



**Institute of Social Studies**

**Graduate School of Development Studies**

**CIVIL SOCIETY ENGINEERING DEMOCRACY:  
THE CASE OF ZIMBABWEAN DIASPORA CIVIL SOCIETY  
ORGANIZATIONS BASED IN SOUTH AFRICA.**

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### ***ABSTRACT***

This study adds to the growing concerns of the role in democratization by civil society. It zeroes in specifically to look at civil society in the Diaspora or in exile. The short research focuses on Zimbabwe pro-democracy CSOs based in the Diaspora in particular South Africa with a view of deepening understanding of causes of disgruntlement within the pro-democracy movement -made of political parties and Civic organizations-. Their vulnerability in South Africa which does not see the need for Zimbabweans to flee their country and the possibility to lobby and advocate for Zimbabweans to be protected by the South African government and laws and for the International community to play a more prominent role in solving the Zimbabwe governance crisis. Here field research work was taken on in South Africa for a month -July to August- particular attention was given to a network of 20 civil society organizations calling them-selves the Zimbabwe Diaspora Forum (ZDF).

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## ***ABBREVIATIONS***

|           |  |
|-----------|--|
| ANC       | African National Congress                            |
| ICCPR     | International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights |
| UN        | United Nations (Organization)                        |
| CSOs      | Civil Society Organizations                          |
| MDC       | Movement for Democratic Change                       |
| SAWIMA    | Southern Africa Women in Migration Action            |
| SADC      | Southern Africa Development Community                |
| UDHR      | Universal Declaration of Human Rights                |
| ZANU (PF) | Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front     |
| ZAPU      | Zimbabwe African People's Union                      |
| ZDF       | Zimbabwe Diaspora Forum                              |
| ZSF       | Zimbabwe Solidarity Forum                            |



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### ***DEDICATION***

To all those on the continent of Africa and across the Globe; to whose pain, aspiration to dignity and injustice unrelenting global effort is allocated; and to posterity, for the record.

*"Freedom itself is never the end of the road-only the beginning"* (Ignatieff, 1994:107)



## CHAPTER ONE-INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The brief background of Zimbabwe's trajectory since 1965 -pre colonial- up to independence in 1980 is given in this chapter. The picture is picked up again as from the year 2000 up to now. Here issues of human right deficit, civil society deficit in Africa and in particular in Zimbabwe is discussed. The problem that has arisen within the pro democracy movement made of internal civil society and those in exile and opposition political movement is discussed. Finally this chapter looks at the methodology of how the study was carried out.

### 1.1 ZIMBAWE –economic, socio-political developments-

The crisis in Zimbabwe dates back to 1965 when Ian Smith, the leader of Southern Rhodesia, issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain, imposing white-minority rule<sup>1</sup>. The above action fueled international sanctions and resulted in a guerrilla war which, by 1979, had claimed some 36,000 lives and displaced some 1.5 million people.<sup>2</sup> In 1980, a nation was born out of a protracted armed struggle and many years of pain, suffering and oppression. The ideals of the liberation war were of *one person one vote* and the yearning for freedom:<sup>3</sup> freedom from oppression, freedom from racism, freedom from human indignity and violation, freedom from poverty and hunger, ignorance and disease. Yet in the last 6 years, the standard of living in Zimbabwe has declined dramatically; with the official poverty rate now well over 80%.<sup>4</sup> At the same time, the healthcare infrastructure has collapsed, human rights abuses have become rampant, and hundreds of Zimbabweans have fled their homeland to escape political persecution and to seek economic opportunity.<sup>5</sup> According to a Human Rights Watch report released in December 2005, Zimbabwe is 'spiraling into a huge political and economic crisis.' Inflation as of writing this research stands at over 1000%, unemployment rate currently stands at 76.5%, industrial production is now operating at 30% of capacity; commercial agriculture has declined 60% in the last five years and the GDP has been declining steadily.<sup>6</sup> Life

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<sup>1</sup> Human Rights watch report:2006

<sup>2</sup> Ibid

<sup>3</sup> The Zimbabwe We Want: Towards a national vision:2006

<sup>4</sup> Human rights watch: January 2006

<sup>5</sup> Ibid: December 2005

<sup>6</sup> Ibid: January 2006

expectance has declined over the past decade from 62 years -one of the highest in Africa- to 37 years -one of the lowest in the world-<sup>7</sup>. As the economic and social conditions have been worsening, so too has the human rights situation. New laws introduced in the past few years limit freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of speech.<sup>8</sup>

There are currently a huge number of Zimbabweans living abroad, due to all the above hardships. It is difficult to quantify the numbers of Zimbabweans in the Diaspora, as some take the citizenship of the country of immigration, and many are undocumented. Research carried out by the Scientific and Industrial Research and Development Centre (SIRDC) among documented Zimbabweans estimated that 535, 609 Zimbabweans had gone to live in the Diaspora since 1990.<sup>9</sup> The largest numbers were based in the United Kingdom (36.8%) followed by Botswana (34.5%), the USA (6.9%), South Africa (4.6%) and Canada (3.4%).<sup>10</sup> A further 13.8 per cent of Zimbabweans were living elsewhere in the Diaspora.<sup>11</sup> The figures underestimate the number of Zimbabweans in the region as the number of undocumented migrants who either entered neighboring countries, usually South Africa and Botswana, through official ports and then over-stay, and those who travel without valid travel documents had increased.<sup>12</sup>

## **1.2 Indication of the problem**

After almost six years of activism by Zimbabwe and Diaspora based civil society actors towards democratic governance, respect for rule of law and human rights in Zimbabwe. One can easily conclude that there has been no notable improvement in respect for rule of law and human rights. In fact the opposite could be true. Why is this? Although the role of civic groups in Zimbabwe towards democratization is acknowledged, they are facing a lot of opposition and suspicion from several quarters, within the pro-democracy movement, some of whom see them as a group of opportunists who are out to get cheap popularity and political mileage at the expense of the major opposition political party, the Movement for

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid

<sup>8</sup> Ibid

<sup>9</sup> Alice Block,2005

<sup>10</sup> Ibid

<sup>11</sup> Ibid

<sup>12</sup> Zinyama,2002:9



Democratic Change (MDC)<sup>13</sup> Tensions have emerged between civic activists operating in Zimbabwe and those based in the Diaspora. The former who perceive themselves as having an objective assessment of the Zimbabwe crisis rooted in its daily economic and political realities, have criticized Diaspora activists for being out of touch with the political reality on the ground.<sup>14</sup> Adding to this the Zimbabwean based activists feel the Diasporas are cowards who have run away from the frontline of the 'struggle' against authoritarianism in Zimbabwe.<sup>15</sup>

Raftopoulos goes on to say that, the tensions between internals and exiles have, as in the case of other liberation movements, had an adverse impact on the productive interaction and exchange of ideas between the two groups. In addition to the above problems, racial, class, ethnic, linguistic and regional divisions among the Diaspora activists have worked against the formulation and implementation of a common programme of action.<sup>16</sup> This study seeks to establish the role, legitimacy and effectiveness of the Diaspora civil society within the pro-democracy movement on Zimbabwe.

### **1.3 Background to the problem**

Although it is a well recognized fact that independence in most of the sub Saharan African countries came as a result of concerted civic action, a most surprising thing is the sudden death of civic action after independence in most if not all of these countries. Firoze Manji points to this lack of civic action and blames all the misgovernance and backwardness in the region on it.<sup>17</sup> He accuses the liberation war leaders of high jacking the people's struggles against oppression by their colonial masters, and claiming all credit for bringing freedom.<sup>18</sup> He is convinced that the people's struggles for freedom were rooted in human rights principles and practices including freedom of expression, of movement, the right to vote, to justice and so on.<sup>19</sup> At independence, the political architecture was defined on the basis that the majority shall govern. However, those who took the baton of power in many cases ran away with it crowding out the majority in the nation building process. The

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<sup>13</sup> *The Standard*, 23 February 2006.

<sup>14</sup> Raftopoulos, 2006: 53

<sup>15</sup> Ibid

<sup>16</sup> Ibid: 54

<sup>17</sup> Manji 1997: 98

<sup>18</sup> Ibid

liberators patented the struggle and could not accommodate any other centre of power<sup>20</sup>. The liberation war leaders declared that there was no need to continue to fight for these rights, because everyone was 'free'. To continue to protest would be to fight against a 'government of the people'. Today, however, as Firoze Manji says, it is the absence of these rights that has caused much turmoil and suffering of the people in the region.<sup>21</sup>

### 1.3.1 Oppressive Laws and Human rights

Zimbabwe is not an exception to the scenario described above. Some repressive pieces of legislation exist in Zimbabwe statute books, with the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) being of particular concern. POSA requires four days advance notice to -not permission of- the police for any public gathering.<sup>22</sup> It also gives the police power to prohibit any public gathering they reasonably believe would result in public violence -even though police permission is not required to hold any gathering-; to disperse such a gathering; and to cordon and search any area at any time.<sup>23</sup>

There are certain freedoms that are universally recognised as inherent in any democratic society. They provide a conducive environment for good governance and democratic participation and ensure that the basic human rights are adhered to. There is therefore need to understand as the study embarks that the restrictive laws are a violation of acceptable standards within the global family. There is need for the safeguarding of particularly the following rights, which Zimbabwe is state party to as of 1981. **Freedom of association and assembly:** Article 20 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* provides for everyone to have the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association and that no one may be compelled to belong to an association. The US State Department Report (USSD) 2004, published on 28 February 2004, stated that,

The Zimbabwean constitution provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government restricted this right in practice through laws such as POSA which many legal experts believed were unconstitutional. The police repeatedly used force to break up non-violent demonstrations by its critics and erect roadblocks in urban areas to prevent public gatherings from taking place<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid

<sup>20</sup> Ibid

<sup>21</sup> Ibid

<sup>22</sup> United States Zimbabwe country report:2004

<sup>23</sup> Ibid

<sup>24</sup> Ibid

**Freedom of speech and expression:** Article 19 of the *Universal Declaration of Human rights* says:

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.<sup>25</sup>

This freedom – and its extension, freedom of the press – is so essential that its absence jeopardizes other freedoms and undermines the whole democratic process. In the last five years in Zimbabwe, 5 private newspapers, 2 radio stations and 1 private television network have been denied licences to operate, closed or bombed down.<sup>26</sup> Torture has reportedly been used to deal with political opponents of the government and civil society human rights activists.<sup>27</sup> Article 2 of the *UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or degrading Treatment or Punishment* states:

Each State Party *shall* take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.<sup>28</sup>

It is clear to all reasonable people that the ruling Zimbabwe regime has failed to comply with this basic international obligation.<sup>29</sup> The Ministry of Home Affairs is deeply aware of the issue because it has been raised on several occasions with him in Parliament<sup>30</sup>. In reaction to a recent wave of protests against deteriorating social and economic conditions in the country, the Zimbabwean government has intensified its campaign to suppress peaceful dissent, Human Rights Watch said in a report released in 2006.<sup>31</sup> It is in the light of these considerations that existing and proposed legislation such as POSA and AIPPA should be re-examined and either abolished or amended.

Consequently as a result of the above conditions, there has been a mass exodus of Zimbabweans to Europe and neighboring countries in particular South Africa, in search of work, political expression freedom and better living conditions. Analysts say about 3

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<sup>25</sup> Banning, 2004:26

<sup>26</sup> The suppression. New.Zim.Com 25 June 2006

<sup>27</sup> Ibid

<sup>28</sup> Banning T:3

<sup>29</sup> Human Rights Watch :2006

<sup>30</sup> Ibid

<sup>31</sup> Human Rights watch report 'You will be thoroughly beaten': 2006

million of Zimbabwe's twelve million population have already fled to South Africa, many of them illegally.<sup>32</sup> Issues of freedom of association, of speech, of movement, of religion and of fear from torture continue to be significant concerns in the South African context of the Zimbabwean Diaspora, and do not disappear because of exile. These people have formed groups and mobilized for support in order to bring about democratic governance in their country.

#### **1.4 Relevance and Justification of the research**

This research project originated from the need for information and knowledge about whether (and how) Zimbabweans who are living outside the country, in particular in South Africa, have organised themselves into a viable civil society in exile. Out of many formal and informal discussions for solutions to Zimbabwe crisis at different platforms, continuous need arises to identify potential important actors in resolution. This research contributes to the on going debate on who is legitimate among many democracy actors, to voice on behalf of 'people' by assessing the impact of civil society in the democratization processes, in particular civil society activism from the Diaspora in Zimbabwe.

#### **1.5 Research objective**

The objectives of this research is

- To determine the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Zimbabwe Diaspora civil society based in South Africa, in the pro-democracy movement.

