Institute of Social Studies

Graduate School of Development Studies

THE DIALECTICS OF RELIEF AND REHABILITATION IN ONGOING CONFLICT: A MINDANAO CASE

A Research Paper presented by:

CHERYLL RUTH R. SORIANO
(PHILIPPINES)

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for Obtaining the Degree of:

Master of Arts in Development Studies
Specialization:

Politics of Alternative Development Strategies

Members of the Examining Committee:
Bas De Gaay Fortman
Paschal Mihyo

The Hague, December 2002

This document represents part of the author's study programme while at the Institute of Social Studies; the views stated therein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Institute.

Research papers and theses are not made available for outside circulation by the Institute.

Enquires:

Postal Address:

Institute of Social Studies
P.O. Box 29776
2502 LT, The Hague
The Netherlands

Telephone : -31-70-4260460
Telefax: -31-70-4260799
e-mail: postmaster@iss.nl

Location:

Kortenaerkade 12
2518 AX, The Hague
The Netherlands

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACEH	Accion Contra El Hambre
ARMM	Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DECS	Department of Education, Culture and Sports
DOH	Department of Health
DND	Department of National Defense
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
E.O.	Executive Order
GO	Government Organization
HDI	Human Development Index
ICP	Immaculate Conception Parish
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
INTERACT Mindanao	Inter-Agency Committee for Relief, Rehabilitation and Development of Areas Affected by Armed Conflicts in Mindanao
IRRP	Integrated Relief and Rehabilitation Project
LGC	Local Government Code
LGU	Local Government Unit
MCC	Mindanao Coordinating Council
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
NDCC	National Disaster Coordinating Council
NGO	Non-government Organization
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCD	Office of Civil Defense
OIC	Organization of Islamic Countries
OPAPP	Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
PCDF	Philippine Canada Development Fund
PETFRR	Presidential Executive Task Force for Relief and Rehabilitation of Mindanao
PD	Presidential Decree
SPCPD	Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development
SND	Secretary of National Defense
SZOPAD	Special Zone for Peace and Development
TFTM	Task Force Tabang Mindanaw
TM	Tabang Mindanaw
UNDP	United Nations Development Project

Chapter 1

Uncovering Issues and Gaps in Relief and Rehabilitation Assistance

In the past, discussions of humanitarian assistance focused on describing its altruism and intrinsic goodness, thereby shielding it from scrutiny and critical analysis. More recently, however, humanitarian assistance has become a topic of academic, practical, and political concern. Various factors led to this increased interest: a level of disenchantment with results, the lack of organizational and institutional learning, little documented improvement of operations over the years, an overall lack of accountability to the public at large and the beneficiaries, and their problematic impact. Other concerns revolve around the varying interpretations of relief and rehabilitation by different humanitarian organizations that lead to differences in the content, scope, and impact of humanitarian assistance that they provide. Over the last years there has been a number of valuable attempts to discuss these issues and to identify best and worst practices.

Operationalizing Relief and Rehabilitation Assistance

Generally, relief operations are primarily concerned with the physical survival of individuals, that is, "life-saving" for people in exceptionally high-risk situations (Apthorpe 1997:86). The role of relief assistance is to sustain people through short periods of stress until such time as the crisis is over (Macrae, et.al. 1997:224-225). This includes the provision of food, water, health services, and temporary shelter for the displaced peoples (De Zeeuw 2001:12) with the presumption that upon provision of such, things will be back to normal again. However, in cases of ongoing conflicts, relief activities are deemed inadequate as "complex situations are seen to suggest the need for complex responses" (Pieterse 1998:7). Thus, concern has become directed for the need for humanitarian assistance to go beyond saving lives and providing relief.

Therefore, the idea of rehabilitation, which comprises short to medium term reconstruction activities with a developmental concern for promoting livelihoods and reducing future

vulnerability, came about. It assumes that a *"normal life or process of development can be reconstructed"* (Macrae, et.al. 1997:225). From the 1960s onwards, humanitarian action was based on a linear model focusing on relief assistance, and when the conflict is over, development assistance would then be provided. In the 1980s, the continuum model of relief and development was developed, thereby bringing about the concept of rehabilitation, which bridges the gap between relief and development activities. Some who see rehabilitation as a link between relief and development increase the scope of rehabilitation to activities in the field of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration, and institutional and political reform (De Zeeuw 2001:12).

Nonetheless, definitions of 'rehabilitation' remain varied across different organizations. (Macrae, et.al 1997:224). For some agencies, rehabilitation is seen as the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure, while others view it necessary to see rehabilitation as an integrated process— that which encompasses the provision of livelihood opportunities, peace-building and psychosocial interventions. However,budgetary constraints, the lack of political will, and a weak governments in war torn situations contributes to the practicability question faced by the relief-rehabilitation-development continuum.

Some argue, however, that notwithstanding the context of ongoing conflicts, an integrated rehabilitation initiative should be pursued because it has the potential of preventing the worsening of conflicts, considering the close linkages between food shortages-famine, population displacement, and war. Also, the ongoing perception of disenfranchised people emphasizes that relief and rehabilitation should not be separated from each other (Ritmeijer, 1998 cited in Risgallah, 1999:25). This is with the assertion that long-term reconstruction/development shall be futile until a sufficient degree of renewal of the communities that will help transform the conflict is facilitated.

Issues and Gaps in Relief and Rehabilitation Assistance
in Ongoing Conflicts

Aside from debates on the scope of relief and rehabilitation assistance, the implications of humanitarian assistance have also been subject to critical scrutiny, because of assumptions and evidences pointing out that such initiatives do more harm than good.

There are varied ways through which relief and rehabilitation can feed an ongoing conflict (See Anderson 1999 : 37-66). Since these represent economic wealth and political power, people engaged in war always want to execute control over these resources. Access to and distribution of resources can be manipulated by warring parties for their own benefits. Due to difficulty in their own supply, a considerable part of humanitarian assistance could be stolen or traded by warring parties to receive weapons in return. While humanitarian assistance can create its own industries where profits can be made and wages can be paid, it can also reinforce market distortions by feeding the war economy and undermine peacetime production and productivity. Inconsistencies in the levels of assistance to different communities can also feed existing tensions.

Further, insufficiency in the provision of relief and rehabilitation assistance can also feed the conflict or breed new tensions. Especially in ongoing conflicts, the focus on saving lives fails to address more concealed needs, such as reconstruction of worsening socio-economic conditions. These are very crucial as neglect to address tensed social conditions more directly feed the war economy[1] while the inability to provide a sufficient economic base heightens frustrations that could trigger further grievances. Further, the increased activity and exposure of international humanitarian assistance organizations in both relief and rehabilitation contributes to the doubts of affected communities on the government's capabilities.

Although experienced in various extents by different humanitarian assistance agencies, these observations made it imperative for scholars and humanitarian practitioners to scrutinize their strategies. Opening a black box, it created doubts about the formerly-held assumptions about humanitarian assistance.

Despite empirical evidences showing how relief and rehabilitation could feed conflicts, moral and humanitarian principles nonetheless dictate the need to continue humanitarian action (Anderson, 1999; Moore, D. 2000; Slim, 1997a). Thus, aside from identifying ways on how relief and rehabilitation assistance could feed ongoing conflicts, attention has been directed towards improving relief and rehabilitation strategies that support peace rather than feed the

---

[1] Interviews with relief and rehabilitation volunteers of OXFAM and Tabang Mindanaw note that the people affected by the war take sides from among the warring parties. When asked to sketch out aspirations, many children aim to become members of the warring parties.

war. Thus, such opening of a black box also created avenues for critical reflection by humanitarian agencies for opportunities to improve on their craft.

Based on lessons learned from previous humanitarian practice, a large amount of studies focused on how humanitarian assistance coming from the international community could be more effectively undertaken were carried out (Quinn, 2002; International Alert, et.al. 2001; Anderson, 1999, Vaux, 2001; OXFAM-Great Britain, 1997; Duffield, 1999; Van Leeuwen, Frerks and Hilhorst, 1999; De Zeeuw, 1999; Roe, 1999; Slim, 1997a, 1997b; Christoplos, 1998; Apthorpe, 1997, 1998). Nonetheless, in the experience of humanitarian organizations, it turned out that there was no single story to tell of what entails an effective relief and rehabilitation strategy. Evaluations and scholarly studies also focused on specific contexts (i.e. Ofstad in Sri Lanka, 2000; Apthorpe in the Horn of Africa, 1997; Pausewang in Somalia, 1999). Analyses of workable strategies varied across ongoing conflicts or post conflicts and still had levels of differences within each kind. Many studies dwelt on looking at the applicability of humanitarian approaches based on the roots of the ethnic conflicts, kind of politics and governance in the recipient state, and potentials for partnerships with local organizations. Based on these studies however, it seems that there are certain aspects in the intrinsic nature of humanitarian assistance that necessarily feeds ongoing conflicts. For example, the principle underlying humanitarian assistance, *impartiality*, dictates the provision of humanitarian assistance to anyone on the basis of the *"the urgency of need"* (Slim, 1997c). For example, relief and rehabilitation resources may be provided to families of rebel groups, who may in turn sell or trade such resources for arms and weapons that exacerbate war. As humanitarian assistance agencies are continually adopting ingenious strategies to lessen the negative impact of their actions[2], it is also imperative to emphasize on strategies being carried out to attack the unintended negative implications of humanitarian assistance.

This is because the puzzle does not end in finding out why and how relief and rehabilitation initiatives fail. It follows that coming up with an effective relief and rehabilitation strategy should not only be based on lessons learned from failures. Another intriguing puzzle, is looking for relief and rehabilitation initiatives that are potentially successful in overcoming the negative unintended implications of humanitarian assistance. Thus, the questioning

---

[2] See Anderson (1999), pp. 39-42; 44-49; 51-53.

should not end at why relief and rehabilitation fail but should extend to what constitutes the strategies of promising cases of relief and rehabilitation.

However, most of the studies on how to more effectively carry out relief and rehabilitation are externally driven (i.e. focusing on how to improve the international communities' humanitarian assistance strategies). While more recent studies (De Zeeuw, 2001; Anderson; 1999, International Alert, et.al. 2001, Quinn, 2002) are now taking note of local capacities, the focus remained "deductive" and allowed international organizations to determine opportunities for intervention by the recipient state and civil society organizations in relief and rehabilitation with them, instead of the other way around. Such could be because in the study of interstate conflicts, weak state, poor socio-economic conditions, and weakened civil society and institutional structures are assumed to be interplaying to serve either as the root of the conflict or as factors exacerbating the ongoing conflict. While such considerations probably contribute to an underestimation of what local initiatives can do it is nonetheless imperative to look at how relief and rehabilitation could be more effectively carried out through national and local initiatives, with mechanisms for determining opportunities for the participation of the international humanitarian assistance community.

Like other inter-state ethnic conflicts, the Mindanao conflict has caused severe damages not only to life and property but in the legitimacy of the state, the credibility of systems and institutions, as well as distress in people's relations and capabilities. Nonetheless, government and national civil society continue to undertake relief and rehabilitation. However, while state and civil society initiatives are most intermediate and crucial, there is no sufficient critical reflection on whether relief and rehabilitation based on these initiatives are doing good or creating further harm. As sporadic clashes continue to erupt and destruct communities, a huge amount of resources are mobilized to continue relief and rehabilitation assistance without critical scrutiny. There is no comprehensive knowledge if relief and rehabilitation resources address the needs or contributes to the sustainability of the affected community, nor if the resources feed the ongoing conflict, nor how these indirect implications breed further grievances. There is also no understanding of the potentials of already institutionalized initiatives applying alternative approaches in coming up with an effective model for relief and rehabilitation in Mindanao. There is a need to study how to maximize national capacity through a government strategy that harnesses the potentials of local and

national civil society initiatives and at the same time determines avenues for relevant partnerships with the international humanitarian assistance community.

It is within this gap that this paper aims to make a contribution. It aims to find lessons both through failures and promising cases among the existing relief and rehabilitation initiatives in Mindanao. Given the crucial role that relief and rehabilitation play in ongoing conflict, there is a need to understand the potentials and limitations of some relief and rehabilitation initiatives for the conflict-infested region. Interested in addressing the research problem: *"How could relief and rehabilitation be more effectively tuned to the context of ongoing conflict in Mindanao?"*, this research shall attempt to surface learnings from the experiences in relief and rehabilitation in Mindanao with the aim of building a more effective relief and rehabilitation strategy therein, and in other contexts of ongoing conflicts as well.

Methodology and Organization of the Paper

The preceding discussion has set out the main problematique of this study, uncovering issues and gaps in relief and rehabilitation assistance in the global context, in general, and in the Mindanao context, in particular. These are laid out as empirical justifications for the exigency of studying how to carry out relief and rehabilitation in Mindanao more effectively. In answering this paper's problematique, a discourse of lessons learned from the Mindanao conflict and conflict theories, from the practice of relief and rehabilitation in Mindanao, and from the major principles and approaches in humanitarian assistance are undertaken.

Before relief and rehabilitation practices in Mindanao are uncovered, an understanding of the conflict environment it is embedded on is necessary (Chapter 2). Aside from using the Mindanao conflict as a background, a systematic analysis of the conflict will be used to understand the shape, outcome, and implications of relief and rehabilitation initiatives. A review of secondary data on conflict theory and on the Mindanao conflict will be useful here. Personal interviews conducted in the Philippines (in Manila and in Mindanao) with people studying the conflict provides additional reflection and insight on the analysis of the conflict.

Against the Mindanao backdrop, the dominant practice of relief and rehabilitation therein is presented in Chapter 3, involving government's institutional and operational framework for relief and rehabilitation. The role of the larger civil society and their linkages with government

initiatives are covered in the dominant framework. Lessons learned from the issues and gaps in government's dominant approach for relief and rehabilitation in Mindanao shall be presented in discourse with the Mindanao conflict (noting how various actors and politics surrounding the conflict shape the character of government's initiative) and the major principles and the practices within the international framework.

This paper's case study (presented in Chapter 4), barangay (village) Nalapaan in Mindanao where a national civil society organization leads an Integrated Return and Rehabilitation Project (IRRP) shall be used as an alternative case of relief and rehabilitation in Mindanao. The IRRP applies a relief and rehabilitation strategy distinctive from government's framework. Similarly, the potentials and limitations of the Nalapaan case as both an alternative and a promising strategy shall be analyzed in light of the political economy of the Mindanao conflict, the role of the state and the international community, and the levels of participation of the grassroots community. The Nalapaan case shall also be discussed in the purview of the international humanitarian framework for humanitarian assistance.

