Alternative Approaches to International Cooperation: Global Citizenship and Dutch Citizen Engagement

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Abstract

There is currently much debate about the future of development cooperation. While perspectives about how much it has accomplished vary widely, many scholars and practitioners alike agree that the role of development assistance—its structure, effectiveness, and relevance for the future—is in need of re-evaluation.

One of the trends towards change includes increasing citizen involvement in the process of development. There is a focus on increasing the participation of citizens in the South in the planning, implementation, or evaluation of the development interventions that affect their lives. At the same time, there has been a resurgence of the idea of global citizenship in the North. Northern citizens are encouraged to learn about international issues and get involved with the global. They are encouraged to donate money to international campaigns, to become ‘responsible consumers’ by reducing personal consumption and making ‘globally-ethical’ consumer choices on fair trade and eco-friendly products. But does Northern citizen responsibility towards the global end there?

In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs actively seeks to raise awareness among the Dutch public about development cooperation, and there are innovative projects that seek to involve Dutch citizens directly in the development cooperation process. This research analyzes three of those projects—Oxfam Novib’s Reversed Development Co-operation, Linkis’ small-scale private development initiatives, and the NCDO’s Third Chamber, a citizen advisory body to the Dutch Parliament. This paper seeks to examine the ways in which these projects have the potential to offer progressive alternatives to mainstream development cooperation, and how they involve Dutch citizens in global citizen action.

It is the conclusion of this research that unless projects seeking to involve Northern citizens in development cooperation engage with the immanent, or underlying, forces of development that create and maintain poverty and exclusion, their effectiveness will be limited and in danger of remaining in the realm of the symbolic.
Acknowledgements

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Importantly, I am incredibly grateful to the many people I interviewed who made time to share with me their experiences and perspectives. This was truly one of the most interesting parts of this research. It was highly inspiring to learn about all of the reasons why people make space in their lives to get involved in projects that seek to make the world a more just place. I extend a special thank you to Oxfam Novib, Hivos, and the Third Chamber for providing me with the contacts for the case studies presented here.

Finally, I am deeply thankful for the learning process itself; it has been a rollercoaster of engaging with new ideas, challenging my own deeply held assumptions, and being pushed beyond my comfort zone. I hope that the work presented here can reflect in some part the incredibly wonderful and challenging learning process that this has been.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee of the OECD</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFSA</td>
<td>Gun Free South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSTZG</td>
<td>Landelijk Stichting Tegen Zinloos Geweld (The National Foundation Against Senseless Violence)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCDO</td>
<td>Nationale Commissie voor Internationale Samenwerking en Duurzame Ontwikkeling (National Committee for International Cooperation and Sustainable Development)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>PIs</td>
<td>Private Initiatives</td>
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<td>RDC</td>
<td>Reversed Development Co-operation</td>
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<td>TC</td>
<td>Third Chamber</td>
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<tr>
<td>WOW</td>
<td>Words Over Weapons</td>
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<td>WJMJ</td>
<td>Wapen Jezelf Met Woorden</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Area and Relevance

Much debate has and continues to take place about the effectiveness of development cooperation over the last 60 years; Has it been successful? Has it been a failure? Though much has been achieved through international development aid, overall poverty has increased as the gap between rich and poor has widened. Academics, practitioners, policy makers, and concerned citizens voice strong opinions on all sides of this debate and there is a wealth of statistical evidence to back up each argument. In deference to the complexity and inherent multi-dimensionality of the development process, this paper consciously chooses to avoid this question of how much or how little has been accomplished. Parfitt (2007) maintains that the very fact that there are over a billion people living on less than US$1 a day, and another billion people living on less than $2 a day, tells us that we have much work left to do in order to meet our basic development goals.

As many scholars have noted (Sogge, 2003; Easterly, 2006; Riddell, 2007) the development community has a great ability to reinvent itself, learn from past mistakes, and adapt to new global trends and political-economic conditions. Development practice has undergone many innovative changes, including bringing empowerment and participation of the poor—and women in particular—firmly center in the development agenda, and shifting the traditional donor-recipient power relationship as much as possible to a more partnership oriented one.

However, while the development discourse has become more progressive, this shift is often not reflected in fundamental changes in power dynamics on the ground. Moreover, dominant political and economic paradigms have not changed significantly—political and economic policies at the state level are often not harmonized with the development goals of their own development cooperation programs and grantees. As we move into the next 50 years, many scholars and development organizations are actively looking to find ways to bring more innovation and fundamental change to the international development paradigm.

One of the current trends towards change includes increasing citizen involvement in the process of development. The idea of participation—that Southern constituents for whom development projects are meant to help should have some role in the design, implementation, or evaluation of those projects—is now widely accepted by the development community, albeit to different degrees. There is a focus on increasing the participation of the poor through means such as the promotion of democratic decentralization, and community-based natural resource management schemes.

While there is much literature on the changing dynamics and capacities of organizations and citizens in the South, and some discussion about NGOs in the North, a review of the role of Northern citizens is lacking. What are their responsibilities toward and potential roles within international development cooperation? Some of this debate has manifested around the concept of global citizenship. Northern citizens are obliged to learn about international issues and the realities of life in the developing world. They are encouraged to donate money to international campaigns; to become 'responsible consumers' by reducing personal consumption and making 'globally-ethical' consumer choices on fair trade and eco-friendly products. Globalization and

1 Gaventa (2003) charts four primary meanings of participation as expressed in the development discourse that relate to the character and quality of involvement of individuals: participation from below, participation as involvement of 'beneficiaries' and 'users,' participation as 'stakeholder' involvement, and participation as exercising the rights of citizenship.
advances in information technology make a connection to the global more tangible, and there is an ever-growing cadre of international business and development professionals.

But does Northern citizen responsibility towards the global end here? Many would contend not. First of all, Northern citizens have long been involved in development cooperation, directly and indirectly, through private initiatives and lobbying. Edwards (1999) highlights the idea that an educated Northern public can be a powerful "constituency for change," putting the necessary pressure on political and business leaders to enact more just global policies and increase support for international development cooperation.

With much development aid coming from Northern countries through bilateral and multilateral state channels, citizens in the North may be particularly well poised to make an impact on the development decisions of their political leaders. In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs vigorously promotes citizen involvement in, and awareness of, international development cooperation. Over the last few years, Dutch development organizations have begun to devote resources towards raising awareness in the Dutch public about international development cooperation, and creating new linkages between individuals and organizations at home and those in the developing world. The concept of global citizenship is often invoked in this context. But the extent to which engagement in development cooperation can be considered global citizenship is highly contested. Other critics suggest that Northern citizen involvement is encouraged as a means of 'greasing the wheels' of the status quo as this growing internationalism and citizen involvement is channelled to stave off demands for more structural changes in the way that aid is distributed.

This paper explores the theoretical terrain of global citizenship within the current international aid debate, through three Dutch case studies. These cases represent innovative programs of Dutch citizen involvement in international development cooperation that are supported by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

1.2 Research Question

The primary research question of this paper is:

*How are Northern citizens contributing to alternative approaches in international development cooperation?*

This research will analyze three new programs that seek to raise awareness of international development cooperation in The Netherlands by engaging Dutch citizens in development cooperation through participation at the local level. These programs seek to build solidarity between people, across borders. They do this by facilitating face-to-face contact or debate, and critical engagement with development issues. They also work to challenge traditional stereotypes and power relationships between North and South (particularly of the North as the knowledge holders and the South as knowledge and skill recipients), using a language of global citizenship and partnership.

These three programs are: Oxfam Novib’s Reversed Development Co-operation, Linkis’ small-scale private development initiatives, and the NCDO’s Third Chamber—a citizen advisory body to the Dutch Parliament. This research seeks to examine in which ways these programs truly are innovative. Do these programs encourage people to look critically at development cooperation
and seek out new ideas or models? Has participation in these programs affected the outlook of Dutch participants in relation to their perceptions of the South and people in the South?

These programs were chosen specifically because of their innovative qualities. They all, in some way, represent unique ideas within the Dutch development system, and seek to engage with emerging sentiments of global citizenship.

In particular, the research attempts to situate these new programs within the larger backdrop of the Dutch political and economic landscape to gain some insight into why these projects are promoted and ultimately supported by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

1.3 Methodology

All research conducted was qualitative, and included the use of semi-structured interviews, primary document analysis, analysis of relevant research reports, and internal evaluation reports. Only one of the interviews was tape recorded, but extensive notes were taken during and immediately following the interviews to ensure a high level of accuracy. Any quotes from interviewees presented in this paper do not reflect exact statements but notes taken either during or immediately following the interview (the exception to this was Henny Helmich of the NCDO, whose interview was taped).

**Reversed Development Co-operation**

For Reversed Development Co-operation (RDC), I interviewed key people from the Dutch participants in two RDC projects: Diversity Joy and Words Over Weapons. I was interested to understand how they came to be involved with this new project, what their expectations and experiences were within this context, and how they perceived of the concept of reversed development.

**Linkis**

For Linkis, interviews were conducted with Linkis program officers and upper management at two co-financing agencies: Oxfam Novib and Hivos. There was the conscious decision to gather information at the organizational level as opposed to the level of program participants. This was primarily because my goal was to get a broad picture of Linkis as a whole—what is its scope and role in the larger picture of Dutch development cooperation. It was also due in part to the large number of programs funded every year (several hundred), and the near impossibility to get a representative idea of their experience. Of course, this has influenced the type of information received.

**Third Chamber**

For the purpose of this research, I conducted interviews with Third Chamber (TC) members and project staff. Interviewees were chosen to represent in a general sense the diversity targets set by TC—gender, age, political affiliation, region of the Netherlands, and both Dutch and Southern members—based on a purposive, convenience-based sample. The questions in these semi-structured interviews sought to get information about why the person had joined the Third Chamber, what they expected to get out of the experience, and how they feel the experience has
changed their behaviour. The questions also sought to get a sense of their conceptions of global citizenship and whether they felt themselves to be acting as a global citizen.

