Conflict management in Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country

The effectiveness of consociational conflict management

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Abstract

This thesis researches the effect of consociationalism as a conflict management tool on the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country. In order to determine if consociationalism has been implemented, five indicators are used: proportionality, the effective number of parties, the grand coalition, the mutual veto and segmental autonomy. As a counter-theory, Europeanization is used. The indicators used to determine if Europeanization has been implemented are EU funding, the representation of the regions in the EU institutions and the mediation role of the EU in the conflicts. Evidence is found that elements of both theories have been implemented in both regions, although more elements of consociationalism have been implemented in Northern Ireland than in Basque Country. The EU has not adopted a mediation role in both conflicts. In Northern Ireland, both consociationalism and Europeanization have had an effect on the amount of violent conflict in the region, although the Europeanization has mostly encouraged the adoption of consociational power-sharing. The conclusion for Northern Ireland is that consociationalism has been an effective conflict management tool. In Basque Country no relation could be found between the implemented elements of consociationalism and Europeanization, and the reduction in the amount of violent conflict. The conclusion for Basque Country is that consociationalism has not been an effective conflict management tool.

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Abbreviations

ANV Basque Nationalist Action
AP Alianza Popular
CDS Centro Democrático y Social
CLMC Combined Loyalist Military Command
CoR Committee of the Regions
DG Directorate General (of the European Commission)
DUP Democratic Unionist Party
EA Eusko Alkartasuna
EAJ-PNV Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea-Partido Nacionalista Vasco
EE Euskadiko Ezkerra
EP European Parliament
ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
EU European Union
FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
GFA Good Friday Agreement
GNI Gross National Income
GNP Gross National Product
HB Herri Batasuna
IRA Irish Republican Army
MLA Member of the Legislative Assembly (of Northern Ireland)
NIA Northern Ireland Assembly
NIE Northern Ireland Executive
PCE-EPK Partido Comunista de Euskadi-Euskadiko Partidu Komunista
PCTV Partido Comunista de las Tierras Vascas
PP Partido Popular
PSE-PSOE Partido Socialista de Euskadi-Partido Socialista Obrero Español
PR Proportional Representation
SDLP Social Democratic and Labor Party
STV Single Transferable Voting
UA Unidad Alavesa
UCD Unión de Centro Democrático
UK United Kingdom
UKUP United Kingdom Unionist Party
UPyD Unión Progreso y Democracia
US United States
UUC Ulster Unionist Council
UUUC United Ulster Unionist Council
UUP Ulster Unionist Party
UWC Ulster Workers’ Council
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1. Introduction
The world is ridden with conflicts of groups that want to separate from a larger political unit. In Canada, for example, Quebecois separatism is still alive, even after the 1970s when the language laws were implemented (Quebec separatism, 2005). On the other side of the world, China faces separatism from the Tibetan region, which want to form its own country (Brookes, 2000). Europe is no exception to this and several European states face separatist movements. Figure one shows the potential independent states in Europe. Not all of the areas on the map are characterized by a high-profile separatist movement that is in clear conflict with the established state. Moreover, not all separatist movements use violence to reach their goals.

Separatism is a theory that falls under the larger theory of secession. Secession refers to the act of withdrawal from a larger group or political unit (Buchanan, 1995) and thus addresses a “fundamental problem of political theory: the moral basis for the state’s authority” (Boykin, 1998). Separatism refers to the wish of a group of disjunction from a larger group or political unit (Topic’, 2011). It can have various degrees, from full political secession to just greater autonomy.

This thesis takes a closer look at two conflicts in Europe: the one in Northern Ireland and the one in Spanish Basque Country. Both of these conflicts take place in a region within a country. However, the separatist direction is different. Whereas Basque separatism focuses on the establishment of a new (Basque) state, separatism in Northern Ireland is directed toward making the region part of the Republic of Ireland (and thus not the creation of a new state). If the separatist goals are different, why choose these regions?

