iSS

Institute of Social Studies

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Institutions, Incentives and Public Participation.
Unveiling the Myth of Public Participation in Coastal Policy
Planning in the Netherlands

A RESEARCH PAPER PRESENTED BY

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(Kenya)

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for obtaining the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
SPECIALIZATION: RURAL LIVELIHOODS AND GLOBAL CHANGE

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THE HAGUE, DECEMBER 2004

This document represents part of the author's study programme while at the Institute of Social Studies; the views stated therein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Institute

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AF	*Analytical Framework*
APSA	*American Political Science Association*
CBOs	*Community Based Organizations*
CCP	*Coastal Cooperative Program*
CIEP	*Center for Institutions and Environmental Policy*
CZMC	*Coastal Zone Management Center*
EU/C	*European Union/Council*
EUCC	*European Union Coastal Center*
GNP	*Gross National Product*
ICM	*Integrated Coastal Management*
IDS	*Institute for Development Studies*
IES	*Institute for Environmental Studies*
IHE	*Institute for Water Development*
IPO	*Association of Provinces*
IWCO	*Independent World Commission on the Oceans*
LNV	*Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Protection and Fisheries*
PTPA	*Political Theory and Policy Analysis*
RIKZ	*National Institute for Marine and Coastal Protection*
SIDA	*Swedish International Development Agency*
UNEP	*United Nations Environmental Program*
UNCED	*United Nations Conference on Environmental Development*
UvA	*University of Amsterdam*
UVW	*Association of Waterboards*
V&W	*Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management*
VNG	*Association of Netherlands Municipalities*
VROM	*Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment*

ABSTRACT

This paper examines coastal management institutions in the Netherlands in light of V&W's desire to mainstream public participation in coastal policy processes. First, it teases institutional outcomes and how they shape stakeholder participation within the highly democratic and decentralized system of coastal policy planning. It reveals that, despite the presence of decentralized institutional frameworks within coastal management, public involvement and broad-based stakeholder participation is far from being achieved. This it argues is a result of institutional outcomes and incentive structures which undermine efforts to foster people-centered policy processes by enabling the participation of a minority group within the coastal sector, while excluding the majority of the non-state actors and the public. This paper reveals that the current institutional structure and resultant incentives within it are not a result of bad practice but a product of the unique ecological and social-cultural characteristics of the county. The role that floods and rising sea levels have played in shaping coastal policy was noted in this paper as being the architect of the existing institutions. The paper concludes that, for people-centered policy processes to blossom within public institutions, the right incentives able to pull people to participate need to be established. In addition policy makers ought to be sensitive to contextual uniqueness of regions before adopting policy-planning methods as this has tended to explain the growing gap between policy and practice.

[Key Words: *Institutions, Incentives, Public participation, Policy making, Coastal Management and Netherlands*]

CHAPTER 1: The Paradox

1.0   Background: *Meeting Spatial Quality within Safety Demands*

The Netherlands is part of the North Sea that stretches from Cap Blanc Nez [France] to the North part of Jutland in Denmark [V&W, 2003; pp7]. Pressure from the sea resulting from rising sea levels, climate change and unexpected storm intensity has subjected the Netherlands to a constant war with water. With well over 25% of its land below sea level, the Netherlands's coastal policy's focus is on mitigating floods and ensuring coastal defense [CZMC, 1995] - hence safety levels of 1:10,000[1]. In 1993 and 1995, the Netherlands was startled by extreme sea-level rise in Zeeland, which resulted in precautionary evacuation of residents along the Rhine and Waal rivers. These disastrous events reflected the failure flood protection policies to guarantee safety to the Netherlands's residents. These events prompted the State Secretary of V&W and the president of UVW to establish an Advisory Committee to assess the extent of the risk within coastal zones and make recommendations for desirable changes to water and coastal policy [Cabinet Report, 2002; Floris Van Ogtrop, 2002]. Their task was to focus primarily on identifying gaps within current policies given the consequences of climate change, rising sea levels and land subsidence.

The committee concluded that the current water and coastal management system was not capable of responding to challenges faced in the sector and that to make Holland a safe, livable and attractive country a new approach into policy planning had to be adopted. The team revealed further that the governance structures lacked an integrative component and despite high-levels of decentralization, policy planning was still centralized with minimum non-state actor involvement. This approach, they argued perceived coastal processes within the narrow scope of flood protection, which fails to take on board the other socio-economic, cultural and political dynamics of coastal ecosystems. The failure to in cooperate all aspects of coastal ecosystems is reflected in the incompatibility of the overall coastal policy with reality [Arends and Hoogewoning, 2003]. To overcome this challenge, ACWM advocated for a more integrative policy planning processes where the public plays a leading role in decision-making. Various reasons were put forth for this proposal: Firstly, increased public involvement would provide a framework upon which diverse aspects within coastal

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[1] 1:10,000: the government can only tolerate 1 flood in 10,000 years

ecosystems can be integrated into policy outcomes. Arends and Hoogewoning [2003] argue that the current policies had failed to incorporate all aspects of coastal management given the rigid decision-making processes and the failure to institutionalize integrative policy planning at all levels of governance. Secondly, there was need for increased citizen involvement in policy planning so that they can become more aware of coastal processes and the risks they pose to their existence. The assumption behind that argument was that a public that is involved becomes more aware and is likely to assume more responsibility in planning and management programs [Cabinet Report, 2000]. Finally, approaches geared at raising standards of coastal quality require the involvement of coastal communities as resource custodians if increased ownership, legitimacy and popular support to the management interventions is to be achieved [Cabinet Report, 2003]. This report shaped the coastal policy for 2003-2005 under, which mainstreaming public participation was a key goal to be achieved.

1.1   The Paradox

While practice reveals a lack of integrative people-centered policy processes, studies continue to rank the Netherlands as a leading light in ICM. This is mostly equated to its robust network of highly decentralized and democratic institutions as spaces for stakeholder involvement and participation [J. de, V, 2001; Jorissen *et al*, 2000; V&W, 2003]. Besides the levels of decentralization, the Netherlands coastal process is argued to thrive on virtues of consensus building and the politics of accommodation embedded in its national environmental policy plans [Jan & Svante, 2000; Pettenger, 2002]. These views seem to contradict what happens in practice and in retrospect fail to match up with the discussions in section 1.1 which illustrates V&W's failure to integrate policy planning. To unveil this paradox, this paper initiates a study of the Netherlands's coastal decision-making institutions. It examines the nature of incentives created by the institutions and how they shape stakeholder participation in policy planning.

To unveil this paradox, this paper examines whether coastal governance institutions in the Netherlands provide an enabling environment to foster public participation in policy processes. To effectively do that, it examines the nature of incentives structures created within institutions or outcomes of policy processes and how this influence stakeholder interaction and participation. Besides understanding institutional factors that shape

stakeholder participation, this paper attempts to examine and unveil the factors that have shaped the current policy panning processes and existing institutions. This is an important learning process as they explore possibilities of mainstreaming participatory processes in coastal policy planning.

Undertaking this study was vital as it exposes the intricacies and complexities involved in mainstreaming participatory processes within public institutions of policy making. In so doing it provides a clear theoretical understanding of how institutions shape stakeholder roles and empirical evidence using the Netherlands coastal process as case of illustration.

1.2   *The Speculation:* **Key assumptions**

In an attempt to unpack the above paradox, this paper makes the following assumptions:

- The existence of democratic institutions does not facilitate a participatory process
- Institutions undermine or enable public participation as key spaces for interaction
- Institutions undermine participation processes by creating perverse incentives
- The existence of an incentive structure [whether negative or positive] is shaped strong mediating factors outside formally operating institutions.

The relationship between institutions and public participation has drawn increased interest among scholars, and provides insight into unpacking the myth of public participation in the Netherlands. Studies by Blackburn and Holland's [1998]; Cornwall's [2002]; Dzur, A's [2002] and Thompson, [1995] reveal that despite tremendous efforts and good intentions, democratic institutions continue to undermine public participation in policy processes. The failure of these institutions to foster people centered policy processes lies in deeply embedded assumptions held by those who hold democratic institutionalism as an ideal for citizen involvement [Clever, 2001; Corter *et al*, 1998]. One such assumption is the perception that people are rational choice makers, capable, reliable and willing to participate but lack the institutions within which to channel their views [Botes and Rensburg, 2000]. Cornwall [2002] argues that this assumption has realized the growth of CBOs and decentralized forms of governance in the late 90s and after, but with little empirical evidence indicating the expansion of public involvement in policy processes. Based on these arguments, this paper examines the incentive structure within decision-making institutions with an aim of assessing

their ability to mainstream public participation in coastal policy processes. By carrying out a historical analysis of coastal management approaches, this paper also presents a probable explanation of why the decision-making institutions undermine possibilities for public participation.

1.3   Methodology

This paper is a product of an intensive desk study with selective doses of primary data. The theoretical base of this paper involves establishing a link between institutions and stakeholder participations and how the former shapes the latter. To derive this link, I undertook a rigorous and extensive review of books, journals, newspaper cuttings, papers and research reports containing information on the challenges and prospects for institutionalizing public participation processes within public policy arena. This method and information collected was vital since I was able situate my paper within ongoing debates on institutionalizing participation processes. The key limitation was the scantiness of documented literature on participatory processes in coastal management and specifically on Netherlands. I overcame this challenge by evaluating project and research reports, papers and journal articles from other related sectors especially within natural resource management since most the key features of best practice cut across disciplines. The following information centers played a key role among others in shaping my literature review:

- The IDS Participation Club through their intensive research projects on participation practice enriched my understanding of pertinent aspects of good practice.
- CIEP within the department of PTPA at Indiana University provided a lead into literature on incentive structures within institutions and how they influence collective action in common-pool resource management.
- Articles and papers presented in annual conferences of the APSA provided insightful sources and information on democratic professionalism and emerging deficiencies within democracies.

A clear illustration of coastal governance in the Netherlands required a review of historical and contemporary management patterns over time. I scanned through government reports on coastal processes, policy documents, journals, magazines and academic documents. This information was vital in providing a description of coastal governance processes and even

more important when trying to understand the history behind the current institutions. The key obstacle was that the bulk of the information especially government documents were mostly in Dutch language, which I neither read nor understand. I therefore opted to seek translations for portions that I thought were very important otherwise I concentrated on information presented in English language. It is therefore possible that I missed out on vital information which might have been lost in translations or not captured in the English versions which I noticed were usually very brief as compared to the Dutch versions. The libraries at RIKZ, IES at UvA and IHE in Delft provided useful information bases to this effect.

To obtain accurate information about perceived institutional incentives, it's important that one talks to the staff involved. This provided a key challenge given the sensitivity of information I needed. For example information related to budget allocations, remuneration, and other motivational factors was paramount if my AF was to be of use in carrying out this study. This was methodologically challenging as variables like remuneration, internal budgets and motivational benefits were confidential and not easily accessible. It became evident too that individual staff members treated such issues as personal and were reluctant to freely divulge any information. I resolved to rely on publicly accessible information like overall budgets, respective national allocations and breakdowns provided in annual reports. On this basis, I made use of my own speculations from general budgets and in reference to the theoretical discussions was able draw discussions regarding resource allocation for participatory processes. Where possible I made attempts to hold consultations with various staff members at RIKZ and members of the general public. Lastly, my one year experience at RIKZ was helpful in shaping my data as it gave me an opportunity to witness policy design processes, deliberation and other discussions first hand.