1.4 Limitations

The initial intention of this research was to contact and interview Southern participants wherever they had an active role in the program. This was possible for the Third Chamber, but in the case of Reversed Development Co-operation I experienced difficulty reaching the South African counterpart organizations. Their perspectives could have better enriched the research.

In some ways this study is quite broad. The examples studied within the three different cases are not exhaustive or numerically representative of the experience of all participants in the cases studies. It is therefore not the intention of this study to provide quantitative answers to the research questions. Rather, it seeks to provide insight into what is currently perceived as innovative ways in which Northern citizens are getting involved in development cooperation, and examine what effect this may have.

1.5 Structure

The next chapter will outline the key theoretical framework used in this research. It will describe the major debates around the current aid paradigm, cover a definitional landscape for the concept of global citizenship as it is used today, and finally draw upon Edwards' theory of creating a constituency for change. Chapter 3 presents a background of development cooperation in the Netherlands, and presents findings from the three case studies analyzed in this research: Reversed Development Cooperation, the Third Chamber, and Linkis. Chapter 4 examines the findings from the different case studies against the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2, and presents a cross-case analysis. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the paper with a synthesis and areas of further research.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The turn of the new millennium roughly marked the 50-year anniversary of the beginning of development assistance as we conceive of it today. Development assistance\(^2\) is a large and growing industry that has gone through many theoretical and practical changes since its inception. Many scholars and practitioners alike agree that the role of development assistance, its structure, effectiveness, and relevance for the future is in need of re-evaluation.

Contemporary processes of globalization such as the growth of migration and diaspora communities, increasing economic interdependence, advances in communications technologies, and the rise of transnational environmental and social movements have all served to change the way that many of us perceive our rights and responsibilities in relation to the global. The mobilization of citizens and civil society groups worldwide is helping to reshape our global systems. In the North in particular, the concept of global citizenship is becoming widely used by NGOs wishing to inspire citizens to become more informed about global processes and their role within them. Indeed, as Northern citizens consume the vast majority of the Earth’s resources and are political constituents in the world’s donor countries, they potentially form an important constituency that can be used to further a progressive social change agenda.

In this context, the word *paradigm* is taken to refer to the dominant practices, values, and assumptions that form the conceptual and structural underpinning of a development practice and praxis.\(^3\) While a complete analysis of the current aid paradigm requires a whole book to itself, this section will summarize some key aspects, values, and practices that are of particular relevance for this research: the aid chain, the thematic focus on the Millennium Development Goals, and ‘imminent’ vs. ‘immanent’ forms of development. The first section will briefly discuss these characteristics. 2.2 will then present an overview of some primary critiques of development aid and recommendations for its future. The following section will take a look at Edwards’ (1999) Constituencies for Change. Finally, this chapter will conclude with a description of the analytical framework that guided the analysis of this research.

2.1 What is the Current Development Aid Paradigm?

Riddell (2007) refers to three predominant “aid worlds”: aid provided by official government agencies (referred to as Overseas Development Assistance, ODA), aid provided by NGOs, and humanitarian/emergency aid provided by both official agencies and NGOs. This research will engage primarily with ODA and NGO-provided aid. Two of the case studies are supported by Dutch co-financing agencies (CFAs)—NGOs who are funded in large part by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).

*The Aid Chain*

The aid paradigm is characterized by the vertical movement of funds and resources from North to South. Funds move from Northern donor governments through their official aid agencies to Northern NGOs, who disperse funds to Southern NGOs, who then disperse those funds to the

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\(^2\) In this paper, ‘development assistance,’ ‘development cooperation,’ and ‘development aid’ will be used interchangeably.

\(^3\) Definition adapted from the American Heritage Dictionary and the Oxford English Dictionary, 2007 editions.
poor. At each stage of the aid chain there is upward accountability: official aid agencies are accountable to Donor governments; Northern NGOs are accountable to official aid agencies; Southern NGOs are accountable to Northern NGOs. Even donor governments are held accountable in some degree by their funders: the Northern tax payer. Often the only party to whom no one is strictly accountable is the one whom projects are designed to serve: the poor.

This model has been highly critiqued as overly complex and inefficient. Sogge (2001) in particular highlights the political interests involved in maintaining this aid chain, and the fact that only a small portion of what was initially intended for the poor actually reaches them. Bornstein, Chapman, and Wallace (2007) similarly echo this concern. These scholars illustrate the power dynamics inherent in this vertical structure where funds, knowledge, resources, and responsibility only flow downwards, and accountability only flows upwards.

The same chain can also be used to describe the process of defining program agendas. Simbi and Thom (2000) single out Northern development organizations, and the pressure imposed on them by their funders, as controlling the development agenda under the guise of ‘capacity building.’ They refer to this as “implementation by proxy,” and view this as a regression in development praxis, spurred by unequal power relations between Northern and Southern actors.

The Millennium Development Goals

The adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000 has impacted the focus and discourse of current development practice and ideology. The United Nations Millennium Declaration, adopted in 2000 by 187 nations, was intended to create a common platform for the values and actions necessary to create a peaceful and equitable future as the world moves into the new millennium. The Declaration set the stage for the Millennium Development Goals: 8 targets that represent the main development challenges faced by the global community, stemming from past commitments made in the UN and other international summits.

The MDGs are set to be achieved by 2015, and are coupled with a set of targets and indicators with which to measure their progress. The MDGs have taken a central place on the agenda of most donor countries and to a large extent guide official debate and discussions about development cooperation. Renard (2007) considers this part of the “new aid paradigm,” and a shift away from what he identifies as the two previous paradigms of the “project approach” and “structural adjustment policies.” The new aid paradigm consists of the MDGs as the goals of development cooperation, and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) as the method to achieve those goals, combined with the Paris Agenda’s focus on donor ‘harmonization’ and ‘alignment.’

Saith is highly critical of the MDGs as little more than a feel-good “string of global wish lists” (2006:1167), impossible to enforce, with vague indicators and serious theoretical and definitional weaknesses. Through the US-led Monterrey Consensus, the MDGs became embedded within the neoliberal political and economic agenda, emphasizing the role of the private sector and public-private partnerships.

Development practitioners are aware of these deficiencies. Practitioners at all four of the agencies interviewed for this research noted this critique but felt that the MDGs still provided them with useful targets with which to frame development issues to their Northern constituents. When raising awareness in the public, this may be true. However, when the MDGs are used as tools to set development policy, it can have a distorting effect. Ultimately, Saith’s critique of the MDGs is
not for their content, which he agrees is universally desirable. It is that the MDGs are embedded in traditionally inequitable national and global structures.

**Imminent vs. Immanent Development**

Cowen and Shenton (1996) distinguish between two forms of development intervention: imminent, or “willed development policy,” and immanent, or “underlying processes” that affect development outcomes (Hickey and Mohan, 2005:241). As stated by Hickey and Mohan, “imminent development emerged over the past two centuries largely as a means of managing those ‘surplus populations’ that have either been excluded from or ‘adversely incorporated’ into processes of immanent capitalist development” (2005:241). They contend that development practice overwhelmingly tends to focus on imminent forms of development over the larger immanent processes.

In some ways imminent development can be viewed as treating the symptoms, and not the root causes, of development problems. Focusing on imminent development may deliver supplies and services to those who need them, but it does not address the fundamental structural imbalances that create and reinforce inequity. The recent trend towards participatory development in some ways addresses this gap. Hickey and Mohan (2005), however, question whether participatory methods adequately address issues of power and politics. They caution that for a participatory process to lead to any social transformation, it must be embedded within a larger, radical political project that seeks to expand the practice of citizenship; that challenges established power relationships; and that structurally disentwines “modes of accumulating economic and political power” (Hickey and Mohan, 2005:251).

**2.2 Perspectives on the Development Aid Paradigm**

There is much reflection in academic circles about the current role of development aid; what it’s accomplished after more than fifty years of development work, its effectiveness, and prospects for the future. Perspectives on these questions are as diverse as their proposed solutions. Assessments range from claims that development aid has had quite limited success (Easterly 2006; Sogge 2002); that it serves to promulgate the neo-mercantilist proclivities of the West (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2002); or, that while being modestly successful, a reframing of purpose and goals is now in order to match the needs of a changing world (Van Rooy, 2000; Fowler, 2000; Sen, 2006). What many scholars do agree on, however, is that the current aid paradigm is on the cusp of change.

Easterly (2006) offers a strident critique of the mainstream development aid paradigm and what he calls the “Big Plan” approach to development. He outlines a dichotomy between “Planners” and “Searchers”: Planners are expert elites and policy makers in donor countries, and Searchers can be anyone with a good, testable idea. Easterly contends that the problem with development assistance is that it has been dominated by the visions and policy prescriptions of Planners. Development goals have not been reached because Planners look for the “Big Solution” to the world’s big problems, thus setting unattainable goals whose successes along the way cannot be adequately measured and for whose failures no one is really accountable. Searchers, on the other hand, find small solutions to localized problems. Planner’s solutions are top-down and control-oriented, with no accountability. Searchers solutions are home grown, feedback oriented, and accountable to those they intend to help, and often also to market forces.
Parfitt (2007) makes a similar critique of “development as Grand Theory.” He says that the majority of development narratives until now outline something of a singular ultimate path to development, with the same processes and the same end-goal. He is critical of the Grand Theories as utopian projects and eschatologies—delineating some future end point of development and thus being forever elusive goals. Indeed, this is Easterly’s primary critique—they offer feel-good, simple solutions that constituents in the North like to hear but that Northern politicians are unaccountable for when they do not succeed.