#### **1.6 Research question**

There can be no doubt as to the wide range of questions that a paper of this nature can seek to answer. The very topic itself, together with the close relationship between the two countries (South Africa and Zimbabwe), can no doubt bring forth a myriad of questions on a variety of issues. For purposes of brevity, however, the research shall focus on this key question:

- What factors (e.g. internal, national, regional and global) affect the legitimacy and

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<sup>32</sup> *The Cape Argus* (SA), 31 May 2006

effectiveness of Zimbabwean Diaspora Civil Organizations as an actor within the pro-democracy movement in seeking to promote more democratic outcomes in Zimbabwe?

### 1.7 Key concepts and definitions

**Civil Society:** In this study we use the concept of civil society, both as an analytical concept and its characteristics as a tool to gauge legitimacy and effectiveness for democratization. Civil Society Organisation (CSO) covers a wide range of actors from informal activist groups and well-established registered organisations (NGOs) to civil movements and their networks. Generally civil society as a concept entails devolution, decentralization, accountability, plurality, collective and consensus based leadership in policy formulation and programme implementation.<sup>33</sup> Is that the case in this subject of research?

**Democracy:** Democracy does not consist of a single unique set of institutions. Schmitter says there are many types of democracy, and their diverse practices produce a similarly varied set of effects. To quote him verbatim:

Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through competition and cooperation and through their elected representatives.<sup>34</sup>

Democratization –therefore- is a process by which rulers make it possible for those that they represent to take part in the process of governance.<sup>35</sup> What distinguish democratic rulers from non-democratic ones are the norms that condition how the former come to power and the practices that hold them accountable for their actions.<sup>36</sup>

**Diaspora Civil Society:** The phenomenon of ethnic loyalty towards homeland is usually called Diaspora.<sup>37</sup> Therefore the Diaspora civil society is a range of formal or informal organized actors based outside their home country, yet acting with yearning and action towards their 'homeland'.

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<sup>33</sup> ICCO,2003

<sup>34</sup> Schmitter,1991:101

<sup>35</sup> Gilbert,1987: 56-80

<sup>36</sup> Ibid

<sup>37</sup> Talta,1999:2

**State:** The formal features of state – cabinet and parliament, legislation, judiciary systems and executive branches are more or less the same in Africa.<sup>38</sup> Analyzing the nature of the state and how it used its powers is central to identifying ways of improving oppressed and marginalized people by strengthening democratization and governance.<sup>39</sup>

**Rights and the rule of law:** Rights include civil and political liberties as well as economic, social and cultural rights or entitlements.<sup>40</sup> Therefore arguable the entry point to claim entitlements is the right to participation, in policy making and governance, which is essential a political process. The rule of law assumes that people are legally protected against violent injury of their freedom and person, that their rights are protected and that the law guarantees agreements and commitments.<sup>41</sup> Conditions are appropriate legislation, unequivocal and impartial implementation and effective enforcement.<sup>42</sup>

**Legitimacy:** This is to declare lawful and in broad it means rightfulness.<sup>43</sup> Legitimacy addresses not the question of why people should obey the state, but the question of why they do obey a particular state or system of rule.<sup>44</sup> What are the conditions or processes that encourage them to see authority as rightful, and therefore underpin the stability of a regime or system?<sup>45</sup> Legitimacy also looks at the processes and the machinery of maintaining itself i.e. democratic norms and room for reform.<sup>46</sup> What is the political clout of the Diasporas as actors in the pro-democracy movement?

### 1.8 Methods of data collection

The study is based on the view that the self-analysis of the Zimbabwean Diaspora civil society is indispensable if its nature could be sincerely understood. This research study approach is qualitative, inferring that it belongs to a family of approaches concerned with collecting in-depth data about human social experiences and contexts. Asks who, which, what, when and why.

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<sup>38</sup> Mutume,2002:10

<sup>39</sup>Ibid

<sup>40</sup> Ibid

<sup>41</sup> Ibid

<sup>42</sup> Ibid

<sup>43</sup> Heywood, 2002:210

<sup>44</sup> Ibid

<sup>45</sup> Ibid:211

<sup>46</sup> Ibid: 213

Data for the paper will be derived from both primary and secondary sources.

### **1.8.1 Primary Sources**

Primary sources of collecting data are described by most researchers as the best in carrying out research. The researcher has the opportunity to be on the ground, and meet with his subjects, talk, discuss and come up with raw data from the field. One of the sources of collecting primary data for qualitative research is through face-to-face interviews. The researcher had semi structured interview questions, which he asked a selected sample of the population. Open-ended questions -or semi structured- have the advantage of making the interviewer probe and explore a particular point with the interviewee. The interviewees were also able to freely explain, further where it was necessary.

### **Sampling**

The target population was Zimbabwean Civic groups based in South Africa, particularly those represented by the Diaspora Forum -made up of 20 organizations-, ordinary legal and illegal immigrants, and South African CSOs. In order to study this group, a purposive (non-probability) sample was selected, and opportunity sampling was used. The opportunity sampling technique was used in selecting the groups to be studied. This technique is ideal for this selection because the groups are homogenous, and they may not all be in one place. Randomization sampling was used to interview (and observe) the targeted samples.

In July and August 2006, the researcher spent 20 days in Gauteng province of South Africa. 20 ordinary Zimbabwean immigrants were interviewed in this survey, the majority of them being men -13 men against 7 women-. Of these, 10 of them were married, 8 were single, and 2 were divorced. The ages of those interviewed varied from 18 years up to 46 years. 10 of these were in the 21-30 age group, 7 being in the 31-40 age group and 3 were above 40. Initially it was envisaged that 60 interviewees would participate in this research. However, only 20 were accessed at the end, reasons being that many potential interviewees were afraid to come and talk about their experiences, for fear of being exposed and deported from South Africa. The timeframe was also too short, for there was no time to relax and assure them. Out of the 20 affiliate CSOs to the ZDF, 8 had opportunity to be interviewed in-depth, looking at the whole processes of the coming together of the Diaspora CSOs

under ZDF in 2005 and the consequences for each organization.(see Annex A and B)

The interviewees were identified through networks from Zimbabwe Diaspora Forum and Crisis Coalition, who hosted the researcher for the 20 days.

Only 5 interviewees were holders of the Asylum Seeker Permit Section 22 which allowed them to study and work in South Africa. Only 2 of them had the Refugee status, even though some had been in the country as far back as 2000 and had acquired the Asylum Seeker Permit by 2001. The other 13 did not disclose what status they had, only agreeing that they have no asylum papers or refugee papers.

The interviews were done on a one to one basis, so as to protect the respondents. In this research, key informants were the leadership of the Zimbabwe Diaspora Forum testing its legitimacy, in defining its commitment to the goal, the ordinary participants of organizations within CSOs, ordinary migrant Zimbabweans, other Zimbabwean pro-democracy groups who are not part of the ZDF, the South African civil society, and the CSOs who are still operating from Zimbabwe, thus analyzing the legitimacy and effectiveness within their constituency.

To assess the factors that the Zimbabwe Diaspora CSOs have on the relations between Zimbabwe and South Africa, and the effectiveness of the CSOs execution of their mandate, questions were targeted to South African Government Officials at the Home and Foreign Affairs ministry departments and the Zimbabwe embassy. Permission was sought to quote by name those interviewed in the field work.

### **1.8.2 Secondary Sources**

This paper shall also use secondary sources for its data collection. Finnegan says that secondary sources are 'those that discuss the period (or events and people) studied but are brought into being some time after it.'<sup>47</sup> Library based literature and internet sources were used for secondary data. Newspapers, the television, and magazines that give reports as events unfold, were also used as sources of secondary data.



## CHAPTER TWO-CIVIL SOCIETY CONCEPTUALIZATION

### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter will focus on the theoretical framework of the paper, as well as theories of civil society in general. The concept of Diaspora and Diaspora activism within global civil society is alluded to here. Finally this chapter looks at the strategy and characteristic of civil society towards successful contribution to political transformation. The shortcomings, failures and weaknesses of civil society will also be discussed.

### 2.2 Civil Society and Democratization

If one looks today at the drama of democratization in nations the world over, nothing is more appealing than the idea of ordinary citizens acting collectively on behalf of democracy. These struggles for democracy were the catalyst for the emergence of multiple forms of civil society activism and organisation- from student groups, to trade unions, to neighbourhood associations. These organizations created conditions that made it possible to establish free political systems, 'including eroding the legitimacy of authoritarian institutions and in some cases literally hollowing out an entrenched tyrannical leadership'.<sup>48</sup>

But what is the history and philosophy behind civil society?

According to classical thought, civil society and the state were seen as inseparable, with both referring to a type of political association governing social conflict through the imposition of rules that prevented individuals from doing harm to one another.<sup>49</sup> In his description of the *polis*, Aristotle depicted civil society as an 'association of associations' that enabled citizens -or the few that qualified- to share in the noble task of ruling and being ruled.<sup>50</sup> Thus in this sense the state represented the 'civil' form of society and 'civility' described the requirements of good citizenship. Late medieval understanding of the term equated civil society with 'politically organized commonwealths', which was a type of civilization which was made possible because people lived in law-governed associations protected by the state<sup>51</sup>. In contrast to Aristotle, Plato and Hobbes, the Enlightenment

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<sup>47</sup> Finnegan,1996: 48

<sup>48</sup> Encarnacion,2003: 6

<sup>49</sup> Edwards,2004:8

<sup>50</sup> Ibid

<sup>51</sup> Ehrenberg,1999:9

thinkers saw civil society as a defense against unwarranted intrusions by the state on newly realized individual rights and freedoms<sup>52</sup>. These rights and freedoms were organized along voluntary associations. Thus civil society was seen as a grouping of associations committed to protection against the state, and to resisting despotism.<sup>53</sup>

This is the same theme that prevails today, and forms the theoretical base of this paper. Today, writers like Ernest Gellner and Robert Putnam continue with the same theme, which basically is hinged on the value of voluntary associations in curbing the power of centralizing institutions like the state; protecting pluralism and nurturing constructive social norms.<sup>54</sup> In contrast to classical liberals, liberal egalitarians see the inequitable distribution of resources and opportunities in society as a result of the ill-health and poor function of civil society<sup>55</sup>. This is an important insight, particularly with reference to Zimbabwe today, where there are glaring disparities in the distribution of resources, the economy is run down, there is cruel repression and suppression of rights and civil society is rendered all but redundant and ineffective. There is thus a dire need for an active civil society, because of the suppression of rights and critical shortages in every sector of life.

### **2.2.1 Civil Society as the public sphere theory**

Another complementary school of thought that runs in tandem with the Zimbabwe situation is that of Antonio Gramsci. Philosophers like John Dewey and Hannah Arendt took Gramsci's ideas about civil society and developed around them a theory of the 'public sphere' as an essential component of democracy. To Dewey, the term 'public' meant the shared experience of political life that underpinned public deliberation on the questions of the day<sup>56</sup>. It can also mean political space; that is the right to exercise one's rights in governance issues. Anything that eroded this public sphere, like the commercialization of the media or the 'commodification' of education had to be resisted<sup>57</sup>. In the Zimbabwean case this erosion is seen in the nationalization of the media since 1982, and the banning of alternative sources of information; the deprivation of freedoms and suppression of human

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid

<sup>53</sup> Ibid

<sup>54</sup> ibid

<sup>55</sup> Ibid

<sup>56</sup> Edwards,2004:8

rights.<sup>58</sup>

### 2.2.2 Weaknesses of Civil Society

According to Encarnacion the sad thing about total faith in civil society is that it has failed dismally to consolidate the democracy that it so successfully can bring about.<sup>59</sup> He says:

Decades into what is largely regarded as the largest expansion of democracy in human history, it is clear that the view of civil society as the engine behind the consolidation of democratic regimes-currently an established conventional wisdom in democratization studies-is deeply flawed and needs reconsideration<sup>60</sup>

Ndegwa is in agreement with Encarnacion when he says that civil society in many parts of the democratizing world has failed to sustain the vigour obtained in the fight against dictatorship.<sup>61</sup> This failure has led many people to worry about 'post- transition civil society recession' that could threaten democratic consolidation.<sup>62</sup> True, new democracies the world over are limping along chasing after the consolidation of democratic governance. This suggests the hard reality that the institutionalization of democratic procedures such as free elections does not guarantee a well-performing democracy. In many of the world's new democracies, even competitive elections have not ensured liberty, adherence to the rule of law, and widespread respect for civil and human rights. Diamond writes:

To varying but alarming degrees, human rights are flagrantly abused, ethnic and other minorities suffer not only discrimination but murderous violence; power is heavily if not regally concentrated in the executive branch; and parties, legislators, executives and judicial systems are thoroughly corrupt.<sup>63</sup>

This observation could not be a more true reflection of the Zimbabwean case, where an active civil society managed to help bring democratic rule in a whirlwind revolution towards independence, but has failed so dismally to sustain that same democratic rule, because of the very same factors that Diamond raises.