The choice for Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country is because they have some commonalities. Besides being regions in countries, they have three things in common. Firstly, they had a high-profile separatist movement that (secondly) used violence to reach its goal. Both the IRA in Northern Ireland and ETA in Spanish Basque Country were not shy of the use of violence. The third commonality is associated with the main research question of this thesis, and refers to the fact that the use of violence in these conflicts has been declining over the past decades (see graph 1). Yet in both regions violence associated with the conflicts is still a common occurrence.

On the twelfth of April 2010, a car exploded in the city of Belfast, Northern Ireland (Sharrock, 2010). Republican terrorist splinter groups were suspected of causing the explosion, which was aimed at the headquarters of MI5, the national security service of the United Kingdom (MI5, 2010). This shows that the conflict in Northern Ireland hasn’t been completely solved. Simply put, the conflict in this region is between the unionists and the nationalists. The unionists are Protestant and want Northern Ireland to be part of Protestant Great Britain (Kerr, 2005). Nationalist have a Catholic religion and want Northern Ireland to be part of the mainly Catholic Republic of Ireland. Because of the ongoing conflict, conflict management is still required.

A bomb explosion in September 2010 shows that the conflict in Spanish Basque Country is not solved yet either (Kyero.com, 2010). The Basques are a culturally distinct Christian Group in the North of Spain, on the border with France. The ETA is a group that conducts terrorist attacks to win independence for a Basque state (Council on Foreign Relations, 2010). Conflict management is required here too.

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1 There are three arguments for a state’s legitimacy, which derive respectively from the authors Kant, Locke and Hume (Boykin, 1998). The first of which includes the rightness of its institutions and aims. If groups can legitimately secede from the state, this form of legitimacy is threatened because the state’s institutions are no longer seen as ‘right’. The second base for a state’s legitimacy is consent, which is threatened by secession because “consent may be legitimately withdrawn in favor of an alternative political arrangement” (ibid). The final base of legitimacy is its usefulness in producing order. This generally means the endurance of the historical state and permits groups to transfer their loyalties to other groups that they find more useful. Thus, secession admits that the historical state is no longer able to produce order.
Conflict management in Northern Ireland consists in many part of applied consociationalism. “In a consociational regime, each cultural group has an official role in the constitutional system which guarantees group rights while preserving the whole state unit” (Ehrlich, 2000). Both the nationalists and the unionists in Northern Ireland share the political power. This system has also been implemented in Spain, when it comes to managing the conflict of the Basques and the Basque Country.

The use of violence shows that both conflicts haven’t been solved. Now it’s the question how effective conflict management procedures have been in Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country. Because consociationalism has been used as a conflict management tool in both conflicts, this thesis focuses on the effectiveness of consociationalism. To avoid falling for the trap of automatically associating any developments in the conflicts with consociationalism, a second theory of conflict management will be taken a look at. Because the United Kingdom and Spain are both members of the European Union², European integration can also be used as a conflict management tool and thus can also be responsible for any developments in the conflicts.

Figure 1: Separatism in Europe

![Figure 1: Separatism in Europe](source: (Disclose.tv, 2009))

1.1 Research questions

This research takes a look at the effectiveness of conflict management in Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country. Specifically, the effectiveness of the consociational model and Europeanization are looked at. Because of time reasons, this thesis does not make any recommendations on how to improve the observed effectiveness of both models. The research makes use of a main research question and three sub-questions.

Main research question:

Have Europeanization and the consociational model been an effective conflict management tool in the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country?

Sub-questions:
1. What are the backgrounds of the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country?
2. Are there elements of consociationalism and Europeanization present in Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country?
3. Have consociationalism and Europeanization had an impact on the degree of the conflicts?

² The United Kingdom has been part of the EU since 1973, and Spain has accessed the EU in 1986 (European Union, 2011).
1.2 Why this research?
Besides the reasons given in the introduction, it is personal experience that made me come up with the main research question. During my study abroad time in Belfast, Northern Ireland, in 2009, there was a bomb scare at a bank near the university. The immediate surroundings of the bank were shut off. However, I seemed to be the only one who was a bit nervous about the bomb scare. The ‘locals’ weren’t impressed and seemed to be used to bomb scares. Also during other conversations I had with citizens of Northern Ireland, among whom a former police officer who had to move house in the 1980s after receiving threats, it became clear that there were still tensions between the unionists and nationalists in Northern Ireland. Surely, Northern Ireland has come a long way since ‘the Troubles’, but how effective has conflict management been if the ‘locals’ don’t find bomb scares unusual?