While Easterly criticizes the plans of the government aid agencies and large international financial institutions, Amartya Sen asserts that Easterly’s conclusions about the “well-intentioned doers of great harm” (Sen, 2006:43) is overblown and ignores the complexity and nuance that are inherent in the problems of development. However, Sen agrees that a reasoned critique of grand plans is critical to moving the development agenda forward, yet points out that many of the Searcher-inspired programs Easterly highlights are in fact projects that germinated in official development agencies. Sen also agrees that Easterly’s focus on the need to promote more of a Searcher mentality—innovative, local solutions to local problems, and home grown, piecemeal reform—is an important one.

Far from being well intentioned, Petras and Veltmeyer (2002) view development aid as no less than imperialism in an altruist’s clothing. They contend that a political-realistic approach has dominated aid giving. In this conception, aid is given with the explicit intention to meet the political ends of the donors; what they call “reverse aid.” In particular, development aid is often contingent on compliance with a neo-mercantilist agenda such as the opening of markets, and reducing subsidies and barriers to trade. They give the example of Latin America, where aid and development loans from International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have long been conditional on market liberalization, while the U.S. (a primary donor to the IFIs and major trading partner with Latin America) maintains its subsidy system and protects American producers. They contend that development aid has undermined indigenous development attempts, and encouraged ‘bad governance’ and democratic deficit in an attempt to implement the widespread adoption of neo-liberal free market policies. In Petras and Veltmeyer’s conception, development aid is part of a long, historical process beginning with colonialism, intended to continue securing benefits to Euro-American hegemonic powers. However, Petras and Veltmeyer conclude their assessment by stating that “the issue is not aid or no aid, but aid under what conditions and in what socio-historical and political context” (2002:292).

Van Rooy (2000) looks more specifically at the world of Northern NGO-led development assistance, much of which is funded by ODA. She contends that because Northern NGOs have been so successful, they may have “worked themselves out of a job.” First, NGOs put the issue of equitable globalization firmly on the agenda of global leaders, the IFIs, and multilateral institutions like the G8. Second, the quality of ODA has improved: the amount of tied aid is less today than in the past, environmental impact assessments are common procedure before projects can be approved, and the idea that development is a gendered process—and gender must be taken into account—is also commonly addressed. Furthermore, there are many more Southern organizations that are doing effective work in their home countries today than in the past, in part due to support from Northern NGOs.

Because of this good work, particularly that of helping to build the capacity of Southern NGOs, the future for Northern NGOs is limited unless they can adapt to new roles as networkers and advocates. Many of Van Rooy’s recommendations point to the emergence of Southern networks and social movements as the important movers and shakers of the coming decades. It seems the
time has come for Northern NGOs to relinquish the helm to other emergent actors. However, this does not mean that they have to become obsolete.

Taking this idea a few steps farther, Conyers (2007) provocatively asserts that the solution may be to put an end entirely to development aid as we know it, and instead create a kind of international welfare/transfer system in which all development assistance is put into a common pool and allocations are made to countries based on need. Riddell (2007) fleshes out this idea further, while taking a slightly more control-oriented approach. He advocates for the creation of a new International Aid Office (IAO) that will oversee an International Development Aid Fund, financed by mandatory contributions from the wealthiest countries. If the IAO determined that the country’s government had “sufficient commitment, competency, and capacity to use the aid funds effectively” (Riddell, 2007:392), the allotted funds would be given directly to the government. If not, the funds would be allocated to a “national implementation agency” for use and distribution (Riddell, 2007). There are still important questions about this idea that require clarification. For example, who would run this International Aid Office? Judging by the dominance of OECD countries in international fora, could we expect something different in this context? It would not only institutionally, but also ideologically have to be based in an ethics of trust and equity, disentangled from paternalistic overtones.

The various critiques of development aid presented here have some important themes in common. First, they are anti Big Plans, highlighting the need for more diversity of strategy and localized, home-grown solutions. Second, they all point to the relinquishing of Northern control over Southern development agendas in different capacities, from increasing recipient country’s control over how their aid is spent, to moving aside to allow Southern organizations to take the wheel. The big question, of course, is how can these changes be brought about?

2.3 Global Citizenship

The definition of a locally-based citizenship conception remains itself a highly contested arena. The entrance of the term global citizenship into common parlance has created new definitional dilemmas, as well as a host of new literature that seeks to support or challenge its use. NGOs, activists, environmentalists, corporations, and consumers are all referred to as global citizens. Indeed, it is a term with highly fungible delimitations and, as Fox (2005) contends, weak definitional merit. In the North, the concept of global citizenship is often used to evoke a sense of responsibility towards the global, and to inspire Northern constituents to act on issues of social justice or to change lifestyle habits. It can also refer to transnational corporate social responsibility and ideas of socially responsible consumer behaviour.

Conceptually vague though it may be, it is not clear that global citizenship is a baseless term. Many individuals do feel a deep connection to communities outside of their geographical, political location. Importantly, global citizenship is intertwined in different ways with ideas of local citizenship. Many activities understood as global citizen action take place at the local level, through fundraising, campaigning, or advocacy. In many instances, fostering active local citizenship is used as a vehicle for building what Edwards (1999) terms “cultures of concern”—an interest in improving local communities, that by extension moves awareness to the global.

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4 The ideas in this section were initially explored in the ISS course 4301 essay entitled, “A Space Between Definition and Rhetoric? The debate about Global Citizenship”
Ruddick (1990) describes the example of the Argentinian mothers of the disappeared, whose actions to address the human rights violations of their own children slowly grew to encompass child rights in other countries (Ruddick, 1990 as cited in Hutchings, 2002).

**Global Citizenship in Historical Perspective**

Global citizenship is today an oft-used phrase, but it is certainly not new; the concept of the *cosmo-polite*, or citizen of the cosmos, was an important concept for the Stoics of ancient Greece and Rome (Carter 2006; Dower 2002; Williams 2002). As described by Williams (2002), the idea of cosmos expanded beyond a conception of empire or even of planet to embody a “divine order governed by Reason. They were global citizens because they understood themselves as existing meaningfully only within this ordered, reasoned whole” (Williams, 2002:2-3); the dictates of a nation state were artificial when compared to the natural membership humans had in the larger order of the universe.

Similar ideas saw a resurgence during the Enlightenment period through cosmopolitanism and philosophers such as Kant. Cosmopolitanism was closely related to the ethical philosophies of Natural Law and Natural Rights which hold that there are certain rights possessed by the individual that are beyond human actions and human law (echoing the Stoic’s *cosmo-polite*). Cosmopolitanism encompasses a belief in three main areas: the universal equality of human beings, human rights that supersede national law, and the importance of deepening the interconnection between nations and between people. Global citizenship can thus be viewed as the inherent right of the individual to belong to a community beyond the narrow confines of the bounded state and nation.

Contemporary cosmopolitanism reflects this commitment to the inherent rights of the individual. It points to the growing body of international human rights law, and the growing acceptance of the jurisdiction of international legal bodies, such as the ICC and the ICTY. This lends itself to a much broader global acceptance of the idea that the individual has rights beyond what may be granted or refused them by the national state in which they happen to live.

**Theoretical Perspectives of Citizenship**

Conceptions of citizenship fall along two primary axes: that which is state-centered, and that which is society-centered. In each, the legitimacy of citizenship and its attendant rights stem from these different institutional connections. In the liberal political tradition, state-centered conceptions describe a legalistic relationship with certain rights conferred upon an individual by a state, and a set of obligations, rights, and responsibilities binding one to the other.

Society-based citizenship reflects the civic republican tradition and implies that citizenship comes from membership and participation in a community. In this vein, Painter (2005) describes a radical pluralist model in which citizenship is viewed as practice: the polity actively engaging not only within communities and with governance institutions, but also with its environment. Citizenship here is not a state as much as it is a process: it is the active and continuous assertion and negotiation of rights between various groups as well as with local/national government and institutions.

In each conception, citizenship is linked with an institution—either the state or society—and, as Lister (1997) points out, has inherent exclusionary tendencies. In state-centered citizenship, those who live or are born outside of the state are excluded from membership. In the civic republican
tradition, those who either cannot or do not wish to participate are likewise excluded. Lister acknowledges that citizenship implies both rights and responsibilities. But she asks, “What is the appropriate balance between the two and how does that balance reflect gender and other power relations?” (Lister, 1997:31). Both the rights-based and the society-based conceptions of citizenship have the potential to particularly exclude women “disadvantaged by the sexual division of time” (Lister, 1997:33), and who may be structurally excluded from participating in the formal politics of the state. Lister proposes a feminist theory of citizenship that merges the rights-based and participatory notions of citizenship. She argues that it is critical to “define both citizenship and ‘the political’ in broad terms so as to encompass the kind of informal politics in which women (and oppressed groups more generally) often take the lead” (Lister, 1997:33).

When we think of global citizenship, we are primarily viewing it from the participation-based model given the absence of a global state. What are the rights and, importantly, the duties associated with global citizenship? Dower (2002) asks, are active participation and explicit adoption of global responsibility a precondition for global citizenship? Is global citizenship more about rights or duties? If it is about rights then global citizenship can be universal, whether or not those rights are claimed or realized. If it is about duties then only those who can and wish to take on those duties can claim global citizenship. However, the requirement of active participation and the fulfillment of duties could effectively exclude women, the poor, those who do not have access to communications technologies, and other marginalized groups.

Lister’s feminist theory of citizenship is highly relevant for the debate surrounding global citizenship. There is a real need to define global citizenship in broad enough terms to be inclusive of groups marginalized from interacting in the global arena. Indeed, a conception of global citizenship should encompass both rights and duties and be defined broadly enough to be inclusive of groups marginalized from interacting in the global arena. Otherwise, the danger is that global citizenship may become another form of imperialism—where elites have rights to have a voice in and access the global that the poor do not. Parry’s (1991) idea of the “mutual society” can be useful to incorporate here. He proposes that duties can reflect one’s ability to participate, and entitlements can reflect one’s need. It is the principle of reflexivity: “from each according to his or her own ability, to each according to his or her need for the condition of agency” (Parry, 1991:186).

