nature of politics and democracy in Turkey seems different in its characteristics compared to Western European experience. In Turkey’s context, the formation of secular nation-state with Kemalist ideology overemphasized the central position of state-machinery and bureaucracy in Turkish democracy. It has been run by powerful political or state-elites motivated to control the politics in the country.

This is also influential on the state of civil society in Turkey by diminishing their political potentials and their role in democratization. The deepest challenge against civil society participating in democratization in Turkey rises on inefficient presence of the public space which civil society is widely accepted to share with the State in the literature.

2.2. The State of Civil Society in Turkey

Looking at historical background of civil society in Turkey is useful to assess the state of civil society today. Mardin (1969:264-265) stressed that, no equivalent to forms of civil society which were widely discussed in Western thought had existed in the Ottoman Empire.

However, after more than 150 years of contact with modernization, the debate on the state of civil society in Turkey is more complex. In the first stages of modern Turkey, new-born nation-state occupied much of the public space. The State was deeply bureaucratized. All through the single-party period, Turkish politics was ruled by one secular party pursuing policies of national unity, leaving no space for civil society. The central place this ideology carries in politics in Turkey is found as one of the main obstacle against development of a free and efficient civil society (Karaman and Aras, 2000).

Following the multi-party period, ‘departing’ motivations began to emerge in Turkey’s civil society. Liberalization and industrialization gave rise to new parties and organizations leaning on entrepreneurs, middle or working-class. They triggered new forms of civil society whether political, economical or cultural. The process was furthered by urbanization which gave rise to new fusions of civil organizations as a result of the massive contact between rural and urban Turkey.
The 1960s witnessed deepening civil society in Turkey. Labor unions, business organizations as well as student and youth associations gradually got diverse and mobilized around their interests some of which were radically in contradiction with the State. Surprisingly, 1961 Constitution as the final outcome of the 1960 military intervention was progressive in that sense, opening the legal ground for civil society in the country as a response to rapid growth, industrialization and urbanization. There was a significant increase in political potentials of interest groups, social movements and civil society after 1960s.

However, the rise of party-elitism following the multi-party period weakened representative essence of political parties. This weakening can be related also to the global process of departure from mass-parties era. But mostly, it is because of the persistent interventions of the military to civil governance. As Ergil (2000:123) stated all the groups outside the official mainstream of Turkish society have been, one time or another, silenced by the State. After 1980 military coup, political parties and representative democracy lost its attraction, accountability, responsiveness and participation from the society.

Sakallioglu and Yeldan (2000:494) pointed out ‘the weakness of Turkey’s public/political sphere’ parallel to ‘the isolation of the political class from the rest of the society’, adding that ‘the institutional restructuring of Turkish political life after the military coup of 1980 is a fundamental source of this disconnection between the state and society.’ It vacuumed almost all sides of the political spectrum, banned almost all civil organizations and democratic, civil, collective rights for a period.

Returning to democracy in 1983 is significant in that sense. ANAP governments opened major labor organizations and some other civil society institutions in their democratization policies. But democratization measures of ANAP did not contain an inclusive approach to ‘outsider politics’ out of the State’s central authority on politics. Islamist organizations were exceptions in that sense. They benefited from the support of vast populations in big cities fostered by rapid urbanization. This is partly due to alienation of millions seeking for a refugee in the frame of neo-liberal
economies of the 1980s, partly due to moderate attitude of ANAP towards these organizations. In Turkey there was undoubtedly a significant relaxation of the strict Kemalist line towards Islam after Özal came to power in 1983 (Hann, 1997:37). But also, it is related to reflections in Turkey to the global process of returning to traditional, religious identities.

Kubicek (2002:764) found the reforms of ANAP ‘less a retreat of the State than its reorganization.’ However, this was not a barrier for ANAP’s neo-liberal policies. The party has furthered its deregulation measures giving more space especially for business-oriented civil society organizations. Hann (1997:33-34) claimed that there were expectations that civil society at that time would get stronger in Turkey where ‘prospects for civil society as an economic realm of unconstrained free enterprise were greatly enhanced through Özal’s politics of privatization, deregulation and the general weakening of state control.’

However, liberalization of Turkey after 1980s did not bring democratization for all segments of civil society. It did not increase political potentials of labor organizations and democratic civil society. While business-oriented organizations were increasing their efficiency in policy-making of the country, labor organizations and traditionally oppressed organizations were far from benefiting the policies of democratization. They were still subjected to anti-democratic remaining of the 1980 military coup.

Therefore, civil society in Turkey can be considered weak and impotent in terms of the public space it shares with the State. Civil society exists in name only; the people and the institutions, especially, those of the less economically fortunate classes, do not have complete, unhampered freedom from the traditionally coercive, officially ideological, state bureaucracy (Karaman and Aras, 2000:44).

2.3. Concluding Points
The nature of politics in Turkey can be characterized with a strong State at the center of politics occupying most of the public space. It is guarded by the military to protect the sustainability of political order against questions on national and secular identity. In this context, civil society finds less space to have democratic
potentials compared to its European counterpart. When politics and the State are perceived as synonymous, the political order loses its role as a mediator between the State and civil society (Ergil, 2000:45).

But, after multi-party period, liberalization, industrialization and urbanization, this frame began to change. These processes gave rise to fragmentation of politics into a plural set of political and civil organizations, mediating at least partially between the State and society. However, democracy in Turkey was persistently interrupted by the authoritarian nature of the State against ‘outsider politics’ of the official ideology.

1980 military intervention opened the way for radical changes in economic politics of Turkey from welfare-state to liberalization. However, liberalization did not bring democratization in Turkey. Schmitter (1995:15-16) counted Turkey as a case where transition from authoritarian regimes takes a unique form:

In these cases, the forms of democracy persist – especially, regular elections. But the opportunity for specific groups to participate, ....the constitutionally guaranteed liberal freedoms of expressions and assembly are subject to interference by state authorities, and/or the capacity of elected representatives to act are limited by such non-elected and undemocratic officials as armed forces, the police, or both.

In that sense, civil society has structural weaknesses in Turkey. It developed asymmetrically within each liberal democratization process. Liberalization within 1980s led to an increase in political potentials of private sector. Certain segments of civil society increased their political potentials within policies of deregulation and privatization, however outsider politics and economically deprived parts of society did not benefit from democratization equally.

3. Civil Society and Democratization
In this chapter, political potentials and limits of civil society and their relations with democratization are assessed. In the literature, discussions around civil society are mainly concentrated on its functions, political potentials and limits in the structuring and democratization of modern political orders. The debate is enriched by various contributions with different definitions opening new multi-disciplinary
grounds of discussions. Hence, the first section starts with referring to historical roots of the debate. Second section proceeds with contemporary discussions. In the third section, definitions and actors of the concept are examined, followed by an evaluation of political potentials and limits of civil society in the fourth section.

3.1. Historical Roots of the Debate
Civil society has been around for hundreds of years, ever since voluntary associations, mutual-help groups and interest groups were formed (Hajnal, 2002:1). Earlier considerations of civil society began with the structuring of modern political orders in Western Europe and Northern America. Historical roots of the debate are found for and against the attributions of pluralism. Chapman (1965:91) saw the aim of pluralism as ‘to divorce moral and economic progress from political instability.’

Tocqueville is widely accepted to have written on theoretical roots of pluralism. The promotion of civil society in his studies about new-born United States is historical, where he considered ‘free citizen associations’ as ‘powerful instruments of action’ (Haywood, 2002). He welcomed the very nature of voluntarism in civil associations claiming that they create opportunities for people to come together for the purpose of their own interests. Tocqueville, who declared that “in democratic countries the science of association is the mother of all science,” examines the nature of free political and civil associations, saying that, “free political associations serve as counterweights to the coercion of political power” (Galston, 2000:65).

Locke saw the associations of free citizens themselves defined in terms of their multiple, distinct and separate economic interests, as a foundation of modern political orders, while for Hegel civil society was historically produced as a sphere of pluralistic individual and corporate ‘ethical’ life (Gibbon, 1998:35-36). Hegel saw civil society as the third ‘complementary’ ethical institution out of the other two of ‘ethical family and rational, ethical state based on the rule of law and separation of powers’ (Brown, 1994:170). In that sense, apart from Locke’s emphasize on ‘individualized’ roots of civil society, Hegel stood one step closer to pluralist understanding by bringing an ethical, rational and corporate essence into civil society.
In contrast, Marx’s critics on Hegel are essential as a major departure from pluralist attributions on civil society. He underlined the links between civil society and the State. Marx’s starting point was an attack on the idea of the State’s self-differentiation from civil society (Gibbon, 1998:37). He found civil society and the State ‘not as counterweights to each other with a plurality of institutions opposing and balancing the coercion power of the State, but complementary in terms of a provision of a political domination’ (Gellner, 1994). He understood civil society in a material sense, the expression of particular property rights: ‘bureaucracy’ is the ‘state formalism’ of civil society (Migdal, 2001:130).