Personal experience also made me include Spanish Basque Country in the research question and make a comparison between Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country. During visits to Basque Country in both Spain and France, citizens showed their ‘Basque identity’ everywhere. I saw the Basque flag only slightly fewer, if not equal or more, times than the Spanish and French flags. This shows that people who live in that region, feel like they are part of another culture than the Spanish (or French) one. What is interesting however, is that the Spanish government has rejected an offer of the ETA of a permanent cease-fire (NOS, 2011). This begs the question of how effective conflict management in Spanish Basque Country is.

Research about the effectiveness of consociational conflict management is necessary for both societal and theoretical reasons. Explanations for this are given in the next two paragraphs.

1.2.1 Theoretical relevance
“Theoretically relevant works helps us to arrive at a better understanding of the phenomena that we study theoretically or empirically” (Lehnert, Miller, & Wonka, 2007). After studying the effectiveness of the consociational model we get a better understanding of the conflicts in both countries. This information helps us to gain knowledge about which aspects of the consociational model work in reality. With this knowledge we can adjust the model itself, in the hope that any future applications of the model will lead to more effective conflict management.

However, because, as will be explained in chapter four, the external validity of this research is limited, the thesis will only make very modest conclusions about the effectiveness of the consociationalism as a conflict management tool.

1.2.2 Societal relevance
For societal reasons, it is important to know if the consociational model of conflict management is effective. “Socially relevant research furthers the understanding of social and political phenomena which affect people and make a difference with regard to explicitly specified evaluative standards” (Lehnert, Miller, & Wonka, 2007). Ethno-national conflicts certainly affect citizens of Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country, so it is important for them that the conflict is effectively managed. It is also of importance for policy-makers in the countries, as they can learn from their experiences and apply enhanced forms of the model in other regions torn by conflicts.

1.3 Chapter overview
The research in this thesis is split into two parts. The first part consists of preliminary information about the research. Chapter two provides general information about Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country and about their political systems. It also gives a short background of the conflict in these regions. Chapter three states the theoretical framework for the thesis. It describes two theories of conflict management, consociationalism and Europeanization, and comes up with two hypotheses that might answer the main research question. It also identifies which data sources are
going to be used for the research. The next chapter operationalizes the concepts of the research. A dependent variable and two independent variables are identified, together with indicators that point to the (possible) presence of the variables in the Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country. Also, the measurement viability and reliability are discussed for every indicator. Chapter five states the research design for answering the main and sub-questions. Various research designs are discussed and after weighing the pros and cons of each of those designs, a research design for the thesis is chosen.

The second part of the thesis provides answers to the main and sub-questions. Chapter six examines if consociationalism and Europeanization have been implemented in Northern Ireland. Chapter seven in turn, looks for signs of consociationalism and Europeanization in Spanish Basque Country. While examining, both these chapters make use of the indicators mentioned in chapter four. The next chapter looks at the effectiveness of conflict management in Northern Ireland, and for this makes use of the indicators for effective conflict management mentioned in chapter four. Chapter nine looks at the effectiveness of conflict management in Spanish Basque Country. Chapter ten tries to provide an answer to the question if consociationalism has solved the conflicts (and thus the underlying reasons for the conflicts) or if consociationalism is merely a tool ‘manage’ the conflicts (and thus the conflicts themselves still exist). Finally, chapter eleven gives a short summary of the thesis and provides answers to the main and sub-questions. It also mentions the difficulties experienced during execution of the research and gives recommendations for further research.
2. Case background

Before going further with the research, it is important to provide some background information on the topic in hand. This chapter provides a brief historical overview of the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country. It also provides general information about the two regions.