2.4 Creating Constituencies for Change

Edwards contends that “a strong constituency in the industrialized world is a prerequisite for the success of more equitable global regimes, new forms of governance, and the sacrifices required to alter global patterns of consumption and trade” (2001:10). According to the Zedillo Report:

In most industrial countries, and predominantly in the United States, the public has little awareness of the moral issues or the dictates of self-interest in alleviating poverty elsewhere in the world... and they have little idea of how meagre is the actual record of foreign aid giving (Zedillo, 2001:15).

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5 This review of Edwards is a substantially revised and expanded adaptation of work done initially for an essay entitled “The Future of Development Aid” for ISS course 4319.
Indeed, an educated and compassionate Northern public forms the cornerstone of Edwards’ constituencies for change, a critical mass of people in the North that can provide the political and ethical pressure needed to make international development cooperation (and new forms of it) a priority for state and business actors. This is done through education, “nurturing new solidarities” (Edwards, 2001) between people and across borders, and breaking down the psychological barriers between what is perceived of as ‘us’ and ‘them.’

In particular, Edwards cites the importance of building “cultures of concern” in the North. To do this, the work must begin with the inequalities that exist in the North. People who are fighting their own poverty can hardly be expected to spend the time to create more sustainable and globally-ethical lifestyles (Edwards, 1999:189). Edwards calls upon the experience of Scandinavian countries with progressive social policies in which “attitudes for helping abroad are intimately related to attitudes toward helping at home” (1999:190). Indeed, the Scandinavian countries (and the Netherlands) are the only developed countries that have met the UN aid target for OECD countries of 0.7% of GNP. Thus, Edwards closely correlates the fostering of active local citizenship and domestic “cultures of concern” with the ability of a population to extend this sense of care and responsibility to the global arena. Programs that encourage local citizen action may eventually have reverberating effects on international development cooperation.

Schulpen and others remain sceptical that these new ‘constituents’ are truly able or willing to push for a more progressive agenda than that which is promoted by government development policy or the large aid organizations (interview, Schulpen). Even if they are willing, just because people are ‘educated’ about development gives no indication of how they perceive development can be best carried out, and no guarantee that their perspectives will be better or more ‘progressive’ than dominant development policies. Schulpen’s research points to the fact that many of the small-scale private initiatives (PIs) through which concerned Dutch citizens contribute to development, are at best benign and have little impact on pushing the aid agenda in new and more progressive directions.

2.5 Analytical Framework

The analytical framework used here is designed to deconstruct the type/depth of global citizen action present in the three programs, and assesses its potential to facilitate change in international cooperation. To assess levels of global citizen action, I have created a ‘ladder’ of citizen action based on different levels of engagement and commitment. (See Figure 1)

Important elements in this analysis are the type of engagement with issues either at the international level or with relevance to the international; engagement with people or groups across borders in ways that build solidarity; and activity that broadens the scope of one’s normal engagement with the local and the international.

Passive global citizen action refers to activities that involve interacting in some way with the international but that do not involve any significant activity outside of one’s normal sphere of engagement. There is little commitment or lifestyle change, nor any direct connection with people across borders. People who are active in this category may have a deep concern about international issues or people in other countries, but their actions do not take them out of their daily routine or connect them with people of other regions in any direct, meaningful way. In a sense, passive global citizenship can also be thought of as ‘armchair activism’: individuals are informed
to some degree about international issues, and take some actions to get involved, but they are all activities that can be done without leaving one’s living room or altering one’s normal routines.

_Limited engagement_ refers to activities in which individuals act in ways that broaden their normal sphere of action. In the passive category above, an individual may donate money to an international campaign. In _limited engagement_, a person would go out and fundraise for the international campaign. Engagement here is often of a singular or short-term nature, and does not involve a significant degree of interaction or connection with people or groups across borders although there may be an indirect connection through, for example, membership in the same international organization. The community with which one engages most frequently is still the local or national, but the goal of one’s engagement is directed to affect change at a global level.

**Figure 1: Degrees of Global Citizen Action**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Global Citizen Action</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sustained, deep engagement/work with people or transnational campaigns/networks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sustained engagement with people from the South for shared goals/shared project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Limited Engagement</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Volunteer work abroad—short term, such as ‘volunteer holidays’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Engagement in an international campaign</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Engagement in a local campaign with an international goal, i.e. “Free Tibet”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Participating in demonstrations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fundraising</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Critical debate &amp; reflection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Writing letters/emails of protest, signing and forwarding petitions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Passive</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “Globally ethical” consumer choices</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Donating money to international campaigns or organizations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Membership in international organizations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Awareness of how international issues affect oneself and people in other countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Travel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Learning about events, trends, and issues outside of one’s country</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Active* global citizen action is marked by a more personal, longer-term engagement with campaigns, networks, or groups of people across borders. People who demonstrate an active degree of global citizen action have, as their normal sphere of activity, a deep connection to the global. Individuals in this group may identify strongly as members of a community that is transnational in nature. Their engagement with global issues often takes place in transnational arenas (whether virtual or actual).

Two caveats should be noted. First, these categories are not fixed and absolute. Many people may move between these categories at different times in their life. Second, there are many people who either reject the notion of international allegiance or interconnection, or who are marginalized from the global system due to factors such as poverty or lack of access to communications.
infrastructure. They fall outside of the present analysis but may be conceptualized as dormant global citizens.

The second variable in this analysis is that of the potential of each case study to present a positive alternative to the development cooperation paradigm. This is examined using the following criteria:

1. Does it challenge existing power relationships?
2. Does it challenge current trends in the development aid paradigm?
3. Does the process address immanent, or underlying, processes of development?
4. Does it link in any way to development policy, not just development programs?
5. What is the project’s scope?

The first and third questions are adapted from Hickey and Mohan’s (2005) framework for transformative participation. They posit that in order for change to occur in larger social structures, current relations of dominance and exclusion that maintain the status quo must be challenged. Furthermore, the underlying, immanent forces that affect development outcomes must also be addressed.
3. BACKGROUND AND CASE STUDIES

This chapter will describe the case studies used in this research: Oxfam Novib’s Reversed Development Co-operation (RDC), Linkis, and the National Committee for International Cooperation and Sustainable Development’s (NCDO) Third Chamber. These are new programs in the Netherlands that are designed to actively involve Dutch citizens in development cooperation. All three cases seek to build awareness and support for international development cooperation, and utilize a language of global citizenship. At least two of them also explicitly attempt to challenge North-South stereotypes and power relationships. They do this by supporting private initiatives (PIs)—small-scale development projects designed by individuals or groups of individuals to be carried out either abroad or at home—albeit in different capacities. All three cases are supported by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs via direct subsidy through the NCDO or, as is the case with Reversed Development Co-operation, by indirect subsidy.

3.1 Development Cooperation in The Netherlands

Despite of its small geographic size, the Netherlands is the sixth largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor. Since 1997, the Netherlands has fixed its development aid contribution at .8% of its GNI, making it among the few nations that have surpassed the UN/OECD GNI target for development aid of .7%. Seventy-five percent of Dutch ODA is given bilaterally, to 36 countries, and is focused in a maximum of 2-3 sectors within each country. All bilateral aid is in the form of grants; according to the Development Assistance Committee Peer Review Report for 2006, the Netherlands decided to eliminate bilateral lending because of the growing burden that debt was having on developing countries.

Recipient countries are selected based on their level of poverty and need, progress towards democratization and good governance, as well as factors such as historical relationships and public support for relationships with particular countries (DAC, 2006). As of 2005, 18% of bilateral ODA was channelled through NGOs. The Netherlands is a strong supporter of donor harmonization and sector-wide approaches; these principles play a lead role particularly in bilateral funding strategies.

The Ministry of Development Cooperation is a “floating” ministry, in that it has a Minister but not its own department as such. It exists within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The MFA has four primary areas of responsibility: European Cooperation, Political Affairs, International Cooperation, and Regional and Country Policy. Development cooperation policies thus have a close relationship with the political priorities of the MFA—a subject that will be discussed later in the paper. Within the Ministry of Development Cooperation is the National Committee for International Cooperation and Sustainable Development (NCDO). This agency is the public support/marketing arm of the Ministry. Its mission is to raise awareness and build support among the Dutch public for development cooperation. The Third Chamber is a project of the NCDO, and the brainchild of its director, Henny Helmich. It is also a donor in its own right for domestic projects that raise awareness about international cooperation.

The MFA has identified the importance of civil society organizations in development cooperation, and there is currently a system of co-financing in which Dutch NGOs can apply for official ODA funding. Funding is allocated on a programmatic basis, for a period of 4 years. The annual

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6 Reduced in 2003 from 49 countries
maximum that is allocated in this way is EUR 550 million. This allocation system was an attempt to open up the funding process to a broader spectrum of Dutch NGOs, beyond the historical ‘4 pillars’ NGOs, representing the traditional pillars of Dutch society (Catholic, Protestant, Humanist, and broadly, ‘Other’). Each of the co-financing agencies (CFAs) is required to spend a percentage of their budget on raising awareness in the public for development cooperation and related issues such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

The MDGs factor importantly into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ODA funding priorities, and this trickles down to the Ministry of Development Cooperation and the projects and co-financing agencies that they fund. Poverty reduction is a primary focus, and other specific target areas are education, environment, water, AIDS prevention, and reproductive health.

3.2 Oxfam Novib’s Reversed Development Co-operation

This section begins to explore a possible definition for a theory of reversed development cooperation, and describe how it is expressed in the Oxfam Novib context. Still in its infancy, the program embodies an innovative concept that in many ways is inventing itself as it goes along.