The analyses in Chapters 3 and 4 shall be substantiated by interviews conducted with key persons involved in both the dominant and alternative relief and rehabilitation strategies in Mindanao. Field visits in relief and rehabilitation sites in Mindanao both in certain areas where the government operates and in barangay Nalapaan where the IRRP is being implemented are used to deepen insights and arguments on the issue.

This paper shall then build on a framework for carrying out a more effective relief and rehabilitation strategy for Mindanao. Based on the analysis and findings in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, this paper discusses possible contributions on how to more effectively carry out relief and rehabilitation in the context of ongoing conflicts. These will be summed up in this paper's concluding chapter (Chapter 5).

Chapter 2

The Conflict in Mindanao

Understanding the complex nature of the Mindanao conflict and the complex solution that it entails is crucial in the study of how to more effectively carry out relief and rehabilitation. Noting the caution that relief and rehabilitation assistance has been in some ways exacerbating conflicts, an understanding of the conflict actors, the roots of the armed struggle and the political dynamics of the conflict is important in both understanding the character of existing relief and rehabilitation initiatives and in coming up with an integrated and more effective relief and rehabilitation strategy.

The Moro People's Struggle for Self-Determination

For more than three decades now, groups of Muslims in Mindanao have engaged in armed conflict against the forces of the Philippine government. As a gory civil war continues to erupt, costing many lives and resulting in extensive damage to properties and investments, Mindanao is continually being transformed from being a "land of promise" to a "land of grievance, aggression, and devastation".

The Moro people's struggle for self-determination takes us back to the resistance of the Muslims from their incorporation to the Philippine political entity when the United States granted the Philippines independence in 1948. In the late 1970s, the aspiration of the Muslims of Mindanao for self-determination, then centered on independence, was again revived by the Mindanao Independence Movement and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Despite this clamor for independence, Philippine governments since the 1970s until the present operated under the auspices of the Tripoli Agreement (1976) where autonomy and not independence is the framework for conflict resolution (Tan 2000:1-2). Despite the grant of autonomy, the armed conflict in Mindanao persists. It remains the ultimate hope and the underlying causes of the struggle of the Muslim community in the

Philippines that their development doe not lie in the Christian dominated Philippine state but in allowing them to govern themselves and manage the resources in their own land.

The issue then surfaces two major questions: 1) what factors brought about the Muslims' struggle for independence from the Philippine state?; and, 2) what sustains the conflict despite the grant of autonomy to Muslim-dominated areas in Mindanao?

Mindanao, Colonization, and State Policy

Islam came to the Philippines at the end of the 13th century and the Muslim missionaries integrated themselves with the Lumads (the indigenous peoples of Mindanao). Some of the local inhabitants sought to be converted to Islam and as early as the 15th century, the Muslims in Mindanao have already established a centralized form of government, the Sultanate. Having the characteristics of an independent state, the Sultanate became a symbol of Islamic power in the region, dominating trade and commerce, and control and access to Mindanao's rich resources. Before the Spaniards came, Islam was already expanding in Luzon and Visayas, the two other major islands of the Philippines.

After long armed struggles, Spain conquered Luzon and Visayas and forced the mass conversion of the natives to Christianity. Later on, the Spaniards sent military forces to Mindanao to gain an upper hand in the trade and commerce in the area and Christianize the Islamized natives. In a long series of wars waged against the Moros[3], the Spaniards compelled the Christianized Filipinos to fight with them against the Moros, who counterattacked fearsomely. Since then, the Muslim communities continually resisted subjugation, encroachment in their lands, and the destruction of their communities.

After more than 300 years of colonization, Spain sold the Philippines to the Americans (Muslim, 1994; Quimpo, 2001). Again, direct interference of the Americans to Moro affairs led to the so-called "American-Moro wars" where an estimated 20,000 Moros died (Layson, 2001:4). A comprehensive resettlement program facilitated the continuous influx of Christians from Luzon and Visayas to Mindanao. When the Philippines gained independence

---

[3] Derogatory term used by the Spaniards for the Muslim Filipinos. The term "Moro" later on became acceptable to the Filipino Muslims representing their identity as members of an Islamic government", the goal of which is to be separated from the Philippine which they consider as foreign government.

in 1946, most Muslims could not identify themselves with the new republic, whose laws were derived from Western and Christian values and whose public school was Americanized and alien to Islamic tradition (Quimpo, 2001: 274).

The transmigration of Christians completely transformed the demographic picture of Mindanao. The Muslims were reduced from about 75% of Mindanao's population in the 1900s to 25% in the late 1960s. Of the total population of 14.7 million in the 1990s, the Moros constitute only 17.5%, the Lumads 5.3%, while the Christian Filipinos are more than 70%. (Rodil, 2001 cited in Quimpo 2001: 274; Arellano 2000: 25-26). This influx of non-Moro farming migrants led to the alienation of the communal Moro land system, and the alteration of their indigenous land-use practices. The Muslim Filipinos were forced to adopt the framework of eminent domain and private property during American colonization, but which highly contrasts with the Moro communal system of land ownership (Fianza 1999: 22). Through the monopoly of prime lands by Christian businesses and a small landowning Moro elite the Moros found themselves in competition with the Christians for the same niches in the division of labor and territory.

State policy of continued aggression and all out war against the Muslims blew the conflict up into huge proportions. An incident considered to be a prelude to the armed conflict, the "Jabidah massacre" [4], manifested the state's perception of the Muslim ethnic group as one that should be suppressed, if not annihilated. As a form of retaliation, Muslim rebels have since then fought strongly with government soldiers. In 1972, then President Marcos imposed Martial law, citing Muslim secessionists as one of the biggest threats to national security. The MNLF, set up in 1969 by young Muslim militants, took to the fore of the armed struggle for self-determination and later issued a manifesto declaring their renunciation of the Philippine government and the establishment of the "Bangsamoro Republik" or Islamic government (Quimpo 2001: 275-276). In 1984, a faction was created within the MNLF, which later became the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)[5].

Government introduced avenues to forge peace agreements with the Muslim rebels. The Tripoli Agreement was executed with the MNLF in 1976, establishing "autonomy" for

---

[4] In 17 March 1968, Muslim trainees of the Philippine Army were recruited to infiltrate the Malaysian state of Sabah, but according to investigations were slaughtered by their superiors as a manifestation of the anti-Muslim bias in the Philippine military.

Muslims in 13 provinces, or the Special Zone for Peace and Development (SZOPAD). Unable to agree with the Marcos government on how to interpret and implement the peace agreement, the MNLF reverted to a secessionist stance. MNLF signed another peace agreement with the Aquino government in 1987—the Jeddah Accord, but talks to work out the details failed once again. Other initiatives, such as the establishment of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) also aimed to empower the Moros towards genuine autonomy. A component of the SPCPD is the creation of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) where Muslim communities were again given the so-called autonomy to rule their own people.

While the MNLF was pacified through continuous negotiations with government, ARMM caused insecurity with the MILF, which was becoming the biggest insurgent force in the Philippines. While government also forged separate peace negotiations with the MILF, hostilies never ceased and militarization remained the main ingredient in government's strategy. While government succeeded in weakening the MILF forces, the destruction created by the conflict, together with a failure to actualize the "development effort", only worsened the situation in Mindanao.

The conflict in Mindanao has had serious effects, not only within the region but also in the entire country. The armed skirmishes in the year 2000 alone displaced an estimated half a million persons, destroyed 6,229 houses, and damaged another 2,115 (OXFAM, 2001 cited in NRC, 2001). Above the casualties and displacements, social relations have been greatly severed, scarce resources have been reoriented for the war effort, there is huge dis-investment and disruption of services, imbalance in agricultural growth[6], and developmental projects have been long-delayed.

ANALYSIS : Examining the Roots of the Moro Armed Struggle

1. Entitlement Deprivation and the Tyranny of the Majority

There are several kinds of entitlement systems : a) access to resources as well as to the fruits of production; b) state (and state subsystems) - arranged entitlements; and, c) entitlements arising from the international legal order through regional and international cooperation of

---

[6] For more on the impact of the 2000 war, see NRC, 2001.

states (Fortman 1999: 44-52). These systems represent regularized arrangements for establishing legitimate claims. Behind these systems hides a particular system of beliefs, order and resulting institutions that constitute rules and arrangements and creates positions for people. The state is responsible of arranging and re-arranging entitlement positions through administrative policies and law, if people do not evenly gain access to resources and fruits of production. At the same time, regional and international cooperation of states may also bring forth a re-arrangement of entitlement systems.

The Moro armed struggle is rooted from these varied sources of entitlement failure. Following De Gaay Fortman and Kortekaas' (1996) analysis of state-ethnic conflicts through an entitlement systems framework, this represents a major difference in the actual and expected outcomes of claims to production, exchange and distribution as compared to what they think they have title to, coupled with the inability of both the state and international cooperation to re-arrange entitlement systems that will benefit and satisfy the Muslim Filipinos in Mindanao.

Deprivation from Access to Resources and Fruits of Production

As a capital in production, the Moros resent the entitlement failure connected to their "land" (Mindanao), which has been taken away from them through the transmigration of Christians in Mindanao. The institutions and systems governing them had also been threatened as they shared Mindanao, including the resources and fruits of production therein with non-Christians. This later on minoritized them in the region, which they formerly dominated.

Similarly, an entitlement gap in exchange and distribution is apparent in the Mindanao conflict. The Moros resented the strong regional economic disparities and the uneven rate of social and economic change in the country. Mindanao records the highest poverty incidence (44.6%) among the island groups vis a vis the national average of 31.8%[7]. There are more than 1.4M poor families in Mindanao (as of 1997) and more than half of them cannot even meet their daily food requirements. Seven out of ten provinces in the Philippines that are lagging behind in terms of human development are located in Mindanao (PHDR, 1997).

---

[7] NCR –6.4%; Visayas –38.3%, Luzon – 29.8% (NSCB, 2000).

Maguindanao[8] in Cotabato recorded one of the lowest HDIs. In terms of health and functional literacy rates, Mindanao provinces are again at the bottom, with Maguindanao as having one of the lowest levels. Provinces in Mindanao that are predominantly Muslim lag behind the rest of the island in almost all aspects of socio-economic development (U.S. DOS, 2000 cited in NRC, 2001).

Majoritarian Control of State-arranged entitlements and the Myth of State Neutrality.

Under the theory of liberal democracy, the state ought to protect every member of society from injustice and oppression, violence and invasion of other societies, and erecting public institutions which shall not be at the interest of any individual (Smith 1776 cited in Fortman and Kortekaas, 1996). Thus, the effectiveness of the state to arrange entitlements shall be manifested by meeting the interests and needs of "every member of society". If access to resources and fruits of production in a free market economy does not benefit the Moros, the role of the state in effectively arranging and re-arranging entitlements is crucial in controlling or fuelling the escalation of conflict. Unfortunately, the present structure of Philippine politics and government has successfully done the latter rather than the former.

Mohamed Salih (2000), in his essay, "Majoritarian Tyranny in a World of Minorities" analyzes the inter-relationships of minorities and the state, democracy, and authoritarian development. In his discussion of minorities and the state, Salih (2000:6) asserts that 'the all-encompassing nature of the state', its capacity to influence events and control resources makes it attractive to intense competition of diverse forces. Thus, both majority and minority seek to control or influence the state and its subsystems and institutions, especially those systems that extract and manage revenue. Ideally, the state's role is to maintain its neutrality in using its monopoly of power to protect the rights of its citizens, whether belonging to a majority or minority. Conflicts often occur when the minority feels that the majority, as condoned by the state, 'uses its privileged position to deny it a voice in the political arena' (Salih 2000:6).

This majoritarian tyranny thesis is useful in explaining the failures of state-arranged entitlements to pacify the struggle of the Moros struggle for independence. The Philippine state does not only fail in protecting the Muslim minority, but deliberately commits atrocities

---

[8] Due to transmigration of Christians in Mindanao, Cotabato has been split into four provinces, four of

against them. Its silence in the Christian majority's access to power and resources aggravates the atrocities that it creates over the Muslims by not being able to service even the basic needs of the Muslims in Mindanao. Regional imbalance as presented earlier shows how the Muslim dominated regions are marginalized in terms of human development. This is coupled by the state's inability to facilitate the recovery of their ancestral lands through a more equitable land reform program. These economic rights demanded by the Moros also include a larger share in public funds and increase in access to government services and goods.

What adds insult to injury is that huge Christian dominated businesses and corporations continue to profit from Mindanao's resources. In both ways, the state abused its dual function of restriction and protection by neither having the capability to restrict those who want to attack the minority nor to protect the minority by providing opportunity to express their identities. Protection could have been done by creating institutions where the Muslim minorities could govern themselves and maximize their resources, such as the grant of meaningful autonomy.

Philippine Democracy and the Muslim Minority. The way a democratic government guarantees the rights and entitlements of the minority is significant in either preventing or mobilizing economic grievances from turning into collective violence (Douma, et.al. 1999). A democracy, in its ideal form, is supposed to enable the state to restrain the majority from abusing its powers against the minority, as a "neutral entity". However, as Salih (2000:14) argued, "the concept of state neutrality becomes a myth in societies where the elite of the largest religious, ethnic, or linguistic group also forms the majority, as defined by the performance of political parties in elections".

Indeed, the social crisis in Mindanao arising from the armed conflict is not eased by the democratic system favoring the dominant majority in all decision-making, while not institutionalizing effective mechanisms for power-sharing. Elected by the majority, the Muslims see the state as not only inefficient in servicing their needs and aspirations but instrumental to their marginalization, as the representative of the majority. Political representation contingent on national elections will not ensure election of a Muslim or a Lumad candidate to the Senate and certainly not the highest executive positions unless

---

which are predominantly Christian and one predominantly Muslim (Maguindanao).

supported by a national political party. Noting that Philippine democracy provides that key government posts are decided by majority of votes at the national level, the State fails to institutionalize mechanisms that will enable a substantial level of representation of ethnic minorities within this "democracy". At the same time, less than one percent of lawmakers are Muslims, making it difficult to bring policy reforms to bear on serious issues concerning Mindanao. Neither are Muslim representatives in politics able to function as effective shadow governments that could undertake meaningful checks and balances.