1.4   Structure of the Paper

Chapter one lays the foundation of the paper by presenting an overview of events that placed the participation debate as a key policy item in coastal policy in the Netherlands. The nature of policy planning and implementation is argued within this chapter as being linear and centralized despite the existence of decentralized democratic institutions. This paper therefore examines the link between decision-making institutions and stakeholder participation, by examining the nature incentives structures that emerge from various policy and organizational processes. This link is established in chapter two where theoretical arguments

on institutionalizing public participation are analyzed and discussed. A vital end product is my analytical framework, which I employ in chapter three to analyze my findings. Chapter three is a combination of description and analysis of the incentives structure as outcomes of institutional interaction and governance in coastal governance in the Netherlands. The descriptive part is a summary of the institutional framework and policy planning process, while the analysis involves a thorough assessment the institutional environment and how it impacts on people's involvement. Chapter four concludes the paper by synthesizing key issues that emerge from previous chapters. It also analyses the factors that explain the current institutional framework in the Netherlands by applying the AF and two other related theories.

CHAPTER 2: The Basics

Discussions on integrating people-centered policy processes have revolved around multiplication of participation spaces through decentralization efforts [Clever, 2001; IDS Workshop, 2001]. These discussions have however failed to match up with the vacuum due to the absence of citizen involvement in policy settings. With that, there is growing need to understand the explanations behind this mis-match. This chapter attempts to provide this explanation by drawing the link between institutions, incentives and public participation. It posits that institutions fail to create the right incentives to foster people-centered policy processes. North [1993] defines institutions as rules of the game [soft institutions]. This chapter and paper in general perceives institutions beyond North's definition to incorporate bureaucratic organizations [hard institutions]. A combination of hard and soft institutions in this paper defines the institutional environment[2]. Incentives on the other hand are perceived as material, non-material benefits and outcomes of institutional interactions and policies processes, which incite, encourage or discourage a motive.

2.0   The Theoretical Umbrella

This paper is situated within the broad theories of civic environmentalism and institutions respectively. Theories of civic environmentalism embrace aspects of participation in policy formulation where they assume a positive and direct relationship between political democracy, decentralization and citizen participation [Abel and Stephan, 2000]. Emphasis is placed on representative democracy defined in terms of free and fair elections as a legitimate for providing voice to citizens through representation in policy-making arms of government like the parliament. Studies have revealed however that such democratic institutions fail to match the hype accorded to them because of the lack of empirical evidence illustrating public voice in policy outcomes. A missing component according to Clever [2001] and Khadiagala Gilbert [Personal Communication, 2004] is the value of devolution of power, which bestows decision-making right to the public and local government.

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[2] Own definition

Evolutions within civic environmentalism acknowledge its static nature where neo-civic environmentalists[3] argue that there are exists institutional factors which in spite the existence of political democracy, they continue to undermine citizen's participation. Neo-civic environmentalists posit that true and practical civic environmentalism is only possible if these limitations are acknowledged and overcome. One starting point of doing this is by recognizing the heterogeneity of communities and working a broad web of stakeholders to facilitate a process where the public or citizens are able to voice their concerns and interests in policy deliberations [Chambers, 1997]. One fatal limitation of this theory is its inability to provide a framework within which institutional barriers can be mapped and analyzed. It fails to achieve this goal by perceiving the public as a homogenous group and presuming that the polls represent collective interests of the public that works towards a common good.

Theories of institutions come in handy to fill this gap. Institutionalists perceive institutions as rules of the game, which influence and shape people's behavior [North, 1993]. They argue that stakeholder interactions within missing institutions are marred with high transaction costs related to coordination, provision and organization. These transaction costs related to asymmetrical information and bounded rationality lead to collective action problems. Overcoming collective action problems is an entry point into fostering people-centered consciousness and depends on the nature of institutional environment to lower transaction costs of coordination, motivation, mobilization and organization [Ostrom *et al*, 2002].

2.1 INCENTIVES within INSTITUTIONS and ORGANIZATIONS

Coastal planning presents a challenge to practitioners seeking to integrate public participation as a key ingredient in policy planning. This is because coastal management is a technical field, which relies on scientific information and pays little or no attention to lay knowledge. In the Netherlands for example, coastal policy has for centuries focused on infrastructural flood defense which places technological innovations on the forefront. Mainstreaming participation in such highly scientific fields not only requires creation of spaces within democratic institutions, but also a review of the institutional environment as the within which policies are debated and formulated. The rivalry in this case is between two opposing knowledge systems; the experts and the public respectively. The experts perceive public

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[3] [3] Neo-civic environmentalism – is a term I have coined up to differentiate the old from the evolved school

knowledge as being inferior and unscientific while the public equates professional norms to a narrow minimization of reality [Korten, 1984]. Such perceptions shape internal organizational cultures which then dictate who gets to participate and who does not. This is based on the nature of emerging incentives. Analyzing internal organizations and resultant incentives is vital in understanding the role that organizations as *hard* institutions play in shaping stakeholder participation. The underlying assumption in that regard is that policy makers and implementers can only learn to be democratic by acting democratically [Dewey, 1927].

Korten [1984]; Pumbert & Pretty [1997], reflect upon professionalism as an example of an organizational culture and one which rightfully applies to coastal management. They posit that, from a reductionist and positivist perspective, coastal management still remains a technology-intensive practice that places emphasis on getting the science right. The main actors in this field are technical experts who rely and perceive the ecosystem through the narrow window of their profession. Pessimistically, they assert that situations where logical positivism defines the mode of thinking, resource governance tends to give an upper hand to rational-expert based analysis in determining best institutions or management solutions. Within such cultures, enforcement and management practices are enforced through standard setting instruments like permit systems, zoning rights and plans among others. All this standards are based on so called scientific professional tests operating under the blindfolding umbrella for achieving a common good [Buchy & Hoverman, 1999]. Despite the existence of democratic institutions, such management fields continue to shrink participatory spaces as they exhibit centralized top-down mechanisms of decision-making exemplifying a typical one-way mode of communication that is purely *"orders down"* and *"reports up"*.

In practice public participation tends to be inconsistent with the conventional self-images of modern professionalism and expert-based delivery of services. Professionals in the public service and in specialized fields acquire their jobs based on their specialization and expertise. Their role is specifically to analyze technical information and make professional judgments about *"optimal"* solutions to complex problems. With specified terms of reference requiring particular skills, technical professionals present a challenge when it comes to changing their attitudes as a vital process of learning. Their professional ethic doesn't leave room to pass problem solving to groups of local people or *"outsiders"* from the broad clan of experts. An organizational culture of this kind can easily shrink the room for public participation and lead

to self-exclusion, as the public will definitely feel inferior. The same will also apply for support staff and subordinate staff who are not necessarily hired on the basis of expert skills like geologists, engineers among others. At the same time, the terms and package set-aside for staff members is coined around the expectation of the employer. It is within such contexts that strong incentive structures are required for staff members as a reward to lure them into paying the price to change their attitudes, and take up a new responsibility while making accommodative compromises towards each other. Fostering such change involves extra costs not just financially, but time-wise as it entails changing ones way of doing things, thinking and interaction respectively.

Transforming organizations to embrace virtues of citizen participation is a resource intensive exercise. It goes beyond learning participatory techniques to demanding changes within organizational rules and behavior. A review of organizational cultures will be profitable as they create room for experimentation, innovation and creativity among staff members other than fostering the rigidity of their job descriptions [Thompson, 1995]. The organizational culture described above for example requires and calls for an in-depth review of how things are done within organizations. Breaking rigidity in technical fields requires a shift towards broadening the scope of expertise on the disciplinary wheel of the organization. Korten, [1984] recommends multi-disciplinarity in such settings, which means the creation of a balance between the various disciplines e.g. a balance between social scientists, anthropologists, political scientists etc amidst the natural scientists. Multi-disciplinarity as a human resource policy however has failed to achieve the goals of collective and collaborative learning. This is because organizations are also shaped by overarching policy agenda which then dictates who have more voice than the other. Cornwall [2001] posits that overcoming the rhetoric of multi-disciplinarity requires an environment where diversity of disciplines is embraced and the interaction and fusion of knowledge systems is reflected in respective policies. This, she mentions should be reflected in hiring policies, the organization's mission statement among others.

A trans-disciplinary environment enables the emergence of valuable habits - competencies, interests, norms and healthy relations of authority. Incremental widening of knowledge systems through trans-disciplinarity backed by transformative training as a means to transfer of skills and technology within an institution sets the stage for integrative decision-making. Training and broadening of the epistemic systems also relies on the nature of partnerships

with other third sector organizations as probable incentives for fostering social and interactive attitudes [Blackburn and Holland, 1998]. The vitality of this process is that it facilitates a process of social learning and experience sharing among various disciplines in the organization. Widening the scope of policy planning by encouraging trans-disciplinarity opens up links with the third sector agencies. The popular view argues Thompson [1995] is that collaboration with third sector agency has the ability to take a more independent view about priorities of the public.

Organizational cultures are not only shaped by staff members, but also with the overall legal and policy frameworks that govern a given sector. A favorable organizational culture might in itself be an incentive for participation in certain contexts, but is not a guarantee unless there are laws in place that provide complete and symmetrical information to the public. The role of legal frameworks, policies and laws is vital when regulation of behavior is paramount. As argued by Korten [1984] public participation and devolution of decision making power to some teams of experts rubs against the grain which can either lead to exclusion of the general public. This view is echoed by Ostrom *et al*, [2003] who posit that a move towards public participation or collective action in many respects contradicts the ethics of experts in terms of what *knowledge* to respect. It is vital therefore to put in place clear public participation laws and integrative planning policies so as to enforce the attitude change and make involvement in policy planning a right.

The need for legal frameworks and clearly stipulated rewards, incentives and penalties for integrative policy planning is vital depending on the nature of good at stake. For public goods, the consumption of one stakeholder does not affect the amount available for the other. The desire to participate in managing such goods is usually low given the fact that there are no competing interests at stake. To foster citizen involvement in the provision and management of such goods calls for strong laws within which clearly stipulated penalties and rewards for those who participate or don't respectively. Private goods on the other hand usually have strongly vested interests where one stakeholder's consumption affects the consumption of the other [Ostrom *et al*, 2003]. Both cases might require incentives, but of a different kind. Ostrom posits that for public goods, incentives aim at stimulating participation to overcome the problem of free riders, while for private goods, laws are in place to moderate and control role against the emergence of exclusionary institutions like patron-client relations, moral hazards and adverse selection. Overcoming free riders and the emergence of

dysfunctional institutions requires the provision of information. Powerful actors within decision-making contexts are argued to use information as a tool for subordination, domination and exploitative patronage. Ensuring access to perfect information within well-established legal frameworks is noted by Ostrom as being a key motivational factor for fostering participation and collective action and assists to overcome collective action problems.