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid:9

<sup>58</sup> Raftopoulos,2006:58

<sup>59</sup> Encarnacion,2003:65

<sup>60</sup> Ibid

<sup>61</sup> Ndegwa,1996:15

<sup>62</sup> Encarnacion,2003:6

<sup>63</sup> Diamond, 1979: 29.

### 2.2.3 Understanding pro-democracy civil society deficit.

It is gratifying to note that on the continent of Africa, some civil society groups have become excellent examples of how brutal regimes can be overcome. In stating the case of Kenya, Ndegwa says that four conditions must obtain in order for civil society organisations to advance democratization in the face of successive opposition through state control.<sup>64</sup> These are: *organization; resources; national, regional and international alliances; and political opportunity.*

Ndegwa however says that the four conditions mentioned above are not enough, because sometimes a discrepancy emerges between two civic organisations placed in similar circumstances: one actively advocating political pluralism 'and the other remaining politically obtuse'<sup>65</sup>. He describes this scenario as the 'two faces' of civil society. This casts doubt on the assumption that civil society necessarily commits itself to democratization. A case in point is the existence of the December 12<sup>th</sup> Movement headed by a Coltrane Chimurenga.<sup>66</sup> This is an Afro-American civic group whose mission is to give the impression to the world that the situation in Zimbabwe is alright, and defends President Mugabe's policies.<sup>67</sup>

Ndegwa goes further and states that after all, there is nothing intrinsic in civil society organisations that would automatically make them supportive of democratization. He says there is nothing in them which makes them opponents of authoritarianism either. 'Rather,' he says,

The impetus for civil society's involvement in the democratization movement can be located in two externalities: a wider social movement and political opportunity'.<sup>68</sup>

Civil society analysts share the opinion that the only ideology that civil society organisations share in common is the pluralism that allows individual groups to exist, advocate and pursue their goals-including some that may even undermine pluralism.<sup>69</sup> How far do the Zimbabwean civic groups in South Africa fit into the above analysis?

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<sup>64</sup> Ndegwa, 1996: 15

<sup>65</sup> Ibid

<sup>66</sup> Raftopoulos, 2006: 58

<sup>67</sup> The group is based in the United States and pays frequent visits to Zimbabwe, getting widespread TV, radio and newspaper publicity for its 'noble and patriotic' efforts.

<sup>68</sup> Raftopoulos, 2006: 58

In terms of democratic transition in Zimbabwe, it is therefore more prudent to argue that for organisations in civil society to be supportive of democratization, they have to embrace the social movement for democratic change: that is, articulate democratic values as well as pursue actions to challenge the non-democratic regime.<sup>70</sup> Unfortunately, not all civil society groups can manage this practice consistently. A case in point was the manipulation of the National Constituency Assembly (NCA) constitution by its presiding chairman in order to get a third term in office.<sup>71</sup> Such actions no doubt have a negative impact on the overall agenda of the organisation, and of the pro-democracy movement. More of how civil society uses the four characteristics that Ndegwa expounds on is discussed in chapter 3, 4 and 5.

### 2.3 Diaspora Theorized

**Diaspora** is a term often used by historians to describe the Jewish people's search for a home after their uprooting from the Holy Land.<sup>72</sup> It's identified with memories of Jerusalem, memories of Israel and a belief in the Messiah. It is derived from a Greek word meaning dispersion and presumes there is a 'homeland' to which the Diaspora will eventually return.<sup>73</sup> How appropriate is this term then for describing modern migrant groups such as the Sikhs and the Zimbabweans. Could the Sikh's attachment to Punjab in India or Zimbabwean's attachment to MaDzimbabwe as an "imagined homeland" be treated as Diaspora? How is the distinction of different experiences and groups settled away from their land of origin among whom are refugees, short-term laborers, exiles waiting their chance to return and migrant groups with varying rights in the host country. Analysts in seeking a common theory for human migration have associated 'Diaspora' to capture the most common experiences of displacement associated with migration; homelessness, painful memories and a wish to return.<sup>74</sup> It would be of note to see how the Zimbabweans outside their 'homeland' see and feel about it, in the later chapters.

According to Robin Cohen, Diasporas exhibit the following features: dispersal from an original homeland often traumatically; alternatively, the expansion from the homeland in

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid:59

<sup>70</sup> Ibid

<sup>71</sup> The Constitutional crisis. The Herald 26 April 2006

<sup>72</sup> Talta,1999: 2

<sup>73</sup> Hapke,1984:13

<sup>74</sup> Talta,1999: 3

search of work ; a collective memory and myth about the homeland and the idealization of the supposed ancestral home; a return movement; a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over the long time; a troubled relationship with the host societies; a sense of solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries; the responsibility of a distinctive creative, enriching life in tolerant host countries<sup>75</sup>.

### **2.3.1 Global Civil Society and its link to the Diaspora**

The concept of global civil society also stands to benefit Zimbabweans in the quest for democratic governance. The term can be viewed as a way of recognising how politics has moved beyond the national level.<sup>76</sup>

From the view of 'Reformers', the idea of global civil society supports interconnectedness among nations of the world, and the construction of global governance as a way of benefiting the many rather than the few. They support the extension of international law, especially relating to human rights.<sup>77</sup>

In the introduction to *Global Civil Society*, Mary Kaldor et al assert that it has increasingly become difficult to insulate societies from the outside world, because pressure of trade, travel, indebtedness, Diaspora communities as well as increased communication have made closed authoritarian states much harder to sustain.<sup>78</sup> A much more important observation is that pressure for democratisation has come from below; from civil society groups that have been able to expand the space for their activities through links with the outside world. Keck and Sikkink, talk about the 'boomerang effect' whereby civil society can use their links with the outside world to put pressure on their own governments.<sup>79</sup> They have done so with success in Slovakia in 1994; where civil society activists, housed by Diaspora communities, with international support campaigned to get people to vote in order to remove the nationalist elected dictator Meciar.<sup>80</sup> In Serbia the young people's resistance campaign Otpur succeeded in mobilising international support to bring about an end to dictatorship,

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<sup>75</sup> Cohen,1997:23

<sup>76</sup> Anheier,2005: 8

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.: 1

<sup>78</sup> Ibid

<sup>79</sup> Ibid

<sup>80</sup> Ibid

using its Diaspora family.<sup>81</sup>

## 2.4 Strategies and Characteristics of Civil Society

Two basic conditions must be met for a challenge to contribute to political transformations in terms of respect of rule of law, respect for fundamental human rights and return of democratic space: One is that the challenge must be able to withstand repression, and two the challenge must undermine state power<sup>82</sup>. Generally, when the interests of political authorities are threatened, repression is used as a means to control or eliminate the challenge. Unlike democracies, where dissent is expected and tolerated, non-democratic regimes cannot simply ignore protest, as its mere existence represents a threat to the regime<sup>83</sup>. Ackerman and Kruegler point to four characteristics that must influence non violent, unarmed struggles. That is formulation of functional **objectives** that are compelling and vital to the interests of the challenging group, and attract the widest possible support, both within society and externally.<sup>84</sup> Secondly, there must be in place, **multiple methods of non violent action**, which enhance and expand the repertoires of nonviolent action.<sup>85</sup> Struggles for political change should not depend on a single event, however momentous, but rather should focus on the process of shifting the balance of political power through a range of mutually supporting actions over time. Ackerman and Kruegler state, that thirdly,

In almost all cases, wide dispersion of nonviolent actions, both geographically [place] and throughout the social and political environment [space] . . . compromise the opponents' ability to respond and diminish their overall control.<sup>86</sup>

The more **spaces and places** challenged, the greater the likelihood of the struggles remaining resilient and undermining state pressure. Therefore affirming the importance of using Diaspora space in the case of Zimbabwe, as little political room is found within. Swift and accurate **communications** are also necessary to authenticate instructions, to counter enemy propaganda, and generally to inform and bolster the fighting forces. Communications to the world outside the conflict are no less important, with images carried by print and broadcast media playing a key role in interpreting the conflict for outsiders and

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<sup>81</sup> Ibid, p 9

<sup>82</sup> Schock K:www.kubatana.net

<sup>83</sup> Ibid

<sup>84</sup> Ibid

<sup>85</sup> Ibid

in motivating third party involvement.<sup>87</sup> How is the communication of strategies, ideas and information between internals and externals and above all between leaders of the Diaspora Civil Society and their constituencies?

## 2.5 Conclusion

Thus, to sum up this chapter, opinions defer as to the purpose of society, whether it can bring about democratic government or not, or whether it can simply facilitate and concretize it. It becomes more complicated when Diaspora and global civil activism is put into the nexus. Furthermore, there are also disagreements on the effectiveness of different strategies necessary for civic action success. Yet clear objectives, multiple strategies of action, multiple spaces and good communication enhance positive impact.

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid

<sup>87</sup> Ibid



## CHAPTER THREE-THE DIASPORA

### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter looks at the framework picked up in chapter 2 by Ndegwa and Encarnacion on political opportunity. Using that framework the study looks at Kenya and Uganda. The case study of Diaspora activism is brought up from the Sikhs in India and the implication for the Zimbabwe case. It will wind up by looking at literature on the implications of the failures and successes of Diaspora civil society and Zimbabwe based civic groups in relation to the Zimbabwean situation.

### 3.2 Civil Society Success: The case of Kenya

One important factor that explains the success of civil society in forcing political concessions elsewhere in Africa relates to the availability of opportunity to mobilize, agitate and bargain with the state from a position of strength.<sup>88</sup>

Interestingly, Zimbabwe's civil society groups are not the only ones on the African continent which have had to fight an authoritarian regime. The same NGO bill that Zimbabweans are struggling against was passed into Acts by the Kenyan and Ugandan governments. In Kenya, the government responded to NGO and civil society political challenges by effecting the NGO Coordination Act of 1990, which sought to monitor and control NGO activities.<sup>89</sup> It was a contentious issue, but fortunately, it turned out to be one of the areas in which NGOs have enabled civil society expansion and empowerment in the country.<sup>90</sup>

The same happened in Uganda, where the government placed NGOs under its internal security secretariat in 1989.<sup>91</sup> In each of these cases the civic groups succeeded in their objective. In the case of Kenya, two organisations were in the forefront of resistance, and these were the Law Society of Kenya and the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCKK).<sup>92</sup> These two organisations opposed further steps by the single party regime of Daniel Arap Moi to remove or weaken many of the legal institutions guaranteeing

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<sup>88</sup> Huntington, 1991:13

<sup>89</sup> Ndegwa, 1996:23

<sup>90</sup> Ibid

<sup>91</sup> ibid

government accountability. The success of the Kenyan NGOs had important implications for the political reform movement (which the Zimbabwean civil society groups are fighting for). First, it allowed NGOs to operate freely and independently from state interference-thus increasing the freedom of actors in civil society. Secondly, it allowed some NGOs (like the Green Belt Movement) to pursue more forthright political actions with a reduced risk of being outlawed.<sup>93</sup>

The relatively strong position of civil society groups in the Kenyan case was embedded in four factors.

- Political opportunity.
- Collective resources
- Organisation
- Alliances with donors, local and international

The availability and use of political opportunity includes institutional openings allowing access to the state to express disagreement with policy and lobby for changes. The state - like Zimbabwe- was besieged by civil unrest, opposition parties, and international donors demanding political pluralism and respect for human rights.<sup>94</sup> This allowed NGOs to organise effectively and coordinate their resources to oppose the government.

The second factor that helped the success of civil society was the level of NGO collective organization and their combined resources. In particular, the formation of the NGO Network and the elected NGO Standing Committee gave NGOs a strong collective voice.<sup>95</sup> Zimbabwe today does not have many NGOs, most having been forced to close down by the private voluntary organization (PVO) bill and the threatening NGO Bill of 2005.<sup>96</sup>

Thirdly, the NGOs had strong alliances with international donor agencies.<sup>97</sup> These consistently facilitated the NGO effort to fight the controlling legislation in many ways. For instance, the United Nations Development Fund and the Ford Foundation in Nairobi funded the initial seminar organised by the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Nairobi.<sup>98</sup> It was at this seminar that NGOs resolve to fight the legislation instead of

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<sup>92</sup> Ibid

<sup>93</sup> Ibid:25

<sup>94</sup> Ibid:26

<sup>95</sup> Ibid

<sup>96</sup> Ibid

<sup>97</sup> Ibid

<sup>98</sup> Ibid:28

adjusting to it.<sup>99</sup> International NGOs also voiced strong support for the NGOs.