3.2. Recent Discussions on Civil Society

The twentieth-century history of the concept begins with Gramsci (Gibbon, 1998). Gramsci also looked at civil society from the prism of power relations in modern politics. His attempt was to unmask the links between the State and civil society by pointing out political coalitions between the State and corporate civil society structures in Western Europe at 1910s-20s. This is significant remembering Mussolini and Hitler administrations one decade later, in his country Italy and Germany where civil society existed strongly not as a democratic form but rather a corporate structure of fascism.

Contemporarily, discussions around civil society continue around issues such as ‘the nature and limits of liberal democracy, the durability of capitalism and the sources of breakdown of state socialism’ (Gibbon, 1998:33). Liberal, pluralist views emphasize private potentials of civil society contesting the authoritarian tendency of the State. In contrast, counter-arguments of the skeptical claims against these private potentials underline the importance of the State or emphasize the political content inserted in civil society from the prism of power relations. Therefore, civil society is expected to contribute to democratization and development within different proposals and merely contradictory motivations. To favor democracy, one should instead strengthen civil society as against state and politics, including, some say, by supporting the growth of a capitalist market economy or, others say, by simultaneously promoting the autonomy of civil society against the market (Tornquist, 1998:108).
According to Gellner (1994:193), the broader sense of civil society refers to a total society ‘within which the non-political institutions are not dominated by the political ones, and do not stifle individuals either.’ Habermas (2003:87-88) talked about a redefinition of the State, society and economy in today’s world where ‘the international economic system—in which states establish the boundary between their domestic economies and foreign trade relations—has been transformed into a transnational economy’. However, besides ‘de-bordering’ aspects of globalization, Habermas underlined the framework of the nation-state ‘which is still necessary on political stage comprised by the political projects aiming to compensate the undesirable effects of capitalism.’

Gellner (1994:97) saw economic decentralization central to constitute a pre-condition for resembling civil society saying that ‘such a society can be plural and contain countervailing forces and balance mechanisms, which are located in the economic sphere or work by means of economic power.’ Brown (1994:176-177) claimed that self-reliance and the ability to make one’s way in the world are promoted by civil society and undermined by a system in which the state is the universal provider. However, in this approach, civil society is undermined to limits of market-oriented motivations. The State is seen as the platform of policy-making out of these market-oriented motivations and is undermined to be only the source of corruption and inefficiency.

Recalling the critics of neo-liberal doctrine against failed-states’ exercise in developing world, the following is a call for civil society to fill the vacuum of the State in terms of providing some basic services that were covered conventionally by the public nature of the State: When the state fails to deliver public goods, insurance, management of externalities, minimum basic needs, and democratic rights, civil organizations may develop to fill the vacuum, and also market failures may lead to the emergence of these forms of organizations (De Janvry et al. 1995:4).

However, motivations of market-oriented civil society for democratization are questionable remembering the proposed context of neo-liberal rise. The democratization process that is linked with the neo-liberal model, however, mainly
gives influence to the people who already have access to power and money in the local context (Roebeling, 2002:213). In that sense, claiming that the deepening of civil society will necessarily enhance democracy is questionable from the prism of power in modern societies.

Tornquist (1998:109-126) found some theoretical and analytical weaknesses, problems of generalization and dubious relevance in recent neo-liberal civil society paradigm. First, he pointed out that 'this paradigm sets aside relations of power in civil society and assumes citizens to be equal yet conflicts over power related to any factor are fundamental in processes of democratization.' Second, he talked about an ambiguity on the importance of economy as the only engine of the rise of civil society. Third, he claimed that 'it is assumed that the best way of fighting the negative effects of capitalism is to further deepen the same civil society that capitalism is giving birth to.' At that point, he reminded the coexistence of civil society with very different types of regime, including fascism in Italy and Germany. He concluded that 'the presence and strength of civil society are poor historical explanations of democracy.'

He furthered his analysis by the problems of generalizations in recent neo-liberal paradigm. He reminded that 'applying the civil society paradigm outside its primarily European framework also means that historical realities tend to be set aside, by giving the contradicting nature of modernization and democratization experiences outside Europe, mainly carried out first, by the colonial powers and later, the state itself, both from above.' He pointed out 'the dubious relevance of the paradigm where, in many cases the still persisting and re-emerging authoritarian rule goes hand in hand with the rise of capitalism, general modernization, elements of civil society despite the belief that, the lack of popular political organization and representation based on interests and ideologies are supposed to be the most serious problem in current democratization.'

It is incorrect to assume that forces that create poverty, exclusion and injustice exist only in governments, public policies and market institutions. They lie within civil society as well. In other words, civil society encompasses contending power relations and group interests that can both advance and impede poverty reduction, equity, inclusion, justice and other
social development objectives. Civil society is essentially political in its
meaning. The civic arena contains roots of power differences that are used
to perpetuate poverty and exclusion. This reality must be factored into
development initiatives (Fowler, 2000:7).

3.3. Definitions and Actors of Civil Society
Like all key concepts in the social sciences, ‘civil society’ has a variety of meanings
from two sources: first, it has been invoked explicitly by pro-democracy movements
throughout the world, second, it has different meanings for different people.’ In that
sense, definitions of civil society may vary in their focus, analysis, political content
and motivations. However, ‘civil society has been a convenient term with some
surprising commonalities’ (Migdal, 2001:130).

In that sense, many definitions are derived from a tripartite model of spheres
divided: public, private and civil society. This is mainly inspired by liberal pluralist
understanding on modern societies where civil society stands side by side with the
State and the market (Roebeling, 2002). Some separate civil society also aside from
the family. They locate ‘voluntarism, self-constitution and self-mobilization’ inside
civil society (De Hart and Dekker, 1999).

Fowler (2000:1-6) opposed definitions limited with the ‘Western time-frame and
geography’. He proposed a context-specific understanding on civil society. Civil
society is constantly changing and therefore very difficult to grasp analytically
(Berglund et al. 2002:36). Benaboud (2003:77) claimed that ‘these definitions are
all descriptive, and cannot reveal the rich and complex nature of the concept.’

Some define civil society within the actors involved. These definitions offer more
opportunities to understand civil society within its own dynamics as they follow
content-wise definitions embedded by the political dynamics and the nature of the
actors involved (Nagle and Mahr, 1999; Berglund et al. 2002). In reality, civil
society is an arena, not a thing, and although it is often seen as the key to future
progressive politics, this arena contains different and conflicting interests and
agendas (Scholte quoted by Edwards, 2001:1).
A huge variety of networks and associations, community groups, NGOs, social movements, trade unions and peasant organizations, business associations (excluding firms founded for profit-making), academia, ethnic associations, religious groups, cooperatives and community organizations are counted as civil society organizations (Edwards, 2001; Foster, 1999). Political parties are also generally considered to be a part of civil society. However, there are some counter-arguments to place political parties in this definition. Mouzelis (1998:59) offered a third position for political parties and defined them as ‘major organizational means for articulating civil society interests with the state, particularly in democratic parliamentary context’.

3.4. Political Potentials and Limits of Civil Society

The common thesis on civil society and democracy is that the former is a precondition for the latter, that civil society is a guarantee against ‘totalitarian democracy’ and dictatorship (Tornquist, 1998:108). Western theories focus on the role of civil society in securing individual freedom and democracy in the face of incursions by States (Roebeling, 2002:211). In that sense, mainstream liberal pluralist understanding on civil society became significantly influential both in modern political thought on democratization and in development practice on the behaviors of donors and the nature of partnerships they recently prefer.

The promotion of civil society in democratization and in development practice of donors overlaps with the rise of neo-liberalism. It also meets the transition period of former Soviet countries to plural democracy and market economy. The promotion is again valid in recent shift to new preferential of post-Washington consensus. Knight and his co-authors (2002:12-13) pointed ‘a broad consensus about development among the world’s elites, including major international donors, government leaders and think-tanks with three components: first, democracy is seen as the best form of government, second, private enterprise in the free market is identified as the primary engine of economic development and third, civil society is given a paramount role.’

In recent years, there has been a significant move away from what was known as the Washington consensus—the belief that market liberalization
and Western-style democracy offered a universal blueprint for growth and poverty reduction across the world. Central to the emerging post-Washington consensus are a number of ideas that place civil society at the heart of the development debate (Edwards, 2001:2)

At this point, the question to be asked is how the deepening of civil society is expected to contribute to democratization and development. In its broadest sense, civil society is accepted to have an overall participatory essence that advances the level of democracy. Two channels are essential for this participation: from below by opening the links for more active citizenship and from outside by balancing the coercive power of the State. Finally, this is supposed to lead to democratization in political order and improve the nature of politics (Jacobs, 2003; Mouzelis, 1998).