The theoretical discussions above provide a useful insight into understanding institutional factors that undermine public participation and integrated policy planning efforts. They however fail to go beyond to provide probable explanations behind the existence of those institutional frameworks. Clever [2001] asserts that institutional frameworks do not emerge in a vacuum, but are shaped by mediating factors which should be well understood before seeking to propose a shift. In the context of mainstreaming public participation, it is of profound value to search for these explanations given the fact that institutions are shaped according to the role they were meant to play. These specific roles shape the kind of participation evident within them [Cornwall, 2001], which then places different demands on decision-making institutions. Consultative participation for example will require a strong central system of decision-making where policy issues are discussed at national levels with and later consultations held with selected stakeholders [Arstein, 1969]. Collaborative management on the other hand will require a well-coordinated and integrated system where devolution of power to the local government is embedded in the law. To provide explanations behind the existence of a given institutional framework, calls for a historical analysis of the institutions and the socio-cultural context within which the respective sector in embedded [Clever, 2001]. This is of added value as it brings in the argument that interactions between stakeholders also take place outside formal organizations.

Thompson, *et al* [1990] takes a lead in shaping this argument by positing that symbolic meanings attached to resources for example and the historical experiences within a region play a key role in demarcating spaces of interaction. From a cultural theory perspective, Thomson *et al* [1990] posits that, the way people are socialized around a given resource shapes the meanings that people attach to it. This socialization, which he defines as the *"culture"*, could be as a result of historical events, catastrophes or symbolic moments that dictate how people perceive a given resource. The Somali community perceives the camel as a revered animal given the fact that historically, camels have been the source of hope in terms

of transport within the desert, dowry, food and also a source of livelihood. This symbolic attachment to the camel and the role that the animal played during the 1972 drought as the beast of burden has potential to dictate the approaches for livestock management. Cultural perspectives therefore shape the nature of management and policy options that emerge by providing a socio-scientific basis of how people tend to be socialized by a given resource [Floris Van Ogtrop, 2002]. The management approach further determines stakeholder relations. Within the same perspective, a country that has been in constant war with floods for example will tend to treat water as a foe and will therefore invest in building institutions capable to combat floods. Its policy options will be shaped by among other factors historical experiences that the country has faced. This informal setting is increasingly playing a key role in shaping policy and management approaches. Thompson in *fig. 1* below presents four main management approaches that he argues are shaped by different socialization experiences.

Fig. 1: Cultural perspectives

Source: Originally by Thompson, but diagrammatically copied from Floris Van Ogtrop, 2002: 56

A *fatalist* he argues will deal with issues as they come. He is more curative and known to mobilize communities only when need arises. The *individualist* tends to have an economic eye focusing on issues that have an economic connotation pegged to it. Measures put in place focus on redeeming the economic base, which in most cases resembles most liberal or open market scenario. They rely on individual power to coin and foster change and their better meant. *Hierachist* on the other hand is one bearing futile experience with a given resource,

long history of interaction with the resource. They adopt a blend of curative and preventive measures based on previous experience. Such an approach is usually technocratic, expert led with specialized institutions taking the lead in decision-making processes. Lastly, *egalitarians* perceive resources as being part of the natural cycle. Their management approach creates room for holistic stakeholder involvement where all parts of the system have a key role to play. According, to Thompson such a society is an ideal context to mainstream public participation in decision making than the rest. He argues further however that there are possibilities to envisage a shift from one perspective to another, but that is a long and slow process and depends on societal and developmental changes [Hoekstra, 1998]. One aspect that lacks in the cultural theory that I attempt to include in my theoretical discussion is how political shifts also play roles in shaping the outcomes of institutional interactions. Political culture as an institution determines the kind of political agenda and economic pattern that a country adopts.

The role that institutions play in either enabling or undermining public participation in policy process is made clear in the theoretical discussions above. That link forms the AF upon which this study is undertaken and summarized in *fig. 2* below.

Fig. 2: Analytical Framework

Source: Author's Construct

CHAPTER 3: What it takes

INCENTIVES within INSTITUTIONS: *Bringing Policy to the Ground*

This chapter is divided into two sections. Section 3.1 is a description of the institutional framework and policy planning process for coastal governance in the Netherlands. Section 3.2 is an analysis of incentive structures that emerge from the institutional framework. The institutional framework and policy processes are analyzed within the theoretical arguments discussed in chapter two. A combination of the two sections attempts to assess whether decision-making institutions in coastal management in the Netherlands undermine people-centered policy processes through the analysis of institutional incentives and policy outcomes.

3.1 Institutional Context for Coastal Governance in Netherlands

Policies impacting coastal management in the Netherlands are argued[4] to be a product of integrative deliberation between the National, provincial and local government [Pettenger, 2002]. At the national level, V&W coordinates policy activities through incorporating economic, agricultural and housing aspects of coastal management by collaborating with EZ, LNV and VROM respectively. At the local level, Waterboards and Municipalities are responsible for implementing policy frameworks designed by the national government.

National Level

The role of the national government is legally enforced by the Flood Protection act of 1960. It was responsible for setting and defining policy frameworks within which the provinces and local government operated. V&W takes the lead to coordinate policy activities between four other ministries as mentioned above [*see arrows in table 1*]. To effectively undertake its tasks its divided into five main directorates which act as specialized arms of government. The directorate of Public Works and Water Management [PWWM], is solely responsible designing, planning and evaluating water and coastal policy; the Roads and Hydraulics Engineering Division [RHED] is responsible for providing policy advice on public hydraulic

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[4] Term "argued" is used because it doesn't reflect what happens in practice.

and road engineering project. Finally, RIKZ is in charge of providing policy advice on all issues related to coastal, Marine and Water Resource management.

Provincial Level

In the Netherlands, four provinces[5] are directly involved in coastal management. This is because of their close proximity to the coast. Provinces perform their tasks under the Provincial Administration Act. They are responsible for formulating strategic and operational policies in the form of structure plans [*streekplannen*]. These are broad plans that designate areas within provinces that need to be zoned for housing, commercial development or nature conservation [Fockert, 2001: 33]. As the link between the national and local government, provinces also play supervisory roles where they monitor the local government to make sure their activities conform to the **set** national goals. The decision-making organs of provinces are the provincial council [*elected body of 45-85*], Executive [*nominated by the provincial council*] and Governor [*nominated by the government*].

Municipalities

There are five hundred municipalities in the Netherlands involved in coastal policy issues. As the lowest arm of coastal governance, their responsibility is to adopt, elaborate and implement zoning plans and policies approved by the provinces, but developed by the national government [V&W, 2002]. Operating under the Municipality Act, municipalities have a key role of issuing zoning and investment permits to individuals and companies in coastal zones that fall within their mandate. Like provinces, municipalities are governed by a council, executive and a mayor as its head.

Waterboards [WB]

The existence of waterboards dates back to the 8th century. In attempts to tackle issues related to rising sea levels and subsiding land, communities elected representatives to regional meetings where these issues were commonly discussed [Olsthorn and Tol, 2001]. These meetings formed the basis upon which Waterboards currently stand [V&W, 2003]. The very

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[5] Friesland, South Holland, North Holland and Zeeland

first phase of WB was people-based and enjoyed the autonomy within communities to mobilize resources for flood management. After the review of the 1814 and 1815 constitution, WBs were elevated into being arms of local government responsible for flood defense. Functioning under the Waterboards Act, WB are also responsible for granting permits for investment activities in flood defense zones and also enforcing water authority by-laws.

3.1.2 Policy formulation Process

The life of a policy begins with the **exploration phase.** Stipulated in the *spatial planning act,* the exploration and planning phase is the responsibility of the national government and involves the analysis of potential policy statements [V&W, 2003]. The baseline information for providing this analysis is collected, by specialized teams of V&W. The baseline information is analyzed to extract policy options and guiding principles, which are presented to the first and second chamber for debate. The product of the exploration phase is referred to as the *key planning decision [KPD],* which is a fairly refined precept of coastal management. The KPD is open for discussion for enrichment [V&W, 2003]. The second phase is the **Key-planning phase.** During this phase, the KPD is presented to the cabinet where main elements that form the spatial policy are extracted and presented to other stakeholders for discussion and deliberation [V&W, 2003]. The refined guidelines are compiled into policy that is passed on the lower arms of governance for elaboration, contextualizing and further implementation.

Table 1: *Summary of Institutional Framework for Coastal Governance in Netherlands*

National Level		V&W	↔	VROM	↔	LNV	↔	MEA
			Tasks {	Drawing water management and coastal policies				
				Draws policy document [one per four years]				
	V E R T I C A L			Information collection and circulation				
				Coordination and supervision of flood defence				
				Enforces preconditions for defence				
Provincial Level		Zuid Holland	↔	Noord-Holland	↔	Zeeland	↔	Friesland
			Tasks {	Draws and Approves water & zoning plans				
	L			Adopts, elaborates & implements regional plans				
	I			Commissions flood defence work				
	N			Coordination and supervision of flood defence				
	K			Discontinues work that conflicts with public				
Local Level	A G E S	Waterboards	↔			Municipal Councils		
			Tasks { Protection against flooding			Tasks { Adopt zoning plans		
			Water management [Quality and quantity]			Elaborate, implement and amend zoning plans		
			Management of inland waterways and roads			Grant permits relating to zoning plans		
			Draws management plans & Water auth by-laws			Enforce zoning plans		
			Issue permits to coastal activities			Impose penalties to defaulters		
				HORIZONTAL LINKAGES				

3.1.3 To what extent is the coastal policy planning process integrative?

The multiplication of decision-making spaces under the slogan of decentralisation is a visible strength of the Dutch coastal policy. It however fails to give any indication of integrated planning or a semblance of devolution of decision-making power. This conclusion is based on the following observations:

♦ The *spatial planning act* within which decision-making roles are stipulated bestows all policy planning and design powers in the hands of the national government. This leads to a more centralised decision-making process as noted by Ostrom and Marco [2002].

♦ The local government is not involved in the actual policy planning process. They only get involved in the elaboration and implementation of the already identified policy issue [V&W, 2003]. The policy planning process is linear with minimum room for deliberation and consensus seeking. While some government reports insist that the KPD phase involves stakeholder participation, they fail to provide any evidence of who gets to participate, the selection process and how the external views are incorporated in the end product. In addition, even if indeed there is discussions, its convened on already shaped policy guidelines.

◆ At the national level, each ministry is still responsible for providing input into coastal policy. This perception is rhetoric as practice reveals that integration at national level is far from being achieved with each ministry focusing on compartmentalised processes. Sander Hoogenvoning, Project Leader for Weak Links at RIKZ reinforces this argument by asserting that coastal policy is a product of segmented policy items from pieces from various departments but not a product of harmonized, collective and interactive planning processes.