The last factor is that the NGOs had strong alliances with other oppositional forces in civil society. Important were the new opposition political parties embraced the NGOs' cause as a contributory part of the broader objective of democratizing the state.<sup>100</sup>

In the Zimbabwean case, three of the factors that worked in Kenya have not been well exploited. True, sanctions have actually been imposed on the government, an umbrella body for NGOs called National Association of Non –governmental Organisations was formed. What appears to be missing is the formation of strong alliances with international donor agencies, and this is the area in which the Diaspora civic groups should be playing a pivotal role, but unfortunately are found most wanting.<sup>101</sup>

### **3.3 Diaspora Activism: the case of Overseas Sikhs – Punjab, India.**

In applying Cohen's criteria, it seems that overseas Sikhs communities fulfill the sufficient conditions of a Diaspora i.e. dispersion, reluctant hosts, contest over homeland and maintenance of an active relationship with their mother country. The partition of Punjab in 1947 brought havoc to millions of people, who became refugees, crossing the borders of India and Pakistan under communal violence.<sup>102</sup> Talta goes on to say that much of the migration after 1947 has been for economical reasons, yet it is plausible to argue, taking a long historical view of the process, that it was the dislocation, uncertainty and violence caused by the partition of Punjab.<sup>103</sup>

Sikhs like many migrant communities, remain reluctant settlers, sharing uncertainty about their fate in host countries.<sup>104</sup> In Europe as the destination of the largest Sikh community, they have also faced discrimination and non acceptance. Sikhs are contesting a home land as exemplified by political events such as the Naxalite movement in the 1960s and the tragic events in the Punjab during the 1980s<sup>105</sup>.

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<sup>99</sup> Ibid

<sup>100</sup> Ibid

<sup>101</sup> Raftopoulos, 2006: 58

<sup>102</sup> Talta, 1999: 6

<sup>103</sup> Ibid

<sup>104</sup> Ibid

<sup>105</sup> Ibid

We want more powers for Punjab-it has nothing to do with other states. We are a nation ....What I demand is a separate constitution for Punjab-right to passports, currency and a separate flag as during the reign of Maharajah.<sup>106</sup>

Overseas Sikh communities have a complex web of exchanges with the Punjab in an ongoing process of mutual dependence. It can conveniently be understood in terms of economic, social, religious and political.<sup>107</sup>

The Diaspora Sikhs' communities have provided funds, support and mobilization for various political issues emanating from their homeland. Over the past 30 years civic and political groups formed in Britain and North America have forged direct links with civic and political movements of the Punjab.<sup>108</sup>The forming of organized groups in exile by the Sikhs is an example that can be contrasted with the Zimbabwean Diaspora.

### **3.4 Implications of the argument to the Zimbabwean Case**

In Zimbabwe 'space' within the pro-democracy civil society is divided into six major areas: the Church, the Labor Movement, and the feminist groups, the Legal Profession, the Media and the Diaspora. How have CSOs both in exile and within Zimbabwe set goals and used the multiple spaces, places and different actions to realize those goals?

#### **3.4.1 The Zimbabwe Diaspora**

Zimbabwe has three distinctive periods when significant numbers of numbers of people left the country for the Diaspora.

The first period took place immediately after independence in 1980, a sizeable number of the white population left the country as they felt the reconciliation process as announced by the prime minister of the new Zimbabwe could not be trusted and out of fear of reprisals.<sup>109</sup>

The second period is related to the notion that Cohen speaks of as 'disposal often traumatically from the original homeland'. This period was between 1983 to 1986 during what it is known as the Matabeleland dissident era, which estimated twenty thousand (20) civilian were killed, manly by the government soldiers.<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> Singh, 1945

<sup>107</sup> Talta, 1999:63

<sup>108</sup> Ibid

<sup>109</sup> Hill G, 2005:28

<sup>110</sup> Coltart, 1990:9

The third period is between 1998 up to the present year. This movement has been due to the economic and political meltdown in the country, which has characterized by high unemployment, high poverty levels, and the run-down of public institutions -health, education etc-, and above all a polarization and abuse of state institutions to further entrench the hold over power of the ruling party.<sup>111</sup>

The Zimbabwean Diaspora is no different from other Diaspora communities -Jews, Sikhs, Jamaicans, Lebanese, and Ethiopians- in that they often yearn for their ancestral home and when in the Diaspora they relate and organize with each other along racial, ethnic and political lineages.<sup>112</sup> South Africa hosts legally and illegally over three million Zimbabweans, who are a combination of the three movement periods mentioned above. In South Africa as the destination of the largest Zimbabwean community, they have also faced discrimination and non acceptance. There have been reported cases of xenophobia and selective arrests by South Africa police towards Zimbabweans.<sup>113</sup>

From the year 2000, Zimbabweans in the Diaspora have responded to the authoritarianism in Zimbabwe in various ways. Some Diaspora organisations like the Association of Zimbabweans Based Abroad (AZBA) have lobbied governments, continental organisations and international human rights groups to condemn and act against Zimbabwe's violations of human rights.<sup>114</sup> They have mostly used the internet -mostly e-mail and websites-, and direct appeals for this. Diaspora political groups based in South Africa have also lobbied the South African government to take more decisive action to resolve the Zimbabwean crisis.<sup>115</sup> This is because South Africa is seen by many as an influential player in regional and continental politics. The Diaspora political groups have used the open political climate in their host countries to establish political alliances with international organisations and other pro-democracy civic groups.<sup>116</sup> They have also resorted to legal litigation, and one case was in 2005 when the Diaspora Vote Action Group (DVAG) in England filed a suit in the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe seeking to overturn the electoral regulations limiting

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<sup>111</sup> Raftopoulos 2006:58

<sup>112</sup> Ibid

<sup>113</sup> *The Cape Argus* (SA), 31 May 2006.

<sup>114</sup> Raftopoulos 2006:59

<sup>115</sup> Ibid

voting outside the country to embassy officials and members of the armed forces.<sup>117</sup> Although the Supreme Court dismissed the case it served to draw international attention to Zimbabwe's uneven electoral field.<sup>118</sup>

Zimbabweans in the Diaspora have also established Diaspora media institutions that have contributed to the reporting and understanding of the Zimbabwe crisis.<sup>119</sup> These have assumed great importance in the light of the closure of the Daily News and the non-existence of private broadcasters.<sup>120</sup>

More activities undertaken by Zimbabwe Diaspora groups, particularly in South Africa, shall be discussed in Chapter 4 which will deal with such efforts, as well as failures, successes, ideals and ideas.

### **3.4.2 Political opportunity in Zimbabwe for Pro-democracy CSOs**

What is clear in the Zimbabwean case is that from the contentious 2000 parliamentary elections to the present, the pro-democracy civil society has responded to state authoritarianism by performing three distinct roles, in enhancing *political opportunity and space*.

- The first has been to document and publicize the extensive human rights abuses, the land invasions, the 2000 and 2002 elections and Operation Murambatsvina/ Restore Order (May–September 2005).<sup>121</sup> This process has entailed lobbying regional, continental and international organizations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU) the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) to censure the Zimbabwe government for its human rights violations.
- The second role played by civil society has been a humanitarian one, which entails the provision of medical care, safe housing and legal support to victims of state-sponsored violence.<sup>122</sup> This has been enhanced by regional support, mostly South Africa Council of Churches and COSATU.

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<sup>116</sup> Ibid

<sup>117</sup> Ibid

<sup>118</sup> Ibid:25

<sup>119</sup> Ibid

<sup>120</sup> Ibid

<sup>121</sup> Ibid

- The third role has been to provide civic education to Zimbabweans on issues relating to voting, education, health, gender equality and other rights. Again the alliance created with regional and international civic groups has been helpful, in printing materials and resources for transportation and salaries for peer educators.<sup>123</sup>

In all three roles, civic society has been seriously curtailed by, polarization, ideological differences, state harassment and severe restrictions on their access to rural areas. Draconian legislation such as AIPPA and POSA has further constrained civil society activities. The NGO law being pushed since 2005 increases the government's powers over the activities of NGOs.<sup>124</sup> Among other things it proposes to ban foreign funding for human rights NGOs. This has driven out quite a number of NGOs, and forced a heavy scaling down of activities by others. Such pressures have pushed more individuals and organizations to leave Zimbabwe and/or to operate from within South Africa.<sup>125</sup> This then leads one to ask; is the environment better there?

### 3.5 Conclusion

There is no consensus of whether Diaspora civic groups enhance bringing about democratic governance 'at home'. Again evidence is given that this is conducive area for activism as shown by the overseas Sikhs and Zimbabweans, particularly when Diaspora civic groups engage assistance from so-called international civic groups. It will be important to keep these differences in mind when assessing the activities of Zimbabwean Diaspora civic groups in South Africa. In a nutshell therefore, the activities of Zimbabwean civil society groups in the face of the government's repressive laws have been quite mixed. Some organisations have been divided along political lines. Perhaps this confirms what Ndegwa means when he says that there are inherent discrepancies in NGOs that render them incapable of bringing about democratic governance.<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> Ibid

<sup>123</sup> Ibid:34

<sup>124</sup> Ibid

<sup>125</sup> Ibid:36





## 4.0 CHAPTER FOUR- DIASPORA CSOs IN ACTION

### 4.1 Introduction.

This chapter looks at the findings on the field both in South Africa and in Zimbabwe, concerning Diaspora activism. How are they viewed by different actors and factors that they interact with? The chapter is made up of interviews with ordinary Diasporas, South African CSOs, and leaders of the ZDF, non member Zimbabwean CSOs, the Zimbabwean embassy officials and the South African Ministry of Home Affairs. The chapter also brings out some analysis on how the network of twenty (20) Diaspora CSOs under the banner of ZDF and other pro-democracy Diasporas are succeeding or failing to achieve their intended goal. As stated in Chapter 1, this research project originated from the need for information about whether -and how- Zimbabweans who are living outside the country, in particular in South Africa, have organised themselves into a viable civil society in exile, so that they can be able to help bring about democratic governance in their country.

### 4.2 The Zimbabwe Diaspora Forum

Our plan is to come up with a rationalized and centralized strategic process for all Zimbabweans living abroad. Our plan is to ensure that in the foreseeable future we will have a strong global forum that will clearly articulate our issues as the Diaspora community. Our plan is that this forum will help us have a common voice on any issues affecting Zimbabwe be it at home or abroad. More importantly, our plan is premised on the simple thesis that unless and until we as the Diaspora get more organized, we will remain irrelevant to the future of our country.<sup>127</sup>

The Zimbabwe Diaspora Forum (ZDF) was networked in June 2005 by the coming together of civil society organisations exiled in South Africa. Its constitution was approved by a congress made up of 19 affiliated members. Most of the affiliated members are pro-democracy and humanitarian service providers, some of whom serve the more than 3 million Zimbabwean immigrants. At present there are 20 affiliated members (see annex A and B). The affiliated organisations are quite diverse in their scope.<sup>8</sup> of them deal with victims of torture; 4 provide humanitarian services; 2 are involved in refugee assistance, 2 are legal institutions, and 1 is a media institution. All these have a mixture of professionals

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<sup>126</sup> Ndegwa, 1996:15

<sup>127</sup> Molokele, New Zimbabwe.com 18 April 2005.

such as lawyers, teachers, journalists, priests as well as ordinary members.

Its main principle is to support each of the affiliate's activities, not to take over these activities. 'The idea is not for them to give up their identities, but to put efforts together'<sup>128</sup> Most of the affiliate organizations have been active for at least 5 years. There are, however some civic groups which are not affiliated to the Zimbabwe Diaspora Forum, and these compete for space and resources.

The ZDF does have a constitution, but has no legal status. The ZDF's constitution states that the organisation has the capacity to acquire rights and obligations in its own name can enter into legal transactions and commercial traffics, can sue and be sued in its own name, and can raise funds locally and abroad and spend them in pursuit of its objectives. However, in discussions with the researcher, the leadership conceded that exercising these functions could prove difficult without legal status.

