An economic view on the implementation of performance contracts by the Dutch police

Master thesis

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Preface

After four years of hard work, I am glad to finish my study Economics and Business Economics at the Erasmus University Rotterdam with this master thesis. Working on a thesis is very different from attending classes and taking exams, which I always did well.

First, I had to think about a subject for my thesis, which was not very easy. My study contained so many different subjects, theories, and experiments, that there were many possibilities. Since my interests developed into the direction of economics of organizations and game theory, it would be obvious that my thesis subject would be in that domain. But even then, I was free to choose anything I would like, while I had to consider the social and scientific relevance and also the feasibility. I finally found a subject in the direction of motivating people whose task it is to make sure certain things do not happen and making them accountable.

The second step was searching for literature and deciding how my research should look like. Also this part was not very easy for me. There was not much literature on this precise subject and I did not like reading many articles, since it was a great time investment. I decided to look at the AIVD, the General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands. I was doubting about making a theoretical model or looking at the practice, but both appeared to be no success. The theoretical model I had in mind was too complicated and I didn't have an idea to make a simple one. The practical part was also not successful, since the information I asked for was too secret. I had to change my subject and I was back to square one.

In my literature research, I found some articles about motivating police forces. Since the police are less secret than an intelligence organization, I decided to have a try on this subject. In consultation with my supervisor, I decided to focus on the practical story and look at the way in which the performance contracts of the government were implemented in the police organization.

The third part was conducting the research and gathering the information I needed. This part was easier for me than the first two parts, but nevertheless took a lot of time since I had to contact police forces to ask for the information. Most police forces did not respond or declared that they didn't have time to answer my questions. That made me very grateful to the people that made time for me. I experienced that asking questions and getting complete and useful answers was not as easy as it seemed. After all, contacting and questioning the police forces was a very valuable

experience for me. After a lot of time and work, I finally had enough information to write my thesis.

The fourth and last part of my thesis was the writing process, which started in September. It took a lot of time and often I found out that my planning was unrealistic. However, in mid-November, I finally finished the processing of my last conversation. What remained was to reduce my story from 155 pages to the current 79 (excluding the appendix).

When I was writing my thesis, about the difficulty to assess performances, I realized that this does also apply to my thesis. I spent a lot of time on this research for more than half a year, but not everything is represented in this thesis. This especially holds for the brainstorming, the search for information and background information, and the preparation, carrying out and processing of the interviews. Of course, the process of revision and improvement is totally invisible. I hope my supervisor believes my story that I exerted enough effort on this thesis and he will assess my research as satisfactory.

Writing this thesis was a hard time for me, and I did not always like the work it entailed. It was also frustrating that I could not make much progress for a while and everything took more time than I expected. I want to thank my parents and my partner Sander, who supported me in this period. I also want to thank my supervisor Bauke Visser who always came up with ideas and advices, and had a good knowledge of the applicable theory. Last but not least, I want to thank the people of the police who made time to answer my questions. In particular, I want to thank Dirk Scholten (Politie Fryslân), Joachim Verhoeyen (Politie Zeeland), Edgar Taale and Piet Melsen (Politie Rotterdam-Rijnmond), and Bé Wiertsema (Politie Groningen). Thanks to them all, I can now proudly present you this thesis.

Summary

In 2003, the government introduced performance contracts for police forces (the 'Landelijk Kader Nederlandse Politie (LKNP) 2003-2006'), as a reply to the increasing criminality, the dissatisfaction of citizens, the bad functioning of the policy cycle to bring national policy themes into the policy of regional police forces, and the lack of information about police activities.

The LKNP 2003-2006 contained ten result agreements, concerning the number of suspects delivered to the Public Prosecutor, a survey of (young) persistent offenders and the processing time of their charges, timely settled legal aid requests, operational foreigners supervision, telephone accessibility, telephone quality, the score 'availability', the score 'satisfaction with last police contact', the number of fines and transactions, absence due to illness, efficiency, and expansion of the work force. If the police forces would realize these agreements, they could get performance payment, which was approximately 1% of the regular police budget.

The pros and cons of these contracts are described by de Bruin (2001, 2002), Sluis et al. (2006), and Vollaard (2003). Many intended positive effects indeed occurred, while unintended perverse effects did not or scarcely occur. (Hoogenboom, 2006; Jochoms et al., 2006).

In this thesis, ten police forces were interviewed to find out how the contracts were implemented. The results of the interviews were compared with the theories of the risk-incentives tradeoff (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992), the incentives-distortion-risk tradeoff (Baker, 2002), and objective and subjective performance assessments.

The findings from the interviews are the following. At the strategic level (the police force management), the quantitative performances were passed on to the districts. At the tactical level (the districts), passing on to teams happened. Some team chiefs made performance agreements with individual policemen, others did not.

Steering happened on all levels and also on individuals. Steering is defined as 'purposeful attempts to influence the carrying out, so as to (better) attain the intended purpose and/or act more in harmony with norms' (Terpstra, 2002, pp. 21). Managers made choices in the deployment of personnel and used benchmarking to introduce incentives. Human resource management was an important steering instrument. People that performed well stood a chance of a promotion or another (more interesting) function. Many people inside the police want to make a career and this motivates people at all levels, up to the police force administrator.

Accountability was related to steering. Managers monitored the performances and people were called to account for their performance. Failing to realize performance agreements had no direct

consequences, however in the long term consequences could arise in the form of being unable to make a career or being transferred to another function.

Steering and accountability worked step by step: each manager steered and called his employees to account because he was steered by and had to render account to his manager too. This started with the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK) and via the police force administrator it affected all levels up to the policemen at the operational level.

In none of the interviewed police forces, internal performance payment based on predetermined performances was used for divisions or people. Most police forces did have a policy to reward exceptional performances, but this was not related to the performance agreements and also not predetermined. Almost all people within the police are nowadays positive about the performance agreements and the corresponding performance steering.

Based on the theory, I have investigated whether individual performance pay would be possible. Individual performance pay can be seen as objective performance assessment, while steering and accountability correspond to subjective performance assignment. In a system of steering and accountability, the exact amount of incentives, discretionary power and distortions depend on the extent to which the manager focuses on the results.

I conclude that subjective performance assessment will be more appropriate than objective performance assessment, for five reasons. First, the relationship between certain performances and safety is unknown, so that there is a risk of stimulating undesired behavior. Second, the signal-to-noise ratio of some proposed performance agreements is low. Third, immeasurable performances exist, which are important for safety. Situations cannot be expressed in numbers, while they determine which performances are good. This makes the story behind the numbers very important. Fourth, distortions in police work need to be prevented and discretionary power is very important for policemen. Last, police work cannot be seen as production where more is always better.

Comparing performance payment for police forces with performance pay for individuals, it appears that the latter is less desired for the following five reasons. First, individuals are more risk-averse, so making them bear risk is inefficient. Second, the risk is higher on the individual level since local situations have a lot of impact on the individual performance. Third, the teamwork character of police work makes it impossible or undesired to make individuals responsible for certain performances. Fourth, the personal strengths of each person would not be taken into account, which may be inefficient. Last, incentives may be lower (as are distortions) when police forces are rewarded, since it is not the individual's own money.

1. Introduction

In this introduction, I start with discussing the history of the performance contracts for the Dutch police, including the comments and expectations preceding the introduction of these performance contracts and the effects and results afterwards. After that, I will introduce my own research by stating my research question, sub-questions and research method. Finally, I will give an overview of the structure of this thesis.

1.1   The history of the performance contracts for the Dutch police

1.1.1   The background story

The Police Law of 1993 organized the police into 25 regional police forces and a nationally organized National Police Services Agency ('Korps Landelijke Politiediensten', KLPD). The point of departure for the control of the regional police forces was 'decentralized, unless'. This meant that management and authority were mainly organized locally. Police forces had a lot of freedom in determining their policy with regard to the carrying out of their legal task. (Jochoms et al., 2006).

The Police Law 1993 made the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations ('Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties', BZK) responsible for the management of the Dutch police. The Minister of Justice was responsible for the criminal law enforcement. Concerning the regional police forces, the police force administrator ('korpsbeheerder') was the mayor of the largest municipality in the police region, who was responsible for the management. The regional police board ('regionaal college'), consisting of all mayors of the region and the chief public prosecutor ('hoofdofficier van Justitie'), was responsible for the government and policy of the regional police force. Authority was in the hands of a mayor (for public order and assistance) and the public prosecutor (for criminal law enforcement and criminal investigation). The chief of police ('korpschef') was responsible for the day-to-day management. (Morée et al., 2007; Hoogenboom, 2006; Meppelink, 2005; van Sluis et al., 2008). The police force management ('korpsleiding') consisted of the chief of police, often together with the police force administrator, and the chief public prosecutor. Sometimes also the acting chief of police, and directors (for instance the director Management) belonged to the police force management.

In 1997, an evaluation study about the functioning of the new Police Law pointed out that national policy themes were not enough implemented by the regional police forces. The decision-making was not transparent and the democratic supervision limited. Another problem arose in the fact that the government could not intervene in the police activities, since the Police Law offered little possibilities. (Jochoms et al., 2006).

The new cabinet of 1998 attached importance to central planning and control instruments. The cabinet developed the Policy Plan Dutch Police ('Beleidsplan Nederlandse Politie', BNP), in which some policy themes were formulated, that were evaluated yearly. (Jochoms et al., 2006). Via the national policy and control cycle, national policy themes were brought into the policy of regional police forces (Morée et al., 2007).

In 2001, evaluation studies pointed out that the national policy and control cycle did not function well. Police forces dealt with the cycle differently, no dialogue took place concerning the contents of the policy themes, steering information was ambiguous, there were too many indicators and no clear definitions. (Morée et al., 2007). The national priorities set appeared to have little practical implications. Furthermore, the government was not able to check actual compliance with the national priorities, because of the lack of reliable and complete information on policing activities. The police inspection and peer reviews were also not successful in maintaining quality. (Vollaard, 2006). The fact that police forces had no information about how the resources were spent "shows that matters of resource allocation are not on the top of the decision makers' minds" (Vollaard, 2006, pp. 1). Other problems were the little coordination between police forces and the weak incentives to work efficient and effective.

Since the beginning of the seventies, the registered criminality multiplied by a factor seven to ten. (Jochoms et al., 2006). Citizens experienced the increasing insecurity as unacceptable, and as a result they exerted pressure on the police. After all, the police was the most visible part of the law enforcement. The citizens, Public Prosecutor, and the ministries of the BZK and Justice shared the view that the police paid too little attention to (criminal) enforcement. The police should tolerate less. A discussion about the core tasks came up, which led to a focus on core business. (Jochoms et al., 2006).

In 2002, Pim Fortuyn put the social problems on the agenda. He forced the government to do more than only distributing budget over the police forces ('hands off approach'). (Vollaard, 2006). The cabinet Balkenende I made safety a main point of policy. The Safety Program 'Naar een veiliger samenleving' was drawn up, with the main objective to reduce criminality and inconvenience by 20% to 25% (compared to 2002) in the period 2008-2010. Established priorities were prevention, intensifying criminal investigation, enforcement, and visible supervision and control in the public domain. (Ministerie van BZK & Justitie, 2003).

Concluding performance agreements on output (and efficiency) with all partners in the safety chain would be an instrument to achieve the objective. The effect of these performance agreements would be twofold. First, an incentive would be given to police forces to perform well.

Second, the government would get a better view on the carrying out of the tasks and on the performance of the police, i.e. the police would become more transparent. (Morée et al., 2007). This resulted in the Dutch Police National Framework 2003-2006 ('Landelijk Kader Nederlandse Politie 2003-2006', LKNP 2003-2006).

1.1.2 The performance contracts

Vollaard (2003, pp. 53) defines performance contracts in this way: "In a performance contract, the principal specifies rewards and possibly penalties conditional on the extent to which the contracting organization meets targets on specific performance indicators". He emphasizes that performance contracts are contracts at organizational level, instead of contracts for managers.

The LKNP 2003-2006 contained performance agreements for the carrying out of tasks of the police, based on (pre)defined performance standards. Most of them were output agreements. Social effects (outcomes) were represented by a few indicators which were based on the survey 'Politiemonitor Bevolking' (PMB), later called 'Veiligheidsmonitor Rijk' (VMR), in which for instance customer satisfaction was measured. (Jochoms et al., 2006).

Concretely, there are ten result agreements and seven control agreements ('beheersafspraken'). It concerned the following result agreements.

(a) (I) The number of suspects of which a charge ('proces-verbaal') is offered to the Public Prosecutor increases in 2006 with 40,000 (20%) relative to 2002.

   (II) Processing times ('doorlooptijden'): 80% of the charges of (young) persistent offenders is offered to the Public Prosecutor within 30 days after the first interrogation (Kalsbeeknorm). Police forces draw up a survey of these (young) persistent offenders.

(b) The percentage of timely settled legal aid requests has increased in 2006.

(c) The operational foreigners supervision is intensified.

(d) Telephone accessibility on the National Telephone Number Police ('LTP'): 80% of the calls is answered within 20 seconds, 90% within 30 seconds and 95% within 45 seconds. Telephone accessibility on the alarm number 1-1-2: 80% of the calls with wireline telephony is offered to the emergency rooms within 15 seconds, with mobile telephony within 30 seconds. The quality of the service should be good.
   The score 'availability' in the PMB will be substantially improved.

(e) The percentage of the PMB population that is '(very) satisfied' with the last contact with the police will be substantially improved.

(f) The number of fines and transactions, that stem from police stops, increases in 2006 with 180,000 relative to 2002.

(g) (I) The total national percentage of absence due to illness is in 2006 maximal 8%

   (II) The efficiency of the work force increases with minimal 5%. Each police force formulates a plan.

(h) Expansion of the work force with 4,000 full time equivalents (fte)

The LKNP 2003-2006 was the foundation of the 25 regional convenants that were concluded between the Minister of BZK and the Minister of Justice on the one hand, and the administrator of a regional police force on the other hand. (Jochoms et al., 2006) In the regional convenants, also regional and local priorities could be included. Regional police forces could, for instance, make agreements with other partners in the safety chain.

When regional police forces realized the performance agreements from the regional convenants, they laid claim to performance payment ('Prestatiebekostiging'), which was approximately 1.3% of the regular budget. The payment that was related to the performance agreements was consciously set relatively low, so that not realizing them would not endanger the continuity of the police force. Over the years 2003, 2004, and 2005, performance payment was paid to the police forces when they met a predetermined growth path. In 2006, 50% of the performance payment was distributed to police forces based on their realization of the performance agreements and 50% based on benchmarking. Benchmarking would be done within five clusters, that were formed on the basis of address density and number of houses.

A more extensive description of the performance agreements and the system of performance payments can be found in appendix A. Successors to the LKNP 2003-2006 were the LKNP 2007 and the National Priorities 2008-2011. See appendix A for elaboration on these contracts.

1.2 Pros en cons of performance contracts

1.2.1 Positive effects

The main objective of the performance contracts (LKNP) was to contribute to the performances of the police. In addition to this, the performances of the police would become more visible and the police organization more transparent. There was a broad consensus about the desirability of the performance agreements, also within the police organization. (Morée et al., 2007)

Performance measurement is an incentive for production, innovation, appropriate accountability, and external orientation. It leads to transparency, since the products, activities, and aim of the organization become clear. Furthermore, it rewards performances and prevents bureaucracy,

while rewarding plans or internal processes do not guarantee performances. Last, it promotes the quality of policy-making and decision-making, since decision makers have more information about objectives and performances. (de Bruin, 2001, 2002)

1.2.2 Problems with performance measurement

De Bruin (2001, 2002) mentions some situations in which performance measurement is problematic. I will discuss them below. In brackets, the 'optimal' situation is mentioned, where performance measurement is possible. These problems do not make performance measurement impossible, but attention should be paid to them.

- An organization has no products, but obligations and values (↔ has products)
    → interference of the government goes with inherent ineffectiveness and inefficiency.
- The products are multiple (↔ simple) → values may conflict and may be neglected.
- An organization is process-oriented (↔ product-oriented) → good process yields no products.
- The production happens in relation to others (co-production) (↔ autonomous production)
    → performances are only partially due to the effort of the organization.
- The products are interwoven (↔ isolated) → externalities are neglected.
- The relations between effort and performance are unknown or contested (↔ are known)
    → products are only partly the result of the effort, giving a wrong picture of effort.
- The quality is not definable in performance indicators (↔ is definable) → quality is neglected.
- The products are various (↔ uniform) → performances are ambiguous and not comparable.
- The environment is dynamic (↔ stable) → the above mentioned problems change. From professional perspective, a dynamic system of performance measurement is desirable, while from managerial and controllable perspective stability is preferred.

Sluis et al. (2006) adds the following problems. First, the primary process of the government is complex and standardization is difficult. Second, cooperation and learning from each other is important. Third, evaluating the chosen actions often requires knowledge about the situation and also expertise to judge the actions and situations. Last, the (outcome) effects of governmental interventions are hard to measure and effects may not always occur immediately.

1.2.3 Perverse effects of performance measurement

Regardless of the positive effects, the problems with performance measurement yield a lot of perverse effects (negative, undesired effects), which will be discussed now (de Bruin, 2001, 2002).

- Performance measurement stimulates strategic behaviour (increasing production in a way that has no effect on outcome). This is called 'gaming the numbers'.

- Performance measurement blocks innovations and ambitions, since current production is rewarded and there is an incentive to make easy, simple products.

- Performance measurement veils the actual performances, since information is aggregated. Causal relationships and the story behind the numbers are not visible anymore.

- Performance measurement drives away the professional attitude: no quality, no system responsibility, more bureaucracy. The focus is on performances and making them transparent, and there is less willingness to share professional insights.

- Performance measurement leads to a punishment of performances, since the rewarding budget is limited and non-performers cannot be punished.

Hierarchical use of performance measurement seems effective and efficient, since it contains clear targets and the administrator is able to steer even without the expertise of the complex processes. However, it may lead to perverse effects. There is always a tradeoff between the desire to steer, the autonomy of professionals, and the perverse effects.

1.2.4   The police

According to Vollaard (2003), the few existing empirical studies indicate that there is scope for improvements in the accountability and incentives of the police, since there are great differences in performance between police forces and police performance declines. Police forces can learn from each other and performance contracts steer the choices of allocating the budget.

In spite of this, Vollaard (2003, pp. 10) concludes that "the performance contracts are not likely to be very effective in achieving verifiable improvements in police performance". The criticisms he mentions are the following.

- Meet the numbers at the cost of quality, since the contracts only look at the numbers, not at the way they are achieved. Examples of strategic behaviour are frivolous fining, picking the easiest criminal charges, and producing charges with questionable evidence.

- Limited possibilities to respond to changing regional circumstances, since the targets are fixed.

- The government is not able to set the performance targets at the right level, since the government does not have enough information. The power of incentives will be low, since targets depend on previous performances, which differ between police forces.

- The flexibility at the national level is restricted, while policy priorities differ regularly.

- Undesirable biases in police work, since the weights of indicators will not be proper.

- Lack of consumer choice and negative spiral. Because of the monopoly position of the police, citizens pay twice for the poor police performance. First, they experience poor police care and second, since the police force does not get the performance payment, it is more difficult to improve their performance next year.

See Vollaard (2003, chapter 8) for an evaluation of each performance agreement of the LKNP 2003-2006. He does not consider the target of 180,000 additional fines annually to be a major achievement, since this involves 19 additional fines annually per active police officer. The same holds for the 40,000 additional charges, since the number of police officers will increase over the years. Furthermore, Vollaard thinks the customer satisfaction is not ambitious, since it is based on the best own performance in the past. In this system, police forces have no incentive to improve performance more than the target. Incentives also disappear if target cannot be reached anymore. The targets make regional police work more supply-driven than demand-driven.

1.3 Effects and results of the performance contracts

Most objectives were not realized nationally, which automatically means that not all police forces managed to realize their agreements. However, an increase is visible on all performance indicators, so the performance contracts indeed increased output on the measured performances. Hoogenboom (2006) mentions the following (intended) positive effects of performance steering.

- Increasing quality of the management
- Increasing transparency
- Increasing direction at information processes: the generating, analysing, storage and accessibility of steering information has been improved.
- Greater operational involvement of managers
- Increasing judicial production (number of cases offered to the Public Prosecutor)
- Discussion about core tasks of the police
- The cooperation with partners in the safety chain is improved (Morée et al., 2007)

Furthermore, non-functioning of local authority services and partners in the safety chain came to light and the integral safety care became more clear.

Hoogenboom (2006) concludes that the performance contracts did not, or only incidentally, lead to unintended perverse effects. Investigated effects are for instance bureaucracy, goal-substitution, number fetishism, prevention paradox, creative accounting, and dysfunctional police competition. He gives three explanations.

- At the individual level, the targets are easy to meet (this holds for the judicial agreements).

- Managers have more operational involvement and correct for instance frivolous fining.

- Individual police agents make their decisions, for instance to fine or not, on the basis of their own assessment of the situation, according to their professional autonomy.

Both managers and individual police agents are aware of the possible perverse effects and make sure they do not occur. 'There is still far from a matter of a change from the community policing model to the command and control model' (Hoogenboom, 2006). Respondents indicate that it is difficult to find the right balance between qualitative and quantitative aspects of police work. However, they take care of this balance (Morée et al., 2007).

Although the performance payment was held consciously low, Morée et al. (2007) find that some police forces really needed this payment for good management. For all police forces, the performance payment was an extra incentive to realize the agreements. The system of performance agreements itself did also generate incentives, even without performance payment, since police forces did not want to be at the bottom of the surveys that were published for instance in the annual accounts. (Morée et al., 2007). A criticism, Morée et al. (2007) mention, is that it would have been better to develop the instrument performance steering completely before implementing it.

1.4   Overview of the research

Dutch citizens consider fighting crime and maintaining public order the most important tasks of the government. These citizens are very dissatisfied about the work of the police (Vollaard, 2003, pp. 17). Therefore, it is important for the government to ask the question 'how can I motivate or steer the police so that police performances, and thereby safety and public order, improve?'. The government decided to conclude performance contracts with police forces and relate performance payment to it. In order to predict the effects of such contracts, it is important to know how they affect different levels within the police organization.

The problem statement of this thesis is "How are performance contracts implemented in the police organization in order to stimulate individual policemen to contribute to the performance agreements?". I want to answer this question by using the following sub-questions.

- What are the performance contracts and performance agreements?

- How are the performance agreements implemented in the police organization?

- Did the police make use of internal performance agreements?

- Is performance pay used inside the organization?
- What other ways are used to motivate policemen?
- What does the economic theory say about the possibility of performance pay?

Performance agreements at the national level, for police forces, have been described before (Morée et al., 2007; Groenewegen, 2010) and Vollaard has applied the economic theory to police forces as a whole (Vollaard, 2003, 2006). In this thesis, the implementation of the contracts at lower levels in the police organization is described and I apply the economic theory to individual policemen. Jochoms et al. (2006) also look at the effects of the performance contracts within police organizations. Their research is done in the police forces Haaglanden, Rotterdam-Rijnmond, Flevoland, IJsselland, and Amsterdam-Amstelland. This research concentrates on ten police forces, which are mentioned below. Furthermore this new research may give recent opinions.

The social relevance of my thesis is the knowledge about the implementation of the performance contracts and the effects they have inside the organization. Safety is an important issue for citizens, so the police organization has to function well. Also for the government, it is important to know the effects of policy that is determined nationally. Last, many publications about the Dutch performance contracts are in Dutch, so my English thesis makes it more accessible for non-Dutch speakers.

My research method is the following. I contacted many police forces, but only a few responded. I had face-to-face interviews with two police forces: Zeeland and Rotterdam-Rijnmond. Three other police forces were interviewed by telephone: Fryslân, Twente, and Haaglanden. The police forces Groningen, Gelderland-midden, IJsselland, Gooi en Vechtstreek, and Zaanstreek-Waterland responded via email. The people I had contact with were advisor of the police force management, controller, communication staff member, policy staff member, management staff member, or district chief. The contacts are made between July and October 2010.

The questions I asked regarded the way of implementing the contracts, the way of steering, the changes after the introduction of the contracts, the evaluation of the contracts, and the positive and negative effects of the contracts inside the organization. I supplemented these interviews with insights from Jochoms et al. (2006), who interviewed people at all levels in the police organization. Given my economic study, I was particularly interested whether or not performance pay was used inside the police organization and whether or not it would be possible according to the economic theory.