Philippine democracy fails in its promise of 'equal representation and wider participation that supposedly carries a set of mutually reinforcing institutions that could address grievance and reduce the likelihood of civil war (Gates, 2002:15) However, it continues to perpetuate injustice against the national minorities (Tan 2000:2). As long as Philippine democracy remains exclusionary, lacking institutions that will allow power and decision-making to be shared among equals, it will continually fuel rebellion by encouraging the rise of alternative sources of power for creating greater avenues to assert entitlement demands.

State subsystems and institutions (i.e. executive, legislative, and judiciary) fall short in the provision of basic services (i.e. education and public health), in the enactment of laws and policies that will spur Mindanao development, and in exacting justice and human dignity for the Muslims. The Muslims' perception of a more gloomy future awaiting them and their children leads them to wish for a return to the Sultanate or to look at other options different from the status quo where the Philippine state and its subsystems are unable to protect their interests. Facing a long blockage of entitlement gap, the Filipino Muslims wish to hold on to the life that they used to lead. This also represents a goal for a greater amount of entitlements compared to meager level of entitlements that they are presently enjoying.

Entitlements Arranged by the International Order

The state's integration in the international legal order allows for a re-arrangement of entitlement systems at the supra level. However, in many accounts, international cooperation only resulted in worsening entitlement systems. The enactment of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by many countries including the Philippines, enumerates a number of rights that ought to be protected by the state to allow its peoples to live a 'life in dignity'. These rights range from self-determination to socio-economic and political rights to

the right to development. However, the absence of accountability mechanisms to check the state's effectiveness in protecting these rights propagates its inefficiency in protecting these rights. Further, the lack of rights awareness, especially the poor Muslims in Mindanao, and the weaknesses of civil society to disseminate information about these rights disables them to fight for their rights through legitimate venues. This poses another dilemma of whether further informing the deprived Muslims of their rights will be better off for them or will just fuel further grievances. However, it is only by making them aware of these rights and through pressures from civil society that decades of rights neglect could be acted upon. Further, if the state sees self-determination or access to development as a right and not a struggle that Muslims have to fight for, then it becomes its responsibility to service and protect these rights and entitlements.

A shift in the political balance of power and control of resources in Mindanao (i.e. modernization, globalization) has also brought about fundamental changes in the legal status of the Muslims and Christians. The lost power and influence of royal families belonging to the Sultanate serve as another factor for the continuing armed conflict. In the former Sultanate, members and relatives of the royal family occupied high status, with authority over their warriors and slaves. In the modern state, the royal families have no actual power over their former slaves and warriors. Thus, there is a view of sustaining the armed struggle in order to overthrow the modern state so that the Sultanate could function again. Further, the implementation of structural reforms in the Philippines led to trade liberalization and industry expansion. As industries boomed, Mindanao resources were used up. The Muslims saw themselves in competition with the Christians for entitlements (i.e. in employment, income, and resources). At the same time, the state was not able to translate the boom of investments towards greater goods and services for the Muslims. Instead of re-arranging entitlements for the betterment of the Muslims, such phenomena created greater entitlement deprivations and demands for them.

2. Breakdown of the Social Contract

Addison and Murshed (2001) provide an analysis of civil wars as rooted in two factors: 1) a partial or complete breakdown of the social contract, often involving disputes over public spending, resource revenues, and taxation and, 2) a competition over natural resource rents, where poverty and injustice play a crucial role. The social contract is the "agreed upon rules

of the game" that govern the distribution of resources and obligations across society—and the connected mechanisms for settling dispute (Addison and Murshed 2001:2). Within nation states, the fiscal system will secure a workable social contract if the allocation of public expenditures and the appointment of resources and revenues are judged to be fair. Contemporary wars are more often related to the breakdown of explicit or implicit arrangements to share these resources. This contract for sharing of revenues becomes more difficult "when there is imperfect credibility with which the side that controls the resources honors its commitment" (Addison and Murshed, p.2).

Rebel groups may choose not to fight the government if it "receives a credible fiscal transfer from government that weighs more than what they would get in the event of the overthrow of the state" (Addison and Murshed, p.4). However, behind the efforts to finalize peace negotiations with the rebel groups, government continually fails to provide meaningful autonomy to the Muslim communities and allow them to rule their own people and their own resources (representing "greed" over these resources) that would be tantamount to a workable fiscal transfer.

ARMM or an Extended Arm of Government?

This breakdown of the social contract explains the failure of government's provision of an autonomous government for the Muslims. A large amount of power and responsibility in local governance was supposedly provided to the ARMM. However, it remained incapacitated with funds, fund-generating capacity, and full autonomy to implement development projects to carry out additional responsibilities. Thus, ARMM functions remain solely administrative, focusing on tax collection and maintenance of physical infrastructure[9].

Further, the power to make reforms through policy change remains the prerogative of the government. These superficial attempts to share power and resources represent a breakdown of the social contract that results in the persistence of warfare. Recent press releases show that even the MILF is becoming less firm in its previous clamor for separatism[10], and more open to autonomy, if this will solve the Mindanao problem. This shows that separatism is not exactly their ultimate aim, but a real hand in governing themselves and their resources in a

---

[9] Interview with Director Dumagay, 27 August 2002.
[10] For details see Umali (2000), p. 9.

manner that conforms to their Islamic heritage and aspirations. However, government's piecemeal efforts in facilitating power and resource sharing only increase the level of frustration of the Muslims, thereby contributing to the persistence of the conflict.

Elite Control of Power and Resources

The political economy of Mindanao depicts how the power elites (Muslim and Christian) have remarkably developed the mining and agro-industrial potentials of the region over the years, leaving a very small portion to the poor Muslims and indigenous people to divide among themselves (Tan 2001:4). Usually, elites and their businesses do not even pay their taxes in the region but secure them in their national coffers or abroad. Tax payments are normally done through their Manila head offices (Tadem, 2000). Thus, while Mindanao resources are used up, revenues accrue to the Manila government. The result is a wide disparity of income and opportunities between Manila[11] and the South (Mindanao). Further, while elite groups exist among the Moros themselves, they are seen by warring parties as co-opted by the state who abandon the objectives of Moro state building. This represents a social contract that only binds the state and the political and economic elites, which further marginalizes the poor Muslims in Mindanao.

Competition over Diffuse Resources

Mindanao spreads over 34% of the country's land area and provides a substantial contribution to the country's economy. The Moro areas in Mindanao have rich reserves of untapped natural resources, raw materials, and cheap labor[12]. This richness in resource is the reason why Mindanao is labeled as the *"Land of Promise"*. These areas, especially those within the MILF camps have potentials for generating huge revenues for government should it be able to clear it of rebel groups, or get them to cooperate with government. Addison and Murshed's (2001) study point out that competition over diffuse resources (i.e. renewable and geographically spread resources like soil and water), brings about a conflict especially when access to and ownership of these resources are highly unequal. Given this, an increase in

---

[11] Manila has the complete services, modern infrastructure, access to resources, and the best opportunities not available in the periphery, such as Mindanao.

[12] Mindanao is characterized by fertile soil suitable to cultivate a variety of crops and has a timberland of nearly 39% of the nation's forest cover. It represents 48% of gold production and other elements. The

poverty or a greater perception of injustice leads to more fighting. In Mindanao, conflict is rooted in grievance over the ownership of resources by Christian and international corporations compared to the access or benefit over these resources by the Muslims. Persisting structural inequality and regional economic disparity, without corrective actions, has planted deep grievances among the Muslims. This is further worsened by the absence of a trickle down mechanism of the fruits of production resulting from the use by the non-Muslims of these resources.

Towards collective violence

Decades of blockage in entitlement gap, tyranny of the majority and broken-down social contract created grievance and alienation of the Muslims that pushed them to demand for change and organize collective violence against the state. Islam as major element of the Moro ethnic identity, magnified by shared historic experiences, served as a mobilizing factor for them to demand for change, form a "will-in-action", and resort to collective violence. Underlying this is their goal for meaningful autonomy from the largely Muslim-biased Philippine nation whom they see as their aggressors. The defensive reaction on the part of the state has led to violent clashes that ignite the continuous cycle of violence. Violent clashes led to further weakening of systems, institutions and great loss of resources that creates further entitlement gaps and deprivations, that again mobilizes "will-in action" that sustains the already violent conflict.

CONCLUSION: Conflict Begets Further Conflict

The Mindanao conflict has been magnified so much that it has crept into many other dimensions. It is historical, dynamic and multi-dimensional, and it has multiple roots and consequences. Therefore, claiming it as purely an economic or political problem is to oversimplify the problem and to delimit it to a single dimension calls for an oversimplified solution. While historical and economic factors played an important role in triggering grievance and discontent, the political dimension revolving around issues of bogus power-sharing, exclusionary democracy and poor governance is seen as a major contributor in mobilizing the transition from grievance to collective violence. Ethnicity is seen here not as

---

Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) is also eyeing a marshland in the said area for natural gas extraction (Ippadi, 2000: 1-2)

the root but as a tool to muster the Moros' will-in action against the government. As political, economic, societal and interpersonal dimensions interplay in causing and sustaining the conflict, they should also be taken as a package when coming up with solutions thereto. This means that while political (i.e. peace negotiations, grant of autonomy) and economic solutions (i.e. rehabilitation and promotion of growth in Mindanao) are proposed or undertaken, the predominantly Christian society's lingering prejudices against the Muslims, misunderstanding of the Mindanao conflict and the culture of violence escalating among the victims of war in Mindanao should also be given concern.

As the conflict persists, it begets further conflict by accumulating new entitlement failures, further disintegrating the social contract, and manifesting the state's a-neutrality by propagating a tyranny of the majority. As piecemeal solutions to the conflict are offered and without offering sufficient mechanisms for equitable power and resource-sharing, new grievances are bred that could fuel the upsurge of worse conflicts in the future.

The failure of government's efforts to forge peace with the rebels hinders the economic development of Mindanao. Billions of funds which could be aligned for the development of Mindanao goes to military spending and to relief and rehabilitation (NRC, 2001). Thus, the much-needed fiscal transfer that could revive the broken social contract becomes more farfetched. The prominence of humanitarian aid programs also siphon off much of local NGO capacities.

Simultaneously, the inability to arrive at acceptable political solutions, and the poor economic conditions has been causing a culture of violence among the Mindanaons. This is becoming a recruitment ground for collective violence in the future. Many Muslims whose relatives have been killed or injured in the war form hatred not only against the military but the entire government. Christians directly affected by the conflict form fear and hatred against the Muslim rebels and generate a prejudice against the Muslims that they pass on to their children.

The persistence of the conflict also further illuminates, a tyranny of the majority. As government fails to cater to their aspirations of gaining access to power and full control of their resources, the Muslims see a state only capable of protecting the majority of Christians. As the state continues to offer them false autonomy, state policy of keeping the Muslims

formally integrated into the Philippine territory is seen by the Muslims as an instrument for the state (as the representative of the majority) to oppress them. The differential access to government resources and services emphasize the advantages of the Christians over the religious minorities. Philippine democracy, which is supposed to institutionalize mechanisms for equal access to resources and opportunity remains exclusionary, with a dominant majority, state, laws, and institutions unprepared to share power with the Muslim minority. As the Philippine political system fails to distribute access and control to power and resources to the minority Muslims, they feel that they have no alternatives other than violent opposition.

The failure of the political solutions to the problem is due to its minimal economic counterpart. While peace talks are being formulated, millions of poor Mindanaons are hungry and vulnerable to join collective action against the government, or simply join banditry. As an example, the Abu Sayyaf, a group of formerly poor Muslim youth, which has resorted to kidnapping and other terrorist activities, continually recruits poor young Muslims for a promise of wealth and access to arms. Consequently, the existence of such banditry from among the Muslims strengthens the lingering anti-Muslim bias in Philippine society. These contribute to the over-all political and economic instability of the country, which severely affects the country's tourism industry and discourages large investments that could spur growth in the country, including Mindanao.

With the persistence of conflict, there is no law and there is a clear absence of a judicial system. This allows for the deliberate destruction of communities, reckless burning of houses, and killing of civilians and further worsens the already failing entitlement systems of the Muslim Filipinos. Entitlement presupposes a "protected command over resources" and the conflict creates an environment where a system to protect these entitlements are broken (Fortman, 1999). Reconstruction of broken entitlement systems requires a long struggle for the cessation of hostilies, and ultimately, the resolution of the conflict.

Moreover, deteriorating socioeconomic conditions caused by the persistence of the conflict seriously affects all aspects of life and society (i.e. physical well-being due to health problems, lack of access to education for skills development). The persistence of the conflict also creates more immediate needs: new homes, reconstruction of damaged infrastructure, restoration of destroyed livelihood systems. Accompanying these immediate needs is a

21

clamor for aid programs that are sensitized to priority needs and constraints, and a restoration of social relations with other ethnic groups.

This chapter has presented the dynamics of the Mindanao conflict and the role that various actors in Philippine society has taken in both fuelling and sustaining the conflict. Despite the general clamor for ending the conflict, some have found the conflict to be a way of life, a source of income and livelihood, or of power and access to resources. Thus, the conflict could beget further conflicts by creating a political economy that is conducive to further conflict. As these actors take a role in the conflict dynamics, they also inevitably participate in shaping the outcome of relief and rehabilitation. For instance, despite the role taken by government as a party to the conflict, it also continues to play an active role in the provision of relief and rehabilitation assistance. At the same time, national civil society, despite its representation of the "majority" and shortcomings in indirectly sustaining the conflict, also actively participates in relief and rehabilitation. There are also the grassroots, whom, due to their heterogeneous character may either clamor for an end of war and make good use of relief and rehabilitation or propagate and support a war economy due to the benefits gained from relief and rehabilitation resources. Situated in the dynamics of the Mindanao conflict, this paper leads us to the succeeding chapters focusing on relief and rehabilitation practice in Mindanao where actors directly or indirectly engaged in the conflict take an active role. It is through such practices in the midst of ongoing conflict that we hope to pick up failures and successes from which a more effective relief and rehabilitation strategy could be built on.

Chapter 3

LEARNING FROM FAILURES

Government's Relief and Rehabilitation Approach for Mindanao

Government's Approach to Relief and Rehabilitation

The Mindanao conflict has been persisting for more than three decades now and communities affected by the conflict also continually necessitate relief and rehabilitation. Given this cycle of war, then relief, then rehabilitation, then ongoing war, one would hope that there already exists a clear structural framework and institutional setting for the management and implementation of relief and rehabilitation in Mindanao.