Berglund and his co-authors (2002:14) accepted civil society as ‘one of the factors that captures the most important aspects of attitudinal/social consolidation (of democracy) between the others of: social cohesion and the level of modernity, people’s ability to cope with differences (of opinion, ethnicity, etc.), coping with political freedoms, human rights and political culture.’ They regarded these factors in a political order as determinants for an improvement on all social relations.

De Hart and Dekker (1999:75) furthered discussions in favor of democratic potentials of civil society with their assumption that ‘the deepening and revitalization of political democracy with the potentials of a recovery or preservation of social cohesion by civil society possibly also increases the efficacy of government policy’. In that sense, intermediary organizations create the opportunities to channel political debates to the governments. Edwards (2004:15) saw this potential of channeling debates, accountability, cohesion and fostering good-governance as ‘one of the developmental potentials of civil society.’

In that sense, civil society is accepted to mediate between different political and economic motivations with its potential of being an arena for spreading consensus between competing interests. Streeten (1995:31) claimed that ‘institutions of civil society can prevent the threat caused by the fact which states and markets often tend to weaken and undermine each other.’
However, all these proposals of civil society to spread democratic essence by creating the links for participation, consensus, cooperation, articulation of interests, shock-absorbing, private sphere and protection from authoritarianism and coercion can be undermined by various limitations. The first one of these limitations is the context-specific frame of the state-civil society relations.

In their study where they examined democratization and civil society in CEECs, Berglund and his co-authors (2002:165) concluded remarkable points: According to them, in political terms, 'CEECs have been a transitional zone between the Western tradition of division of power and the Eastern tradition of concentration of power. This fault-line coincides with that one between Western and Eastern Christianity, the Eastern tradition is at its strongest in territories once under Ottoman rule, and the Western tradition is strongest in areas marked by Lutheranism.' They claimed that in comparison to the Eastern tradition territories, Western tradition territories of Central and Eastern Europe have stronger civil societies today.

The comparison of Western and Eastern traditions based on by turn, Lutheran division of power and Ottoman concentration of power is consistent in terms of a consideration of recent EU Enlargement. CEECs in Western traditions accessed to EU in shorter periods by fulfilling their democratic consolidation according to Copenhagen Criteria of EU Enlargement compared to more problematic Enlargement processes of Romania, Bulgaria and more significantly Turkey in Eastern traditions.

Another limitation to democratic nature of civil society is the matter of political relevance. Streeten (1995:31) claimed that 'the institutions of civil society - churches, trade unions, interest groups, action groups, the media and many others - are often quite undemocratic, in spite of their rhetoric.' Berglund and his co-authors (2002:36) pointed out the necessity of political opinions of the actors to credit them for strengthening democracy: 'a social group that acts outside the sphere of politics (within the sphere of violence) is not part of civil society.' Fowler (2000:7) distinguished 'the developmental approach to civil society' underlining the fact that, 'not all civic groups are civil in their behavior':

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The Ku Klux Klan, fundamentalists of various persuasions, and pro-and anti-abortion groups do not necessarily operate according to norms that reject violence and other uncivilized behavior. Only a thin red line separates uncivilized behavior from legitimate civil resistance, demonstrations and constructive confrontation.

Two other limitations to civil society are related to the external frame they exercise in. First, the fragmentation of civil society actors limits their political potentials in practice. There is a limitation in the way in which organs of civil society participate in the national agenda or in the state agenda because they are largely either cut up into just sectors (Constantino-David, 1998:189). This fragmentation brings difficulties for projects especially at national or higher-level to build platforms of democratization with civil society actors since each segment of civil society follows its own agenda of democratization. It is difficult to built a policy-frame from this variety.

Second, today civil society actors are still limited to operate in an arena which is mainly state-driven. Even in a neo-liberal frame of civil society emphasizing its private potentials, actors involved in the process operate in public spaces that they have to co-exist with the State. Therefore, political potentials of civil society are subjected to state interventions. When the matter is democratization, this intervention generally becomes more problematic and contains political aspects where the State also has to be taken into account.

3.5. Concluding Points
Civil society is one of the most widely discussed concepts in political thought. Since the rise of modern ages, it has been promoted or criticized by different views examining its political potentials and limitations. The debate is mainly on relations between the existence and efficiency of civil society and democratization.

Pluralist discourse sees civil society as a platform or actor in politics to limit the coercive and authoritarian nature of the State. It promotes civil society to mediate between the State and society and to foster active, ethical citizenship in political culture. Liberals further this by emphasizing private potentials of civil society contesting the functions of the State as an instrument of decentralization and
deregulation. They promote civil society today regardless of its political content and power allocated inside the concept.

However, civil society can not be understood without the prism of power relations and its ‘political content’ hidden under its ‘private potentials’. Therefore, a content-wise approach is necessary to grasp civil society and its relation with democratization analytically. Kopecky’s (2003) definition of ‘civil and uncivil society’ or Fowler’s (2000) ‘developmental approach’ are accurate to credit civil society as an actor of democratization. These define civil society ‘democratic’ according to its political relevance and democratic exercise in a political context.

In that sense, Turkey’s governments and EU bodies involved in democratization of Turkey within EU encounter process must consider their civil society practice according to ‘democratic political content’ of civil society they promote or cooperate.

Another crucial point is the context-specific nature of state-civil society relations. Jacobs (2003:20-21) divided civil society into two forms in a given context, weak and stronger versions of civil society: the weak version refers to the simple existence of free and voluntary associations independent of the State and valuable for creating the conditions for individuals to become more active citizens. However, according to him, for the possibility of more effective citizenship, the ability of these individuals to influence the State is found necessary. This requires the stronger version of civil society with its content of free public spaces of communication – public spheres – (the practice of open discussion about matters of common concern). The potential of these public spheres, according to Habermas (1989:248-249) is ‘their promoting rational-critical debate and reasoned forms of consensus in societies’

In that sense, democratization policies of Turkey’s governments must surround the measures related to civil society participation in the process. Not only democratizing legal frame of associations but also freedoms of opinion and expression must also be taken into account and fully exercised to strengthen civil society in Turkey.
EU also has to consider its civil society practice in the process. Cooperating with civil society that has already stronger political potentials is not enough to achieve stronger version of civil society in Turkey. As mentioned before, especially business-oriented civil society has more advanced links of cooperation with EU. This frame must consider weaker segments of civil society in Turkey as well.

4. EU and Civil Society
This chapter examines the nature of EU’s motivations and practice for civil society in European integration. The focus is on EU common policies where civil society participates to policy-making at EU-level. As EU is one of the official actors driving Turkey’s encounter to European integration, this is essential to meet the main objective of this research clearly. In that sense, the first section of the chapter examines civil society in EU social policy. In the second section, civil society in EU regional policy is assessed.

4.1. Civil Society in EU Social Policy
At the institutional structure of EU, the engine of civil society participation in policy-making is the European Economic and Social Committee (hereafter EESC). EESC was set up by the 1957 Rome Treaties in order to involve economic and social interest groups in the establishment of the common market and to provide institutional machinery for briefing EU Commission and EU Council on EU issues (EESC, 2004a).

It is an advisory committee consists of European civil society representatives. EESC gives consultancy to upper EU decision-making bodies of EU Council, Commission or Parliament by declaring opinions on key policy areas about EU affairs. Its opinions are forwarded to EU decision-making bodies and published officially. However, in some policy areas, taking EESC consultation is mandatory while in others, it is optimal. But EESC can declare opinion on its own-initiative. Out of the 170 advisory documents EESC publishes approximately a year, 15% are issued on its own-initiative (EESC, 2004a).
317 members of EESC are drawn from economic and social interest groups around member states according to the population of the country. Members are nominated by national governments and appointed by EU Council for a renewable 4-year term of office. They belong to one of the three groups: Employers, Employees, and Various Interests (EESC, 2004a).

Employers’ Group consists of representatives from business organizations regardless of their origins and scale whether public or private, large, medium or small-sized enterprise organizations. It exchanges information regularly with civil society organizations like Union of Industrialists and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (hereafter UNICE), Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry (Eurochambers), etc. as well as with various sectors’ civil society organizations. The group policy, in general reflects the opinion of European industrial federations in supporting the development of a EU of free market economies with freedom of trade and movement within the internal market, in the belief that this is the best road to growth, competitiveness and employment (EESC, 2004b).

By nature, Employees’ Group carries a different policy-frame around the issues of: the fight against unemployment, improvement of living and working conditions, protection of fundamental freedoms, repercussions of economic globalization, jeopardizing of EU’s social achievements and the establishment of the single market and the euro (EESC, 2004b). Most of the representatives inside Employees’ Group come from European Trade Unions Confederation (ETUC) background. In consistency with political motivations calling for deeper integration, Employees’ Group believes that, to meet the challenges of globalization is possible only by ‘strengthening European integration and protecting and improving European social model’ (EESC, 2004b).