I link the information from the interviews to the economic theory about incentives, in order to say something about the possibility to use incentives at lower levels in the police organization.

My findings are the following. It appears that individual performance agreements are sometimes concluded, but no internal performance payment is used. A system of steering and accountability is used to direct everyone's attention to the performance agreements. This means that policemen and managers have to render account for performances and these performances are included in performance interviews. In this way, career perspectives depend partly on performances. Steering and accountability are a form of subjective performance assessment. Based on the economic theory, I conclude that subjective performance assessment is more appropriate for the police than objective performance assessment. It is also likely to be better than no performance assessment at all, considering the situation before performance contracts and opinions inside the police.

1.5   Structure of the thesis

Some expressions that I use in this thesis require a short explanation. First, I can often not quote definitions, since most books and articles I use are written in Dutch. Sometimes, I will translate Dutch sentences literally to English. This will be indicated by single quotation marks ('…'). Literally quoted English sentences will be indicated by double quotation marks ("…"). Second, I use the term 'policeman' for all kind of employees at the operational level. Third, the terms performance contracts, performance agreements, and result agreements are used arbitrary for approximately the same concepts. With performance contracts, I mean the convenants, that contain performance agreements. Result agreements concern results, to which a standard can be related. Performance agreements are more general and comprehend all agreements, also benchmarks, projects, plans or innovations.

I will now give an overview of the structure of my thesis. In this chapter, an introduction is given to the (history of) the performance contracts that are concluded between the ministries and the police forces. In chapter two, I will discuss the relevant (economic) literature that I will use in chapter four to assess the possibility of internal performance pay. The literature comprehends the incentive-risk tradeoff, the incentive-distortion-risk tradeoff, and objective and subjective performance assessment. Furthermore, I will introduce the concept steering. Chapter three consists of the interviews I had with police forces and in chapter four I represent the most important findings, analyze them and relate them to the theory. Last, chapter five gives the conclusion.

2. Related literature

In this chapter, I discuss the relevant theories. Section 2.1 starts by discussing the relevant economic theory, consisting of the tradeoffs between risk, incentives and distortion and objective and subjective performance assessment. Section 2.2 introduces the concept steering. Finally, section 2.3 treats the importance of autonomy and discretion for the police.

2.1 Economic theory

2.1.1 Introduction

When the actions of an employee are not observable, a moral hazard problem arises: the employee can undertake actions that increase his own payoff, at the expense of others. Others are the managers, the firm, or the shareholders of the firm. One way to avoid moral hazard problems is to introduce incentive pay, since that makes an employee responsible for his actions.

2.1.2 Risk-incentives tradeoff (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992)

There is often a tradeoff between risk and incentives. If the employee is paid a fixed salary, he is exposed to no risk, i.e. insured against income variation. However, he may work very slowly or do wrong work, especially when the manager cannot observe his effort. Making his pay dependent on output or outcome induces him to work harder and on the right things, but imposes risk on the employee when output or outcome depend on factors beyond his control and when not all efforts are represented in output or outcome. People are assumed to dislike risk, so they have to be compensated for the risk they bear. "Efficient contracts balance the costs of risk bearing against the incentive gains that result" (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992, pp. 207).

2.1.2.1 The model

Risk sharing appears to be efficient: the total costs of risk bearing are minimized when the less risk-averse person bears most risk. Since publicly traded firms have a wide base of shareholders, it is reasonable to assume that the total risk premium of the firm is much smaller than the risk premium of an individual employee. On the basis of this argument, the principal-agent theory assumes that the firm (principal) is risk-neutral, while the employee (agent) is risk-averse. The conclusion from the risk-sharing theory is that from an efficiency point of view, the firm should bear all risk and the employee should receive a certain fixed salary.

However, the principal wants to induce the agent to act in the interests of the principal. This is the central problem in the principal-agent theory. Optimally, the employer would reward the

employee based on things that contribute to the goal of the employer, like effort, intelligence, honesty, and imagination. When these contributions can be measured accurately, this imposes no risk on the employee. However, often they cannot be observed. The best thing the employer can do, is rewarding performance. This imposes risk on the employee for two reasons.

First, besides contributions of the employee, performance is often a result of things beyond the control of the employee. It follows that indicators that correct the random effects should optimally be included. These random effects are called noise or risk and cause a higher variance of the performance measure.

The *incentive-intensity principle* says that optimal incentives are higher when:

- The efforts of the employee contribute more to the goal of the employer.

- The precision with which the effort can be measured is higher (i.e. the variance of the performance measure is lower).

- The agent's risk aversion is lower.

- The agents responsiveness to incentives is higher (the costs of adjusting effort are lower).

Second, some efforts may not be represented in performances, while they do contribute to the goal of the employer. The theory says that such efforts will not be exerted. Efforts are distorted (see section 2.1.3). All efforts should be equally rewarded to ensure that all efforts will be exerted. This involves that if some efforts cannot be measured and can thus not be rewarded, none of the efforts should be rewarded.

2.1.3   Incentives-distortion-risk tradeoff (Baker, 2002)

Section 2.1.2 assumes that performance measures are undistorted, that means that they provide incentives that are perfectly aligned with the objectives of the organization. However, the contribution of effort to the performance measure may not be equal to the contribution of this effort to the goal of the employer. When differences exist, valuable actions (for the goal of the employer) may not be taken when they reduce the performance measure and useless or harmful actions (for the goal of the employer) may be taken when they increase the performance measure. In between these extremes, the effort exerted to each action may be lower or higher than is optimal for the goal of the employer (i.e. distorted). However, as long as the contributions work in the same direction, using the performance measure may result in a higher value of the goal of the employer than using no performance measure at al (paying a base salary).

There is a tradeoff between incentives and distortion, since it becomes more attractive to distort effort when it yields more (i.e. when incentives are higher).

2.1.3.1   The model

A wage that depends positively on the performance measure will induce employees to choose efforts or actions that maximize the performance measure.

Baker finds that optimal incentives (the optimal weight on the performance measure):

- Decrease when there is more distortion.

- Decrease when the performance measure is more noisy (risky), i.e. is more determined by uncontrollable random effects.

- Does not depend on the correlation between the employer's goal and the performance measure.

Strong incentives should only be used when the firm disposes of a contractible performance measure with both low risk and low distortion.

Given some incentive structure, incentives increase in controllability (i.e. relatively less noise). However, if there are distortions, they increase with the power of incentives. Therefore, there is a tradeoff between incentives and distortion and between risk and distortion. Whether or not incentives improve efficiency and total utility depends on both risk and distortion.

2.1.4   Objective and subjective performance assessment

Vollaard (2006) describes why and how the government should give incentives to police forces. "The government's objective for the police can be defined in general terms as the reduction of crime, promotion of safety and reduction of disorder in an efficient, effective, and fair and decent manner." (Vollaard, 2006, pp. 26). These contributions cannot be measured. Output (police activities) can be measured, but they are influenced by other actors and factors as well.

Vollaard (2006) uses two categories of performance assessments (objective and subjective) and evaluates and compares them by the following three qualities of incentives schemes.

- Signal-to-noise ratio: the extent to which efforts of the police are represented in the performance measure. A higher signal-to-noise ratio means stronger incentives.

- Discretionary power: police forces should have some discretionary power, see section 2.3.

- Distortion of effort: distortions and strategic behaviour must be prevented.

2.1.4.1   Objective performance assessments

Objective performance assessments use predefined performance measures and define a 'good performance' in advance. A rule for reward or penalty is related to the assessment and is also determined ex ante. Three types of objective performance assessments are distinguished:

- Outcome measures:
  - Low signal-to-noise ratio (low incentives), since outcomes are influenced by many actors and factors outside the police organization.
  - Great degree of discretion, since the police forces decide themselves on how to realize the outcome.
  - Low distortion of effort, since these measures comprise more dimensions of police work than the other measures.
- Output measures:
  - 'Neutral' signal-to-noise ratio (some incentives), since there is some interaction with the outside world, but outputs are more controllable than outcomes.
  - Very little discretion, since the government prescribes the best way of achieving the outcomes and therefore does not (fully) use the expertise of the police forces.
  - Some distortion of effort, since not all outputs of the police are measured and the quality of the measured outputs cannot be easily observed.
- Internal processes measures:
  - High signal-to-noise ratio (high incentives), since the internal processes are relatively little affected by outside actors and factors.
  - Very little discretion, since the government prescribes the best way of achieving the outcomes and therefore does not (fully) use the expertise of the police forces.
  - High distortion of effort, since these measures only reflect some dimensions of police work.

(Vollaard, 2006).

2.1.4.2 Subjective performance assessments

Subjective performance assessments evaluate performances afterwards, without (fully) using predefined performance measures. The reward is based on a judgement ex post. Comparing the qualities of incentives schemes with objective performance pay, subjective performance assessment has:

- Lower signal-to-noise ratio (lower incentives), which is due to the noise associated with the subjective evaluation.
- Greater discretionary power, since performances and choices can be explained and therefore justified. Furthermore, police forces can adapt to changing circumstances, since 'good performance' or 'good choices' are not defined in advance.

- Limited distortion of effort, since more dimensions of police work can be included by asking for explanations. However, other types of distortions may present themselves. First, evaluators may never assess performance badly. Second, the perspectives of the evaluators may not fully coincide with those of the government.

As can be seen from the overviews above, there is a tradeoff between the noise of a performance measure on the one hand, and the distortion of effort and discretionary power on the other hand. According to Vollaard (2006), providing strong incentives to the police, without inciting to strong distortions, is challenging because police work consists of many activities and each activity involves many dimensions. (Vollaard, 2006).

2.1.4.3   Comparing objective and subjective performance assessment

The choice between objective and subjective performance assessment depends on the tradeoffs. Subjective performance assessment may be better than objective in case of the police, since police work is multi-dimensional and quality is important. Gaming is limited and Vollaard (2003) thinks other types of gaming are not very likely to happen in case of the police. The measures still provide incentives, in contrast with outcome measures. Problem may be that customers (evaluators) are not able to assess performance well or evaluate only the visible police work, and that performances of different police forces are not comparable. (Vollaard, 2003, 2006).

2.2   Steering

2.2.1   Defining the concept steering

Steering ('sturing') is a concept from public administration[1]. Steering corresponds to things like coordination, planning and control, management, accountability and policy. Terpstra (2002, pp. 21) defines steering as 'purposeful attempts to influence the carrying out, so as to (better) attain the intended purpose and/or act more in harmony with norms'. This involves establishing purposes, priorities and norms, influencing the way in which the work is carried out, gathering information about the carrying out, and rendering account, monitoring, and evaluating the carrying out and the performance on the basis of the purposes or norms set. (Terpstra, 2002).

In the economic literature, steering is related to motivating employees. The motivation literature focuses on performance pay, delegation, and career prospects. People are made (financially) responsible for their behavior. Employees are assumed to be rational in most theories, so that motivation has to come from incentives and the assumption is that people will shirk if they have the possibility. Experimental researches also look at 'irrational' motivators, like immaterial

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[1] In English, literature about governance or government of the police, police administration, police authority, or police system is relevant for this subject. Since I will use the Dutch literature, I will talk about 'steering'.

awards. Steering and motivation are both concerned with the question how managers can induce employees to do the right thing. In case of steering, the incentives may be less explicit. A manager may just give orders, without relating direct benefits or sanctions to them and without making official agreements on them. However, employees care about the beliefs a managers has about them, for psychological reasons or for their job. 'Pleasing the manager' and reputational concerns may be accompanied by working on the stated goals and may therefore be a motivator.

I will use 'steering subject' for the party that steers and 'steering object' for the thing that is steered, which can be input, throughput, output or outcome. 'Steering instruments' are the things with which steering takes place. 'Bijsturen' is translated as "adjust steering".

Terpstra (2002) adopts the typology of Hood (1998), which distinguishes four types of public organizations, each with a specific way of steering or managing. Fatalists do not use steering and leave things to their fate. Hierarchists use strict management, expertise, coordination, procedures and rules to influence the carrying out of the work. Commands and rules are given, followed by tight supervision and control. Individualists believe in market-like mechanisms and use competitions and leagues, information, and contracts to introduce incentives. Last, egalitairians believe in the 'basis' (the floor), let them to make choices, and enable participation from below.

Sluis et al., (2006) distinguish four steering models. They relate to the classical and modern view on steering, and to top-down and bottom-up in the following way.

	Classical / Traditional	**Modern**
Top-down	Command and control	Steering on outlines Selective steering
Bottom up		Facility steering

The command and control model is hierarchical and top-down oriented. The manager defines the problem and decides about the solution. The power to steer belongs to the central government and destroys the possibilities for self-steering[2]. Steering on outlines means that the manager confines himself to declare the outlines of the policy. Self-steering takes place within the determined frames. Steering instruments are delegation and mandate. Selective steering let the developments occur. Only on particular, accurately chosen points intervention takes place. Self-steering is very important here. Last, in case of facility steering, the manager ('facilitator') enables other governments, executive organizations or private organizations to steer. The facilitator monitors these steering subjects and tries to learn from them. In practice, these types of steering will not be present in their pure form, but in hybrid forms. (Sluis et al., 2006)

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[2] De Zeeuw (2009, pp. 30) defines self-steering as 'the possibility and freedom of actors to react in a flexible way to changing developments in the environment and steering signals.'

Steering can come from above, from below, and from outside. Steering from above (top-down) is done by actors with formal steering competence by means of authority, management, government, and policy. In case of the Dutch police, this is done by the mayor, (chief) public prosecutor, police force administrator, chief of police, or regional police board.

Steering from below (bottom-up) means, in case of the police, that citizens and practice professionals (the floor) influence the policy. The characteristics of police work create a demand for professionals, who have specific local knowledge, to determine policy and strategy.

Steering from outside is for instance the national steering, like the LKNP, which limits the autonomy in policy developments. In addition, steering on the quality of police work happens by the self evaluations, audits, visitation, and the Police Inspection ('Inspectie Politie'). Furthermore, citizens are asked to express their appreciation for police work. (Sluis et al., 2006)

Steering on different levels concerns different things. Steering on the lowest level (operational steering) is concerned with the deployment of the police officers, while at the police force management level (strategic steering), the mission, objectives and priorities are formulated. Meppelink (2005) mentions another form of steering as well, namely organizational steering, which is concerned with the organization of the police and for instances the finances.

Until the mid-eighties, the government used traditional or classical ways of steering (De Zeeuw, 2009). The assumption is that developments and problems are controllable and solvable from a central point, i.e. top-down. Steering is an arrangement problem of people and means, and happens through enforcement of objectives, tasks, responsibilities and authorities (hierarchical).

Based on criticisms on the traditional view of steering, the concept of steering changed from the eighties onward. The modern view on steering assumes a complex and unknown society, in which all institutions, organizations and groups try to shape policies and influence each other. Steering happens by deliberation, negotiation, exchange and compensation. It corresponds to individualistic steering (contracts with output agreements) and egalitair steering (contracts and relationships between related organizations to solve common problems). (Meppelink, 2005)

2.2.2   Performance steering

Jochoms et al. (2006, pp. 40) define performance steering as 'the process in which steering of the organization takes place by systematically determining the mission statement, strategy and objectives of the organization, rendering them to all organization levels and making them measurable by reporting critical success factors and performance indicators in order to finally being able to take actions adjust the steering of the organization'.

Performance steering is part of the modern view on steering and accords with the popularity of New Public Management (NPM), which boils down to the idea that governmental performances are measurable and account can be rendered for them. (Jochoms et al., 2006; Sluis et al., 2006).

2.3   Autonomy

The police disposes of a substantial autonomy, which is also called discretionary space[3]. This applies for both the police organisation and the individual policeman (Terpstra, 2002). A discrepancy exists between formal hierarchical authority relations and the actual freedom in choices that executive workers have. This means that what executive policemen do, is not per definition what the manager told them to do and the other way round. (Jochoms et al., 2006).

There are different reasons why authority is relevant for the police. First, it is important for the quality of police work that executive workers on the spot have the authority to make decisions. The tasks of executive workers are too complex to be fully set down in formal rules, so that each situation has to be assessed individually. Executive workers are in the best position to do this, since they have the information that is necessary to make decisions. Managers do not have as detailed information, since they are not on the spot. Furthermore, most decisions have to be made quickly, so that there is no time to ask the manager for his opinion.

Second, supervision of police work is very difficult. A substantial part of the police work takes place on the street, where managers are not present. Furthermore, the demand for police service exists 24 hours a day. For these reasons, managers do not have enough information to assess the situation and thus are not able to supervise the decisions made by executive workers.

Third, police work is mostly reactive, i.e. it depends to a large extent on the information and demands the police receive from the citizens. Defining objectives in advance is hard and may also be undesirable. (Terpstra, 2002)

Steering policemen is difficult because objectives are unclear, information is lacking, and supervision is not possible. Another problem is that executive policemen see rendering account as a motion of distrust and a misunderstanding of expertise. (Jochoms et al., 2006) Autonomy may be the best solution. The drawback of autonomy is that it creates a distance between objectives, rules, or policy on the one hand and the execution practice on the other hand. Many researches indicate that it is not always possible to bring activities into line with policy or rules. The researches also stress the dilemma between the necessity of steering on the one hand and the necessity of freedom of choice in carrying out on the other hand. (Terpstra, 2002).

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[3] "A public officer has discretion whenever the effective limits on his power leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of action" (Hoogenboom, 2006, pp. 16)

3. Interviews

This chapter consists of the interviews I had with police forces. Since not everything can be represented in this chapter, some things are transferred to appendix B. This is indicated with *. The most important findings of the interviews return in chapter four.

3.1   Rotterdam-Rijnmond

3.1.1   History of result steering in police force Rotterdam-Rijnmond [*1]

Police force Rotterdam-Rijnmond introduced result steering in December 2001, before the government concluded the performance contracts for police forces. Rotterdam degenerated in the eighties and nineties. Inhabitants had enough of it and Pim Fortuyn, who lived in Rotterdam, opened the debate. Fortuyn said that he would dismiss the chief of police of Rotterdam-Rijnmond if he would become premier. The chief of police did not want to let this happen and introduced top-down result steering. In spite of the top-down way, the implementation was successful. According to Piet Melsen, this was partly due to the recognition of policemen of the degeneration in Rotterdam. The system worked with red squares if targets were not realized and green squares if they were. An example of this system can be found in appendix B.

Until then, district chiefs were concerned about management, their employees and means, but not about safety. Safety was the concern of people below them in the hierarchy. In the result steering system, district chiefs had to focus primarily on safety. They were called to account for the red squares. However, there were no hard consequences.

Calling to account included comparisons with other districts and district chiefs, who were asked for tips. District chiefs went back to their district management team and called those people to account. Steering could occur by saying: "I don't want you to do that, I want you to focus on the car burglaries, because their number increases". The system was completely implemented up to the lowest level (the police officers). Contracts were used for this goal. In those contracts, the number of fines, arrests concerning drunk drivers, and mutations were specified. When agreements were not realized, policemen got an unsatisfactory evaluation.

Working from outside to inside became important: the police was in the service of citizens and should adapt themselves to the needs of those citizens.

The effect of the result steering system was that the organization was strongly directed at results on safety and degeneration. That was exactly what the chief of police wanted, so it was a very good development. The number of reports decreased, while the number of arrests increased. The quality requirements for documents and accountability did also increase strongly. Before the

system of result steering, the focus on performances was insufficient and also not concrete. Annual plans were vague, with sentences like 'we will strive for …'.

The difference in operational police work was that policemen that were used to give only a warning, now stopped someone to fine him. Many people, both inside and outside the police, considered this pleasant.

3.1.2 Implementation of the national agreements

Both national and regional agreements were included in the long-range policy plan ('meerjarenbeleidsplan') and the annual plan ('jaarplancyclus'). National agreements were not considered more important than regional agreements. Regional objectives were formulated by the police force management ('korpsleiding'), but the ideas came from within the organization, from the mayor, the regional police board, and the Public Prosecutor.

There were a lot of indicators that were monitored monthly, both control issues and output performances. By this monitoring, managers saw whether or not they met the norm and benchmarking was possible. When all numbers were red, managers steered on them. Besides the numbers, explanations were included in the monitor set, like district specific characteristics.

Service heads ('diensthoofden' *[3]) and district chiefs were responsible for the control aspects and operational objectives. Once a month these performances were discussed with the police force management, at least one-to-one but sometimes also in the police force management team ('korpsmanagementteam', consisting of all district chiefs and service heads). In these conversations, the story behind the numbers was always important. It could be the case that a lot of capacity was directed to big murder cases, which yielded only one suspect per case. This involved that many small cases could not be treated, that might have delivered 100 suspects. That could not be derived from the numbers. When there was no good reason for not realizing the results, it was a matter of better steering. Failing to realize performance agreements did not have direct consequences for district chiefs. They were not immediately dismissed. At the most, they were transferred to another function.

Below the district chiefs in the hierarchy were the heads ('hoofden' *[4]), who were steered by district chiefs. These heads steered chiefs ('chefs') of the areas. Above the district chiefs in the hierarchy was the police force administrator (the mayor of Rotterdam), who was ultimately responsible for realizing the national performance agreements. He had to render account to the Ministry of BZK. The chief of police held these accountability conversations. At the national level, the Minister of BZK was called to account by the Parliament.

Although there were no direct consequences of failing to realize performance agreements, people may have been punished by being unable to make a career. Edgar Taale believes that most people inside the police organization want to make a career (by moving up the hierarchy).*[5] In order to realize performances, steering and being hard is sometimes necessary.

People at all levels were called to account by their manager in conversations, and their career depended partially on the evaluation of their manager, which was based on the monitoring figures and the story behind the numbers. There was understanding in case bad performances were not the fault of the responsible managers. The police force administrator and the chief of police wanted to deliver good performances as well, since the Ministry of BZK could be seen as their boss. The ministry could assess that they did not function appropriately. Furthermore, the police force also needed the Ministry of BZK, for instance for legislation or for extra money to innovate. That made it in the interest of the police force administrator and the chief of police to maintain a good relationship with the ministry.

At each level, people that were called to account began to steer and call to account the people below them in the hierarchy.*[6] This was the way to achieve performances. The objectives were passed on to lower levels as long as possible and as long as there was no threat of perverse effects. Without passing on, only the police force management and maybe the process owners would be responsible for the results. They had to pass the agreements on to lower levels to bring the agreements to the attention of everyone in the organization.

Steering also involved making choices. Every manager steered in another way. It could be very directive: 'this is what you have to do and I don't care how you manage it', or it could be more in deliberation: 'what do you think of your performance? What is your approach?'. Often, steering involves that doing one thing means that another thing cannot be done. In the monitoring reports, choices were visible. Some districts scored very good on a certain indicator, but very badly on another indicator. The reasons for a bad performance were various: a lack of attention for it, a shortage of personnel, or other (higher) priorities. In case of a lack of attention, it was a matter of steering. Actions could be organized or employees could be instructed to pay attention to performances.

At all levels, there had to be attention for these choices. When performances were far below the norm, people had to work on them. If they did not, their manager had to monitor that and call them to account. If that did not happen, his manager had to say that he had to steer better. It worked step by step. Choices were passed on to the people that were responsible for them.

In the police force Rotterdam-Rijnmond, there was process steering besides the formal, hierarchical structure, based on areas. For the four processes[4], process owners were appointed that steered horizontally. They were service heads or district chiefs with a specific portfolio.*[7]

3.1.3   Performance payment

The police force Rotterdam-Rijnmond did not use some performance payment inside the organization. Performance payment can have perverse effects. There has to be a stimulus to pay attention to performances, but the focus cannot only be on the performance figures. It cannot be that someone who deals with a great murder investigation, is punished because he does not realize the quota for suspects to deliver to the Public Prosecutor. His actual performance may be the same as the performance of someone who treats more cases, but only small ones.

Edgar Taale believes that making the salary of policemen dependent on their performances will result in undesired effects, like people that fine too much. On the one hand, policemen have to be servile and aim at customer satisfaction, on the other hand, policemen are crime fighters and have to enforce. When policemen appear too much in the crime fighter's role, the respect for the police will decrease and citizens will not support the police anymore.

