



Institute of Social Studies

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

**New Episode of Farmer Movement in Indonesia:
Case Study of Pati Farmer Union**

A RESEARCH PAPER PRESENTED BY

Chasan Ascholani

(INDONESIA)

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for obtaining the degree of

**MASTERS OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
SPECIALIZATION:
RURAL LIVELIHOODS AND GLOBAL CHANGE**

MEMBERS OF THE EXAMINING COMMITTEE

**Dr. Murat Arsel
Prof. Dr. Ben White**

THE HAGUE, DECEMBER 2005

This document represents part of the author's study Programme while at the Institute of Social Studies: The view stated therein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Institute.

Research papers and theses are not made available for outside circulation by the Institute.

Enquiries:

Postal Address:

Institute of Social Studies
P O Box 29776
2502 LT, The Hague
The Netherlands

Telephone: 31 70 426 05 41

Fax: 31 70 426 07 47

Email: Voorvelt@iss.nl

Location:

Kortnaerkade 12
2518 AX, The Hague
The Netherlands

**To My Beloved Wife Uke Syarifatul Farida
and My Beloved Son M. Nabil Salim Asqolani:**

*“Living far a way from both of you has made my life filled by
loneliness, since only with you I can enjoy this life”.*

(The Hague, November 2006)

Foreword and Acknowledgements

This paper discusses the emergence of new farmer movements as a response of capitalistic development in agriculture sector applied in many developing countries. The structural adjustment program (SAP) brought by the World Bank is the reason of these new movements since farmers are trapped in and do not have control over markets. It observes Indonesia context by taking an example of Pati Farmers Union (Serikat Petani Pati-SPP). This choice is made because SPP was successful to pressure Pati local government to subsidize farmers for buying their paddies in 2004. In detail, this paper discusses the factors influencing the success of SPP advocacy for paddy prices issue. I wish it will be useful for those studying farmer movements in Indonesia since I think this type of movement will become greater due to consequences of SAP agenda.

In this regard, I would like to give my great appreciation to my supervisor Dr. Murat Arsel for his kindness to discuss with and give thoughtful ideas for me to improve my paper. My great thankfulness also goes to my second reader Prof. Dr. Ben White who has given very valuable comments for my analysis in this paper.

Moreover, I specially thanks to SPP activists, namely Gunritno, Tanto Pursidi, Husaini, Hardi, Sukilan, Kaseran, Nur Salim, Sulistyono, Kamelan, Sunhadi, who have kindly given much information about their activities. In their busy time, they still have time to discuss with and sometimes take me to some places. My special thanks are also to SHEEP activists, Andreas, Petrus, Ady Nugroho, and reporters from KOMPAS, Soeprpto, and from Wawasan, Jukari. They are really nice people to discuss with. They have given much information for my research. Furthermore, my special thanks go to representatives of the agriculture office and those of the local representative body who have kindly explored the government and local parliament point of views for SPP actions and activities. These opinions enrich my knowledge about the political opportunities at the local level.

I also would like to address my thankfulness to lecturers at ISS who have enhanced my understanding on rural livelihoods, globalization, development and many other issues. These are very useful either for my academic studies or my works in NGOs. ISS staffs have also contributed to make my life in Holland enjoyable. In addition, my grateful appreciations go to my Indonesian friends. They have shared the loneliness, information, knowledges, difficulties, and happiness with me for being living far a way from our families.

Additionally, I would like to express my great thanks to the Ford Foundation that has given me a great opportunity to take an academic skills training at Maastricht University and a masters degree at Institute of Social Studies (ISS) the Hague, the Netherlands. This valuable chance has changed my focus of study from Islamic studies to Development ones. My gratitudes also go to The Indonesian International Education Foundation (IIEF) and The Netherlands Education Centre (NEC) in Jakarta who have arranged all requirements for my study in the Netherlands.

Lastly, but surely not least, I greatly appreciate and thank to my wife Uke Syarifatul Farida and my son M. Nabil Salim Asqolani who have sacrificed and intensively supported for my study abroad. Their wishes, good spirits, and cheerfulness, give me an inner power to finish my study here. Eventhough I am far a way from them, they are always in my heart. Next, my gratitudes also go to my parents in Pati, abah Masálim and ummi Taslimah, and my parents in law in Jombang, Papa Suharyono and mama Nur Suwanah, and my family members: Hasan Mansur, Hasanatun Naímah, ning Varis Nuryana and her husband, Ema Chofsoh Pungkasari and her husband, who always encourage me to take this good opportunity and take care my family.

The Hague, November 2006

Chasan Ascholani

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword and Acknowledgements	i
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	iii
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES.....	v
ABBREVIATIONS	vi
ABSTRACT.....	viii
CHAPTER 1	1
Introduction.....	1
General Background	1
Indonesian Context	2
Objectives and Research Questions	4
Analytical Framework	5
Research Methods	5
CHAPTER 2	7
New Farmer Movement and Political Action: Theoretical Perspectives.....	7
Defining Peasantry.....	7
New Farmer Movements.....	8
Determinant Factors in Political Action	10
A. Farmers' Power	11
B. Political Opportunities.....	15
C. Strategies and Tactics.....	18
Summary	19
CHAPTER 3	20
An Overview of Pati Farmers and SPP Movement	20
A Description of Pati Farmers	20
SPP and its Advocacy for Paddy Prices.....	21
Other Issues raised by SPP	23
Summary.....	25

CHAPTER 4	26
SPP as a New Farmer Movement	26
SPP's Activists are not Peasants	26
The Emergence of New Farmer Movements	29
Summary	32
 CHAPTER 5	 33
SPP Actions for Paddy Price Protection	33
Rice Distribution Problem: Reasons for Action	33
SPP's Power	36
A. Common Interests	36
B. Collective Identity	37
The Openness of Political Opportunities	44
SPP's Strategies and Tactics	48
Summary	49
 CHAPTER 6	 51
Concluding Remarks	51
 BIBLIOGRAPHY	 55
LIST OF RESPONDENTS	60

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

FIGURES :

Figure 1. Tilly's mobilization model	18
Figure 2. Rice distribution channels	34
Figure 3. The factors influencing SPP advocacy for paddy price issue in 2004	50

TABLES :

Table 1. The differences between old peasants' and new farmers' movements.....	10
Table 2. Operated farm land distribution among farmer households in Pati	21
Table 3. Land ownership and other income sources of SPP activists.....	27
Table 4. The characteristics of SPP movement	31
Table 5. The distribution of land holding among farmer households in Sukolilo	38
Table 6. Educational background of SPP activists	41

ABBREVIATIONS

AoA	: Agreement on Agriculture
APBD	: Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah – Local Government Budget
BAPPEDA	: Badan Perencanaan Daerah – Local Planning Body
BPD	: Badan Perwakilan Desa – Village Representative Body
BPS	: Badan Pusat Statistik – Statistic Centre Bureau
BULOG	: Badan Urusan Logistik – Food Security Institution
DEPTAN	: Departemen Pertanian – Agriculture Department
FO	: Farmer Organization
FSPI	: Federasi Serikat Petani Indonesia – Indonesia Peasant Union Federation
GKP	: Gabah Kering Panen – Unhusked Paddy
HET	: Harga Eceran Tertinggi – Maximum Prices
HKTI	: Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia – Indonesia Farmer Union
IKM	: Identifikasi Kebutuhan Masyarakat – People’s Need Identification
IMF	: International Monetary Fund
KTNA	: Kontak Tani-Nelayan Andalan – Farmer and Fishermen Association
KUD	: Koperasi Unit Desa – Village-based Cooperative
NGO	: Non Governmental Organization
PDIP	: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan– Party of Democracy Indonesia Struggle
PKB	: Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa – Party of Nation Resurgence
PKT	: PT Pupuk Kaltim – Kaltim Fertilizer Inc.
PLG	: Pati Local Government
PLRA	: Pati Local Representative Assembly
SAP	: Structural Adjustment Program
SHEEP	: Society for Health, Education, Environment, and Peace
SPP	: Serikat Petani Pati – Pati Farmer Union

TNI : Tentara Nasional Indonesia – Indonesia National Military
WB : World Bank
WTO : World Trade Organization

ABSTRACT

The emergences of new farmer movements taking place in India, Costa Rica, and Senegal are signs of farmers' resistance against new policies on agriculture sector. Their demands which were not land reform like other peasant movements, instead remunerative prices, indicate the newness of these movements. Based on many researches, these are triggered by implementation of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) that promote privatization and market liberalization for many developing countries. Resulting from these programs, farmers find themselves are trapped in markets which are controlled by other actors, mainly big companies.

In fact, this phenomenon is also found in Indonesia where some farmer organizations have organized protests against the government. They demand subsidies and protections for lowering input costs and increasing output prices. One good example of this type of movement is presented by Pati Farmer Union (Serikat Petani Pati-SPP) that has raised issues of paddy and fertilizer prices, banning import rice, irrigation management, and others. This paper specifically focuses more on SPP's actions for paddy price issue in order to understand the determinant factors of the success of its advocacy in 2004 where tensions between farmers' power and political context were examined. For Indonesia context, this type of movement generates a new episode of farmer movements which pressure the government to intervene markets, especially for agriculture inputs and outputs.

... ..

... ..

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

General Background

The emergence of new farmers' movements in some regions in India, such as in Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, and Karnataka, during late 1970s and 1980s has been serious discussions among scholars to understand farmer responses to the capitalistic development in agriculture sector (Brass et al. 1994)¹. In those movements, the issue demanded was not land reform, but remunerative prices or lower cost of inputs (fertilizers, irrigation, credit, energy) and higher returns for outputs (crops, livestock). They were united as commodity producers who put the state as the target of agitation (Brass 1995: 35-36 and Lindberg 1995:101).

In fact, this type of movement also takes place in other countries like Costa Rica and Senegal. Farmers' movement in Costa Rica that was organized by small producers in Tierra Blanca emerged firstly in 1980s. They demanded price supports, input subsidies, interest rates, crop insurance, marketing mechanism, and technical assistance (Edelman 1999: 91-93). Moreover, McKeon et al (2004: 8-25) show the case of farmers' movement in Senegal. Since 1993, *The Conseil national de concertation et de cooperation des ruraux* (CNCR) has organized movements demanding for agricultural credit, inputs and equipment, moratorium for farmers' debt, and involvement in negotiation with the World Bank (WB) for agricultural program planning.

Based on their studies, Brass (1995:6), Gill (1995: 208), Lindberg (1995:120), Edelman (1999: 96-100), and McKeon, Watts and Wolford (2004: 21-25), conclude that the emergence of new farmers' movements is a result of capitalism development in agriculture where farmers as producers are trapped in markets which are beyond their control. Neoliberal policies that brings structural adjustment program (SAP) and financial stabilization promoted and supported by WB and IMF (International

¹ See the serious discussion in the Journal of Peasant Studies. *Special Edition on New farmers' Movements in India*. Edited by Tom Brass. Volume 21 Number 3 and 4. April/July 1994. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.

Monetary Fund), has caused serious changes in rural communities regarding changes of social, political, and economical environments surrounding their lives.

In this case, Pieper and Taylor (1998:13) state that one of the WB's functions is to "reduce state intervention, and to add "transparency" to the economy, liberalization, and privatization". It means that markets will take control over all productions and distributions of goods and services, while the state role in the structural adjustment concept is just as "guarantor of property rights and the money supply" (Stein 1994: 1844). In doing so, it has authority to use violence to do its tasks.

The fact that SAP has failed to increase people welfare shows the reason for farmers' resistance. Weisbrot et al (quoted from Lefebvre 2003: 27) report that after neoliberal policies implementation from 1980 to 2000, compared to 20 years before, the rates of economic growth and other indicators like life expectancy, infant and child mortality, education, and literacy were declining. In addition, Grinspun (2003: 51) also states that neoliberalism has created "large inefficiencies that cause serious social, economic, and ecological harm".

Besides, liberalization in agriculture sector promoted by World Trade Organization (WTO) through Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) has hampered farmers' livelihoods as small producers since governments do not protect them any more. This agreement consists of three issues. First, governments have to reduce their subsidies for agriculture either for inputs or outputs. Second, increasing market access should be guaranteed through liberalizing import regimes by reducing import tariffs, "tariffication" of all non-tariff barriers that will be reduced, and tariff rate quotas. Third, all members have to reduce their subsidies for exporters, so that they will compete with other producers from other countries (Grispun 2003: 57-59).

Indonesian Context

In Indonesia, farmers' disappointments are indicated by many protests raising issues of rice and fertilizer prices and banning imported rice. One example of this action is presented by Pati Farmer Union (Serikat Petani Pati-SPP) which has pressured Pati local government (PLG) to support them to be able to compete in rice markets. In fact,

this union has raised issues of paddy and fertilizers prices and others. This is different from many peasant movements taking place in Indonesia since 1980s. Firmansyah et al (1999: 151-153), after conducting researches in 11 provinces, found that most of peasant movements are based on conflict of land expropriation done by the government, big companies or Indonesian Army in the name of "development". Therefore, they always demand land reform.

Unlike other peasant movements, SPP focuses more on policy advocacy activities through negotiation with PLG and other economic actors. For instance, in 2003/2004 it asked subsidies from PLG to run rice barn for prices bargaining (Kompas 09/02/2004). These activities were successful to raise farmers' bargaining power to PLG and rice traders for increasing paddy prices. Besides, recently SPP has also demanded the producers and distributors of fertilizers to guarantee that farmers will have fertilizers at the maximum price set up by the government (Harga Eceran Tertinggi-HET) (Jawa Pos 28/07/2006). This is a good example of farmers' resistance against the government policies on agriculture.