The third group inside EESC provides representation for civil society with diverse backgrounds and policy-frames. According to EESC (2004), the presence of Various Interests Group ensures that full voice is given to the concerns of other segments of civil society around Europe for various social, occupational, economic and cultural organizations that make up civil society. Various Interests Group brings this wide concern and civil society involvement to EU agenda. In that sense,
emphasize and distinction EESC puts on social and civil dialogue is rather progressive.

While social dialogue is between organizations of employers, employees and the State at national-level on the issues covering working-life, civil dialogue is much broader. It refers to the dialogue between the State and civil society at any concern. However, civil dialogue mechanism inside EU is heavily criticized by some segments of European civil society due to the criteria brought by EU Commission on ‘being organized and acting on European level.’ Participation of civil society organizations from regional, local levels and grassroots, advocacy organizations in EU-level opinion-making is weakened by the preferential of EU bodies seeking for civil dialogue.

There are also doubts about the autonomy of civil society, claiming that EESC is acting as a ‘filter on civil dialogue’ and carries the threat of ‘monopolization of civil dialogue’ (EESC, 2003a:7-29). The debate is still valid today despite the distinction at the recent European Constitution (EU, 2003:19-20). The Constitution defines ‘participatory and representative democracy’ in Article 46 in favor of civil dialogue and in Article 47, it promotes social dialogue at EU level.

EESC builds up links with civil society from CEECs and Turkey in the context of Enlargement Process as well as from the third countries. EESC assigns ‘strengthening the role of civil society in these countries’ as a mission for itself (EESC, 2003b:9). Joint Consultative Committees (hereafter JCCs) set up with some Enlargement countries, including Turkey run the dialogue between EESC and civil society from these countries. In that sense, EESC claims itself supporting civil society and fostering social and civil dialogue by promoting the establishment of economic and social councils in third countries, as well as Enlargement countries (EESC, 2003b:22).

4.2. Civil Society in EU Regional Policy
Regional policy provides the frame of administrative reforms in accession and Enlargement countries. These reforms scope on decentralization that widen the links for civil society to access more efficiently to policy-making processes. Like the key
concept of social dialogue for social policy, cohesion is the core of regional policy implications of EU.

Cohesion policy refers to a range of EU policies having the common aim of reducing or ameliorating the economic disparities (Rumford, 2000:1). But, it is a political goal also, as Nanetti (1996:59) claimed by which ‘EU is moving toward political integration.’ For accession and Enlargement countries, the aim of regional administrative reforms is to become compatible with regional funds. These reforms establish an appropriate legal framework and an administrative breakdown of the territory on the NUTS statistical-regional division system, as well as a redefinition of the responsibilities of all parties involved -including regional parties- (EU, 2004).

In that sense, civil society benefits an indirect improvement in overall process within decentralization of regional administrations and funds released to regional and local parties in favor of cohesion. However, it is hard to say that these policies will necessarily lead to democratization. EU structural policy has disturbed existing relations between central and local levels but has not radically altered the balance of power (Laffan, 1996:341).

Laffan (1996) claimed that the introducing of regional funds in 1988 has deepened decentralization of resource allocation in Ireland and weakened the control of central governments on these resources. But, she (1996:340) stressed that the centralized state and a dependence on government agencies for development has weakened local initiative and capacity in the context of Ireland.

In that sense, EU’s regional policy is in favor of reducing the central bureaucracy and state interventions in the economy. It has a market-driven bias since it is based on the liberal EU model of economics applied according to regional economic disparities. The success of this approach depends in the long-term on a strengthening of civil society and local competence (Laffan, 1996:340).

4.3. Concluding Points
European integration has started following the World War II by Western European governments against new threats fostered by the ‘divided-Europe’ of Soviet
socialist block versus the Western capitalist block. In that sense, European integration is a market-driven process since its foundation with the preferential of liberal democracy and free-market ideals. Hine (1998:3) found EU as a market-driven process despite some highly protective and interventionist measures taken like agricultural policy. Thereafter, steps towards European integration were essentially confined to the economic sphere (Plattner, 2003:45).

With the rise of the complex dynamics of globalization, European integration has been driven towards new perspectives of enlargement. Deeper political dimensions were inserted into the project. It is evident that each integration perspective is inter-related vis-à-vis separate periods of deepening and enlargement processes.

EU accession has an indirect effect on democratization which increases political potentials of civil society. It is acknowledged that the role of EC accession for Greece, Spain and Portugal in the 1980s as a key element ‘bringing these countries from authoritarianism to democracy’ (Plattner, 2003:46; Bootle, 2004).

The presence of an efficient, stable democracy based on the rule-of-law is a precondition for Enlargement as defined in Copenhagen criteria of 1993. In that sense, enlargement process has an overall democratization effect to the direction of pluralistic market-economy regimes (Laursen, 1999).

For Enlargement countries, the advantages of accession to EU are twofold. First, the political agenda gets more suitable for democratization within the institutional links opening wide between these countries and EU bodies. The process is similar also for Turkey. Second, EU funds and resources provide significant opportunities to apply social and regional policies within aspects of democratization and civil society participation.

McMillan (2003:9) stressed the expectations for EU funds and subsidies as a factor for EU’s attraction around the continent. However, it is likely to be that, EU funds and resources are going to be reduced in the coming years due to the growing debates, critics and struggle for these resources inside EU (Martished, 2004). In case of Turkey’s any possible accession, these funds are going to be more
problematic due to the scale of the country and the use of the political weapon of funds-release where Turkey’s receipts have been suspended many times in terms of Greek vetoes or human rights disputes, etc (Eder, 1999).

EU’s social policy offers opportunities for democratic political potentials of civil society and it is progressive (Gold, 1998). Social dialogue supports civil society organizations from social sides to play an active role in terms of the convergence Enlargement brings (Egger, 2003). The debate on more room for other segments of civil society especially for development, advocacy and grassroots organizations – who lead democratic values more in civil society – is promising. In Turkey’s case however, the attempts to institutionalize social dialogue in the country is highly problematic as it will be discussed in chapter five.

In the frame of EU’s regional policy, the links for democratization and increasing civil society’s participation in the process are more questionable. IMF (2000:1) saw the goal of EU accession as ‘one of the key driving forces behind the adjustment and reform efforts that these countries pursue.’ In that sense, regional policy goes hand in hand with deregulation and decentralization. In cases where central state has an overemphasized control over resources like Turkey, this seems democratic however, the impact is indirect and subjected to context-specific conditions and it is not expected to be permanent. As Laffan (1996:341) stated ‘effective regional and local government depends in the end on political culture, the vibrancy of civil society and the state tradition within each member state.’ However, emphasize of EU in regional policy is, as Rumford (2000:68) said ‘not a movement of the oppressed and marginalized.’

5. The Practice and the Alternative Strategies

In the first section of this chapter, the practice of the State for civil society participation within democratization of Turkey in EU encounter process is assessed. The second section examines the practice of EU bodies in the process. In the third section of the chapter, responses from various segments of civil society in Turkey to the process are examined. The fourth section concludes alternative strategies to increase civil society participation in democratization of Turkey in this encounter.
5.1. The Practice of the State in the Process

EU is the most attractive regionalism option for Turkey. The reasons behind that are complex and diverse. Grugel and Hout (1999:10) defined 'region-building' as 'the set of strategic calculations by actors located inside states and societies who push for integration as a way of positioning themselves in response to global change'. They see Turkey’s motivation to EU accession ‘driven by state-elites.’

It may seem contradictory that motivations for EU accession have been driven long by the State despite main political obstacles in the process have also arisen around the issues of reorganizing and limiting the State’s authoritarianism. However, motivations of the State for EU accession are rooted in the modernization project of Turkey and its political orientations.

The first ‘strategic calculation’ of Turkey’s state-elites for EU accession can be ideological. Kemalism is committed to modernize Turkey by directing it to the West. Second, it is politically important to find Turkey’s position in one of the most complex regions of the world. As Eder (1999:79) pointed out, the expectation is to locate Turkey inside the advance set of EU to avoid ‘total isolation and marginalization’ in the process of globalization. This became urgent after the end of the Cold War. Historical anti-communist belt that countries like Turkey were positioned upon lost its attraction with new dynamics of globalization. Third, access to advanced EU markets takes away the disadvantages of EU’s protective policies against Turkey’s weaker economy.

Most of Turkey’s foreign trade is done with EU. However, Customs Union in 1995 did not include processed agricultural products where Turkey has comparative advantages. In fact, as Eder (1999:88) stated, ‘Turkey’s position within EU is weakened economically by the fact that it is the first country to enter into the EU without full membership’. The meaning of this is, as Eder continued, ‘Turkey will not be able to benefit any significant extent from the social and regional funds designed to ease the costs of adjustment, especially during the first stages of joining.’
EU protects its economies at the highest levels ever with highly-advanced tools like funds despite its emphasize on liberalization of international economic order. Hence, it is vital for Turkey to continue its economic integration with EU at the maximum. That is why, advocates and actors of liberalization, including the State in Turkey see ‘no alternative on the above horizons’ to EU accession as Pamir (1994:135) stated.