The above analysis counters the common view that coastal policy processes in the Netherlands are integrative and shaped by accommodation of diverse views [Jan & Svante, 2000; Pettenger, 2002; V&W, 2003]. For a policy process to be integrative and participatory, there need to be feedback loops for discussion and interaction at every level of decision-making. Baseline information for policy planning has to be collected by a wide spectrum of stakeholders and discussed within a context of diverse interests. Back and forth feedback mechanisms are vital in policy planning as they open up room for wider involvement and give a policy outcome a rich reflection of diverse views. A dynamic policy planning process has potential therefore to invite a broad spectrum of stakeholders as compared to a linear policy process. As is the case in coastal management in the Netherlands the evidenced linear planning process where decisions and roles are delegated by the national government, the dominant form of participation is on of consultation on already scientifically tested and established policy guidelines. These stakeholders are not involved in the actual agenda shaping and design. Despite the decentralised system of coastal governance, institutionalising integrative policy planning through devolution of power to the local government and other non-state actors remains elusive.

The following section examines these decision-making institutions with an aim of understanding why despite the high levels of decentralization, policy processes are far from integrative. In so doing, it analyses the potential of both the soft and hard institutions and how they undermine public participation in policy processes.

3.2.1   Red tape: *A key dysfunctional institution*

A study conducted by the Dutch Administrative Board on Administrative Burden [ACTAL] estimates transaction costs as a consequence of red-tape[6] nation-wide at about **3.6%** of the GNP. This is an equivalence of **16.4 billion Euros**. The study revealed further that **20%** of the administration costs are as a result of EU regulation; **60%** from the congestion of the bureaucracy and **20%** as a product of loaded national legal procedures. Of the total costs, **10%** was directly contributed by V&W. Congestion of the bureaucracy and multiplication of procedures, laws and processes was presented as being an explanation rising red tape in V&W. A typical illustration of a congested institution was the Waterboards where in 1990; the Netherlands had **129** Waterboards with a staff of **7,590**. Currently, there are **37** waterboards with a staff of **10,470** [V&W, 2004-2005]. Congestion within waterboards has been argued to be a factor contributing to inefficiency and slowing down decision-making processes. Ostrom *et al* [2002] asserts that congested institutions tend to hinder collective action, as they are marred with paper work that then takes up the place for deliberation and negotiation. This significant growth of the bureaucracy within WB has not led to efficiency; instead it has reduced planning and policy processes into long, tedious and cumbersome *signature-seeking* activities.

Decision-making institutions marred with red-tape have potential to affect stakeholder participation. A discussion with two residents of Friesland who are also members of a local waterboard mentioned that it *is easier to oppose a policy once it has been approved than obstruct it in the planning phase*. This they mentioned was because of the long queues, numerous appeal-forms to be filled and signatures one has to seek before an appeal could be heard. As a dysfunctional institution, *Red tape* undermines possibilities for democratic participation as it enables patronage while empowering those capable to manipulate the system. It also heaps the cost of administration onto the public who are not involved in planning in the first place [see table 2 below]. My observation at RIKZ was similar to the waterboards in the sense that decisions take a long time to be made. Such a setting encourages time wasting and profits only those who have the means to manipulate the

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[6] Red-tape is also referred to as administrative burden

system. On the contrary it discourages spontaneity and creativity among those who do not have the ability to muddle through the system. This tedious process does not arise from a vacuum, but is a product of deficiencies inherent in democracies where local government institutions are forced to comply with reporting requirements, standards and guidelines arising from multiple laws and regulations. A key consequence of increasing red tape is lack of accountability and transparency given the clogged decision-making process [Ostrom *et al*, 2002].

Table 2

Do citizens get involved, or they just pay for it?

According to Peter van Rooy and Jelle Leenes, initiators of the water association, the Dutch pay more and more for water management, while they barely feel involved in it. Peter van Rooy, chairman of the Waterboard argues that one of the effects of decentralized water management programs has been the overlap and duplication of effort. If a dike was to collapse for example, one is able to see five different water authorities on TV within 24 hours: The minister of interior affairs, the state secretary of traffic and water (works), the Queen's commissar in Utrecht, the mayor and the dike county of waterworks." This he argues is not only confusing to the public but an illustration of poor coordination between government entities. The lack of a well coordinated effort has contributed to increased red-tape, duplication of roles and congestion of coastal management departments. The costs involved are however paid for by the public through taxes. When it comes to issues of management, the consumers are on their own

Source: [Binnenlands Bestuur, 20/08/2004]

3.2.2 The question of representation: *A Zoom into Waterboards*

Waterboards are the lowest management institutions in coastal issues. As institutions shaped by community efforts in the 8th C one would expect that they would act as a resonator of people's voice. A review of internal organization revealed however that waterboards unlike presented by [Ostrom and Marco, 2002] as the lens of citizen's voice, continue to shrink peoples participation in coastal and water management. A key justification for this position is the question of representation in waterboards. Representation in WB is by the poll where members of the community elect representatives to speak on their behalf on common water and coastal issues [Waterboards Association, 2002]. While that appears to fit well on paper, the practicality of who exactly gets to participate still stands to be answered [see table 3]. A study undertaken by Olsthorn and Tol [2001] where they reviewed the role played by coastal

protection institutions, exposed the principle of *'unity, of pay, say and interest'*[7] [UPSI] within WBs which is a principle that states that only parties with an interest on coastal issues should have a say and therefore pay for coastal protection. This principle fails to provide a framework for collective responsibility and fails to foster community involvement. Within this policy:

- Businessmen, shipment companies, landlords, tenants of undeveloped land, owners of undeveloped land and tourist firms were identified as stakeholders with particular interests on coastal issues.
- 69% of the seats are allocated to the above group
- 31% of the total seats is set aside for the rest of the community

This gap in representation fails to match requirements of a community centred institutions. The UPSI exemplifies inequalities of power in decision-making by allowing the participation of a minority group of landlords and other community gatekeepers while discriminating against the working portion of the public. The UPSI principle as an institution within WBs undermines public participation processes, despite the fact that membership is based on elections. As an institution where participation is by the poll, decisions are also arrived at through the voting. The common occurrence given the seat allocation is that decisions are made in favour of those with the money to buy votes and convince – in this case those holding 69% of the total seats.

The Hague Times [30th September, 2004] edition revealed a scandal involved in this years WBs elections. It revealed that powerful candidates seeking re-election used their money and position to lure the electorate by buying-off votes and forging signatures Hague Times [30th September, 2004]. This is contradictory to the view held by Ostrom and Jansen [2002] and others that waterboards have shown resilience as democratic institutions. My speculation as is that of Sander Hoogenvoning [Project Leader Weak-Links RIKZ] is that WBs have stood the test of time because they have managed to sustain powerful structures through patron-client relations and silencing the voice of the people through allowing the flow of incomplete information and congesting decision-making procedures with long and tedious administration

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[7] UPSI – Principle where only those concerned with coastal issues have a say and pay towards management activities of WBs

and paper work. UPSI for example limits the potential for engaging a wider spectrum of stakeholders because of their selectivity in determining who can participate.

Table 3

Who gets to participate? *Where are the fishermen?*

A historical analysis of the fishing industry revealed that by 1900, 1% [800] of the working population was working in the fishing industry. This minority group sustained an important part of Dutch culture; that is consumption of the Herring fish. Coastal policy approaches and perceptions in the mind of policy makers overlooked fishermen as key stakeholders within coastal management. Immense Delta engineering activities of 1900s which included the closure of three estuarine inlets: Greveingen; Haringuliet and Veerse Meer are argued to have contributed to the disappearance of popular income fetching fish-specie like crustacean, cod, sole, mussels, and oysters. In addition salty water sea food also disappeared. At this expense, other sectors like construction, shipment and tourist sprout as high technological flood protection barriers emerged within the coastal policy program. These areas have grown up to be key tourist areas targeting anglers, deep-water divers, motorboat cruisers and campers who are all sports of the affluent in society. The Storm-surge barrier for example attracts about 3 million tourists every year, which has made tourism a leading partner in spatial planning and policy. While one would expect fishermen to be stakeholders, the role played by segregation within WB, isolated them as an economic group. Policies that followed isolated them further.

Extracted and synthesized from: [Saeijs, *et al*, 2004]
"Changing estuaries, changing views"
Research commissioned by WWF-The Netherlands.

3.2.3 Public participation laws and regulations

The ability to win a game of chess lies among other factors in the ability of the players to be mysterious about their next move. In this case, there are no laws that govern or enforce loyalty between players. In this case, bounded rationality carries the day. Public participation in policy processes however, requires legal frameworks to enforce the existing fluid [non-existent] contracts between policy makers and the public. Within such laws, clearly stated statutes have to be documented and penalties enforced which upon practice, makes public participation a right. Public participation laws and enforcement instruments act therefore as incentives for public involvement as they get to know their rights. It also bestows a responsibility upon bureaucrats the need to absorb the interests, desires of the public in policy debates. The lack of however, as noted by Ostrom *et al*, 2003 in chapter 2 increases the scope of free riders from the public's side while fails to address any power structures that work against broad stakeholder forums within bureaucracies. A review of policy documents on

coastal management and government policy gives no indication of a policy on public participation in the Netherlands. The Cabinet Report [2002] argues that the lack of a law on public participation encourages has encouraged free riding as the public passes-on management responsibilities to the government. The report identifies that a communication plan would be a vital starting point towards drafting a law on participation. The implicit argument in that case is that the Dutch people are not aware of their rights and therefore lack sufficient information on coastal and water issues. The lack of a law on participation is an incentive for those not interested in participation to isolate themselves. It is also possible that the absence of laws on public participation gives bureaucrats no incentive to feel obligated to involve the public or integrate their views in policy plans. In addition, the presence of overarching laws like the *Flood Protection Act of 1960* undermines integrative policy processes. This is because they bestow full policy planning, formulation and evaluation mandate to the national government.

Contradictions within Policies

Contradictions within coastal laws can also be argued to undermine clarity and leaves room for maneuver by power structures and those with vested interests within a given policy. The *Flood Protection Act of 1960* for example bestows all decision-making powers to the national government which contradicts the main tenets of 4th Coastal policy on Coastal management and the *Spatial Planning Act of 1965* which advocate for the devolution of power to other tiers of coastal governance. This is of great significance since the FPA is the overarching act upon which all coastal policies are founded. Conflicting legislation also raises questions on the extent of integration within the national levels [see table 1] because one would expect collaborative effort towards a harmonized coastal policy [Olsthorn and Tol, 2001]. In the light of these legislative conflicts the Cabinet report of 2001 is currently advocating a called for a single coastal policy, which incorporates all interests.

3.3 How does the V&W's internal organization impact public participation in policy processes?

While section 3.2 examined the soft institutions, this section examines how the organizational culture within V&W impacts people's participation in policy processes.