These farmers' protests shown by SPP movement and others indicate that the government's policies on agriculture have made farmers feel disappointed. For instance, rice liberalization has lowered rice prices which become serious problem for farmers. In detail, on September 1998 the government did rice liberalization in response to the recommendations of IMF and WB (Ariga and Kitano, 2000: 18). Then, on 1 December 1998, Indonesia agreed to accept a reform package from WB and IMF that Indonesia should:

"(1) liberalize her rice market by allowing rice prices to be determined by market mechanism and private companies to import rice; (2) special market operations for rice at subsidised prices are to be targeted only at food insecure people; (3) the rate of rice subsidies are to be reduced to a maximum of 20 percent of BULOG base price; (4) all food subsidies other than rice subsidies should be eliminated; and (5) fertilizer subsidies should be eliminated" (Oxfam-GB, 2001: 5).

Moreover, Indonesia had a commitment to WTO that:

"Indonesia has committed itself to a bound tariff ceiling of 180 percent of rice imports. This tariff will have to be decreased to 160 percent in 2004. Furthermore, Indonesia has agreed to guarantee access for 70.000 tons of rice from other countries" (Oxfam-GB, 2001: 6).

Due to this problem, Indonesia government has tried to intervene on food prices and its distribution through the state institution of food security (Badan Urusan Logistik-BULOG). Its functions, indicated in the government decree (Peraturan Pemerintah - PP) number 7 in 2003, are to manage good quality and enough food for people, to control food prices, to manage the government's buffer stocks, and to distribute food to particular groups decided by the government (BULOG. 2003a). In detail, the government has four main objectives in rice markets, namely:

“setting a “high enough” floor price to stimulate production; establishing a ceiling price which assures a reasonable price for consumers; maintaining sufficient range between these two prices to provide traders and millers a reasonable profit after holding rice between crop seasons; and keeping an “appropriate” price relationship between domestic and international markets” (Robinson et al. 1998: 5).

These aim to accommodate all interests of farmers, traders, and consumers in order to prevent their unrests. Nonetheless, this intervention is still not working properly to help small and poor farmers for competing in rice markets.

Objectives and Research Questions

As a farmer movement, SPP has raised many issues, but due to limited time this paper focuses only on SPP's action for paddy prices issue in 2004. It also discusses a little bit of fertilizer prices and other issues raised by SPP aiming for giving a comprehensive picture of SPP movement and distinguishing it from old peasant movements. The objective is to understand the type of SPP movement and the determinant factors of the successful advocacy organized by SPP in order to pressure PLG to subsidize farmers for storing paddies aiming for higher prices in 2004. Regarding the objective, the author formulates a main research question, namely:

“Why was SPP successful to pressure the local government in order to allocate budget for subsidizing farmers in the annual budget of 2004?”

The three sub-questions are:

1. Can SPP movement be categorized as a peasant movement?
2. How did SPP movement negotiate with PLG to achieve its aims?
3. What factors influenced on the success of SPP advocacy?

Analytical Framework

In order to answer the question, the author discusses five concepts. First, it is necessary to define “peasantry” aiming for distinguishing it from “farm entrepreneurs” to categorize who SPP activists really are. In this paper, Shanin’s (1990) and Ellis’s (1993) concepts of peasantry are used to understand who SPP activists are. Second, debate on new farmer movements taking place in India is raised in order to explain the differences between old peasant movement and new farmer movement. Some authors, namely Assadi, Brass, Gill, and Lindberg (1995) have contributed in this issue.

Third, the concepts explaining farmers’ power to struggle for their interests, consist of common interest as incentives for peasants (Olson: 1971, Foweraker: 1995, and Wilson: 1973), group identity (Blumer: 1995, Gamson: 2005, Hunt and Benford: 2004, Huizer: 1980, Pakulski: 1995, and Whittier: 2002), leaders in movements (Edelman: 1999, Huizer: 1980, Morris and Satggenborg: 2004, and Wilson: 1973), and capability to organize movement (Edward and Mccarthy: 2004 and Shively: 2003). Fourth, the theory of political opportunity gives explanation about conditions and situations that provide chances for SPP to struggle for their interests. In this paper, the basic theory of political opportunity from Tarrow (1998) is applied which contains five dimensions. In addition, this theory is also discussed by Kriesi (2004) and Shah (2002).

Fifth, the choice of strategy is applied in the purpose of complementing farmers’ power in describing the use of power. It explains some activities in order to do policy advocacy, such as demonstration, alliance, opinion building, and negotiation. These theories derive from Gamson (1998 and 2004), Heywood (2002), Shively (2003), Whittier (2002), and Wilson (1973).

Research Methods

This research uses qualitative method where both primary and secondary data are analyzed. It gives description and explanation of SPP movement and the determinant factors influencing the success of SPP’s advocacy for paddy price issue.

Primary data are obtained through semi-structured interviews and informal conversations with 19 respondents. First, SPP activists, who are from different sub-districts, are interviewed as representatives of the union. They are also leaders in local groups who engage with the union activities. Moreover, participatory observation is done by joining in SPP's meetings, either formal or informal ones, from 15 July to 31 August 2006. In doing this, the author did informal conversations with some people met in the meetings.

Furthermore, two members of Pati local representative assembly (PLRA), namely members of Commission B, are interviewed, as they intensively discussed with SPP to negotiate for policy making. Then, the representatives from PLG, the agriculture office, are important informants, especially those who worked with SPP for negotiation and implementation of the policy. Afterwards, activists of Society for Health, Education, Environment and Peace (SHEEP), a Yogyakarta based NGO working with farmers in Pati, are other informants. They have played an important role in discussing the issues and strategies with SPP; and one of its staffs intensively involves in SPP's board. Finally, media reporters from Wawasan and KOMPAS are interviewed as contributors in opinion building for the issue raised by SPP. In these data collections, triangulation data is ensured by cross-checking among SPP's members, SHEEP activists, PLRA's members and government officers.

Documents collected for primary data are SPP's documents and local newspapers reporting the advocacy process. While for secondary data, the author uses data from statistic centre (Badan Pusat Statistik-BPS) and researches done by others who have given descriptions and explanations on peasants' movements and rice price policies in Indonesia. Moreover, some researches on new farmers' movements done in other countries, especially those in India, will be used to provide comparison between new farmer and old peasant movements.

CHAPTER 2

New Farmer Movement and Political Action: Theoretical Perspectives

This chapter gives theoretical framework to understand concepts and debates on peasant movements and determinant factors influencing the success or failure of movements. First, it explains the two different concepts of peasantry. Then, it discusses the differences between old peasant and new farmer movements. Finally, this chapter explores the determinant factors from different perspectives, namely farmer's power, political opportunity, and strategy.

Defining Peasantry

The term "peasant" is often used to describe the rural poor, so that their movements are called as peasant movements. According to Shanin (1990: 23-24), "peasantry consists of small agricultural producers who, with the help of simple equipment and the labour of their families, produce mainly for their own consumption and for the fulfilment of obligations to the holders of political and economic power". In order to explain this definition, Shanin (1990: 41-43) gives general types of peasants, namely: (1) the peasant-family farm is the basic unit of multi-dimensional social organizations; (2) land husbandry is the main source of their livelihood and consumption needs; (3) they have specific culture of the way of life which is usually close to their natural environment; and (4) they are dominated by outsiders who are basically landlords or rural elites.

Shanin's definition is clear to point out rural poor called "peasant". However, the second type is not clear enough to differentiate among tenants, small land holders, and sharecroppers, for landownership issue; whether they all are included as peasants or not. Moreover, as stated by Kearney (quoted from Edelman 1999: 189) "the peasant is no longer an identity supported by contemporary social conditions". Some reasons mentioned are (1) they depend on non agricultural activities for significant portion of their income. In many cases, they become temporary wage labourers for non farm activities, (2) migration out of rural people has created multifaceted or even trans-

national identities, and (3) they participate in cultural practices of a modern or post-modern world, like dressing, listening music, using technology and so forth.

In this issue, Ellis (1993: 13) gives a definition in economic perspective that “peasants are households which derive their livelihoods mainly from agriculture, utilise mainly family labour in farm production, and are characterized by partial engagement in input and output markets which are often imperfect or incomplete”. Emphasizing the last criterion, Ellis wrote that when peasants “become wholly committed to production in fully formed markets”, they are not peasants anymore, instead farm entrepreneurs. Fully formed markets occur when some important conditions, such as diversity and abundance of information, transport, mobility, inputs, outlets and consumer goods, are fulfilled in markets.

New Farmer Movements

Shanin (1987: 360-361) classifies peasant political actions into three types. First, *autonomous class action* is suggested by Marxist theory. This action occurs when a social class crystallizes in conflict, creates their own ideology, identity, aims and leaders. The conflict is based on class where peasants as a class are dominated and pressured by upper class like landlords or rural elites. The second one is *guided political action* meaning that peasants are organized and moved by an external power-elite which unites them. In some cases, peasants’ actions are used by elites to gain their interests. Third, peasants can organize *amorphous political action*. It takes two forms of actions, namely (a) local riots as a sudden reaction to the government policy resulting from accumulated frustration, and (b) peasants passivity like peasant disobedience.

In addition, Shanin (1990: 158-160) mentions the characters of peasant actions which are applied to all the three types of actions. First, peasants tend to fight for land rather than for broader political aims, to be preoccupied with local day-to-day concerns rather than with general long-term aims and complex ideologies. Second, peasants remain disunited and politically naive. Third, peasants do not control their leaders. In other words, they are the object and tool, rather than the subject, of political actions.

Furthermore, Paige (quoted from Fauzi 2005: 24) explains when and under what condition peasant movements occur. Peasants will organize action when: (1) using their lands, landlords always hold the power to control peasants, (2) peasants mobility to enter the higher class is impeded, and (3) work condition of peasants allow them to build solidarity. The first two are the reasons why peasants want to protest, while the third one is the condition when peasants are able to organize themselves.

All movements demanding land reform, such as land division and land redistribution, and based on social class conflict are indicated as "old peasant movements". The characters of these movements correspond to Shanin's definition and criteria of peasant. However, in 1994 there was a debate on the issue of "new farmers' movements" taking place in India during late 1970s and 1980s. Instead of demanding land, these movements brought other issues, namely remunerative prices.

Some examples of these movements are those in India, Costa Rica, and Senegal. Those are called new farmers' movements because those are different from the features of old peasant movements. Brass (2000: 108) explains that the newness of new farmers' movements are: (1) those are led by rich farmers, (2) those are non-political form of mobilization, meaning that there is no political interest, (3) these movements specifically put the state as a target of agitation because of the assumption that the state must be responsible for regulations benefiting to farmers, (4) farmers are united as commodity producers, not class-based line, and (5) they demand remunerative prices. Nonetheless, in the case of movements in India, Brass still questioned some characters above. For example, it cannot be denied that there were the existence of class and closeness to a political party either right or left parties. The leaders in the farmers' movements came from upper class, and had close relationship with political elites.

Close to Brass' identification, Dhanagore, Joshi, and Shahasrabudhey (quoted by Assadi. 1995: 215) also give four characters of new farmers' movements. First, farmers are not like the image of peasants which are 'simple', 'spiritual', 'traditional', and 'passive'. Second, they are united as rural mass and not differentiated by class, ethnicity, community, caste, and religion. Third, they stress on the importance of remunerative prices. Fourth, they are apolitical. However, for Assadi these characters

are still questionable. While, Lindberg (1995: 101) distinguishes new farmers' movements from old peasants' movements by giving three main characters: (1) the issue raised is remunerative prices, (2) the organizers and leaders are middle and rich farmers, and (3) the target of agitation is the state. In this case, Webster (2004: 4) believed that "the politics and practice of the rural poor today is to engage with the state", either by conflict and open contestation or by patronage and primordial connection.

Based on the discussion above, the differences between old peasant and new farmer movements are summarized in the table below.

Table 1. The differences between old peasants' and new farmers' movements

	Old Peasants' Movements	New Farmers' Movements
Issue raised	Land to the tiller	Remunerative prices
Members/Leaders	Landless labourers, small tenants, and poor peasants	Middle and rich peasants
Target of agitation	Landlords	State
Form of mobilization	Political	Non-political
Identity	Social class	Commodity producers or rural mass

Source: combined from Assadi, Brass, Dhanagore, Joshi, Lindberg, and Shahasrabudhey (1995).

Determinant Factors in Political Action

The arguments about factors that determine the success or failure of farmers' political action are various. Shah (2002: 17) states general components of social movement, namely objectives, ideology, programmes, leadership, and organization. These elements are interdependent and influencing each other. These relate to stages of social movements introduced by Blumer (quoted from Udehn. 1996: 290). The stages are (1) agitation to organize and make people to move, (2) development of *esprit de corps* as means to unite them, (3) development of morale which will be in forms of solidarity and commitment, (4) formation of ideology, and (5) development of operating tactics chosen to gain their goals.

All these components and stages are derived from the farmers' side which can be generalized as farmers' power and tactics, whereas there is political context which influences much on the success and failure of farmer movements. Other actors, such as NGOs, political parties, government officers, parliament members, and media, also play important roles in determining the frame and dynamic of farmer movements. In this issue, Kriesi (2004) and Tarrow (1998) introduce the concept of political opportunity which is able to shape social movements. To summarize, there are three main factors influencing farmer movements, those are farmers' power, strategies and tactics, and political opportunity. Aiming for systematic analysis, the issue of political opportunity is discussed before the issue of strategy and tactics.

A. Farmers' Power

According to Crozier and Friedberg (1980: 40), sources of power are special skills and functional specialization, relation between an organization and its environments, control of communication and information, and the existence of general organizational rules. If farmers are able to obtain those, they will be successful to hold power for bargaining with other actors. Nonetheless, Wolf (1987: 370-371) realizes that "the poor peasant or the landless labourer, who depends on a landlord for the largest part of his livelihood, or the totality of it, has no tactical power". The reasons behind are: they often work alone and in routine works; feudalistic relationship with landlords drives them to not participate in action as they are resistant to dislocation; and their past exclusion from political participation discourages them to be involved in movements. Therefore, they rely on external power to challenge the power which constrains them. Consequently, only those who are land owners or middle and rich peasants (farmers) and peasants outside of landlords' control, are able to sustain protests against dominant power holders.