Table 1: General data

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<td>10.7%</td>
<td>Vitoria-Gasteiz</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


2.1 Northern Ireland

Northern Ireland is one of the four countries of the United Kingdom, next to England, Wales and Scotland. Northern Ireland has approximately 1.8 million inhabitants. The 1920 ‘Government of Ireland Act’ officially separated the region from Ireland and made it part of the United Kingdom. “Because Northern Ireland is a constituent element of the UK, its head of government is the British prime minister, and its head of state is the reigning (English) monarch” (Encyclopaedia Brittanica, 2010).

However, this does not mean that Northern Ireland hasn’t a government of its own. The Northern Ireland Assembly is the regional government. Through the years, the legislature has undergone several changes. The legislature from 1920 till 1972 was formed by the Northern Ireland Parliament, which always chose the Ulster Unionist Party for the Executive. The Parliament was abolished in 1973 (suspended from March 1972), when the Northern Ireland Constitution Act was signed. This Act gave permission to establish the NIA, which would also choose the Executive. The modern and current NIA was established under the ‘Northern Ireland Act 1998’ (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2010).

The first NIA was actually established two months before its official start, when the Sunningdale Agreement was signed (BBC News, 2008). This Agreement aimed to establish a power-sharing Northern Ireland Executive and a cross-border Council of Ireland. In March 1973 the UK government published a White Paper which proposed a NIA with 78 members, who were to be elected by proportional representation. The UK government would still hold power over decisions made concerning law, policing and finance, but the Council of Ireland (consisting of members of the NIE, NIA and the Irish Executive) would have a consultative role. This version of the NIA did not
survive long; it was abolished in 1974 after a strike by the Ulster Workers’ Council and opposition from republicans.

A new version of the NIA came into office in 1982, as a body to scrutinize the actions of the Secretary of State, the UK minister who was responsible for Northern Ireland affairs. However, this NIA did not get support from nationalists, and was thus resolved in 1986.

As said at the beginning of this story, the modern NIA was established in 1998. Although suspended four times, it was never abolished and now has 108 members. The tasks for which it is responsible are the ones that have been devolved from the national government in London. It is also responsible for appointing the NIE. The most recent power that was devolved to the Assembly was that of policing, in 2010 (McDonald & Watt, 2010). The NIA has been given powers to execute home rule. However, these powers (and the Assembly) can at any time be recalled by the national government (Hail, 2011).

Moreover, the whole NIA can be suspended by the national government at Westminster. This has been done several times in the past (see box 1), when there was a fear that the devolved government of Northern Ireland could not be continued due to heavy tensions between the political parties. In 2002, Secretary of State John Reid suspended the NIA after “Ulster Unionist leader and First Minister David Trimble said he and his ministers would resign if Sinn Féin was not excluded from the executive amid allegations of republican spying” (BBC News, 2002).

The modern NIA has been suspended four times in the last eleven years (Left, 2002). When the NIA is suspended, its powers are transferred to the Northern Ireland Office. The Northern Ireland Office is a department of the United Kingdom Government Office that is responsible for Northern Ireland affairs and is based in the building of the NIA, Stormont, and in London (Northern Ireland Office, 2010). It represents Northern Ireland at Westminster and represents Westminster in Northern Ireland. The NIO is also responsible for overseeing the devolution in Northern Ireland.

**Box 1: Suspension dates of the modern NIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suspension of the modern NIA:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 February – 30 May 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 August (24 hours) 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 September (24 hours) 2001</td>
</tr>
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</table>

The term ‘the Troubles’ is used widely to refer to the period of the heaviest conflict in Northern Ireland, between 1968 and 1998. After the 1998 Good Friday Agreement violence still occurs, but more sporadic. Violence was used as a method of goal-attainment by two segments of society, namely the nationalists and the unionists. The conflict between these segments mostly revolved around the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. Nationalists wanted to see the region become part of the Republic of Ireland, while unionists strived for unison with the UK. The division between nationalists and unionists is also often based on religion, with most nationalists being Catholic and most unionists being Protestant.

One solution to this conflict might be seen as the separation of Northern Ireland into two regions, one of which becoming part of the Republic of Ireland and the other remaining part of the UK. This, however, was difficult to achieve. Northern Ireland does not feature a clear geographical division between the nationalist and unionist segments of society (Lijphart, 1977), as can be seen in figure four. A geographical division of Northern Ireland is thus highly unlikely.