The police does not deliver piecework and cannot be evaluated by production, certainly not at the individual level. Rewarding on pieces does not work because police work is mostly unstructured. Furthermore, it does also not take into account the different positions and processes in the police organization. Neighbourhood police work ('wijkpolitiewerk') is difficult to measure.*[8] Last, police work is team work. Some people may spend more time at the police station, while others spend more time on the street.

Especially on a lower level, performances are hard to compare only based on figures. Local situations may have a huge impact on the performances, while on the regional level those impacts can level out: when one district performs badly because of the circumstances, another district may perform better. Edgar Taale believes that on local level, performance payment shout absolutely not been introduced. He is not against performance payment for the regional police force as a whole.

Performance payment for the police force was 1% of the total budget, so a small stimulus. Edgar Taale thinks this payment should also be small, since performance payment aims at realizing performances and there is a risk of a perverse effect if the payment is a big portion.*[9]

The police force Rotterdam-Rijnmond did make use of 'bewust belonen'. People that performed very good received a bonus. Edgar Taale thinks this is a better way of rewarding.

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[4] Neighbourhood Police ('Wijkpolitie'), Direct Aid ('Directe Hulpverlening'), Criminal Investigation ('Opsporing'), and Intake, Service & Support ('Intake, Service & Ondersteuning')

3.1.4   Motivating policemen

Stimulating people happened by means of 'bewust belonen', a study, and bringing somebody up for another (more interesting) function. Edgar Taale thinks that ambitions, careers, and prestige played an important role at all levels.

Concretely, motivating employees happened by result steering (the personal activities plan ('persoonlijk activiteitenplan', PAP)) and by the personal development plan ('persoonlijk ontwikkelplan', POP). The PAP contained the results: 'what have you done?' Some people came to the police from a social inclination, to help people. Those people (policemen on the beat, 'wijkagenten') did not want to fine. However, the core businesses of the police are law enforcement and helping people, but not just one of those.

The POP concerned things like 'what do you want to reach, what do you think of your development, how do you see the future, at what departments do you want to work?'. The police force Rotterdam-Rijnmond was a great organization with around 6,000 employees. The advantage of such a great organization was that people could switch between various functions. Police work had a lot of aspects. Furthermore, there were horizontal possibilities (the different districts) and vertical possibilities (the hierarchy, 'de lijn'). The mobility policy was aimed to switch people after a few years, because that would make them fitter, happier or more motivated. The system of automatic promotions was abolished long ago. Last years, people had to apply for each function and compete with colleagues. The chances each person had to get the promotion, depended on his performance. Furthermore, this was an incentive to learn, study, do a work placement practice, and broaden one's horizons, since those things increased the chance of promotion. Money was made free for these developments.

3.1.5   Changes as a result of the performance agreements

The story behind the numbers always received importance. The Ministry of BZK steered more, for instance on finances and performances. The ministry did this by more controlling (asking interim questions about the progress). The chief of police had to show the efforts he and his police force did to meet the requirements. When there was political attention for a subject, the police force management attached importance to it, and the police force management demanded the lower management to attach important to it. This lower management also started to steer on the subject and ultimately it affected all levels in the organization.

The police Rotterdam-Rijnmond introduced result steering before the performance contracts were introduced by the government. Some things changed when the government introduced the

LKNP 2003-2006. However, the system of result steering already existed. The ministries linked performance payment to the parts they considered important. Performance payment was not necessary anymore in the great system of thinking, but it gave an extra focus. Those focuses were political choices (for instance weighting child pornography versus human trafficking). The police forces adopted those focuses.

An example is the bonus that was related to violence crimes, besides the money for the number of suspects to deliver to the Public Prosecutor. In this way, the government wanted to stimulate police forces to deal with violence crimes. The effect was that within the big performance (number of suspects), the police force focused on the specific targets. The big performance was realized, but if the district chief had to choose between property crimes and violence crimes, the latter was chosen since a bonus was related to it.

The agreements to which performance payment was related were important, because if they were not realized, it cost the police force Rotterdam-Rijnmond more than one million euro. When an agreement was not realized, the police force tried to find out what was the reason for it.*[10] However, performances were important themselves. The performance payment that was related to them sometimes led to stricter steering. In September, the police force management had a good indication whether or not the performance agreements could be realized at the end of the year. When the police force management thought the performance agreements would not be realized, there was more attention for and extra steering occurred. However, it was always a consideration, since other things that happened might have also required attention. Therefore, deviating from the performance agreements had to be possible. Again, the story was important.

3.1.6   Comments on the performance agreements

For performance steering, numbers are not most important, the story behind the numbers is. Numbers can be manipulated and can change as a result of external circumstances. The police force had problems with the registration of numbers by the Public Prosecutor. First, the police delivered suspects to the Public Prosecutor and the moment they registered them determined the processing time. Second, cases of domestic violence with one perpetrator and one victim were not registered by the Public Prosecutor anymore. It concerned 1,400 cases per year on an agreement of 25,311 (2003-2006) for Rotterdam-Rijnmond. They should have counted in the number of suspects, because the police exerted efforts to these cases. Third, there were problems with the information systems of both the Public Prosecutor and the police. Fortunately, the Ministry of BZK understood these problems and listened to the story behind the (incorrect) numbers.

3.1.7   Conflicts

The police force Rotterdam-Rijnmond was very good in result steering, the best of the country according to Piet Melsen. In the audit of 2005, it appeared that Rotterdam-Rijnmond was a good police force and the result steering was top of the bill. The system was worked out and there was an actual view on everything. The concepts of Giuliani*[2] were implemented: control (monitoring everything, having an actual view) and compare (district chiefs did not like it when their district performed badly while another district performed good, which was all visible).

The audit commission said to the chief of police: 'you have a very good police force, BUT you forget the people'. Because everything was directed at safety, actions, fining, and arrests, there was no time to educate employees, which came at the cost of the development of people. Employees who asked permission for a course (for instance social work or integral safety) to a district chief, were told 'that is annoying, since you have to meet the objective of 180 fines. If you don't meet your target, another has to fine more, but he already has a target'. The district chief said that there was actually no time for a course, since the objectives had to be realized. Some people complained that nothing was possible anymore: having a day off, a study; everything was aimed at results and objectives.

The advice of the audit commission was: 'keep your right leg on result steering and safety objectives, but straighten your left leg on the development of people'. This was not easy, since it could not come at the cost of safety, but the police force succeeded.

The hard culture of calling to account is a bit gone. There is also no need for it anymore, since the system of result steering became part of the functioning. Nowadays, policemen have a personal development plan (POP, the left leg) and a personal activities plan (PAP, the right lag), as discussed in section 3.1.4.

Policemen prescribed what happened on the street. They wanted to fine those people that infringed the law, but did not fine people that did not deserve it from the point of view of the policemen. The discretionary authority of a policemen, to fine or to arrest or not, got into a tight corner because of result steering. Not fining in a situation the policeman thinks it is undeserved, may involve that the target is not met. The target for fines was 180 per year, i.e. less than 1 per day, so not a huge number.

Policemen were used that they decided whether or not someone was fined, not their manager. In fact, that was still the case, but policemen did not experience it that way when the manager said "that's all fine, when you meet the target of 180". That part was a culture change. No culture

change was related to shoplifters, car thieves, and people that threatened, since everyone agreed to arrest more of those people.

3.1.8   Evaluation of the performance agreements

The focus on the numbers is not bad, according to Piet Melsen. He thinks it brought the police force Rotterdam-Rijnmond a lot of good things. People that come to the police want to make a difference, they want to improve safety. More numbers means that they are closer to their core tasks. Some people achieve results by conversations and mediations, others by charging and sometimes it can only be done by charging. The idea that they, as policemen, contribute to safety is satisfying. Policemen want to realize the objectives because they care about safety. Since safety improved as an effect of result steering, policemen supported result steering.

In the police force Rotterdam-Rijnmond, performance steering was applauded on all levels in the organization, although there might have been doubts about some agreements. In the beginning, there was resistance to the performance agreements, at least on some indicators. Society was very opposed to the quota for fines. This harmed the image of the police a lot. When a policeman stopped someone who drove too fast, this driver commented 'go capture real criminals'. However, after the exclusion of the quota for fines from the NP 2008-2011, the police force Rotterdam-Rijnmond employed it still as guideline. An amount that was considered reasonable was determined for the police force. This amount was divided over the districts, neighbourhood police teams, and individual police agents. The individual situations were taken into account and division happened according to reasonability.

The police force believed it could not be the case that a policeman did not fine at all. Police work was not only the provision of services, but it comprehended also enforcement. Enforcement entailed fining. People that did not want to fine, had to be forced a bit. They were not called to account hardly when they did not realize their quota, but it was a way to monitor whether or not someone fined. When the quota for fines was for instance 5, police agents that fined 0 times would be called to account, but also police agents that fined 10 times, since too much fining may lead to complaints. These performances were discussed in performance interviews.

The idea behind the national quota for fines was good, but it was laid on thick. In that case, the means become objectives themselves. Police force Rotterdam-Rijnmond used the quota for fines only as means to stimulate people to enforce and not be too soft. But it was not used as objective, so that people were not hardly called to account when they did not meet the quota.

Performance steering involved that everything had to be seen in a wider context. Input, throughput, output and outcome were all related to each other. Edgar Taale considers output indicators good, provided that whole spectrum is seen in connection with each other, that is what the 'story behind the numbers' is about. Less budget and less capacity should lead to lower performance targets.*[11]

In the end, outcome was what it was all about, but this was hard to measure. Objective safety was increasing, measured by the number of reports, but subjective safety stayed the same. The question was: what is the reason that people do not feel safer, while it is safer? It could for instance be due to the ageing (more older people that feel less safe), loitering by young people, clashes due to cultural differences, or media that reported all crimes. The police force Rotterdam-Rijnmond has a communication department that aims at communicating what the police does, in order to create a positive image.

Piet Melsen thinks an important factor was the lack of social cohesion in the four problem areas. People did not know their neighbours, did not take part in projects to get acquainted with each other, did not want to improve the area since they wanted to leave as soon as possible. Language problems did also play a role. When those isolated people were asked whether the area became safer, they would probably say no.

It is questionable whether a decrease in reports means that objective safety improves. It can also be that the willingness to report a crime decreases. Furthermore, the number of reports depend on the attention for specific types of crime. For instance, from 2003 onwards, the attention for domestic violence increased. The number of reports increased from 5,000 to 9,000. That did not mean that it became less safe. When local authorities were encouraged to report each destruction, also the number of these reports increased. Steering on numbers can be perverse. Police forces can say: the number of reports has to decrease, so we stimulate not reporting crimes. This is not what we want and ultimately, safety is important. Safety should be the main thing when focusing on performance agreements.

The police forces did not want a lot of agreements in the performance contracts, since for each agreement they had to render account, which involved administrative costs, and agreements limited the regional authority (of the regional police board) in setting priorities, i.e. determining own targets. The difficulty was sometimes that national indicators had the attention of politicians and the media, while regional priorities did not.*[12]

3.2 Fryslân

3.2.1 Implementation

The police Fryslân (Friesland) included the performance agreements in the policy plan, in which priorities were stated. The performance agreements were seen as priority. Furthermore, the quantitative performance agreements were passed on to the six districts. In the district plans, a guideline for the quantitative performances per district was taken down. This was monitored and steered by the regional control division, and district chiefs were called to account when they did not meet the targets. Each district chief managed some teams, including criminal investigation departments. Criminal investigation department chiefs and group chiefs were called to account for instance concerning the processing times.

For the police Fryslân, local priorities that were not part of the convenant were as important as national priorities. Both were included in the long-range policy plan. Regional priorities were formulated by the Public Prosecutor, the police's own management, or by the mayors.

The police Fryslân tried to realize the performance agreements by steering on all agreements and calling district chiefs to account. The control division kept an eye on the processes and many processes were improved. This was in favour of the efficiency. Steering happened via the Dashboard, which was a two-monthly report of the performances per district or per team. Realized performances were marked green, almost realized performances yellow and bad performances red.

There were no direct consequences if performances were not realized, however in the long term there might have been. In the Netherlands, managers were not used to be very directive. The police Fryslân did not use punishment when agreements were not realized, but did use rewards for district chiefs or team chiefs that managed to bring about good performances. However, this was not determined in advance. The police Fryslân did not use internal performance pay that was related to the objectives from the LKNP 2003-2006. Rewarding employees who performed well was possible and happened by ex-post assessment, but was not related to the objectives.

In the time of the LKNP 2003-2006, the police Fryslân were composed of six districts that consisted of some teams. Later on, this changed into eleven teams and no districts. I have only information about the steering in the situation of the eleven teams. Team chiefs discussed the performances that had to be achieved by their team in their team deliberation. Team chiefs made individual result agreements with the people that had to contribute to a certain performance. However, when the performances lagged behind, the whole team discussed what could be done

about it and tried to realize the performances. In the end, the team chief was responsible for the steering with which the results at team level had to be realized.

Teams had a quite big freedom in regulation. However, this freedom became more limited since scaling-up (centralisation) appeared to work better for some processes. Nowadays, process owners decide how certain processes are organized in all teams, like youth cases, acts of violence, and the core processes intake, criminal investigation and enforcement. This process steering aims for efficiency gains and quality gains, since all processes will be organized in the same way. The team chief is no longer responsible for the way in which the work is done, but still for the quantity and the personnel policy.

3.2.2   Changes as a result of the performance agreements

Steering became more directive. Managers did intervene and called district chiefs and team chiefs to account when performances were disappointing.

The focus on the numbers increased to some extent. However, there was also a greater focus on quality, since processes were investigated and optimized. Moreover, a division quality support was set up to improve for instance the quality of records.

3.2.3   Comments on the performance agreements

The number of suspects to deliver to the Public Prosecutor from the LKNP 2003-2006 was divided over the police forces on the basis of full-time equivalents (fte's) or 'budgetverdeeleenheden' (bve). This was a rough distribution code, where no attention was paid to the real supply of work. For certain police forces, the number of suspects to deliver to the Public Prosecutor was more difficult than for other police forces. The safety situation was not taken into account. Dirk Scholten mentioned that Friesland was one of the safest regions of the Netherlands, so delivering more cases automatically meant that they delivered less weighting cases.

Exerting pressure on the police is a good thing according to Dirk Scholten. However, he advocates concluding agreements with other partners in the safety chain and evaluating police performance in relation to the performances and processes of the partners. That was not the case. Concluding a contract with partners in the safety chain will lead to synergy on all levels (strategically, tactically and operationally). Each partner will know his contribution to safety and

the part for which each other partner is responsible. Furthermore, if each partner has a contract, it is in the interest of all partners to work together in order to realize performance agreements.

3.2.4   Conflicts

Especially the demand of the Public Prosecutor concerning above-regional criminality fight caused bottlenecks. The Public Prosecutor wanted to solve more weighting criminality, like hemp plantations. The question what is important, is a subjective one. However, directing capacity towards important criminality involves that less capacity is available for often occurring forms of criminality that cause a lot of inconvenience for citizens. Usually this did not lead to problems, but choices had to be made and some things had to be released. The discussion about the core tasks of the police might have helped in making choices. There was also a problem of measurement: neighbourhood-oriented working ('wijkgericht werken') yielded no measurable results, while discovering hemp plantations did.

What Justice wanted sometimes conflicted with what mayors wanted, since there was limited capacity. There is always more demand for police work than there is supply. However, Dirk Scholten thinks that the conflicts should not be exaggerated. Many things overlapped (Dirk Scholten mentions 80%): national priorities like violence and youth were also regional or local priorities. Paying attention to local priorities contributed to the national priorities too. National and local priorities were therefore not very contrary to each other.

3.2.5   Evaluation of the performance agreements

Dirk Scholten calls the performance contracts 'fantastic and excellent in order to give the police a shaking that they should better look at their management, their steering and the appreciation of citizens for their work'. 'It brought the police many goods. It is harmful that the performance contracts are not developed further.'

The number of fines per police officer was already included in the policy plan of the police Fryslân, before the introduction of the performance contracts. The number of fines remained included in the policy plan when the agreement was removed from the NP 2008-2011. According to Dirk Scholten, 100 fines a year is not very much and is easily attainable.

The scores 'availability' and 'satisfaction with last police contact' were very good agreements, since they were qualitative agreements. According to Dirk Scholten, Fryslân was leader (or belonged to the top 5 in other years) concerning these indicators for customer satisfaction. He does not know the exact reason for this good performance, but he thinks it was due to the great amount of contact the police Fryslân had with their citizens and the investigations they did on

customer satisfaction. Dirk Scholten considers it ridiculous that exactly these components were excluded from the NP 2008-2011.

3.3 Zeeland

3.3.1 Implementation

The performance contracts of the government were not converted to performance contracts at the individual level. According to Joachim Verhoeyen, police forces were reserved to pass the output performance agreements on to individual policemen. A discussion exists whether output indicators say something about the contribution to safety. Next to it, the performances may be difficult to measure accurately and correctly.

Some performance agreements were passed on to the teams but not further, for example the number of suspects to deliver to the Public Prosecutor. At least, passing on further was not included in the official central steering of the police force management, but team chiefs could make individual agreements. There was at the level of the police force management no need to make individual agreements, since the performances in 2003 were pretty good. However, there was a lot of steering, also on individuals, which had to lead to the realization of the agreements.

The organization structure was the following. Under the police force management were three districts situated. The district chiefs were managers of team chiefs. Under the team chiefs were location commandants that did the operational steering. The police force management, the district chiefs and the division heads formed the management team ('managementteam'). The district chiefs were finally responsible for the results. Team chiefs were responsible for the results of their team. The problem was that there was no relation between the strategic level (the police force management team) and the operational level (the policemen under the location commandants). It was difficult for the police force management to make the right decisions, since they did not know what was going on at the lowest level, where the decisions had to be carried out. Steering happened too much on districts and too little on teams.

There became more attention for controlling. A control division was set up to keep an eye on the performance agreements. Already from the beginning, a lot of steering took place on the performance agreements. The amount of monitoring increased and more feedback was given to managers. Between the police force management and the district chiefs, conversations took place in which the results were discussed. This was the strategic steering.

At the operational level, district chiefs and division chiefs had monthly conversations with their team chiefs about operations and problems. The results were also discussed in these

conversations, but they were more a point of concern of district chiefs and division chiefs than of team chiefs.

Team chiefs did receive steering information. The steering report they received was a survey that contained quantitative performances, like charges, arrests, collisions, alcohol use, and speeding offences. There was no norm related to these individual performances. Team chiefs could see what their team members produced and compare that to their own targets. Based on the steering information, they could adjust the steering.

Performance assessment purely based on these numbers was not possible, because assessment had to be related to the tasks of the individual and the type of work he did. Some policemen may focus on support tasks, so that they do less operational tasks, which are measured. That did not mean that team chiefs were not able to conclude individual agreements within their team. There were team chiefs that did so. Steering of policemen at the operational level happened by means of daily briefings, in which the actual situation was discussed. Furthermore, the performances of policemen were discussed in performance interviews, which were also part of steering.

There were no sanctions when performance agreements were not realized. Team chiefs had to render account to their district chief in periodical management conversations ('managementgesprekken'). There was no rewarding of predetermined performances. However, people that performed very good, implemented a project successfully, or worked overtime could be rewarded according to the rewarding policy 'bewust belonen'. In this policy, exemplary behavior and exceptional performances could be rewarded in the form of money or leave. Core tasks were specified for each police function and rewarding could occur for non-regular tasks. Joachim Verhoeyen emphasized that the role of the manager is very important in order to prevent undesired effects from happening. The best managers do not focus on the numbers that need to be achieved, but communicate the meaning of the agreements and the way in which numbers contribute to the ultimate objectives.

3.3.2 Changes after the introduction of the performance agreements

It is difficult to isolate the effects of the performance contracts on the police Zeeland. The problem is that the police Zeeland became in 2004 an article 4 force, what means that they were preventively supervised by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations because of their bad financial situation. According to Joachim Verhoeyen, the police Zeeland may have been more focused on the performance agreements and the corresponding financial reward than they would have been if the financial situation was good. In that case, the (development in) result

steering is not only due to the performance contracts themselves. Both effects cannot be distinguished. However, in 2003, when the article 4 status did not yet apply, steering on results and on performance agreements already increased a lot.

In 2007, the audit commission pointed out that the result steering of the police Zeeland was over the top (Kwaliteitsbureau Politie, 2007). The police force management steered very strongly on results and the police Zeeland did score very good on those results. However, a situation of suboptimization occurred. First, the focus on the results came at the cost of (improvements of) the processes. There were no process owners appointed.

Second, the development of employees stayed behind. Employees were very much focussed on results and did therefore not develop other competences. The size of the police force may play a role in this. For a small police force, like Zeeland, the development of employees costs a lot of money and time, i.e. it results in a lack of capacity.

A third negative point was the decreasing space for objections. Managers gave orders and they had to be obeyed. As a consequence, policemen did not communicate their view on policy and the difference between the view of the strategic level and the reality of the operational level increased.

Last, there was sometimes too little attention for outcome. Steering happened on output performances, with less attention for the question what was ultimately important, namely safety. The police is in the service of the citizens. The important thing is to give meaning to the ultimate objectives, instead of blindly fining or arresting. Some team chiefs sent their employees off to fine if the target was not reached yet. The question that has to be asked is whether or not this improves safety. In some cases it will, for instance when drivers limit their speed after being fined for speeding.

Sometimes output gets in the way of outcome. For instance great traffic checks or raising traffic fines evoke a lot of resistance. Resistance leads to conflicts and harms the legitimacy of the police. Less legitimacy results in social effects like less subjective safety and a loss of police authority in for instance mediations. Community policing ('gebiedsgebonden politiezorg') aims at regaining legitimacy. Attention has to be paid to the way of approaching people. Some policemen are applauded when they fine, while others evoke aggression with fining. Team chiefs should also steer on the approach.

The performance contracts formed the basis for the strategy and policy, instead of just supplementing them (Kwaliteitsbureau Politie, 2007). The national view and policy on safety became leading for the policy within police regions. Joachim Verhoeyen considers this quite far-reaching.

Recommendations of the audit commission were to create a culture in which desired behavior like entrepreneurship, professionalism, and customer satisfaction is central. An example of investing in customer satisfaction is simplifying reporting. The strategic level should pay more attention to the feasibility and the effects at the operational level.

The important lesson the police Zeeland has learned is that delivering performances and paying attention to the development of people do not have to work against each other. The same holds for steering on output and having attention for social effects (outcome).

Trends are visible. The policeman on the beat was a social worker, who did not fine. A reaction to that situation was the movement towards more repressive enforcement. However, as a consequence, enforcement became too repressive and a tendency backwards occurred. Nowadays, legitimacy and connections with society become important. Society has to supply information to the police, so the police has to spend more time in the areas.

Joachim Verhoeyen thinks the extent to which and the way in which result steering is implemented, depends to a large extent on the chief of police. When the chief of police is a strong advocate of result steering, it happens, while in case a chief of police attaches little value to the performance agreements, it receives less attention at all levels. The police force had to render account to the Ministry of BZK in a convenant conversation for the performances, so the performance agreements were not without obligations, but chiefs of police could for instance believe that focussing on criminality and doing what had to be done would automatically lead to the results that had to be achieved.

3.3.3   Comments on the performance agreements

The objectives from the performance contracts were not always realistic, in the opinion of Joachim Verhoeyen. The performance agreements were concluded for four years. In those four years, all kinds of policy developments and safety developments took place, to which the agreements were not adjusted. The question is to what extent the objectives that were formulated in 2003, were still desirable and attainable in 2006, given these developments. Joachim Verhoeyen thinks that more attention should have been paid to this question. Since there were doubts about the extent to which the agreements were realistic, these agreements were not suitable to be passed on to individual policemen.

As an example, Joachim Verhoeyen mentions the number of suspects to deliver to the Public Prosecutor. That number was constantly increasing over the years, although the Netherlands became safer. The products of the police are not as easy as in many commercial organizations.

The production of the police depends on what happens outside and on national developments. When the number of reports decrease, and/or safety improves, less suspects will be delivered to the Public Prosecutor, regardless of the performance agreements. Performance agreements should be adjusted to such developments.

Joachim Verhoeyen admits that from political-governmental point of view, it is easier to specify a target for suspects to deliver to the Public Prosecutor than to formulate outcome objectives. When the performance agreements are realized, the Ministry congratulates the police forces and when they are not realized, the Ministry says that police forces did not steer enough. Police forces on the other hand doubt on the effect of those targets, since they believe that safety is what it is all about.