In doing so, farmers need some elements to be able to organize strong political action. *First*, they need common interests that will become their incentives to act. Wilson (1973: 194) states "the vision of a goal to be obtained through collective action is the *raison d'etre* of social movements". MacIver explains it further that "the common interest is always a direct social interest" (Udehn: 1996: 278), meaning that common

interest has to be socially agreed and constructed by all members, otherwise internal conflict, as a result of dissatisfaction of some members or leaders, will become a serious problem. In this case, Udehn (1996: 281) warns that group size has an effect on finding common interest. "The larger the group, the less interest members of the group have in common".

Many cases show the incentives are economic benefits, such as subsidies from the government, land distribution for landless peasants, and increase of returns. However, the incentives are not necessarily economic motives. It can be prestige, respect, friendship, and other social and psychological objectives (Olson 1971: 6-7). These could be combined with social and political benefits as investment for future improvements, for instance environmental improvement and political participation in decision making.

The logic of this common interest is given by Scott (quoted from Foweraker 1995: 80) mentioning the reasons for people to organize political action. People will react to change their position, when they are excluded from social benefits and/or from political decision-making. These conditions lead people to share morality and a sense of injustice to develop social power generated by social mobilization of their participants (Frank and Fuentes 2002: 37-38). It will be the fact if there is the absence of social and political institutions that work for and defend their interests.

Second, collective identity is important to unite farmers under one movement to achieve the same goals. This identity will result in solidarity and commitment among followers and leaders. According to Snow (quoted from Hunt and Benford (2004: 440) "collective identity is a shared sense of "we-ness" and "collective agency". Explaining this, Pizzorno states that social movement actors share not only specific concerns, but also ideas, beliefs, solidarity and sense of belonging (Diani. 1992: 111). Those are able to build collective identity.

Consequently, this definition requires something that will become means to unite farmers into one identity. This can be in a form of natural or inherited one, such as identities based on particular ethnic or race, but it can also be socially constructed (Tarrow 1998: 119), especially for collective actions that have purposes for broader

issues like remunerative prices. Relating to Tarrow's ideas, Whittier (2002: 290) adds that collective identity is also shaped by the relationship with external contexts. It influences the dynamics of groups, and consequently it will reconstruct their identities when they are in negotiation or in conflict with other groups.

While in Marxist theory, social class is the means to organize people since it is an identity that belongs to specific people in social stratification. Pakulski (1995: 75) believes that "all important social conflicts have a class basis and class character because class represents the key social dimension of modern (capitalist) society". The concept of social class defined by Shanin (1990: 33) is "a unity of interest, expressed in group subcultures, group consciousness and group action, shaped in turn by the conflict-relationships with other classes". Peasantry as described by Shanin is a social class because it is shaped by the conflict between peasants and landlords or rural elites. For building class consciousness, Huizer (1980: 166-173) mentions three factors, namely stimulating awareness of being exploited by other class, the role of strong and charismatic leaders, and the use of 'conflict model' to create militant groups.

Unlike Marx who introduced only class identity, Weber brought up three group identities, namely class, status, and party. "Class exists when a category of people have similar specific and significant components of their life chances determined by commodity and labour markets". While status is "'proper' lifestyles and a collective sense of we-ness that revolves around social esteem or 'honour' (either positive or negative senses)". Then, a party is "a social group with a shared identity that is concerned with power, the ability to influence others, even against their will" (Gamson 2004: 435). Compare to the concept of social class, the three identities are more relevant to present conditions because people are not only divided by social classes.

To build identity as *esprit de corps*, Blumer (1995: 67-68) proposes three ways to develop it. First, movements have to conduct the development of in-group--out-group relation, so it will be clear who are involved in the movements and who are not (outsiders). Second, the formation of informal fellowship association is also an important method which is able to strengthen the feeling of closeness among members

as they feel that they are in the same kinship. Third, many movements create followers participation in formal ceremonial behaviour to give impression of seriousness.

Resulting from strong collective identity, members of movements will have solidarity for each other and commitment to the movements. Hunt and Benford (2004: 439) defines solidarity as “rooted in the configuration of relationships linking the members of a group to one another”. It has two facets, namely “a body of confederates that can be identified as a collective and a spirit that involves feelings of identification with that group”. Emphasizing this, Gamson (2004: 434) writes that “solidarity gives rise to social cohesion and depends upon an awareness of and identification with a collective”. Then, as another result of identity, “commitments can be seen as an individual’s identification with a collective that leads to instrumental, affective, and moral attachments that lead to investments in movement lines of activity” (Hunt and Benford 2004: 440).

Third, strong leadership is an essential requirement for farmer movements to organize and manage their movements’ dynamics. Edelman (1999: 194) and Huizer (1980: 169-170) mention that peasant movements need charismatic leaders who are in most cases, are better-off peasants or at least less poor ones. James Petras (quoted by Webster 2004: 23) and Morris and Staggenborg (2004: 174) also emphasize that peasant leaders are educated peasants with strong organizational capacities.

Leaders play roles to mobilize followers, negotiate with politicians, and build relation to news media so that their voices are heard (Edelman 1999: 194). Morris and Staggenborg (2004: 181) add that leaders influence movements by “setting goals and developing strategies, creating movement organizations and shaping their structures, and forging connections among activists, organizations, and levels of action”. These statements show the importance of leaders in social movements for achieving their goals.

In this element, Blumer introduced four types of leaders: agitator, prophet, statesman, and administrator (Wilson. 1973: 195). Agitator leaders have strong courage and oratorical skills to influence others in order to follow them. Prophet leaders are like

prophets who have strong ideology and vision to be implemented. Then, statesman leaders have ability as good diplomats to negotiate with other actors. Finally, administrator leaders are managers who manage and integrate all resources to be devoted for goal achievement.

Fourth, farmer movements need organizational capability to mobilize resources, like money and labour, in order to carry out their activities. Edwards and McCarthy (2004: 118, 132-133) add two other resources, namely organization building and collective action. In order to obtain these resources, social movements need to have means of access; these are aggregation such as building networks and forming coalition, self-production by founding social movement organizations to conduct activities, cooptation/appropriation by recruiting local affiliates from existing organization, and patronage that is being close to and loaned by sympathetic individuals. Olson (1971: 121) emphasizes on members as resources to be mobilized. The greater the members that movements have, the greater their power to pressure other actors.

However, Shively (2003: 271-273) warns that collective actions often have three problems. First, "not all interests are equally well organized". Some of them may be neglected by the process how movements are organized. Second, "some groups command a disproportionate voice in the interest-group system because they have special advantages". This can be as a consequence of the first problem because some movements are not organized democratically. Third, their leaders are not closely responsive to the members' wishes, and in many cases they just think of their own interests.

B. Political Opportunities

Kitschelt (quoted from Kriesi 2004: 69) states that "political opportunity structures influence the choice of protest strategies and the impact of social movements on their environment". In order to understand the degree of openness of the political opportunity structures, Kriesi (2004: 70) defines that it is "a function of its (territorial) centralization and the degree of its (functional) separation of power". In other words, if the governance administration is decentralized which separates its power, the political opportunity is greater.

In detail, Tarrow (1998: 76-80) introduces five dimensions of the political opportunity. First, increasing access to participate in policy making emerges as a result of policies set up by the government. It usually comes from democratization and decentralization process which gives opportunities to civil society organizations to involve in development process. Second, instability of political alignments encourages marginal groups to exercise their power to compete with other political organizations like political party.

Third, fraction among elites leads to outbreaks of contention. Some elites will cooperate with people organizations which have real interests as representative of their members to gain political power. Fourth, influential allies coming from either NGOs or political parties will encourage excluded groups to do protests, since they feel having friends who will support, defend, and even represent them in negotiation with policy makers. NGOs are often good alliances for people movements to struggle for their interests, since NGOs have responsibility to do empowerment for civil society (Thomas. 1992: 136-138). However, as warned by Frank and Fuentes (2002: 55), alliances with NGOs or political parties are also in danger of cooptation.


Discussing this, Chapman and Fisher (2000:158-159) describe the advantages and disadvantages of the three structures of formulating collaboration between NGOs and farmer movements. First, *pyramid structure* allows NGOs to speak in the name of farmers with authority from them. However, this structure will neglect NGOs' role on empowering farmer organizations (FOs), because they only focus on pressuring the government. The question of the legitimacy also emerges if NGOs always speak on behalf of farmers as they are not FOs. Second, by building *wheel structure*, NGOs function like FOs. They have the same role to exchange information, but the process in this structure is slow, so it will miss sudden opportunities in political context. Finally, the third structure is *web structure*. NGOs can take position as the centre of the collaboration where NGOs provide key and important information for FOs' advocacy. Nonetheless, it is slow to take action, as FOs are sporadically distributed to all arenas.

Unlike the three structures above, Edwards and Hulme (2002: 64) emphasize that the function of NGOs when they are involved in supporting local initiatives, is more on

'process', namely awareness and consciousness raising, group formation, leadership building, and training in management skills, rather than the 'content' of agenda and activities which will be held by local organizations. The reason for this is the vision that only those who have problems and interests are logically acceptable to struggle for their own interest. Accordingly, NGOs cannot directly approach the government either by lobbying or campaigning in public arena as NGOs are not representative of local people, in this case farmers.

Fifth, declining state's ability to repress people is a chance for challengers to struggle for their goals. Many states do repressive approach to deal with people protest; and sometimes this approach leads to opposition organizations formed by people to exercise their power against the government. Explaining this, Tilly states that "repression can either depress collective action or raise the costs of organizing and mobilizing opinion" (Tarrow. 1998: 83). By contrast, sometimes the state also facilitates people's organization like farmer organizations to participate in policy making. The state will facilitate "those movements which have reformist demands within the institutional framework than those movements which aim at overthrowing and replacing state power" (Shah 2002: 23). In this concept, Tilly gives a good description of repression and facilitation affecting on collective action. It is shown in the figure below.

Figure 1. Tilly's mobilization model



Source: adapted from Udehn (1996: 304)

C. Strategies and Tactics

According to Whittier (2002: 299), strategizing is “the process of interpreting political opportunities, cultural acceptability, goals, and the tactics likely to promote change”. Generally, the strategy of collective action is **persuasion, bargaining, and coercion** (Turner quoted from Wilson 1973: 228). Nonetheless, the choosing of strategies depends on the particular social, economic, and political contexts where collective action takes place.

For this purpose, Gamson (2004: 254) introduces two means for influencing policy makers, namely (1) persuasion, that is changing the orientation of decision makers through reframing the issue, and (2) inducements and constraints. Inducements are promoting advantages if policy makers do particular activities, while constraints are discouraging them by giving disadvantages to do so. This is applied by changing the situation where the target of influence operates. In doing these, media is the central instrument to make them work. Gamson (1988: 224) and Wilson (1973: 251) believe that media is able to attract people’s attention and deliver movement messages to public.

In doing persuasion strategy, people organizations can do lobbying to policy makers aiming to influence them to put their interests in policies. Heywood (2002: 13) lists some organizations to lobby with, namely bureaucracy, assembly, courts, political parties, mass media, and supranational bodies. However, the power to lobby depends on the organization's resources; those are public sympathy, the size of its membership or activist, its financial strength and organizational capabilities, its ability to use sanction, and personal or institutional links to government or political parties.

By contrast, coercion strategy needs tactics like strike, land occupation, industrial sabotage, and mass demonstrations. The purpose of these is to force policy makers to adopt people interests and fit in the policies being created. While, for doing bargaining strategy, movements can release petitions, do legal actions, build up grass-root organizations, public campaign, use of economic power, electoral activity, and negotiate with state officials (summarized from Edelman (1999: 196), Huizer (1980: 177 and 182), Shively (2003: 278-282), and Tarrow (1998: 99)).

Summary

In short, the social concept of peasantry was introduced by Shanin, while Ellis gave an economic perspective. Discussing the newness of new farmer movements, some authors described five criteria on issues, leaders, target of agitation, form of mobilization, and identity, to distinguish these from old peasant movements. However, some criteria were questioned for the case of movements in India. Theoretically, the determinant factors of the success or failure of farmer movements could be farmer's power deriving from the four elements, namely common interest, collective identity, leaders, and organizational capacity, and/or political opportunities, and/or the choice of strategies.

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

2. The second part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

3. The third part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

4. The fourth part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

5. The fifth part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

6. The sixth part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

7. The seventh part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

8. The eighth part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

9. The ninth part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

10. The tenth part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

11. The eleventh part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

12. The twelfth part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

13. The thirteenth part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

14. The fourteenth part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

15. The fifteenth part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

16. The sixteenth part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

17. The seventeenth part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

18. The eighteenth part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

19. The nineteenth part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

20. The twentieth part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

21. The twenty-first part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

22. The twenty-second part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

23. The twenty-third part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

24. The twenty-fourth part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

25. The twenty-fifth part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

26. The twenty-sixth part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

27. The twenty-seventh part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

28. The twenty-eighth part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

29. The twenty-ninth part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

30. The thirtieth part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

31. The thirty-first part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

32. The thirty-second part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

33. The thirty-third part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

34. The thirty-fourth part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

35. The thirty-fifth part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses.

CHAPTER 3

An Overview of Pati Farmers and SPP Movement



This chapter describes a feature of Pati farmers and SPP movement. For describing SPP movement, first it gives detail chronological activities for paddy price advocacy in 2003-2004. Then, it explains a little bit other issues raised by SPP in order to understand the complete picture of SPP movement and to analyze it according to the criteria of new farmer movement discussed in chapter 2.

A Description of Pati Farmers

The features of Pati farmers are described by BPS Pati (agriculture census 2003). It reported that in 2003 Pati had 330,569 households, and about 55.54 percent (183,588) were farmer households who were mostly living in Sukolilo, Pucakwangi, Kayen and Winong sub-districts. On average, they held 0.51 Ha land which was used for agriculture activities and their houses. However, a lot of farmer households were *petani gurem* (peasants who operate less than 0.5 Ha). BPS noted that 50.21 to 84.42 percent of farmer households in each sub-districts were *petani gurem*. For example, the two greatest number of *petani gurem* were those in Sukolilo (7883 households) and in Winong (7289 households). Ironically, 63 percent of *petani gurem* only held less than 2500m², and 38,188 households just operated less than 1000m². The detail operated farm land distribution among farmer households is shown in the table below.