Reversed Development Co-operation (RDC) is a project founded by Oxfam Novib in 2006, as the brainchild of director Sylvia Borren. RDC was envisioned as a way to push the idea of development forward by challenging it with a more radical proposition: the North is also in need of development assistance, and it is organizations and people in the South who may be the best qualified to give it. Many problems faced in developing countries also find expression in the North, and the North would do well to learn from the experiences of innovative Southern development practitioners. Much expertise has developed in the South as people have cultivated localized, creative responses to social problems. RDC wishes to highlight this knowledge by facilitating learning partnerships between Southern and Dutch organizations to share and build upon this wealth of Southern knowledge and experience. The idea is that ultimately this type of ‘reversed’ development cooperation can lead to a more balanced relationship between North and South, where the skills and abilities of practitioners on each side of the aid chain divide are valued equally, and ‘partnership’ is more than a euphemism for masking the old, unequal power relationships between benefactor and recipient.

In a way, RDC can be seen as a ‘reversed transfer of knowledge.’ But is it anything more than that? A core goal of RDC is to challenge Dutch perceptions of superiority. RDC contends that the North to South flow of skills and resources in the development context has created a sense among the Dutch that they have little to learn from the experience of people living in the developing world. RDC seeks to turn this perception upside down by facilitating exchanges where the Southern organization is the expert and the Dutch organization is in the position of learning. Through the E-motive network, Oxfam Novib facilitates the linkage of the Southern and Dutch counterparts, and the Southern organization shares their expertise through face-to-face collaboration and training with the Dutch group.

Of particular interest to the RDC program are those projects that deal with problems related to social fragmentation and exclusion. According to Oxfam Novib’s definition, RDC has “the goal to get people to better work together (strengthen social cohesion) and to offer them an active role

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7 E-motive is a network of several Dutch organizations that want to work to build active citizenship in The Netherlands and improve social cohesion.
in society (active citizenship) inspired by innovative and artful projects from developing countries. Beyond this, the definition of what makes a project ‘reversed development’ as opposed to just knowledge transfer is that it encompasses a broader agenda of shifting Northern perceptions about people in the South from knowledge consumers to knowledge holders.

This cross-border collaboration is also intended to foster a sense of shared goals and common values between the two organizations. The concept of global citizenship is highlighted in RDC’s promotional literature, and is a strong motivating force for the design of the program. In Oxfam Novib’s view, a global citizen is “aware of the wider world and has a sense of their own role as a world citizen; respects and values diversity; has an understanding of how the world works economically, politically, socially, culturally, technologically and environmentally; is outraged by social injustice; participates in and contributes to the community at a range of levels from local to global; is willing to act to make the world a more sustainable place; takes responsibility for their actions” (interview, Kammeraat). RDC seeks to reinforce emerging global citizenship identities by facilitating action at the local level.

Since its inception two years ago, RDC has funded 30 exchanges focusing on issues of building social cohesion in the Netherlands. Projects have included such diverse subjects as violence awareness programs in high schools, conflict resolution and facilitation trainings, programs for Dutch police to better cope with female victims of trafficking, and circus performance for troubled youth. In some cases this is a one-time collaboration; in others the relationship lasts over many meetings and leads to larger, longer-term collaborations. RDC projects are chosen for funding by Oxfam Novib on the basis of their contribution to building social cohesion, and for their embodiment of reversed development values. For the most part projects are with Southern counterparts that are already Oxfam Novib grantees, but this is not always the case.

According to Oxfam Novib’s written documents on RDC, “globalization is forcing us to take on a new approach in involving people in the struggle against poverty. The traditional North-South thinking (transfers of money and expertise from North to South) has made way to global citizenship.” Additionally, they contest that the effects of globalization, in particular family networks, travel, and communications, has “turned a large part of the (Dutch) population into global citizens.”

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8 “Reversed Development Co-operation” Oxfam Novib promotional document
Figure 2. Funding Chain & Institutional Framework of Case Studies

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  - Ministry of Development Cooperation
    - (Other Funders)
      - Oxfam Novib
        - Diversity Joy
          - D. J. Holland
        - Words Over Weapons
          - Phaphama S. Africa
          - LSTZG Holland
          - GFSA S. Africa
      - Third Chamber
        - Members
      - (Reversed Devel. Co-operation)
    - NCDO
    - CFAs
      - (Other Funders)
      - Linkis
        - (Dutch Private Initiatives)
They counter that globalization has also served to polarize Dutch society (particularly from anti-immigrant sentiment) and to create new pockets of isolation and exclusion (as is the case with many refugees and migrants). RDC is designed to address some of these negative effects of globalization, while at the same time building support for development cooperation. Oxfam Novib hopes that Reversed Development Cooperation can contribute to fostering active citizenship and strengthening social cohesion.

This research analyzed 2 RDC programs: Diversity Joy and Words Over Weapons (WOW). The following sub-sections will present information about each of these cases.

**Diversity Joy**

Diversity Joy is an Amsterdam-based organization offering workshops that teach people how to transform conflicts and violent situations using a model of communication and self-reflection developed by the South African organization Phaphama. Diversity Joy was founded by Tom Schram in 2004 after an extended visit to South Africa where he came into contact with Phaphama.

During the 1990s, Phaphama professionalized and built upon the Alternatives to Violence Project, a Quaker method of conflict resolution first developed for use in American prisons. Today, Phaphama offers workshops to disadvantaged individuals and communities in South Africa, training people in non-violent and respectful conflict resolution techniques that strengthen community ties and build empowerment. Schram participated in their training sessions, and was deeply moved by the transformative aspects of the program. He returned to the Netherlands determined to give something back to Phaphama and to find a way to bring their ideas into the Dutch context. He founded Diversity Joy and heard of the potential of funding through Oxfam Novib’s RDC program.

In a sense, Diversity Joy is unique in that it started out being ‘reverse developed’—as Schram says, ‘We are reverse, reversed, developed.’ Diversity Joy began with the intention of learning from Phaphama and has established a close and intensive training relationship with them. Schram has a complex and nuanced perspective on reversed development. As he describes, ‘development used to be about providing help; then it became more about partnership. But in practice it is still about providing help’ (interview, Schram). He believes that the RDC idea was to push the idea of development by challenging it with a more radical proposition: reversed development co-operation.

Schram contends that RDC is never an end goal as such in which the Southern organization is always in a position of consultant and the Dutch organization always as trainee. Rather the goal is to come to a balanced, respectful, and mutually reinforcing partnership. According to Schram, Diversity Joy is still in an unbalanced relationship with Phaphama in that they are still in a training phase. But they are starting to create joint projects in which the two organizations are equal partners: creating evaluations and training manuals, starting exchange programs for program facilitators and then for students. The idea here is first to do programs in the Netherlands that mix white and black schools and then bring a group of those students to
connect with students in South Africa. Finally, the partnership between Diversity Joy and Phaphama has become a platform for working together abroad. The two organizations have been invited to co-lead workshops in Israel and Asia.

According to Schram, the relationship between Diversity Joy and Phaphama began with a profound respect for and desire to learn from Phaphama’s work. From the beginning it was viewed by him as a long-term process of learning. There is consistent and close engagement with the individuals at Phaphama. Tom feels that he has been personally changed by his experience of learning from Phaphama; this sentiment was also reflected by Program Manager Leon Beckx. Phaphama’s contributions to Diversity Joy have had clear and profound effects on their programs in The Netherlands.

Schram also brought up another area of importance for RDC. Diversity Joy is one of the few RDC projects that does not connect with one of Oxfam Novib Southern grantees, and Phaphama’s recent funding proposal to Oxfam Novib was turned down. Schram says that Oxfam Novib is exploring other ways that they can support the work of Phaphama, but so far nothing is concrete. So how to give something back? There are many people here who have connections and affinities in South Africa. The partnership with Diversity Joy has helped to build Phaphama’s network both in the Netherlands and in South Africa, and has been lucrative in terms of funding for the South African organization.

**Words Over Weapons (WOW)/Wapen Jezelf Met Woorden (WJMW)**

Words Over Weapons is a collaborative project between Gun Free South Africa (GFSA) and Landelijk Stichting Tegen Zinloos Geweld (LSTZG). The project is active in both South Africa and the Netherlands, and involves school-based learning modules and multi-media components that address issues of violence, aggression, and weapons use. The program aims to sensitize students to the effects of violence, by encouraging them to speak about their personal experiences and reflect on them next to statistics about violence. Additionally, students in each country learn about the experience of violence in the other country, and have the opportunity for virtual exchanges through an internet-based system. Certain students and teachers have the opportunity for physical exchanges where they meet their counterparts in person.

In both the South African and Dutch context, the educational programs have similarities, but are adapted to fit the particular needs and constraints of each country context. For example, in South Africa, where there is a government requirement for anti-violence learning components, WOW is a part of the teaching curriculum that is executed by the regular class teacher. It is currently taking place in ten schools and the program consists of 8 lessons. In the Netherlands, participating schools (there are 2) bring in special ‘guest teachers,’ as it is not directly government funded. The Dutch program consists of 2 sessions after which the regular teacher can keep it going if s/he decides. In 2008 there is a planned peer event, in which participating students from the Netherlands and South Africa can meet. There is also a plan for an ‘experts meeting’ for the teachers to meet and exchange experiences, solutions, and ideas for improvement.
WOW began as an idea that the Dutch LSTZG had in 2005. They approached Oxfam Novib for funding, and were told that funding would be available if they carried out the program through the RDC program. The E-motive network connected LSTZG with GFSA because of their similar focus on violence prevention and youth. In a way, making this project reverse developed was kind of like “an assignment from Oxfam Novib” in order to receive funding (interview, Pruysen). However, LSTZG saw that GFSA had expertise in the area of violence prevention in schools and saw an opportunity to learn from their experience.