In the NP 2008-2011, the government tried to use performance indicators that relate output to objective safety. An example is a suspect-ratio besides a number of suspects. The suspect-ratio is the number of suspects per report. This is an attempt to correct for the number of reports. However, steering on this ratio is difficult. At the force level, this ratio has meaning, but at team level it does not. The team that treats the report is not per definition the team that arrests the suspect. When steering is not possible on performances, agreements on them do not make sense. The Kalsbeeknorm, concerning processing times, only means that the process is all right, but does not say anything about whether or not correct decisions are made or correct intervention took place. That is why the discussion appears whether it is desirable to steer on output. The relation with safety is unclear.

The subjective safety components of the LKNP 2003-2006 (the scores 'availability' and 'satisfaction with last police contact') were removed from the performance contracts in 2008. There were some problems with them. First, many police forces questioned how they were able to steer on these scores. There is no one-to-one relation between objective safety and subjective safety. Objectively, safety may increase, while in the experience of citizens it may become more unsafe. The question then is: what is the reason that people do not experience more safety, while safety increased according to the numbers.

A second problem was that it was questionable whether the random check was representative. There was only a small number of respondents in the Police Monitor Population (PMB / VMR) and the error significance was high, some 10%. Therefore, the results from this survey had only limited value.

Another problem was that the police were only small players in the safety chain. Other partners affected subjective safety as well, so there was no one-to-one relation between the actions of the police and subjective safety.

Last, it is unclear in what way police behavior affects subjective safety. Consider the situation where many policemen are patrolling the streets. A citizen may feel safe, because of so much police protection, or may feel unsafe, when he thinks that the police is patrolling *because* this area is very unsafe.

However, also after the exclusion of these performances from the performance contracts, subjective safety was investigated. Police forces want both the objective and subjective safety to be high. When discrepancies are observed between objective and subjective safety, the police try to find the cause of this. Investigation of subjective safety is good, but concluding performance agreements in this domain is not.

3.3.4 Conflicts

As discussed in section 3.3.2, conflicts mainly occurred with regard to attention for leadership, processes, employee development, customer satisfaction, and legitimacy.

Furthermore, each police agent has a legally determined discretionary authority to fine or to arrest. This makes it difficult to steer an agent, since he should still be able to act independently and according to his own expertise. Some conflicts occurred in this field and they were related to the question to what extent there was space for objection. Joachim Verhoeyen thinks that steering from inside was stronger than the discretionary authority. This will partly be due to the performance agreements, but still a very important factor is the role of the manager. When the police agent knows his team chief will support and cover him, he will feel more free to use his discretionary authority. In case of distrust between the agent and the team chief, the agent will ask permission for everything he does, in order to be covered.

The same story applies to the relation between a district chief and the police force management. It should be understood by the police force management when less suspects are arrested because there is less criminality. When this understanding is lacking, the district chief may take actions that have perverse effects but achieve the unrealistic objectives.

Prevention may get into a tight corner, since the performance agreements do not aim at prevention, but at repressiveness. However, it is not completely true that prevention cannot be expressed in numbers. Police forces can make their projects and efforts visible, for instance in accompanying people to prevent them from making mistakes.

3.3.5 Evaluation of the performance agreements

The performance contracts took effect. The results improved *on the measured indicators*. These indicators do not give a total picture, but a picture on output.

Initially, the introduction of the performance contracts was not accepted with open arms by many police forces, including Zeeland, because of the possible perverse effects. After some time, people saw also the benefits, namely the results that were achieved. Joachim Verhoeyen thinks people within the police force Zeeland experienced the performance contracts mainly positive. Nowadays a movement backwards occurs, also at the Ministry of BZK. Fewer performance agreements are included and the Parliament criticizes agreements at the individual level.

3.4   Haaglanden

3.4.1   Implementation

The implementation of the performance contracts happened by means of a plan and control cycle. The objectives for the police force Haaglanden were divided in objectives per police station. These objectives consisted of numbers and of reactions on things that could happen. The chief of each police station had three times a year a conversation with his manager. Both quantitative and qualitative performances were discussed. The managers assessed the overall performance, which could be seen as career perspectives.

No direct financial incentives were used for individual policemen or for people at a higher level in the organization. This may be for ethical reasons, or because policemen and managers should not be pressurized to achieve only quantitative performances. Another point is that the rights and duties of civil servants, which policemen are, do not match very well with a system in which for instance the chief of a police station will receive a bonus when his police station delivers a good performance. It is not by definition his own performance. What did exist was a system to reward individual performances by means of gratuities ('gratificaties') and promotions.

The police force held conversations with the competent authorities (the mayor and chief public prosecutor). The competent authorities attached importance to the national priorities on the one hand and on the other hand to the safety of the areas and for instance whether demonstrations did not get out of hand. The latter things were more difficult to express in numbers.
The American business model is not implemented in the Netherlands. That idea is that every year the objectives increase with $x\%$ compared to the previous year and huge bonuses are related to these performances. The police in the Netherlands believe that this will lead to the loss of the balance in police work. Everything that is measurable will become more and more, and the reward of this higher performance is that the performance that has to be delivered next year is even higher. That will not be motivating.

The objectives were also not sharpened each year, but the level was maintained and the time that was left, after achieving this performance level, could be spend on other important things.

3.4.2 Changes as a result of the performance agreements

The performance contracts resulted in more steering on the hard numbers. This change was one-off, so that it was not the case that steering intensified with each extension of the contract. Steering jumped to a certain level and that level was maintained. Nowadays, a movement back arises. The idea that not everything can be expressed in numbers gains ground. Furthermore, the numbers are only a part of the story.

The attention for the performances was a culture change, which was introduced by the government. Nowadays, the national government is not the only one that wants to achieve things: the chief public prosecutor, mayors, and the own direction do also want to achieve things, for which result steering may work well.

3.4.3 Comments on the performance agreements

The performance payment that was related to the performance agreements was distributed to the police forces the year after the performances were achieved. Furthermore, the performance payment was an incidental benefit, an once-only payment, even when a police force obtained it every year. The incidental character of this payment made that it was not allowed to use this money for structural expenses, i.e. extra personnel. It was not possible to say: 'I employ some extra policemen, because I know they will recover the costs on'. If that would be the case, police stations would be able to improve their performance structurally.

The money could for instance be used for projects and once-only purchases. These project had per definition nothing to do with the performances that were delivered one year earlier. It might for instance have been possible to hang some extra cameras in some areas, but this had nothing to do with the direct safety of that area. Furthermore, the police stations that delivered a good performance did not feel rewarded, for instance by more personnel or more holidays.

3.5 Twente

3.5.1 Implementation

Agreements from the performance contracts were included in internal management contracts ('managementcontracten') and management reports ('managementrapportages'). Result conversations were held twice a year between the police force management and the division manager. The police force was divided into three districts. The conversations contained the

progress of various subjects. The results were seen in combination with developments. Good developments could be shared with other districts. However, this system was more and more experienced as number driven approach, where sight of meaningfulness was lost, what was not motivating.

The cycle of management report conversations ('managementrapportagegesprekken') has stopped in the end of 2008. The chief of police left and in the end of 2009, a new chief of police was appointed. The police force Twente was still engaged in investigating the results, how they could be realized, and if they were not realized, why not. The awareness grew that there had to be steering information and there had to be steering on the work that was done and on how it was done. A link to America can be made. The Dutch police look what happens in America and gain insights from that system. The American police treat results very businesslike and strict. The results of the American police are publicly discussed and accounted. This system is not what the Dutch police want, but within the Dutch police there are plenty people at all levels that want to render account, but only for meaningful things.

Recently, accountability conversations were introduced in the police force Twente. These conversations were in new style: meaningfulness had to be a central point. Meaningfulness was derived from the long-range policy plan, annual plan and local main points. The new system aimed for representing the results and using steering information to make choices.

The priorities and objectives on national, regional and local level were all included in the long-range plan and the annual plan. In the management deliberations ('managementoverleggen') on the various levels, these objectives were monitored. In the management team ('managementteam'), a police force dashboard ('korpsdashboard') was used to monitor what happened.

Rewards for persons or groups were not used. In 2008, a note was made to work with performance payment for units. The idea was that the money the police force received might have to be divided to the units that deserved it and delivered good work. However, this idea was never implemented, because the chief of police left and the idea was never worked out.

Steering and making choices was most important. The police force Twente wanted a lot and had to do a lot, but had limited capacity, namely the number of employees. Steering meant choosing projects, relating the deployment of capacity to the results, and achieving the results.

Employees on the floor may have a different opinion than the police force management. Sometimes these employees follow their own ideas and sometimes they do what the police force

management say, but with dissatisfaction. However, the employees have a need for choices that are made at a higher level.

The police Twente contained 14 towns, divided over five clusters. The safety problems in those clusters determined the cluster annual plan. Those five cluster annual plans together formed the basis for the annual plan and were complemented by the national and regional main points. Thereby, the annual plan of the police Twente was set up also from the lower level. It worked motivating for the floor when they recognized their own ideas in the annual plan. Giving the floor a role was the most important way of motivating people for the police Twente. The police Twente also tried to realize ideas from the floor by giving people the opportunities to test their idea.

3.5.2   Comments on the performance agreements

Financially, the performance payment became an element of the budget the police counted on. The performance payments were a structural part of the budget. That made it important to realize the performance agreements. However, policemen at the operational level had in the first place attention for the current problems in their area and how to solve those problems.

3.5.3   Conflicts

The police force Twente worked strongly according to a prevention strategy, for which hard numbers were not directly available. If the police force prevented for instance riots, they had results, but these results were not included in the numbers. Rendering account did not comprehend prevention, but was about performance agreements that might not have been realized because a lot of capacity was directed to prevention. In this way, prevention may get into a tight corner when the police do not pay attention. Very conscious choices have to be made, which is difficult.

3.6   Groningen
3.6.1   Implementation

The national performance agreements were included in the regional annual plans. Quantitative performance agreements were divided over the districts. Some agreements were passed on to the units under the districts, where they were included in local annual plans. Most objectives were not suitable to be passed on to individual policemen. For instance in case of suspects to deliver to the Public Prosecutor, it was not possible to make an individual policeman responsible for some number, since he was not the only one that was responsible for delivering those suspects and his

number of suspects depended on the effort of others. Easier to pass on to individual workers was the number of fines. In the past, some districts used standards for the minimum number of fines a policeman had to have, dependent on his function. Nowadays, no agreements are passed on to the individual level. It fits less well with the company philosophy. However, the delivered production of individual policemen is still involved in the evaluation of their functioning.

'Lijnchefs' were responsible for the achievement of performances. The 'lijnchefs' consisted of the district chiefs and the unit chiefs below them in the hierarchy. They were supported by portfolio holders ('portefeuillehouders'), who advised over processes, work methods, plans, etcetera. These portfolio holders were managers at the strategic level, including the district chiefs. An example is the portfolio holder Criminal investigation, who makes proposals how to realize the number of suspects to deliver to the Public Prosecutor.

This meant that ultimately, the whole unit together was responsible for achieving the results, but the unit chief was called to account in case the results stayed behind. This responsibility could not be laid down with individuals. Policemen were only responsible for the carrying out of their activities. The unit chief had to stimulate his workers to realize the desired results. Periodical work considerations ('werkoverleggen') and daily (de)briefings were used for this purpose. Policemen were called to account for their contribution to safety and to the realization of the targets in personnel conversations ('personeelsgesprekken'), i.e. in performance interviews, assessment interviews, and personal development plans.

Policemen had freedom in commitment. When there was an agreement, for example that driving speed had to be reduced in order to reduce the number of collisions, a policeman could not decide himself not to carry out this speed check. However, in other situations, like the reduction of alcohol use in traffic, he could decide himself where and when he carried out the checks. That was part of his professionalism. The freedom to decide might have been bigger before the introduction of the performance agreements, but this depended on the believes of the 'lijnchef'.

Monthly, the results were monitored and discussed in different deliberations, both on local and regional level. In case the results stayed behind, steps could be taken to adjust steering. The deliberations at the regional level were decision-making. In principle, the police force management made the decisions. The deliberations on local level (work considerations and daily briefings) contained more space for consideration. Executive workers were consulted and also expectation management got a chance.

Policemen were paid a monthly salary, and were not paid in relation to their performances. In exceptional situations, individuals could be rewarded according to 'bewust belonen' for their performances. However, this was not related to their activities (core tasks), but to a special way of

carrying out the tasks. Except from rendering account, no methods were implemented to stimulate the realization of targets.

3.6.2 Changes as a result of the performance agreements

Before the performance agreements, there were no agreements to pass on to districts, units or individuals. Many activities were part of the domains 'general supervision and enforcement of public and legal order'. In addition to this, policemen contributed to programs and plans that were specified to approach a certain problem. The introduction of performance contracts led to more steering of the 'lijn' (the hierarchy), not in the last place because of the related performance payment. Not realizing the objectives would lead to a financial damage for the police force. The amount of performance payment of € 1.6 million gives a substantial incentive.

3.6.3 Conflicts

Solving simple cases, like shoplifting, yielded more suspects than carrying out a large, long-lasting research for a serious harm of the legal order. A good example is the pyromaniac the police Groningen had to face. Arresting this one suspect cost the police force 33 man-years work. From the point of view of the realization of the performance agreements, this was the wrong choice: in those 33 man-years, many more, easy cases could have been treated, which would have lead to more suspects so that the performance agreement suspects to deliver to the Public Prosecutor would have been realized.

At a lower level, it happened that people were too much directed at the numbers, instead of at safety. The competent authorities (the Public Prosecutor, Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, and Ministry of Justice) are not enough convinced of this problem.

3.6.4 Evaluation of the performance agreements

The performance contract brought the police force Groningen something good, according to Bé Wiertsema. The understanding that steering on certain results had to be more and better, led to more grip on the work and to a safer society. This safety was expressed in the number of reports and clarified reports. The question is whether this safer society would have also been achieved without performance contracts. Various studies indicate that safety did not only increase in the Netherlands, but in many European countries as well. Those European countries did supposedly not use similar performance contracts.

A drawback of the performance indicators was that everybody was very directed at them. This development could be seen as positive, since people wanted to realize the performance

agreements and organize their work from this perspective. However, the negative part of the story is that people might organize (and manipulate) the work in such a way that the target is realized, irrespective of the question whether the actions contribute to the ultimate goal, which is the improvement of safety.

Policemen experienced the performance contracts for the greater part as restriction to their freedom and as limitation to their creativity and the possibilities they had as professionals. Numbers became leading, not the work itself, which was aroused by the current performance indicators. Bé Wiertsema considers it questionable whether the number of suspects to deliver to the Public Prosecutor, the suspect ratio violence, and fines did influence safety in the best way. Things like proactive working and preventive actions were not taken into account.
*[13]

3.7   Other police forces   *[14]

In the police forces Gelderland-midden, IJsselland, Gooi en Vechtstreek, and Zaanstreek-Waterland, the same story applies. Pieter Chattellon indicates that it is questionable when a police force, team, or individual does good work. Good work is not by definition realizing a certain performance agreement, because police work is much more than that. The police force was more directed at the development of employees and this development did not only consist of the realization of the quotas. Individual rewards were an integral part of human resource management as instrument for development.

4. Analysis

In this chapter, I will analyse the interviews from chapter 3 (section 4.1) and apply the economic theory to the insights from the interviews and Jochoms et al. (2006) (section 4.2). Jochoms et al. (2006) discuss how primary police processes were influenced by performance steering. A summary of Jochoms et al. (2006) can be found in Appendix C.

4.1   Analysis of the interviews

4.1.1   Performance payment

This section will discuss whether or not internal performance payment was used, the reasons for this decision, other ways to motivate people, and whether or not failing to realize agreements had consequences.

The first conclusion from the interviews is that none of the interviewed police forces used internal performance payment, based on predetermined performances, although the government did make use of performance payment. In the interviews, five reasons are given.

First, it is questionable whether output indicators provide a good assessment of police performance. Police work contains many aspects and which performances are good depends often on the situation. In one situation, fining may be the best solution, while in another situation the appropriate solution will be just a reprimand. The same applies to the number of suspects that are delivered to the Public Prosecutor. Their number should be weighted by their importance and by the inconvenience they cause. The problem is that including weights would make the system of performance agreements more difficult and less clear. Furthermore, the weights that have to be assigned to cases have to be determined subjectively.

Edgar Taale mentions that especially on a lower level, performances are hard to compare only based on figures. Local situations may have a huge impact on the performances, while on the regional level those impacts can level out. So the dependence on the situation becomes a greater problem lower in the organization (in statistical terms, the variance of the error term is bigger).

Second, although studies indicate that the predicted perverse effect of the performance contracts of the government did not occur, many people inside the police believe they will occur when performance agreements are made at lower levels and especially when performance pay is related to them. 'Not only from this study, but also from experiences elsewhere in the government and business, it turns out that relating compulsory performance agreements to financial incentives increases the risk of perverse effects. Also in this respect, there can be pleaded for more space for professional steering and accountability on the basis of (individual) quality notions' (Jochoms et al., 2006, pp. 225).

Managers do not want their employees to focus purely on output performances. As Joachim Verhoeyen mentions, the role of the manager is very important. A good manager will concentrate on the ultimate objective of the performance agreements. However, if agreements become more challenging, it is more difficult to concentrate on the objective, because the manager will be called to account when he does not realize the performance agreement. The same will hold for policemen that are rewarded based on their performance. Furthermore, the contribution to the ultimate objective (safety) is hard to identify.

Third, some objectives that exist at the level of the police force are not suitable to be passed on to lower levels. Joachim Verhoeyen mentions suspect-ratio's that don't say anything at team level since the team that treats the report is not per definition the team that arrests the suspect. Bé Wiertsema arguments that individual policemen cannot be made responsible for a certain number of suspects, because of the team work character of police work. In terms of the economic theory, this will impose risk on the policeman. Team work may also mean that one policeman spends more time on the street while another spends more time at the police station.

Fourth, some performance agreements from the convenant were considered unrealistic and unattainable. They were not related to the real safety situation and especially the number of suspects to deliver to the Public Prosecutor was considered too high. For this reason, police forces did not want to make internal performance contracts based on these agreements.

Last, Iain Wilson states that the rights and duties of civil servants play a role in the decision about internal performance pay, since these rights and duties do not match very well with a system in which chiefs receive a bonus when their police station delivers a good performance. Unfortunately, he did not elaborate at this point.

Most police forces did make use of the rewarding policy 'bewust belonen'. In this policy, exemplary behavior and exceptional performances could be rewarded in the form of money or leave. Core tasks were specified for each police function and rewarding could occur for non-regular tasks. Police forces Rotterdam-Rijnmond, Fryslân, Zeeland, Haaglanden, Groningen, and Zaanstreek-Waterland all used rewards in the form of 'bewust belonen', gratuities or promotions. Important is that such rewards are based on ex-post assessment, and performances are thus not defined in advance. However, team chiefs were unsatisfied about the possibilities to reward and give attention to employees who performed well (Jochoms et al., 2006).

'Bewust belonen' aims at stimulating and motivating people. However, people may not be able to work harder to get this reward, since it rewards only exemplary behavior and exceptional performances, that may not always occur, and only a few people can be rewarded in this way.

Another way to motivate people is by the mobility policy (Rotterdam-Rijnmond), in which people can get other (more interesting) functions if they perform good. Giving the floor a role in determining the annual plan of the police force (Twente), so that they recognize their own ideas, is also motivating.

When agreements were passed on to lower levels in the organization, no sanctions were used in case of bad or disappointing performances (Rotterdam-Rijnmond, Fryslân, Zeeland, IJsselland, Gooi en Vechtstreek, Zaanstreek-Waterland). Failing to realize agreements had no direct consequences. However in the long term it might have, for instance in the form of being unable to make a career or being transferred to another function.

The performance payment of the government was an extra motivation for police forces to deliver good performances. Derk van 't Spijker declares that the performance payments were a structural part of the budget, which made it important to realize the performance agreements. Edgar Taale supplements that more attention was paid to the performance agreements and extra steering occurred when it appeared in September that the performance agreements would not be realized at the end of the year. Also Bé Wiertsema mentions that more steering occurred as a result of the performance payment. Last, Piet Melsen indicates that performance payment, and especially the bonus for instance for violence crimes, gave an extra focus besides the performance agreements themselves.

4.1.2   Implementation of the contracts

This section will describe the way in which the performance contracts were implemented in the police forces. First, I will discuss the passing on and the performance agreements that may be concluded. After that, I will represent the steering instruments that are mentioned in Jochoms et al. (2006). Then I will explain how steering and accountability work. I conclude by saying something about the motivation of (older) policemen.

All police forces implemented the performance contracts in the same way. Interesting to see is that both the police forces Fryslân and Rotterdam-Rijnmond indicate that regional or local priorities that were not part of the convenant were as important as national priorities. It is at the police force level not the case that unrewarded tasks are neglected. In most cases, the police force management does also want to achieve certain performances and has certain priorities.

The agreements from the regional convenants were included in a long-range plan ('meerjarenplan') and subsequently in a annual plan ('jaarplan'). In this annual plan, specific main policy points and result agreements were taken down. (Jochoms et al., 2006)

Many agreements were passed on to lower levels in the organization and some were even passed on to individuals, like the number of fines. Quantitative performance agreements are a form of objective performance assessment. Steering and accountability on the performance agreements happened on all levels.

The difference between making agreements, and steering and accountability is that in case of just steering and accountability, no target has to be specified. The manager can assess the situation, on the basis of which he can assess the output performance. The characteristics of subjective performance assessment apply to this situation. Steering and accountability also occur in case there are targets. The proportion of objective and subjective performance assessment depends on how the manager deals with the agreements: does he look purely at the numbers and assess performance as insufficient if the target is not reached, or does he look mainly at the situation and the story behind the numbers? Steering and accountability can refer to the numbers and targets only, but can also concern the story behind the numbers.

Police force managements concluded agreements about the numbers with district chiefs, but not about the way of achieving them. District chiefs were free to decide. (Jochoms et al., 2006)

The amount of steering increased after the introduction of the performance contracts and steering became more directive. As Bé Wiertsema says: before the performance agreements, there were no agreements to pass on to districts, units or individuals. It was more general and less attention was paid to performances.

Jochoms et al. (2006) mention three instruments were used for steering. First, benchmarking made it possible to compare districts, teams and individuals, ranking should give extra motivation and learning was possible, since good performing districts, teams or individuals could be asked for advice.

Second, human resource management was used to steer. In two of the five regional police forces in the research of Jochoms et al. (2006), district chiefs laid claim to a bonus when they achieved their results. In another regional police force, district chiefs were rewarded linearly with the output they achieved above a certain standard. At lower levels, individual performance agreements played a minimal role in the rewarding of policemen. In performance interviews, output numbers became more important and policemen were called to account by gradations, however this almost never led to a dismissal. Before the performance contracts, performance interviews for executive workers were not common. (Jochoms et al., 2006)

Last, capacity management aimed at making the planning and deployment of personnel as efficient and effective as possible, in order to achieve a performance as high as possible. Projects and tasks were evaluated on their usefulness. (Jochoms et al., 2006)

Because steering information became available, managers could compare the performances of different employees. Piet Melsen indicates that district chiefs of good performing districts are asked for advice for less well performing districts.

Accountability is a good way to pass on objectives that are formulated at the top of the organization (in this case: by the government) to the operational workers. Parliament calls the Minister of BZK to account. He calls police force administrator to account. Therefore, the police force management calls district chiefs to account, who call their workers (usually team chiefs) to account. Team chiefs also call policemen to account for their contribution to the team performances.

At each level, steering takes place on the level below. The goals that have to be achieved should be determined, communicated and monitored. Managers divide the performance agreement for their division over the employees and encourage and incite them to achieve their part of the performances. In the end, the people at the operational level have to deliver the contribution. Team chiefs have to make sure that those contributions add up to the team performance that has to be achieved. District chief steer the team chiefs by setting the team performance agreements such that they add up to the performances that have to be delivered at the district level. The police force management divides the performance agreements that have to be delivered by the regional police force (stemming from the policy plans and thus from the LKNP 2003-2006, the regional police board, and the own police force management) over the districts.