Table 2. Operated farm land distribution among farmer households in Pati

=<4,999m ²	5000-9,999m ²	10,000- 24,999m ²	25,000- 34,999m ²	=>35,000m ²
124,471	37,441	18,299	1,800	1,577

Source: Agriculture Census BPS Pati 2003.

This table states that 88.19 percent of farmer households in Pati held less than 1 Ha land. It means the majority of them were small farmers, while it was only 0.86 percent who could be called as rich farmers since they operated more than 3.5 Ha. In fact, the Agriculture Census 2003 did not provide data on landless peasants. It just describes the difference between all households (330,569) and farmer households (183,588). Accordingly, the 146,981 households were not farmer households, but it does not mean that they all were landless peasants, because some of them might work in other sectors like being traders or government officers. The data only notes that there were 149,473 households working as wage labourers in agriculture sector. Logically, they were mostly landless peasants and those who operated less than 0.5 Ha land (*petani gurem*).

SPP and its Advocacy for Paddy Prices

Officially, SPP was formed on 3 October 2003 by farmers coming from some sub-districts in Pati, namely Sukolilo, Jakenan, Tambakromo, Tlogowungu, Gembong, Pucakwangi, and Margorejo aiming to organize farmers for paddy price issue. The reason of founding this organization was they realized that the government neglected farmers' interest in its policies for agriculture development (SPP's document 2004). Actually, since 2000 SPP activists have built networking with some local farmer groups in several sub-districts facilitated by a Yogyakarta based NGO, CD Bethesda, for issue of health care and disaster relief. This background has given them opportunities to question their lives relating to farming, such as flood and drought, high inputs cost and low output returns.

Before forming SPP, Sukolilo farmers had organized a demonstration against PLRA demanding access to BULOG. Then, SPP initiated to bring up the issue of paddy price at the local level in the end of 2003 by conducting a public discussion between

farmers, PLG, PLRA, BULOG, and an expert from Yogyakarta, Wahono from Cindelaras (an NGO). In this discussion, PLG represented by the agriculture office said that it was not possible for PLG to protect paddy price as it needed 700 billion rupiahs, whereas its budget (APBD) was only 500 billion rupiahs (SPP's document 2004). In short, it did not have any idea to solve the problem, low paddy prices, and then PLRA representatives asked SPP to formulate an idea.

Therefore, SPP and farmers proposed a program for paddy price protection. The program was, SPP would borrow money (3.5 billion rupiahs) from APBD to buy its members' paddies when harvest time came since at that moment paddy price was much lower than the floor price set up by the government. Then, these paddies would be stored for three to four months aiming to wait for higher price. When higher price is coming, they will sell the paddies, and return the money to PLG. The reason to concern more on paddy prices instead of rice prices was small farmers usually just sell paddies. They called this system as *tunda jual* (postponing to sell). Nevertheless, after negotiation for several times, the commission B of PLRA just recommended for lending 1.5 billion rupiahs, and it was not final decision.

Finally, after struggling for many times and devoting much energy to pressure PLG and PLRA, they accepted SPP's proposal to allocate fund for paddy price protection in the APBD 2004. The program agreed was, PLG asked SPP members to borrow money from a local bank, and it provided 500 million rupiahs (about 55,500 USD) to pay for the interest; so it was called subsidized credits. It chose this way to conduct the program because as being ruled by the central government, PLG cannot lend money from APBD as it is just for grant (interviews with the two agriculture officers). This was the first time for PLG to provide fund for paddy price protection, and to involve a 'real' farmer organization in the annual program planning.

In evaluation, farmers concluded that this program failed to solve the problems due to some reasons. First, the credits were given to farmers on June, July and August 2004 when the second harvest was already finished in many sub-districts. Therefore, some farmer groups did not use the money for buying paddies since there were no paddies left in farmers' hand. Actually, farmers were expecting to have credits during the first harvest on January and February 2004 when paddy prices were the lowest due to rainy

season. Bureaucratic process caused this late of credits. Second, for farmers these credits just benefited to the bank which got interests from APBD, while farmers needed to work hard to gain profits, since this program was not like what they proposed. Third, not all SPP members were ready to access and manage these credits. That was why SPP could not take all subsidies to borrow money from the bank. Although there were some constraints, farmers still could return all the credits (interviews with Husaini, Tanto, and Gunritno).

Other Issues raised by SPP

In order to understand SPP movement as a new farmer movement, it is necessary to know other issues raised by SPP. Irrigation issue had been raised by Sukolilo farmers before they formed and joined SPP. The problem was, many Sukolilo farmers were facing flood in their rice fields when rainy season, so that many of them had failed harvest since their paddies were flooded. This flood was caused by silting up of Juana II River. Moreover, some people put *jarang*² to catch fishes in the river which blocked water, and naturally it went up to flood farmers' rice fields (Tanto and Gunritno 2006: interviews).

For this reason, they organized demonstration to PLRA to plan a program to normalize the river and to forbid people to put *jarang* in it. Accordingly, PLRA and the infrastructure building office agreed to allocate budget for normalizing the river. They also warned people living around the river to not put *jarang* in the long way of it. This rule has encouraged SPP activists in Sukolilo to control and destroy *jarangs* in the river, since some people still did it. Husaini (2006: an interview) noted that at least Sukolilo farmers has pulled out some *jarangs* for twice. This issue actually was raised again in the farmer meeting in 2006, but due to strong demands on fertilizer prices issue, SPP then focused on it.

Another issue raised was fertilizer prices. This issue started to blow up when SPP carried out a huge farmer meeting in the centre of Pati city in 2006. In this

² *Jarang* is a tool to trap and capture fishes that swim along way in the river.

The farmer meeting organized by SPP on January 2006.
(Source: Muhammad Khoiron, 2006)



meeting, many farmers complained that they often did not get fertilizers for subsidized prices (HET). They paid much higher prices for these, since many traders argued that they did not have many stocks in their shops. For advocating these farmers, after the meeting SPP did discussions with PLRA and PLG to solve the problems, but there was no result from these. In the negotiation between PLG represented by the agriculture office, fertilizer distributors, and farmer organizations, Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia (HKTI) and Kontak Tani-Nelayan Andalan (KTNA) agreed to buy fertilizers on higher price than HET, but SPP disagreed with them. It argued that HET had been set up by considering profits for distributor, so they have to sell fertilizers on HET (interviews with Tanto and Gunritno). SPP activists were disappointed with PLRA because it did not have power to control fertilizer producers and distributors.

Therefore, they decided to directly force and negotiate with the fertilizer producer (PT Kaltim and Petrokimia) in order to control and re-manage their distributors. For this purpose, they, cooperated with HKTI central Java, organized a demonstration in the provincial city, Semarang. It resulted good responses from PT Kaltim, so that its representative came to SPP basis in Dukuhseti sub-district to check fertilizer prices. Afterwards, SPP did meetings with the two producers, and as a result, PT Kaltim re-managed and evaluated some of its distributors. Recently, many farmers in SPP basis are benefiting for the subsidized prices (Husaini, Tanto, and Gunritno 2006: interviews).

In addition, in 2005-2006 SPP had a conflict with the association of head villages in Pati (Pasopati) because it refused Pasopati's proposal to extend the duration of head villages position to 10 years. For SPP, it was different from the government decrees

and could limit other villagers to be head of villages. Due to this conflict, some SPP activists were terrorized by unknown people. Moreover, SPP also raised an issue of banning imported rice in the meeting on January 2006, and even it warned to do sweeping for imported rice in Pati (interview with Husaini). Besides, SPP did solidarity actions for flood affected people in Sukolilo and Kayen in 2006. In this disaster, many SPP members lost their paddies since they could not have harvests. At present, it assists people who are suffering from the cement factory construction plan in some villages in Sukolilo. Due to this plan, land brokers are coming to buy villagers' land, and some have sold theirs. These villagers worry because they will lose good water resources for their livelihoods if the factory is built there (interview with Gunritno).

Summary

In conclusion, the majority of Pati farmers are small farmers who operate less than 1 Ha land, even many of them just hold less than 1000m². This picture of Pati farmers can be used to analyze SPP as a farmer organization. For its advocacy on paddy price issue, SPP did many activities, such as demonstration, public dialog, press release, and negotiation process, to blow up the issue, and devoted much energy in this action. Besides, SPP has raised other issues, namely fertilizer prices, irrigation management, the length of head village duty, banning imported rice, solidarity for flood affected people, and environment issue for water resources.

CHAPTER 4

SPP as a New Farmer Movement

In this chapter, the discussion of peasantry issue is raised to understand who SPP activists really are. This analysis is used to identify SPP movement whether as a peasant or a farmer movement. Afterwards, it discusses the newness of SPP movement compare to old peasant movements. This is brought up to Indonesia context where new farmer movements have started to emerge.

SPP's Activists are not Peasants

Observing all SPP activists, by referring to their land ownership, it can be said that all activists, except Husaini, Kaseran, and Nur Salim are small and middle farmers compared to the feature of Pati farmers (see table 2). They own 0.35 - 1 Ha land per person. Due to lack of land, some of them have other jobs apart from being farmers. However, based on their operated farm land, two of them, namely Hardi and Nur Salim, can be called as rich farmers because they farm additional land from village-land which is in total more than 5 Ha. The detail of their land ownership and other income sources is indicated by the table below.

Table 3. Land ownership and other income sources of SPP activists

No	Name	Land Ownership (Ha)	Other Income Sources
1	Tanto Pursidy	1	Water pump group share
2	Sulistyono	0.5	None
3	Gunritno	1	Water pump group share
4	Husaini	0	NGO salary
5	Sukilan	0.5	Small fertilizer trader
6	Kamelan	0.35	Private service provider for electric power
7	Sunhadi	1	Madrasah teacher
8	Hardi*	1	Head of village
9	Nur Salim**	2.25	Fish breeder and small fertilizer trader
10	Kaseran	2	Rice trader and water pump group share

*as a head of village, he operates village-land (*bengkok*) 10 Ha until he finishes his duty.

** as a village officer, he farms 3.05 Ha village-land (*bengkok*).

Source: survey on August-September 2006

Referring to Shanin's (1990: 23-24&41-43) criteria of peasantry, it can be said that all SPP's activists are not peasants. First, it is true that they, excluding Husaini³, are small and middle rice producers and family farm, but they also employ others to cultivate their land since they still use traditional way which consumes a lot of labourers to produce rice. Moreover, they cultivate paddies not only for their own consumption, but also for expecting returns from selling paddies.

Second, land husbandry is not the only sources for the activists' incomes. Some of them have other income sources. Water pumps shares for examples, generate significant incomes for farmers. These activities are not land husbandry, but are still related to agriculture. As their land ownership varies, BPS's definition on *petani gurem* is useful to analyze the differentiation in farmer communities. For those who have 2 Ha or more can rely their livelihoods on their own land, but those who do not,

³ This exclusion of Husaini is applied for all analysis of peasantry issue, since he is the only activist who has no rice field, and his income is completely not from rice production returns.

need to rent others' land or to find other jobs to be able to feed their families and meet their needs.

Third, SPP's activists and their communities mostly have specific culture relating to their traditional farming. Some farmers still practice traditional ceremony when they start to grow paddies. Symbolically, it was showed in the farmer meeting in January 2006. Besides, as part of village communities, they have shared culture called *sambatan* or *gotong-royong*. For instance, this can be found in the road construction to their rice fields and building someone's house. These activities are done by many people without any payment, since they consider these as their duty and solidarity for neighbours.

Fourth, they are not dominated by landlords as they have their own land. Moreover, at the village level, many of them have challenged rural elites who are represented by head of villages. For example, in the case of constructing road to rice fields, farmers did it by themselves, without any permission and support from the head of village (interview with two Sukolilo activists). In fact, some of them are the village representative members (Badan Perwakilan Desa-BPD), such as Tanto and Sunhadi who have right to control the village administration. This case is different from what White and Wiradi found that "larger landholders dominate village-level power structures and have access to stage patronage both in and outside agriculture" (Husken and White 1989:258). In some cases, power at the village levels not only comes from land ownership, but can also be generated from social status, like being government officers or political party activists, networking and relationship with outsiders, such as NGOs, Parliament members, and politicians, and financial power, especially for successful traders.

However, the last criterion of Ellis' (1993: 13) definition which states that peasants are "partially engaged in input and output markets which are often imperfect or incomplete", is found in many SPP activists' cases. Most of them really do input and output transactions, but informal relationship often influences on the transactions. Besides, some of them do not have any choice to buy cheaper fertilizers or to sell paddies for higher prices because the prices are determined by traders. Although imperfect markets are there, they still cannot be categorized as peasants since they do

not meet other criteria. Only the one who does not have another income apart from being a farmer, and owns only 0.5 Ha land might still be called as a peasant.

The Emergence of New Farmer Movements

The emergence of SPP movement is to respond to the failure of rice distribution process through the public sector which does not benefit small farmers. As a result of this failure, in 2003 paddy price was so low; and farmers did not want this problem to happen to their first harvest in 2004. That was why they organized this political action.

Based on the characteristics of new farmer movement discussed by Brass, Dhanagore, Joshi, Shahasrabudhey, Assadi, and Lindberg (1995), SPP movement can be categorized in this movement. First, SPP has raised issues of paddy and fertilizer prices which are remunerative prices issues. For paddy price issue, SPP did not demand the government to increase the floor price, but it asked PLG to subsidize farmers in order to be able to compete with traders in markets. For Timmer et al (1983: 167&208), this intervention tries to reduce marketing cost by giving opportunities for farmers to store and process their own paddies aiming for higher prices. While for fertilizer price issue, SPP just asked the producer and the government to guarantee that farmers will have fertilizers on HET that has been stated.