3.3.1 Professionalism[8] Ethics: *Incentive for Whom?*

Shaping participation spaces within technical fields presents renewed challenges to implementing and policy making organisations as they mostly ooze with high level professionalism. Glover, [2003: 25]'s review of policy on biotechnology identified four main characteristics of technical fields in light of public participation within policy processes. These include:

- They permit public participation under restricted terms – limited debate on prior framing and assumptions
- Limited discussion and participation on issues of risk and risk management – this is because such are mostly defined by science
- The circle of participation is usually limited to teams of experts, technicians, firms and bureaucrats
- Scientific information, regulations in the form of models which require to be translated and interpreted to lay men

The Discovery Channel's [DC] review of coastal management in the Netherlands refers to it as an *extreme engineering approach*, which dates back to historical times [see table 3]. Their interview of Nico Poulkviet [a Surge Barrier Specialist and a survivor of the 1953 floods] revealed that the far-reaching effects of floods left Holland with no choice but to adopt high technological methods of dealing with nature. This he argues is shaped by the fact that without the current flood-engineering infrastructure under the Delta Program, 66% of the entire country would flood in a twinkle of an eye [V&W, 2002]. This innovation involves redirecting rivers, closing estuaries, constructing dams, strengthening dikes and reclaiming land from the sea. This approach is legally embedded in the Flood protection Act that

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[8] Professionals and Technical experts will be used interchangeably in this paper to mean one and the same thing

requires the national government to do all it can to avert the effects of rising sea level. Playing a central role in coastal policy, this management approach is reflected by the fact that 3,500 km of the Dutch's coastal zone is under heavy flood engineering structures. In addition, there an increasing call for more innovations and technical learning argues Gunter Konne, [a Climatologist within the DC series] because of uncertainties related to climate change and global warming. To implement this enormous investment, the Dutch coastal sector has invested in raising teams of experts by grooming individuals and institutions with of specialized, technical skills [Olsthorn and Tol, 2001].

Within this approach coastal processes are assessed through continuous testing, monitoring and coding of information using scientific tests. Physical, chemical and biological coastal processes are assessed through continuous testing, monitoring and coding of information using a combination of methods to match the technical approach. According to the RIKZ-Research development department, remote sensing, decision support systems [BOS], geographic information systems, mathematical models and other geological mapping methods are the key data collection approaches [V&W, 2000]. Emanating from the Delta Commission [see table 3], the organisational chart gives an impression of who is involved in shaping coastal policy in Holland. Apart from RIKZ, the other specialized arms who are bestowed with the responsibility of providing policy advise and shaping policy agenda include: *Institute for inland Water and Waste Management* which is responsible for water engineering and hydraulic systems; *the Roads and Hydraulic division* which is in charge of the civil engineering of roads and mechanical operations; the *Civil engineering systems and Survey systems* [www.v&w.nl]. My speculation is that the above units fail to capture all the components of coastal processes.

The approaches set and also reflected in the team within the Delta Commission presents a narrow view of coastal issues. A probable outcome which seems to be the case is that the agenda by pushed in for managing coastal processes is for technological advancement and infrastructure, but not necessarily one keen to look at the sociological impact of such processes [See illustration in table 3] and the cultural cost-benefit analysis of the approach. The extend of uni-disciplinarity within coastal processes was also clear within RIKZ for example where a review of several job advertisements revealed that specialized training and understanding of key concepts in disciplines like civil, mechanical, chemical and electric engineering, oceanologists, information Technology was a main requirement for potential

employees [www.rikz.nl]. My own observation revealed that such human resource policies are reflected within the internal organization of RIKZ, which is currently shaped by a particular clan of expert teams.

A study by TNS-NIPO [Research Organization] revealed that 42% of the general public who were above 21 years old are not aware of how coastal and water policies are made. In an article titled, water management in chaos, TNS-NIPO mentions that there exits a widening gap between policy makers and the public. A probable explanation for this gap as provided by NSCMG in Jorissen, *et al*, 2000 is the complex management approaches adopted by the engineers within the public service. They recommend widening up the scope of coastal policy to in cooperate other non-technical aspects as a strategy to improve communication between the public and policy makers. Olsthorn and Tol, [2001] notes that the nature of high level technocratic cultures within coastal policy is reflected in the way the public is always taken by surprise whenever coastal interventions are proposed. In their study, 87% of the key coastal policy interventions including the recommendations of the Delta commission are met with uttermost resistance and protests. Their analysis reveals that while lack of participation is usually a missing link, the other is that the public's failure to comprehend policies is because of the complex nature of how they are presented. The ability of the public to participate in such highly technical information and industrialized coastal management is dismal. A thorough analysis of the professional culture and how it undermines peoples involvement is carried out in section 3.3.1.1 below.

Table 4

The growth of professionalism and technological engineering in coastal management in the Netherlands dates back to the historical days of land reclamation and the fight against the Rhine in the 8th C. [Discovery Channel: Extreme Engineering Series, October, 2004]. Holland's experience with floods from the Rhine has provoked the growth of technical departments and scientific solutions to curb the ravaging impacts of coastal erosion and flooding. After the 1953 floods for example, V&W set up a Delta Commission to forge a way forward into tackling the effects on floods and also develop future control measures. This commission comprised of 12 civil engineers, an agricultural engineer and an economist [Saeijs, et al, 2004]. The role of the Delta commission was to forge a way forward in minimizing future effects of floods. The current coastal policy and management approach however is shaped by the activities of the Delta Commission which definitely continues to empower technical experts within the national government while sidelining lay knowledge from the public. In addition, partnerships emerging from such contexts deliberately exclude other knowledge-systems that could enrich and capture a wide variety of interests in policy interventions.

3.3.1.1 Partnerships and Collaborations

Given the level of professionalism within the coastal sector, it is without question that resultant partnerships and networks will reflect a narrow-scope of like-minded actors. While there is splendid effort to embrace a multidisciplinary approach at national level [see table 1], there is little indication of diffusion of knowledge and shared learning between the various ministries. This can be argued on the ground of contradictory policies and disjointed approaches as discussed in section 3.1. At the national level, like other tiers of coastal governance, partnerships are coined either depending on the nature of management approaches adopted or the relative clout a given stakeholder interest holds. At the national level for example as already identified within WBs USPI, VROM, LNV and EZ are identified in my view related to the fact that construction and housing have taken a leading role in coastal issues given the fact that tourism alone commands 25% of the country's GNP. The role of the Ministry of Culture and social services and Education for example would have been of added value given that its under this docket that issues of immigration and non-Dutch residents is tackled. Integrating such aspects would be important in capturing a holistic view into coastal policy. Partnerships are therefore sought around organizations that bear political clout like the Shipment Companies, Tourist Associations, Organizations of Vehicle Owners while unrepresented environmental groups, marginalized fishermen and other social groups receive minimum recognition as stakeholders [WPI-Report, 2003] This occurrence reflects Thompson's [1990] Individualistic perspective discussed in chapter 2 where policy is shaped by the economic value pegged upon a given resource. Once the economic value is factored, stakeholders who have a ability to achieve the economic goal receives greater attention as a leading actor.

The technical nature of coastal processes in the Netherlands also penetrates the emerging departments within organizations. The Royal Netherlands Institute for Sea Research [NISR], which is the official research partner on coastal and sea issues with RIKZ, is divided into four key departments. These departments include: The department of Physical Oceanography; Chemistry and Biology; Marine Biogeochemistry and Toxicology; Biological oceanography, Marine Ecology and Evolution [NISR website]. The same pattern is reflected in the nature of specialized arms as described in section 3.3.1.

A general analysis from this summary is that partnerships that emerge are embedded in the overarching coastal policy but is also shaped by the management approach adapted by the Netherlands. Given the nature of high technocratic and scientific engineering activities to tackle coastal issues, the partners aligned along with V&W are either:

- Like-minded organizations e.g. EUCC, IHE
- They have political clout attached to them based on their economic power e.g. tourist associations, shipment companies, housing and landowners
- Technical institutions e.g. NISR, specialized arms, Delft Engineering and Hydraulics school, etc

In light of shaping participation spaces, exclusive partnerships of this kind have an ability of limiting who gets to participate [Glover, 2003]. The choice of partners can lead to either an inclusionary or exclusionary process. This is because partnerships and networks forge a social fabric that act as the glue to bring people together. Exclusive networks can also be an incentive for *free riders* to isolate themselves from a-would be integrative process. This is because the language of communication is only understandable to those within the club [See section 3.3.1.3 of this chapter]. This paper is not against the role that experts play in coastal policy but argues that for meaningful collaboration between various stakeholders, the web of networks has to be broadened to embrace members of other professional clans. Widening the scope of partnership has potential to broaden ownership and commitment necessary for effective and sustainable implementation of prescribed policies. This however begins when an organization is able to embrace values of diversity. As argued by Korten, 1984, in chapter 2, diversity through a multi-disciplinary setting is core to effective management and is an incentive for disinterested groups to participate. Re-orienting and reviewing internal organizational cultures to embrace virtues of peoples participation requires the development of multi-disciplinary partnerships the will provide room for a broad spectrum of collaboration and tolerance among diverse organizations and individuals as it reduces the risks of rigidity, redundancy and defensiveness in decision-making processes [Mitchell *et al.*, 1997].

3.3.1.2   Technical innovations and budgetary allocations

The Delta commission after the 1953 floods recommended a 5.5 Billion Euro for tackling the effects of the disaster and putting in place mitigation mechanisms. It is not surprising 3.6 billion [66%] of the total budgets was set aside for constructing the storm surge barrier masterpiece in E. Scheldt [Central Planning Bureau]. The remaining 1.9 was set aside to offset initial impact assessment, resettlement and compensation costs. According to the RHED, 40 % of the total costs is invested in extreme engineering, while 10% of the budget is aside for maintenance and repair of industrious flood defense infrastructure. Such budget allocations also permeate training component within V&W as will be discussed later in this chapters. Confidential budget reports indicated that within V&W, revealed that funding towards staff training and development is restricted to aspects within the scope of technical advancement. Funds for training are allocated to staff members willing to undertake training within partner training institutions including Technical School in Delft, IHE and other Hydraulic schools within the EU and abroad. I guess this is because they have no choice other than to stick to what is stipulated as being a key requirement within their job descriptions and requirements for their tasks. A study undertaken by Nijmegen University reveals that the bulk of the budget goes to maintaining the flood protection dunes, dykes and sluices while less and less is set aside for public training and education programs, internal non-technical training.

3.3.1.3   Training and Capacity building

"Effective participation requires giving people access to information on which to base deliberation or to mobilize to   assert their rights and demand accountability"
[Cornwall, 2002: PP. 35]

Training is a key component within RIKZ's and V&W's ICM. In-house and external training sessions for staff members are well coordinated and individual budgets allocated to the Human resource department. *But what is the nature of training offered?* As highlighted in section 3.3.1, the growth of technical practices and high level engineering management approaches has also shaped the kind of training offered within policy organizations. Within such highly industrialized and technical departments training budgets are allocated for raising qualified and refreshed personnel to match with the high-tech management approach. A

review of the annual reports of RIKZ for example revealed that most of the staff members undergoing company training specialize either on content issues of focus on specific expertise within the narrow clan of natural science. This study reveals that it is only until 2003, that some staff members of RIKZ began attending training on ICM. The Delft Institute of Hydraulics, the UNESCO-IHE among other specialized technical institutions forms the key training zones for staff members [RIKZ, Annual Reports, 2003].