Democratization attempts regarding civil society have been pursued parallel to EU encounter since the resurrection of the official relations between Turkey and EU in 1987. Earlier measures were designed to institutionalize and coordinate the relations opened with European Community (hereafter EC). They were indirectly related to improve participation of civil society in democratization.

The first adaptations related to civil society have begun in 1989 with the government notice 1989/4. With the notice, EC Consulting Committee was established alongside other two committees related to EC affairs. Civil society institutions such as TUSIAD, IKV, TOBB, Union of Banks, etc. were given a chance to participate in the Consulting Committee.

However, in addition to the majority of business-elite civil society actors represented in the Committee, the State’s central position in this body was also persistent. State Planning Department was assigned to hold the Secretariat of the Committee and minister of EC Affairs and administrators from various high-level public institutions were appointed as the majority in the body. In that sense, these attempts can be regarded premature in terms of providing suitable grounds for democratization and civil society participation in this process. It is hard to accept that these Committees achieved their objectives (Omurgonulsen and Oktem, 2003:10).

In most of the 1990s, democratization related to any promotion of civil society did not progress significantly due to persistent over-emphasize of state control in these attempts. Additionally, Turkey was terrorized by Kurdish question and the terrorist violence. These conditions diminished the aspects of democratization. The
encounter between Turkey and EU was also persistently brought into diplomatic crisis by disputes over human rights and democracy.

Customs Union in 1995 brought the issue of EU accession in Turkey. It was soon accompanied by debates on democratization as it was criteria of EU accession. The State took some democratization steps regarding civil society. Economic and Social Council of Turkey (hereafter ESCT) was established in 1995 to adopt social dialogue principle of EU in Turkey.

The same picture of the State’s central position in these civil initiatives and the lack of implementation appeared on the issue of establishing social and civil dialogue in Turkey. The institutional capacities of ESCT were dramatically weakened by obscured legal grounds that should identify the operational frame of the body. Between 1995 and 2001, the legal base of ESCT was based on government notices that were revised, cancelled, reformed within each government change (Isigicok, 1999).

In addition, the State’s hegemony in the Council is once again another reason of why ESCT does not mean an important step through establishing social dialogue and increasing civil society participation in democratization of Turkey. Ruhi (2003:5-7) found ESCT not as a board of civil society and social dialogue that limits the authority of the State on policy making in certain issues but rather, as an institution that lacks concrete legal grounds which is referred only to legitimate the decisions of governments.

The meetings of ESCT were requested by the governments when no appointment was scheduled in some periods for more than 16 months (DPT, 2004). In that sense, ESCT is accepted to be state-driven rather than a civil platform. Recent reforms of the new AKP government in the organization of ESCT needs more progress. The opinion-release by EESC (2004c:6) in July 2004 that promoted Turkey’s accession to EU has welcomed the mobilization of ESCT in recent government’s period but asked for a deeper institutional capacity, coordination and civil society representation in ESCT.
The meetings of ESCT are now scheduled automatically for once in every three months instead of being based upon a government request. However, Tinar (2003) calls for more civil society representation in ESCT which still contains 15 representatives from government and administrative public institutions in addition to Prime Minister heading the Council.

Democratization reforms gained speed after recognition of Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership in 1999 Helsinki Summit of EU (Rumford, 2002; Sozen and Shaw, 2003, Hale, 2003). Turkey responded to this decision by some institutionalization attempts to further this encounter with EU (Bayart, 2003). General Secretariat of EU Affairs (hereafter GSEA) was established to coordinate the implementation of necessary adaptation measures in the State administration and organizations.

However, an attempt to build a Committee in GSEA where various civil society actors would be represented has failed (Omurgonulsen and Oktem, 2003). Instead, working groups have been established with the representatives of various civil society organizations mostly from business-elites organizations again.

Most importantly however, three internal developments were significant to rise the calls for deepening democratization and political reforms in the country. The first was the significantly descending terrorist violence after the arrest of the leader of PKK who was caught in a controversial mission in Nairobi at Greek Embassy in February 1999. The second was the earthquake in August 1999 that will be discussed in the following section related to civil society practice in the process. And third, in February 2001, the deepest financial crisis of contemporary Turkey occurred when country’s economy has recessed more than 7% overnight. All these developments gave rise for calls to democratize the country and apply deep political reforms and change.

Following was the landslide elections of November 2002 which provides significant aspects of changes in Turkish politics by its nature (Brewin, 2003; Onis and Keyman, 2003; Acikel, 2003). For the first time, all political parties that were inside the Parliament before the elections all of which governed Turkey in the last decades were left out by the polls. A new party called AKP that has recently departed from
the old strictly Islamist Welfare Party won a major victory and came as a single-party in power for the first time since 1991.

AKP government furthered the policy of EU accession to higher levels with the Emergency Action Plan. Policies related to EU accession were put into action. The leadership of the AKP has displayed a good sense of priorities, capturing centre stage with its campaign to hasten EU accession (Aras and Gokay, 2003:159).

Legislative reforms to ease restrictive laws against democratic and civil rights have been taken into account more recently in these reforms. New legislations were put into force to democratize legal grounds for civil society between 2003 and 2004. New Civil Code, New Law on Associations and Foundations brought major changes. Restrictions such as giving associations and foundations names based on differences of ethnicity, religion and language were abolished as well as other democratic measures in the latest legislation reform in July 2004.

5.2. The Practice of EU Bodies in the Process
Following the Customs Union in 1995, relations with European-level civil society begun to be improved and institutionalized deeper. In that sense, JCCs between ESCT and EESC were established in 1995 (EESC, 2004c:2). Main trade unions and employers organizations like DISK, TUSIAD who participated in the recently-born ESCT have joined these JCCs. However, due to the structural weaknesses of ESCT mentioned earlier, the efficiency of these JCCs did not progress. They served more as platforms of exchanging opinions and recognizing each other.

EU Delegation to Turkey (hereafter EDT) is the main EU body operating in Turkey in this process. EDT supports democratization and civil society in Turkey under the title of ‘Democracy and Human Rights’. EDT (2001:1) claimed that ‘after Helsinki period the importance of providing the active participation of the organized civil society in Turkey to EU accession process has increased.’

Between 2003 and 2004, EDT supports six different programs under the title of ‘Democracy and Human Rights’ with a budget of slightly over 17 million € from EU resources (EDT, 2003:42-52). The scope and activities of these programs vary
from institution building in public bodies to direct partnerships with human rights organizations and civil society related to democracy.

In that sense, except three programs initiated in cooperation with public institutions to improve participation of civil society in policy-making and to foster human rights and democracy education in the country, other three programs involve with various civil society organizations. Two of them are initiated in coordination with civil society organizations from democratization backgrounds.

A program called ‘Rethinking Human Rights and Civil Society in Turkey’ was initiated in cooperation with the ‘Foundation of Economic and Social History Turkey’ and the ‘Human Rights Foundation Turkey’ (hereafter FHRT) aiming to create public awareness by mobile activities around the country (FESH, 2004).

A Network for Democracy, Human Rights and Civil Participation was another program in cooperation with related civil society. It was initiated with Social Participation and Improvement Foundation with the aim of increasing public awareness among the youth on human rights and democracy (EDT, 2003:49).

These programs are weak in terms of their potentials considering the scale of Turkey. But they can be considered as the first steps of an increasing awareness for civil society in Turkey on the changing opportunity structure within EU programs offered.

However, there is a strong lack of information on EU in Turkey. A public survey held by EU (2003b:45-49) on public opinions in candidate countries on key issues of their democracy, politics and EU accession period shows that in Turkey, despite the latest rise in support for an EU accession, knowledge and availability of information about EU and Turkey’s accession process is extremely weak.

Among other Enlargement countries, people in Turkey have the lowest levels of information on EU and the implications of accession. In that sense, there is a strong need for initiating public relations activities and ease the access to EU opportunities for civil society in the country.
In that sense, two measures that EDT has taken are promising. The first is, the initiation of STGP (Civil Society Improvement Program, hereafter STGP). The second is the opening of the EU Information Center in January 2004, late but still welcomed. The Center is designed to enhance public relations and provides information and documentation related to EU encounter process. It also hosts meetings and seminars for improving the coordination with civil society in Turkey (EDT. 2004).

STGP is running between from 2001 until the end of 2004 to promote civil society and its participation in the process under the title of ‘Democracy and Human Rights.’ It contains five programs on local civil initiatives, enhancing Turkish-Greek Dialogue, enhancing dialogue and capacity among trade unions and syndicates, enhancing dialogue between chambers and markets with their European counterparts and police, professionalism and public (STGP, 2004a).