Second, SPP movement is organized by small and middle farmers, and only two of them might be called as rich farmers. Their land ownerships show that most of them do not have high returns from rice production. Hardi and Husaini (2006: interviews) said that many poor farmers were also involved in some SPP demonstrations, such as those in Semarang (against PT Pupuk KalTim-PKT 2006) and Pati (the farmer meeting 2006).

Third, in its actions SPP put the state represented by PLG as target of agitation. It always pressured PLG to adopt farmers' interests. However, in its advocacy for fertilizer issue, farmers did dialogues with PLRA and PLG, but there was no concrete action from them to solve the problem. For this reason, SPP changed its strategy to

directly pressure and negotiate with the producer of fertilizers, PKT (Husaini, Tanto, and Gunritno 2006: interviews). The choice of PLG, PLRA and PKT as target of agitation is based on the idea that they are powerful actors in rice and fertilizer markets, so that they are able to influence the markets. In this case, SPP wants big actors to change market structures for benefiting small farmers.

Fourth, in the sense that there is no single political party that involves in organizing SPP actions, this movement is non-political. However, some issues raised like conflict with the association of head of villages which is supported by the Regent and rejecting cement factory construction are really political issue. Besides, although SPP activists stayed to be neutral for the Regent election on July 2006, it was just caused by an analysis that there was no dominant candidate who would definitely become the Regent (interview with a SPP activist-anonymous). Therefore, organizationally they did not support any candidate for the election. Moreover, in the future SPP has a plan to prepare for local politic elections from the village to district levels. Furthermore, in the sense that influencing political decision process, indeed SPP has done political action, including Tanto's role as a member of the government's team for agriculture issue.

Fifth, unlike old peasant movements, SPP movement has an identity as rice producers who are neglected by the government policies on rice and fertilizer distributions. This identity is discussed in the next chapter.

Lastly, SPP has good alliances with mass media to voice its messages to public and policy makers. These media have contributed to make SPP more powerful in front of other actors. Besides, NGOs are strategic partners for capacity building for its activists. Recently SPP also makes good contacts with some young Moslem leaders from *pesantrens* (Islamic boarding schools), youth and student organizations, and Sapto Darma leaders for mass mobilization. For fertilizer issue, SPP also joins HKTI for tactical objectives.

To summarize, the six characteristics of SPP movement showing that SPP is a new farmer movement, are described in the table below. In this case, by referring to Shanin (1987: 360-361) SPP action is closer to be categorized as *amorphous political action*

showing farmers' resistance to government policies, but it does not organize local riots or farmers passivity. Instead it mobilizes institutionalized political actions which took place within the local political framework.

Table 4. The characteristics of SPP movement

Issued raised	Remunerative prices and related issues
Leaders	Small, middle, and rich farmers
Target of agitation	The local government and the producer of fertilizers to change market structures
Form of mobilization	Non-political party led movement, but has political interests
Identity	Commodity producers and excluded groups
Alliances	Mass media for opinion building, NGOs for capacity building, young Moslem leaders, youth and student organizations, and Sapto Darmo leaders for mass mobilization, and HKTI for tactical objectives

Source: author2006

Like what Brass, Gill, and Lindberg (1995), Edelman (1999), and McKeon, Watts and Wolford (2004) discuss, SPP movement is a response to capitalism development which is brought by SAP in agriculture sector. This program has pulled out the state's role on rice market (see Pieper and Taylor 1998:13), so that paddy prices are more determined by market where big traders are the most powerful actors. As small and medium producers, SPP members do not have bargaining position in market. That is why they asked the government to support them.

In fact, new farmer movement like what SPP has done can be identified in other movements, such as HKTI's actions. As the government formed organization, HKTI⁴ has raised issues of rice and fertilizer prices and banning imported rice. In doing so, its leaders often write and release statements on newspapers. Furthermore, FSPI⁵, as federation of many peasant unions that usually raise issue of land reform, has

⁴ See <http://www.hkti.or.id> for detail information on HKTI.

⁵ See <http://www.fspi.or.id> for detail information on FSPI.

organized demonstrations to refuse imported rice. It means FSPI also raises an issue of rice price since the imported rice will affect on lowering local rice prices. These phenomena show that Indonesia has experienced new farmers' movements that may become greater in the future as capitalistic development through adjustment and reform policies are intensively applied in agriculture sector; unless the political system accommodates farmers' interests in political decisions.

Moreover, many peasant/farmer organizations, like FSPI realizes that the problem of land appropriation is not cause by feudalistic system in rural areas, but it is triggered by neoliberal policies on market liberalization and privatization for agriculture sector. These policies have driven the government and big companies to occupy peasants' land, and in the name of "development" use it to produce cash crops and other agriculture products. For this reason, apart from land reform issue, FSPI also raises issues of food sovereignty and banning imported rice.

Summary

In brief, SPP activists cannot be named as peasants since the four criteria from Shanin and the three from Ellis are not completely met. Only one of them might be called as a peasant. Besides, SPP does not raise the issue of land reform like other peasant movements, because mostly its members have already had a piece of land. Therefore, referring to the characters of new farmer movements discussed by Brass et al (1995) SPP movement is a new farmer movement which is becoming new phenomena in Indonesia as some farmer organizations also raise the same issues. In the future, this type of movement will become greater, since privatisation and market liberalization has been applied in agriculture sector, such as water privatisation, agriculture inputs and outputs liberalization where cheap imported products easily enter local markets.

CHAPTER 5

SPP Actions for Paddy Price Protection

This chapter explores and analyzes SPP advocacy for paddy price protection done in 2003-2004. Before discussing the factors and ways how SPP did its advocacy, firstly this chapter reviews the reasons why SPP asked subsidies from the government to have higher prices for their paddies. Then, it focuses on issues of SPP's power, political context, and its strategy to understand the influential factors determining the success of its actions.


Rice Distribution Problem: Reasons for Action

Indonesia has two ways of rice distribution, namely through private and public sectors. In the private sector, farmers sell their paddies to collectors or local traders who usually have rice mills for processing paddies to be milled. Then, they sell it to big traders and wholesalers who bring rice to markets either local or trans-islands markets, such as from Java to Kalimantan, Sumatra, and Papua.

In the public sector, the collectors or local traders sell rice to big traders or village-based cooperatives (KUD) who are contractors of BULOG to supply for the government's buffer stocks. As its function, BULOG will distribute it to poor people, civil servants, police and military forces, and disaster relieves through the government programs. Besides, BULOG does market intervention by selling rice in lower prices to consumers when the price is higher than the ceiling price expected by the government. The purpose is to provide affordable food for all citizens, especially for urban consumers and rural poor (BULOG 2002a). Moreover, in order to fulfil its function, every year BULOG imports rice for its stocks. Though, as noted by Ariga and Kitano (2000), BULOG only distributes 10 to 20 percent of the distribution volume⁶, its procurement is still significant to influence rice prices in markets. In detail, the rice distribution channels in Indonesia are shown in the figure below:

⁶ Distribution volume is 60 percent of the total production, since the 40 percent left is for farmers' consumption and seeds for next cultivation.

Figure 2. Rice distribution channels



Source: Ariga, H and Naohiro Kitano (2000)

Based on this figure, it can be understood that farmers will have profit when KUD and collectors/rice millers buy farmers' paddies by the floor price set up by the government or higher than that. Especially through KUD, farmers will benefit more, assuming that farmers are KUD share holders, so that they will get dividend annually. However, in practice, the role of KUD in the public sector is decreasing, since BULOG contractors are mostly dominated by big traders. In 2006 for example, cooperatives just supplied 5.97 percent of the BULOG procurements (BULOG 2006). Moreover, many cases show that KUDs are owned by a few rich people who have good connections with the government leaders.

In fact, the prices paid to farmers are different from those set up in the government decree on paddy floor prices. Evidence of these differences is indicated by monitoring reports conducted by BPS and the agriculture department (DEPTAN). This monitoring was carried out on 24 April and 1 May 2003 (DEPTAN 2003). The data reported on 24 April 2003 note that the lowest price of unhusked paddies (Gabah Kering Panen-GKP) was 667 rupiahs/kg (44.18% lower than the floor prices) in Kebumen, Central Java. In contrast, the highest one was 1353 rupiahs/kg (13.2% higher than the floor prices) which was in Deli Serdang, North Sumatera. Moreover, data reported on 1 May 2003 show that the lowest price of GKP was 667 rupiahs/kg

(44.18% lower than the floor prices) in Kebumen, while the highest one was 1424 rupiahs/kg (19.2% higher than the floor prices) in Langkat, North Sumatera.

Furthermore, the data reported by BPS on February – April 2003 state that the average rice prices paid to farmers was decreasing which was from 1271.22 to 1172.52 rupiahs/kg. The prices in many provinces were lower than the floor prices. These were in North Sumatera (8.33%), West Java (30.97%), Central Java (57.38%), East Java (55.42%), Nusa Tenggara Barat (41.67%), South Sulawesi (45.83%), and South Kalimantan (100%) (DEPTAN 2003). In Central Java for instance, 57.38% of observed prices were lower than the floor price, meaning that many farmers were not benefiting from it.

In this case, small farmers are in the worst condition because they have little returns for high production cost as their land is small plots. The smaller the rice fields, the higher the cost of production, since the use of inputs is not as efficient as the larger ones. Moreover, for rich farmers, they still have chances to store their paddies or to negotiate with BULOG to access for being its contractors, but for small farmers, they cannot be contractors as the requirements are not set up for them. These are (1) they are legally registered and have a business on rice milling; (2) they have dryer place/machine, rice mill machine, and storehouses; (3) their rice mills can produce certain amount of rice required by BULOG; (4) they are able to protect paddy prices in their working area; and (5) they have to give collateral (certificates or cash) for 2.5% of the contract (BULOG 2002b). For these reasons, in 2003-2004 SPP did political action at the local level to pressure the government to allocate budget for supporting small farmers to store their paddies aiming for higher prices.

Many arguments also say that floor prices often fail to benefit small and poor farmers, and to increase their incomes. Streeten (1987: 47) mentions three reasons: (1) farmers produce and sell not only one crop, so one crop price will not affect others; (2) they may be insulated from price fluctuations through marketing board; and (3) goods bought by farmers are also increasing. While, Timmer et al. (1983: 167 and 208) consider high marketing cost as an important reason, either it is caused by real cost of transportation, storage and processing or monopoly done by big traders for gaining

excess profits. In addition, Hayami and Herdt (quoted from Sicular 1989: 19) argue that apart from producers, they are food purchasers.

SPP's Power

A. Common Interests

To understand SPP's activities, there are two main reasons that make farmers organized policy advocacy in 2003-2004. First, as discussed above the BULOG's role is not functioning properly to implement the floor prices for protecting farmers. Small farmers are in worse condition since they do not have access to BULOG. Moreover, in many cases contractors of BULOG buy farmers' paddies on market prices, not on the floor prices which, during harvest time, are mostly higher than market prices.

Second, as market rules, if the supply of rice can be maintained in a constant way, the price will not fluctuate so much. For that reason, farmers want to keep their paddies for several months, and then sell these when the price is higher. However, to produce rice, small farmers have to spend much money since the agricultural input costs are so high. Commonly, they borrow money from private money lenders because they do not have access to banks. Thus, many of them are trapped in debts; and the only solution is to sell their paddies when harvest time comes. In other words, they do not have capacity to store their paddies for several months, as they need cash to pay back their debts, to feed their family, and to cultivate other crops for the next season.

These are economic reasons for farmers to mobilize political action. However, many SPP activists said that this movement is not only for economic reasons, but also for *pasedeluran* (brotherhood relationship). It means that they consider all SPP activists as their brothers, so that they have close relationship, including understanding and helping internal family problems of the activists.⁷ One of the evidences of this personally closeness is, they just use text messages from mobile phones to invite all activists to arrange meetings. These mixed economic and social objectives for social movements are indicated by Olson (1971: 6-7) and Barry (quoted from Udehn 1993: 251).

⁷ Husaini, Gunritno, Sulistyono, Tanto, Kamelan, Sukilan, Kaseran, and Sunhadi confirmed this statement. Especially Gunritno who is from Samin Community still has strong Javanese tradition and concept of *paseduluran*.

In addition, these farmers felt that PLG did not pay any attention and think of their lives. Tanto and Gunritno said (interviews), “we were so disappointed, because at that time APBD was spent to buy motorcycles for head of villages, whereas farmers were suffering from low paddy prices”. For this reason, SPP activists insisted to demand budget allocation for farmers in the APBD. Andreas (2006: an interview) also recognized that this feeling of being neglected by the government was one of the reasons for farmers (including Samin community in Sukolilo which is one basis of SPP) to get actualization and recognition from public, especially from PLG and PLRA. As stated by Scott (quoted from Foweraker 1995: 80) and Frank and Fuentes (2002: 37-38), being excluded from public goods, in this case is APBD, and policy decision making, namely the annual program planning, are reasons, as political objectives, for farmers to organize collective actions.

B. Collective Identity

As mentioned above, SPP was initiated by mostly small and medium farmers coming from 7 sub-districts in Pati, but in fact the most organized groups are those in Sukolilo. Farmers in this sub-district are always the greatest supporters for SPP's actions like demonstrations, public meetings, and negotiation processes.⁸ Therefore, other actors like PLRA members and the agriculture office consider SPP as a Sukolilo or southern Pati organization.

According to Husaini (2006: an interview) there are some reasons why Sukolilo farmers are the most active in SPP. First, farmer groups in Sukolilo are mostly water pump groups. These groups have contract with many farmers to provide water for their paddies. They will get shares from the outputs. For this reason, many farmers realize that the groups are really benefiting for them. Second, Hardi's position as head of village is useful to mobilize many farmers. Third, Gunritno is a strong leader. He has a good relationship with Sukilan (Galiran village) and Kaseran (Wotan village) who are able to mobilize many farmers from their groups. Fourth, grant fund provided by CD Bethesda for these groups several years ago has stimulated their activities.

⁸ All SPP activists interviewed agreed on this statement.

Based on the agriculture census 2003, Sukolilo had 21,210 households. There were 7883 *petani gurem* among 15,783 farmer households. On average, Sukolilo farmers operated 5,018m² land. The detailed distribution of land holding among them is explained in the table below.