According to ZDF documents, the Forum's main objectives are as follows:

- To strive for a peaceful democratic dispensation in Zimbabwe and heal the wounds of the political activities, which forced people into exile, by engaging the South African authorities on the problems facing Zimbabwean refugees.
- To initiate discussion and stimulate debate amongst member organisations on strategic issues affecting the Zimbabwean CSOs sector.
- To promote cross-border networking and cross-pollination of information, knowledge and development experiences in Zimbabwe, Southern Africa and the rest of the world.<sup>129</sup>

According to respondents from within the ZDF, the forum, acting together or as affiliates has been successful in a number of ways, in fulfilling these objectives. For example, they claim that the forum has been involved in a panel which debates and attempts to influence South African refugee policy with the Department of Home Affairs. They also claim that ZDF has helped raise awareness of the political and social meltdown in Zimbabwe, through an advocacy programs which included marches and radio programs. ZDF has also helped thousands of Zimbabweans to obtain Asylum and Refugee documents within South Africa;

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<sup>128</sup> Interview with Daniel Molokele, Johannesburg, 5/08/06

<sup>129</sup> See Zimbabwe Zimbabwe Diaspora Forum Policy Document.

indeed the department of Home Affairs uses SAWIMA, one of the (registered) member organizations of ZDF to verify and authenticate Zimbabwean refugees. In addition, the ZDF claims that because of their intervention, hundreds of people detained in Lindela deportation camp have been released. In one of their documents, ZDF affirms their important role as follows:

We believe that our functions are needed and will continue to be needed as long as there are people arriving from Zimbabwe into South Africa, and as long as there is no political freedom in Zimbabwe. We believe that political and economic change in Zimbabwe will be engineered from the Diaspora.<sup>130</sup>

The Zimbabwe Diaspora Forum according to its document is apolitical and will support a political system which:

- Reviews the constitution of Zimbabwe for broad consensus and entrenchment of human rights and restoration of property rights.<sup>131</sup>
- Allows Diaspora vote and dual citizenship to allow smooth return of Zimbabweans who acquired foreign citizenship while in the Diaspora.<sup>132</sup>

#### 4.2.1 Some Weaknesses in the Constitution

There are certain weaknesses of the network of CSOs' constitution that are not in line with the democracy that it seeks to bring about in Zimbabwe. One of these is that members of the Executive Committee are eligible for re-election an unspecified number of times, and more or less indefinitely. Office bearers however are in office for two-year periods. The provision in the constitution that office bearers can hold office for long periods of time has often been described as a cancer in Zimbabwe. Such office bearers tend to be corrupt, arrogant and do not listen to other people's views. In Zimbabwe itself, this tendency was recently exemplified by the case of the chairman of the National Constitutional Assembly, who tampered with the constitution so that he could stay in power for another term. Could it be that civic society organizations, which have become increasingly sceptical and critical of the power and influence held by politicians and governments, are failing to live up to the lofty standards they expect of government and other major actors? This point was made

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<sup>130</sup> Ibid

<sup>131</sup> Ibid

<sup>132</sup> Ibid

forcefully by one of those interviewed, a church leader who asked:

Should not civic actors be held to the same standards of democracy, transparency and accountability as the politicians and governments?<sup>133</sup>

There may be some truth in his comments to the extent that there is lack of democratic processes; leadership transparency and accountability are undermining the influence and power of civil society on institutions of governance.

Civic Society who include the church, have influence and moral authority from the public perception that they are legitimate—that they somehow represent the voice of the voiceless and the issues of sector groups that should otherwise be down-trodden.<sup>134</sup>

This would then lead one to believe that ordinary Diaspora Zimbabwean would appreciate the work of Diaspora CSOs. Yet with the majority of interviewees; it seemed the church was silent and civil society was too deep in its own internal discourses, to make any meaningful change.

#### **4.3 Interviews with ordinary Zimbabweans in South Africa**

During fieldwork it became clear that the network of CSOs in the ZDF sees part of its core work as providing moral support and direction for the three million or so Zimbabweans who are presently exiled in South Africa. It sees all of them as in need, having lost their nationhood, citizenship and entitlements in Zimbabwe. Indeed, some Zimbabwean interviewees and contacts professed no knowledge at all of the ZDF. Its role in helping them did not seem to be appreciated, as they saw their immediate needs as legal status to pursue economic and career opportunities, that a democracy like South Africa offers. Some said that as far as they were concerned, the forum was a grouping of individuals out to make a name for them-selves, and was not doing anything for them. “I have never heard of it” said Moses, a Zimbabwean working as a shop assistant in Johannesburg.

Sometimes there are so many of these organisations that you don't pay attention any more. At times, hardly a week passes without being visited by some of these people, or they send fliers inviting you to some meeting. They don't serve any purpose. Why should I join them? My main concern here is to make money for my

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<sup>133</sup> Interview with Dr G. Shana, Church leader in SA and Zimbabwe .13/08/06

<sup>134</sup> Ibid

family back home.<sup>135</sup>

Nomusa had this to say about the ZDF;

These guys only serve to make South African government aware of us illegal immigrants, thus bringing, the police on us and adding to the xenophobic attitude on us. They should leave trying change Mugabe and work for the betterment of migrant's human rights. We are vulnerable to xenophobia, underpayment and outright abuse by the police<sup>136</sup>

This attitude was repeated by other interviewees and was mentioned as an attitude that needs to be won over by activists, saying that if there was democracy in Zimbabwe, the economy would do well and thus no need to cross borders illegally. This is a sign that much civic education needs to go to the Diaspora community on the work of pro-democracy CSOs. Yet Shadrek was full of compliments for the Diaspora CSOs

These CSOs are doing a wonderful job, they helped my colleagues and I to get out of Lindela, where we were about to be deported back to Zimbabwe. They helped me get my asylum papers.<sup>137</sup>

Yet as the study probed further it became clear that the affiliates of the ZDF were known, as they had been active for more than 5 years. The ones that helped with humanitarian and legal assistance were on the lips of majority. This was easy to understand as most of the immigrants are undocumented and therefore illegal aliens, thus needing help to survive humanly, whilst seeking legal residence.

Another Zimbabwean James, who is 34, said that he once attended a meeting organised by one of the Diaspora Civic groups. He said that it was well attended. "The problem", he said,

Was that there was not much organisation. Every body wanted to talk at the same time. And they talked about money, money, money. Anyway, I don't trust these guys...<sup>138</sup>

When asked about the allegation of demands for money, a member of the treasury said that only affiliated organisations and members were obliged to play a financial role. He said that this was necessary because it was the ZDF's responsibility to pay for renting offices,

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<sup>135</sup> Interview with Nomusa, refugee, 11/08/06

<sup>136</sup> Ibid

<sup>137</sup> Interview with Shadrek, asylum seeker, 12/08/06

<sup>138</sup> Ibid

booking halls for meetings and future staff salaries. Since 2005, said the official, all expenses had been covered by the executive members. This, obviously, has repercussions on the membership and performance of the organisation. It is likely under these circumstances that those who pay the most money can actually influence the allocation of positions that they want to hold in the organisation, and cannot easily be removed from those positions.

James's words were echoed by several other interviewees, both men and women, who said that they came to South Africa to look for money, and not for politics. The cross-border traders -most of whom are women- said that they hardly ever get the time to pay attention to, let alone attend, these kinds of meetings. They also emphasised the fact that 'every Zimbabwean' was looking for money, and some members of these organisations were also using their organisations to raise funds for themselves.<sup>139</sup>

This view -of money being more important than country- is widely held in South Africa and other countries -especially in Europe-. It has been said that in reality, Zimbabweans in the Diaspora are benefiting from the economic doldrums that Zimbabwe is in.<sup>140</sup> The Zimbabwean dollar is always falling against major currencies, and, because of the resultant hyperinflation in the country, Zimbabweans abroad send foreign currency in, change it on the black market and fetch huge amounts of Zimbabwean dollars with which they buy property and other luxuries in Zimbabwe. Some of them use hard foreign currency to purchase the property and luxuries, while the country's coffers are dry of foreign currency.

No doubt this raises serious questions about the commitment of Zimbabweans in the Diaspora to the democratic cause. No wonder there has been a harsh exchange between them and those at home, the latter who have questioned the overall commitment of those in the Diaspora to changing things in the country.<sup>141</sup> They have accused the Diaspora exiles of being cowards who ran away from the war front, sought comfort and luxury abroad and now seek to tell Zimbabweans at home what is good for them<sup>142</sup> (i.e. democratic change).

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<sup>139</sup> Interview with cross-boarder trader at NI station, Johannesburg 7/08/06

<sup>140</sup> IOM document on Zimbabwe Immigrants. [www.iom.iom](http://www.iom.iom)

<sup>141</sup> Raftopoulos 2006:26

<sup>142</sup> Ibid

When asked about this, the ZDF chairperson could neither confirm nor deny the allegations, but said that everybody was entitled to their own opinions; and in any case not everyone in Zimbabwe was in the liberation war of independence (1975-79), front fighting. Others were very inactive, or actually opposed the struggle for democratic change. The most important thing, the chairperson said, was that at least some people were doing something, both inside Zimbabwe and outside. He also mentioned the need to raise the world's awareness of the situation in the country, and said that it was those people in the Diaspora who were best positioned to do this.<sup>143</sup>

#### **4.4 Linkages, Synergies and Challenges**

In this section we continue to draw on interviews conducted during field work and explore the findings towards ZDF legitimacy, effectiveness on its advocacy actions within the pro-democracy movement and its influence on relations with Zimbabwe and South Africa governments. One interviewee who preferred to be known as Marufu had to say this about Diaspora activism within the pro-democracy movement.

I have been personally miffed by the fact that even opposition leaders based in Zimbabwe (MDC) have since 2000 viewed us as opponents rather than fellow comrade. We have the capacity to organize and be recognized as "the" future of Zimbabwe. If anything, we are the ones who have lived democracy. It is our right to organize ourselves in any form if both Zanu (PF) and the MDC pretend that we do not exist. We are denied the vote and the opposition we worked hard to form and strengthen feeds rallies with rhetoric against us.<sup>144</sup>

In chapter one this study noted that the problem within the pro-democracy movement is that the Diaspora activists are even viewed as competitors to the opposition MDC.<sup>145</sup> This quote above confirms the feeling of being somehow unwanted and illegitimate actors. How is the ZDF handling different players within their socio-political environment?

##### **4.4.1 Solidarity networks with South African Civil Society**

The ZDF leadership says that it is mainly because of its efforts that linkages have been

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<sup>143</sup> Interview with Forum chairperson Daniel Molokele 05/08/06

<sup>144</sup> Interview with Marufu, 6/08/06

<sup>145</sup> Raftopoulos, 2006:53

formed between the dire situation in Zimbabwe and regional civil society organisations.<sup>146</sup> It quoted as dramatic the solidarity between Zimbabwean civic society organisations and COSATU, the South African Labour body. Other organisations it has formed linkages with in South Africa are the Zimbabwe Liaison Office (ZLO), the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSV), South African NGO Coalition (SANGOCO), the South African Council of Churches, the South African Catholic Bishops Conference, the Inter-Denominational Women's Prayer League (IDWPL), the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS), IDASA, the Institute of Justice and Reconciliation, the South African Communist Party, the Young Communists League and several youth and student organisations.<sup>147</sup>

They also mentioned the formation of the Zimbabwe Solidarity Forum (ZSF), which was done with the support of major South African civil society organisations. It is a network of organizations that are involved in the promotion of solidarity for sustainable peace, democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe. The ZSF seeks to share perceptions and insights into the dynamics of the Zimbabwean context.<sup>148</sup> It also seeks to engage in initiatives aimed at influencing the situation in Zimbabwe and seek areas of synergy, as well as expose South African government and civil society to the latest information from key opinion leaders around the crisis in Zimbabwe.

Mr. Smith explained that within the ZSF, opinions on Zimbabwe range from extremely critical of the Mbeki's stance culminating in a call for total disengagement with the Zimbabwe government, to recognition of the delicacy of the relationship between the two countries.<sup>149</sup> Formal and informal meetings have been held between staff at the Zimbabwe embassy in South Africa and officials from the South African government, particularly involving the abuse of Zimbabweans in South Africa by xenophobic South Africans, and the large population of Zimbabweans in South Africa.<sup>150</sup>

The Zimbabwe Solidarity Forum says the challenges that it faced with Zimbabwe Diaspora CSOs were their non-unity and duplication of activities as well as the contestation for

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<sup>146</sup>Interview with Nora Chengeto 03/08/06

<sup>147</sup> Ibid

<sup>148</sup>Interview with Richard Smith, 10/08/06

<sup>149</sup> Ibid.



constituency, and space among themselves.<sup>151</sup> Another feature that ZSF noted was the division along lines of ethnicity and party politics and keen competition for resources within Zimbabwe Diaspora CSOs.<sup>152</sup> There were also division in-terms of governance ideologies; some felt federalism was the key to managing the country's economy and others agreed with the current Unitarian system of central government.<sup>153</sup>

Yet commendation had come from member affiliates of the ZSF about the coming together of Zimbabwean Diaspora CSOs in 2005, among them COSATU.

When challenged about why no one of Zimbabwean descent or Zimbabwean organization was represented on their board? The coordinator Mr. Smith felt that there might arise a conflict of interests as the ZSF was meant to be objective and neutral, without taking strongly the views of one side or other in the present political polarized climate in Zimbabwe. The fact that no Zimbabwean is part of the Zimbabwe Solidarity Forum, seemed not to go well with Diaspora CSOs, as they felt that they were now competing for space and resources from international donors and they were not sure how these funds that are raised on their crisis behalf are used.<sup>154</sup> In-fact some of the Zimbabwe Diaspora CSOs members said they suspected that most of the white face of South African civil society who are working on Zimbabwe, are themselves former Zimbabweans, who left the country in the first phase of Diaspora movement as expounded in chapter three.