STGP supports civil initiatives with some priority areas such as gender, environment, development, children, human rights, etc. In that sense, STGP considers capacity building and training activities for local and grassroots civil society organizations which is very accurate.

In addition, STGP implemented activities on taking the profile of civil society in Turkey where there has been three regional meetings with more than 180 representatives of various local and grassroots civil society actors (STGP, 2004a). These meetings have shown significant results indicating the main arguments of this research. Representations of civil society actors declared their problems mainly on the issues of: the lack of awareness on democratic and participatory potentials of civil society actors, the need for institution and capacity building and the lack of common platforms and networks for coordination (STGP, 2004b).

EU Commission Reports are also important external instruments of EU in this encounter. They are issued on a regular basis since 1999 Helsinki Summit in the frame of pre-accession strategy ‘to stimulate and support Turkey’s reforms’ (EU Commission, 2003:4). Based on this strategy, EU Commission monitors Turkey’s
progress in Copenhagen Criteria annually. Therefore, these reports have a scope on democratization measures taken by Turkey in the process.

Emphasize of these reports is on implementation (Onis and Keyman, 2003). They regularly address the need to strengthen civil society in Turkey (Brewin, 2003:143). For instance, 2003 Regular Report of EU Commission (2003:9) welcomed efforts of civil and social dialogue in Turkey and put the priority of providing assistance to improve civil society participation in policy-making.

As a result of recent democratization reforms, EU Commission acknowledged in its October 2004 Regular Report that Turkey has fulfilled Copenhagen Criteria of EU Enlargement. It advised EU Council to start accession talks with Turkey in December 2004. But the most significant developments after the issuing of October 2004 Report have come from European side.

The decision of EU Commission was scheduled two years ago, in December 2002 whether to advice to start negotiations with Turkey or not according to Turkey’s progress until October 2004. However, the agenda in Europe has fallen into a deep debate very recently on Turkey’s accession after the release of the Commission’s October 2004 Report proposing to start accession talks. The debates have arisen in such a nature that indicates many problematic from EU side in this encounter process which will be assessed in the concluding section of this chapter.

5.3. The Response of Civil Society in the Process

In earlier periods of this encounter, civil society response to the process was much less. This is due to first, EU agenda was not seen yet in political agenda of the country and second, EU encounter was seen only as an economic integration process.

With the Customs Union in 1995, perceptions of different segments of civil society in Turkey on this encounter began to emerge. As Eder (1999:91-92) pointed out, employers’ organizations of different sectors inside TUSIAD were diverse in their interpretation of the Customs Union, mainly due to benefits and losses from this integration. On the other hand, mainly due to the nature of this state-driven process
discussed earlier, certain segments of civil society in Turkey like labor organizations were totally excluded from the process as Eder (1999:92) pointed out that ‘they were not even consulted about the Customs Union.’

The calls for democratization in Turkey begun to emerge from different sides of the political spectrum following the end of the 1990s as mentioned earlier where the political agenda was tired of structural conflicts and dilemmas against a stable democracy. In 1997, TUSIAD published a report on democratization. The organization had previously advocated entrepreneurial freedoms but not civil liberties (Lovatt, 1997:228). The report (TUSIAD, 1997:1) was a clear call for democratizing Turkey from a liberal perspective claiming that ‘Turkey can not take up the economy of the West but leaving its democracy out.’

Another significant development in relation to civil society involvement in political reforms occurred following the major earth-quake of August 1999 (Kasaba and Boydogan, 2000; Kubicek, 2002). Compared to the State, official relief institutions, the military and local governance, civil society organizations responded to disaster relief faster and more efficiently which has credited them.

Following the conflict with the State due to its attempt to centralize the aid-flow and control the activities of civil society in disaster area, civil society organizations published a common issue in September 1999 on major newspapers to protest the attitude of the State against their activities in the area.

However, after 1999 Helsinki Summit, democratization process in Turkey has been scheduled to the terms of EU encounter process. This is mainly due to the State’s democratization exercise only within the channels and scheduling of EU encounter driven by its motivations for accession.

Kubicek (2002:776) claimed that ‘there are great potentials for liberalization in Turkey today, pushed by new state-elites as well as the EU.’ However, concentrating on EU accession as the only dynamics of democratization brings major problems to the process.
In that sense, in the first years of post-Helsinki period, not all civil society actors in Turkey who push for democratization participated in the process and found the chance to examine the chancing opportunities for democratization vis-à-vis EU encounter process. Civil society actors that have more institutional links and more experienced to operate in EU dynamics—in this case, business-elite organizations—took the lead of democratization within EU encounter.

But more recently, the agenda on EU accession and political reforms ripened enough to create gradually the participation of more diverse segments of civil society in the country to the debate with different proposals to democratize Turkey.

Business-elite organizations have the most advanced institutional links with EU since the beginning of the process. TUSIAD has its own representation at EU level and is a member of UNICE. These organizations follow their democratization agenda from the space created by EU accession possibility. TUSIAD is committed to monitor and promote Turkey’s political, economic and institutional reform process, within the framework of the EU accession process (TUSIAD, 2004:1).

In that sense, following 1999 Helsinki period and the recognition of Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership, TUSIAD published a second report with the claim that the organization helped to change the main philosophy of the economy in the past and today it feels responsible to overcome the structural blockages in politics and to support the formation of a broad social consensus in Turkey (TUSIAD, 1999:1). The report advises fulfillment of Copenhagen Criteria for EU accession as the urgent prospect of democratization in the country due to the necessity of replacing Turkey’s image of an anti-democratic country with the one that improved its democracy because ‘today political and economic relations can not be separated from them.’ (TUSIAD, 1999:2)

While lobbying for Turkey’s accession against the negative debates storming in France following the October 2004 Commission Report, TUSIAD declared that Turkey can respond to growing labor force need of an aging EU and an accession will increase the country’s attraction for more foreign direct investment (Radikal, 2004a).
On the other hand, another leading business-elite organization TOBB - a member of Eurochambers - also participates in the process actively. TOBB lobbies for EU accession and asks for having a chair on the table when the negotiations will begin (Aksam, 2004).

The organization follows a lower profile about democratization debates in the process compared to TUSIAD. President of the organization sees 'improving the entrepreneur middle-class as the way to transform all cultural differences into folkloric characteristics.' (Radikal, 2004b). In that sense, TOBB stands more distanced from discussing the structural components of politics about democratization of the country.

In the sum, liberal business-elite civil society actors in the process have better institutional links in the process and participate to policy-making actively compared to other segments of civil society in Turkey. However, their position in debates on democratization is left behind their market-driven motivations in terms of building political stability for economic stability. Most components of these organizations prefer to sustain their calls parallel to the dynamics of EU encounter and remain isolated from democratization attempts from different segments of civil society.

Organizations based on ethnic identities and democratic-leftist or Islamic organizations have joined to the process more recently compared to their business-elite counterparts. However, their accompany in the process indicates an important step against opening wider channels of debate in the process since they are mostly the outsiders of conventional politics in Turkey as mentioned earlier.

Islamist motivations are exceptional in that sense. As mentioned earlier, after 1980s they benefited more tolerance from the State in Turkey. Except some top-level institutions in state-bureaucracy keeping the line of strict Republican interpretation of secularism, they found deeper opportunities compared to other 'outsider politics'. Turam (2004:276-278) concluded that 'there has been a gradual transformation from a hostile separation of the early republic and religion to a recent friendly compartmentalization between the two.'
Their recent struggle with secularism was on the issue of ‘scarf’ in public institutions where their democratic rights were banned by the protective measures of the secular state. In that sense, they expect to benefit from a wider and tolerant interpretation of secularism around EU. However, recent developments in France and some other key-member states on the issue of ‘scarf’ parallel to Turkey’s attitude seem to bring new debates on the issue.

The Islamists regularly invoke a language of democracy and human rights when explaining their actions (Rumsford, 2002:265). However, a decision of European Court of Human Rights in favor of Turkey’s legislation banning to wear scarf in public institutions was significant in the process. Withdrawal of a legislation attempt in September 2004 which would penalize fornication in Penal Code due to the storming critics from the public opinion in Turkey and EU Commission is also a significant development. It indicates new fault lines between Islamist civil society and democratization of Turkey in EU encounter process.

However, despite these problems most of the Islamist movements support current AKP government who split from traditional Welfare Party line before the elections and furthered democratization and political reforms in EU encounter process to the highest levels ever after they came to power. The main discourse of AKP government still rises from communication of civilizations, not a clash.

Kurdish politics in Turkey seems to be the most supporting ‘outsider one’ for EU accession (Jego, 2004). That is mainly due to the consistent impression that the improvements in democratic rights of the Kurds are pursued parallel to EU accession policies. A public survey showed that expectations from EU accession differ among the country (Birgun, 2004a). According to the survey, ‘the expectations from South-eastern Turkey concentrate on freedoms, justice and human-rights.’