Table 5. The distribution of land holding among farmer households in Sukolilo

<1000m ²	1000- 2499m ²	2500- 4999m ²	5000- 7499m ²	7500- 9999m ²	10000- 14999m ²	15000- 19999m ²
1094	2504	4367	2999	1678	1901	639

20000- 24999m ²	25000- 29999m ²	30000- 34999m ²	>= 35000	Total
313	112	70	106	15,783

Source: Agriculture Census BPS Pati 2003.

This figure shows that majority of Sukolilo farmers were small farmers who operated less than 1 Ha land. In this sub-district, paddies are the most popular crops as mostly they grow these for twice a year. As explained by Hardi, Tanto and Gunritno (2006: interviews), compared to sugar cane production, rice productions absorb much more workforces. Besides, for those who only farm a little piece of land, they can become temporary workers and collectors of remaining paddies in rice fields during harvest time.

Another fact that, in this sub-district there is Samin community⁹ (they prefer to be called as *sedulur Sikep*), and for this reason some people assume that SPP is supported by this community. In fact, Gunritno, one of SPP activists is a member of Samin community. However, Gunritno (an interview) said that not all *sedulur Sikep* are members of SPP. Only those who understand and agree with him, want to join SPP's activities, because many *sedulur Sikep* still consider that demonstration is a rude and

⁹ Samin community is an indigenous community living in some places in East Java and Central Java. They practice their own belief inherited from their leader Samin Surosentiko.

impolite action. They just want to involve in negotiation and audiences with the government, but not in demonstrations.

Based on these facts and SPP's activists feature (see Table 3), SPP's identity is not social class as proposed by Marxist theory, but an identity as rice producers and excluded people. The fact that they do not consider rice traders, fertilizer distributors (rich people), the fertilizer producer (big companies), and local elites (PLG officers and PLRA members) as common enemies (Andreas and Gunritno 2006: interviews), shows that their identity is not based on class which is built on conflict in relation with upper class (referring to Shanin 1990: 33). Compare to Marxist theory, in this case, Weber's (quoted from Gamson 2004: 435) identification of "status" as an identity is more able to explain SPP's identity. For SPP's case, "status" means their work as farmers and their sense of "we-ness" because of being excluded by the political system. This statement is supported by the evidence that SPP activists and members come from different communities, such as Moslem, Christian, *Abangan*¹⁰, and *Sedulur Sikep*.

For building this identity, despite doing three ways suggested by Blumer (1995: 67-68), SPP activists have their own method, namely informal visits to each other. This derives from the concept of *paseduluran*. In this concept, someone who will consider others as their *dulur* (brothers), he/she should know their home and families (Gunritno 2006: an interview). The fact is, mostly SPP activists know the others' home and families, even some of them with their wives, occasionally visited the others' home and joined in SPP activities. This factor is also different from those stated by Huizer (1980: 166-173) to build class consciousness, except the role of charismatic leaders who play important roles in SPP movement.

Accordingly, this *paseduluran*, that for Hunt and Benford (2004: 439&440) is a configuration of relationship, has successfully enhanced commitment and solidarity among them. For instance, in carrying out SPP activities, they often devote much time, sometimes until midnights especially when they want to do demonstrations,

¹⁰ *Abangan* people are those who are formally on their resident identities stated as Moslem or other religion followers, but they do not practice completely the religion obligations, instead they are practicing Javanese belief.

negotiations and farmer meetings. They also spend their own money for its activities indicating their commitments to SPP. Besides, their solidarity is shown by many activities, such as when they would be interrogated by the police because it accused SPP for conducting illegal Wayang¹¹ presentation in 2004.

C. Leadership

Gunritno, as indicated by Soeprapto, Sunhadi, and interviews) is a strong leader farmers. He is able to farmers because he has a with local leaders in Baleadi villages where the greatest activities come from. For farmer meeting on January able to mobilize Sapto community to join the

Gunritno, a 37 years old, is a young leader in Samin community (*sedulur Sikep*) in Sukolilo. Though he did not graduated from elementary school, together with 7 farmers, he leads a water pump group. This group has to irrigate about 140 Ha rice fields farmed by 120 farmers living in three villages. About 50 percent of them are *sedulur Sikeps*. In fact, he has interacted with NGO activists since several years ago. This has influenced on his views on social movements (interview on 25 October 2006).

Jukari, Husaini, Kamelan (2006: for Sukolilo organize many close relationship and Wotan supporters for SPP instance, in the 2006, he was also Darmo¹² meeting, although

the issue raised was not appropriate for them since the majority of them are not rice producers (Gunritno 2006: an interview). In addition, Gunritno, as noted by Kamelan, also plays role in building networking with NGOs like Desantara from Jakarta. This role has helped SPP to find out financial contributors when it needed supporting fund for its activities, such as farmer meetings. Sunhadi added that Hardi is another leader as he is the head of Baleadi village, so he is easily able to mobilize his people. The role of these two leaders is as charismatic leaders who have many followers as stated by Huizer (1980: 169-170) and Edelman (1999: 194).

In addition, Soeprapto and Husaini (2006: interviews) stated another leader, that is Tanto Pursidi who is the head of SPP. Husaini explained that Tanto plays important role in negotiation with other actors, especially the government, and making statements in newspapers. According to Blumer (quoted from Wilson 1973: 195), his role is as a statesman.

¹¹ Wayang is a traditional event that tells stories like Ramayana, Pundawa, etc. In many cases, it also adopts local stories. At that time, SPP asked the Dalang to present Wayang entitled "Among Tani".

¹² *Sapto Darmo* is one of local believes that is considered by the government as a legal belief. This community has a good relationship with Gunritno since he is *sedulur Sikep* who has also local belief.

Tanto Pursidi, born in 1971, has been involved in a water pump group in Sukolilo since 1997. Now, he, with 7 farmers, leads a group for 235 members. This group has to irrigate 215 Ha rice fields. He has also positions as a deputy of village representative body (BPD), a youth division for HKTI Pati, and a secretary for KTNA Sukolilo. Since two months ago, he has represented farmers to involve in a team organized by the agriculture office for policy recommendation for the Regent (Bupati) (interview on 29 October 2006).

Another leader mentioned by Kamelan and Adi (2006: interviews) is Husaini. He plays important role in discussing strategies and building networks with NGOs because he is working for SHEEP. In many cases, Petrus (an interview) also said that Husaini often becomes an administrator and organization manager for SPP, including to arrange meetings and to document its activities. Referring to Blumer, his role is more as an administrator. Husaini himself realized that his role in SPP has created strong dependency as many tasks are given to him. He said (an interview), “farmer groups always wait to start activities, especially for advocacy issue. But, for economic purposes they can organize themselves. Since SPP focuses on advocacy, they wait for outsiders’ initiatives”.

Husaini added Nur Salim as one of the leaders. He often did organizational management for SPP. Perhaps, his graduating from a university initiates him to do it. The detail of SPP activists’ educational background is listed in the table below.

Table 6. Educational background of SPP activists

No	Name	Educational background
1	Tanto Pursidy	Primary school
2	Sulistiyono	Senior high school
3	Gunritno	Not graduate from primary school
4	Husaini	Senior high school
5	Sukilan	Primary school
6	Kamelan	Senior high school
7	Sunhadi	Senior high school
8	Hardi	University graduate (S1)
9	Nur Salim	Islamic Institute graduate (S1)
10	Kaseran	Not graduate from primary school

Source: survey on August-September 2006

The fact that only two of 10 SPP activists are university graduates shows the genuineness of this farmer movement. In this case, what stated by Petras (quoted from Webster 2004: 23) and Morris and Staggenborg (2004: 174) that peasant leaders are well educated people, if “educated” is understood as formal education, is not always true for farmer movements in Indonesia. Many of SPP activists are only graduates from senior high school; even some of them did not finish elementary school. Nonetheless, they have non-formal education which is obtained through their discussions and interactions with NGOs, reporters, parliament members, and the government officers. They are actually learning from their experiences. In addition, unlike what indicated by Huizer (1980: 169) that Indonesian peasant movements were led by urban based organizers, all SPP activists are living in rural areas. However, if “urban based” is understood as relationship, indeed SPP has a relationship with urban based activities since one of its activists is an NGO worker who has an office in Pati city.

Husaini, a 29 years old, has worked for NGOs since 2000. At that time, he was working for CD Bethesda Yogyakarta that had programs in Pati for flood affected people. From these programs, he met the embryo of SPP. Now, he is working for SHEEP in central Java, including managing programs in Pati (interview on 27 October 2006).

From more than a month of observation in SPP’s meetings and informal conversations, it is clear that SPP has no single leader who is the most powerful to make decisions in it. The leadership is collectively constructed, like what said by Sulistyono (2006: an interview) that everyone has his own role. Nevertheless, there are still dominant collective leaders among them, such as Gunritno, Tanto and Husaini, who have different roles in SPP movement.

D. Organizational Capability

This organization has no main financial sources to fund its activities. The two NGOs that often financially support SPP are SHEEP and Desantara. These supports are based on SPP’s needs since it is not formally assisted by a single NGO. When SPP has an activity and it has no money, it approaches the NGOs to fund a part of the budget. However, Petrus (2006: an interview) said that SHEEP just supports small contributions like for transportation and discussions. These NGOs’ roles are significant for mobilization of the four resources mentioned by Edwards and

McCarthy (2004: 118 & 132-133); those are money, labour, organization building, and collective action. Moreover, Husaini's position as a SHEEP and SPP activist at once has influenced so much on the dynamic of SPP movement, especially for mobilizing organization building and collective action.

Although NGOs play important roles, SPP's members are really able to mobilize their own money and labour for the success of their activities. This fact is supported by confirmation given by Hardi, Sukilan, and Kaseran (2006: interviews). They are from the two villages which have the greatest SPP's supporters. They said that local farmer groups spend their own money for transportations and logistic supports when they participate in SPP activities like demonstrations. Nur Salim (an interview) also mentioned this when his groups from three villages joined the farmer meeting on January 2006.

While, in order to organize members as resources (Olson 1971: 121), SPP has structure in it. It has board members that consist of three farmers from different sub-districts, namely Margorejo, Sukolilo, and Jakenan. For day to day activity, it has an executive council consisting of a head, secretary, and treasury and four divisions; those are advocacy, networking, public relation, and data management. Furthermore, it has contact-persons in 11 sub-districts. Nonetheless, in practices this structure does not function well. For instance, all the broad members are not active recently. It is understandable since SPP is a movement organization that has no restriction for farmers to join or quit from this organization. Due to this condition, some SPP activists realize that only a few of its members are really intensively involved in all its decision makings. Husaini said (an interview), "in term of movement, SPP is supported by many people, but for an organization it likely has no member".

Regarding this organizational capacity, indeed some SPP activists also have positions in other farmer organizations. For example, Tanto is a youth division member in HKTI Pati (district) and a secretary at KTNA Sukolilo (sub-district), Kamelan is a secretary of HKTI Pati (district), and Nur Salim is a head of KTNA Kayen (sub-district). These facts show that SPP activists really have organizational capability to manage SPP as a farmer organization. However, this involvement in other organizations does not encourage them to limit their activities and commitments for

SPP. Moreover, officially SPP does not build strategic collaboration with the two organizations, but just for tactical objectives.

The Openness of Political Opportunities

Since 2001 Pati government has applied decentralization policy, as national policy, which requires need identification from the lowest level, namely at the village level. This policy increases the openness of political opportunities for pressure groups like SPP (Kriesi 2004: 70). Every year, before annual program planning, PLG conducts people's need identification (Identifikasi Kebutuhan Masyarakat-IKM). In doing this, all local leaders in villages within a particular sub-district are invited to discuss people's needs. At this moment, they have chances to propose programs for PLG's annual program. In practice, many leaders invited are those who have close relationship with head of sub-districts.

The result of this IKM will be discussed by related offices, such as the agriculture office for agriculture issues. If the offices agreed to support the programs proposed by people through IKM, they will submit these to local planning body (Badan Perencanaan Daerah-BAPPEDA) in order to be evaluated according to their feasibilities. However, the agriculture office is also willing to directly accept program proposals from farmer organizations without going through IKM processes (interview with the two office representatives). Then, when the offices and BAPPEDA have agreed on program plans, those will be stated by the regent (Bupati) as PLG's program plans. These will be discussed with PLRA, and as a result it will be the annual local budget (APBD). While, another way to propose a program is directly proposing to PLRA, for example to commission B for agriculture programs (interview with respondent 16). In this case, SPP, for paddy price protection program, did this way, and then the agriculture office put it in its program plan.

In the case of SPP's proposal, not all members of commission B agreed to support this program (interview with the two PLRA members). Nonetheless, after discussing several times, Commission B decided to propose this program to the committee of budget planning. The three important members at that time, namely those from military-Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan

(PDIP), and Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), supported it (Jukari 2006: an interview). The reasons were as stated by a PLRA member (interview with respondent 16):

“..... this was the first time for farmers to ask subsidies, and this was not grants, instead credits. In contrast, PLRA allocated much money for other sectors in grants. Moreover, the amount of money approved (500 million rupiahs) was much smaller compare to other grants like for infrastructure buildings”.

It was supported by the fact that at that time the price of paddies was really low, so the commission wanted to help farmers. The only apprehension was, if the money would be used by only limited members or individual elites of SPP.

However, some activists (interviews) realized that apart from their pressures to PLRA, its members had interests to proclaim that they worked for farmers, so that they hoped farmers would vote them for 2004 election. Besides, some PLRA members also wanted to access the money for their constituents. A government officer said:

“.....SPP’s interest was likely supported by PLRA, that was why the agriculture office could not reject it. PLRA members did not spontaneously agree with SPP’s proposal, but after considering farmers’ protest and chances for 2004 election, they decided to approve it. It was political consideration for gaining sympathy from farmers and making farmers stay calm” (interview with anonymous from PLG-14).