#### **4.4.2 Interactions with the South African government**

The ZDF, according to its treasurer Mr. Luke Dzipange, has as one of its main objectives, as to document the number of Zimbabweans in South Africa. The ZDF has already started a database through one of its members, SAWIMA. Dzipange sees this as benefiting the South African government as it will enhance the processes of integration of immigrants into South African society. Secondly, creating such a database should help to counter the general perception that immigrants and Zimbabweans in particular, are not well-organized and are mainly involved in criminal activities. Undocumented individuals are more likely to

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<sup>150</sup> Ibid

<sup>151</sup> Ibid

<sup>152</sup> Ibid

<sup>153</sup> Ibid

<sup>154</sup> Interview with chairperson of CCZ Mr. Luke Dzipange, 05/08/06

be vulnerable to the stigma of xenophobic attitudes.<sup>155</sup>

The South African government agrees that some organization within the immigrants themselves will help, as suggested by Mr. Molife of the Ministry of Home Affairs.<sup>156</sup> The ZDF felt there was little room to maneuver within the ANC led South African government or shift its “quiet diplomacy” on Zimbabwe. The South African government also used its police against Zimbabwean immigrants.<sup>157</sup>

Adding further to the suspicion of supporting a repressive regime due to historical ties and roles, Mr. Molife of the South African Ministry of Home Affairs said the Zimbabwe pro-democracy groups were ungrateful to their government for bringing independence and development. He however acknowledged that a lot could be done by his government and the civic groups, but people should remember that Zimbabwe is a sovereign country.<sup>158</sup>

It is this whole ideology of Zimbabwe being a sovereign state that has made most countries in the SADC region and the continent adopt a hands-off stance on the crisis in the country. African leaders tend to see and treat each other as brothers, much to the detriment of their citizenry. The citizens are meant to be eternally grateful to the liberators, fulfilling the saying ‘see no evil, hear no evil and talk no evil’

Zimbabwean human rights lawyer based in the Diaspora Mr Brian Kagoro had this to say about the South African government;

It has interfered adversely; if South Africa had not done anything...it had just sat in South Africa and concerned itself with governing itself that would have been a blessing for us. The fact that South Africa adversely interfered, took positions, positions that actually tipped the balance of forces in favor of ZANU PF the ruling party in Zimbabwe is what we are complaining about. Whether or not South Africa had not acted would not have been of concern to us. What is a concern to us is that South Africa actually interfered to maintain the status quo.<sup>159</sup>

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<sup>155</sup> Ibid

<sup>156</sup> Interview with Mr. Molife of South African Home Affairs Ministry 09/08/06

<sup>157</sup> *Herald* 26 June 2006

<sup>158</sup> Interview with Home Affairs Mr. Molife, Johannesburg 09/08/06

<sup>159</sup> Interview with Brian Kagoro, SW Radio 23/09/06

Some have said that if South Africa was not a constitutional democracy, with strong institutions of adhering to the rule of law, international covenants and international business interests, it would have deported most of the pro-democracy activists based there. In international relations aspect, it is understandable why the South African government has both a political and economic interests on what happens to its largest trading partner in the region.<sup>160</sup>

#### **4.4.3 Interactions with other Zimbabwe CSOs based in South Africa**

As is now evident, the ZDF does not work with affiliate members only, but shares the space for democratization with like-minded organisations on Zimbabwe, in South Africa. One such organisation is the Crisis Coalition in South Africa. Through its affiliate member, Southern African Women Institute Migration Affairs (SAWIMA), together with Crisis Coalition, the ZDF organised a demonstration and a petition to the UN's representative in Pretoria, to alert the UN that the recommendations put forward after an inquiry into the Operation Restore Order had not been implemented by the Zimbabwe government, and people who had been affected continued to suffer and to live in dilapidated structures where disease and the elements cause them a lot of misery.<sup>161</sup> According to Crisis Coalition in SA representative Mrs Eleanor Sisulu and Mr. Daniel Molokele, the Forum and Crisis Coalition collaborated towards the constituency in Zimbabwe, since Crisis Coalition is an off-shoot of Crisis Coalition (Zimbabwe), a Zimbabwe based organisation. Besides collaborating in demonstrations, they also had advocacy activities towards influencing the South African government's policy on Zimbabwe; towards helping legal and illegal immigrants seeking political asylum and towards clarifying the Zimbabwe crisis to the South African community at large.<sup>162</sup>

A question was posed to the ZDF that as Crisis Coalition was formed earlier than the ZDF doing more or less the same issues was there a need of the ZDF? In an interview the Vice Chairman of the Forum Mr. Sox Chikowero had the following to say as the reason for the formation of the Forum. The Diaspora CSOs felt that Crisis Coalition (S.A.) was a sub-

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<sup>160</sup> Murray:155

<sup>161</sup> The research-study visited the demonstrations that were held in Pretoria, South Africa on the 9/08/06

<sup>162</sup> Interview with Eleanor Sisulu and Daniel Molokele. (Separately), 3<sup>rd</sup> August and 5<sup>th</sup> August 2006 respectively.

office of Crisis Coalition the organization in Zimbabwe therefore is not a decision maker but an implementer of decisions made in Zimbabwe.<sup>163</sup> Yet Crisis Coalition (SA) felt becoming an affiliate of the ZDF would mean changing its constitution, as they were just an off-shoot of an operating organization in Zimbabwe.

The Zimbabwean Government has established at least one Diaspora civic group to try to give the impression that it also enjoys considerable political support among Zimbabweans in the Diaspora. This group is known as the December 19 Movement and headed by Coltrane Chimurenga, is based in the United States of America, with a chapter in South Africa<sup>164</sup>. It seems this organization works with the Zimbabwe security agents to infiltrate and weaken the agenda of pro-democracy CSOs in South Africa. This research study tried to engage this organization, but was unsuccessful

#### **4.4.4 Interactions with the Zimbabwe government**

One major weakness, which may also be seen as strength of the ZDF, is that there is no communication between its affiliates and the Zimbabwean government, or the Zimbabwean embassy in South Africa. When asked how they could achieve their goal -of bringing democratic governance to Zimbabwe-, Mr. Molokele said the network of CSOs saw no point in engaging the Zimbabwe government or its subsidiaries because most of the activists were in the Diaspora because of the repression back home, therefore, there was no reason to interact with the repressive regime, or its representatives. Most of the immigrants in South Africa were classified as illegal; they saw the embassy as completely aloof and uncaring towards their economic plight and need for legal papers.<sup>165</sup>

According to Mr. Chigidi, an official at the Zimbabwean embassy, no one at the embassy knew of the existence of the ZDF. He went so far as to lament that Zimbabweans in South Africa did not visit the embassy, or use it in any way, except in death cases. He said that he had not seen or heard of any petition concerning Zimbabweans in South Africa, or any talk about the lack of democracy in the country. Mr Chigidi felt that Zimbabwe's relations with South Africa economical and political 'had never been better', in spite of the 'noise' made

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<sup>163</sup> Interview with Forum Vice Chair of ZDF Mr. S Chikowero, 06/08/06.

<sup>164</sup> Raftopoulos, 2006:53

<sup>165</sup> Interview with Daniel Molokele 11/08/06. Interview with Mr. Chigidi of Zimbabwe Embassy (SA), 5<sup>th</sup> August 2006

by the Western countries and pro-democracy activists.<sup>166</sup> This comment was surprising as he had earlier said the embassy knew of no pro-democracy CSOs based in South Africa

Clearly, members of the ZDF do not see their government or its embassy as of use. Indeed they expressed fears about 'infiltration' by government security agents within their organizations, and keep their distance from officials representing the ruling regime. There is no doubt the Zimbabwe regime has quite a lot of interest in surveillance and intelligence gathering among the Diaspora in South Africa.

#### **4.4.5 Relations with political parties**

The Zimbabwe Diaspora Forum according to its document is apolitical. The ZDF says it prohibits political parties from engaging in its activities. It says it defines itself as civil society space, independent of governments, and its participants reject violence as a method of political action. Yet most of the people in the leadership of these pro-democracy groups are also members of the opposition political party MDC. The first dilemma that this creates is that civil societies are better off not seeking political power. Once they do so, they cease to be civil society, which is objective.<sup>167</sup> The second is that the MDC itself split into two factions, and this has split its members, some of whom belong to the same civic group. Thus there is now polarisation within the civil society groups, and the leadership in the groups acknowledged that it is a real challenge.<sup>168</sup>

The prohibition on political parties, which have 'traditionally' been considered the only way to participation in political action, was questioned.<sup>169</sup> The ZDF says the prohibition was to prevent the forum being penetrated by inter-party strife, which derives from the goal, proper to political parties, of gaining political power. The chairperson of the forum says it was believed that parties would all, quite naturally compete to 'take over' the forum as a new tool to mobilising support, and seek to make them political party instruments.

Yet instead of seeing this cooption of civic members to political parties as a problem the ZDF leadership saw it as a necessary 'evil'.

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<sup>166</sup> Interview with Mr. Chigidi of Zimbabwe Embassy (SA), 08/08/2006

<sup>167</sup> Diamond, 1979:32

<sup>168</sup> Interview with Eleanor Sisulu Crisis Coalition 03/08/06

<sup>169</sup> Interview with Nqabutho of the MDC-Mutambara faction 08/08/06

This is part of the strong alliances with other oppositional forces in civil society, necessary for democratic change in culture and way of doing things, as politicians and civic actors feed of each other and thus shape each other in terms of democratic tendencies<sup>170</sup>.

Thus alliance through individuals with oppositional political party is seen necessary in terms of sharing ideas and strategies.

But, the question of leadership has become fundamental. The formation of the MDC did two things. It fundamentally weakened the civic leadership and the architecture of civil society. In the euphoria of 1999 and 2000 and the belief that MDC would sweep to power, what happened is that a lot of the civic structures mortgaged themselves to the political process within the MDC.<sup>171</sup>

It would not be practical to identify and prevent members of the political parties or vice versa from participating in each other movements as individuals, as alluded earlier, indeed many of the ZDF members are affiliated to political parties. The hope is that no one will seek to turn the Forum space into an instrument for party political aims. Yet the challenge for effectiveness comes with the legitimacy given by the constituency that both civil society and political parties share.

#### **4.4.6 Internals' Expectations of Externals**

Zimbabweans abroad have learned from the communities in which they live and would like to impart such knowledge to the home community in ways that would stimulate growth and community development bridging the gap between the Diaspora and the home-based communities.<sup>172</sup>

Contrary to expectations, as alluded by newspaper reports<sup>173</sup> as stated in chapter one of hostility between internals and external activists, the CSOs in Zimbabwe tended to be all in support of their relationship with the CSOs in the Diaspora. The National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), which has over two hundred and fifty (250) groups affiliated to it and is one of the largest and most effective against the Mugabe regime said it valued the efforts of the Zimbabwe Diaspora CSOs and others outside Zimbabwe, and treasured their association with them for the exchange of ideas and information.<sup>174</sup> Its South African spokesman, Mr. Mao, said that there was an advantage in numbers, particularly in raising

<sup>170</sup> Interview Chairperson ZDF 10<sup>th</sup> August 2006

<sup>171</sup> Magaisa :2006

<sup>172</sup> Interview with Musekiwa T, Sandton South Africa 09/08/06

<sup>173</sup> *The Standard*, 23 February 2006.

resources, and raising international awareness on the plight of people in Zimbabwe. He dismissed the myth that people in the Diaspora were cowards who had fled the heat back home, and simply shouted from the havens of sound economies. He however felt that there should be more communication between the ordinary people at home and Diaspora CSOs.<sup>175</sup>

The Zimbabwe Diaspora Forum should not be seen as the answer to the challenges of our time; it should be seen as a viable part of the answers(s) with a very distinctive contribution. Other spaces for action, for campaigning, for taking decisions are necessary for the democratic struggle to move forward, thus the Diaspora is an important space for incubating these.<sup>176</sup>

Another Zimbabwe based CSO, Crisis Coalition in Zimbabwe, said that the fact that it saw fit to open offices in South Africa was testimony of how they see activism from the Diaspora, and their input in terms of ideas and resources<sup>177</sup>. Its major challenges were several, and included convincing the South African government that 'quiet diplomacy' was not the way forward for Zimbabwe. Another was to convince ordinary South Africans that those calling for democracy in Zimbabwe were not detractors of the land reform and puppets of the West (as Mugabe often says).<sup>178</sup> That is why they set up the offices in South Africa. The same trend continued with other CSOs in Zimbabwe like the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions and others, who all supported the need to fight from the Diaspora.

#### **4.5 Conclusion**

Thus, to conclude this chapter finding show that the coming together of twenty Zimbabwean Diaspora CSOs in South Africa is a mile stone within the whole agenda of the pro-democracy movement. The interviews with ordinary illegal and legal migrants shows that a lot has to be done by the Diaspora CSOs in influencing them to be pro active politically towards Zimbabwe. It became clear that there are tensions between the CSOs, the Zimbabwean embassy, the South African government and opposition political party.

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<sup>174</sup> Interview with Mr. Nyika Mao at Crisis Coalition Offices, 3/08/06

<sup>175</sup> Ibid

<sup>176</sup> Ibid

<sup>177</sup> Interview with Mufema J. Legal advisor of Crisis coalition 13/08/06

<sup>178</sup> Interview with Eleanor Sisulu of Crisis Coalition(SA), 3<sup>rd</sup> August 2006

Yet it was of interest to note that there was co-operation between internal Zimbabwean CSOs and exile Zimbabwean CSOs.