Indeed, there is some presence of an institutional structure for the management of the destruction caused by the conflict. At the national level, the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) has the mandate to "direct, control and coordinate" the country's resources to address major disasters (natural or man-made), including the Mindanao conflict (Presidential Decree No. 1566, 1978). As such, the conflict is managed with a common framework used for managing natural disasters such as typhoons, floods, and volcanic eruptions.

The NDCC organizes multi-sectoral disaster councils at every level of government[13] to allow linkages with relevant agencies and organizations and mobilize resources needed to manage disasters. This responsibility of local officials in disaster management is strengthened by the enactment of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 (devolution) which provides local government units (LGUs) a disaster management fund of 5% of its development fund upon its own declaration of a state of emergency (LGC, 1991). Within this institutional framework, the Office of Civil Defense (OCD), a technical support to the NDCC, coordinates the activities and functions of various agencies to implement NDCC policies relevant to disaster management.

---

[13] In each of the administrative region of the country, including the ARMM, Regional Disaster Coordinating Councils (RDCC) are tasked to undertake similar functions as the NDCC for the regions, headed by regional chairmen designated by the President. In each local government unit, the Local Disaster Coordinating Council (LDCC) is headed by the elected local chief executive. (ADRC, 19 November 1999).

The framework for disaster management has four components: 1) disaster mitigation, which aims to minimize the impact of a disaster in terms of casualties and damages; 2) disaster preparedness, which aims to reduce risk vulnerability through hazard analysis and community preparation; 3) disaster response, which covers relief operations; and, 4) rehabilitation and reconstruction, which aims for the reverting back of the communities to normalcy. Within said framework, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) is responsible to extend emergency relief assistance to the victims of all disasters and undertake social services with the aim of *"immediately restoring them to rehabilitation and a life of normalcy" (PD 1566, 1978)*.

Other inter-agency bodies were later created through to improve the institutional framework for relief and rehabilitation in Mindanao. Due to the aftermath of the 2000 war, the Mindanao Coordinating Council (MCC) was created to manage and coordinate all government efforts for relief and rehabilitation in Mindanao. Chaired by the President and with Cabinet secretaries as members, the MCC was a top-level body that has no sufficient immersion in the Mindanao conflict. Later on, the Presidential Executive Task Force for Relief and Rehabilitation of Central Mindanao (PETFRR), was created as the implementing arm of the MCC to expedite the rehabilitation of communities affected by the conflict. Although PETFRR was somehow able to reach the ground (as it little by little provided some needs of the affected communities), its actions were "without the benefit of consultation or real participation of the stakeholders" (Mercado, 2000). Further, like the MCC, the PETFRR still undertook rehabilitation in trickles, with no integrated plan of how to rehabilitate the affected areas. In many cases, livelihood opportunities are not available in the areas where the new shelters were built.

Travelling along the Cotabato-Davao National Highway in Mindanao, a series of government-built shelters could be seen. Surprisingly, many of them were uninhabited. In an interview with some residents in the inner areas, the residents informed that the family beneficiaries of the houses constructed along the highways have left because those were not their original areas. They were given shelters and some seeds, but they didn't have lands to till in the area. As their livelihood systems are not accessible, they chose to move back to their areas of origin, sought back what was left of their farms, and simply shared houses with some relatives. Some of the interviewees were also contemplating on leaving the area due its significant distance to the lands that they till.

In February 2001, another body, INTERACT Mindanao was created to synchronize and integrate relief, rehabilitation and community-based development in conflict-affected areas in Mindanao. (Executive Order No. 2, 2000). INTERACT has potentials because it institutionalizes mechanisms to address many gaps in the existing framework: local consultations, concept of community-based development, synthesis of civil society initiatives, and peace building. Although promising as a structure, INTERACT it lacks a clear system of complementarity with the NDCC and DSWD and was abolished after only 7 months of creation[14]. Further, as the MCC, PETFRR and INTERACT were not created by law, they served coterminous purposes and were easily abolished by political influences and events.

International, National and Local Civil Society Responses

Philippine government policy for the provision of humanitarian assistance by the international community is for resources to be channeled through its governmental institutions. Assistance from the international community mostly comes through financial support (i.e. donor-arranged funding) made in partnership with government or civil society groups. Nonetheless, some humanitarian organizations still choose to provide direct assistance to the communities through goods, training, technical assistance and services.[15]

There also are national and local civil society initiatives for providing relief and rehabilitation in Mindanao. Tabang Mindanao (TM) represents a broad national civil society initiative for relief and rehabilitation[16], which provides relief and later launched its Integrated Return and Rehabilitation Program (IRRP) for war-affected areas. The IRRP facilitates the return of the evacuees to their villages and assist them in rebuilding their communities as *"Spaces/Sanctuaries of Peace"*. This paper's case study, Nalapaan in Pikit, Cotabato, covers the 4 pilot communities of the IRRP. Among the other local initiatives is Balay Mindanao, which focuses on the provision of relief and peace advocacy and the Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Associations (PAHRA), which advocates the promotion of human rights of the conflict-affected populace.

---

[14] See The Manila Times, 23 September 2001, cited in the NRC, 2001
[15] For more on this, see NRC, 2001, pp. 57-61; Quitoriano, 2001, pp.50-56
[16] Tabang Mindanaw was formed in 1998 to respond to the food crisis caused by the drought in Mindanao (TM, 2000).

Relief and rehabilitation efforts of civil society are generally provided without coordination. Specifically for relief, this has led to unevenness in the goods and services provided in evacuation centers brought about by varying standards, principles and approaches applied by different agencies (U.N. Resident Coordinator, 2000 cited by NRC, 2001). In some cases, those with better access to the towns gained more relief packages. The same is true for rehabilitation. OXFAM provides direct humanitarian assistance through public health inputs (community health management training and lectures, latrins and water systems) and a teacher's training educational program (in partnership with DECS), and it holds partnerships with local NGOs in providing livelihood programs and peace-building activities in certain target areas. ACEH focuses on the provision of toilets and sanitary facilities in selected communities. TM undertakes a more integrated relief and rehabilitation project. Many other international donors, through partnerships with government, focus on building shelters and provision of minimum livelihood assistance. While civil society may have altruistic goals in providing assistance, glaring irregularities and differences in the quality, quantity, and levels of relief and rehabilitation assistance are apparent. With this lack of coordination, some communities are rehabilitated with an integrated framework, or a semi-integrated framework, while others receive basic shelters or have yet to be serviced by any form of rehabilitation assistance.[17]

Government Initiatives Vis a Vis the International Framework:
Issues and Gaps in Relief and Rehabilitation Practice

The dominant institutional setting for relief and rehabilitation in Mindanao creates opportunities for feeding and breeding further conflicts:

First, the Department of National Defense (DND), which oversees the Philippine military (the main party to the armed conflict), simultaneously manages the NDCC which is the over-all policy maker/coordinator for disaster management. Such absurdity in set-up incapacitates government in coming up with clear and integrated approaches on how to rehabilitate war-affected communities, while simultaneously preparing for war. The same problems in the institutional framework is entwined in the all-encompassing nature of the national disaster

---

[17] Interview with DSWD Assec. Ruel Lucentales, 2002.

management framework that disallows a differentiated strategy for relief and rehabilitation of Mindanao.

The dominant relief and rehabilitation framework also falls short in the principles that should guide humanitarian assistance: humanity, neutrality and impartiality. These three principles are lifted from the top three of seven guiding principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movements. The principles of humanity and neutrality are utterly disregarded. Humanity (as defined by the Red Cross and Red Crescent) is the desire *"to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found... to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being"* (Slim 1997c:4). As a guiding principle of humanitarian assistance, *"humanity"* dictates the need to go beyond saving lives by providing essential materialisms such as food, water, shelter, and medicine but towards providing a wider range of inputs that will facilitate *"respect for human being"*. Neutrality, on the other hand, as an underpinning of the humanitarian position, is operationalized as *"not taking sides in hostilities or engage anytime in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature"* (Red Cross and Red Crescent, cited in Slim 1997c:7). Government's framework defeats this principle due to the fact that the DND, which controls government's military arm, also acts as the main policy-maker and coordinator of relief and rehabilitation. This makes the existing institutional structure inevitably a-neutral.

Although government applies the principle of impartiality, operationalized as *'non - discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions'* (Slim 1997c: 7-8), it remains unable to curb the moral and practical dilemmas involved therein due to the absence of a well-thought out strategy. For instance, relief and rehabilitation assistance is provided to anyone affected by the conflict, including the rebel families. The lack of coordination mechanisms in the management of humanitarian assistance creates a practical dilemma in the application of this principle (i.e. duplication in the provision of assistance to rebel families allows them to sell or trade goods for arms). Thus, the incorporation of the impartiality principle is insufficient in itself. It requires a carefully planned strategy to curb its negative unintended effects, such as the possibility of feeding the conflict.

This dominant approach to relief and rehabilitation also represents a focus on *"mercy"* (See Pieterse 1998 :8) and not on *"rights"*. As nothing specific in the legal documents mandate

singling out Mindanao as a complex emergency[18] that needs a conflict-sensitive strategy, rehabilitation strategies are oriented towards mere extensions of relief: evacuation, and rebuilding of houses and infrastructure which is the same as relief for natural disasters. These are all based on the aim of *"relieving suffering"*, as contrary to *"bringing back a state of normalcy"*, which the existing disaster management framework purports to do. Although generally accepted by many humanitarian assistance organizations, the *"return to normalcy"* as a goal could be seen as insufficient in the Mindanao context as entitlement failures ignited that the armed struggle in the first place were present in these previously "normal" (i.e. non-hostile) conditions. Nonetheless, government still fails in achieving this target by providing mere extensions of relief. In the case of fires and typhoons, building of shelters and reconstruction of damaged infrastructure may be sufficient. However, in ongoing conflicts, not only infrastructure is damaged but livelihoods, social relations, and personal integrity. Thus, there should be a primary understanding of the conflict and the strategies appropriate to the conflict context (which differentiates it from other disasters) prior to action.

There is a big debate on the humanitarian agenda in war: *"Is it enough to save lives alone or should a broadly based human rights agenda be pursued?"* It is clear that a relief and rehabilitation agenda focused on mercy in Mindanao has been generating dangers of exacerbating the conflict by breeding further grievances. Thus, a broadly-based rights approach that does not only encompass sustainability rights (i.e. right to life, food and health) but many other rights such as empowerment and the right to development is necessary for an effective rehabilitation assistance strategy for Mindanao.

Empowering the people should start at addressing their immediate needs. An OXFAM study on poverty in Mindanao notes the immediate needs of the people affected by the conflict: "working animals, seeds and other farm inputs". These needs are focused on the restoration of the livelihoods that they have lost during the conflict and do not even transcend survival needs (Quitoriano 2001: 46). Yet, they could not be provided sufficiently by government's framework. This is notwithstanding the estimated P11 billion worth of aid directed for relief, rehabilitation and peace-building in Mindanao[19]. Government initiatives in the provision of livelihood assistance is limited in providing trickles of seed dispersal and group credits to acquire carabaos. Further, livelihood resources are provided without ample training and

---

[18] Interviews with Director Vilma Cabrera and Ms. Bing Arieta, 22 August 2002.

28

opportunities for use. Many resettlement areas are built where farming lands are not accessible, or where fighting continues that discourages agriculture, thus making seed dispersal and credits to acquire a carabao futile. Further, provision of livelihood resources through group lending may be highly problematic in ongoing conflicts where communities are in distress and social relations are severed. Those who acquire these resources have strong doubts if they will be able to pay off the credit, which adds up to their further stress and tension[20]. Such initiatives are insufficient to enable the communities to be empowered nor to partake in the development process.

Aside from mercy, government is focused on forging peace negotiations with the rebels, without an accompanying dedication to abide by the social contract that it has neglected. Thus, rebel parties remain discontented and affected communities breed further grievances due to the insufficiency and unsustainability of resources provided to them. Further, peace-building initiatives are not incorporated in rehabilitation strategies that could address social tensions escalating within the affected communities (Anderson, 1999). The absence of peace-building initiatives incapacitates government to mitigate the possible negative unintended effects of the assistance that it provides.

There is also lack of meaningful capacity building within communities that could allow them to develop strategies from within to improve their livelihoods. LGUs have been devolved with powers to undertake disaster management but they are not accompanied with the necessary fiscal transfer to perform the additional responsibilities. Local capacities have the potential to curb the practical dilemmas of relief and rehabilitation through local knowledge and experience but this asset of the grassroots is not maximized in the government's framework. This notion of government incapability to effectively relieve them from suffering, provide adequate goods and services and harness their capabilities can create further grievances that fuel the conflict.

Government encourages humanitarian aid to be coursed through it (i.e. in form of funds). This represents an inductive approach that could allow for greater coordination of relief and rehabilitation assistance. However, the lack of coordinative capacity of government disables

---

[19] For details, see Quitoriano, Table 14, pp. 50-51, Annexes 3-12.
[20] Interviews with residents in the municipalities of Bago- Inged, Rajamuda, Bulol, in Pikit, Cotabato (recipients of government assistance), August 2002.

29

it to determine and offer opportunities for participation of the humanitarian assistance community. Thus, instead of coursing resources through government, many civil society groups continue to find their own target communities. There is no complete picture of serviced and unserviced areas necessary for strategizing interventions. Especially for rehabilitation, different agencies have varied statistical basis for the affected communities and standards of operation (NRC, 2001, pp. 62-66). This sometimes leads to a duplication in the provision of goods, which creates opportunities for beneficiaries to trade excess relief goods to traders or rebels. As various players independently look for their targets without systematic trafficking, coordination, and standardization of efforts, varying quality and quantity and in levels and coverage of assistance is experienced, which creates tensions among the recipient communities

Government's framework for relief and rehabilitation also lacks conflict containment (Pieterse 1998 :8) and is unable to ensure that areas being rehabilitated shall be freed from sporadic clashes. Thus, shelters constructed in areas where people feel unsafe were left uninhabited. The route for humanitarian assistance were not declared as conflict-free areas either, thereby allowing the warring parties to retain control over humanitarian assistance goods.

CONCLUSION: *The Resonating Myth of State Neutrality in Relief and Rehabilitation*

Foregoing considered, it is inadequate to end the discussion without asking, "why is the shape and structure of government's relief and rehabilitation strategy so bad?" The 'myth of state neutrality' provides a basis for analysis of this issue. While state neutrality is questioned in the context of the state not being able to protect the minority against aggression of the majority, the Mindanao case shows that most especially in ongoing conflicts where the state is a party to the conflict, the illusion that the state could be both neutral and effective in carrying out relief and rehabilitation could simply be trashed. To support this, let us first analyze strategically government's position in the conflict.