According to Koning et al. (2004), the advantage for the government of making agreements with the management of a police force is that the managers in the organization are better able to steer the people below them because they have a better view on their work than the government has. The authority to steer is very decentralized at each level.

Steering and accountability are inextricably bound up with each other. Because each manager is called to account by his manager, he wants to realize the performance agreements. His career opportunities depend partly on the performances his division achieves. The way to make sure the people of his division deliver their contribution to the performances, is by making them responsible too. On all levels, it seems to work in the same way. Rendering account is related to performance interviews and career opportunities, so that everybody wants to make a good

impression. On the lowest level, this good impression is made by delivering the performances where it is in the end all about. All managers above this level occupy themselves with steering.

This means that the objectives that the government gives to the police forces will find their way in the hierarchy and will reach the lowest level. Both steering and accountability work step by step. This may make it difficult to take into account the story behind the numbers. A manager (A) may have sympathy for the story of one of his employees, but he has to render account too. If manager A does not realize his target, because his employee didn't, the manager above him (B) may not be happy with the story, since he may therefore also not realize his agreements.

Managers are going to steer and make their employees responsible for their performance because the managers have to render account to their manager. Joachim Verhoeyen therefore thinks that the extent to which and the way in which result steering is implemented, depends to a large extent on the chief of police. Jochoms et al. (2006) do also find that the strictness with which a district chief steers a team chief is influenced by the strictness with which the district chief is steered by the police force management.

Steering does also involve making choices. Edgar Taale, Dirk Scholten, Derk van 't Spijker, and Bé Wiertsema indicate that because of the limited capacity, not everything can be done. Dirk Scholten gives the example that directing capacity towards important criminality involves that less capacity is available for often occurring forms of criminality that cause a lot of inconvenience for citizens, and the other way round. By steering, managers indicate what they consider important and where employees should be aimed at or work on. In this way, they try to achieve the performance agreements (and maybe other important things).

When career perspectives are very important for motivation, the question arises whether old policemen (above 40 years old) are less motivated than formerly or than young policemen. They may focus on the end of their career and have no prospects of promotions anymore. A study of TNO (Winthagen et al., 2006) indicates that this is not the case. Old policemen are quite motivated (7.8 on the scale 1-10) and not less motivated than younger policemen (8.0).

This study also mentions factors that influence the motivation of policemen. Employees would be more motivated when the management would treat them in a better way, would have knowledge about what happened on the floor, and would appreciate the work on the operational level more, when there would be more possibilities to move up, more salary, less organizational changes, and when employees could work on other tasks or specific projects.

4.1.3 Difficulties, conflicts and tradeoffs

This section will consider difficulties and problems police forces experience with the performance agreements, conflicts that occur in choices and tradeoffs that result. The first problem is that performance agreements are not related to the real safety situation and the weight of cases is not taken into account. Second, not all performances could be expressed in numbers, so that sometimes too little attention was paid to certain activities. The third point is the tradeoff between steering and autonomy. Fourth, repressive behavior may harm legitimacy. Fifth, focussing on output may result in too little attention for outcome. Last, performance payment of the government cannot be used for structural expenses.

Police forces consider it a problem of the LKNP 2003-2006 that performance agreements are not related to the real safety situation. Dirk Scholten declares that delivering more cases in a relative secure society automatically means that less weighting cases are delivered to the Public Prosecutor. Some team chiefs of the police force Zeeland sent their employees off to fine if the target was not reached yet. The question is whether or not this improves safety (in the best way). Jochoms et al. (2006) do also find that sometimes policemen especially looked for fines and that policemen that could not meet their fines quota participated in checks at a completely different domain, like traffic.

The fact that only the number of suspects delivered to the Public Prosecutor counted and not the weight of the crime or the inconvenience it caused may have caused problems. Both Edgar Taale and Bé Wiertsema mention that when a lot of capacity is directed to big cases, like a murder or a pyromaniac, this involves that many small cases cannot be treated, that may yield many more suspects. This cannot be derived from the numbers and from the point of view of the realization of the performance agreements, directing capacity to a big case is a wrong choice.

Investigators experienced limited possibilities to arrest those people that caused trouble in areas, because the social effects of dealing with different types of criminal offences were not taken into account. (Jochoms et al., 2006)

Jochoms et al. (2006) state that it became increasingly difficult to meet the performance standards for two reasons. First, because of the increased number of police stops, citizens changed their behavior. Second, the standards increased yearly, especially the number of police stops and suspects to the Public Prosecutor.

Measurement problems limit the effective use of performance agreements. Dirk Scholten declares that mayors often want neighbourhood-oriented working ('wijkgericht werken'). However, this yields no measurable results, so that no agreements can be made on it. Directing capacity to other things, like arrests, does yield results. Edgar Taale indicates that neighbourhood

police work ('wijkpolitiewerk') is difficult to measure. It is important that policemen on the beat ('wijkagenten') have contact with the citizens. Giving them a bonus when they hold ten conversations, does not take into account the quality of their work. Furthermore, their work is more than holding conversations.

The police force Twente worked strongly according to a prevention strategy, for which hard numbers were not directly available. In this way, prevention may get into a tight corner when the police do not pay attention. The importance of making choices comes back here. The police force Twente is conscious of this threat and pays attention to it. Furthermore, preventive tasks will be included in the policy plan and therefore steering will take place on this subject. Joachim Verhoeyen thinks prevention can be expressed in numbers to a certain extent. However, these measures are not included in the LKNP 2003-2006. Economically spoken, just making visible preventive tasks says nothing about their effect on safety, what matters in the end.

Both the police forces of Rotterdam-Rijnmond and Zeeland experienced that the development of employees got into a tight corner. The result agreements, and in the police force Zeeland also the article 4 status, made everybody focused on the results in the first place. Employees did not develop other competences and managers did not approve education of people, since these people had to contribute to the performance agreements, otherwise they would not be realized. Audit commissions recognized these problems and both police forces successfully paid attention to them. Joachim Verhoeyen concludes that the important lesson the police Zeeland has learned is that delivering performances and paying attention to the development of people do not have to work against each other. Police force Rotterdam-Rijnmond did also succeed in both paying attention to the performances of employees and giving them the opportunity to develop themselves.

In most police forces, the processes improved. In the police forces Rotterdam-Rijnmond, Fryslân, and Groningen, process owners or portfolio holders were appointed in order to improve the processes so as to achieve better performances. However, in the police force Zeeland, the focus on the results came at the cost of (improvements of) the processes.

The experience was that the performance contracts were implemented top-down. Jochoms et al. (2006) support this finding. This meant that managers gave orders and determined the focus, so that there was less space for objections. As a consequence, policemen did not communicate their view on policy and the difference between the view of the strategic level and the reality of the operational level increased. Kant & van Raak (2009) support the existence of this difference.

This illustrates the tradeoff between steering and autonomy. Each police agent has a legally determined discretionary authority to fine or to arrest. Policemen want to fine those people that infringe the law, but do not want to fine people that do not deserve it from the point of view of the policemen. This point of view gets into a tight corner because of result steering. Not fining in a situation the policeman thinks it is undeserved, may lead to not meeting the target. Officially, policemen determine what happens on the street (for instance whether or not to fine or to arrest), but in practice they have to meet their targets, so that their manager in fact determines how often a policeman has to fine or arrest.

The tradeoff between autonomy and steering is difficult. On the one hand, policemen must be able to act quickly and according to their own professionalism. They have specific information about the area or about the situation that occurred. On the other hand, there is demand for steering, since the government wants to pass their objectives and priorities on to the lowest level, where the work is carried out. The role of the manager may be important, but the tradeoff always exists, except in the case the preferences of the policemen fully coincide with those of the government. In that case, there would be no need for steering.

Both Edgar Taale and Joachim Verhoeyen mention that repressive behavior can harm legitimacy. Society was for instance very opposed to the quota for fines. Fining policemen and policemen that dealt with smaller cases experienced a lack of authority from citizens. Furthermore, there is a risk that citizens will not support the police anymore, while the police depends on the information that is supplied by society. Last, less legitimacy may result in less confidence in the police and thus feeling less safe.

The police Zeeland indicated that there was sometimes too little attention for outcome. Steering happened on output performances, with less attention for the question what was ultimately important, namely safety. However, most police forces paid attention to this. Edgar Taale repeatedly emphasizes that the story behind the numbers is the most important thing, not the numbers themselves. The police force Twente nowadays hold accountability conversations which focus on the points of the long-range policy plan, annual plan, and local main points. Most police forces understand that the focus cannot only be on output numbers and sometimes local situations require attention. It is one of the reasons why people do not want individual performance agreements. Jochoms et al. (2006) conclude that in practice, the pressure to perform made the linking of output (quantitative performance agreements) to outcome (local problems) very hard. The team chiefs were expected to make the linking.

Jochoms et al. (2006) also find that output numbers played a greater role (in steering) after the performance contracts were introduced. In management deliberations and conversations, this came at the cost of attention for the safety situation (outcome) and the approach of a particular problem (throughput).

A drawback of the system of performance payment is that it cannot be used for structural expenses, i.e. extra personnel. First, this means that police stations cannot use this payment to improve their performance structurally. Second, the police stations that deliver a good performance do not feel rewarded, for instance by more personnel or more holidays.

4.1.4   Evaluation of the performance contracts

This section will discuss the opinions of the interviewed people on the performance contracts and agreements.

All people I spoke with are mainly positive about the performance contracts, although not everybody agrees with all agreements. Most policemen considered the performance agreements attainable. Only the continuously increasing quota for cases to deliver to the Public Prosecutor was considered unattainable and also not in line with the change in behavior of citizens that was perceptible. (Jochoms et al., 2006)

Piet Melsen indicates that the effect of the result steering system was that the organization was strongly directed at results in the form of more safety and less degeneration. That was exactly what the chief of police wanted, so it was a very good development.

Edgar Taale considers output indicators good, provided that they are treated in connection with inputs and the way of using those inputs. In the police force Rotterdam-Rijnmond, performance steering was applauded on all levels in the organization. Piet Melsen believes that policemen supported result steering because they saw that safety improved as an effect of result steering.

Dirk Scholten believes that the performance contracts were a good way to give the police a shaking that they should better look at their management, their steering and the appreciation of citizens for their work.

Joachim Verhoeyen thinks that it should be investigated whether performance agreements are still realistic after some time, since many political and criminality developments occur. Furthermore he believes that some performance measures have to be improved, before they can be used in performance contracts. But he admits that the performance contract did increase performances on the measured indicators.

Initially, the introduction of the performance contracts was not accepted with open arms by many police forces, including Zeeland, because of the possible perverse effects. After some time, people saw also the benefits, namely the results that were achieved.

According to Bé Wiertsema, policemen experienced the performance contracts for the greater part as restriction to their freedom and as limitation to their creativity and the possibilities they had as professionals. Numbers became leading, not the work itself, which was aroused by the current performance indicators.

According to Piet Melsen, the availability of more numbers means that policemen are closer to their core tasks and what they want to achieve as a policeman. Team chiefs in Jochoms et al. (2006) do not think that the management is per definition easier with this output focus. In any case, the output has to be linked to local problems. However, it may be easier to assess the contribution of each team member if the output performances are known. This information was not available before the performance agreements.

Apparently, the understanding of people of the performance agreements is very important for their motivation and their support. The recognition of policemen of the degeneration in Rotterdam made them support the top-down implemented result steering system. According to Jochoms et al. (2006), policemen would be more motivated if they knew the broader context, since they better understood the agreements, better accepted them, and might come with interesting ideas to achieve them. This was not the case. 'Because just the numbers are taken as point of departure in the direct communication, the impression arises on the floor that achieving the results is seen as objective itself.' (Jochoms et al., 2006, pp.75)

In the police force Twente, they believe that recognition of policy plans is also important for the motivation on the floor. Jochoms et al. (2006) give an example of a force where police officers were asked how they wanted to attain the targets. In this way, police officers may see the agreements as their own agreements, which motivates them to realize the performance

4.1.5   Further research

This section will mention four topics on which further research is desirable, according to the interviewed people.

Joachim Verhoeyen declares that a problem with the scores 'availability' and 'satisfaction with last police contact' was that many police forces questioned how they were able to steer on these figures. In terms of the economic theory, the noise was so big that the signal was hardly represented in the scores. At least, police forces did not know signals that were represented in

these scores. However, the police force Zeeland still investigated subjective safety after the performance was excluded from the performance contracts. The police force considers subjective safety important, but no agreement should be related to it. Research has to be conducted on the way in which police forces influence subjective safety and what other factors play a role. Even the effects of police behavior were unknown. The presence of many policemen on the street can both increase and decrease subjective safety. Since both the government and police forces care about subjective safety, it is important that the relationships are investigated.

Edgar Taale mentions that the relationship between objective safety and the number of reports is not clear. Objective safety is measured by the number of reports, but this number can for instance be influenced by the attention for a specific type of criminality, or by the willingness of people to report a crime, instead of by the real safety situation. Further research on the meaning of this performance measure and maybe on other measures of objective safety may be necessary.

Bé Wiertsema doubts whether the number of suspects to deliver to the Public Prosecutor, the suspect ratio violence, and fines influence safety in the best way. The effects of proactive working and preventive actions on safety have to be examined, just like the way in which proactive working and preventive actions can be measured.

Bé Wiertsema is not convinced that the improvement of safety is certainly an effect of the introduction of performance contracts. In other European countries, safety improved as well, but without such contracts. However, I think performance contracts were an instrument of the Dutch government to induce the police forces to pay attention to their performances and pass on priorities. Earlier attempts did not work. The (start) situation in other countries may have been different, but it may be interesting to investigate.

4.2   Applying the economic theories

4.2.1   Pros and cons

This section will apply the pros and cons of section 1.2 to the operational level.

As I will explain below, the pros and cons of performance contracts that are mentioned in section 1.2 do apply to the operational level, both in case of steering and accountability and in case individual performance pay would be introduced.

Three positive effects are mentioned: increased transparency, less bureaucracy, and improvement of policy-making and decision-making. First, specifying core tasks gives more direction to policemen. It is more clear what is expected from them. However, this requires that the measured performances contribute to the ultimate goal (safety), because otherwise the direction can have no or even a negative effect on safety.

Second, a positive effect of transparency is that the performance of a policeman may be better assessable with the existence of numbers, which gives incentives. The fact that transparency creates incentives to produce can mean that benchmarking is as effective as performance pay in inducing good performances. However, it is important that the story behind the numbers is also taken into account in the assessment, since not everything can be expressed in numbers.

Third, since performances are specified and rewarded, annual plans may become more concrete. Last, transparency leads to the availability of more (quantitative) information, so that managers may be able to make better decisions.

Most problems with performance measurement are applicable to the police organization. I will mention five problems. First, police work is not a product, but aims at increasing safety and livability. Legitimacy is very important here, which may conflict with effectiveness and efficiency. Second, the police have to play two roles: the enforcing crime fighter and the helping servile agent. They may conflict and the latter role is less expressed in performance numbers. Third, police work is team work, so that individuals cannot be held responsible for certain performances. Fourth, quality in the form of the weight of cases and the inconvenience they cause is not represented in the performance measures. Situations, that determine which performances are good, can also not be expressed in output numbers, which makes standardization difficult. Last, the dynamic character of police work requires autonomy, which is restricted by predetermined performance agreements.

Managers should ask policemen for the story behind the numbers, in order to include quality and situation specific characteristics. It is questionable whether situations can be taken into account in subjective performance assessments, since managers are not on the spot.

Possible perverse effects are strategic behavior, blocking innovations and ambitions, veiling actual performances, less professionalism and more bureaucracy, performances that are penalized, targets that are set at the wrong level, and a negative spiral because of the payment.

Strategic behavior may be limited, since steering and accountability can be seen as a form of subjective performance assessment. Steering and accountability require a subjective judgement of the manager so that more aspects of police work can be included in the performance assessment. However, this depends on the strictness with which the manager steers on the numbers, relative to the story behind them. From the interviews and Jochoms et al. (2006), it appears that managers and policemen are aware of the possible perverse effects and make sure they do not occur. Managers for instance steer on the spread of the number of subjects, number of police

stops, processing times over offence types to prevent 'easy scoring'. Furthermore, the police Twente take care that enough capacity is directed to prevention and the police Rotterdam-Rijnmond emphasizes the importance of the story behind the numbers.

I will now mention some perverse effects that do occur. First, the development of people sometimes stayed behind. This can be seen as innovations in human capital that become impossible, since current production takes priority.

Second, the story behind the numbers threatens to fade into the background since numbers become more important and the story is not represented in numbers. In this way, performance measurement veils the actual performance. As steering becomes stricter, it is more difficult for managers on the lower level to take into account the story behind the numbers, as I already mentioned in section 4.1.2.

Third, performances can be penalized. 'Bewust belonen' can only reward some exceptional performances. When everybody performs better, most people are not rewarded for it. Non-performers are also not punished, since both Jochoms et al. (2006) and the police forces indicate that failing to realize performance agreements does not lead to sanctions or dismissals.

Fourth, Vollaard (2003) thinks that the government is not able to set the performance targets at the right level. This is a problem at lower levels in the organization, since by steering and accountability these 'wrong targets' are passed on to lower levels, where they will also not be at the right level. This may cause strategic behavior or undesired actions (according to the situation). Managers at lower levels may be better able to assess what is a realistic performance target, but the problem is that they are steered from above, so that they do not feel free to determine the targets.

4.2.2 Performance payment

In this section, I will use the economic theories from section 2.1 to evaluate performance pay for individual policemen. I will also compare objective and subjective assessments. Finally, I will make a comparison to performance payment at the police force level, since the LKNP 2003-2006 appeared to have positive effects (see section 1.3).

4.2.2.1 Applying the economic theories to the situation of the police

Optimally, police forces would reward policemen according to their contribution to safety, and maybe the help services they provide. This would impose no risk on policemen. However, the contribution to safety of the police as a whole is not measurable, not to mention the contribution of individuals. Performances can be measured, but as stated in section 4.1.5, the relationship between some performances and safety are unknown. This is a problem, since it becomes clear

from section 2.1.3 that the contribution of the employee to the performance measure should approximate the contribution to safety, otherwise distortions or biases in behavior occur. Rewarding police performances may even be more difficult since the relationship between performances (for example fines and charges) and safety depends on the situation, which cannot be included in a performance measure. Moreover, safety may not be as objective as it sounds. Because of the limed capacity of the police, choices may have to be made between different types of crimes, or different groups of victims. The question how much each crime or group of victims should be weighted is subjective.

A second problem is that some performance measures of the LKNP 2003-2006 have a low signal-to-noise ratio, for instance the scores 'availability' and 'satisfaction with last police contact'. Including such performance measures does not enhance performance, since police forces and policemen have no idea how to contribute to them. It only imposes risk on police forces or policemen, which is inefficient.

A third negative point according to the theory is the existence of unmeasured performances, like prevention, help services, knowledge of areas, contact with citizens, and informal ways of solving problems. Most of these performances are hard to express in numbers. According to the theory, they should be included in the performance measurement if they contribute to safety, otherwise too little effort will be directed to those tasks.

In the model of Milgrom & Roberts (1992), a variable y is used to reduce the variance of the performance measure. In case of the police, the number of reports may be a good indication for the amount of criminality and thus for the appropriate number of fines and charges. An example of the use is the suspect-ratio, which is included in the NP 2008-2011. However, as long as the relationship between objective safety and the number of reports is not clear and this number does also depend on other things than criminality, it causes risk and may invite strategic behavior. Developments in criminality of other countries may correct changes in criminality that are not due to the effort of the police, but the problem here is that other countries may not be comparable to the Netherlands. Since good performance depends on the situations, the performance measure should be corrected for the situation. Unfortunately, this is not possible. Inputs may also be included, like the resources a police force receives from the government. In the end, many things could be thought of, but research has to be carried out to find the factors that influence all these variables, the relationships with the error term of the performance measure, and accurate measures for the factors.

There are different types of compensation schemes. In Milgrom & Roberts (1992) and Baker (2002), linear compensation schemes are presented, in which each product yields a bonus β or b. The intervals with which compensation takes place can be increased, for instance by rewarding every 100 products. Targets are set and a bonus will be granted when they are met. The system of performance payment works in this way, with only one target. Once the last target is reached, the employee has no incentive to produce more. In case of the number of fines and arrests, this may be desirable. The policeman can spend the rest of his time and effort to other tasks, that may not be rewarded and there is no risk of perverse effects after the target has been reached. However, strategic behavior can still occur for the rewarded products. A disadvantage of this system is that once it is clear that the target cannot be reached anymore, all incentives disappear.

4.2.2.2 Comparing objective and subjective performance assessment

I will now compare objective and subjective performance assessment. Vollaard (2006) describes three types of objective performance measures. I assume that on the operational level, outcome measures are not possible, since the contribution of individual policemen on safety is not measurable and this type of measure would impose too much risk on an individual. I think internal processes measures are less applicable for the operational level than for the police force level and I also think they are not desired, since the government wants the police performance to go up. Therefore, from now on I will use the term objective performance assessment for output performance assessment.

Objective performance assessment corresponds to the current output performance agreements. Steering and accountability are less decisive than agreements and are based on the subjective judgements and insights of managers. Therefore, steering and accountability can be seen as subjective performance assessment. This means that in principle, steering and accountability provide less incentives than performance agreements, but leave more space for discretion and lead to a less extent to strategic behavior (distortions). Based on the interviews, I think that the two other possible distortions that Vollaard (2006) mentions will not be a great problem. I think the managers (performance evaluators) will assess performances badly if they have reason for it. I see no reason why they would not be honest. Furthermore, Chakraborty & Harbaugh (2007) show that experts will credibly rank issues in case of "comparative cheap talk". This means that given that only some policemen can be rewarded according to 'bewust belonen' or can get a promotion, the manager will assess their performance truthfully. Second, evaluators will have the same priorities as the government, because the system of steering and accountability starts within the government and works down the hierarchy. The idea that the other types of gaming will be limited for the police is supported by Vollaard (2006).

Based on the pros and cons, it appears to be very important for the police to take into account the story behind the numbers. The first reason is that judging a performance requires information about the situation. Second, specific characteristics (like the weight of a case) have to be taken into account to include 'quality' in the assessment and to prevent strategic behavior (like frivolous fining, picking the easiest criminal charges, and producing charges with questionable evidence). Both the situation and the characteristics cannot be standardized and included in the performance measurement. Third, some important parts of police work, like prevention and neighborhood police work, can also not be expressed in numbers. However, these things can be monitored by the manager, at least by asking a policeman for the story behind the numbers.

The drawback of subjective performance assessment is that it provides less incentives than objective performance assessment does. However, in case of the police this may not be a great problem, since policemen may be intrinsically motivated (Vollaard, 2006, pp. 26; Morée et al., 2007, pp. 22; the interview with Piet Melsen). However, their ideas about how to achieve safety may be different from those of the police force management and the government. As an example, some policemen never want to fine, while the government and managers consider fining a part of police work. When the manager notices such a discrepancy, he can make steering and accountability more directive and more based on numbers. This system is more flexible than objective performance assessment. The advantages of subjective performance assessment are that discretionary power is higher and distortions are lower, because more aspects of police work can be included in the evaluation and they do not have to be standardized. This also lowers the noise. However, it may be difficult to assess the performance correctly and objectively, based on a story of a policeman.

Police work is not just production where more is always better, as long as the revenues of extra products exceed the costs. This involves that systems of performance pay, that aim for increasing production in this way, may not be suitable for the police organization. In the end, as Joachim Verhoeyen mentions, as long as objectives are realized with steering and accountability and performances improve, there is no need to use also performance pay.

I conclude that at the operational level subjective performance assessment will be better than objective performance assessment for five reasons, which are explained above. First, the relationship between certain performances and safety is unknown, so that there is a risk of stimulating undesired behavior. Second, the signal-to-noise ratio of some proposed performance agreements is low. Third, immeasurable performances exist, which are important for safety. Situations cannot be expressed in numbers, while they determine which performances are good.

This makes the story behind the numbers very important. Fourth, distortions in police work need to be prevented and discretionary power is very important for policemen. Last, police work cannot be seen as production where more is always better.

These points are a greater problem for objective than for subjective performance assessment. Objective performance assessment requires that targets are predetermined and it is hard to include some important aspects of police work. Subjective performance assessment is not predetermined, the requirements can be changed if necessary, and more aspects of police work can be included.