In that sense, presentation of the mayor of the biggest city in South-eastern Turkey who was elected from DEHAP –the party that supports democratization in Turkey from Kurdish people’s perspective- in the Istanbul Summit of EU Parliament’s
Greens' Group at October 2004 is significant. He (Birgun, 2004b, Radikal, 2004c) declared that following 1999 Helsinki period, a civil dialogue has begun in Turkey on the Kurdish question that must be furthered with an EU accession.

Human rights organizations' response to democratization in Turkey in EU encounter process is more diverse. Human Rights Association (hereafter HRA) issued its opinion on democratization of Turkey within EU encounter process before Helsinki Summit at October 1999. HRA (1999) said that it considers democratization and improving the level of human rights in Turkey separate from the candidacy for EU membership and underlined that internal dynamics that determines democratization must take the action in these processes.

FHRT on the other hand begun to participate in public awareness activities on human rights and civil society within the opportunities EU bodies offer in Turkey. Very recently HRA and FHRT issued a common press-release at 09 October 2004 on the conditions of protection of human rights in the country. HRA and FHRT claimed that torture and ill-treatment persists systematically despite the decrease in recent periods and they protested Prime Minister's speech at EU Council claiming on presence of suspected links between their organizations and some terrorist networks. They also asked for fulfillment of the promised 'zero-tolerance' policy of the government against torture and ill-treatment (Radikal, 2004d).

Labor unions also begun to participate in debates on democratization of Turkey within EU encounter process recently. Latest legal measures aiming to improve institutional capacities of ESCT offered broader opportunities for social dialogue. However, there are some problematic in the practice of labor unions in democratization of Turkey in EU encounter process some of which remain from the 1980 military rule and still affects political potentials of the unions in the country.

Aydin (2004:4) claimed that unions remain isolated from EU encounter process and its democratization aspects because their practice in struggle is limited to collective-bargaining for the wages. He continued that 'in Turkey the unions do not participate to democratization process within EU encounter and do not realize these changes as democratization for their social rights because of the conventional understanding.
that can not understand the relation between the question of democracy and the struggle for the wages.

This is mainly due to the nature of politics in Turkey in the post-1980 period which limited unions as immobile platforms existing in the struggle for the wages but not for the broader frame of democratic consolidation.

In the sum, civil society is gradually getting involved in democratization of Turkey in EU encounter process which is promising in terms of changing the nature of this consolidation. Various segments of civil society call for different proposals of democratization as the debate on political reforms get deeper in the agenda. However, due to various weaknesses in the practice of the official actors involved in the process, the nature of this democratization still needs more progress. This is only possible with alternative strategies to increase civil society participation in democratization of the country.

5.4. Concluding Points on the Alternative Strategies

The central position of an authoritarian state remains in political reforms the country is witnessing recently. Therefore, the role of the State in the future of politics and democracy in Turkey is questionable and needs to be reformulated. The argument here may seem parallel to the expectations in the past from the re-emerging of civil society in transition of CEECs to market economies that emphasized liberal private potentials of civil associations. However, in case of Turkey, the inefficient presence of the public space to foster democratization and civil society participation in this process rises upon political grounds rather than economical.

In that sense, alternative strategies for an increase in participation of civil society in democratization of Turkey in EU encounter process are concerned with a greater transition in the nature of politics, democracy and state-society relations in Turkey.

A democratic consolidation what Diamond (1994:15-16) called 'the process by which democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its citizens' which is 'involved with behavioral and institutional changes that normalize politics
and narrow its uncertainty' should be taken into account. These measures require an improvement in political institutions on grounds of political inclusion or access of citizens to politics.

Hence, more access should be given to various human rights and advocacy organizations and conventionally oppressed, oppositional civil society initiatives for the institutionalization of civil and social dialogue and for the making and monitoring of these political reforms. Democratization is largely, though not exclusively, a matter of the progressive recognition and inclusion of different groups in the political life of society (Dryzek, 1996:486).

Democratization of Turkey should be carried in coordination with not only the privileged, high-level business associations. An unequally organized society finds that every attempt at decentralization and devolution threatens to relinquish power to the privileged, with the result that people must choose between public and private authoritarianism (Unger, 1998:220). In case of cooperating with the highly-bureaucratized corporate structures of civil society, democratization ends up in the opposite direction. Therefore, new opportunities should be designed and provided to conventionally rejected formations of civil society.

Building platforms for various segments of civil society where they can appear to be in dialogue with political environment is not enough for democratization. There is the possibility of what Schmitter (1995:25) called 'societal corporatism' that replaces the former state corporatism 'if the previous system retains its basic structure of representational monopoly, official recognition and hierarchic coordination.' In that sense, organizational and operational capacities of these dialogue platforms should be strengthened in favor of their civil nature and democratic potentials. Additionally, fully-implementation of recent democratic legislations should be guaranteed.

But most generally, a political vision that these democratization attempts are pursued not for giving concessions to guarantee EU accession but for improving democracy in Turkey for its own people and its own institutions should be clearly acknowledged. This perspective should be considered by democratic civil initiatives.
of Turkey also. The issue of democratization of Turkey can not be left upon the
drive of inter-state political relations or to the rules of the game called the balance
of power and diplomacy between states.

It is likely that despite the recognition of Turkey’s candidacy at the highest EU
level of 1999 Helsinki Summit, EU also does not seem to have discussed and
prepared itself sufficiently for a possible Turkey’s accession which is, by its nature
the most challenging and significant expansion of the EU ever. Gottschlich (2004)
claimed Turkey’s membership as the biggest EU project ever.

Allusions such as that made by Giscard d’Estaing, President of the European
Convention, -who was in charge of preparing the EU Constitution- to an
unbridgeable cultural gap between the EU and Islamic Turkey demonstrate a lack of
claim that Turkey’s membership would spell ‘the end of the European Union’
betrays his intergovernmental view, in which the large member states pull the
strings.’

Sungar (2003:37) regarded these debates on ‘defining the borders of Europe, the
search for the ‘Christian roots’ of European culture and suggestions of ‘special
relationship’ instead of full membership’ to have ‘negative effects as far as
Turkey’s membership was concerned.’ These debates blur the political grounds for
objective and democratic implications of pre-accession strategies of governments in
Turkey. They lead to misinformation and manipulation of the public space in
Turkey where civil society is expected to contribute to the process. Gunes-Ayata
(2003:206-207) pointed out that, ‘nearly half of the population in Turkey (49 %)
thinks the EU is a Christian club, so there may be no place for a Muslim country.
This is quite understandable after the recent attempts around EU to insert the
principle of ‘Christianity’ to the draft EU Constitution. In political agenda of
Turkey, these motivations expand the grounds for counter-democratization
motivations to recall the conventional line of the State back in Turkish politics and
democracy.
However, EU bodies and initiatives for civil society in Turkey gradually become an important source of not only resources but also increasing information, skills and experience for cooperation. Recent improvements in the process are promising.

Since it advised for starting accession talks, latest report of EU Commission (2004:10) defined strengthening political and cultural dialogue between Turkey and EU member countries as a third pillar. It defined civil society in Turkey as ‘the most important actor to implement this dialogue.’ According to the report, the Commission will ‘present proposals on how to support such a dialogue.’

However, regarding the deeply-structured problems on the state of civil society in Turkey discussed earlier, EU has to consider its practice in the process from the point of keeping the communication and cooperation channels accessible to more civil society actors in Turkey at various levels.

6. Conclusions
Turkey is descendant of the Ottoman Empire that has been a part of European history for centuries despite its widely acceptance of appearing in Europe as the contrast of Europe in many aspects. Turkey’s politics and democracy have been insistently suffering from structural problems lying deep in its foundation.

The nature of politics in Turkey is characterized by being one of the oldest and significant modernization projects in the region Building the modern, secular ‘nation-state’ meant building a new ‘nation’ in a sense. Indeed, the twin pillars of Kemalist ideology, Turkish nationalism and secularism, are the main two sources of the country’s current crises (Yavuz, 2003:59). In this concrete structure, however, no room was designed for the ‘outsider’ politics against concretely dominant Turkish nationality and secularism. State-machinery was central to give a shape not only to the nature of politics but also to the society.

Marx’s emphasis on the ‘empirically real contradiction’ of state and society is still difficult for Turkish thinkers to understand, for the contradiction is not a datum of the Turkish experience. The ideology of Kemalism denies it (Mardin, 1969:279).
In that sense, Onis (1997:43) found political debate in public sphere of Turkey ‘retarded by the absence of ideas, values and objectives as bases for conciliation and integration – which is, after all, what politics is all about.’ Cinar (1997:72) claimed Turkish politics ‘reduced to administration’ by the hegemony of state-elites and their central ideology.

Therefore, state-elites and their central ideology to modernize the country in a top-down approach occupied most of the political space in the first decades of contemporary Turkey where the model was depending on one secular Turkish nation and nation-state.