The constitutional status of Northern Ireland has a long history, which is shortly summarized in the next paragraph. To keep the background of the conflict short and comprehensive, the history of Northern Ireland is described from 1700 till 1970. This period is the most relevant for the provision of a background to ‘the Troubles’ and the period after that. Key events that happened during ‘the Troubles’ and the past decade can be found in the chronology in Appendix III.
2.1.1 Conflict background

The 17th century featured the arrival of Protestant settlers in Ireland, who migrated mainly from Scotland. These settlers mostly occupied the northeastern part of the island (Ulster, later to be Northern Ireland). “The struggle for Irish independence from Britain began as early as 1641 and was continued in the 1798 rebellion” (Tonge, 2005). The Act of Union was signed in 1800, which officially made Ireland part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. However, Irish nationalism didn’t stop after the Act of Union. Instead it grew, strengthened by famine and conflicts over ownership of land. An economic cleavage also became apparent between the richer Protestant ‘settlers’ in Ulster and the Irish in the rest of the country.

In an attempt to placate Irish nationalism, the liberal government implemented the Home Rule Bill of 1886 and tried to give Ireland semi-autonomy within the British empire. The Protestants saw this as a threat to their political, cultural, religious and economic liberty and the Ulster Unionist Council was established in 1905 in reaction to this. The Council brought together the political and religious leaders of unionism and effectively fused the Unionist Party with the Orange Order. The unionist movement had the backing of the Ulster Volunteer Force, which was a paramilitary group. “Unionism’s strength defeated the Home Rule Bills of 1886, 1893 and 1912” (ibid). In the meantime, Irish nationalism had also grown in virulence, which was a response to the actions of the UK government in the Easter Rising against British rule in 1916.

The partition of Ireland was seen a possible solution of the conflict for the first time, though it was still seen as unsatisfactory by the nationalists. One would also think that the unionist would be against partition, as it they would like to preserve the status quo (Ireland was already part of the UK). However, unionists were pro-partition and saw partition as a way of creating a democratically legitimate Northern Ireland.

In the 1918 general election, the nationalist party Sinn Féin won 73 out of 105 seats in parliament. The party independently and uni-laterally declared the Irish Republic, and created a corresponding parliament (Dálail Éireann). The Dáil refused to recognize British rule, which continued on the island, with parliaments in Dublin and Belfast. In 1920 the Government of Ireland Act was signed and officially partitioned Ireland and created an autonomous Northern and an autonomous Southern part of the island. However, the two parts were still under British rule and IRA activity

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3 The Orange Order was named after the Dutch Protestant William of Orange, who defeated the army of James II (who was a Catholic) in the Battle of Boyne in 1690 (Roberts, 1971). Catholics are banned from becoming members. Every year Orange Parades are held on 12 July to celebrate the Battle of Boyne. These parades are controversial and encounter much resistance from Catholics, who feel that the parades are sectarian and triumphant (Euronews, 2009).
soared because this. This led to the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, which established Ireland as a self-governing dominion within the UK and gave Northern Ireland an option to opt out of the Irish Free State, which it exercised. “Sinn Féin and the IRA split over whether to accept the Anglo-Irish Treaty, leading to one of the bloodiest episodes of Irish history: the civil war of 1922-23” (ibid). The anti-treaty forces, led by Eamon de Valera, were defeated and the Treaty was accepted. De Valera, however, established the political party Fianna Fail as an opposition party to the pro-treaty government. The party entered Dáil Éireann after the 1923 elections and adjusted the workings of the treaty so as to achieve greater independence for the Irish Free State. The transition to the Republic of Ireland was completed in 1949 by another party, Fine Gael.  