In a system of steering and accountability, the exact amount of incentives, discretionary power and distortions depend on the extent to which the manager focuses on the results. From the interviews and Jochoms et al. (2006), it becomes clear that some managers focus on the story behind the numbers (the meaningfulness) and will see what performances follow. They may keep an eye on performances, but just tell people that they have to work on it, without relating a target to it. Others want to realize their own target or believe performance numbers are important and steer in a very directive way on performance numbers. Those managers make individual agreements and may assess performance as insufficient if the target is not reached. This situation looks very much like objective performance assessment.

It will depend on the situation and the behavior of policemen which type of steering and accountability is appropriate. The more the manager focuses on numbers, the more strategic behavior is incited and the less discretionary power policemen have. However, the incentives to realize these performances is greater. Managers are restricted to be too soft, since they are called to account themselves for the results of their division and thus for their steering.

Whether or not a financial reward is related to the subjective assessment does not matter. The current system of steering and accountability uses chances to be promoted or acquire another function, like a task that is more interesting, ambitious, prestigious, responsible, difficult or easy etcetera. In addition, the pay may be higher. So people will experience an increase in utility if they get the new function. The present value of these things is included in the utility function in this period, on the basis of which an employee decides how much effort to put in this period. In economic theory, it does not matter whether the reward for effort is current income, the present value of future income, or the present value of future job facilities, since all are included in the utility function.

4.2.2.3   Comparing payments for individuals and payments for police forces

I will now make a comparison between performance payment for the police force and individual performance pay. From section 2.1.2.1 and 2.1.3.1, it becomes clear that optimal incentives are lower when the risk aversion is higher, the variance is higher, the distortion is higher, and the contribution to the ultimate objective is lower. As I explain below, I think that these things hold for individual performance pay, when it is compared to performance payment for the police force. Therefore, I conclude that performance pay at the individual level should be lower than the existing performance payment, which is already relatively low.

Important is that the incentives that are given by the government, are incentives for police forces (i.e. organizations), not for persons. Police force administrators and chiefs of police are called to account by the government, but they do not receive performance pay. Performance pay for individuals will differ in this aspects from the performance payment of the government.

There five some reasons why performance payment for the police force is more appropriate than performance pay for individuals. First, as is stated in section 2.1.2, firms are assumed to be less risk-averse than employees. Therefore, rewarding persons will entail an efficiency cost equal to the risk premium.

Second, as Edgar Taale mentioned, individual situations have a lot of impact on the performance of individuals and teams at the operational level, but have less impact on the police performance as a whole. At the police force level, those impacts can level out. Furthermore, area specific characteristics may be more difficult to take into account on the operational level, since the areas are smaller and more diverse than on the police force level. This means that the noise of the performance measures is greater at the operational level than at the police force level.

Third, some performance agreements cannot be passed on to individuals, since those performances are realized in team production. At the police force level, the signal-to-noise ratio may be high, while at the individual level it is low. Some performances may not even be measurable on the individual level.

Fourth, rewarding every policeman for a certain performance may be inefficient, because it does not take into account the personal strengths of each person. One person may be better in work on the street, while another person may be better in work at the police station. Differentiation between individuals may be more efficient.

Last, when the police force is rewarded, incentives may be less than when persons would be rewarded. The contribution of each person to the performance measure yields the police force something, but the person is not directly rewarded for his contribution. Section 2.1.3 pointed out that distortions decrease when the power of incentives decreases. This could mean that rewarding persons would lead to perverse effects, while rewarding police forces does not. Furthermore,

police forces can use the performance payment for police activities, while individual performance pay cannot be used for this purpose.

Concluding, the fact that performance contract and performance payment had positive effects on the police force level is no justification to use them on the individual level. Furthermore, the effects of the performance payment cannot be separated from the effects of the performance contracts and the system of steering and accountability. So it cannot be said that performance payment itself had positive effects. It can be that steering and accountability are the main causes of the positive effects. Since steering and accountability are already used inside the police organization and performance agreements are sometimes made, that would mean that there is no need for performance pay anymore. More research should be carried out to the separate effects of those three components.

Apparently, the existing imperfect performance measures are better than no performance measures at all. First, after the introduction of the performance contracts, performances increased as did safety. Probably, the rewarded performances and the corresponding control and process agreements contribute to safety. Second, most people nowadays support performance steering, at least the meaningful variant. These professionals approve subjective performance assessment, while they disapprove objective performance assessment. Conducting research to improve performance measures will improve their effect on safety, also in case of subjective performance assessment. As stated in section 2.1.2.1, optimal incentives increase with the precision with which effort can be measured, i.e. the less is the variance of the measurement error. Being able to measure performances with more precision therefore means that incentives increase or performance measures can become more objective.

5.   Conclusion

5.1   Retrospective of the research

The problem statement of this thesis was "*How are performance contracts implemented in the police organization in order to stimulate individual policemen to contribute to the performance agreements?*". I mainly focussed on the operational level, i.e. the policemen that carried out the work.

In this thesis, I started with the history of the performance contracts and an overview of the literature on pros and cons of performance contracts, performance measurement or performance steering. I briefly presented the effects of the LKNP 2003-2006, which appeared to be positive. In chapter two, I represented the economic theories about the incentive-risk tradeoff, the incentive-distortion-risk tradeoff and objective and subjective performance assessments. Then I introduced the concept steering based on Terpstra (2002), Sluis et al., (2006), and Meppelink (2005). Last, I described why autonomy or discretionary power is very important for police agents. In Chapter three, I discussed material from the interviews I had with police forces. These interviews were analysed and related to the theory in chapter four. In this chapter, I will draw the conclusions.

5.2   Investigating the problem statement

The government introduced in 2003 performance contracts for police forces: the Dutch Police National Framework 2003-2006 ('Landelijk Kader Nederlandse Politie (LKNP) 2003-2006'). In the LKNP 2003-2006, ten result agreements and seven control agreements were included. The LKNP 2003-2006 was the foundation of the 25 regional convenants that were concluded and I investigated how these regional police forces implemented these contracts.

The performance agreements were passed on to lower levels. At the strategic level (the police force management), the quantitative performances were passed on to the districts. At the tactical level (the districts), passing on to teams happened. The agreements were included in long-range plans and annual plans. Some team chiefs made performance agreements with individual policemen, for instance by a contract, while others did not. In some police forces team chiefs had the freedom to decide on individual agreements, while in other police forces it was centrally determined how much fines and charges a police officer should have (Jochoms et al., 2006).

Steering happened on all levels and also on individuals. Steering meant saying what had to be done, making choices and trying to realize performance agreements. Managers made choices in the deployment of personnel, and used benchmarking and human resource management to introduce incentives. Human resource management was an important steering instrument. People

that performed well stood a chance of a promotion or another (more interesting) function. Many people inside the police want to make a career and this motivated people at all levels, up to the police force administrator and the chief of police.

Accountability was related to steering. Managers monitored the performances and people were called to account for their performance. Failing to realize performance agreements had no direct consequences, however in the long term consequences could arise in the form of being unable to make a career or being transferred to another function. The system of steering and accountability worked step by step: each manager steered and called his employees to account because he was steered and had to render account to his manager too. This started with the minister of BZK and via the police force administrator it affected all levels up to the policemen at the operational level.

None of the interviewed police forces used internal performance payment for divisions or people, based on predetermined performances. Most police forces did make use of the rewarding policy 'bewust belonen', in which exemplary behavior and exceptional performances could be rewarded. However, this was not related to the performance agreements and not predetermined.

In the interviews, five explanations for not having internal performance pay were given. First, it is questionable whether the output indicators provide a good assessment of police performance. This especially holds on lower levels in the police organization. Second, perverse effects (unintended negative effects) may occur when the income of people is made dependent on their 'production'. Third, some performance agreements are not suitable to be passed on to lower levels, since the observed performances result from team production. Fourth, some performance agreements from the convenant were considered unrealistic and unattainable by the police force management. Therefore the police force management did not want to pass them on to individuals. Last, the rights and duties of civil servants, which policemen are, do not match very well with a system in which for instance chiefs or policemen receive a bonus when they or their police station deliver a good performance.

Besides internal performance pay (based on predetermined performances), which was not used, three other ways of motivating people came forward in the interviews. First the chance of getting another (more interesting) function when someone performs well is a very important motivator in most police forces. Many people inside the police seem to want to make a career and a good assessment of their manager contributes to that. This is related to the system of steering and accountability.

The second motivator is the rewarding policy 'bewust belonen'. However, people may not be able to work harder to get this reward, since it rewards only exemplary behavior and exceptional performances, that may not always occur, and only a few people can be rewarded in this way.

The last way to motivate people is by giving them (the floor) a role in determining the annual plan of the police force, so that they recognize their own ideas. Also the possibility of starting projects from the lower level is motivating.

5.3   Economic theory

Based on the economic theory, I conclude that subjective performance assessment will be more appropriate than objective performance assessment, for five reasons. First, the contribution to safety is not measurable and the relationship between certain performances and safety is unknown, so that there is a risk of stimulating undesired behavior. Second, the signal-to-noise ratio of some proposed performance agreements is low. Third, immeasurable performances exist, which are important for safety. Situations cannot be expressed in numbers, while they determine which performances are good. This makes the story behind the numbers very important. Fourth, distortions in police work need to be prevented and discretionary power is very important for policemen. Last, police work cannot be seen as production where more is always better.

In a system of steering and accountability, the exact amount of incentives, discretionary power and distortions depend on the extent to which the manager focuses on the results.

Comparing performance payment for police forces with performance pay for individuals, it appears that the latter is less desired for the following five reasons. First, individuals are more risk-averse, so making them bear risk is inefficient. Second, the risk is higher on the individual level since local situations have a lot of impact on the individual performance. Third, the team-work character of police work makes it impossible or undesired to make individuals responsible for certain performances. Fourth, the personal strengths of each person would not be taken into account, which may be inefficient. Last, incentives may be lower (as are distortions) when police forces are rewarded, since it is not the individual's own money.

5.4   Comments

This research contributes to the information about the implementation of the performance contracts and about the experiences from within the police organization. Furthermore, I apply the economic theory to the operational level. The conclusions from my research correspond to other studies. Jochoms et al. (2006) draw the same picture about the situation: the performance

contracts are implemented by steering and accountability, performance payment is not used at the operational level (however, they find district chiefs that receive bonuses), some conflicts occur, but policemen support performance steering on the whole. My conclusion that subjective performance assessment is more appropriate in case of the police than objective performance assessment is supported by reality, by the opinion of policemen I interviewed and by de Bruin (2001, 2002), Sluis et al. (2006), and Vollaard (2003).

It is interesting to see that economic models, which are a simple reflection of the complex reality, work perfect in simple situations, like performance pay for fruit-pickers, but often fail in more complex situations. There is many literature on problems with performance pay, like team production, multitasking, moral hazard, limited liability. However, the reality cannot be fully included in a model since the model would become too complex, while it aims at simplifying. This will always be a dilemma, but a lot of research is carried out to exceptions to the theory to find solutions for the problems that arise. In this way, reality may be more and more modelled.

I did not look at whether the concluded agreements were good or served the purpose in the best way. Vollaard (2003) evaluates the performance agreements in the LKNP 2003-2006 in chapter eight. Nor did I evaluate whether the system of steering and accountability is the best implementation method or governance structure. Literature on implementation or execution of police policy will be relevant for this purpose. I found especially Hrebiniak & Joyce (1984) useful for an introduction to the different aspects of strategy implementation.

5.5 Further research

I want to make a distinction between 'functional further research ' and 'scientific further research'. The functional part concerns research that has practical benefits, for instance in the form of an improvement of the performance measures. For the following topics, further research is desirable.

- Subjective performance assessments of citizens

  Police forces do not know how they can influence the scores from the PMB or VMR. Concluding research to the factors that affect these assessments may enhance and improve the available performance measures. It may be better possible to measure the contributions of the police forces to the subjective scores, or it may be possible to limit the noise by including factors that also influence the scores.

- The effect of police actions on subjective safety

  Subjective safety measures how safe people feel. Their feelings will be influenced by police actions, but the question is how. The beliefs of the citizens is very important.

Consider the situation that there are many policemen present at the street. Does a citizen feel more safe because of the protection, or does he feel less safe because he thinks that the high criminality is the reason for the presence of the policemen. The same holds for the number of arrests. In principle, the more criminals are arrested, the safer it will be. However, a citizen can think that a high number of arrests means that there is a lot of criminality. The way of approaching people may influence the satisfaction about the police in general or about police actions. Currently, police forces do not know what beliefs they generate with their behavior.

- The relation between performance indicators and safety

    Safety is the ultimate objective of the performance agreements. However, for some indicators, it is not clear whether they improve safety. This point is also the eighth conclusion of Hoogenboom (2006). For the performance agreements to be successful, it is important that these relationships are present and are known.

    As an example, the number of reports is used as indicator for objective safety. However, this number can be manipulated and depends for instance on the attention for certain types of crimes. Another example is that it can be questioned whether the number of (traffic) fines increases objective safety and what the effect is on subjective safety or legitimacy. In the end, the performance indicators that have most effect on safety or reflect safety in the best way should be used.

The suggestions for the scientific further research may not have direct practical implications, but are interesting to improve the knowledge about the performance contracts and their effects. In the end, theories can be tested and improved with this knowledge. I will mention six suggestions.

- Investigation of the separate effects of performance agreements, performance payment and steering and accountability

    The researches that have been done so far (Morée et al., 2007; Jochoms et al., 2006; Hoogenboom, 2006) analyzed the effects over time: how did the police organization change after the performance contracts were introduced in 2003. However, the performance contracts consisted of performance agreements, to which performance payment was related and steering and accountability took place over these performances. This means that the effects of performance payment alone, or of the performance agreements alone (for instance benchmarks in annual accounts) cannot be investigated. In order to say something about the way in which police forces should be motivated, it is important to know the effects of all three components.

- Are the effects of the performance contracts structural or temporal?

    The performance contracts had positive effects on the performances of the police. When the government would abolish the performance contracts and the steering and accountability, would police performances go back to the level before the contracts, or did police mentality change so that police forces will nowadays pay attention to performances also without pressure from the government?

- Developing a theory that includes autonomy, subjective performance assessment, and objective performance assessment

    It would be interesting to analyze the tradeoff between autonomy, steering (subjective performance assessment), and agreements, targets, and incentive pay (objective performance assessments). Including them in one theory may make it possible to look what is optimal in which situation. It may also be possible to analyze how these aspects should be combined: how much autonomy in combination with how much agreements? Are objective and subjective performance assessments substitutes or complements in case of the police?

- Who should make the decisions?

    The police have limited capacity. They have to make subjective choices in police activities. A moral question is who should make these choices. Policemen on the beat may have the best information position. However, the choices in police activities and types of crimes, may be political choices. Of course, not all choices are the same. Some choices should be made by the government, but some very specific choices can only be made by the policemen on the spot. Other choices may be made by low managers, so that some area specific characteristics can be taken into account. It would be interesting to analyze what decisions should be made at what level.

- Is the current system of steering and accountability a good way to implement the contracts?

    In this thesis, I described how the performance contracts were implemented. Interesting questions are whether this way of implementing is a good way and what other ways of implementing could have been chosen. What are the pros and cons of different implementation methods?

- What form of steering is appropriate in which situation?

    As I described in section 2.2, there are different forms of steering. There is no clear overview in which situations which form is appropriate. Which factors determine the success of each form of steering? This information is important for implementation.

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Interviewed people

Edgar Taale   Politie Rotterdam-Rijnmond
                                Beleidsadviseur Korpsleiding, Afdeling Beleids- en Bestuurszaken

Piet Melsen   Politie Rotterdam-Rijnmond
                                Districtschef

Dirk Scholten   Politie Fryslân
                                Adviseur bij bureau Korpsleiding & Chef van dienst/hulpofficier van justitie

Joachim Verhoeyen   Politie Zeeland
                                Controller, Stafbureau Korpsleiding

Iain Wilson   Politie Haaglanden
                                Ploegchef Planning en Control

Derk van 't Spijker   Politie Twente
                                Hoofd Bestuursondersteuning & Communicatie

Bé Wiertsema   Politie Groningen
                                Dienst Bedrijfsvoering Regiopolitie Groningen

Lineke Traas   Politie Gelderland-midden
                                Afdeling communicatie

Léonie Hamming-Slagter   Politie IJsselland
                                Coordinator beleidsondersteuning, Plv. hoofd Bureau Korpsondersteuning

Saskia Aupers   Politie Gooi en Vechtstreek
                                Hoofd Communicatie

Pieter Chattellon   Politie Zaanstreek-Waterland
                                Beleidsmedewerker Kabinet Korpsleiding

Appendix A: Performance contracts

The Dutch Police National Framework 2003-2006 (LKNP), contained ten result agreements and seven control agreements ('beheersafspraken'). The result agreements concerned intensifying criminal investigation (agreements a, b and c), intensifying supervision and enforcement (agreements d, e and f), and improving efficiency (agreement g). They could be divided in output measures (a.I and f), subjective performance measures (d (availability) and e), and internal performance measures (a.II, d, g). The control agreement aimed for improving the efficiency. The performance contracts could be seen as steering on outlines to make interpretation on regional and local level possible (Morée et al., 2007). It was a modern variant of command and control, which interfered in both the management and the contents of policy (Sluis et al., 2006). The performance contracts were formulated by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice and the police organization. The result agreements from the regional convenants would together lead to the realisation of the national result agreements.

A.1   Organization of the performance contracts 2003-2006

In 2003, the regular budget for the Dutch Police was €3.5 billion[5]. Besides that, €52.6 million (≈1.5% of the regular budget) was made available yearly for rewarding police forces on the basis of the performance agreements. The budget that was related to the performance agreements was consciously set relatively low, so that not realizing them would not endanger the continuity of the police force. The money was awarded to the police forces the year after the performances had been achieved. Since it was an incidental benefit, it was not allowed to use this money for structural expenses, like extra personnel. The performance payment could be used for instance for projects and once-only investments.

As for the regular budget, the 'Budgetverdeelsysteem' (BVS) was used to distribute the performance-related budget over the police forces. The part of the budget each force laid claim to depended on workload, availability/accessibility, problem approach, and some region specific elements (like the presence of harbour, government, and airport).

Of the performance-related budget, 75% would be distributed to police forces based on their realization of the performance agreements and 25% based on benchmarking. Benchmarking would be done within five clusters, that were formed on the basis of address density and number of houses. Scores were assigned based on the ranking in the cluster and the total score on all

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[5] Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2004c, pp 42: Rijksbijdragen

performance agreements determined the payment for benchmarking. However, in the end, benchmarking was only used for 2006 and for 50% instead of 25%.

Over the years 2003, 2004 and 2005, performance payment ('Prestatiebekostiging') was paid to the police forces when they met the following growth path:

- 2003: on average, 15% of the objectives of 2006 is realized

- 2004: on average, 35% of the objectives of 2006 is realized

- 2005: on average, 65% of the objectives of 2006 is realized

- 2006: all of the objectives of 2006 are realized for at least 100%

For each performance agreement, the percentage of improvement relative to 2002 was calculated. The average of all improvements was compared to the growth path, i.e. all indicators had the same weight and performances improvements were mutually exchangeable. In 2003, 2004, and 2005, all police forces met the growth path.

For 2006, payment happened by a pace list:

- Realizing 10 of the 10 indicators yields a payment of 100% of the budget

- Realizing 9 of the 10 indicators yields a payment of 80% of the budget

- Realizing 8 of the 10 indicators yields a payment of 65% of the budget

- Realizing 7 of the 10 indicators yields a payment of 55% of the budget

- Realizing 6 of the 10 indicators yields a payment of 50% of the budget

- Realizing less than 6 indicators yields no payment

Besides the numbers, also the story behind the numbers was considered important. In yearly progress conversations between the ministers and all police force administrators, deliberation took place about the need to adjust the agreements. Besides this, yearly progress conversations per region between the director Police and the director Juridical Enforcement of the ministries and the chief of police took place. These conversations were called convenant conversations. (Morée et al., 2007).

The performance contracts were based on reciprocity between government and police forces: both the police force administrator and the both ministers entered into obligations. Information problems were solved by using preferably sources outside the police organization, since they were objective and uniform, also for other partners in the chain of safety. (Morée et al., 2007).

A.2   Summary of contents of LKNP 2003-2006

The parties that signed the agreement are

(1) the ministers, consisting of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK) and the Minister of Justice.

(2) the police force administrators, consisting of the police force administrators of each of the 25 regional police forces and the KLPD.

Article 2: Regional convenants

(b) The regional convenants contain the result agreements and the accompanying indicators from the National Framework, at which standards (the aspiration values of the indicators) from the National Framework are adapted to the regional situation. Besides, a reference value is indicated per result agreement.

(c) The result agreements from the regional convenants together lead to the realisation of the national result agreements

(d) Parties are free to include additional (result) agreements in the regional convenants

Article 3: Commitments of the police force administrators

The police force administrators oblige themselves to take al necessary measures that lead to the realization of the regional convenants per police force, which lead aggregately to the realization of the following result agreements.

(a)

(I) The number of cases 'with a known perpetrator' offered to the Public Prosecutor increases such that the number of suspects of which a charge ('proces-verbaal') is offered to the Public Prosecutor increases in 2006 with 40,000 (20%) relative to 2002.

(II) Each force draws up a survey of (young) persistent offenders and/or 'hardcore youngsters' ('harde-kernjongeren') yearly. Agreements are made with safety chain partners about the proportion of these young persons that can be handled yearly. The processing times ('doorlooptijden') of the criminal offences committed by these (young) persistent offenders and/or 'hardcore youngsters' should be such that 80% of the charges of these criminal offences is offered to the Public Prosecutor within 30 days after the first interrogation of the suspect (Kalsbeeknorm).

(b) The percentage of timely settled legal aid requests, that are issued to forces for settlement, has increased in 2006. The value of the increase will be determined later.

(c) The operational foreigners supervision is intensified.

The intensifying is monitored on the basis of police stops and the number of (criminal) illegal foreigners that are arrested.

The results will be evaluated in relation to the rest of the safety chain. This agreement will be made more precise later on.

(d) Agreements are made in the regional convenants about the minimal score on telephone accessibility on the National Telephone Number Police ('Landelijk Telefoonnummer Politie', LTP), about the quality of the service concerning the LTP and the alarm number 1-1-2, and about a substantial improvement of the score 'availability' in the survey 'Politiemonitor Bevolking' (PMB), later called 'Veiligheidsmonitor Rijk' (VMR).

The telephone accessibility on the LTP should be such that 80% of the calls is answered within 20 seconds, 90% within 30 seconds and 95% within 45 seconds. Concerning the alarm number 1-1-2, 80% of the normal calls with wireline telephony should be offered to the emergency rooms within 15 seconds, for mobile telephony this is within 30 seconds. Furthermore, capacity should be doubled within 30 minutes in case of great calamities.

By a substantial improvement of the score 'availability' is meant: reaching the highest value achieved by the police force in the period 1993 to 2002.

(e) Agreements are made in the regional convenants about an substantial improvement of the percentage of the PMB population that is '(very) satisfied' with the last contact with the police. The police should be more aimed at the public.

By a substantial improvement is meant: reaching the highest value achieved by the police force in the period 1993 to 2002.

(f) The number of fines and transactions, that stem from police stops, increases in 2006 with 180,000 relative to 2002. The police should enforce the law more consequently, and tolerate less.

(g)

   (I)   The total national percentage of absence due to illness is in 2006 maximal 8%

   (II) The efficiency of the work force increases with minimal 5% in aid of the primary process, including the reduction in the percentage of absence due to illness. Capacity management is an important development.

      Each police force formulates a plan.

   (III) Police forces that have a percentage of absence due to illness in 2006 that is lower than 8%, are allowed to subtract the difference from the 5% efficiency target.

(h) Expansion of the personnel capacity with 4,000 full time equivalents (fte's)

Article 4: Performance payment

The system of performance payment ('Prestatiebekostiging'), as agreed in 2001 by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Management Council of the Police (Korpsbeheerdersberaad'), will be employed for the result agreements that will be made on the basis of this National Framework.

Article 5: Commitments of the ministers

(1) The ministers exert themselves maximally for the realization of all (changes of) legislation and rules, that are stated in the Safety Program.