However, with the shift to multi-party system accompanied by the opening of the country to the West, liberalization, industrialization and rapid urbanization, former concrete frame begun to change with different segments of civil society emerging and participating in the making of politics in the country. Therefore, interpretations of Turkish politics and democracy containing only the analysis of the state’s overemphasized presence and its central ideology are not enough to assess the frame of politics and the state of civil society in the country.

Following the multi-party period since 1946, different motivations compete with each other in the polls or in the civil sphere to pursue their policies. But the military and the state-elites are also keen on staying as an actor in these spheres insisting to ‘normalize’ politics and democracy to the conventional line of the Republic. Therefore, Turkish democracy and civil society stumble when it goes too far from this conventional line by the interventions of the military or anti-democratic measures of the authoritarian state.

In that sense, the interruption of multi-party democracy by state-coupes weakens pluralist essence of Turkish democracy but also civil society. However, there is an asymmetrical appearance in the strength, efficiency and political potentials of different segments of civil society. While corporate civil society benefits more opportunities to pursue their policies in political space, conventionally oppressed ‘outsider’ segments of civil society face difficulties to exercise in Turkey’s democracy.
Additionally, with the sharp transition to neo-liberal policies of deregulation and privatization following the latest military intervention of 1980, business-elite organizations and employer's associations develop their capacities more profoundly compared to organizations of the economically deprived segments of the society.

In that sense, to talk about an increase in civil society participation in democratization of Turkey in EU encounter process, a clear understanding on the political potentials of civil society and their relation with democratization is required.

In historical background of mainstream understanding on civil society, the concept is often accepted to exist between a less-defined, homogenous private sphere and political authority. Tornquist (1998:108) claimed that 'For liberal theorists like Tocqueville, civil society is rather civilized social interaction in between the 'mob' and the state.'

In that sense, pluralist understanding on civil society regards the concept as an actor in politics that has great potentials to spread democratic exercise in the society and the political order. According to pluralism, civil society is capable to limit the coercive state exercise as an external platform between the State and the society. Additionally, they claim that it serves as a shock-absorber that offers stability and sustainability of the political order.

Liberals further promoting civil society by underlining its private potentials. According to their emphasize, wherever the State has difficulties or fails to deliver services or goods, civil society is welcomed to serve as an alternative of the State. However, especially after recent neo-liberal paradigm fostering deregulation, privatization and decentralization altering the public nature of the State exercise on providing services or goods, this is questionable in terms of dismantling accessibility of these goods and services for all.

It can also be said that pluralist and liberal claims of civil society regard the concept without the political nature and question of power located inside its content.
However, it is hard to say that civil society is a unique form spreading democratic civil nature in a society neutrally.

Therefore, departures from liberal pluralist views on civil society regarding the concept from the prism of power, the actors involved and its political relevance are progressive and necessary to claim it as an actor of democratization.

In that sense, an official exercise to increase participation of civil society in democratization requires this prism. In case of Turkey’s EU encounter, the official actors of the process –Turkey’s governments and EU bodies- must shape their civil society exercise according to that prism to accomplish an increase in civil society participation in democratization of Turkey.

Important limitations in political potentials of civil society –being subjected to the State at the end while operating in the public sphere or being fragmented into divisions with different political motivations on democratization- require precise measures on civil society.

Therefore, Turkey’s governments must develop more inclusive and democratic policies against civil society –including oppositional ‘outsider’ civil society. EU bodies must consider their institutional and operational capacity building in Turkey in the process.

EU is the other official actor operating in Turkey’s encounter process implementing policies for increasing civil society participation in democratization Turkey faces. Therefore, civil society exercise of EU during its own integration process can give such clues to assess the nature of EU’s motivations and policies on civil society.

There are some contradictions in EU common policies. For instance, Rumford (2000:2-7) claimed that ‘on one side, EU applies a cohesion policy but on the other side it follows policies which result in greater disparities.’ Another significant example of these contradictions is the famous agriculture policy. EU is the biggest interventionist economy of the world considering the scale of its subsidies –around
half of its approximately 100 billion € annual budget was spent on agricultural subsidies in the 1990s—despite its rhetoric on free-market.

The practice of EU on civil society is also diverse in its common policies. The formation of a European civil society through the integration process has very much been framed by the logic of economic competition, to the detriment of democratic institutions (Scott-Smith, 1998:4). Therefore, different policies have different natures for civil society participation in their practice.

Participation of civil society in EU policies is mainly related to deepening of institutional capacities of EU. On the other hand, each enlargement brings new dynamics inside EU and changes integration perspectives (McMillan, 2003). In that sense, the debate on the future of EU is to what extent the institutional capacities of EU and the enlargement should be furthered.

Streeck (1995:414) called ‘the lack of citizen identification with “Europe”’ as a ‘democratic deficit’ on EU area. He claimed that the redistributive social policies of EU are developed to close this deficit, which he opposed ‘there are neither institutional nor economic nor political reasons for national governments promoting economic union to help European civil society build supranational political resources capable of remodeling the Community into an interventionist federal welfare state.’

Despite the long way EU has taken in its own integration, it is hard to talk about a uniform nature in EU common policies. This is due to the level this integration arrived in its deepening and enlarging today containing very different political sides with sometimes conflicting motivations. EU is not a homogenous structure. It is a sum of conflicting national, economic, political interests trying to give the whole structure their own direction. Thus, the EU means different things to different people (Plattner, 2003:43).

In case of Turkey’s encounter process, the variety of opposite political motivations and contradictory policies from EU bring very important vulnerabilities to the
process. Democratization process in Turkey is unfortunately too much linked to the progress achieved in EU encounter.

Dependency to an external political agenda brings high levels of vulnerabilities to political aspects of democratization in the country. Majority of the problems in this encounter currently appear to rise from the State’s anti-democratic nature in Turkey. However, it should always be kept in mind that EU has applied Customs Union - under very advantageous conditions for itself- with Turkey in 1995 when the country was in the middle of much deeper political tensions and anti-democratic policies. Or in 1980, when Turkey was driven into a heavily oppressive regime by the military intervention, Turkey-EC relations were interrupted finally one year later.

The first impact of the military intervention on Turkey-EC relations was limited. The conditions which Turkey was driven into a military intervention were considered. At the final point, the stability of NATO’s south-eastern front was at risk (Kaleagasi, 2004:11)

Therefore, democratization process in Turkey must urgently be separated from the dynamics of EU encounter. EU must participate in the process as an external contributor monitoring the progress according to its own criteria and support democratization process with its more advanced resources.

However, scheduling democratization in Turkey to EU encounter rises from the practice of the State in the process. The State is taking important steps to democratize Turkey on the way to EU mostly as if these reforms are done in terms of improving its position in the negotiations of EU accession.

Official measures taken in this encounter process are also mainly problematic. They have the prints from the nature of politics and democracy in Turkey discussed earlier. The authority of the State remains overemphasized that weakens democratic impacts of many reforms, even making them undemocratic in some cases.

For instance a significant example to these measures was the latest ‘Minority report’ that has been discussed widely in the country currently. Two years ago, Prime
Minister’s office has established a Human Rights Consultation Committee consists of 78 members from official institutions (including security forces, ministry representatives), civil society organizations (including TOBB, TUSIAD or HRA, FHRT) and academia.

The Committee issued a report of its sub-committee called ‘Minority and Cultural Rights Working Group’ on minority rights in the country where important steps of reforms including ratifying new constitutional citizenship were proposed. However, after the issuing of the report, representatives of the official bodies and some civil society institutions in the Committee -that were absent during the voting- rushed to declare that they are not involved with the report. Some civil society representatives in the Committee even prosecuted the authors of the report considering the security of the political order. The author of the report, Oran (2004:6) said that these members in the Committee from some ‘civil’ society organizations behave as if they were public authorities.

Therefore, official measures to increase participation of civil society in democratization of Turkey in EU encounter process must contain forces of democratization in the country. The broader sense of a new understanding is necessary from the State to make this democratization by dynamics of Turkey, for Turkey’s people and institutions, not top-down but in cooperation with ‘down.’

EU encounter process which seems to have the same characteristics of a state-driven process can lead to democratization by all means for all segments of society only in that way.

EU’s practice on democratization related to civil society is also subjected to the same terms. At least institutionally, EU’s practice with civil society is fostered by mostly business-oriented civil society. EU should consider its cooperation links with civil society according to an ‘empirical understanding of civil society which arises within the overall character of the political community’ as defined by Kopecky (2003:14-15).
Despite all these problematic in the process, the debate on democratization and civil society participation in Turkey within EU encounter process is still promising. Different segments of civil society gradually push their calls for democratization in political aspects of this process. In that sense, the case of Turkey's encounter with EU continues to offer new areas of research, debate and interest for researchers involved in democratization, civil society, politics and international relations.
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