Government, as the defender of national (or the majority's) sovereignty and territorial integrity, is a major party in the armed conflict. To curb this call for independence and pacify

the rebel's interests, government moves from peace negotiations to militarization. At the same time, in the conflict analysis presented in Chapter 2, government played and continues to play an active role in watering the roots of the conflict in the first place. Government, in itself and through international cooperation, is unsuccessful in effectively arranging and re-arranging entitlement systems to manage a more equitable distribution of power and resources. Its institutions and subsystems also fail to provide even the basic services necessary for the Muslims and the people of Mindanao in general to live a life in dignity. It also broke the social contract that it is responsible of fulfilling by failing to facilitate power-sharing and genuine fiscal transfers. Finally, without any noticeable effort to lift the lingering anti-Muslim bias in society, and unable to control resource abuse of Mindanao by the Christian elites, it is seen by the Muslim minority as an instrument of Christian majoritarian tyranny.

In light of all these failures, I end up with two questions: *"How do we expect this government, given its current position in the conflict, to provide meaningful relief and rehabilitation to the war-devastated communities?"* *"How could we expect the Muslim communities in particular and civil society in general to be both receptive and cooperative to government initiatives?"* Relief assistance could be provided even if trust is not sufficiently built. However, for an integrated rehabilitation assistance to be effectively carried out, active participation of the grassroots and civil society (i.e. in terms of articulating their needs and sharing their capabilities and potentials) is crucial. Trust and legitimacy are also necessary to enjoin people's participation. Decades of government's incapacity to resolve the Mindanao conflict, facilitate the development of Mindanao, and at the least, efficiently provide relief and rehabilitation assistance devoid it of legitimacy and people's trust to further carry out relief and rehabilitation.

The analysis of issues and gaps enveloping government's relief and rehabilitation efforts in Mindanao provides evidence that it could not exercise relief and rehabilitation effectively and that this is influenced primarily by the inter-relationships of its position in the conflict and the relief and rehabilitation approach that it takes.

Government gives little attention in working out a more efficient institutional framework for relief and rehabilitation. For instance, government has not realized (or ignores) after years of implementation that its institutional make-up for relief and rehabilitation, which is technically subsumed under the military, is inefficient and represents a conflict of interest. Likewise, the

31

creation of new bodies for more effective coordination tries to project its commitment to address its shortcomings. However, the lack of concrete and quality outcomes over the years signifies that perhaps these bodies are constituted to create political positions rather than improving performance.

Is this solely due to poor governance and lack of political will or does it represent a political and military strategy? As the protector of national security, the government may believe that it is its mandate to retain military control of relief and rehabilitation in Mindanao, as part of its larger military strategy (i.e. to retain control over resources, coverage and direction). *Or is it a product of both?*

In terms of processes and operational framework, government does not differentiate between non-belligerent peacetime catastrophe with conflict-generated catastrophe. Thus, a conflict-generated catastrophe is given a peacetime relief and rehabilitation response. The adverse implications of this approach tells us that similar responses cannot be employed for totally different contexts. In a conflict environment, there is a complex interplay of actors and events that necessitates careful planning and strategizing. A relief and rehabilitation strategy that does not consider such differentiations poses a great danger of only further exacerbating the conflict.

Despite the huge amount of funds directed to relief and rehabilitation over the years, the quality of assistance provided to the communities has not improved, nor in the least, cover for the immediate needs of the affected communities. Instead, it created a notion in majoritarian society that due to Moro-initiated wars, Mindanao is exhausting government's scarce resources. Nonetheless, the international community continues to send financial aid to government to continue its provision of assistance. Whether this is done for pure altruism or as an instrument of political influence and manipulation is an interesting issue for further research. Further, direct assistance from some humanitarian organizations also creates inconsistencies and further challenges state capability and legitimacy. The interplay of all these issues further contribute to a kind of relief and rehabilitation assistance that not only fails to cater to the needs of affected communities but worse, breeds further grievances and tensions.

Despite these concerns, relief and rehabilitation is continually being (mis)used by government to exercise its sovereignty, display a 'concern for the minority', retain control and access to Mindanao's peoples, and demonstrate its "capability" to respond to the urgent needs of the most vulnerable. In many instances, government embarks on rehabilitation because it is claiming that it can already begin reviving the communities after successfully weakening the rebel forces and having full military control of the situation. Therefore, government's relief and rehabilitation program, no matter how inefficiently carried out, has instead concealed its capability to actually enact meaningful development in Mindanao and resolve the conflict therein.

While it is complex enough for relief and rehabilitation to be provided effectively and neutrally in the context of ongoing conflict, it becomes even more difficult and problematic if implemented by a warring party. This is because the provision of neutral and efficient relief and rehabilitation by the state is a myth unless it is provided in a post-conflict setting. However, conflict resolution may be necessary but not a sufficient condition in carrying out relief and rehabilitation efficiently. At the same time, relief and rehabilitation as a political strategy to conceal government's incompetence to resolve the conflict coupled with the huge amount of aid coming from the international community will make it difficult for government to veer away from this function.

Nonetheless, it is necessary for government to primarily focus on addressing the roots of conflict and finalize a binding peace agreement with the rebels. Until it has done so, government should for the meantime support and allow resources to be directed to civil society groups who are not politically and directly involved in the conflict to undertake a relief and rehabilitation strategy that is attuned to the Mindanao conflict.

CHAPTER 4

From a "No Man's Land" to a "Space for Peace"
Lessons from an Alternative Relief and Rehabilitation Strategy

A Fusion of Diverse Actors in Nalapaa

Nalapaan is composed of four sitios (communities), one of which is Muslim dominated, another one Christian dominated (San Roque), and the other two composed of the tri-peoples (Nalapaan Proper and Baruyan): the Muslims, Christians and the Lumads. Located along the Cotabato-Davao National Highway, Nalapaan is often severely hit by the armed conflict between government and the rebel groups. The wrath of the 2000 war was unleashed in the area when military planes took turns in dropping bombs on Camp Rajamuda, the third largest MILF camp in Pikit. MILF forces also retaliated with machine guns and mortars. When the war subsided, the municipality of Pikit, including barangay Nalapaan was declared as a "no man's land", due to the extent of destruction in the area. How Nalapaan is revived from a "No Man's Land" to a "Space for Peace" through the IRRP is the focus of this Chapter. Reflecting on potentials and limitations, this paper finds lessons from the alternative relief and rehabilitation strategy applied in Nalapaan, with the end in view of coming up with a humanitarian assistance strategy more tuned to the Mindanao conflict context.

For both the 1997 and the 2000 war in Mindanao, the Immaculate Conception Parish (ICP) of Pikit has been active in the provision of relief assistance. After the 1997 war, the Parish planned to spearhead an integrated rehabilitation project in the area. However, even before it took off, another war broke down in April of 2000. Pikit is one of the most embattled towns in Cotabato, where at least 40,000 individuals were displaced during the 2000 war. At the height of that conflict, the parish organized a disaster response team to provide relief assistance in evacuation centers, including those in Nalapaan[21].

---

[21] Interview with Father Roberto Layson, August 2002

IRRP Areas of Coverage

Kapatagan,
Lanao del Sur
15 Communities

Sapad, Matanog
Maguindanao
4 Communities

Nalapaan, Pikit
Cotabato
4 Communities

Kabacan and Matalam, Cotabato
9 Communities

Limbalod, Pagagawan
Maguindanao
5 Communities

Dungguan,
Carmen, Cotabato
5 Communities

Since the breakout of the 2000 war, TM also participated in the provision of relief assistance to Mindanao communities. While the war was still going on in August 2000, TM launched an integrated return and rehabilitation program (IRRP) and sought communities where the program could be implemented. TM is an initiative of Task Force Tabang Mindanaw (TFTM), a consortium of business, church and media foundations, assisted by charitable and banking institutions. To implement the IRRP, TM forges partnerships with religious partners and civilian volunteers within its target areas.

In partnership with the ICP of Pikit, TM initially facilitated a series of dialogue and consultations with local government units, military commanders, and the MILF forces. The evacuee families were also convened to identify their immediate needs, areas of origin, access to land and assessment of the status thereof, and to organize themselves into a community. Thereafter, a 'community declaration of peace' was facilitated, embodying the community's willingness to return to their former homes and to declare their own areas as spaces/sanctuaries of peace. The declaration served as an appeal to government and MILF to end the conflict in the area and respect the people's 'space for peace'[22]. In October 2000, the Nalapaan community was able to gain the assurance from the warring parties to relieve the area from hostilities and recognize the people's right to return to their communities. Binding this is a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed by the community, the military and the MILF.

> "When we launched the Space for Peace project in the four sitios in barangay Nalapaan, the people hung banners made of plastic laminated sacks, decorated the roads with flaglets and bandalas. It was more than a fiesta (feast). Muslim and Christian mothers together prepared the food while the men gathered coconut for snacks. The governor, military, MILF representative, local government officials, representatives from government line agencies and various local and international NGOs sat on the same table while they watched the presentation and listened to the testimonies of elders and the reading of the declaration of peace to the community. The drama presentation was very touching that the guests were in tears, including the MILF representative".
>
> Roberto Layson, OMI, Parish Priest of ICP, Pikit, Cotabato

Upon signing of the MOA, developmental activities were implemented in all four sitios of Nalapaan. These initially comprised capacity building and continued community organizing to ensure the appreciation and active participation of the community in implementation, evaluation and enhancement of the program. A comprehensive development program was instituted within the community through a series of planning workshops. This encouraged the community to become the main implementers of the program. Upon submission and approval of the community's development plan, the communities were trained to generate skills in managing the IRRP. Also integrated in the strategy is the classification and documentation of land tenure cases of the target communities and their resolution from the National Commission on Indigenous People's (NCIP) and NGO Forum. The program also incorporated sessions on the 'culture of peace' and other peace education modules, conflict

---

[22] Presently, TM uses the terminology "Sanctuaries of Peace", instead of Spaces for Peace for its rehabilitated communities. However, as the community is more comfortable with the latter, Nalapaan retained the label of "Space for Peace although it remains one of TM's recognized 'Sanctuaries of Peace'.

transformation and other topics to foster dialogue and understanding among Nalapaan's tri-peoples.

Further, basic services were provided. Totally damaged houses were accounted and replaced and repair of partially damaged houses were undertaken. School buildings and mosques were rebuilt and damaged facilities were replaced. Water systems development was undertaken through a partnership with ACEH and OXFAM-GB. A feeding program for children was organized on a regular basis of 5 times a week during the initial stages of rehabilitation. Seminar workshops on health education, childcare and alternative medicine are continually being undertaken with the assistance of government's Department of Health (DOH). Medical assistance was augmented by the reconstruction of the Notre Dame Hospital in Cotabato City. A training program for para-health workers was also conducted with the assistance of DOH and ACEH.

Formal and informal healing sessions of children and women were conducted to help them cope with the traumas of war. In the initial stage of program implementation when the community is still unable to harvest crops, 'food for work' was provided. Livelihood activities for women were also facilitated such as mat making, food processing, and vegetable cropping. Goats were also provided to the families to be bred.

Technical assistance on sustainable agriculture is presently being conducted to rebuild destroyed farms. Farm implements were provided together with seeds and carabaos. Training on organic farming as opposed to commercial farming, agro-forestry, reforestation, and environmental protection was also facilitated (See Annex 1: IRRP Components and Framework).

Nalapaan is presently being replicated in 38 other communities in partnership with government through a funding they received from the Philippine-Canada Development Fund (PCDF)[23]. The end objective is to provide a working model for other organizations who want to adopt an integrated approach to rehabilitate war-torn villages.

---

[23] A few months after the IRRP took off in Nalapaan, TM sought funding assistance from the PCDF to replicate the IRRP in other communities. Simultaneously, a relief and rehabilitation proposal was submitted by government to PCDF, which then agreed to provide funding for government and TM to undertake the IRRP jointly (Interviews with Ben Abadiano, Asec Ruel Lucentales, August and September 2000, respectively).

A Leap Forward in Relief and Rehabilitation

The strategy used for Nalapaan takes note of the communities' right to a safe return to their places of origin, rebuild their communities, and regain their lost human dignity after the war under the framework of 'integrated human development' and a 'peace process' (TM, 2000). Unlike the dominant strategy focused on "mercy", a broadly based rights approach adopted in Nalapaan aims to empower the people and make them part of the development process.

The IRRP's initial advantage was the employment of the "conflict containment approach" (Pieterse 1998:8), based on the protection of the "right of the communities to a safe return to their areas of origin/choice" [24]. Securing a community declaration of peace enabled the organizers to maximize the use of resources that could otherwise have been exhausted if relief was pursued for a longer time. Containment of the armed conflict in the area allowed relief resources to be deviated to the rehabilitation of the communities. At the same time, the declaration of peace encouraged the people to go back to their areas of origin and undertake community rehabilitation without fear of wasting whatever they will rebuild by sporadic clashes. The Nalapaan case showed the cruciality of the containment approach in rehabilitation, which is neglected in the dominant framework for humanitarian assistance in Mindanao.

Still rooted on a broadly based rights approach, the IRRP aims to provide a "respect for the human being" that goes beyond recognizing the right to life, which embodies the humanitarian assistance principle of humanity. As such, livelihood systems and inputs were provided, a sustainable agriculture system was institutionalized, educational, and public health facilities were built/rebuilt, psycho-social interventions were provided, and attempts to address severed social relations were conducted that all contribute to the respect of the human being.

---

[24] IRRP Management Plan, pp.4-5

The project also respected the people's choice to revert back to their areas of origin, where what was left of their livelihoods is accessible. Processing of land tenure cases prior to program implementation also helped in ensuring lands to till for the communities. This return framework ensured that shelters and facilities instituted in the rehabilitation area would not be put to waste.

The principles of neutrality and impartiality were also embodied as the provision of assistance veered away from political influences of the warring parties. Instead, the organizers enjoined the participation of all stakeholders in the project, including government and MILF. With the church as the main project facilitator, the project initially raised the issue of the tendency for partiality to Christian-dominated communities. However, the project was implemented according to the same framework across communities, regardless of ethnic composition. At first, the Christians were jealous because rehabilitation is being spearheaded by the church, "which should work only for Christians" also benefits the "enemies" or the Muslims. Community organizing and peace education sessions helped in making the people understand that one group's progress is tantamount to the community's progress. Also the participation of different non-church organizations showed the Christians that the project is not only the church's initiative but also a convergence of various humanitarian assistance institutions. The presence of a coordinative mechanism and a clearly laid out integrated framework allowed for coordination of actions, which mitigated some practical dilemmas in relief and rehabilitation. Also, community involvement in the project encouraged them to protect the resources involved in both relief and rehabilitation.