(2) The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations makes extra means available for the carrying out of the measures from the Safety Program, the work force expansion, and the quality improvement.

(3) The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations will exert himself for sufficient financing of the costs of all necessary measures concerning quality improvement of the police.
Police force administrators notify that, in case of insufficiency of financial means, necessary measures and developments in the material field cannot be realized, especially towards ICT.

Article 6: National policy and control cycle

(a)

   (I)   The agreements from the regional convenant form the main element of the policy and control cycle.

   (II) Beside the agreements from the regional convenant, compulsory subjects from existing legislation and rules are included in the policy and control cycle.
        In the appendix of the National Framework, control agreements are formulated.

   (III) Reporting happens yearly by the budget, annual report, and annual accounts.

(b) The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the police forces will set up an information statute together

Article 7: Adjustments during the term

(a) The National Framework can be altered if all parties agree.

(b) Interim adjustments can take place due to agreements that are concluded in the formation of a new cabinet.

Interim adjustments can also take place when unforeseen events happen, that require a unproportional police deployment.

(c) A conversation about the progress takes place yearly between the ministers and the police force administrators, in order to decide on adjustments of the National Framework. The performance of partners in the safety chain and potential bottlenecks come up.

Appendix B: Control agreements

(1) Each force implements the national standards for the criminal investigation, as developed within the framework of ABRIO before 1 January 2004.

(2) Six above-regional criminal investigation teams are fully accommodated in the indicated six centre police forces, before 1 January 2004. These teams address above-regional forms of average weighting criminality.

(3) Each force arranges the organization in accordance with the determined reference framework large-scale police actions, before 1 January 2004. A new, multi-disciplinary reference framework large-scale and special actions will be developed before 1 January 2006.

(4) The police forces represent the effects of the 'harmonisatie afschrijvingen politiekorpsen' (HAP) in the annual accounts of 2003. (concerning depreciations)

(5) Each force complies with the agreements concluded in 'Geïntegreerd Middelenbeheer'. (concerning the control of means)

(6) Each force complies with the rules of article 45, 5th paragraph about capital control, concluded in the Police Law 1993.

(7) At least 90% of the police men that are equipped with violence means comply with the requirement that are formulated by the 'Regeling Toetsing Geweldsbeheersing Politie' (RTGP).

(8) Each force meets the aspiration value of the percentage immigrants, that is concluded in the regional convenant, in order to increase diversity.

A.3 The performance contracts 2007

The Dutch Police National Framework 2007 (LKNP 2007) was the successor to the LKNP 2003-2006, as discussed in the preceding section. The LKNP 2007 contained

- Six result agreements that were related to performance payment. For these results, indicators existed for which output or outcome was clearly measurable. The result agreements were adopted from the National Framework 2003-2006, with the exception

of number of fines and transactions (agreement f) and reduction of percentage of absence due to illness (agreement g.I), since these agreements were amply realized by the forces.

- o Cases offered to the Public Prosecutor, processing times of persistent offenders, availability, foreigners supervision, telephone accessibility, and satisfaction.
- Four performance agreement on which benchmarking took place. Benchmarking and accountability were seen as steering instruments that were as effective as performance payment. Furthermore, benchmarking would stimulate learning.
  - o Diversity, integrity, fighting inconvenience, Criminaliteitsbeeldanalyse (CBA).
- Eleven other performance agreements of process, qualitative or organizational nature.
  - o Quality of criminal investigation, financial-economical crime, cybercrime, legal aid requests, discrimination, community policing, efficiency, work force, 'Arbeidstijdenwet' (ATW) violation, working learning, and 'Regeling Toetsing Geweldsbeheersing Politie' (RTGP).

These agreements concerned the categories criminal investigation, supervision and enforcement, service, and quality of the police organization. They were based on the Safety Program and the Midterm Review, that evaluated the Safety Program in 2005. Again, this National Framework was the basis for regional convenants that were concluded between both ministers and the police force administrator of each police force.

The budget of €52 million was divided in 70% for performance payment and 30% for experiments aimed at cooperation in the safety chain.

A.4 The national priorities 2008-2011

The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK) and the Minister of Justice decided to replace the LKNP 2007 and the corresponding regional convenants by the National Priorities 2008-2011 (NP 2008-2011). A change in the Police Law 1993 strengthened the competences of the government concerning the police. At least every four years, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Minister of Justice would determine the outlines of the policy and the management of the police for a period of four years. The outlines of policy, concerning the carrying out of tasks of the police, were called the National Priorities.

The National Priorities were elaborated in national objectives for each police force, which were the contributions of that force to the realization of the National Priorities. The police forces described in their regional policy plan how they wanted to meet the national objectives and they reported about the results afterwards in regional annual reports. If a police force realized the objectives, they received performance payment.

In the National Priorities, only four result agreements were concluded: strengthening criminal investigation (suspect ratio violence offences), strengthening community policing (more policemen on the beat ('wijkagenten') and supplying data), youth criminality and risky youth (survey and processing times), and quantity and quality approach criminality (cases offered to the Public Prosecutor and designing / implementing programs). Steering became more and more on outcome and less on output. (Ministerie van BZK, 2008; Ministerie van BZK & Justitie, 2007)

Appendix B: Interviews (continuation)

Since the interviews contained too much information to be fully represented in chapter three, some 'less relevant' subjects are transferred to this appendix. In chapter three, this is indicated with *.

B.1   Rotterdam-Rijnmond

*1   **B.1.1   History of result steering in police force Rotterdam-Rijnmond**

B.1.1.1   Background story

Rotterdam degenerated in the eighties and nineties. There were many drug buildings, drifters, and addicts. The image of Rotterdam was very bad and the impression tourists got when they came in Rotterdam was not good. Rotterdam started to close hundreds of drug buildings.

In 2001, the movement of Pim Fortuyn, who lived in Rotterdam, appeared. Fortuyn picked up signals from inhabitants that immigration had to be stopped, since the cities were out of absorption capacity, safety had to be restored, and the tolerating policy had to end. Inhabitants were fed up. The police Rotterdam-Rijnmond was not amazed at the popularity of this movement, since they saw the problems in the areas (problems with Moroccan Dutchman, international conflicts between Antilleans and Moroccans, etcetera). They still exist, however to a less degree. In the eighties and nineties, the problems were denied; it was not allowed to talk about. Fortuyn opened the debate.

Fortuyn's statement was that the Dutch police did not work businesslike and policemen were lazy civil servants. The police had to go back to the core tasks: catching scoundrels, stricter enforcement, stricter immigration rules, stricter compliance with laws and rules. This could only be realized by working more businesslike: setting targets and realizing objectives. Fortuyn said: 'All those lazy civil servants will be dismissed when I become premier (which I will), starting with the chief of police of the police force Rotterdam-Rijnmond, Aad Meijboom'.

This chief of police did not want to let this happen and delivered a speech for the police force. Things had to change. Within the police force, there was not much resistance. Also policemen wanted safety and saw that certain things would not be realizable without political support. The speech came down to the following story. The movement of Fortuyn had to be taken serious.

*2   The police force Rotterdam-Rijnmond would introduce top-down result steering. This idea came from New York. Mayor Giuliani made New York considerably safer. He had a few concepts:

- Compare and contrast: why does one district manage it while another doesn't? (benchmarking)

- Command and control: strict steering and monitoring everything.

In New York, Compstat (command statistics) were introduced. There were a lot of huge computer screens, that were full of statistics about the real time criminality intelligence (what is the situation in each area, how many robberies take place, how many murders, etcetera). Giuliani said to all superintendents: 'In your area, insecurity increases. I give you two weeks, and I want the number of arrests to go up and the number of reports to go down. If you do not manage this, you will be dismissed.' The safety of New York increased rapidly.

B.1.1.2   The result steering system

The chief of police of Rotterdam-Rijnmond wanted to implement the New York system. From then on, both the chief of police and the district chiefs had only one priority, namely safety. Until then, district chiefs were concerned about human resource management, how employees felt themselves, whether they worked overtime, how the travelling allowance was, how the buildings and cars were, how the finances were, etcetera. To put it briefly: anything but safety. Safety was the concern of people below the district chiefs in the hierarchy. District chiefs did not check whether these people really took efforts to improve safety. The number of charges per police officer was recorded, but whether a police officer was called to account when he did not produce much charges depended on the chief. There was no structure in which safety came back in everything.

District chiefs had to change their work completely. Suddenly, they received all numbers (the amount of reports of house burglaries, car burglaries, robberies, etcetera) and were told that the numbers had to be reduced. If they were not able to manage that, the police force management would appoint another district chief that could. Everybody was directed at safety.

In that time, a huge result steering system was set up. The system was not complicated, since the police had to spend as much time as possible on safety. The system worked with red and green squares. A five years action plan was made, which looked like the following example.

	2001	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**
Car burglaries	1,000 (actual amount in 2000)	850 (objective)	750 (objective)	720 (objective)	680 (final objective)
House burglaries					
Robberies					
Hold-ups					
…					

In 2001, every month a district chief received a report. The norm was 1,000, which meant that the norm for each month was 83. When the number of car burglaries in a month was more than 83, the square was red, otherwise, it was green.

	Jan	Feb	…	…	Norm
Car burglaries	89	75			1,000
House burglaries					
Robberies					
Hold-ups					

The district chiefs were called to account for the red squares. They had to explain why they didn't meet the norm, what efforts they did to meet the norm, what the plan of approach was, what effect it had, etcetera. It were nasty questions. Every month, there was an operational police force management team, consisting of all (deputy) chiefs constable, where district chiefs were called to account. There were no very hard consequences, but some people left. It was an unprecedented hardness for the police force Rotterdam-Rijnmond.

The performances of all districts could be compared. It was visible when the district chief of district A did not meet the norm for car burglaries, while the district chief of district B did. The first question to district chief A was: "why does B met his target and you didn't?" Besides, district chief B was asked for tips for district chief A. The consequence was that district chief A called his management team together and clarified that he was fed up with it. He got a rebuke once, might accept it another time, but no third time. The employees had to catch scoundrels, fine, increase safety, reduce reports. No "yes, but…" arguments anymore. He asked his people what they did in a day and he might steer them by saying: "I don't want you to do that, I want you to focus on the car burglaries, because their number increases".

The system was completely implemented up to the lowest level (the police officers). Contracts were used for this goal. In those contracts, the number of fines, arrests concerning drunk drivers, and mutations were specified. When agreements were not realized, policemen got an unsatisfactory evaluation. Piet Melsen, as a district chief, never concluded contracts, but just told his people what they had to do.

B.1.1.3 Making choices

In the end, the manager had the authority to prescribe how a situation had to be handled and where capacity was used. The police force management asked the district chief about situations in his district. The district chief had to have knowledge about those situations and know how they were handled and by whom. Besides, district chiefs were forced to go to their district to see what

happens there, know the people, and be present in case of disturbances. Safety was the focus. That was sometimes difficult, since district chiefs also had to manage an organization of 500 employees.

This change concerned working 'from outside to inside'. Formerly, the police worked from inside to outside. This meant that the police existed, regardless of what happened outside. The police did not relate themselves to what happened outside and their own concern was more important than the concern of outside. For example, when a policeman wanted to go home at 5 PM, he did that, regardless of the need for police from outside at 6 PM because a demonstration would be held. Outside had to adapt itself to the police. That is not a good way of working, according to Piet Melsen.

From outside to inside meant that when outside had a need for police, for instance when situations got out of hand, the police had to organize that there was police at that time at that place, also at inconvenient moments or places. This was included in the result agreements, for instance by customer satisfaction. The police was in the service of the citizens, who paid for the police, not the other way round. The freedom of the police decreased, but being in the service of citizens was the objective of the police. This involved that there were many policemen at work on Friday evening and few on Sunday morning.

The service of the police increased as a consequence of thinking from outside to inside. As an example, telephone calls had to be treated immediately and properly. People had to be able to find and contact the police.

B.1.1.4   Effects

The effect of the result steering system was that the organization was strongly directed at results in the form of more safety and less degeneration. That was exactly what the chief of police wanted, so it was a very good development. The number of reports decreased, while the number of arrests increased.

The difference in operational police work was that policemen that were used to give only a warning, now stopped someone to fine him. Many people, both inside and outside the police, considered this pleasant. The question 'the police does not fine enough' is still been answered by 'yes'. The operational policemen focussed on enforcement, setting limits and norms, and fining when someone passed the limit or norm.

The system of result steering was implemented top-down: the manager said: 'this is what you have to do, good luck'. According to the theory, this is not a good way of implementing, since it works better when people see the usefulness and believe they do good work. But there was no time to create support, since the chief of police did not want to be dismissed. In spite of the top-

down way, the implementation was successful. According to Piet Melsen, this was partly due to the recognition of policemen of the degeneration in Rotterdam.

Subjective safety did not improve a lot. Of course, in some areas it did. The safety index, which consisted for 1/3 of objective safety and for 2/3 of subjective safety, is still increasing. There are four problem areas and the police aim to make them safer. As far as the police can see, objective safety improved (the amount of people that call the police, announce or report something). However, the people that lived in those areas did not feel safer. Piet Melsen thinks an important factor was the lack of social cohesion. People did not know their neighbours, did not take part in projects to get acquainted with each other, did not want to improve the area since they wanted to leave as soon as possible. Language problems did also play a role. When those isolated people were asked whether the area became safer, they would probably say no.

Before the system of result steering, the focus on performances was insufficient and also not concrete. Annual plans were vague, with sentences like 'we will strive for …' and 'we try to reduce car burglaries by extra deployment of policemen and means'. No one could be called to account, since everyone 'strove' for it. Piet Melsen considers 'reduce car burglaries' not as an objective, it should be something like 'reduce car burglaries with 20% from 1,000 to 800'. Everything became expressed in numbers, up to the time to answer the phone.

The quality requirements for documents increased strongly. Furthermore, the requirements for accountability went up, a few sentences explanation is not accepted anymore.

B.1.2   Implementation of the national agreements

*3   Regional (operational) services were 'Zeehavenpolitie', 'Regionale Recherche Dienst' (RRD), 'Executieve Ondersteuning' (EXO), 'Regionale Informatie Organisatie' (RIO). Besides, staff services existed, like 'Personeel en Organisatie', 'Controlling', 'Communicatie', and 'Facilitair Bedrijf'.

*4   For the fields Neighbourhood Police (Wijkpolitie), Direct Aid (Directe Hulpverlening), Criminal Investigation (Opsporing), and Intake, Service & Support (Intake, Service & Ondersteuning), heads existed.

*5   Edgar Taale believes that most people inside the police organization want to make a career. Some people are intelligent and have a lot of knowledge, but have no management competences. In the police organization, the only way to make a career is to be 'in de lijn', i.e. moving up the hierarchy and steer people. When district chiefs or service heads are no good managers, they may not manage to steer their people to achieve the results. In order to realize performances, steering and being hard is sometimes necessary.

∗6 At the national level, the Minister of BZK was called to account by the Parliament. As a reaction, the minister called the police force administrator to account. The police force management held conversations with district chiefs and service heads, where calling to account happened. Those people also called to account people below them. In principle, managers steered only the level directly below them. A district chief might have prescribed what the people below the heads had to do, however the actual steering of those people on this point was done by the heads themselves. District chiefs could tell the heads how they had to steer.

∗7 A process owner was chairman of the deliberation of the heads that were responsible for that field. These heads discussed aspects of their work and results with each other. They also had a annual plan and a long-range plan.

Hierarchical responsibility and process responsibility sometimes clashed with each other. An example concerns neighbourhood police versus direct aid. The process owner neighbourhood police wants to meet the requirement that each policeman on the beat ('wijkagent') should spend 80% of his time to neighbourhood police tasks. However, the district chief considers emergency aid more important, since emergency aid must always be available. Emergency aid has to be directly sent to a place where it is needed. The policemen that are available for emergency aid could not do neighbourhood police tasks at that moment.

B.1.3   Performance payment

∗8 Neighbourhood police work is difficult to measure. It is important that policemen on the beat have contact with the citizens. Giving them a bonus when they hold ten conversations, does not take into account the quality of their work. Neighbourhood police work also involves seeing suspicious circumstances. Often it may be false alarm, so there is no direct production. The information steered police work is important, but cannot be stimulated by rewarding fines or being on the street.

∗9 There is a risk of a perverse effect if the performance payment is a big portion. After all, the regional police forces that perform well get more money and the forces that perform bad get no money. Good performing police forces can use the means to invest in activities that contribute to realizing the performances for the next year, in order to get performance payment again, and so on and so on. Police forces that perform bad don't get the means to realize the performances.

B.1.4   Changes as a result of the performance agreements

∗10 When an agreement was not realized, the police force tried to find out what was the reason for it. When it was due to factors the police force was not responsible for, the police force discussed

this with the Ministry of BZK. This story behind the numbers was often taken into account by the ministry.

B.1.5   Evaluation of the performance agreements

*[11] Input, throughput, output and outcome were all related to each other. When a police force had few inputs (people), a certain throughput could be done, which led to some output performances. Those outputs had a certain effect on outcome. That whole spectrum had to be seen in connection with each other. Edgar Taale considers output indicators good, provided that they are treated in connection with inputs and the way of using those inputs, both by the ministries and internally in the organization. Holding conversations with each other is important.

*[12] Both ministries made the agreements in consultation with the police forces, so police forces had involvement. Furthermore, the police force management wanted to deliver good performances as well, so these performances could just as well be included in the national performance agreements.

B.6   Groningen

*[13] An article in the Journal 'Tijdschrift voor de Politie' (Dros et al., 2010) is written by three employees of the police force Groningen. In this article, it becomes clear that the police force Groningen started in 2008 with initiatives to give professionals at the basis more space to improve the quality of their work and increase safety in a durable way. A more bottom-up approach started, in which local authorities gained influence. Connection, craftsmanship, and leadership are central. Society has a demand for a police that is thinking along and proactive when possible, and decisive and repressive when necessary. The police should be focused on a durable improvement of safety and less on realizing short-term production numbers.

Two interesting points are worth mentioning. First,, there appears to be a big difference between the reality of the ministries and the reality of policemen at the operational level (Kant & van Raak, 2009). Second, the police force Groningen introduced a temporary criminal investigation team at the district level to increase the number of charges. This criminal investigation team produced a lot of charges, but the relation with the local police work disappeared. Therefore the team was abolished and criminal investigation came back at the basis.

B.7 Other police forces

B.7.1 Gelderland-midden

In the police force Gelderland-midden, rendering account for the performance agreements happened in the annual reports. The police force management was responsible for the performance agreements and delegated the realization of the performances to the division chiefs. In this layered way, each worker had a share in the realization. Unit chiefs rendered account to the police force management once in the three months. This happened in conversations on the basis of their management reports ('managementrapportages').

B.7.2 IJsselland

In the police force IJsselland, teams were not rewarded when they realized the performance agreements and also not punished when they did not realize them. In teams, steering took place on the results.

B.7.3 Gooi en Vechtstreek

In the police force Gooi en Vechtstreek, no rewards or sanctions were used on the individual level or division level.

B.7.4 Zaanstreek-Waterland

In the police force Zaanstreek-Waterland, quantitative performance agreements were divided over the units, but no reward was related to the realization and no sanction to non-realization. Within the units no performance pay took place, only steering. This steering happened by monthly deliberation ('maandelijks overleg') with relevant managers and police force management. In these deliberations, the performances were presented and there was a possibility to adjust steering. The force did use gratuities ('gratificaties'), but this was dependent on the view of the manager that had a certain budget for this goal.

It is questionable when a police force, team, or individual does good work. Good work is not by definition realizing a certain performance agreement, because police work is much more than that. The police force was more directed at the development of employees and this development did not only consist of the realization of the quotas. Individual rewards were an integral part of human resource management as instrument for development.

Appendix C: Summary of Jochoms et al. (2006)

Jochoms et al. (2006) investigate five police forces: Haaglanden, Rotterdam-Rijnmond, Flevoland, IJsselland, and Amsterdam-Amstelland. They concentrate on only a few theme's of the performance contracts, namely suspects of which a charge is offered to the Public Prosecutor, efforts in the field of persistent offenders (survey and processing times of (young) persistent offenders), and fines and transactions that flow from police stops.

C.1 Strategic level (police force management)

C.1.1 Passing on (government → police force management)

For most police forces, investigated by Jochoms et al. (2006), the regional convenant was the first document with concrete result agreements. The agreements in the regional convenants were included in a long-range plan ('meerjarenplan') and subsequently in a annual plan ('korpsjaarplan'). In this annual plan, specific main policy points and result agreements were taken down. In some plans, the regional convenant was the starting point and the objective of the police force was 'increasing the performance capacity of the force'. In other plans, the objective of the police force was the safety of citizens, since the performance agreements aimed at safety.

A point of concern of regional police forces was that they were not capable of deciding the content of their work (for instance the type of lawsuit), since this flowed from the regional convenant and national main points.

C.1.2 Steering (police force management steered district management)

At the strategic level, the police force management steered the district management (district chiefs) by formulating result agreements per district. District chiefs had freedom to decide on how to realize the results.

C.1.2.1 Steering moments (when did steering took place?)

Steering moments were all moments in which information and communication occurred. Jochoms et al. (2006) restrict themselves to the following formal, face-to-face steering moments.

- Management deliberations ('managementoverleggen')

    These deliberations generally took place monthly. In smaller police forces, the police force management and all district chiefs and division chiefs were present, while in larger police forces a delegation of the police force management and the district chiefs of one cluster came together. In the management deliberations, the operational and control issues were discussed.

- Management conversations ('managementgesprekken') and performance interviews

  In each of the regions investigated by Jochoms et al. (2006), individual management conversations were introduced. They took place between once in the six weeks and once in the three months. In these conversations, a member of the police force management communicated his expectations, in the form of performance agreements, to a district chief. Later on, these conversations were used for the monitoring of the progress of the agreements and, if necessary, for adjusting steering. These conversations also had the character of performance interviews ('functioneringsgesprekken').

- Theme meetings ('themabijeenkomsten')

  Some regional police forces organized theme meetings. The purpose of these meetings was to pay attention to particular trends and developments in criminality and insecurity, or to new methods of working. In these meetings, the story behind or next to the numbers got a chance. These meetings were both preconditional to steering and a moment of steering, because the work of district chiefs was influenced by the police force management.

C.1.2.2   Objects of steering (what did steering take place on?)

Steering happened on output and outcome.

- Output: the in numbers represented performances

  Both the members of the police force management and district chiefs declared that the role of output figures increased especially in the management deliberations and management conversations, at the cost of attention for the safety situation (outcome) and the approach of a particular problem (throughput).

  This development had positive and negative effects. The members of the police force management experienced the concreteness of the numbers useful. Three negative effects were experienced on all levels. First, steering on numbers could bring on tension in the cooperation between hierarchies. Directive steering on the numbers did not match with the need for professional space of the tactical and operational chiefs. Second, the reality of the safety polity could not be (fully) captured in output figures. Third, the pressure was constantly increasing, which raised the question whether the police organization would remain viable in the long run.

  According to Jochoms et al. (2006), it became increasingly difficult to meet the performance standards for two reasons. First, because of the increased number of

police stops, the citizens changed their behavior. Second, the standards increased yearly, especially the number of police stops and suspects to the Public Prosecutor.

Steering by accountability became more systematic, directive and hierarchical. The district chiefs in Jochoms et al. (2006) declared that the output figures were increasingly important in rendering account, which pressurized the attention for the safety situation. However, there were possibilities to talk about quality and outcome.

- Outcome: the ultimate effect of the delivered performance on the problems

    Both members of the police force management and district chiefs declared in Jochoms et al. (2006) that they valued linking output (quantitative performance agreements) to outcome (local problems) highly. Output had to be achieved on the criminality and safety problems. This required good management. From professional point of view, quality and content were the most important things. However, in practice the pressure of performance made the linking very hard. It depended on the management skills whether important tasks that were not represented in output numbers were still stimulated. 'However, the performance figures threaten to (gradually) predominate in all forces, as the numbers increase' (Jochoms et al., 2006, pp. 106).

C.1.2.3   Way of daily steering (how did steering take place?)

The steering cycle contained setting targets, monitoring, accountability and adjusting steering if necessary. The introduction of the performance agreements stimulated the use of this steering cycle. Steering and accountability happened on the basis of information about the results, so that the importance of steering information increased.