## **5.0 CHAPTER FIVE -THE TEST OF CSOs ACTION- FINAL ANALYSIS**

### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter shall bring out clear analytical conclusion from what was collected from the field and critique it using concepts and characteristic of civil society expounded in chapter 2. Are the Zimbabwe Diaspora CSOs a legitimate actor within the pro-democracy movement towards democratization? If so how effective are their actions and what are causes their successes and failures. It looks at critically the role of SADC, in particular South Africa on the crisis in Zimbabwe. It is important to see how the Diaspora CSOs have fared so far in utilising and maximising the spaces their share with other players and discourses, such as HIV/AIDS, Poverty and xenophobia. Could their spaces be fragmented and lack an overall sense of direction or coherence? It is important to hear what is the possible future of the largest Zimbabwe Diaspora group (undocumented and documented political and economic migrants) based in South Africa.

### **5.2 Legitimacy and Effectiveness of Diaspora CSO**

It is the assertion to demonstrate by this paper that, the fact that twenty (20) organisations in South Africa -who themselves have affiliate membership of over 10 000<sup>179</sup>- have voluntarily come to affiliate to the ZDF, a network run by a few individuals who are using their own personal funds, gives legitimacy for activism. The fact that precedence has been set in countries like Georgia, Malawi and India of Diaspora activism gives legitimacy that this is space to be exploited for democratization purposes. The forceful dispersion of Zimbabweans on because of ethnic cleansing acts (1983-86) and abuse and torture of opposition and civil society activists (2000- to date) is criteria enough to fit Zimbabweans to be Diaspora. This then allows them to act towards their 'homeland' with a desire to return and therefore their actions are towards returning to a homeland that is tolerant of diversity. They seek for a homeland that does not give identity because of race, tribe, gender or party political affiliation. The fact that there is applaud by both South African CSOs and the CSOs in Zimbabwe concerning the coming together of these CSOs in the Diaspora gives credence towards legitimacy to the ZDF. The seriousness of the ZDF itself

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<sup>179</sup> Interview with Daniel Molokele 10/08/06

towards achieving its goal of bringing about democratic governance to Zimbabwe cannot be doubted. This is exemplified in the use of their personal resources to run the affairs of the organisation, the meetings they organise within South African different actors and the alliances that they have worked so far in western countries. The study concludes that these are legitimate actors, whose effectiveness is affected by the factors expounded in the coming paragraphs. Their biggest challenge lies in mobilization and convincing the ordinary migrant that they have set up this alliance network for the benefit of all, in spite of status in society.

However, from Ndegwa's writings, as expounded in chapter 2, there are four conditions that must be in place in order for civil societies to democratize their governments, and these are *organisation, resource availability, alliances and political opportunity*. It is against these that the CSOs' Forum should be measured.

**Organisation:** There has been doubt about the organisation of the Diaspora CSOs and the effectiveness of their activities. There has not been much effort to seriously mobilise the Diasporas en-mass. Except for Crisis Coalition (SA), the rest of CSOs have poor structures to influence mobilization. The affiliates to the ZDF lack coordination between activities in Zimbabwe and those in the Diaspora. The formation of the network under the ZDF (2005) has seen an office manned by the coordinator, who though works on a voluntary basis. There are well-kept records of activities such as meetings and workshops. There are also clear leadership structures, with a Chairman, secretary an executive committee made up of five members. This allows then for them to work towards being an easily identifiable organisation and thus accountable and legitimate to act on behalf of the multitudes who identify with the cause of democratization from the Diaspora.

In their structural organization they have been cognisant of the ethnic polarized environment, in that they have balanced the members of the executive committee between the two major ethnicities i.e. Shona and Ndebele. Yet it is the Diaspora CSOs failure to put a united front in their organization quite earlier (2002-5) that has caused the struggle for democratization to wither on. Had they utilised their political space in the Diaspora in a more organised manner a lot would have been achieved in pushing the region (SADC) and the international community to influence a democratic polity in Zimbabwe.

**Resources:** This is a thorny issue. Many a times what we term ethnic, ideological and racial conflicts is really fuelled by personality greed on resources.<sup>180</sup> The material benefits offered by Diaspora activism has led in some cases to the emergence of briefcase Diaspora organisations headed by individuals for whom fighting for democratic change in Zimbabwe has become a lucrative personality industry.<sup>181</sup> Mr Molokele of the ZDF says this is one of the reasons why a forum of affiliates was set up, so that CSOs can be self regulating and not compete and fraudulently use donor funds.<sup>182</sup> As has been said, the ZDF seeks to derive funding for its R30 000 monthly budgets from willing Zimbabweans in the Diaspora. These funds have not been forthcoming and, so far, the organisation has been funded by the committee members. Executive members say that they shall only need funding from donors for two years, after which the organisation shall be able to sustain itself. This is self defeating! They need to be able to galvanise international support and that includes funding, so as to help sustain the democratization struggle back home. Although civil society is not in the centre of power of democratic governance, its partnership with opposition politics puts a strong arm on it to coordinate resources. Yet the challenge lies in the CSOs setting up structures and systems that allow transparency and accountability. This will enhance their credibility and legitimacy. More of the suggested role they can play in this area is found in recommendations.

**Alliances:** Though there are 20 affiliate members to the ZDF, these are mostly Zimbabwean. The fact that the network has been able to unite different racial, ideology-political and ethnic groups is a huge plus. In many cases efforts at unity in Zimbabwe have been compromised by race, party political affiliation, and ethnicity. Alliances have also been formed with Solidarity Forum a grouping of South Africa CSOs, and a few others in the United Kingdom. Diaspora CSOs are networking with the South Africa government, on several issues concerning migrants, this if well executed will influence her foreign policy on Zimbabwe to democracy's advantage. Despite this, it is the study's view that more alliances and networks should be made, especially at global/international level. This way their cause will be heard by a wider audience, and perhaps funding and ideas can come

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<sup>180</sup>Raftopoulos,2006:53

<sup>181</sup> Ibid

<sup>182</sup> Interview with Daniel Molokele 10/08/06

from there. Strong alliances with other oppositional forces in civil society, in particular with Crisis Coalition in South Africa could hasten and strengthen the role and position of the pro-democracy movement and its influence. This could add value legitimacy, effectiveness and open accountability.

**Political Opportunity:** The Mugabe regime has tightened its grip on every possible opportunity for political expression in Zimbabwe. The regime has also tightened its grip on the media; there is very little in the form of the independent press, and the radio and TV are state owned. Yet to be realistic this is where the Diaspora CSOs have space to push for a different political agenda. They live in an environment –South Africa- where respect of rule of law and of international human rights covenants is the rule not the exception. They live in a relatively open and democratic society. Here is where the struggle for Zimbabwe’s democratization could be strengthened and pushed to another level, as Kondlo quoted by Raftopoulos says

The extent to which political structures of host countries are willing to tolerate various forms and expressions of Diaspora activism has also had an impact on the effectiveness of Diaspora activism.<sup>183</sup>

There is the **complicity factor**, of the South Africa government’s questionable ‘quiet diplomacy’, towards Zimbabwe, in spite of the fact that the arrival of as many as 3 million Zimbabweans has fueled a backlash of public anger, human rights abuse and mob violence. As noted in chapter 3 and 4 Diaspora communities face discrimination from host countries. Here it’s noted, in the way South Africans accuse Zimbabweans of fomenting crime, spreading AIDS and stealing jobs in a country with a 40% unemployment rate by working for rock-bottom wages that local people refuse.<sup>184</sup> The South Africa government and some countries in the SADC region have been reluctant to offer material and moral support to Zimbabwean Diaspora activism.<sup>185</sup> There has been little coverage by the media of Diasporas activism by SADC host countries. To some extent deliberate and confirming the notion that SADC, in particular South Africa is in complicity with the Harare regime.

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<sup>183</sup> Raftopoulos, 2006:53

<sup>184</sup> . *The Cape Argus* (SA), 31 May 2006.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid

It has emerged from the Sisulu Commission that the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), acting on the instructions of its managing director, Snuki Zikalala, blacklisted certain civil society voices on Zimbabwe because of particular views they hold on the crisis. Among those banned from the station is Arch Bishop Pius Ncube of the Roman Catholic Church, *Mail and Guardian Publisher* Trevor Ncube, and Eleanor Sisulu, the media manager for the Crisis Coalition South Africa office and political analyst Moeletsi Mbeki, young brother to Thabo, who is a strong critic of Mugabe's policies.<sup>186</sup>

Yet, there has been creativity by Diasporas to break the status quo as created by the Zimbabwe regime towards media coverage. Internet newspapers and satellite radios have sprouted as referred to, in chapter 1 and 3. However there is continuously a need to creatively win the foreign media to the Zimbabwe pro-democracy cause as this would enhance citizen participation of both migrant Zimbabweans and the host South Africans. However in spite of the complicity regional factor, the newly formed United Nations Human Rights Council offers a historic opportunity to show resolve on human rights compliance across the world. As South Africa is amongst the newly elected members on the UN Human Rights Council, the Diaspora CSOs are starting to use this as political opportunity to discuss concerns about the deteriorating human rights situation and explore ideas how to reduce human rights abuses in Zimbabwe.

### **5.2.1 Leadership Gap towards effectiveness.**

We want a strategy that will deliver the country to the people in a democratic manner. Why not another armed struggle, that is the language African leaders understand. These momentary demonstrations do not work. Their only purpose is to try and raise the profiles of these leaders who are living well on workers' subscriptions and donations from the international community.<sup>187</sup>

Numerous are the reasons why little response to action by pro-democracy actors has taken place both in Zimbabwe and in South Africa; some of the reasons why human rights violations continue, why space for democratic politics has not increased, rests with the people, some with the leadership.

From the people's side, in Zimbabwe, grinding poverty has taken its toll: people are weakened from malnutrition, many eating only one meal a day, and are using all their

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<sup>186</sup> Bomba:2006

<sup>187</sup> Interview with ordinary Zimbabwean on the streets of Harare. *SW Radio* 06/10/06

remaining energy in trying to scrape together the wherewithal to feed, clothe and educate their families. In South Africa, fear of the police, fear of deportation, economic survival and the pressure to feed those back home, also limit the political engagement of many. There is also the issue of **leadership** and its legitimacy when it has failed to harness and direct the anger of the people. The political parties and civic movements in Zimbabwe and in the Diaspora have consistently raised expectations, only to let Zimbabweans down by failing to deliver<sup>188</sup>. The Leadership is caught up in personal, ethnic and political ambition squabbles. There is also a sign of fatigue on the part of many leadership actors, shown by the petty complaints of who is doing this and that. These personality clashes and ideological differences have 'militated against the formulation and implementation of a common program of action', thus failure to see and set clear objectives or goals.<sup>189</sup> Failed promises disillusion the people because they lose faith in their leaders, thus influencing society not to feel legitimately represented.

### **5.2.2 Socio-Political Environment Challenge**

To be fair to the ZDF and the whole pro-democracy movement in Zimbabwe and outside, there are very real obstacles which stand in the way of successful implementation of more democratic forms politics in Zimbabwe, these include the extremely limited media coverage of the opposition; human rights abuses by state apparatus using oppressive legislation such as POSA and AIPPA all designed to hamper dissemination of information to the masses; and an apathetic and complicit South African government and media who, for reasons best known to themselves, have consistently failed to deal decisively with their neighbor regime or to support the alternatives to the status quo. Equally, there are risks in involving oneself in the democratization process. No one who has lived in Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe for any length of time is unaware of them, as one known activist and writer noted;

Recently the world saw shocking images of Mugabe's police brutalizing workers who dared to raise their voices. For simply exercising their democratic right to peacefully march in protest against unbearable levels of poverty, demanding an end to harassment of informal traders and calling for access to ARVs, ZCTU workers

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<sup>188</sup> Zimbabwe: An Opposition Strategy:www.kubatana.net

<sup>189</sup> Raftopoulos 2006:53

were brutalized by Mugabe's running dogs. This is the point history must record; the impunity and well-documented cruelty of the Zimbabwe Republic Police has blessings from Mugabe himself.<sup>190</sup>

The Zimbabwean regime will violently suppress any dissent and as alluded in chapter 4 the Zimbabwe regime will not hesitate to send the secret agents to infiltrate any activity outside the country either, as reported that the CIO have been in Botswana and South Africa.<sup>191</sup>

### **5.3 Conclusion**

The Zimbabwe Diaspora CSOs have a claim to legitimacy as actors within the pro-democracy movement, as acknowledged firstly by Zimbabwean immigrants who have come together and affiliate to form the Zimbabwe Diaspora Forum. The alliances –in South Africa- and internationally- that work in consultation with the Zimbabwe Diaspora CSOs are further proof for claim towards legitimacy. The political opportunity they have used in the space they find them self in South Africa is congratulated, yet the effectiveness towards advocacy and lobbying action has been hampered by different economic, social, and political factors.