Exposure in relief during war gained the Parish the credibility as TM's main partner and primary facilitator of the IRRP in Nalapaan. Consultations of the needs and a survey of the people's assets and vulnerabilities during evacuation built camaraderie, mutual trust and respect of the beneficiaries. In the process, they also gained the support and participation of Muslims and Lumads. Trust and mutual respect was built not only among the beneficiaries in the evacuation centers, but in the international humanitarian assistance community and local government. By laying down a clear, integrated framework, it was able to find areas where local government and larger humanitarian assistance community could participate in. Thus, support was generated and the efforts of local NGOs, INGOs, volunteers from the beneficiaries, private sector, local government, military and MILF rebels were synthesized and thereby became complementary rather than conflicting. This was very crucial as it was

impossible for TM and the Parish to provide for an integrated rehabilitation by themselves after months of relief.

The Nalapaan case also applied an "inductive approach", contrary to a "deductive approach" (i.e. externally driven). De Zeeuw (2001 : 14-18) provides a critique of the deductive approach to humanitarian assistance and peace building. He notes that these are generally unable to connect available capacities to the identified needs. Too much reliance on the international community's humanitarian assistance initiatives could lead to a neglect of the needs and particularities of the local conflict situation to which assistance is channeled. Further, externally-driven approaches have the danger of assuming that strategies and actors (i.e. capacities for war and peace) is the same for all war-torn societies. As such, De Zeeuw (2001) emphasizes the value of 'inductive approaches' which shall focus on the conflict and aims to "identify appropriate avenues for external action" that may come out from these. In this approach, international assistance is geared to support the peace process based on local initiatives and locally identified needs.

Supporting De Zeeuw's assertion, following an inductive approach worked well because it is able to include containment: AFP and MILF were enjoined to cooperate in conflict containment through the request of the grassroots themselves. It would not have been possible if government spearheaded it, because it will be seen as biased to represent the military, or if it were the international community who initiated because they don't have the necessary connections with the rebel leaders. Further, LGUs were mobilized to participate as the community itself showed perseverance in pursuing and implementing the project. Participation of different civil society groups also helped in addressing funding and resource issues. They also served as active and receptive participants during the 'cultures of peace' and healing sessions that helped the civil society organizers to understand better their needs and aspirations. Participation of local government officials who are more familiar with the military and rebel group leaders operating in the area helped in encouraging the armed groups to sign an agreement of cessation of hostilities and respect this agreement. This resolved the problem of residents who refuse to go home for fear of the presence of armed vigilantes. A future-oriented programming (i.e. aim for normalcy and sustainable livelihoods) attracted the cooperation of various stakeholders. Through such framework, the IRRP was able to enjoin the international community to participate and coordinate closely with the community leaders for more synchronized delivery of inputs.

The decision to work with local structures maintained a high degree of transparency in dealings and established a system of protection that did not rely on arms. The focus on building the grassroots' capacity also helped in avoiding local power plays of the local government elites. The role of middle players in the community (those recognized by the community and by the major players in the conflict) proved to be important in brokering negotiations and ensuring cooperation of various stakeholders.

The community ownership of the project also encouraged them to participate in planning and decision-making on project components and implementation thereof. Consultation of project beneficiaries prior to implementation was proven to be crucial in avoiding wastage and allowing more strategic and appropriate interventions to be delivered.

The project's focus on the community as project implementers supports Anderson's (1999: 67-76) "Do No Harm" approach which provides a framework for strengthening local capacities for peace and weakening local capacities for war in providing humanitarian assistance that avoids doing further harm. Anderson emphasizes the need to take note of local capacities for peace, which she terms as *"categories and connectors"* coming from systems and institutions (i.e. markets that connect people, infrastructure and communication system), attitudes (i.e. some individuals still carry non-war attitudes), shared values and common experiences as basis for linkage and connection among people on differing sides. At the same time, she emphasizes caution against local capacities for war, which she calls the sources of *"tension and dividers"* emanating from the same elements: systems and institutions (religion and religious institutions, armies and gangs, systems of discrimination), attitudes and actions (violence and prejudice), conflicting values and experiences that lead to differences in perceptions of right and wrong (i.e. justice and injustice). Community organizing and consultations facilitated learning from the perspectives of the beneficiaries about the possible "connectors" and "dividers". The major role that the grassroots played in project implementation is the provision of local knowledge and experiences necessary to find local capacities for peace and war. As participants during the provision of relief and the early stages of rehabilitation, they served as "connectors" by helping mitigate the negative unintended effects of relief and rehabilitation. Peace education sessions also helped in uncovering connectors and local capacities for peace. For instance, a system for working together of the tri-peoples was created as a product of these sessions.

Despite the breakthroughs, the IRRP was not without pitfalls and Nalapaan was not transformed into a perfectly rehabilitated community either:

First, the Nalapaan case shows that provision of livelihood inputs is not tantamount to efficient output. What is required is a detailed assessment and analysis of the needs and capabilities of the community and the patterning of the livelihood inputs to these needs and capabilities (i.e. more carabaos could have been provided to farming communities instead of goats). It is therefore necessary for the organizers to re-assess not only the needs but the skills and capabilities of the community.

> In Nalapaan, most women were provided a goat each to be bred. However, when asked where the goats are now, the women replied that they have sold them at the market because that way they will earn immediate money. They also mentioned that they were not goat breeders before, but farmers. However, the carabaos provided were "not enough", and some are "still very young" to service their farming needs *(Interview with residents of sitio Nalapaan Proper, August-September 2000)*

Difficulty was encountered in enjoining the entire community to participate in healing sessions, trainings, and peace seminars especially that this has no immediate and tangible benefit to them. Some residents informed that while they are aware of 'cultures of peace' seminars, they could not attend them due to the need to address household chores or earn some income. Further, in conflict contexts, some need to find lost relatives, or are busy trying to restore previous livelihoods, or are constrained by war traumas to actively participate in community activities. A certain level of difficulty was also encountered in enjoining the people to adapt organic farming instead of their old commercial farming system. At the same time, while such interventions from civil society are notable, the beneficiaries' own willingness to share and participate (i.e. healing sessions) also determines more active participation and successful results. This is because in certain cases, unwelcome interventions could only pose more problems. This is why thorough assessment of needs should be complemented with sensitive strategies (i.e. regular and informal community visits) that will encourage the traumatized or severely affected to become more receptive to such interventions. TM's integrated relief and rehabilitation also created tensions and jealousies from other communities who were not able to experience equally comprehensive rehabilitation packages (i.e. government beneficiaries).

While specific attention was given to women (i.e. organized them and provided their own opportunity for livelihood), difficulty was encountered to enjoin some of the women's participation as they are still expected to primarily serve as care-givers in the family that discourages them to actively pursue livelihood projects. Further, while the needs of the children were specifically addressed, the IRRP has no specific mention of an intervention directed to the aged or the handicapped, which are also vulnerable sectors in the community.

The IRRP is now being replicated in other communities in partnership with government. This could be seen in two ways: 1) as an opportunity to rehabilitate communities under an integrated framework that allows meaningful partnership of government and civil society; and/or, 2) as a dangerous tool for manipulation and intervention of government. The previous chapter has established that government, when it embarks on relief and rehabilitation, cannot relieve itself from the inherent biases accompanying its being a major party in the armed conflict. This position of government in the unresolved conflict creates doubts about government sincerity and capability in undertaking relief and rehabilitation effectively. Partnership with government could also threaten TM's capability of actively advocating for the ultimate resolution of the conflict.

Moreover, there is a need for the IRRP to systematize further their peace education modules, regularize meetings for area coordinators, and provide a follow-through mechanism to not only monitor but further enhance the quality of life of the people in Nalapaan. As TM has already achieved "completion" of IRRP implementation in Nalapaan, it tends to focus on the replication of the IRRP in other communities and neglect the monitoring of those already rehabilitated. While TM has allowed the community to gain ownership of the project, there are certain areas that need constant follow-through interventions (i.e. cultures of peace seminars, monitoring of military and MILF cooperation, livelihood training, and sustainable agriculture).

Conclusion

This paper veers away from considering the Nalapaan case as a success story to avoid a static view of development initiatives. Instead, it is considered here as a promising case because it addresses what John Paul Laderach calls as the "justice gap" which represents a neglect of

43

social and economic justice as a component of rehabilitation initiatives aligned to peace-building (Laderach 1999 cited in Fortman 2000:7). Situations of violent conflict imply original injustices at its roots while the violence of war creates worse injustices. In Mindanao, original and violence-created injustices pertain to the non-recognition of human rights and human development. These also underpin the failures in government's dominant framework for relief and rehabilitation. The IRRP in Nalapaan addresses the justice gap by going beyond reducing direct violence and employing an integrated process based on human development and human rights. This makes the IRRP as a potentially effective strategy as it integrates within its components ways that extend beyond the concern to the "right to life" but striving to provide a kind of rehabilitation that rebuilds the community, not only its infrastructures but livelihoods and severed social relations. Such rehabilitation strategy finds its way to create opportunities for re-establishing an environment more conducive to peace.

Fundamental in Nalapaan is putting people at the center of relief and rehabilitation. Despite certain shortcomings, this allowed for interventions that are more aligned to the people's needs, entitlements, and aspirations, thereby creating more meaning in rehabilitation for them. Further, sustainability of the project is realizable when anchored on sustained dialogue, consultation, and education, especially if the project was to be taken over by the community. Sincerity of the people to rebuild their communities generates support and creates greater chances for project success. Even if there are untoward incidents beyond the control of the community, the effort of the community to resolve these remains strong.

The project opened various opportunities for different groups to work together for a common goal. Many in government and humanitarian assistance community affirmed the IRRP's significant role in bringing hope to war-torn villages. The framework itself inspired people to improve their efforts towards a more comprehensive relief and rehabilitation strategy.

These breakthroughs address some of the structural shortcomings arising from government's framework for relief and rehabilitation in Mindanao in particular, and in the way the national government treats the Mindanao conflict in general. Notwithstanding its potentials, the Nalapaan case should be seen as embedded in a dynamic process of reform and development,

the ultimate success of which will continually be influenced by the ongoing interplay of anti-reform and pro-reform actors within Philippine society.

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION

Building an Effective Relief and Rehabilitation Strategy for Mindanao

My field research in Mindanao validated the commonly-held assumption that something is erroneous about the way relief and rehabilitation is generally being carried out therein. Relief and rehabilitation assistance were being provided in a piecemeal basis and in many ways feed the war and further exacerbate tensions. While international and local humanitarian organizations take a role within this framework, initiatives were uncoordinated, irregular, and inconsistent, thereby carrying adverse implications.

However, my Mindanao visit also led me to discover a more interesting puzzle. In the midst of these failures, certain communities were carrying out a potentially workable rehabilitation strategy founded on human rights and human development. The families were able to go back to their places of origin and are starting to regain their livelihood in areas, which they themselves declared as peace zones and where a collaboration of various humanitarian assistance organizations, the warring parties, and the local governments, was made possible.

The previous chapters dwelt on these puzzles by explaining the failures and what constitutes the promising cases. Learning from these experiences, a framework for building a relief and rehabilitation strategy more tuned to the Mindanao conflict is outlined into six major points:

- *Strategies are better than Approaches*

This paper emphasizes the need for real strategies, and not just approaches, that embody clear principles and integrated, carefully planned, and appropriate systems and processes. It implies the need to re-examine the principles (i.e. humanity, neutrality, and human rights) underlying and guiding the provision of relief and rehabilitation. If not, gaps therefrom could lead to further entitlement demands and grievances that could breed further conflicts.

Relief and rehabilitation could never be carried out effectively in Mindanao as long as it is subsumed under the present general disaster management framework. There are two concerns here: 1) that a general disaster management framework designed for peace-time catastrophe is both inadequate and perilous when applied in complex emergencies such as the Mindanao conflict; and, 2) that such an inadequate approach is worsened by being carried out under the auspices of government's military arm. This narrow approach to relief and rehabilitation is obliquely motivated by government's position as a warring party in the conflict. Taken in a wider context, this implies that the shape and outcome of relief and rehabilitation initiatives are greatly influenced by the strategic position of the actors in the conflict. This leads to several implications. It challenges the liberal state theory that "the state is a neutral actor and is capable of maintaining its impartiality in respect of the good (questions about what ends are worth pursing)" and that "government precludes the desire to help one way of life over another as a justification of its action" (Kymlicka, 1990 cited in Kissane, 2000:1). Contrary thereto, this paper's findings confronts the capability of governments to carry out relief and rehabilitation (which is considered a "good" as an altruistic undertaking) effectively and neutrally when it is a party to an ongoing conflict. In effect, this also implies the need for humanitarian aid organizations to rethink what Ofstad (2000) calls as the "traditional development agency approach" of providing government-friendly development assistance which, although intended to be neutral, could "disregard the need for balanced development and any extra-ordinary measures" necessary for conflict areas, and at the same time, fail to counter the "fungibility" of aid" [25] (Ofstad 2000:4).

Instead, relief and rehabilitation should be both development and peace-oriented. A recognition of the Mindanao people's right to development is necessary. Those who argue against development should realize that there are alternatives to mainstream development. Alternative development strategies that incorporates local needs and capacities while being based on human rights and human development are most important especially in the context of complex emergencies. Some would question how development could be implemented in Mindanao if development is indirectly seen to contribute to the conflict roots. Chapter 2 has

---

[25] As aid funding carries an element of subsidy to the over-all government budget, these funds enable government to redirect their own resources to other priorities (Ofstad 2000:7).

shown that it is not development per'se but the kind of development that is problematic and marginalizing for the Muslims that triggered their grievances against the state. Therefore, what is necessary is a kind of relief and rehabilitation that: 1) provides an opportunity for addressing entitlement failures by facilitating access to resources, fruits of production and to exchange and distribution; 2) addresses the 'justice gap'; 3) provides for both immediate and special needs; 4) institutionalizes balanced and comprehensive initiatives that looks for opportunities towards longer-term sustainable development; and, 5) supports a movement towards peace. It is therefore implicit that humanitarian aid should be directed from the "traditional" towards a more "pro-active" [26] approach, those which supports the kind of initiatives carrying the above components.