On the executive side, at first, the agriculture office disagreed and was pessimistic on SPP proposal, because SPP had no experience in rice trading, whereas it was the difficult thing to do (interview with respondent 14). The other objection was the experience of past agricultural credits which were not returned to the government. However, due to serious and continuous pressures from SPP, the agriculture office and the secretary of PLG agreed to test farmers by using this program (subsidy for credit interests). A government officer said (an interview-14),

“this project aimed to teach farmers whether they could manage it or not.....and to strengthen a farmer organization.....and to prove to SPP that traders are useful, since there was opinion saying that traders just look for profits. I predicted that SPP would not have profits from this activity”

In this process of negotiation, the program agreed was not like what SPP proposed. Actually, SPP proposed to borrow money from APBD for buying its members’

paddies. Responding to this, Commission B approved the program, but it negotiated the amount of money asked by SPP to be 1.5 billion rupiahs. Nonetheless, in the general meeting between PLG and PLRA on the APBD decision making, the program included in APBD was subsidy for bank interests of money borrowed by farmers. Therefore, it can be concluded that the more powerful decision makers in this case was PLG's team which was the agriculture office and the secretary of PLG. During this process, Tanto said (an interview), "there was no lobby done either with PLRA members or PLG's team".

Referring to the five dimension of political opportunity introduced by Tarrow (1998: 76-80), SPP movement strategically has benefited from some opportunities. First, decentralization policy has increased SPP's access to policy making process, especially through PLRA channels. In addition, the lack of solution offered by the government to solve paddy price problem, was also a chance for SPP to propose a program for the annual program planning. These two conditions had "forced" PLG and PLRA to cooperate and accommodate farmers' interest.

Second, unlike in New Order Regime, in 2003 there was no single majority in PLRA, so the power within PLRA was separated into some big political parties, such as PDIP and PKB, and military representatives. Fortunately, these three factions of power in PLRA had important positions in the Commission B which dealt with agriculture programs. Their agreement to approve SPP's proposal was important to pressure PLG in order to accept the program, since at that time PLRA had more power, although the last decision was influenced more by PLG's team. Without agreement from both PLRA and PLG, SPP's proposal would not be included in the APBD 2004.

Third, instead of being repressive, the government facilitated SPP's interest through negotiation process. This facilitation role, as mentioned in Tilly's mobilization model (adapted from Udehn 1996: 304), was able to improve SPP's opportunity to organize collective action. The government was willing to facilitate SPP, because it had reformist demand, namely subsidy for buying farmers' paddies, which was still in the institutional framework of local politics (stated by Shah 2002: 23). Furthermore, the interest of some PLRA members to be elected again in the 2004 election was also a reason for them to approve SPP's proposal. In this case, the government considered

that SPP did not challenge its power as SPP just asked some subsidies from it. This distinguishes SPP movement from old peasant movements that mostly want to replace or overthrow the government's power.

The role of media cannot be denied. Jukari from Wawasan (2006: an interview) said that he and other reporters also argued PLRA to support SPP's proposal. They did it because there was a discussion about APBD analysis, and as a conclusion they noted that the portion for development budget was so little compared to that which would be spent for the government activities and officers. In addition, as indicated by Soeprapto (2006: an interview), KOMPAS also intensively reported this issue since it had vision to support marginalized people like small farmers. He was even involved in some discussions with SPP. Therefore, mass media was really influential allies at that time (referring to Tarrow).

Nonetheless, the role of NGOs in this advocacy process was not significant. As stated by all SPP activists, there was no NGO that joined their advocacy and negotiation with PLRA and PLG. Media also never reported that this action was supported by any NGO. The indication of NGO's involvement was only found in Husaini's role as he was an NGO activist. NGOs just played roles on supporting for SPP capacity like what described by Edwards and Hulme (2002: 64). The choice of this role, mentioned by Andreas (2006: an interview), was based on decision that SPP's movement is people movement, so NGOs may not intervene it. For this reason, SHEEP takes position not to be involved in the movement, but it will be an agent which supports SPP's movement. This is different from the three structures introduced by Chapman and Fisher (2000:158-159). All advocacy agenda were set up by SPP itself; that was why, PLG and PLRA did not consider that this movement was driven by other actors.

The only one dimension missing in this process was divided elites. Based on information collected, there was no indication of elite conflicts in this case (interview with reporters, PLG officers, and PLRA members). However, there was small disagreement between PLG and PLRA on responding to SPP's proposal. It can be understood from the difference between the program approved by PLRA and that by PLG, but then it ended up with an agreement among them. Perhaps, this conflict was

not recognized by outsiders, since the decisions were made in the meetings which were not publicly accessed, and those who were involved do not want to expose it.

SPP's Strategies and Tactics

In order to raise the issue of paddy price protection, firstly SPP carried out public discussion that involved PLG, PLRA, BULOG, an expert, and many farmers. Following this, SPP proposed a program through PLRA. The reason to negotiate with it instead of with the agriculture office was the assumption that PLRA members were more open to accept farmers' opinions. As stated by Husaini (2005: notes), at least SPP did five meetings (audiences) with PLRA which also invited the agriculture office in order to "force" them to approve this program. In this process, SPP had good arguments, namely the failure of past credit programs caused by ignoring farmer participations, that cannot be denied by PLRA members. It also guaranteed that this program would not fail like other agricultural credits. This tactic is called *inducements* (Gamson 2004: 254).

Since the negotiation took a long time and was difficult to find out solution, in the last meeting SPP warned PLRA that if its proposed program was not approved, it would occupy PLRA office, and campaigned for taxes boycott among Pati farmers as *constraints* tactic (ibid). In fact, these two warnings were successful to make an agreement between SPP and Commission B to bring this program into the budget committee discussion. From this stage, SPP still did about 10 meetings with PLRA, the agriculture office, and the secretary of PLG, until SPP could access the money for its members (Husaini's notes 2004). In short, this advocacy took a long process which consumed much energy.

In doing these tactics, media played important role to send SPP's messages to policy makers and public. SPP had a good relationship with some reporters, especially those from Wawasan and KOMPAS. In many meetings, these reporters were invited by SPP, and then it made statements to send messages to public and to pressure PLRA and PLG. Soeprapto (2006: an interview) said that mass media have made SPP's voice heard by many people, and those have made SPP more powerful to influence policy makers.

Based on the finding, four main tactics, namely demonstrations, public dialog, releasing statements in newspapers, and negotiations with PLRA and PLG, have been done by SPP. Considering these tactics, according to Turner (quoted from Wilson 1973: 228), SPP did *bargaining* strategy. It preferred to negotiate with the state to help small farmers to compete in rice markets through providing subsidy for them.


In short, SPP strategies and tactics are different from those done by old peasant movements. These differences are caused by the different type of demands between SPP movement and old peasant movements. SPP insisted subsidy from the government, while old movements demanded land which was commonly already occupied by big companies or state apparatuses. Generally, SPP's tactics are firstly attracting the government attention by organizing a demonstration, farmer meeting or public dialog. After this, SPP will release statements to press in order to echo its voice. Then, when the government or other actors, gives attention to SPP, it starts to negotiate for its interests. As a matter of fact, SPP has done this chronological tactic at least twice; first it was for paddy price issue, and the other one was for fertilizer prices issue.

Summary

In conclusion, the failure of rice distribution through the public sector managed by BULOG was a main reason for SPP to insist PLG to subsidize them. As producers, they cannot take advantages from rice markets since they cannot determine their paddy prices. In this advocacy, SPP's power derived from economic, social and political common interests as incentives for them to act, an identity as rice producers who were excluded from rice distribution process, collective leaders, and organizational capability with supports from NGOs. The opportunities occurred were decentralization policy, separated power in PLRA, facilitation from the government caused by visible demand, and politicians' interests on 2004 election. To use these opportunities, SPP did strong bargaining position by doing inducements and constraints tactics at once.

The summary of actors and factors influencing SPP advocacy for paddy price issue in 2004 is described in the figure below.

Figure 3. The factors influencing SPP advocacy for paddy price issue in 2004



Source: author 2006

CHAPTER 6

Concluding Remarks

Like other countries, Indonesia government's agreement with WB, IMF and WTO to liberalize its agriculture inputs and outputs markets, as a result from SAP, has generated farmers' resistances either by "silent actions" or open contestation through demonstrations against the government. The popular policy of importing rice for example, has stimulated rice producers and NGO activists, who support them, to organize protests not only in the capital city, Jakarta, but also in many cities in Indonesia. The reason is, imported rice always lowers rice price in local markets, and this becomes a serious problem for rice producers. Moreover, if the government cannot stop illegal imported rice entering local markets, farmers will suffer more.

In this case, the government has a crucial dilemma. On the one hand, it has an obligation to provide affordable food (rice) for urban consumers and rural poor. For that reason, it sets up maximum ceiling price for rice, meaning that if rice prices are higher than that, the government through BULOG will do market interventions by selling rice for lower prices. Referring to the government's agreement above, it likely agrees with neoliberal concepts to liberalize rice markets aiming for getting competitive prices for foods, basically the cheaper ones.

On the other hand, the government also has to protect farmers as rice producers. This protection is needed to encourage farmers to produce more rice. Therefore, it sets up the floor prices for paddies to guarantee that farmers will have profits by selling their paddies on the prices given. In this case, the government tries to intervene rice markets without removing SAP and the rice liberalization agreement with WB, IMF, and WTO. In the agreement, the government is still allowed to subsidize rice, so it subsidizes rice producers through the floor price, and urban consumers and rural poor through the ceiling prices and market operations. For guaranteeing imported rice, officially it manages to open imports only from its institution (BULOG), but illegal imported rice still enters local markets every year.

However, in practice this policy does not work for many farmers. BPS and DEPTAN data in 2003 reported that many Indonesian farmers got lower prices than the floor prices. In addition, the government policy on rice procurements through BULOG is only benefiting for big traders who have many capitals. Moreover, its commitment to liberalize fertilizer markets has significantly increased production costs that have to be paid by farmers. For these reasons, Pati farmers joining in Serikat Petani Pati (SPP) organized collective actions in 2003-2004 to pressure PLG to subsidize them for storing their paddies aiming for getting higher prices.

By referring to the research questions, some conclusions can be made. *First*, in fact SPP activists come from different levels in farmer communities. Many of them are small and medium farmers compared to the features of Pati farmers, but some of them can be included as rich farmers since they operate more than 5 Ha land. This diversity leads them to build an identity not as a social class, but as rice producers and rural people who are excluded from the government policy making. Therefore, peasantry is not their identity.

Based on the criteria discussed in India farmers' movements, SPP movement is one form of new farmer movements with little differences. First, SPP does not only put the government as target of agitation, but it also pressures the fertilizer producers. Second, leadership in SPP movement is handled collectively among some leaders who come from different levels in farmer communities. They are small, medium, and rich farmers. Third, SPP is not a political party-led mobilization, but it has political objectives to involve in policy making process and to prepare for coming elections at the village and district levels. Fourth, SPP's identity is not only as rice producers, but also as rural mass that are excluded from policy decisions and development programs.

Second, in doing its advocacy, firstly SPP organized a demonstration and a public dialog to raise paddy price issue. It made statements in newspapers to deliver its message and to attract attention from the government and public. After getting attention from the government, it started to negotiate intensively with PLRA and PLG to pressure them to approve its proposal. In fact, this negotiation process was tiring process since it needed much energy from farmers. Finally, the government allocated

budget for subsidizing credits for farmers in the APBD 2004, although this program was not exactly like what SPP proposed. This final decision was more influenced by PLG's team, although PLRA played important role in the budgeting process.

Third, generally there were three main factors influencing the success of SPP action, namely farmers' power, political opportunities, and its strategy and tactics. Farmers' power were derived from (1) common interests to gain subsidies from and to be acknowledged by the government, and to build brotherhood (*paseduluran*) among many Pati farmers, (2) collective identity as rice producers and excluded groups that creates strong commitment and solidarity among them, (3) collective leaders who mainly played roles as charismatic, statesman, and administrator leaders, and (4) farmers' capability to mobilize resources like money, members/labour, supports from NGOs, organization building, and collective actions.

The four political opportunities appeared in the advocacy process were increasing participation access due to democratization and decentralization policy, separation power in PLRA, politician interests for 2004 election, alliances with mass media, and the government facilitation caused by modest demand raised by SPP. These gave chances for farmers to pressure and influence policy makers to approve its proposal. Besides, SPP did bargaining strategy through campaign, demonstration, and negotiation process which are different from the strategy done by old peasant movements that mostly was coercive one, specifically land reclaiming.

Fourth, the reasons why SPP was successful in its advocacy in 2004 are; SPP was able to take advantages from some opportunities, mainly facilitation and interests of PLRA members, to influence PLG and PLRA. This was also caused by SPP's demand which was a visible and reformist one, namely just asking subsidies for buying paddies. This reformist demand is the most important factor that created a possibility for the government to facilitate it. At the same time, by supports from NGOs and mass media, SPP was able to enhance its power and to choose the right tactics to pressure and negotiate with PLG and PLRA. SPP could benefit from the opportunities at that time because SPP had capacity and power to influence policy makers. Without its power, it would miss the opportunities. To be successful, farmers have to enhance

their power first, so that when opportunities come, they can use these to influence policy making process.

In fact, the issues raised by SPP are also demanded by some big farmer organizations, like HKTI, KTNA, and even FSPI. This emergence of new movement, caused by massive privatizations and market liberalizations in agriculture sector that push small farmers out of competition in markets, can generate a new episode of farmer movements in Indonesia. This type of movement starts to control market through pressuring the government as an actor in markets in order to support farmers' interests. This is different from old peasant movements taking place in Indonesia since Independence Day that demanded for land reform. However, old peasant movements could take a new step as new farmer movements when they have succeeded to gain their land back. For big organizations which have various members can raise the two issues, land reform and remunerative prices, at once like what FSPI has done.