Over the next year, RDC funded an exchange in which the program officers at LSTZG traveled to meet with the staff at GFSA. They met three times and each time talked in more detail about how to design the project, and how they could best collaborate. Marita Pruysen was brought on in June of 2007 to research how the two organizations could learn from each other and better collaborate. WOW has a distinct collaborative element, but it appears to fall short of a reverse development relationship. At present it is more like “two projects with a small link” (interview, Pruysen).

The difficulty in communicating with GFSA has hampered the program and the learning process for LSTZG. Problems with internet connectivity, lack of capacity on both sides, cultural differences around communication and deadlines, and the barrier of language/accents for phone conversations has reduced the degree of reversed learning that has taken place.

3.3 The Third Chamber

The Third Chamber (TC) is a project initiated by the Henny Helmich, the director of the Dutch National Committee for International Cooperation and Sustainable Development (NCDO). The Third Chamber functions as a citizen’s ‘shadow parliament’ to the Dutch Parliament (the First and Second Chambers). There are 150 members; 120 are Dutch citizens, and 30 are from developing countries. Membership terms last for one year, and members meet regularly to learn about and debate international issues specifically relating to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). TC Members have access to many experts and local, national, and EU politicians, who come at different times to give talks. Topics discussed this year included security in Afghanistan and fair trade. The year culminates as the members formulate their own in-depth development proposals. The best one is chosen by vote of the membership and is then presented to the Dutch parliament to be considered for adoption.

The goal of the Third Chamber is two-fold. First, it seeks to provide a platform for new and creative ideas about development cooperation and to channel those ideas to official bodies. Second, it seeks to enhance public support for development cooperation, and to educate the Dutch public about the MDGs and related issues in the developing world. The NCDO views this as the building of a global citizenship identity: “In this way, the Third Chamber becomes a bridge between concerned citizens and politicians, a means to develop ideas, and a platform for citizens of the global village” (Third Chamber, 2007).
Each year, between 1000 and 600 applicants apply for 150 positions. Participants are chosen according to particular criteria. The Dutch members are chosen with the goal of providing a good representation of different regions of the country, gender and ethnic diversity, levels of education, and political party affiliation. According to Khadija EI Hamdaoui, the Project Leader of the Third Chamber, what is important is that they have an opinion about development cooperation—they don't have to support it, but they must have an interest in it and know something about it (interview, EI Hamdaoui). Potential new members might hear about the Third Chamber through past members, or from advertisements in newspapers, on television, and on ad boards in train stations.

The criteria for choosing the Southern members are somewhat different. Some of the Southern members are expats residing in the Netherlands, and some are residing abroad in their home countries. The goal is to have an even distribution between these two sub-groups as well as a diverse representation of region of origin, gender, and urban/rural background. The Third Chamber does not have access to the same channels of advertisement in the South as it does in The Netherlands. Rather, it relies heavily on its network of former members.

The Southern members have full voting rights (in fact, 1 vote of a Southern member actually counts as 2 to make up for their smaller numbers). The Third Chamber is quite specific about the purpose of their involvement. They are viewed as special advisors that can bring a unique perspective to inform the debates. As stated in a TC promotional flier, “People often write proposals about international development without taking into consideration the views of people in developing countries. That is exactly what the Third Chamber does not want.”

All members in the TC have some interest in development cooperation as a requirement for joining, but members’ experience with development cooperation appears to vary widely. Some people have a complex understanding of development-related issues, while others only know that over EUR 4 billion are spent annually and they want to know what good that money is doing. One member founded Happy Gunjur, a small, private development foundation that builds schools in Gambia, after he and his wife went on holiday there. Another member is an NGO employee, assisting refugees in the Netherlands, another is a local city councillor. Many others are people who wanted to find a way to “give something back” to the less fortunate in the world. Each Dutch member interviewed joined the TC with the desire to learn more about development cooperation, and many joined to expand their networks and have a forum to discuss international issues with other people.

All respondents said that they learned a great deal about development-related issues from their participation in the TC, and that the participation of the Southern members added a critical element. All respondents mentioned the great value of hearing the perspectives of people from developing countries. Most people expressed a similar sentiment to this: “We may think that we have a good idea that can help people in the South, but it may not be so. It may not be what they need or want.” In fact, five respondents expressed that they wished there was more contact with the Southern members.
When asked about the value of the TC, answers fell along 3 lines: Yes, it is valuable because I have learned a lot; Yes, it is valuable for the members but I am sceptical about its impact on the greater Dutch society; Members expressed concern regarding the cost input vs. social output of the program.

There is a heavy focus on the MDGs, stemming from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ focus, distilled through the NCDO. One reason is that it provides a structure and measurable goals to work toward. While speakers and learning events are often along MDG themes, members are not restricted to center their proposals on them. The topics can be quite flexible, as long as they are related to development cooperation.

3.4 Linkis

Linkis is a cooperative funding umbrella program among the main Dutch co-financing agencies (CFAs): Cordaid, Impulsis (which includes ICCO), Oxfam Novib, Hivos, Plan Netherlands, and the NCDO. It works by funding small, private initiatives (PIs) by groups of citizens or informal organizations that have a development cooperation focus. Linkis projects represent roughly 8 million of the 4+ billion euros spent on Dutch development cooperation annually. While this is one of the smaller areas of expenditure, it is still a substantial amount of money.

The first two letters of the name Linkis refer to the Dutch Laagdrempelige Initiatieven, which means ‘low-threshold initiatives.’ The stated goal of Linkis is to enable citizens to get involved directly with development cooperation. It is also intended to increase public support among the Dutch for international development cooperation. Programs that are chosen must have the goal of either poverty alleviation in the developing world, or awareness building for international development issues.

The term ‘private initiative’ refers to a broad spectrum of types of organizations: those that have nothing to do with development cooperation, such as the local fireman’s association; those that have been set up specifically for development. Within this last category the organizations are also extremely varied in their focus and capacity. There are those that fundraise and then give the money to the large agencies like Cordaid; organizations that were set up because someone went on holiday, met a specific person and supports them individually; and those that address groups of people/issues in many villages. There are those that are involved in “brick and mortar” activities—immediate material provision, such as building schools or providing medicines. And there are those that go beyond that to more complex development interventions with a longer-term horizon such as micro credit or broader rural development programs. The private initiatives whose projects receive funding through Linkis often have little or no experience in development cooperation.

In the past, these initiatives were funded directly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In mid 2003, responsibility for funding these projects was passed on to the co-financing agencies. The official reason for this was a matter of efficiency: the Linkis program was a lot of work for little return. For example, the average project that Linkis/Oxfam-Novib funds is between EUR 5,000 and 15,000 (interview, Stoffers).

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9 Schulpen, 2007
Likewise, the average amount of funding per project at Linkis/Hivos is EUR 7,000 (interview, van der Pol and Haanraadts). Since 2005, the Linkis network has funded over 3000 projects. Schulpen (interview, Schulpen) points out that Linkis is a way for the co-financing agencies to strengthen their own roots in Dutch society. It is also a way to better coordinate action between the co-financing organizations, i.e. to better monitor the private initiatives applying to the different agencies for funding to prevent duplicate financing.

Schulpen describes how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the large development NGOs are now moving away from the direct poverty alleviation projects, and the Dutch public has a hard time understanding why. The Ministry is having a difficult time showing what they are doing with the 4 billion euros that they spend every year on development cooperation because of this shift in focus. They are moving to more and more abstract levels of engagement and this is a problem for them in terms of public relations. According to Schulpen, “The public still believes that development is about providing something… (that) what is needed is ‘brick and mortar’ work. It is very hard to convince them otherwise. The idea that the best contribution may be in the form of advocacy and lobbying is too complex for most people to grasp. These small projects are filling this gap” (interview, Schulpen).

Oxfam Novib (interview, Stoffers) notes that one important element most PIs lack is past development experience. According to him, the value of Linkis is that it can embed the smaller initiatives in the larger projects of the co-financing agencies, taking advantage of their past experience, relationships, and infrastructure. He gives the example of building a school: if an organization wants to build a school in Ethiopia, first they build the school, then they hire a teacher, but then they have to connect that school to the national education system. That involves meeting with local government officials and the Ministry of Education. It’s a lot of coordination work and they may not have the necessary contacts. It can also be time-consuming for the Ministry if there are a lot of these projects going on separately.

Schulpen is sceptical that these PIs do much good. Most are ‘brick and mortar’ projects and are very small-scale. While they may provide needed goods such as medicines or schools, they rarely address structural factors that create and maintain poverty or build local capacity. Secondly, they often have little understanding of the local context in which they seek to work.

Still, he offers an interesting dilemma: is it fair to judge these initiatives against a professional development discourse? After all, they are not conceived of or carried out by development professionals, but individuals with a sincere desire to help others. Is this not a good impulse? Don’t they have a right to express their goodwill, so to speak?

Table 1 summarizes some key aspects of each of the 3 cases presented here: Reversed Development Co-operation, Third Chamber, and Linkis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Case Study Variables</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary Actors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reversed Develop-ment Co-operation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Third Chamber</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkis</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
4. ANALYSIS

The cases examined here all have elements of innovation that make them unique in the context of traditional development practice. In Oxfam Novib's Reversed Development Co-operation, the notion of reversing the flow of expertise from North-South to South-North is an idea long overdue. It challenges Northern biases of superiority—held over from the North's collective colonial past—all too often unchallenged and replicated in development practice and policy. RDC also challenges Southern biases that either idealize or demonize the North. The values inherent in RDC can build meaningful solidarity between people across the North-South divide—a solidarity that is necessary to tackle the global problems that we all face.

With the Third Chamber, the notion of average citizens learning about and debating issues of development cooperation in relation to their own political system broadens participants' sphere of citizen engagement, potentially building greater democracy. Citizens engage more deeply in their national political community and process, while increasing their understanding of international issues. The involvement of the Southern members adds, as Helmich says, "a dose of reality," (interview, Helmich) and ensures that their understanding moves beyond post-imperialist notions that the North knows best what the South needs. In this respect, the Third Chamber also challenges Northern biases of superiority, and is highly forward thinking.