- *Fostering Inductive and Meaningful Partnerships*

Chapters 3 and 4 have shown the cruciality of a clear system of partnership within the various actors (local and international) and stakeholders in harnessing resources necessary for a promising rehabilitation strategy. This is onerous, especially in building trust both with the international humanitarian assistance community that carries Western standards and processes of implementation, and with the grassroots, who specifically in conflict contexts, are most vulnerable. In Nalapaan, such partnership was actualized by being able to come up with a future-oriented, integrated relief and rehabilitation strategy that clearly sets out opportunities for their participation. At the same time, the credibility and legitimacy of the project initiators played an important role in forging effective partnerships.

- *Value of Building Local Capacities*

The potentials of local capacities as a crucial ingredient to an effective relief and rehabilitation strategy is highlighted in this paper. One of the grassroots potentials is their immersion in the conflict context, as well as their potentials for being 'local capacities for peace' themselves that builds an approach capable of curbing certain negative unintended effects of relief and rehabilitation. The urgency and importance of engaging in a relationship with communities at the grassroots level, and involving them as partners in rebuilding their communities contributed in the relative success of the IRRP in Nalapaan. As dialogue and the peace

---

[26] Ofstad (2000: 5-6) gives a more detailed discussion of these approaches.

process was brought down at the grassroots level, rehabilitation facilitated the creation of an environment that counters the "degenerative cycle of grievance and violence" [27].

▪ *Addressing the Roots of the Conflict*

Relief and rehabilitation, to be carried out effectively, ultimately requires a strategy that is cautious of not exacerbating the conflict's roots, but instead creates an environment conducive to peace. Complementary thereto should be a wider initiative to attack the conflict's roots.

Peace-making in Mindanao has excessively focused on short-term cessation of hostilities between the parties, without addressing the functioning of the economy and dealing with structural inequalities persisting therein for decades that underlie the conflict's roots. If these are not addressed, grievances are retained and even multiply, making hollow peace negotiations and dialogue serve as mere hiatus' within a never-ending cycle of violence.

Promising cases such as Nalapaan requires containment of the conflict not only within the 'spaces for peace', but in the entire Mindanao. This means that the people of Nalapaan cannot survive within their peace zones alone. The community will have to leave their area for necessary activities that they have to do if they were to enjoy their rights and freedoms and if they were to take part in the development process. In order for the spaces of peace to be replicated in a wider context, an ultimate resolution of the conflict will be required.

Addressing the conflict's roots requires a functional state that understands the ideologies and demands of rebel groups, addresses structural injustices, and formulates a practicable solution acceptable to both parties. Also crucial is questioning the state's legitimacy among groups and areas under its control based on its performance' (Douma, et.al., 1999). To regain legitimacy, government needs to strengthen its institutional capacity towards such that goes beyond adequately delivering goods and services to the deprived areas but extends to enacting non-exclusionary laws and establishment of effective institutions for power-sharing. It also necessitates a functional economy that addresses the socio-economic inequalities created by previous regimes and by the persistence of conflict. This includes the need for a coordinated

---

[27] Adopted from Goodland and Hulme, 1999, cited in De Zeeuw, 2001)

regional development that makes sure those areas far from the capital city like Mindanao are not economically deprived. Noting the role that the breakdown of the social contract played in the conflict, reconstruction must rebuild this social contract by giving the rebels and potential rebels something akin to fiscal and resource transfers, which shall necessarily entail sincere commitments. The state and the international community needs to take on its role of institutionalizing mechanisms for a just re-arrangement of entitlements that current systems of access, exchange and distribution cannot do. There is also a need for government and external development agencies to enhance local capacities in the areas of conflict resolution, livelihoods and enterprise development, and peace building at the community-level.

The 'exact administration of justice' (Adam Smith cited in Fortman 2000a: 12-13) is also crucial in any rehabilitation that aims to incorporate a peace building effort. The role of law here is to keep the community together through a "well-ordered and fair dispute settlement which implies an adequate separation of powers, a state subject to law, and a recognition of fundamental rights" (Fortman 2000a:13). Moreover, the state should be responsible for the provision of collective goods and services and for the protection of the people in socially, economically, and politically weak positions through mechanisms that will effect their empowerment (i.e. transfer of income).

At the same time, essential is a pro-active civil society. This shall include NGOs or community-based Muslim groups that will undertake consultations about the needs of deprived Muslims aside from those represented by the MNLF and the MILF. Government's solution is to forge peace agreements with these two major groups without having a full understanding of the entitlement demands of the many other Muslims who may not be affiliated with the MILF and the MNLF. Initiatives of civil society to promote dialogue and inter-ethnic harmony are still limited in scope and impact and have yet to penetrate communities. As competing groups are vulnerable to external manipulation because of a weak information base, the media, and the academe should go hand in hand in correcting the existing prejudices of the tri-peoples, as well as the many misinterpretations and misunderstandings of the Mindanao conflict that only reinforce further conflicts among the Filipinos.

While direct confrontation of the roots of the conflict is ultimately the ideal, initiatives such as the IRRP in Nalapaan are inspiring movements that embody our clamor for alternatives within the mainstream relief and rehabilitation approaches being carried out. Being a local initiative, Nalapaan carries a huge amount of potential for representing the presence of pro-reform and people-oriented movements within a divided society, which aims to not only question but improve the way relief and rehabilitation is generally being carried out in Mindanao.

Through such movements, attitudes and perceptions of people are changed, not only about rehabilitation but also about peace and war. Rehabilitation of Nalapaan was actualized by first attaining a cessation of hostilities in the area through the clamor of the people themselves. This implies that a cessation of violence is the primary condition before any integrated rehabilitation could be effectively carried out. If the community experiences self-improvement through rehabilitation initiatives that genuinely aim to revert them back to "normalcy", if not even better conditions, regardless of ethnicity then the community realizes more the value of ending the war or ending their support to war. This could, in a wider perspective, create a domino effect that could spread within and across communities, by realizing that integrated rehabilitation could also be replicated in other communities but only if cessation of hostilities is facilitated. If certain failed entitlement systems are addressed by rehabilitation especially of Muslim communities, the benefits of ending the war to facilitate rehabilitation may weigh more than pursuing the war. Thus, initiatives such as that which flourished in Nalapaan paves the way to insight the people's clamor for peace and change their attitude towards war— a great leap in altering unconstructive norms that contribute to the cycle of violence in Mindanao.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abinales, Patricio (2000). **Making Mindanao. Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation State.** Ateneo De Manila University Press: Quezon City, Philippines.

Adams and Bradbury1995). **Conflict and Development: Organizational Adaptation in Conflict Situations.** An Oxfam Working Paper. Oxfam GB.

Addison, Tony and Murshed, Mansoob (2001). **From Conflict to Reconstruction : Reviving the Social Contract.** World Institute for Development Economic Research (WIDER) Discussion paper No. 2001/48

Anderson, Mary B (1999). **Do No Harm : How Aid Can Support Peace-or War.** Colorado: Lynne Reiner Publishers, Inc. Boulder.

Anderson, Mary B. and Woodrow, Peter J (1998). **Rising from the Ashes-Development Strategies in times of Disaster.** Lynne Riener Inc., Boulder.

Apthorpe, Raymond, ed. (1998). *Towards Emergency Humanitarian Aid.* **Development.** Issue No. 12, National Center for Development Studies Asia Pacific Press

Apthorpe, Raymond (1997). *"Some Relief from Development: Humanitarian Emergency Aid in the Horn of Africa (including Sudan), Rwanda and Liberia".* **The European Journal of Development Research,** 9 (2): 83-106.

Arellano, Ernesto, Jr. (2000). **Conflict and Complexity : A Framework for More Adequate Description and Responses for the Conflict in Mindanao.** MA Thesis, ISS.

Asian Disaster Reduction Center, ADRC (1999). **Philippines. National Disaster Reduction: National Disaster Response and International Cooperation.**
http:/www.adrc.or.jp/countryreport/PHL/index.html

Bakewell, Oliver (1999). *"Uncovering Local Perspectives on Humanitarian Assistance and its Outcomes"* **Evaluating Humanitarian Aid: Politics, Perspectives and Practices.** Proceedings of a Workshop. Rural Development Sociology Group, Wageningen University, Netherlands

Bryer, David and Cairns, Edmund (1997). *"For better? For worse? Humanitarian aid in conflict"* in **Development in Practice,** Oxfam, November.

Christoplos, Ian (1998). *"Humanitarianism and Public Service Integrity: How do we get from here to there?"* **The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance** [Internet]
Available in: Wysiwyg://mainFrame.4/http://www.jha.ac/articles/a041.htm. Accessed on 7 November 2002.

Clapham, Andrew (2000). **Human Rights and the Prevention of Humanitarian Emergencies.** Helsinki: World Institute for Development Economics Research, Working Paper No. 211.

Deng, Francis. **The Challenges of Famine Relief. Emergency Operations in the Sudan.** The Brooking Institution, Washington

De Zeeuw (2001). **Building Peace in War Torn Societies: From Concept to Strategy.** Research Project on Rehabilitation, Sustainable Peace and Development. Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael' Conflict Research Unit.. Clingendael, The Hague The Netherlands. [Internet] www.clingendael.nl.cru

De Zeeuw and Frerks (2000). **Proceedings of the International Seminar on the Political Economy of Internal Conflict.** Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingandael Conflict Research Unit, The Netherlands. [Internet] www.clingendael.nl.cru

Diaz, Patricio (2000). *'Compensatory Justice For Mindanao'.* Dugong Mindanaw section of the **Philippine Daily Inquirer,** July 15, 2000 (formerly under the title *'The 6 Buts'.*) www.inq7.net.

Douma, Pyt (2001). **Political Economy of Internal Conflict: A Review of Contemporary Trends and Issues.** Working Paper 1. Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingandael Conflict Research Unit, Clingendael, The Netherlands. [Internet] www.clingendael.nl.cru

Douma, Pyt, et.al (1999). **Executive Summary. Major Findings of the Research Project 'Causes of Conflict in the Third World'.** Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael' Conflict Research Unit.. Clingendael, The Hague The Netherlands. [Internet] www.clingendael.nl.cru

Douma, Pyt. et.al. (1999). **"Executive Summary of the Major Findings of the Research Project "Causes of Conflict in the Third World".** Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingandael Conflict Research Unit, Clingendael, The Netherlands. [Internet] www.clingendael.nl.cru

DSWD (1998). **Briefing on DSWD Disaster Management Program.** Quezon City, DSWD Social Protection Bureau

DSWD (2001). **Administrative Order No. 71.** Minimum Standard Rates of Assistance to Victims of Disasters, Distressed and Displaced Individuals and Families in Crisis Situation.

El Hajj, Naglaa (2000). **The Role of Humanitarian Assistance in Facilitating Peace Process Initiatives in Sudan.** Thesis submitted to the ISS.

Executive Order No. 2 (2001). **Creating an Inter-Agency Committee for Relief, Rehabilitation and Development of Areas Affected by Armed Conflicts in Mindanao.** Malacañan, Manila.

Executive Order No. 261 (2000). **Constituting the Mindanao Coordinating Council.** Malacañan, Manila

Ferrer, Miriam-Coronel (1999). *Introduction, The Plurality of Coexistence on Southeast Asia in Fianza,* IN: **Sama-Sama : Facets of Ethnic Relations in Southeast Asia.** Ferrer, ed. Third World Studies Center : Quezon City, Philippines, pp. 1-20.

Fianza, Myrthena (1999). *"Conflicting Land Use and Ownership Patterns and the Moro Problem in Southern Philippines"* in **Sama-Sama : Facets of Ethnic Relations in Southeast Asia.** Ferrer, Miriam Coronel ed. Third World Studies Center : Quezon City, Philippines. pp. 21-70.

Fortman (2002). *Conflict Matrix.*

53

Fortman, Bas De Gaay (2000a). **Peace in the 21ˢᵗ Century. Upholding Humanity : Challenges of Peace in the 21ˢᵗ Century.** Paper presented in the Seminar : Peace in the 21ˢᵗ Century : Between the Supranational and the Grassroots, Wageningen, the Netherlands.

Fortman, Bas De Gaay (2000b). *"Elections and Civil Strife: Some Implications for International Election Observation"* IN Abbink, Jon and Hesseling Gerti (eds.) **Election Observation and Democratization in Africa.** London:Macmillan Press Ltd.

Fortman, Bas de Gaay (1999). *"Beyond Income Distribution : An Entitlement System Approach to the Acquirement Problem"*. IN: **The Economics of Income Distribution: Heterodox Approaches.** J. van der Linden, et.al. (eds.) Chelternham: Edward Elgar.

In Fortman, Bas de Gaay (1997). *"Doomed to passivity? An exploration of origins of intra-state violence and possibilities for constructive intervention"* IN: **Internal conflicts, security and development",** Fortman and Velhuis (eds.), RAWOO lectures and seminar, Publication No. 14, pp. 5-14

Fortman, Bas De Gaay and Kortekaas, Chris (1996). **Collective Violence within States in a Political Economy Perspective.** Paper presented for the 46ᵗʰ Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs Security Cooperation and Disarmament: The Unfinished Agenda for the 1990s, Lahti Finland. Pugwash Meeting No. 218.

Fortman, Bas de Gaay (1994). *"Sitting Back in Horror: Intra-State Conflict in a Global Context"* in **ISS Alumni Magazine,** No. 2. pp. 16-19.

Frerks, Georg and Hilhorst Dorothea (1999). *"Issues in Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance"* IN **Evaluating Humanitarian Aid: Politics, Perspectives and Practices.** Proceedings of a Workshop. Rural Development Sociology Group, Wageningen University, Netherlands

Gasper, Des (1999). *"Beyond the Project Enclave: Questions and Warnings for Monitoring and Evaluation of Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies"* IN **Evaluating Humanitarian Aid: Politics, Perspectives and Practices.** Proceedings of a Workshop. Rural Development Sociology Group, Wageningen University, Netherlands

Gates, Scott (2002). **Empirically Assessing the Causes of War.** Paper presented on the Economic Research Seminar, ISS, The Hague, The Netherlands.

Guttierez, Eric, et.al. **Rebels, Warlords and Ulama. A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines** (Gaerlan and Stankovitch, ed. Quezon City, Philippines: Institute for Popular Democracy.

Hutchinson and Smith, eds. **Ethnicity.** Oxford: Oxford University Press

International Alert, FEWER and Saferworld (2001). **Development in Conflict: A Seven Step Tool for Planners** Version 1. www.international-alert.org.