The establishment of the Republic of Ireland didn’t bring closure to the conflict. Nationalists in Northern Ireland were now trapped in an unionist-dominated enclave and endured a lot of discrimination from unionists. Terrence O’Neill, as prime-minister in the 1960s, implemented a very modest unionist reformist agenda for better treatment of nationalists. Nationalists wanted to participate in Northern Irish society, but would not do so in its current discriminating form. They increasingly called for reform and civil rights. The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association was established in the late 1960s. The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association was a broad organization covering all social classes in society, nationalist and unionist. Attracting unionist support was difficult, however, as they saw the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association as “the republican movement in another guise [...] In reality the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association was a disparate and often uneasy coalition of nationalists, republicans and socialists, sometimes with little in common other than a desire to confront a discriminatory unionist regime” (ibid). One example of the discriminatory unionist regime was the police force, which was mostly constituted of Protestants to ward off a supposed threat from Catholics. The large-scale discrimination can be attributed to various sources, for example unionist leaders’ populism, contempt for Catholics, the republican ‘threat’ to the state, and the nationalist self-exclusion from society. O’Neill’s reformist agenda wasn’t that different from the wishes of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, but the agenda just couldn’t get enough support for it to be effectively implemented.

Meanwhile, Ian Paisley rose as an unionist public figure and “held political appeal for doubters among the loyalist working class and religious appeal for rural evangelicals” (ibid). There were always ideological divisions within the unionist regime, but until now they were kept under control by means of the voting system, unity of purpose, a lack of class-based challenges and a void in nationalist politics. When nationalists were not only showing civil disobedience, but were also absent from political participation, unionism imploded. The unionist government deployed the police force to prevent nationalist civil rights marches taking place along illegal routes. Because the police force was mostly made up of Protestant members, it was not supported by most nationalists and demands for civil rights developed into civil strife in 1968-69. As shown in graph one, this is when the number of conflict-related casualties exploded. O’Neill was still in office as the Prime Minister, but got less support from nationalists as they discovered that O’Neill had no intentions of changing the security forces.

The civil strife of 1968-69 marked the beginning of the violent conflict in Northern Ireland. To this day, there is still disagreement about what the constitutional status of Northern Ireland should be. Table two shows that in 2001, 59% of Catholics still wanted Northern Ireland to become part of the Republic of Ireland. Furthermore, 79% of Protestants want Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK. Thus, the cleavages between Protestants and Catholics about this aspect of Northern Ireland are still in effect and haven’t changed much from 100 years ago.

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According to Tonge (2005), “the Irish government could do little about partition, other than to ensure that the 1937 constitution formally refused recognition of Northern Ireland as a legitimate political entity by referring to the pending ‘reintegration of the national territory’. Armed campaigns to force the withdrawal of the British government’s claim to Northern Ireland were continued by militant republicans on a small, sporadic scale ...".
Table 2: Constitutional preferences in Northern Ireland in 2001 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remain part of the UK</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Ireland</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Northern Ireland</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Tonge, 2005)

2.2 Spanish Basque Country

Spanish Basque Country is an autonomous community in the north of Spain. It is one of a total of seventeen autonomous communities spread across the country. It has roughly the same population as Northern Ireland. Spanish Basque Country was established in 1978 with the signing of the 1978 Constitution of Spain (Bilbao, 1983). The political system of Basque Country is based on the ‘Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country’, which was ratified in 1978.

Spanish Basque Country is known as one of the most autonomous communities in Europe (BBC News, 2003a). The Basque Parliament has power to decide over issues such as culture, tax, policing and agriculture (Bilbao, 1983). The Basque Parliament is elected by the inhabitants of the regions Álava, Gipuzkoa and Biscay every four years. The Parliament has 75 members, 25 members from each region, and is the representative body for the Basque Government. The elections follow the proportional representation-rule and have a 3% election threshold.

The Basque population, however, is not only located in the three regions of Spanish Basque Country, but also in the autonomous community in Navarre and the south of France, as is shown in figures five and six. Figure seven shows the discrepancy between the official Basque Country, and the territory claimed by ETA, an organization that fights for an independent Basque Country for all Basque people. The conflict in this region mostly revolves around the ETA’s fight for independence and the established state of Spain.