Through Linkis, well-intentioned Dutch citizens who want to help people in other countries are able to make their visions a reality. This can revitalize the mainstream Dutch development paradigm as new ideas from the grassroots of Dutch society can be realized and brought to the attention of the larger co-financing agencies. Some of the co-financing agencies allot a certain amount of their Linkis budget for funding projects brought forward by migrant groups in the Netherlands, helping to build cultural bridges between diaspora communities and engaging the 'new' Dutch in active citizenship.

All three case studies seek to encourage global citizenship and harness the energy of what they often refer to as 'emerging global citizens.' Official documents in each of the cases frequently refer to 'global' or 'world' citizens. For all of the references to global citizenship, two of the case studies—Reversed Development Co-operation and the Third Chamber—fall particularly short of engaging participants in high levels of global citizen action, and all fail to create true alternatives to mainstream development practice (referred to here as change-potential: see Figure 3).

The low change-potential of these cases is a result, not strictly of their embeddedness in official institutions (invited spaces), but also of the lack of links to 'created spaces' of citizen engagement: broader, bottom-up social movements (global and national). This chapter will examine these cases according to their degrees of global citizen action and their change-potential using the framework outlined in Chapter 2. Finally, it will end with an assessment of how the cases may shift into the field of a more change-oriented, instrumental global citizen action.
FIGURE 3. GLOBAL CITIZEN ACTION & CHANGE POTENTIAL

LEGEND

\( X \text{ axis} = \text{change potential}; \) potential to create alternatives in dev. aid paradigm

\( Y \text{ axis} = \text{Global Citizen Action; level of engagement} \)
4.1 Low Global Citizen Action—Reversed Development Co-operation and The Third Chamber

Of the two cases that fall into this category, limited engagement global citizen action (see the x-axis of Figure 3), Reversed Development Co-operation and the Third Chamber rank similarly. Both cases have a similar level of engagement with people from the South, and have an inbuilt mechanism for valuing Southern experience and knowledge and challenging mutual biases. This is important for reducing conceptions of ‘otherness’ between people, and building solidarity at the citizen level across borders. However, there was evidence in both cases that contact with the ‘other’ could increase feelings of difference in certain circumstances. For example, with the difficulties of communication in the Words Over Weapons case there was the feeling that it was due to cultural differences as much as technology problems (interview, Pruysker). In the Third Chamber, one of the Southern members recounted a story about a personal email that another Southern member received from a Dutch member, accusing her of being too critical of “their” proposals (interview, Nyasulu), exposing a feeling of ‘us’ and ‘them.’ Most of the Southern members interviewed expressed that they felt their contributions to debates were valued, although one Southern member felt that “it was often a case of ‘what the southern members say, goes.’” Discussion was only encouraged up to a point, and only on certain things.” (interview, Villiers de Graft).

A critical element of global citizenship is learning about international issues and their complexity. While not directly linked to the level of global citizen action, a critical reflection on current development policy can impact the type and quality of global citizen action, and contribute to the effectiveness of development interventions as project design may better reflect this understanding. Actions within the context of the Third Chamber focus heavily on learning and critical debate and reflection (see Figure 1), placing the Third Chamber within the area of limited global citizen action. Reversed Development Co-operation projects involve a higher degree of activity but are often short-term in nature and do not always reflect a critical engagement with international issues. Thus, RDC also falls into the limited engagement category of global citizen action.

Both cases encourage action that takes place largely in the Netherlands and is targeted towards a Dutch constituency. In the Third Chamber, people sometimes go on to carry out their projects at the international level, but most activity associated with their membership throughout the year occurs in the Netherlands. For the most part, RDC programs take place in the Netherlands (the goal is to build social cohesion within the Netherlands), with influence from the international. However, both of the RDC programs examined—Words Over Weapons and Diversity Joy—included a component of international work. Despite the difficulties of the ‘reversed development’ aspect between Gun Free South Africa and LSTZG in Words Over Weapons, an important part of the program is the virtual connection between participating students in South Africa and Holland. The planned physical exchanges between students and teachers in 2008 will also add to this element. Diversity Joy started out as a learning relationship between its Dutch founder and South African Phaphama, but as Diversity Joy has gained experience and expertise, it is evolving into co-projects carried out at the international level, in regions totally new to both groups.
Table 2. Assessment of Global Citizen Engagement in Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement Criteria</th>
<th>Reversed Dev. Co-op</th>
<th>Third Chamber</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engagement w/ people from the South</td>
<td>Southern org. offers expertise &amp; advice</td>
<td>Southern members offer opinions on issues and co-develop proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenge N-S stereotypes; building solidarity</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning about int’l issues &amp; their complexity</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Reflection on Development Policy</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-creating of projects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target of projects</td>
<td>Dutch constituency</td>
<td>Southern &amp; Dutch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carry out actual development projects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2 Low Change-Potential: Linkis and Reversed Development Co-operation

Global citizen action is not inherently change-oriented. It can reinforce the status quo, or even affect development cooperation negatively as in the recent case of Zoe’s Arch, the French NGO who attempted to illegally remove children from Chad in the name of helping them according to the Geneva Convention.¹⁰

In this analysis, Linkis allows for a high degree of global citizen action, yet ranks the lowest on the change-potential scale, followed by Reversed Development Co-operation (see the y-axis of Figure 3). Linkis’ low score is the result of the largely traditional nature of its programs, its failure to challenge dominant power relations particularly in the context of the flow of aid, and its lack of links to development policy. RDC also lacks links to development policy, and has a very limited scope, but it does appear to more effectively offer alternatives to some of the dominant power relationships common in the development paradigm.

As stated in the introduction to this chapter, both of the programs offer an alternative to a particular aspect of the current development cooperation paradigm. Linkis offers an avenue for citizens to be involved in a sphere usually delegated to experts and official agencies. However, less than ten percent of proposals received are “exceptional” in that they propose something that is a combination of innovative and potentially effective (interview, van der Pol and Haanraadts). Most projects proposed under Linkis do not offer much that is new to development practice. According to Hivos and Schulpen, many of the proposals they receive reflect the development practice of 30 years ago—‘brick and mortar’ activities, i.e. plans to build latrines or schools, and do not reflect the complexity of the process of development that is now

¹⁰ Although proponents of cosmopolitanism would assert that an important element of global citizenship involves a commitment to an ethics of social justice, equity, and interconnection across borders, there is the question of how those ethics are interpreted.
commonly understood by mainstream development organizations (interview, van der Pol and Haanraadts, Schulpen).

Linkis projects are still basically top-down. Hivos expressed that in the last few years, most proposals reflect an understanding that local people should be consulted, and this is certainly an important development. However, the projects are still conceived of and for the most part developed in the North and carried out in the South, reinforcing the vertical aid chain and the Northern expertise-Southern recipient dichotomy. This raises the question of whom Linkis is really designed to serve—Dutch citizens with a desire to interact with the global, or the Southern poor.

Reversed Development Co-operation reverses the traditional North-South flow of knowledge and skills and helps to build solidarity and networks between practitioners in the Netherlands and developing countries. In one of the RDC cases examined, Words Over Weapons, it seems that this reversal has not totally occurred. Rather, the program has evolved as more of a collaboration between separately designed projects in the respective countries. This appears to be due to the donor-driven nature of this particular RDC project. As discussed in the previous chapter, the impetus for being ‘reverse developed’ came from the opportunity for funding. LSTZG voiced concerns over the evaluation and reporting habits of Gun Free South Africa, mirroring an oft-sited woe of Northern funding agencies for their Southern grantees. In the case of Diversity Joy, however, it can be said that this reversal was effective, and the traditional power relationship and flow of knowledge/skills between North and South was altered. A lesson here may be that when the impetus for reverse development is self-initiated, there is a far greater potential for the transformation of power relations.

Table 3. Change-Potential of Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change Criteria</th>
<th>Linkis</th>
<th>Rev. Devel. Co-operation</th>
<th>Third Chamber</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What does it challenge in the existing development paradigm?</td>
<td>Dominance of &quot;experts&quot; in development practice</td>
<td>North-South flow of knowledge &amp; skills</td>
<td>Apathy of Northern public towards devel. coop; dominance of experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does it challenge dominant power relations?</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Partially/Yes</td>
<td>Partially/Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does it have any links to official development policy?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is it linked to a broader, radical movement or project?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope</td>
<td>Relatively Large</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUR 8 million/year ~average grant/project: EUR 7,500</td>
<td>30 projects since 2006</td>
<td>150 members/year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Neither Linkis nor RDC have strong links to development policy, although they are both embedded within the official framework of the CFAs and can potentially inform development practice. RDC has the support of upper management at Oxfam Novib (Executive Director Sylvia Borren) and is in an experimental phase. If it proves successful, it is possible that RDC can begin to influence other areas of Oxfam Novib’s work. At this point however, this is highly speculatory. In the context of Linkis, successful projects may be picked up and carried forward by the CFA. At Hivos, outstanding projects have been co-opted out of the Linkis department and into the funding framework of Hivos. Some examples include a program creating informative brochures for coffee farmers about trends in Northern markets, and a small film festival and arts magazine in Iran (interview, van der Pol and Haanraadts).

Out of the three cases, the Third Chamber ranks the highest in this analysis for change-potential primarily because of its focus on broadening the scope of local citizen engagement. Members learn and debate about Dutch development policy and share their concerns with politicians. Through the process of formulating a development proposal and lobbying for support for it, members gain a deeper understanding of their own country’s political process. This expansion of local citizenship practice is a broader political project that can potentially lead to a greater sense of empowerment and the creation of Edwards’ constituencies for change. Like RDC, the Third Chamber encourages the inclusion of Southern perspectives, and challenges the idea that ‘we know what’s best for you.’ Importantly, each member interviewed said that one of the most important outcomes of joining the Third Chamber was the expansion of their personal networks—building new North-South and domestic Dutch citizen networks.