Rendering account on outcomes meant that district chiefs had to declare what they did to increase safety, instead of explaining the current safety situation. Developments in the safety situation that were not in line with the output developments were a reason to call district chiefs to account. In case of output results that stayed behind the standard, members of the police force management could do two things. First, they could decide that a race to catch up had to take place. Second, they could accept that disappointing results of one district were compensated by better results of other districts.

In the policy documents and management contracts ('managementcontracten'), agreements were made about the numbers, not about the way of achieving them. This meant that steering could take place afterwards, when the results were disappointing or discrepancies were detected.

C.1.2.4 Steering instruments (what did steering take place with?)

Instruments of steering were benchmarking and ranking, HRM and capacity management.

- Benchmarking, ranking, learning

  Benchmarking meant that districts were systematically compared to each other. In some police forces, they were ranked based on output or outcome results. Both steering instruments aimed at monitoring performances, rendering account for them and adjusting steering, if necessary. In this way, districts were more directed to performances. Furthermore, benchmarking stimulated learning, since districts could ask the advice of districts that appeared to achieve good results on a certain indicator.

  The opinions differed concerning ranking. In one region, investigated by Jochoms et al. (2006), the police force management used ranking because they believed that ranking had a strongly steering (and learning) power: no district chief wants to be at the bottom of the list. Ranking was a way to introduce competition. However, district chiefs in this police force argued that the direction towards numbers increased by ranking, which they considered undesirable. The incentive to cooperate with other district may get into a tight corner because of the competition.

- Human resource management

  In two of the five regional police forces in the research of Jochoms et al. (2006), district chiefs laid claim to a bonus when they achieved their results. In another regional police force, district chiefs were rewarded linearly with the output they achieved above a certain standard. Policemen did not agree on this regulation and in addition, they experienced it unfair that they did not receive a bonus when they performed good.

  In case of bad performances of the district (chief), penalties took place in the form of a bad evaluation in a performance interview. In that way, realizing the agreements affected the promotion and carrier opportunities of a district chief. Punishment in the form of exemption from the function happened on a limited scale.

- Capacity management

  Capacity management involved the planning and deployment of personnel. Because of the pressure of the performance contracts, the police force management try to find the most effective and efficient way of using capacity.

C.2   Tactical level (districts)

C.2.1   Passing on (police force management → district)

The regional long-range plan and annual plan formed the basis for passing on the agreements to the districts. Each district formulated a annual plan, in which the contributions to the regional result agreements and to the local priorities were described. Some district plans contained concrete agreements, including the efforts that were required per result agreement, while other plans started with the main local problems and after that, the performance norms were stated. Jochoms et al. (2006, pp. 61) quote a district chief, who said that before the result agreements, the objective in the district plan was to achieve an effect, i.e. improving safety. Many reasons and excuses could be brought forward in case the effect was not achieved. After the result agreements, the result was production, where the objective remained safety. The results were considered realistic and achievable by this district chief.

The most important distribution code for passing on the result agreements to districts was the size of the company unit, which was measured by full-time equivalents (fte's) or 'budgetverdeeleenheden' (bve's). In addition, the history of the local situation and criminality figures were taken into account, although less decisive. According to an adviser of the police force management, this was the way of the lowest resistance and the way in which the pain was divided proportionally (Jochoms et al., 2006, pp. 63). In the time of the research of (Jochoms et al., 2006), attention came on about the question whether the local safety situation would be a better criterion for passing on.

A finding of Jochoms et al. (2006) is that most district chiefs perceived the passing on to their district as top-down, where they had little bargaining power. Regional main points that were formulated at the strategic level limited the districts in determining the contents of their work.

C.2.2   Steering (district management steered operational management)

On the tactical level, the district management (district chiefs) steered the operational management (team chiefs). There were three types of team chiefs: team chiefs of primary policing ('basispolitiezorg'), of an neighbourhood teams ('wijkteam'), and of the criminal investigation department ('recherche').

C.2.2.1   Steering moments (when did steering took place?)

On the tactical level, the same three important, formal, face-to-face steering moments existed.

- Management deliberations ('managementoverleggen')

    Management deliberations took place between two and four times a month. In the management deliberations, distinctions were made between deliberations about output figures and deliberations about developments of criminality.

    These deliberations were used by the district chief as preparation for the regional management deliberations.

- Management conversations ('managementgesprekken') and performance interviews

    These conversations happened in private between the district chief and a team chief, once in the four weeks to three months. These conversations served to discuss the targets and progress of a team. Again, the performance interviews were a part of the cycle of management conversations.

- Theme meetings ('themabijeenkomsten')

    The theme meetings aimed at learning from each other by discussing for instance methods of working, approaches to specific problems, and ways to realize the performance agreements.

C.2.2.2   Objects of steering (what did steering take place on?)

Steering happened on output and outcome.

- Output

    The steering of the district chiefs by the police force management was more directed at output figures. Therefore, district chiefs passed these targets on to team chiefs. Team chiefs experienced that district chiefs mainly focussed on quantitative frameworks in which police work had to get content.

    What the district chiefs did monitor, were the spread of the number of subjects, number of police stops, processing times over offence types.

- Outcome

    Some district chiefs wanted to direct steering at the problems that laid behind the performance agreements. In practice however, they experienced that it was very hard to translate targets (numbers) into concrete interpretations. This was partly due to the distance between the district chief and the carrying out of the work. 'In general, the lowest hierarchical level in the organization has the ultimate responsibility for the concrete link between the performance numbers and the content of the daily police practice.' (Jochoms et al., 2006, pp. 114)

Regardless of the difficulty to steer on a problem directed interpretation, some district chiefs did their best. One example of doing so was giving interpretation to the policy main points and offence priorities of the police force management and the local government. Another example was the appointment of problem owners that were responsible for the design of an approach for problems and for the result of it.

The district chiefs declared in Jochoms et al. (2006) that they put in much effort to realize the result agreements, but that they had their doubts whether the quantitative performance agreements were the right way to solve the criminality and safety problems.

C.2.2.3 Way of daily steering (how did steering take place?)

In the management deliberations and conversations, steering took place by setting down the performance agreements, monitoring the performances, rendering account, mostly in case of bad performances, and adjusting steering if necessary. The quantitative standards appeared to be leading.

In case of disappointing results, the district chief kept a close eye on what the team chief did. It depended on the district chief whether a call to account was a 'friendly' conversations by saying 'pay attention, you are behind' or an annoying conversations. This did also depend on the way in which the district chief himself was steered by the police force management. The pressure of that steering relation was passed on to the team chiefs.

Interesting to see was that the frequency in which team chiefs were called to account increased since the use of performance contracts. Another difference, according to (Jochoms et al., 2006), was that team chiefs were not only called to account individually, but also in a group (for instance in the management deliberations). This accountability for the group happened when output figures were disappointing or when they did not match with the developments in the safety situation.

Steering and accounting mainly concerned the numbers. Only in case of developments in the safety situation that did not match with output figures, steering and accountability became more directed at problems. On the one hand, district chiefs experienced the focus on the numbers as more objective way of steering and accountability (the old way was especially based on feelings). On the other hand, not all concepts of reality were presented in the numbers, which made the focus on the numbers less objective. In addition, there were doubts whether steering and accountability based on output numbers brought about the behavioural change of the teams and individuals that was necessary.

Team chiefs in the neighbourhood policing believed that their work could only to a very limited extent be expressed in numbers, and therefore they should not be steered on numbers. Their

work mainly consisted of preventive tasks, including pointing out problems and advising, which were not easily captured in figures.

C.2.2.4   Steering instruments (what did steering take place with?)

Instruments of steering were benchmarking, HRM and capacity management.

- Benchmarking and learning

    Benchmarking was used by many district chiefs to stimulate mutual learning by teams. Ranking was often not used at the tactical level. In case of disappointing results, the district chiefs recommended asking advice from other team chiefs. Some critical team chiefs wondered whether learning a better way *to achieve the numbers* would contribute to the reduction of criminality and insecurity problems.

- Human resource management

    At the tactical level, rewarding and penalties became more important after the implementation of the performance contracts. The evaluation of team chiefs was based on the numbers, in a more directive, systematic, and concrete way. According to Jochoms et al. (2006), some team chiefs got a promotion or even a financial reward when they achieved a good output performance.

    The output figures of the team influenced the performance appraisal of the team chief. According to the district chiefs in Jochoms et al. (2006), team chiefs were not exempted from their function in case of bad performances. However, team chiefs declared that bad performances may contributed to exemption, although district chiefs would not admit that bad performances were the reason. In Jochoms et al. (2006), situations are mentioned where team chiefs were reappointed because their steering was not strict and directive enough in the eyes of the district chief.

- Capacity management

    District chiefs paid more attention to the way in which the capacity was used, since they had to render account for the output performances. The core task discussion occurred, where district chiefs critically evaluated projects and tasks on their usefulness. The police had to focus on core tasks and not on figurative tasks. Tasks that belonged to other government organizations, but that were sometimes carried out by the police until then, were passed on. Local authorities sometimes asked a lot of capacity for projects or events. Because of the limited capacity, a tradeoff existed between satisfying the demands of the local authorities and achieving the performance agreements. The use of problem owners contributed to the effective and efficient deployment of capacity.

The criminal investigation department struggled with a shortage of capacity, because of the demand of the performance agreements and also the PG-guideline ('PG-richtlijn').

C.3 Operational level (teams and policemen)

C.3.1 Passing on (districts → teams → individuals)

In most forces, investigated by Jochoms et al. (2006), the result agreements were included in the (neighbourhood) team plans ('(wijk)teamplannen'). These team plans had the character of action programs and contained the results that had to be achieved, together with a description of the most important problems in the areas. Individual annual plans were drawn up in some, but far from all, police forces. In some police forces, no individual contracts were concluded, but concrete numbers per employee were mentioned in district plans or team plans. In most cases passing on happened up to the individual level.

The benefit of no individual agreements or numbers was that team chiefs could differentiate between people so that 'the strengths of people are central, they remain motivated, and good results are achieved' (Jochoms et al., 2006, pp. 71). Furthermore, one police force that was investigated by Jochoms et al. (2006) did not want the numbers to be dominant in the daily practice of police work and wanted to emphasize the teamwork character of police work. Besides, when no agreements were made in individual annual plans, this did not mean that there was no steering on these subjects.

Also in the passing on from the districts to the teams, little bargaining power was experienced by the team chiefs. It may even be more top-down than from region to district. Team chiefs decided how to realize their performance agreements. The team chiefs were expected to link the agreements to the local safety situation.

Jochoms et al. (2006) mention three factors that influence the decision to pass on agreements to individual policemen.

1. The point of view of police force management, district management and team management

   'Most police force managements are unanimous in the desire to make individual work agreements (in the next years) in which also performance standards are included, so that the more result-based way of working affects all levels' (Jochoms et al., 2006, pp. 68). In 2005, district chiefs and team chiefs had a lot of freedom to decide themselves. According to Jochoms et al. (2006), there was more support for individual work

agreements than resistance. They expected that the use of individual work agreements would be a matter of time.

2. The hardness of the performance standard

Performance standards differed in their hardness. Some standards were suitable to be passed on to teams, but were not hard enough to pass them on to individual workers.

3. The function within the organization

Passing on cannot happen in the same way for all policemen, since they differ in their functions. A distinction was made between employees in primary policing ('basispolitiezorg'), criminal investigation department ('recherche'), neighbourhood policing ('wijkzorg'), and the emergency help ('noodhulp').

A quota for police stops was passed on to all types of policemen, but policemen on the beat had a lower quota than basic police agents. Policemen on the beat were less responsible for output numbers, since many team chiefs believed that the social effects were mainly important for their job. However, they had other agreements like mapping an area, visiting the hotspots, or talking with citizens.

In the criminal investigation department, numbers played a less important role in steering and accountability. People that were engaged in criminal investigation tasks had no quota for charges, but often had agreements for the number of case reports ('zaakdossiers'), irrespective of the number of suspects they yielded. Only in some police forces, police stops were passed on to C.I.D.-agents, but these agents believed that police stops were not part of their job. Because of performance agreements, more attention was paid to processing times as well.

C.3.2   Steering (operational management steered the floor)

The operational level was the lowest hierarchical level in the police organization and comprised the steering by team chiefs of police officers ('dienders'), chief employees ('hoofdmedewerkers'), senior employees ('seniormedewerkers'), police sergeants ('brigadiers') as project leader. In some regional police forces, team chiefs had group chiefs ('groepschefs') and task chiefs ('taakchefs') below them in the hierarchy.

C.3.2.1   Steering moments (when did steering take place?)

Operational steering happened daily. This was possible because team chiefs and the people they steered were physically near. Jochoms et al. (2006) limit themselves to three important, formal, face to face moments.

- Team deliberations ('teamoverleggen') and theme specific days ('themagerichte dagen')

In team deliberations, the performance agreements and expectations were communicated and later on, the deliberations were used for accountability and adjusting steering. Furthermore, the daily procedures were discussed. Theme specific days concerned the contents of subjects or the way in which performance agreements could be achieved.

- Briefing and debriefing

    Briefings happened two to three times a day. Briefings aimed at passing information. Stimulation and appreciation could happen by mentioning concrete numbers over achieved performances and performances that still needed to be achieved, or more generally by reminding workers of the output performances. No team, investigated by Jochoms et al. (2006), called individual workers to account for their numbers in the briefings.

    Furthermore, work and surveillance assignments were given in order to steer police work. Police officers had to account for the way they carried out the assignment. In this way, steering happened both on direction at problems and on performance agreements.

- Performance interviews and assessment interviews ('beoordelingsgesprekken')

    Before the performance contracts, performance interviews for executive workers were not common. After the introduction of the performance contracts, many team chiefs had a performance agreement to hold performance interviews with the employees below them, but even still there were team chiefs that did not do so.

    In performance interviews and assessment interviews, team chiefs steered on achievement of individual performance agreements. The quantitative performance was discussed, but there might also have been attention for the way they were achieved. The conversations had, in some teams, the character of judgement on results. This led to discipline by the police officers to meet the numbers or have a good story, since they feared negative assessments.

    (Jochoms et al., 2006) give an example of a force where police officers were asked how they wanted to attain the targets. In this way, police officers may see the agreements as their own agreements, which motivates them to realize the performance.

    Most police officers supported performance appraisals, since this made it more difficult to cut corners. However, there were many police officers that believed that the focus was too much on the numbers and that police work was more than numbers.

C.3.2.2   Objects of steering (what did steering take place on?)

Steering happened on output and outcome.

- Output

    At the operational level, the output figures played a much greater role than before the performance agreements. The extent to which steering on output took place, differed per police force and per team chief. Some team chiefs, questioned by Jochoms et al. (2006), steered only on the numbers, others tried to meet the numbers, but used concrete local problems as guideline. Team chiefs emphasized that both motivating policemen and achieving the output performances was important. This was seen as a dilemma.

    The spread of the type of offences and the type of suspects to deliver to the Public Prosecutor differed between police forces. Some team chiefs steered explicitly on the spread, since they wanted to prevent 'easy scoring', i.e. focusing on cases that were easy or fast to process. Team chiefs also tried to spread the numbers over the year, in order to prevent that November and December become 'recover months'

- Outcome

    In conversations, managers tried to link the agreements to the problems and developments that were behind the agreements and steer on the meaning. The respondents in Jochoms et al. (2006) emphasized that the meaning of the performance agreements was what it was all about, not the numbers. However, it turned out that 'in many police forces the broader context and the idea behind the performance convenant is not (sufficiently) taken as point of departure for the communication over and the steering on performance standards' (Jochoms et al., 2006), pp.75). At the lowest level, the broader context and objectives of the performance agreements were not known. 'Because just the numbers are taken as point of departure in the direct communication, the impression arises on the floor that achieving the results is seen as objective itself.' (Jochoms et al., 2006, pp.75)

    In the end, the extent to which was focused on the numbers or the meaning depended on the point of view of the manager: did he think that the results were the basics of police work, or did he think that the meaning behind the numbers was the most important thing. Furthermore, policemen would be more motivated if they knew the broader context, since they better understood the agreements, better accepted them, and might come with interesting ideas to achieve them.

C.3.2.3 Way of daily steering (how did steering take place?)

In group meetings, steering on numbers was not individually oriented, but happened by urging everybody to pay attention to the performance agreements. In private conversations, team chiefs steered policemen and let them render account. Team chiefs declared that it was hard to find a good balance between keeping a close eye on the work of the policemen and giving them the space they needed.

Since team chiefs were responsible for the output, they monitored the output numbers of their team constantly and called someone to account if they were not satisfied with his performance. Team chiefs did not think that the management was per definition easier with this output focus. In any case, the output had to be linked to local problems. However, it might be easier to assess the contribution of each team member if the output performance was known. This information was not available before the performance agreements.

The team chief called the workers that cut corners to account by gradations. First, is the assumption was made that there would be good reasons why a workers did not achieve the performance targets. Second, the team chief and the worker agreed on recovery. This meant that the worker showed that he did his best to improve his performance. In case of no improvement, this was noted in his file. In general, the worker was not dismissed until his performance was structurally below the standard on all his job responsibilities. Besides workers that cut corners, also workers that scored extremely high on certain output indicators (for instance fines or arrests) or had little spread in their output performance were called to account. 'More is not always better', according a team chief in Jochoms et al. (2006, pp. 130). After the introduction of the performance agreements, team chiefs gave positive feedback in case of good performances.

C.3.2.4 Steering instruments (what did steering take place with?)

Instruments of steering were benchmarking, HRM and capacity management.

- Benchmarking and learning

    Some team chiefs used benchmarking by hanging up lists of the operational results. However, a substantial part of the team chiefs was against this idea, since this may give police officers the impression that a good police officer is one that deliver many charges. These team chiefs only distributed a survey in pigeon-holes.

- Human resource management

    Individual performance agreements played a minimal role in the rewarding of policemen, however the interest in it grows. In performance interviews, output numbers became more important and policemen were called to account by gradations, however this did almost never lead to dismissal.

The pressure of work increased since the performance agreements. Team chiefs had to steer on numbers but maintain the sphere and motivation on the floor at the same time. This was why appreciation and rewarding were given attention. However, in practice it was not easy to implement these things. First, because of the pressure of work, team chiefs were not able to give more attention to the workers. Second, team chiefs declared that they had too little personnel technical opportunities to reward. There was not enough money for it, so that only small presents were possible, that brought about only weak incentives. There were possibilities for salary increase, promotion, and education for people that performed above average, but team chiefs experienced this as insufficient. Both managers and police officers took the view that rewards had to be based on the entire police work, not mainly on performance agreements.

- Capacity management

    An important steering instrument of team chiefs was the planning and deployment of capacity. This involved for instance adjusting the planning to the points in time where more or less police services were needed. As an example, checks were done at the moment they generated most police stops. The criminal investigation department looked more critically at the cases they investigated. The cases that were dealt with, were the cases that yielded sufficient return in the form of amount of suspects.

    A positive effect of the performance contracts was that the criminal investigation department had a better view of the supply of work., as a result of which the division could be done better. A negative effect of the pressure of work was that the performance contracts invited to deal mainly with the easy cases Managers experienced that they did not have a choice in this, because they had to satisfy the standards. There was a tradeoff between the weight of the cases and the amounts of cases.

C.3.3 Effects on the daily practice of police work

The effects on the daily practice of police work are discussed per police function.

- Primary policing

    The deployment of personnel was more aimed at efficiency and output. The times, locations and activities were chosen such that they yielded return (fines, suspects, and persistent offenders). Steering happened more exclusively on the core tasks, so that there was less space to do all the things the police wanted. Policemen experienced less freedom to decide on their activities and the way of carrying out their work. Besides, policemen experienced that there was less attention for their ideas. Policemen were

more asked for ideas to realize the performance agreements, but not for ideas to solve problems or improve safety. However, basic police agents considered it stimulating when projects started from the bottom (in contrast to top-down).

Police agents of the primary policing experienced an increase in activities. In the time they spent on those activities, they could not patrol the streets or do projects with partners in the safety chain. The increase in activities was due to the increased importance of complete and correct mutating and registering, the increase in (prescribed) police stops and arrests, including the registration of them, and systematically keeping an eye on persistent offenders, including the mutation of data.

In order to meet the number of fines and suspects to deliver to the Public Prosecutor, more checks and actions were organized, mostly at the domain of traffic. Many agents from the primary policing considered it pestering the citizens, while managers consider it a good way of 'scoring' cases.

Enforcement became more repressive (less was tolerated). Managers did not explicitly steer on repressiveness, but it was a consequence of the steering on the number of fines and arrests.

Most policemen considered the performance agreements attainable. Only the continuously increasing quota for cases to deliver to the Public Prosecutor was considered unattainable and also not in line with the change in behavior of citizens that was perceptible. Because of the great number of suspects that needed to be arrested, policemen had less time to patrol the streets informally and contact citizens.

Police officers had the impression that doing their work well was by fining. Their own opinion was that assessing situations was what made a police officer good. Sometimes, policemen especially looked for fines. Policemen that could not meet their fines quota participated in checks at a completely different domain, like traffic.

Concluding, policemen in the primary policing had to work harder and had to make other choices.

- Emergency help

  Also policemen in the emergency help experienced more workload. They also had to meet the fines quota, including the administrative load that came with it. However, the reactive emergency help itself did not change.

- Neighbourhood policing

  Policemen on the beat were often not used to fining. They did not like it either. This meant that fining became an established aspect of their work. Also the participation in

checks and actions, arrests, and the approach of persistent offenders were new aspects of their work. A good development was that the information position of policeman on the beat was better utilized.

Jochoms et al. (2006) found that mostly old policemen on the beat were against fining and did (only) want to help people. For them, the quota reduced their motivation. However, many young policemen on the beat believed that fining offences was part of police work and they felt less aversion.

The police had to make choices because of the pressure of suspects and persistent offenders. These choices involved that important aspects of the traditional neighbourhood police work could not be done anymore, like conversations with young people, mediation in case of quarrelling neighbours, informally patrolling the streets, etcetera. Both more fining and less attention for traditional neighbourhood police tasks brought about the concern that the legitimacy of the police would be affected and therefore the information position would get worse. Both managers and policemen on the beat expressed these concerns.

- Criminal investigation department (C.I.D)

    The workload of the C.I.D increased because of the production of suspects and the importance of complete and correct registration. Cooperation between teams was not recognized, because the team that did the arrest was rewarded, not the team that did the investigation. Furthermore, the agreements on number of case reports per investigator did not recognize the importance of teamwork.

    The performance contracts increased the attention for the quality of investigation, like complete and correct registration and the Kalsbeeknorm. This was a good development according to both managers and investigators.

    Criminal investigation departments separated incident directed investigation work and problem directed investigation work. Great cases were passed on to the C.I.D. on district level. This discouraged the local investigators that want to apply their specific knowledge and expertise about an area.

    The choices whether or not to deal with a specific case were changed. Before the performance agreements, costs (in time and manpower) and benefits (in social effects) were weighed. After the performance agreements, the focus was on arresting as many suspects as possible, in as little time and with as few people as possible.

    A proactive approach of cases and initiative were not stimulated by the performance agreements. Since the social effects of dealing with different types of criminal offences

were not taken into account, investigators experienced limited possibilities to arrest those people that caused trouble in areas.

Manages gave orders to investigate some cases more extensively in order to increase the number of suspects to deliver to the Public Prosecutor. This was a good thing, according to managers and investigators. However, cases with only one suspect were not investigated extensively in order to find out other criminal offences of this person, since it yielded only one suspect. This caused resistance for both victims and investigators that wanted to be professional in their work.

Investigators and policemen on the beat became less motivated since they believed that production was more important than the work they did or their contribution to safety. Furthermore, the increasing number of suspects weakened motivation. Policemen that arrested much more suspects did not feel proud, because they were still called to account because they did not attain the quota. Moreover, increasing the number of suspects each year did raise the idea that the improved safety, as a result of the increased number of arrests, was of no importance. Many police officers doubted more and more about the usefulness of both the performance agreements and the amount of the quota. Their maximum was reached and because citizens changed behavior, it became even more difficult to meet the quota.

The political and social pressure that was exerted on the police, increased the need for steering, both internally and externally. Many police forces already introduced new management or steering concepts, so steering on output is not only due to the performance contracts. It is a double, recursive movement that happened at the same time. The idea that the police should work more commercially and focus more on efficiency existed already.