As noted in chapter 2, training plays a vital role in re-orienting and transforming bureaucracies by providing favorable cushions for empowering both the public and bureaucrats through the impartation of relevant skills and provision of information. Thompson, J, [1998; 1523] mentions that this process requires the creation of training spaces where actors are able to interact, question, experiment, share and learn – from one another. He argues further that such processes can only be achieved through a blend of both social and technical issues in order to capture the holistic and diverse nature a given system. A setting like RIKZ as an agency responsible for coastal and marine protection requires broadening its training options for its staff members in order to impart important skills like public relations, conflict resolutions, community resource management, and participatory action research among others. Training of this kind is helpful as it equips staff members with the main tenets of good practice in public participation and holistic resource management.

3.3.1.4   Information dissemination

The RIKZ library as the main information hub for staff members was also a reflection of the internal technical culture ingrained within the organization. This library is equipped with literature catalogued into seven main sections, namely: Technical, Oceanography, Physics, and Chemistry, Geology, Biology and Technological sections. This scope presents a limited focus in terms of available information on one hand but also illustrates the areas of focus within RIKZ. Such an information base limits prospects for interdisciplinary learning which Korten [1984] notes in chapter two as being a vital ingredient for creating a diverse learning atmosphere. RIKZ is a specialized arm of V&W with the task of providing policy advice on all issues related to coastal and marine protection. To achieve this goal, it is imperative that staff members at RIKZ can access information that captures all the aspects of coastal ecosystems.

The limited scope of information undermines integrative policy processes because:

- The limited scope of the library narrows the cliental that access the information to either experts or those who have interests in technical issues of coastal management. While on one hand they repel the public, they fail to motivate staff members to broaden their knowledge base beyond their professions. When I was carrying out my study, the RIKZ library was not very helpful given its focus on technical aspects of coastal management.

Institutions within which integration is a key component should give an impression of diverse resource material that captures various disciplines that cross-cut coastal issue. Such resources would probably include community resource management, conflict and crisis negotiation and management, integrated coastal resource management and policy among others. Diversity in terms of information base is a vital incentive for staff members wishing to expand their knowledge beyond their narrow careers [Davey and Phillips, 1998].

What kind of information is available to the public?

One key observation during the process which is also confirmed by both government and independent research reports is the robustness of information on coastal issues in the Netherlands [Pattenger, 2002; V&W, 2003; WRI-Report, 2003]. This information is available in print, electronic and media formats, which is meant to be available to anyone. While that is the case;

- 42% of the public are unaware of how policies are designed? [
- The public is not aware of the risks that coastal resources pose to their existence [Cabinet Report, 2002; V&W, 2003].
- A great percentage of costs incurred whenever floods occur is a result ignorance among the public [Jelle Leenes – Head of Communication of Union of Waterboards]
- Why is it that 87% of the key coastal policy recommendations and interventions are met with stiff resistance and opposition? [Olsthorn and Tol, 2002]

What could probably be the explanation for this mis-match?

- **What kind of information is out there?**

Jelle Leenes [Head of Communication of Unions of Waterboards] argues that the lack of awareness within the public on water-related emergencies such as floods is simply the information available is simply a reflection of what the government is doing to combat floods, but not what the public should do for example. In an exclusive interview with a local daily *Cobouw*, he revealed that people in the Netherlands are not given any advice on dealing with floods until water has started seeping in through their front door. The weekly 'Netherlands lives with water' campaign exemplifies Jelle's views as it is a campaign which in my view expounds on the effort the government is investing in tackling water related issues.

- **Who has access to this information?**

Despite the robust amounts of information available on coastal issues, this information is in technical forms which require to be translated for the public to comprehend. Translating scientific information into general day to day communication language is a difficult task [Jan Visser, 2004 – personal communication]. The implicit message in this case is that only those keen on water related issues or those with the required training will bother to seek this information. This information is not presented in technical, scientific or legal language but is mostly in Dutch. Language as a media for communication plays a vital role in integrating all sectors of society. In the Hague for example which is a coastal province has a huge international community which does not speak or understand Dutch. For those without some knowledge of Dutch, they tend to ignore such information [Annie Muchai, 2004 – Personal communication]

- **What are the methods of dissemination?**

Besides technical components of the available information, the methods of disseminating the information also discriminates on who can access it. Apart from posters, billboards and brochures in coastal resorts, the highly used means of disseminating public information is through multi-media [V&W, 2003]. By the year 2002, WRI reports for 2002 revealed an out of 1,000 people, only 300 had access to internet connection. This is a very low figure given the 16 million population of the country. While most of the information is disseminated through multi-media means, its rare that people will log on to the internet to keep in touch

with coastal and water management issues, leave alone checking the following days weather forecast. The WRI report revealed that the greatest percentage of people visiting websites are young adults and teens who probably spent time listening and downloading music, ordering latest movies that searching for coastal management information. These methods of disseminating information however fail to target the less interested or those that don't have access to Internet services. Using highly technological channels like CD ROMs, Portals and web-based multi-media reflects the content of information being disseminated.

- Are there legal instruments that make access to information access a public right?

A review of the national governments does not give any impression of a national communication plan or a law on public participation. There exists a law within the constitution that allows every citizen a right to information. This law is however passive as it still limits the amount of information to be disseminated to the public. A lack of clearly stipulated laws could in a way be a contributing factor for the growing ignorance as people are not aware of their rights.

Information as noted by Ostrom *et al* [2003] in chapter three is a motivational factor for collective action. Without sufficient information, bounded rationality rules the day and two things happen: either people isolate themselves from the process or are technically isolated.

3.4   Political shifts and how they impact people's policy processes

The above underlying internal organizational and institutional frameworks take place within prevailing political cultures. The following section reflects the current institutional structures in light of the political shifts in the Netherlands. It also analyses resultant policy outcomes and how they potentially impact people's participation in policy processes. From a socialist background, 2002 saw, a new coalition government of Christian Democrats (CDA), the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) and right-wing Liberals (VVD) take office in the Netherlands. The influential right-wing [VVD] party secured the most powerful finance ministry[9] under which the docket of deputy prime minister rests [Weber, 2002]. During the inaugural address the party leaders—Jan Peter Balkenende (CDA), Mat Herben (LPF) and Gerrit Zeal (VVD)— declared an end to a season of *"spending"* and beginning of a *"savings"* era. Citing growing

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[9] Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance is Gerrit Zalm

debt and economic recession, globalization and opening up Holland to the global market was cited by the trio as the solution to Holland's economic question [Budget Reports, 2004, Central Information Department – Ministry of Finance, The Hague].

Emerging policy shifts

- Severe cuts in public spending up to 11 billion euro which has led to a 10% slash of V&W's budget [Cabinet Report, 2004]
- Scaling down of the public service: Dutch Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis estimates that 24,000 civil servants within the current financial year will be laid off within a plan to free up to 1.5 billion euros [Weber, 2002]. Slightly above 1,600 employees of RIKZ to be laid off by end of financial year.
- The budget readings for 2004 during the *prinsjesdag* scraped among other aspects early retirement; there will be no general pay rise within the public sector and motivational gifts like Christmas bonuses will be subjected to taxes [Hague Times, 2004]
- In addition, public funded schemes which allow the disabled to work for a certain amount of time is being faced out and while employees on sick leave were allowed up to 80% salary, the current government has abolished the policy.
- High on the list is scaling down the public service as well as drastic cuts in health insurance, disability pensions and salary revamps
- Emerging within the same political shift is a deterioration of health insurance schemes. According to the Ministry of Finance, each citizen has to pay an extra Euro 1,000 per year towards a basic health care system, which doesn't cover expensive operations and lengthy treatments. These procedures must be paid for out of a person's own funds or by an additional private insurance

What does this mean in light of public participation? Within the current political shift there emerge incentives, which benefit the wealthy and powerful on the social ladder while exerting pressure on the poor and needy. Opening up health insurance for example to the market affects coastal management directly in two ways: 1] people with private insurance do not see the need to participate in policy deliberations as they feel they have played their share by insuring themselves. 2] Market-led insurance on the other hand discriminates against those who cannot afford the package. This goes against the main tenets of participation that involve

providing voice and empowering marginalized groups. Salary cuts, retrenchment and taxes on staff bonus fail to motivate civil servants to take up extra tasks of integrating participatory methods in policy processes.

A study by Ostrom *et al,* 2002 of SIDA's internal organization revealed that uncertainty of contracts, salary cuts and poor rewarding mechanisms greatly undermined efforts within SIDA to foster collective action among its partners. Sander mentions that, the current 10% budget cuts and well over 15% cut of staff at the Hague RIKZ office has put so much pressure and overloaded every staff member. Encouraging contractual employment has left little time to focus on processes, he argues. Everyone concentrates on the end *product.* Participation is continuous, interactive and process laden. It therefore requires motivated staff members who work within a flexible learning environment open to experimentation and creativity. According to Sander, under-employment at RIKZ does not provide room to experiment or make mistakes. *There is no one with the time to come cleaning your mess.* People-centered policy processes are resource intensive. They involve the transformation of both institutions and individuals to create space for participation. High financial costs are incurred in training, hiring and rewarding both staff and the public on various accounts. Information collection, processing and dissemination, interactive partnerships, public and in-house training programs are also financially demanding. The ongoing budget cuts and reshaping of national spending fails to give an impression of guaranteeing a healthy staff, sufficient in numbers to undertake responsibility.

Conclusion

While the coastal governance in the Netherlands is highly decentralized within a thriving democracy, participation still remains an elusive concept in coastal policy. This is because the existing institutions undermine people-centered policies. The resultant incentive structures and outcomes of policy processes enable a centralized, hierarchical and top-down model of policy planning. Within this process the involvement of the public is very dismal. This chapter concludes that the success of integrating people in policy processes relies on the ability of the existing institutions creating the right incentives to motivate the staff and also draw the public closer to the policy arena. This will among other factors depend on the willingness of policy makers to transcend disciplinary boundaries and political agendas and invest in transforming attitudes through training and creation of interactive partnerships to

engage in addressing both articulated and assumed needs associated with coastal management. Constructing a process of social learning within an organization calls for a motivated civil service, well equipped and a public that is aware and highly rewarded to participate.