However, the Third Chamber is limited by a few key factors. First is the fact that it has no real power. Members spend months researching and developing development proposals and present them to Parliament. But in the end, even the best proposal may not be adopted. Many members expressed frustration as they discovered that they had the right to be heard but not necessarily listened to by the Dutch Parliament. In this sense the Third Chamber could be seen as a largely symbolic practice. Helmich, however, points out that symbols can be very powerful (interview, Helmich). Indeed, symbols can be key precursors to new perceptions, but without being accompanied by tangible shifts in political power and engagement, the danger is that symbols may remain just that.

Second, the Third Chamber’s focus on the MDGs may provide a useful framework within which to approach the subject of development cooperation, but it detracts from a critical analysis of the immanent forces affecting development, for example the role of Dutch/European agricultural protections, unequal terms of trade, or the democratic deficit caused by international financial institutions.

4.3 Moving Towards Instrumental Global Citizen Action

One quadrant in Figure 3—labelled instrumental global citizen action—has not yet been mentioned. This is an arena where individuals are highly engaged in actions that are connected to or have reverberations on the global, in ways that have the potential
to bring about alternatives to the current international cooperation paradigm. Actions here address the underlying processes and structures that create the conditions of poverty and inequity. Actions are not just of a programmatic nature but also impact policy. Citizens are able to "project their agency beyond specific interventions into broader arenas, thereby progressively altering the 'immanent' process of inclusion and exclusion" (Hickey and Mohan, 2005:253). This is the place where rights are claimed and/or created. One example of a case that would fall into this category is the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra/Landless Rural Worker's Movement (MST) of Brazil.

What are the factors present in the three research cases that can help or inhibit their movement towards this type of high change-potential citizen engagement? All of these cases are embedded in official development infrastructures, offering particular opportunities and drawbacks; none are connected to a broader, radical political project, although the Third Chamber comes the closest with its focus on building local citizen practice.

The Paradox of Institutional Embeddedness

It is interesting that all three cases presented here are innovations situated in established development institutions either directly connected to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as in the case of the Third Chamber, or indirectly through the co-financing institutions. It seems almost counter-intuitive that projects seeking to alter the status quo would be embedded within the very institutions that stand the most to lose from fundamental changes to the development aid paradigm. Yet many of the Searcher-inspired programs Easterly (2006) pays lip service to are in fact projects that also germinated in official agencies.

There are certainly benefits to being located within larger structures including access to funding, the benefit of a history of development experience (particularly in the case of Linkis), and an established programmatic structure that can streamline activity and reduce the collective action problem that can paralyze a grassroots project. However, being closely connected to conventional development organizations also has its drawbacks. Both the MFA and the CFAs have strong interests in maintaining development co-operation similar to as it is now. If the changes in development aid advocated by Conyers (2007) and Riddell (2007) come about, CFAs would be rendered close to obsolete. They would have to dramatically reframe their activities, as Van Rooy (2000) recommends, by becoming hubs for brokering and networking relationships between activists in the North and South, national and international institutions. Development aid as a political tool of the donor nation-state would be vastly reduced if not close to eradicated. This is not to say that political interests would not find influence in Riddell's vision of a collective aid pot, but it would create a vastly changed system.

Links to a Radical, Political Project

According to Hickey and Mohan (2005), the mark of a project's transformative potential is its link to a broader, radical political project. This is likely because of the focus such movements have on issues of representation and power. Social movements are often the arenas where those excluded from decision-making systems seek to
make their voices heard and exert influence on those systems. By linking to these types of social movements, these projects can widen their democratic legitimacy and ultimately be more effective as the agents of change they purportedly seek to be. This can also be understood as widening invited spaces to interact with created ones.

Whether or not these links would be possible within the funding matrix surrounding the cases here is not clear. There is an unpredictable quality to social movements. The cases in this study are channelling the emergent interest in global citizenship into particular outlets that are ultimately within mainstream structures. Connecting these innovative ideas with the elements of society that are expressing their citizenship outside of mainstream structures may not accomplish ends that are appropriate in the context of what large social institutions are often designed to do: facilitate social continuity.

How might the different case studies move toward that fourth quadrant, where they might offer something new to the current aid paradigm? In the case of Linkis, addressing the top-down flow of planning and resources would cause the greatest fundamental shift. If the primary intention of the program is to allow new ideas for tackling global problems to bubble up from citizens to development institutions, maybe there is a better way that puts the Southern recipients, rather than the Northern citizen, at the center of the planning process. If the main intention is to provide an avenue for Dutch citizens to express humanistic concerns and the desire to get personally involved, maybe it is better to fund learning exchanges or ‘volunteer holidays,’ where Dutch citizens travel to the South and get directly involved with Southern-initiated projects.

In the case of Reversed Development Co-operation, mainstreaming the principles of reversed development into the larger structure of Oxfam Novib could give this project the scope that it currently lacks. Focusing on projects that are self-initiated in their desire to be ‘reverse developed’ can be important here as well. This may require additional funding towards marketing the RDC program in broad social spheres.

By encouraging critical reflection of development issues and expanding the sphere of citizen participation, the Third Chamber offers a potentially powerful innovation. What would make it more effective would be to encourage a deeper reflection on the underlying forces that lead to exclusion, a critical examination of political and economic policy at the Dutch, the EU, and the global level that affect development processes. Finally, altering the TC structure so that members have the right to be listened to as well as heard can be instrumental as well.
5. Conclusion

This research has sought to answer the question, *How are Northern citizens contributing to alternative approaches in international development cooperation?* It has focused specifically on projects that invite Dutch citizens to engage in global citizen action in innovative ways that are embedded within the official framework of Dutch development co-operation. As stated in the introduction, the purpose of this research was not to provide a quantitative, definitive answer to the question. That is a virtually impossible task. The goal was to better understand the potential for progressive change to emerge from within the institutions that guide current development policy and process.

It is clear from this research that the Dutch citizens engaged in the case studies want to see a positive change in the world. They want to better understand why problems such as poverty have persisted for so long, despite the billions of dollars worldwide that is spent to address it. This sentiment was echoed time and again by people interviewed in each of the cases. People in the North are feeling more of a personal connection to the global, whether it is through the experience of travel, the media, or simply a growing awareness of an interconnection that extends out from the local and the national to encompass aspects of the global. The concept of global citizenship is experiencing another resurgence. As during the time of the Stoics and the Enlightenment, there is again a consolidation of global political and economic power that has huge impacts on the world, particularly the poor and marginalized. The current global citizenship resurgence could well be a citizen-based reaction to this consolidation, and a way to seek out a more autonomous, humanistic, and flexible identity.

The potential for a powerful Constituency for Change is in various stages of nascency. This call for change is represented within the development field as well, as the debates between the scholars presented in Chapter 2 show. It is interesting to question why the monoliths of Dutch development cooperation that have much to lose from change, are creating projects that are searching for alternatives. The critical view is that it is a way to release some of the pressure of the new global citizen awareness and demands for accountability and transformation, while shifting in a 'safe,' conservative way, the development agenda. With the exception of Linkis, the cases examined here were created as personal projects of the leaders of two of the most influential Dutch development institutions. It could very well be the case that these development leaders also see, maybe better than anyone else, that the current development paradigm with its funding hierarchy, political control, and bias towards imminent interventions needs to radically shift.

The three cases presented in this research all offer new and interesting ways to channel some of this energy for change. But there is the very real danger that these innovations will remain in the arena of the symbolic. In each of the three cases, the change-potential of each was ultimately limited by its embeddedness in mainstream institutions and lack of engagement with fundamental issues of power. Each case did not take their innovative ideas far enough so that fundamental structural change in the development paradigm could be realized. Linkis offers us the lesson that just increasing the participation of Northern citizens is not enough—challenging fundamental relationships of power and building a complex understanding of development
process is critical. Reversed Development Co-operation portrays how challenging power relationships and bias must affect larger institutional levels in order to make any significant impact, and that this is less effective when it is donor-driven as opposed to self-initiated. The Third Chamber illustrates the limits to widening arenas of citizen participation but not allowing an avenue for that participation to lead to real power to impact official spheres.

Admittedly, fundamental change in a large and established system is a tall order for one project by any account. But single projects have and continue to offer tangible alternatives to the current systems of exclusion that are responsible for so many of the problems development seeks to address. These projects tend to be initiated by more bottom-up processes, where the expansion of citizenship rights and participation is linked to a larger agenda of fundamental changes in power relationships. Social movements have traditionally occupied this role of progressive changemakers. Importantly, they require us to move beyond a control-orientation and put faith in the collective process. When fundamental changes are sought, it is unlikely that conservative, controllable tweaks to the system can bring about the desired results. This research is sceptical that the broader change that is necessary in the development cooperation paradigm can be brought about if the cases remain as institutionally embedded as they are. Aside from the programmatic changes proposed above, linking the case studies here with larger, bottom-up social movements can be a powerful combination.
References


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http://www.macalester.edu/globalcitizenship/


List of Interviewees
(Alphabetical by last name)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brenda Ammeraal</td>
<td>Third Chamber</td>
<td>Dutch Member</td>
<td>09/08/07</td>
<td>Utrecht</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poppy Astrini</td>
<td>Third Chamber</td>
<td>Southern Member</td>
<td>08/08/07</td>
<td>The Hague</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leon Beckx</td>
<td>Diversity Joy</td>
<td>Program Manager</td>
<td>12/09/07</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob de Best</td>
<td>Third Chamber</td>
<td>Dutch Member</td>
<td>09/08/07</td>
<td>The Hague</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylvia Borren</td>
<td>Oxfam Novib</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>29/06/07</td>
<td>The Hague</td>
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<tr>
<td>Berend Brock</td>
<td>Third Chamber</td>
<td>Dutch Member</td>
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