To sum up, SPP movement and other organizations' protests on rice and fertilizer issues indicate that the government intervention on rice market particularly, and agriculture sector generally, has not solved the problems of low returns and high production cost faced by farmers. The intervention, which is still under structural adjustment framework, just benefits big rice traders, fertilizer producers and distributors, since the government subsidies go to them. Farmers still suffer from those classical problems. If this condition is not solved appropriately, farmers' protests will be greater as their interests are neglected in the agriculture policies. Typical SPP movement which is found in other farmer organizations will become new episode of farmer movements in Indonesia which are different from old movements that demand land reform. The land reform issue will continue, especially for peasants who lost their land, because many of land appropriation cases have not been solved, but farmers who have land will demand remunerative prices if they cannot take advantages from markets.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ariga, H. and Naohiro Kitano. (2000). *Current Situation of Rice Distribution System in Indonesia*, in Japan Bank for International Cooperation Review, No.1, 2000, in http://www.jbic.go.jp/english/research/report/review/pdf/report01_6.pdf. Accessed on 19 December 2005
- Assadi, M. (1995). 'Khadi Curtain', 'Weak Capitalism' and 'Operation Ryot': Some Ambiguities in Farmers' Discourse, Karnataka and Maharashtra 1980 – 93. In Tom Brass (ed.). *New Farmers' Movements in India*. Essex: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.
- Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS)– Statistic Center of Pati Regency. *Agriculture Census for Pati Regency in 2003*.
- Blumer, H (1995). *Social Movements*. In Lyman, S.M. and Robert J. Morrow (eds.) *Social Movements: Critiques, Concepts, Case-Studies*. London: Macmillan Press. Pp. 60-83.
- Brass, T (1995). *Introduction*. In Tom Brass (ed.). *New Farmers' Movements in India*. Essex: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.
- Brass, T (1995). *The Politics of Gender, Nature and Nation in the Discourse of the New Farmers' Movements*. In Tom Brass (ed.). *New Farmers' Movements in India*. Essex: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.
- Brass, T. (2002). *Peasants, Populism, and Postmodernism: The Return of the Agrarian Myth*. London: Frank Cass.
- BULOG (2002a). http://www.bulog.go.id/pers/pr_01092002.html, accessed on 11 June 2006.
- BULOG (2002b). *Persyaratan Kontraktor – Requirements for being Contractors*. In <http://www.bulog.go.id/hdg/persyaratan-kontraktor.html>. Accessed on 11 June 2006.
- BULOG (2003). *Produk Undang-undang - Regulation Products*. In http://www.indonesia.go.id/produk_uu/produk2003/pp2003/pp7'03.htm. Accessed on 11 June 2006
- BULOG (2006). *Realisasi Pengadaan Dalam Negeri 2006 – Realization of in Country Procurements 2006*. In http://www.bulog.co.id/excel_data/pp_peng_real.htm, accessed on 25 October 2006.
- Chapman, J. and Thomas Fisher. (2000). *The effectiveness of NGO campaigning: lessons from practice*. In *Development in Practice*, Volume 10, Number 2, May 2000. Oxfam GB. Pp 151-165.

- Crozier, M. and Erhard Friedberg. (1980). *Actors and Systems: The Politics of Collective Action*. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- DEPTAN. (2003). *Laporan Pemantauan Harga Gabah di tingkat Petani: 24 April dan 1 Mei 2003 – Monitoring Report on Paddy Prices faced by Farmers*. In <http://www.deptan.go.id/buletin/gabah/gbh24Apr&1Mei03.pdf>. Accessed on 5 July 2006
- Diani, M. (1992). *Analysing Social Movement Networks*. In Diani, M. and Ron Eyerman (ed.). *Studying Collective Action*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Edelman, M. (1999). *Peasants against Globalization: Rural Social Movements in Costa Rica*. California: Stanford University Press.
- Edwards, B. and John D. Mccarthy. (2004). *Resources and Social Movement Mobilization*. In Snow, D.A., Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (eds.). 2004. *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Pp. 116-143.
- Edwards, M. and David Hulme. (2002). *Making a Difference: Scaling-up the Developmental Impact of NGOs – Concepts and Experiences*. In Edwards, M. & A. Fowler (eds.). *The Earthscan reader on NGO management*. London: Earthscan, pp. 53-69.
- Ellis, F. (second edition-1993). *Peasant Economics: Farm households and agrarian development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ellis, F. (2000). *Rural Livelihoods and Diversity in Developing Countries*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Firmansyah, Esrom Aritonang, Hegel Terome, Syaiful Bahari, and Nanang Hari S. (1999). *Gerakan dan Pertumbuhan Organisasi Petani di Indonesia: Studi Kasus Gerakan Petani Era 1980-an – Movement and Development of Peasant Organizations in Indonesia: Case Study of Peasant Movements in 1980s*. Jakarta: Sekretariat Bina Desa and Yappika.
- Foweraker, J. (1995). *Theorizing Social Movements*. London: Pluto Press.
- Frank, A.G. and Marta Fuentes (2002). *Nine Theses on Social Movements*. In Shah, G. (ed.). *Social Movements and the State: Readings in Indian Government and Politics-4*. New Delhi: Sage Publications. Pp. 32-55.
- Gamson, W.A. (1988). *Political Discourse and Collective Action*. In Klandermans et al (eds.). *International Social Movement Research. From Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movement Research Across Culture*. Volume 1. London: Jai Press Inc. pp. 219-230.

- Gamson, W.A. (2004). *Bystanders, Public Opinion, and the Media*. In Snow, D.A., Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (eds.). 2004. *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Pp. 242-259.
- Gill, Sucha S. (1995). *The Farmers' Movement and Agrarian Change in the Green Revolution Belt of North-West India*. In Tom Brass (ed.). *New Farmers' Movements in India*. Essex: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.
- Grispun, R. (2003). *Exploring the Links Among Global Trade, Industrial Agriculture, and Rural Underdevelopment*. In North and Cameron (eds.). *Rural Progress, Rural Decay: Neoliberal Adjustment Policies and Local Initiatives*. Bloomfield USA: Kumarian Press.
- Heywood, A. (2002)- second edition. *Politics*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Huizer, G (1980). *Peasant Movements and Their Counterforces in South – East Asia*. New Delhi: Marwah Publications.
- Huizer, G. and Stavenhagen, R. (1974). *Peasant Movements and Land Reform in Latin America: Mexico and Bolivia*. In Henry A. Landsberger (ed). *Rural Protest: Peasant Movements and Social Change*. London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd.
- Hunt, S.A. and Benford, R.D. (2004). *Collective Identity, Solidarity, and Commitment*. In Snow, D.A., Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (eds.). 2004. *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Pp. 433-451.
- Husken, F. and Benjamin White. (1989). *Java: Social Differentiation, Food Production, and Agrarian Control*. In Hart, G. et al. (eds.) *Agrarian Transformations: Local Processes and the State in Southeast Asia*. Berkeley: University of California Press. Pp. 235-261.
- Jawa Pos. 28/07/2006. *Keluhkan Distribusi dan Harga Pupuk - Complaining for fertilizers prices and distribution*. Documented by SPP.
- Kompas. 09 February 2004. *Harga Gabah Merosot Hingga Rp. 600 per Kg – Rice Price is Decreasing up to 600 rupiahs per Kilogram*. Documented by SPP
- Kriesi, H. (2004). *Political Context and Opportunity*. In Snow, D.A., Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (eds.). 2004. *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Pp. 67-86
- Lefeber, L. (2003). *Problems of Contemporary Development: Neoliberalism and Its Consequences*. In North and Cameron (eds.). *Rural Progress, Rural Decay: Neoliberal Adjustment Policies and Local Initiatives*. Bloomfield USA: Kumarian Press.

- Lindberg, S. (1995). *New Farmers' Movements in India as Structural Response and Collective-Identity-Formation: The Cases of the Shetkari Sanghatana and the BKU*. In Tom Brass (ed.). *New Farmers' Movements in India*. Essex: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.
- McKeon, N., Michael Watts, and Wendy Wolford. (2004). *Peasant Associations in Theory and Practice*. Program Paper Number 8. May 2004. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
- Morris, A.D. and Suzanne Staggenborg. (2004). *Leadership in Social Movement*. In Snow, D.A., Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (eds.). 2004. *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Pp. 116-143.
- North, L.L. (2003). *Rural Progress or Rural Decay?: An Overview of the Issues and the Case Studies*. In North and Cameron (eds.). *Rural Progress, Rural Decay: Neoliberal Adjustment Policies and Local Initiatives*. Bloomfield USA: Kumarian Press.
- Olson, M. (1971). *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Oxfam-Great Britain (2001). *The Impact of Rice Trade Liberalization on Food Security in Indonesia*. Published in <http://www.maketrade.com/assets/english/IndonesiaRiceResearch2001Final.pdf>. Accessed on 12 December 2005.
- Pakulski, J. (1995). *Social Movements and Class: The Decline of the Marxist Paradigm*. In Maheu, L (ed.). *Social Movements and Social Classes: The Future of Collective Action*. London: International Sociological Association (ISA) and SAGE Publications. Pp. 55-106.
- Pieper, U. and Lance Taylor (1998-revised edition). *The Revival of the Liberal Creed: The IMF, the World Bank, and Inequality in a Globalized Economy*. CEPA Working Paper Series I No. 4, October 1996 (Revised January 1998), Center for Economic Policy Analysis, New York.
- Reisman, D. (1990). *Theories of Collective Action: Downs, Olson and Hirsch*. London: The Macmillan Press
- Robinson, S., Moataz El-Said and Nu Nu San, (June 1998). *Rice Policy, Trade, and Exchange Rate Changes In Indonesia: A General Equilibrium Analysis*. Trade and Macroeconomics Division International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). Washington D.C. 20006 USA. Published in <http://www.ifpri.org/divs/tmd/dp/papers/tmdp27.pdf>. Accessed on 19 December 2005
- Shah, G. (2002). *Introduction*. In Shah, G. (ed.). *Social Movements and the State: Readings in Indian Government and Politics-4*. New Delhi: Sage Publications. Pp. 13-31.

- Shanin, T (second edition. 1987). *Peasantry in Political Action*. In Shanin, T (ed.) *Peasants and Peasant Societies*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Pp. 357-363.
- Shanin, T (1990). *Defining Peasants: Essays concerning Rural Societies, Expolary Economies, and Learning from them in the Contemporary World*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Shively, W.P. (eight edition-2003). *Power & Choice: An Introduction to Political Science*. New York: Mc Graw Hill.
- Sicular, T. (1989). *Introduction: Food Price Policy in Asia*. In Terry Secular (ed.). *Food Price Policy in Asia: A Comparative Study*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Pp. 1-21.
- Stein, H. (1994). *Theories of Institutions and Economic Reform in Africa*. In *World Development* Vol. 22, No. 12, pp 1833-1849.
- Streeten, P. (1987). *What Price Food? Agricultural Price Policies in Developing Countries*. London: Macmillan Press.
- Tarrow, S. (1998)- second edition. *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- The Journal of Peasant Studies. *Special Edition on New Farmers' Movements in India*. Edited by Tom Borras. Volume 21 Number 3 and 4. April/July 1994. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.
- Timmer, C.P., Walter P. Falcon, and Scott R. Pearson. (1983). *Food Policy Analysis*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, published for the World Bank.
- Udehn, L. (1996). *The Limits of Public Choice: A sociological critique of the economic theory of politics*. London: Routledge.
- Webster, N. (2004). *Understanding the Evolving Diversities and Originalities in Rural Social Movements in the Age of Globalization*. Programme Paper Number 7. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development: February 2004.
- Whittier, N. (2002). *Meaning and Structure in Social Movement*. In Meyer, D.S. et al (eds.). *Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State*. New York: Oxford University Press. Pp. 289-307.
- Wilson, J. (1973). *Introduction to Social Movements*. New York: Basic Books, Inc.
- Wolf, E.R. (1987). *On Peasant Rebellions*. In Shanin, T (ed.) *Peasants and Peasant Societies*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Pp. 367-374.

LIST OF RESPONDENTS

No	Name	Institution	Date of interview	Place
1	Tanto Pursidi	Head of SPP and a leader in Baturejo group	19 July and 3 August 2006	Baturejo, Sukolilo
2	Sulistiyono	Secretary of SPP and a leader in Ngastorejo group	20 July 2006	Ngastorejo, Jakenan
3	Sukilan	Treasury of SPP and a leader in Galiran, Baleadi groups	5 August 2006	Baturejo, Sukolilo
4	Gunretno	Networking division of SPP and a leader in Baturejo groups	19 July and 3 and 12 August 2006	Baturejo, Sukolilo and Pati
5	Husaini	Advocacy division of SPP and an activist of SHEEP	21 July and 22 August 2006	Pucakwangi and Pati
6	Kamelan	A leader in Jambean group	15 August 2006	Pati
7	Kaseran	A leader in Wotan groups	24 August 2006	Wotan, Sukolilo
8	Hardi	A leader in Baleadi village and a head of the village	31 July 2006	Baturejo, Sukolilo
9	Nur Salim	A leader from Kayen groups	10 August 2006	Baturejo, Sukolilo
10	Sunhadi	A leader in Tondomulyo group	August 2006	Pati
11	Andreas Subiyono	Director of SHEEP	3 August 2006	Yogyakarta
12	Petrus	Activist of SHEEP	18 July 2006	Pati
13	Adi Nugroho	Activist of SHEEP	4 August 2006	Yogyakarta
14	Anonymous	Ex-an agriculture office representative	26 July 2006	Pati
15	Anonymous	An agriculture office representative	25 July 2006	Pati
16	Anonymous	Ex-local representative member from PDIP	19 August 2006	by phone in Tayu
17	Anonymous	Ex-local representative member from PKB	27 July 2006	Trangkil
18	Jukari	A reporter from Wawasan newspaper	7 August 2006	Pati
19	Soeprapto	A reporter from KOMPAS newspaper	17 August 2006	Kudus

QUESTION

1. The following data were obtained from a study of the relationship between the number of hours spent studying and the number of hours spent watching television.

Hours Studying	Hours Watching Television
0	10
1	9
2	8
3	7
4	6
5	5
6	4
7	3
8	2
9	1
10	0