CHAPTER 4: Conclusion

This paper set out to examine whether decision-making institutions of coastal management in the Netherlands create incentives that undermine people's participation in policy processes. In light of the current desire by V&W to foster an integrated policy making process, this paper held the view that understanding why participation has been a missing ingredient within a highly decentralized democratic system like the Dutch one would be a useful learning point before implementing the policy. Chapter one laid the theoretical foundation upon which the key concepts employed in the paper were discussed and analyzed in light of on going debates on institutionalizing public participation. The analytical framework upon which data for answering the key question was based assumed that institutions create incentives that either enable or undermine people's participation in policy processes. Chapter three is a hybrid of description and analysis, examining the decision-making institutions [both hard and soft] and how emerging outcomes and incentives either create perverse incentives or emit outcomes that undermine the participation of the public in policy processes. The overall analysis revealed that for participation to be mainstreamed into coastal policy in the Netherlands, a review of institutions is paramount. This is because the existing legal framework and organizational cultures empower the national government and selected stakeholders like the wealthy landlords, tourist companies, while excluding the general public from the participating in the policy process. It also notes that the current political shifts have contributed to the shrinkage of welfare state, which continues to breed seeds of individualism on one hand while destroying synergies for collectivity. To conclude this paper, chapter four seeks to answer the following question: what explains the existence of current institutions despite the emergence of perverse incentives? This chapter goes beyond the analysis in the previous chapters not only to sum up the key arguments, but also provide probable explanations for the resilience of current institutional frameworks. The underlying assumption in this chapter is drawn from Thompson's cultural theory described in chapter two which assumes that institutions are shaped by historical and cultural perspectives based upon how people are socialized around a given institution.

The Synthesis

Despite high scale decentralization and the scaling up of democratic institutions within the coastal sector in the Netherlands, public participation still remains a missing ingredient in policy processes. The analysis in chapter three proves the above conclusion where it reveals that these decentralized institutions fail to create a conducive environment within which participatory foundations can be founded. Within a decentralized democratic system, the analysis indicates that policy processes are heavily centralized in a hierarchical mode of decision-making. While there is room for integration between the various tiers of governance, there exits dismal evidence of public participation and integrative policymaking. This institutional framework reflects a *one-way* mode of participation resembling the one posed by Korten [1984] in chapter two. In this mode of interaction, the national government as the lead either informs or consults with other stakeholders on decisions it hopes to make. A one-way mode of communication limits chances for deliberation as usually by the time the opportunity is offered, important decisions on an issue are already in the pipeline The consultative process which is also reflected in the Netherlands policy process is mostly top-down, with a heavy government presence on the lead, while the other tiers play a role in adapting national policies or implementing them. In summary, the institutional analysis undertaken in chapter three revealed that:

- Heavy decentralization in coastal management has contributed to emergence of dysfunctional institutions that undermine participatory processes. The legal framework and coastal policy empowers the national government in policy processes

- Internal organizational cultures within V&W shape participatory spaces for experts and technical teams while shrinking the room for public involvement and attitude shift for the experts.

- Mainstreaming public participation in participatory processes is a renewed challenge given the nature of the good at stake [see figure 3]

- To forge integrative policy processes where people are key stakeholders, strong incentive structures are required which calls for a re-orientation of the legal and organizational structures and cultures within coastal policy.

Figure: 3

Coastal Management Lifeline – Effects of Nature of Good on Public Participation

People took the Responsibility to Reclaim land from The sea [Polder days-Land Acquisition]	People take initiative to protect their land against water. Waterboards come into force and community orgs	Floods take centre stage Regional water Boards Regulation from National govt. Polders with mill drainage	Land reclamation under State control; establishment of management at national level State takes over water
Before 800 BC	800-1250	1250-1600	1600-2000

Land reclamation
People were involved
[Public goods vs. private goods]

Protection against Floods
Takes Priority on Coastal Policy Agenda
[Government control]
[Safety=Public Good] [People took back stage]

4.1   Coastal Management within Flood Protection: *Explanation from a Cultural Theory Perspective*

What explains the prevalence and resilience of centralized, hierarchical approaches to coastal management in the Netherlands despite the heavy decentralization and growth of democratic institutions? As discussed in chapter two, the Cultural theory as presented by Thompson *et al,* 1990, presents useful insight into understanding why decision-making institutions create perverse incentives that undermine public participation in policy processes. Its main argument is that cultural perspectives emanating from historical interactions and experiences with a resource shape the nature of institutional frameworks that emerge. Within this theory, stakeholder behavior is a product of how people have been socialized around a given resource over time and not necessarily the role played by political cultures as commonly perceived. The symbolic meanings attached to these resources could be tied to past and present tragedies, catastrophes and fortunes, which then determine how people perceive that particular resource. The management institutions and approaches that emerge are a reflection of these cultural perceptions.

The Netherlands Case

The Netherlands is a perfect reflection of Thompson's Cultural Theory. Since the days of old, the Netherlands has been in a constant war with water. With 26% of its land below sea level, the country has invested the bulk of its resources in reclaiming land from the sea on one hand and raising the levels of land on the other. Besides attempts to tame rising water levels and redeeming land from the sea, storms and floods due to rising North Sea levels presented the region with extreme challenges. Notable incidences of flooding include the 1461, 1916, 1953, 1974, 1993, 1995 and 2000. These occurrences of floods have played a key role in shaping the perceptions that the Dutch people hold towards water [The Discovery Channel, September Series, 2004]. Water is both a foe and a friend at the same time. On one hand, it accounts for 25% of the GNP of Netherlands, but on the other it has left a painful scar in the minds of Dutch people. The floods of 1953 marked the turning point for this relationship, when the people together with the national government decided that enough is enough. The damage was valued at trillions of euros and claimed over 2,000 lives. With a new tug of war against water, coastal policy was fussed with flood defense under the flood protection act of 1960 [see chapter three].

What are the projections?

| 1. The sea level is rising	2. The land is subsiding	3. River discharges are increasing	4. Precipitation increase
The sea level has risen 20 centimeters in the past century and will rise even further by an expected average of 60 centimeters in the next century.	*In the low-lying parts of the Netherlands, soil subsidence will average between 2 and 60 centimeters by 2050.*	*Climate changes will lead to a 40% increase in river discharges in winter and 30% lower discharges in summer*	*Until 2050, precipitation volumes in winter will increase by approx. 10% and decrease in summer by a few percent.*

...........the response?

Every drop of rain that falls on the polders must be pumped out. Every polder has to be connected to a pumping station that drains away water to a drainage outlet or pool. All polders and weak-links should be surrounded by high scale defense mechanisms. It is only by doing this that we can avoid going back to where we came from.

[V&W Minister Issue to the EU: www.v&w.nl]

The projections above and the response by the minister is a clear reflection of fear and uncertainties associated with risks of flooding shaped by historical experience. Adapting a motto of *enough is enough*; coastal processes over years have involved the engineering of dams, sluices, and dikes, rising of dunes under the famous Delta program. The government has had to assume a powerful role in flood protection. Flood defense institutions have evolved over time adopting a highly technological approach, which the Discovery Channel dubs as *extreme engineering*. Currently 3,500 km of Coastal land lies under flood defense structures without which 70% of Holland would flood [V&W, 2003]. The safety levels stand at 1: 10,000, legally supported with strong zoning, investment permits amidst other policy instruments. The far reaching effects of floods and rising sea levels within uncertainties of climate changing and global warming has left the Netherlands with no choice, but to adopt a hierarchical approach of decision-making where orders from the national government are channeled through highly scientific teams to lower tiers of government [see chapter 3]. This management approach calls for specialized training and expert teams to operate and control monitoring systems [See figure 4 below]. This explains the professional ethos and expert-led bureaucracy in V&W. The national government's role as stated above becomes key to achieving this goal where little room for experimentation or learning. Decision-making power is rests in the hands of expert teams who propose solutions to highly complex problems [V&W, 2000]. It is with no surprise that the role of the public within this setting is bleak if any at all. They are primarily involved in funding the programs through their taxes.

Figure 4:

Institutional Processes and Management Approaches within Flood Prone Region				
Past Experience	General Perception	Management Style	Institutional interaction	Outcomes [see figure below]
•Floods, rising sea levels, expanding rivers, storms [Discovery Channel, 2004]; •Notable floods: 1471, 1916, 1953, 1974, 1993, 1995 and 2000 [V&W, 2003]	•Water as both a foe and a friend. •Most people however perceive water as a foe. •V&W, 2004 – states that the government sets out to pump out every millimeter of water that drops onto the land	•Hierachist, intense use of control structures such as dams and dikes [Floris Van Ogtrop, et al, 2004]. •3,500km of the Dutch coast is under heavy flood defense infrastructure [V&W, 2003]. The goal: Totally control floods	•Hierachist top-down •Centralized within national government •Strong controls with minimum compromise •Professionalism and investment in technical expert teams for policy advice [See Chapter 3] •Concentration of laws and legal frameworks. Zoning plans, investment permits etc	•High safety levels: 1:10,000 •Flood protection policies as overarching policies [Flood Protection Act •Institutions responsible for flood protection: Waterboards, Departments of flood management, •Large scale protection works – storm surge barriers, Dams, Dikes and Sluices [See chapter 3] •Overarching flood protection policy within which coastal policy is embedded.

Management Pathway [Hierarchic Perspective] - CURRENT

↓

Natural Phase
[Rising Sea Levels; Floods; ⟶
Climate Change]

Control
[Hierarchical; top-down; ⟶
Centralized; Expert led;
Flood defense technology]

High Control
[Re-engineering nature – Sluices, storm
Surge barriers, Dams and Safety levels
1:10,000

Desired Goal ⟶

Egalitarian
[Living with floods; integrative policy
Processes; protection of vulnerable groups; public involvement

The Paradox Unveiled

Despite its centralized, hierarchical, top-down management approach, the Netherlands is still regarded as the king of ICM. Within approach, one can infer that coastal management processes empowers central systems of government, expert teams and those economically and political endowed. In this sense the main question that arises is *for whom does it work?* While the answer could be easily assumed, Holland still stands a model in ICM [Fockert, [2001]. This ICM program continues to be replicated in the EU and USA, while possibilities for development cooperation within coastal sectors are being explored in the south. Countries like Vietnam, Mozambique, Bangladesh, and India have already entered into joint coastal management programs with the Netherlands with an aim to integrate its management experiences [IWCO, 1995; V&W, 2001; Olsthorn and Tol, 2002]. This clearly indicates that there is something peculiar about Holland coastal program and one that seems to be achieving remarkable results. An EU commissioned study to assess local information systems among its member states revealed a phenomenal finding that is argued to have placed Holland on the lime-light where ICM is concerned. The findings revealed that over 80% of the population was overly confident and showed immense trust in the national government and the role it has played in coastal management. The report concluded that the majority of respondents during the study argued that despite the centralized nature of policy planning and management receives popular support towards coastal policy. The findings and analysis of

the EU report provides an entry point to understanding why Holland stands out. I therefore set out to examine the concept of trust and reciprocity and how it helps to unveil that lingering paradox inherent in this paper.

Hooghe's Perspective on Trust and Reciprocity

The work of Hooghe [2002] on trust and reciprocity theorizes that an outcome or action **C** is capable of shaping the relationship between actor **A** and **B** respectively. Thus Hooghe [2002] assumes that actor **A** will trust actor **B** depending on **B**'s ability to perform and achieve result **C** [see figure 5]. Besides the ability of an actor to achieve a certain outcome, he mentions that there are other factors that play a key role in shaping trust. In his article identifies the categories of people we tend to trust. This includes people:

♦ with whom we are familiar,

♦ with whom we have frequent contact,

♦ with whom we believe to be similar to ourselves and share the same fears and concerns,

♦ with whom we have positive regard.