Ippadi, Parthasarathy (1998). **Anthropometric and Household Food Security Survey among displaced Families in Central Mindanao** conducted by OXFAM-GB.

Jayme, Catherine. **"The Challenge for Peace in Mindanao:Counter Insurgency Policies of the Estrada and Arroyo Governments for Southern Philippines".** Maxwell Review. Student.maxwell.syr.edu/maxreview/papers/jayme.pdf

Jubair, Salah (1999). **Bangsamoro: A Nation Under Endless Tyranny.** IQ Marin SDN BHD, Kuala Lumpur Malaysia.

Kissane, Bill (2002). **The Chimera of State Neutrality in a Secularizing Ireland.** Paper for Copenhagen Joint Session on Church and State in Europe.

Klerk, Ton (1999). *"Evaluations of Humanitarian Assistance: A Practitioner's Point of View"* IN **Evaluating Humanitarian Aid: Politics, Perspectives and Practices.** Proceedings of a Workshop. Rural Development Sociology Group, Wageningen University, Netherlands

Layson, Roberto, OMI (unpublished). **Tri People History of Mindanao.** Paper used for Cultures of Peace Seminar in baranggay Nalapaan.

Layson, Roberto, OMI. (unpublished). **Dialogue and Peace-building in Mindanao.** Paper used for Cultures of Peace Seminar in baranggay Nalapaan.

Layson, Roberto, OMI. (unpublished). **In War, The Real Enemy is the War Itself.** Paper used for Cultures of Peace Seminar in baranggay Nalapaan.

Macrae, Joanna, et.al (1997). *"Conflict, the Continuum and Chronic Emergencies: A Critical Analysis of the Scope for Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Planning in Sudan".* **Disasters,** 21(3): 223-243.

Mc Kenna (1998). **Muslim Rulers and Rebels : Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in Southern Philippines.** Manila, Philippines: Anvil Publishing, Inc.

Mercado, Eliseo (2000) **"The Five Basic Issues Confronting Mindanao vis a vis the Roles Played by the Civil Society".** Address given to the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, The Netherlands on 29 September. www.philsol.nl/fora/NL00a-Mercado.htm.

Moore, David (2000). *"Humanitarian Agendas, State Reconstruction and Democratization Processes in War Torn societies".* **Journal of Humanitarian Assistance.** Working Paper No. 24. http://www.jha.ac/articles/u024.htm.

Moore, Jonathan, ed. (1998). **Hard Choices. Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention.** Boston: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Muslim, Macapado (1994). **The Moro armed struggle in the Philippines. The Non- Violent Autonomy Alternative.** Office of the President and Mindanao State University, Philippines.

NDCC. **National Disaster Management Plan.**

NDCC (2002). **A Presentation on the Philippines Emergency Management System.** Presented in the Joint National Disaster Coordinating Council Technical Working Group and National Relief and Rehabilitation Services Committee Meeting, NDMC Conference Room, Quezon City.

National Statistical Coordination Board (2000). **Economic Indicators.** Makati City: undated.

NRC (Norwegian Refugee Council)/Global IDP Project (2001). **Global IDP Database : Profile of Internal Displacement : Philippines. A Compilation of the Information available in the Global IDP Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council (as of 17 December 2001).** www.idpproject.org.

Ofstad, Arve (2000). **Countries in Violent Conflict and Aid Strategies: The case of Sri Lanka.** Chr. Michelsen Institute Development Studies and Human Rights, Working Paper 2000:18.

Pausewang, Siegfried (1999). **Humanitarian assistance during conflict in a stateless society: the case of Somalia.** Chr. Michelsen Institute Development Studies and Human Rights, Working Paper 1999:5.

Pirotte, Claire, et.al. (1999). **Responding to Emergencies and Fostering Development The Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid**. London: Zed Books.

Presidential Decree No. 1566 (1978). **Strengthening the Philippine Disaster Control, Capability and Establishing the National Program on Community Disaster Preparedness.** Malacañan, Manila.

Quimpo, Nathan (2001). **Options in Pursuit of a Just, Comprehensive and Stable Peace in the Southern Philippines.** Asian Survey.

Quinn, Mick (2002). **More than Implementers Civil Society in Complex Emergencies.** A Discussion Paper. International Alert, London.

Quitoriano, Ed (2002). **Poverty in Central Mindanao.** An Oxfam Study (unpublished)

Pieterse, Jan Nederveen (1998): *"Humanitarian Intervention and Beyond-Introduction"* in Nederveen Pieterse, Jan (ed.): **World Orders in the Making-Humanitarian Intervention and Beyond.** Macmillan Press, Basingstoke and London, pp. 3-23.

Risgallah, Fouad (1999). **Alternative Approach for Humanitarian Relief Assistance Response in Complex Political Emergency.** Thesis submitted to the ISS.

Roe, Emery and van Eeten, Michel (1999). *"The Threshold-Based Resource Management Approach to Humanitarian Assistance in Emergency Situations"* IN **Evaluating Humanitarian Aid: Politics, Perspectives and Practices.** Proceedings of a Workshop. Rural Development Sociology Group, Wageningen University, Netherlands

Philippine Local Government Code (1991).

Sen, Amartya (1999). **Development as Freedom.** Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sengupta, Arjun (2000). **The Right to Development as a Human Right** (for clarification if published)

Scholdan, Bettina (2000). **Addressing the Root Causes: Relief and development assistance between peacebuilding and preventing refugee flows**. Journal of Humanitarian Assistance. www.jha.ac/articles/a058.htm

Slim, Hugo (1997a). *"International Humanitarianism's Engagement with Civil Wars in the 1990s: A Glance at Evolving Practice and Theory"*. **Journal for Humanitarian Assistance.** http://www.jha.ac/Ref/r021.htm.

Slim, Hugo (1997b). *"Doing the Right Thing: Relief Agencies, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Responsibility in War"* . **Disasters**, 19 (2).

Slim, Hugo (1997c). *"Relief Agencies and Moral Standing in War: Principles of Humanity, Neutrality, Impartiality and Solidarity"*. **Development in Practice**, Oxfam, November.

Tabang Mindanaw Homepage. http://home.mindgate.net/taban...danaw

Tabang Mindanaw (2000). **Integrated Return and Rehabilitation Program (IRRP) for the Civilian War Victims of Mindanao Management Plan** (unpublished)

Tabang Mindanaw (2000). "*Pikit.*" **Tabang Evacuees!!** Nos. 7 vol 1 21-28 June.

Tabang Mindanaw. **Building Sanctuaries of Peace in Mindanao Integrated Return and Rehabilitation Program.** (unpublished)

Tabang Mindanaw (2001). **Sanctuaries of Peace Annual Report** (unpublished)

Tabang Mindanaw (2001). **IRRP Field Visit Report Nos. 3 and 4**(unpublished)

Tabang Mindanaw (2002). **IRRP Second Quarter Progress Report** (April-June)

Tabang Mindanaw (2002). **"Kawayan Alang sa Kalinaw"** Tambayayong January-May 3 (1).

Tabang Mindanaw (2002). **Panag-Ambit sa Kalinaw.** Tambayayong, 2 (2) May –September 2001.

Tabang Mindanaw (unpublished). **Training-Workshop Towards a Culture of Peace.** (Pre-tested Modules Towards a Culture of Peace in the four Sitios of Nalapaan) COP Program in the Spaces for Peace.

Taillant, Jorge Daniel (2002). **A Rights Based Approach to Development.** Presentation to the World Social Forum. Seminar on Globalization and Human Dignity, Porto Alegre.

Tadem, Eduardo C. (1992) "*The Political Economy of Mindanao: An Overview*". IN Turner, Mark et.al. (eds) **Mindanao: Land of Unfulfilled Promise.** Philippines, Quezon City: New Day Publishers, pp. 7-30

Tan, Samuel (2000). **Understanding the Mindanao Conflict: Mindanao at the Crossroad.** Paper presented at the Cotabato Peace and Development Forum. www.inq7.net

Turner, Mark and Lulu Respall Turner. "*Introduction:Images of Mindanao*" IN Turner, Mark et.al. (eds) **Mindanao: Land of Unfulfilled Promise.** Philippines, Quezon City: New Day Publishers, pp. 1-6.

Umali, Tonisito M.C. (2000). **Replicable Models in Conflict Resolution.** Paper presented during the ASPAP Conference and General Assembly entitled " Effective Governance for Peace and Development. Manila Room, Hasmnin Hotel Polytechnic University of the Philippines 19-20 October 2000.

United Nations (2000). **Weekly Update on the Humanitarian Situation in Mindanao,** prepared by the Office of the UN Resident Coordinator.

United Nations. **Declaration on the Right to Development** www.hri.ca/uninfo/treaties/75.shtml

UNDP (1998). **Human Development Report.**

UNDP (1997). **Philippine Human Development Report.**

Vaux, Tony (2001). **The Selfish Altruist, Relief Work in Famine and War.** London: Earthscan Publications, Ltd.

Vitug and Gloria (2000). **Under the Crescent Moon : Rebellion in Mindanao.** Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs and Institute for Popular Democracy. Philippines: Quezon City.

PERSONAL INTERVIEWS

Ed Quitoriano (20 August 2002). Consultant, OXFAM-GB for their Study on the Poverty in Central Mindanao. Presently consultant of the Asian Development Bank, Pasig City.

Vilma Cabrera (21 August 2002). Director, DSWD, Batasan Complex, Quezon City

Bing Arieta (21 August 2002). Relief and Rehabilitation Coordinator, DSWD, Batasan Complex, Quezon City

Ms. Lourdes Lasap (22 August 2002), OXFAM-GB, Quezon City.

Millet Mendoza (23 August 2002). Tabang Mindanaw Executive Coordinator. Ortigas Complex, Pasig City.

Ian Lucero (27, 31 August 2002). Chief, Presidential Management Staff, Office of the President Regional Field Unit 12, Cotabato City

Col. Essel Soriano (27 August 2002). Commander, AFP Task Force, Cotabato City

Rolando Doria (28 August 2002). Office of the Presidential Assistant for Mindanao and Office of the Cotabato City Mayor, Cotabato City

Diamadel Dumagay (28 August 2002), Director, Social Development Planning Division, Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), ARMM Compound, Cotabato City

Claire Light (28 August 2002). OXFAM Program Manager, Relief and Rehabilitation, Cotabato City.

Noel Madeja Pedrola (28 August 2002). Communications Officer, Oxfam-Cotabato, Cotabato City

Kunesa Sekak (3 September 2002), DSWD Regional Director for Region 12 and ARMM, Cotabato City, 3 September 2002.

Ruel Lucentales (5 September 2002). Assistant Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). Batasan Complex, Quezon City.

TELEPHONE INTERVIEW

Arlene Lozano (28 August 2002), Director, Office of the Presidential Adviser for Regional Development, Cotabato City.

Abuton Resort, Tinago, Linamon, Iligan City

Tabang Mindanaw Community Volunteers and Coordinators (22 present of 40):

1. **Ben Abadiano,** Tabang Mindanao Coordinator for the Integrated Return and Rehabilitation Project
2. Baicon Macaraya, Coordinator, Bangsamoro Youth-Ranao Development Center
3. James Macaraya, Co-Coordinator, Bangsamoro Youth
4. May Madeleine Alonzo
5. Celeste Estrella
6. Ludora Tagala
7. Zorayda Manigbel
8. Axciel Mangondato
9. Datu Kim Haji-Ali
10. Camar Alibaser
11. Alinor Odal
12. Lorenzo Abid
13. Binoy Mangundato
14. Maulana Batugan
15. Naharax Naser
16. Numaira Sarip
17. Farida Balas
18. Mubaraq Dorj Casim
19. Rowena Basoy
20. Macatanog, Mochtar
21. Kit Masbud Ali III
22. Ivy Codin

(The discussion was done in conjunction with the team building session of Tabang Mindanaw Community Organizers and volunteers for the IRRP)

COMMUNITY DISCUSSIONS/INTERVIEWS:

Roberto Layson, OMI (29-30 August 2002). Catholic Priest, Immaculate Conception Parish, Pikit, Maguindanao. Project Coordinator of the IRRP in Nalapaan, Pikit Cotabato

Residents of baranggay Nalapaan, Pikit Cotabato (29-30 August 2002)

Residents of baranggay Gli-gli, Bago-Inged, Rajamuda and Bulol, in Pikit, Cotabato (recipients of government assistance)

ANNEX

Framework

Peace Dialogue & Negotiation with the AFP & MILF

Community Declaration

Community Consultation and Planning

**BUILDING SANCTUARIES OF PEACE**

Program Implementation

Expansion and Replication

Monitoring and Evaluation

PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

Phase 1: *Negotiations/Consultations/Information Dissemination*

Activity		Output
Endorsement of the TM IRRP by the President, the SND and the Local Command of the AFP	→	Endorsement of the TM IRRP
Negotiation with the MILF to respect the return and rehabilitation process of the selected communities in their respective barangays	→	Obtain guarantees of support, respect, and commitment in upholding peace and security in the areas where TM is operating its IRRP.
Obtain collaboration of the AFP Regional Commander for the implementation of the process including the creation of a peaceful environment in the areas concerned.	→	Collaborative efforts to attain lasting peace between the MILF, Govt. Military Forces, and the Local People
Conduct consultations with the evacuee families of the selected barangays and agree on a tentative date for their organized return to their respective barangays. Help the partner communities issue their declaration to protect their sanctuaries of peace.	→	A concrete plan of action formulated by the people
Coordination with the Bishops, Ulama, international NGOs, UNDP, and other national NGOs and agencies of this IRRP using a peace framework.	→	Obtain support and commitment
Inform OIC Ambassadors of this process and request their endorsement and support.	→	Obtain support in the IRRP endeavors through media campaign
Inform all national and local agencies of the scheduled return. Make public announcements to insure compliance of all parties.	→	Obtain support in the IRRP endeavors

Phase 2: Conceptualization/Planning/Implementation

Consultation with the Selected Communities	Program Termination	TM and Parish Plan for Expansion of IRRP in Other Areas
Needs Assessment	Program Monitoring & Evaluation	Conduct of Focused-Group Training
Formation of Committees	Program Implementation	Design of Training Courses
Develop Plan of Action/ Proposal	Program Approval	TM Technical Team validates TNA
Initial Assessment of the Plan of Action Developed by the Community	Submit to *Tabang Mindanaw*	Community prioritizes training requirements
TM Team clarifies data gaps or questions on methodology	Field visit to validate proposal → Finalize Program Proposal	Parish Consults community to assess training needs