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<sup>190</sup> Bomba:2006

<sup>191</sup> Raftopoulos, 2006:54





## 6.0 CHAPTER SIX –CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 6.1 Factors in conclusion of study

These internal, national, regional and international factors all have a serious bearing on the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Diaspora CSOs in helping democratize Zimbabwe. The lack of synergy, effective communication and collaboration between those at home and those in the Diaspora is a major contributing internal factor to slowing the effectiveness of advocacy for democratic change. South Africa 'quite diplomacy' in spite of the influx of Zimbabweans running away from the harsh economic, social and political climate in Zimbabwe has begun to look like complicity of an African political brotherhood. The split on ethnic racial and, intellectual lines of the MDC has led to serious polarization of pro-democracy civil society and diverted energies from common goals. The high undocumented levels of HIV/AIDS among the Diasporas immigrants, who are reluctant to seek medical attention for fear of deportation? The hostile environment on the ordinary and mostly likely undocumented immigrants by ordinary South Africans, all delay and hinder the energy and effectiveness of South African based Zimbabwe CSOs and individuals towards action and strategies of democratization. This then has slowed down their impact to be legitimate and seriously represent the Diaspora voice.

So, going by these measures, it is difficult to see the ZDF and other pro-democracy movements realise their dream in the near future. However, the united platform of South African based CSOs under ZDF and their commitment to non violence action can be a good beginning. As has been said before, civil society has brought down authoritarian regimes before. Kenya did it in 1990, and it was through unity, extensive mobilisation of resources, linking up with donor agencies and joining other opposition political forces.<sup>192</sup> Keck and Sikkink write on the 'boomerang effect' whereby civil society uses their links with the outside world to put pressure on their own governments.<sup>193</sup> All these factors have not been well followed on and thus executed erratically.

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<sup>192</sup> Ndegwa,1996: 15

<sup>193</sup> Encarnacion,2003:65

Therefore to sum up this study opinions really do differ as to the purpose of civil society; whether it can really bring about democratic governance, or not, or whether it can simply facilitate it. Evidence has been found all over the world including from Africa -Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Malawi- that indeed civil society within and in the Diaspora -Georgia, Serbia- can help bring about change in polity and political governments, but not necessarily improve the quality of governance in the process. Further more, there are also disagreements on the effectiveness of different strategies necessary for success. Yet clear objectives, multiple strategies of action, multiple spaces and good communication enhance positive impact. The case of the Diaspora activism although complex is accompanied with precedence in other countries as expounded of the Sikhs of Punjab in India who are exercising their right to self determination in India. It is important to note that behind so many governmental, human rights initiatives in the UN, stands civil society, advocating, informing and raising its voice. Civil society together with the media, are the conscience of governments; they expose wrongs, educate, mobilise, and advocate reform and articulate aspirations of peoples around the world.<sup>194</sup> There is no magic shopping list for increasing political activity in Zimbabwe or in the Diaspora and belief in the political process as a way of delivering positive outcomes. There are no quick fixes to the problems bedeviling Zimbabwe. Raising political engagement in our society is hard, and will take time, energy and commitment.<sup>195</sup>

## **6.2 The question of Complexity**

The complexity of the people in the Diaspora is that in a sense they are another economic indirect allies of the Zimbabwean regime. By sending resources through remittances back home and using the parallel market, the funds they contribute become quite substantial and this alleviates people suffering in Zimbabwe. Thus the more people are cushioned by these resources the more they will not seek an alternative way of being governed. What would happen if 'hypothetically' all the people in the Diaspora went back to Zimbabwe at one go? With their new empowered knowledge of living in Democracies, would they not be able to

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<sup>194</sup> Anheier:6

<sup>195</sup> Itayi G:2006

influence action from all corners of Zimbabwe, leading to political change? What if they stopped sending resources back to Zimbabwe, how would the masses react? Maybe this is a gap to be filled by other studies and research.

### 6.3 Recommendations

*What is it, then, that is needed to rectify the situation? What is needed to successfully implement peaceful Actions towards democratization and good governance in Zimbabwe?*

- To pro-democracy CSOs. The participants within the Diaspora CSOs and all oppositional actors contesting the public space need to be absolutely committed to the principle of **using democratic and non-violent means**. For so long as people fear that there are agent provocateurs among the process -who may well incite violence in the course of democratization- peace loving Zimbabweans will remain hesitant about joining a programme of sustained democratization action.
- To the Zimbabwean government: Repeal or amend all national legislation that is incompatible with international human rights law and standards, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. In particular, repeal or substantially amend repressive provisions of the Public Order and Security Act.<sup>196</sup>
- Respect the rights of human rights defenders to do their work in the promotion of human rights, as articulated in the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.<sup>197</sup>

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<sup>196</sup> Human Rights Watch: September 2006

<sup>197</sup> Ibid



## Appendix A

### ORGANISATIONS AFLLIATED TO THE FORUM

| NAME OF ORGANISATION AND ADDRESS   | CONTACT PERSONS & POSITION HELD  | CELL      | EMAIL ADDRESS  |
|--|----------------------------------|-----------|--|
| Association of Zimbabwean Students in SA Universities<br>524 Kingshey Road<br>AUCKLAND PARK 2006 | Kurai Masenyama(President)       | 825468931 | <a href="mailto:kmasenyama@yahoo.co.uk">kmasenyama@yahoo.co.uk</a>             |
| Diabld Zimbabweans Abraod<br>Gauteng Council of Churchs<br>P O BOX 32339<br>BRAAMFONTEIN 2017    | Dinginkululeko Moyo(Coordinator) | 838573755 | <a href="mailto:dza2004@hotmail.com">dza2004@hotmail.com</a>                   |
| Concerned Citizens Of Zimbabwe<br>185 Smit Street<br>BRAAMFONTEIN                                | Luke Zunga(Chairman)             | 835281561 | <a href="mailto:candz@iafrica.com">candz@iafrica.com</a>                       |
| Concerned Zimbabweans Abroad<br>523 Church Street<br>ARCADIA                                     | Jay Jay Sibanda(President)       | 767127004 | <a href="mailto:cza_secretariat@yahoo.com">cza_secretariat@yahoo.com</a>       |
| Crossborder Association Of Journalists<br>114 Rissik Street<br>JOHANNESBURG                      | Magugu Nyathi(Co-ordinator)      | 843686681 | <a href="mailto:magu0974@yahoo.com">magu0974@yahoo.com</a>                     |
| Izenzo Kungemazwi Community College<br>401 Medical Hill<br>Claim & Kotze<br>HILLBROW             | Judith Ncube(Director)           | 832599059 | <a href="mailto:izenzo.college@yahoo.com">izenzo.college@yahoo.com</a>         |
| Zimbabwe Progressive Teacher's Union<br>Khotso House<br>Marshall & Sauer<br>JOHANNESBURG         | Proper Ndlovu(Treasurer)         | 734826182 | <a href="mailto:proendlovu@yahoo.com">proendlovu@yahoo.com</a>                 |
| Southern Women's Institute of Migration Affairs<br>87 De Korte Street<br>BRAAMFONTEIN            | Joyce Dube(Director)             | 726870876 | <a href="mailto:joycesuperkids@webmail.co.za">joycesuperkids@webmail.co.za</a> |
| Zimbabwe Torture Victim&Survivor Project<br>4th Floor<br>Braamfontein Centre<br>BRAAMFONTEIN     | Sox Chikohwero(Administrator)    | 722389192 | <a href="mailto:sox@freedmon@yahoo.co.uk">sox@freedmon@yahoo.co.uk</a>         |
| Tree of Life Project<br>4th Floor<br>Braamfontein Centre<br>BRAAMFONTEIN                         | Dolores Cortes (Coordinator)     | 723041990 | <a href="mailto:dolores.cortes@lantic.net">dolores.cortes@lantic.net</a>       |
| Zimbabwe Action Support Group  | Remember Moyo(Chairman)          | 720324223 | <a href="mailto:remember07@yahoo.com">remember07@yahoo.com</a>                 |
| Zimbabwe Arts Production   | Philip Mugabe (Chairperson)      | 721354220 | <a href="mailto:philipmug@yahoo.com">philipmug@yahoo.com</a>                   |
| Zimbabwe Human Rughts Lobby Group  | Phillani Khumalo(Chairman)       | 840577187 | <a href="mailto:phillanie2000@yahoo.com">phillanie2000@yahoo.com</a>           |
| Zimbabwe Political Victims Association<br>114 Rissik Street<br>Methodist House<br>BRAAMFONTEIN   | Oliver Kubikwa (Secretary )      | 725176066 | <a href="mailto:zipova@webmail.co.za">zipova@webmail.co.za</a>                 |
| Zimbabwe Refugee Association JHB   | Peter Muzanenhamo(Secretary)     |           |  |
| Zimbabwe Refugee Association Pmaritzburg   | Richard Chadya (Chairman)        | 842866150 |  |
| Zimbabwe Refugee Forum   | Sibanengi Dube (Chairman)        | 763233723 |  |
| ZIMONLINE<br>158 Jan Smuts Ave<br>ROSEBANK   | Daniel Molokele (Trustee)        | 729474815 | <a href="mailto:danielmolokele@yahoo.co.uk">danielmolokele@yahoo.co.uk</a>     |



**Annex A**, is the List of organizations and contacts affiliated to the Zimbabwe Diaspora Forum. (Find as an attachment)

**Annex B. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES; DIASPORA CIVIL SOCIETY**

1. Daniel Molokele, Human rights lawyer ZDF chairperson  
Rosebank, Johannesburg. 05/08/06 -10/08/06
2. Eleanor Sisulu, Advocacy coordinator Crisis Coalition (SA). Johannesburg 03/08/06
3. Sox Chikowero Zimbabwe Torture Victim & Survivor Project, Branfontein. 06/08/06
4. Luke Dzipange Concerned citizens of Zimbabwe, Johannesburg. 08/08/06
5. Bishop Goodwill Shana, Word of life, Johannesburg. Church leader in SA and Zimbabwe .13/08/06
6. Nora Chengeto, ZDF coordinator, Branfontein, 03/08/06
7. James, Asylum seeker, Jobert Station, 06/08/06
8. Joyce Dube, Director of SAWIMA and committee member of ZDF, Braefontein. 06/08/06
9. Nomusa, Refugee, Parkstation 11/08/06
10. Mr. Molife South African Home Affairs Ministry, Pretoria. 09/08/06
11. Mr. Chigidi Diplomat Zimbabwe South Africa embassy, Pretoria. 08/08/06
12. Themba, illegal immigrant, Johannesburg, 17/08/06
13. Zimbabwe Progressive Teacher's Union, Khosto House 09/08/06
14. Marufu, status unrevealed, believes the Diaspora are well placed to set up a government in exile/ in waiting. Johannesburg. 06/08/06
15. Mike Ngema, legal immigrant, Rose bank, 12/08/06  
Shadrek, asylum seeker, Gaunteng. 12/08/06
16. Togara, asylum seeker, Johannesburg 11/08/06
17. Keith Silwane Zimbabwe Action Support Group 13/08/06
18. Concerned Zimbabweans Abroad
19. Richard Smith, Zimbabwe Solidarity Forum, Co-coordinator, Branfontein. 10/08/08

20. Lobuhle, Zimbabwe Human Rights Lobby Group, Pretoria. 21/08/06
21. Madube, Cross boarder trader, Parkstation. 12/08/06
22. Dzikiti Doto, Zimbabwe Political Victims Association, Methodist House. 14/08/06
23. Marvelous Mawere, Association of Zimbabwean Students in SA Universities, Auckland. 15/08/06
24. Mao Nyikadzino, NCA, South African representative, based at Crisis Coalition offices, Johannesburg. 06/08/06
25. Tebuko Tlatla, South African who felt it should be known that foreigners, whether Zimbabwean or not were not welcome, as they committed criminal activities.
26. Magugu Nyathi, Zimbabwean exiled Journalist, Cross-border Association, Pretoria, 10/08/06
27. Nqabutho Dube, MDC-Mutambara faction, Johannesburg. 08/08/06
28. Ntokozo Masuku, Human rights lawyer, Johannesburg. 08/08/06
29. Kurai Maseko, illegal immigrant, Pretoria. 10/08/06
30. Jacob Mafume, Crisis Coalition Zimbabwe Coordinator. Harare 06/09/06
31. Arnold Tsunga, Zimbabwe Human Rights Lawyers. Harare 06/09/06
32. COSATU, Johannesburg, 07/08/06
33. South African council of Churches, Khosto House 04/08/06

NB. Some names were only mentioned in part to protect the interviewees.  
Organizations were mentioned only, were persons did not want to be known, as the research had political implications.



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