Figure 5: Trust and trustee relations

C

A   B

4.2   Institutional Structures vs. the Public: *from a Hooghe's Perspective*

Through out this paper, safety against floods has emerged as an overarching coastal agenda in the Netherlands. Despite the effort to perceive coastal ecosystems from a holistic and dynamic view [See desired goal in figure 4], the focus on keeping the feet of Holland's citizens dry still emerges as a key priority [Olsthorn and Tol, 2001]. The concept of trust as an institution can be analyzed within the Dutch coastal process as also reflected within the cultural theory discussed in section 4.1. Weber [2002] argues that land reclamation by the Dutch which currently shapes the saying that *'God created the world, but the Dutch Created*

the Netherlands" was the beginning of a sense of collectiveness togetherness among the people with a common aim - to survive. Waging a war against a common enemy, the Dutch built their trust around the *'polder'*. As a piece of land reclaimed from the sea in a country which is the second most congested, polders were the most appreciated resources at their disposal. They treasured and relied on these fragile pieces of land and amassed their resources behind supporting what was later called the polder model. Besides reclaiming land, the after effects of the 1953 floods, left the Dutch people with no choice but to build a solidarity front and rally their support towards the then existing decision-making institutions. Based on their past experience survival and continued existence on planet earth has been the ground upon social glue that ties the national government to its public is developed. A barrier specialist and survivor of the 1953 floods, Nico Poulkviet mentioned that the Dutch *understand pretty well what it means for a dike to collapse. They have experienced first class consequences of floods... Last on their priority, is to struggle for decision making power while the risks of the North Sea and the rising levels of one meter per century, increasing precipitation and uncertainties of climate change are quite visible* [Discovery Channel, 2004].

Within Hooghe's [2002] theory, the public as actor **A** builds their trust and confidence in the government **[B]** as long as their feet are kept dry. As long as this goal is being achieved the public continues to reciprocate by paying taxes upon which coastal and water management programs are implemented and maintained [Pettenger, 2002]. This effort and confidence by the public is also a product of the safety levels of 1:10,000. Trust is therefore seen as a response to risk. As long as the risks of flooding are measured in terms of the probability of occurrence and the expected damage, people are forced into an obedience-mode [Saeijs *et al,* 2004]. In this case, trust is institutionalized as an expression of bounded rationality [Hooghe, 2002: 6] because the probability of the country flooding can only be gauged by projections or symptoms resembling past experiences as illustrated in section 4.1. A survey undertaken by TNS-NIPO revealed that 87% of Dutch people appreciate the centralized mechanism of water and coastal management. Their confidence in the system they revealed was because of the government ability contain and provide lasting solutions to the problem of floods trough a central system of governance.

Although trust is a device for handling uncertainties, Hooghe [2002] argues further that cultivating trust is only possible in situations where chances for betrayal are law. My

speculation is that this portion of this theory plays a key role in explaining the nature of coastal processes in the Netherlands. Underlying this logic is the perception that we develop trust in conditions where we perceive the risk of betrayal as being minimal. Where flood defense control is concerned, levels of betrayal are very few given the fact that a disaster will cause damage across the board without selecting. While interventions might favor one group against the other, the fundamental goal of achieving safety against floods is not compromised. Such a context breeds mutual trust shaped by commonality of vision.

The fluid nature of trust as used by Hooghe [2002] fails to capture cases of dissatisfaction among actors even within a commonly perceived problem. The roles that lobby groups, environmentalists, and other non-state actors play in protesting against government policy contradict his overall assumptions. My interpretation of that weakness is that Hooghe perceives actors for example the public as a homogenous group. What he fails to acknowledge is that within a segmented society like Holland, despite the unifying factor – the risk to floods within coastal zones, strong competing interests are still represented. In general however, like Thompson's cultural theory, it provides an insightful lens of understanding why the Dutch coastal policy system is shaped the way it is.

4.3   Democratic Professionalism: *Reason behind the Trust and Confidence*

The final probable explanation for the institutional structure of coastal governance in the Netherlands lies in the extent of professionalism as an organizational culture within the sector. Already discussed in chapter three as one creating dis-incentive for public participation, this culture tends to shape the current institutional framework and is helpful in unveiling the puzzle within this study. The following section, using the theory of democratic professionalism attempts to draw the link.

The debate arising from trust and reciprocity above blends with the analysis on professionalism as an ethic within decision and policy formulation processes in the Netherlands. One evident perception recorded in the literature and also from interacting with staff members within RIKZ is the level of professionalism and ability to secure and achieve action C as noted in section 4.2 above. With this level of professionalism and ability to deliver, comes a reciprocal relationship that ties down a strong bond between policy makers, the institution and the public. This argument definitely goes against the analysis provided in

chapter 3 but is interesting as one attempt to understand the incentive structures within coastal governance in the Netherlands.

Pellegrino *et-al*, [1991] notes that, it's within public nature to generally revere, trust and place their confidence in the hands of professionals and the gifted on technical issues. This draw back to the overall standing in this paper the coastal management in the Netherlands is a technical and highly scientific issue. The ability of specialized arms of coastal governance [see chapter 3] to establish links between rising sea level and increasing human activity among others overwhelms the public who are caught up within the euphoria of their historical context relating to floods. Operating within bounded rationality members of the public lack the technical understanding to prove that constructing a house on a dike created in the 15th century will weaken the dikes therefore lowering the safety and quality standards. This is all in the understanding and domain of the scientists who have been studying and documenting all these information.

Sullivan [1995] provides a critical link between professionalism and how it contributes to the growth of democratic cooperation in resource management practice. He posits that a culture of professionalism tends to organize complex modern division of labor to ensure that specific functions are performed well and with a sense of responsibility for the good of the whole [Sullivan, 1995; 11]. He argues further that professional responsibility is motivated by three values: security, integrity and democracy. Integrity operates at the level of the individual; security within the norms of the profession while democracy at the level of the society [public]. Security is what professionals have to gain from the right sort of relationship with the public. Professional work is particularly vulnerable to public recognition as it is judged by the expected results [Action C] and the legal acceptance of the value of services offered by the profession. The authority that professionals have to solve key social problems is based their ability to deliver expected objectives and goals within their mandate. The level of professionalism among other factors as theorized in Sullivan's [1995] analysis of reciprocity shapes my argumentation for the survival and emergence of the current institutional structures in coastal governance in the Netherlands in professionalism.

Despite the perverse incentives within institutions, a culture of professionalism stands out as a comforter that has yielded to democratic trust and popular support of the institutions from the public. This is so because, groups unresponsive to social critic not only risk loss of

integrity, but also risk the loss of the legal legitimacy they need to operate. The decision-making institutions that exist in the Netherlands have been in existence since the 12th century. While various scholars might argue differently to this, long life spans of these institutions is an indicator of their responsiveness to the public or the tolerance and trust by the public towards them. The Netherlands case presents a growing challenge in integrating participation policy processes in developed societies. This is because provision of services is defined by efficiency and effectiveness charged upon public institutions. Cultures of professionalism, standardized division of labor and expert led principles take a lead in allocating resources and making decisions that critically undermines the legitimacy of participatory practices.

Conclusion: *From a Policy Perspective*

Public participation in coastal management in the Netherlands is myth and not real. This myth is built on the popular perception, which equates the existence of democratic institutions within a highly decentralized system to increased cases for citizen involvement. What is commonly ignored is an evaluation as to whether people get involved in practice. To unveil this paradox and lay a foundation for dispelling this myth, the examination of decision-making institutions was warranted. Findings and the analysis reveal that the existing institutions undermine people-centered processes and provide an environment for centralized processes of policy planning. Integration of the public into policy formulation within in coastal management as desired by V&W therefore requires significant planning, careful management throughout the process and more before implementing it. People-centered policy processes blossom within institutions that create right incentives to motivate the staff while at the same time act as pull factors for the public to participate in the process. It is critical also that expected goals and objectives be realistic and in line with the financial, technical and personnel resources available. Opening policy processes to public participation needs to be sensitive and adaptive to the unique ecological and social-cultural characteristics of each region, as well as to the particular problem and interests of the stakeholders involved. Such moves should respect and make attempts to understand the symbolic cultural attachments, mode of socialization that the given public has had while interacting with a given resource under management. It is only by respecting such perceptions that meaningful and action oriented policies can be realized. Societal values therefore have to be recognized as a valuable component of understanding the ecosystem and one for deriving appropriate management strategies to promote sustainable resource use. While debates around

participation within scientific disciplines have revolved around the battlefields of knowledge – whose reality counts, its imperative that clarity be sought into understanding the ethic of professionalism, and more ways of forging meaningful democratic participation within high, technical fields like coastal management.

Why Participation?

With mounting international and national pressure on the need for sustainable resource management and development, calls for citizen engagement after the Rio 1992 and the Earth Summit, within ICM have been on the increase. This wave of induced international pressure, ratification of regional treaties and agreements, decentralization and virtues of good governance has generated new spaces for policy debates and stakeholder interaction. The mismatch in this case is the fact that these spaces perceive the public as mere beneficiaries and consumers, but not as agents within the process. Power relations pervade and carry the day within this spaces, hence the perverse incentives. Spaces made available by the powerful in society may be discursively bounded to permit only limited citizen influence, colonizing interaction and stifling dissent. On the other hand spaces fostered as a way of amplifying the voice of the marginalized may end up being filled by gatekeepers of power in their communities, who speak for but not with those they represent [Cornwall, 2002: pp.9]. With poor incentives within these institutions, first to motivate the civil servants to take up the extra task and secondly too draw people into the decision making table, these institutions have turned out to be bureaucratic tools of the experts and have reduced possibilities of participation to top-down alliances between the various arms of government but not one for fostering the participation of the public in decision making. In addition, today's development landscape is littered with all traces of different versions of participation and with artifacts produced by various waves of enthusiasm for involving people in development in some way or the other [Cornwall, 2001; Fischer, 1993]. With different versions of participation, come a wide variety of spaces set for the participation of different groups of people and stakeholders at different levels. Many governments are therefore taking advantage to shift into this alternative path without thorough understanding of its costs and intricacies.

While some countries are seeking transformative honest participation processes in policy processes, others are still driven by the desire to survive by creating a glimpse of people-centeredness in decision-making. Political economic exigencies, including rising debt, declining terms of trade, economic liberalization and market integration are forcing many countries adapt people-centered policy planning programs [Thompson, J, 1995: 1509]. These factors have had an effect on public spending with governments attempting to fill gaps left by downsized civil services and budget cuts with public voices. In this case, national governments are striving to be efficient by spending less. It might be fruitful to engage a further study of how legitimate calls for public participation can be in a context like the Netherlands that seems to have adopted a purely right-wing mentality characterized by cuts in public spending and destruction of the welfare state. This study would be vital given the fact that public participation is currently being remodeled into an instrumental tool for achieving an ever-widening range of political and economic objectives.

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