Sources: (Wikimedia Commons, 2010) (IA Spanish Culture, 2007)
2.2.1 Conflict background

Unlike the long history of Irish nationalism, Basque nationalism only started about a 150 years ago. “Up to the last quarter of the 19th century there was no Basque nationalist problem” (Mansvelt Beck & Van Amersfoort, 2000). Conflict in this part of Spain mostly was between liberals in the cities and conservatives in the countryside. The four Spanish provinces of Vizcaya, Gipuzkoa, Navarra and Álava featured many Basque-speakers who lived in rural areas. Centuries of emigration of many of these people to the US and large cities in Spain and France, led to a serious decline in Basque-speakers in these provinces. This time also witnessed the nation-building and centralization of Spain and France, among others by making Spanish the official language in the four provinces.

When Vizcaya became a center of industrial revolution in the last part of the 19th century, emigration stopped and immigration started. Most of the immigrants lived in Bilbao. “Since Bilbao was already a Spanish-speaking area, it was neither the language of the migrants, nor their numbers, that shocked the local inhabitants, but the appalling living conditions and different norms and values” (ibid). This was the start of Basque nationalism. The foundation of Basque nationalism was laid by Sabino de Arana y Goiri. He was successful in mobilizing a large part of the lower middle class of Bilbao in supporting his ideas about the future of the ‘Catholic Republic of Vizcaya’. According to Arana y Goiri, this Republic would be primarily inhabited by people of Basque origins and would see a revival of ancestral customs and the Basque language (Euskera) as the official language. Arana y Goiri’s movement managed to get the support of the rural communities of Vizcaya and Gipuzkoa in the first part of the 19th century. The nationalist movement probably got even more support during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in 1923-30, when all political activities were banned (ibid). When General Franco came to power in 1939, all democratic parties, trade unions and expression of the Basque culture were forbidden. The sanctions on the expression of Basque culture lessened in the 1960s and the Basques reacted to this by expressing their culture yet again. Nationalism got even stronger and special schools were established where Euskera was taught.

In 1959 ETA (Basque Homeland and Freedom) was established and became a force against Franco’s regime. ETA soon began to use violence as a means of achieving its goal, which led it to gain legitimacy from the radical nationalist and the left side of the political spectrum. “The use by ETA of language as a core nationalist value is the watershed differentiating the old clerical and fuero-oriented defensive nationalism and the present culture-oriented and inclusive one” (ibid).

Franco died in 1975 and Spain’s parliament was restored by the Constitution of Spain in 1978. As said before, Basque Country was granted an autonomous community in that same year. ETA’s political wing was also founded in 1978. Since then, Herri Batasuna (renamed Euskal Herritarrok in 1998) can count on steady support from a part of the Basque population. This however, did not stop ETA from using violence and even increasing its use of the method. Key events that happened after 1978 until now can be found in the chronology in Appendix IV.

“The French Basques, albeit they have a growing interest in the promotion of their culture, have hardly experienced nationalist mobilization. It would appear that the French Basques may share linguistic features with the Spanish Basques, but politically they do not have much in common” (ibid).
3. Theoretical framework

This chapter gives the theoretical framework for the research. Two theories are explored that each have different answers to the question of what constitutes effective conflict management. Consociationalism emphasizes political cooperation of the groups, while they also have their own institutions. Europeanization, on the other hand, believes that conflicts can be solved if the EU has a role in conflict settlement. After discussing these two theories, two hypotheses will be made to state possible answers to the main research question.

3.1 Consociationalism

Consociationalism is a conflict management theory made famous by Arend Lijphart in the 1970s, who based the theory largely on the Dutch experience of the Verzuiling between 1925 and 1965. The theory is also known as ‘power-sharing’. “This approach focuses on socio-cultural divisions and modes of elite co-operation as the explanatory variables accounting for the actual or potential existence of stable democracy in what is called ‘plural’ (or ‘segmented’, ‘fragmented’) societies” (Butenschon, 1985). In plural societies, a new type of government is imposed that is based on the idea of elite accommodation. This type of government is intermediate to the stage when the conflict is solved and the democracy is stable.

According to Lijphart (1977), consociational democracies have four key characteristics. Firstly, there exists a grand coalition. This coalition spans each pillar and means that the elites of the pillars work together to overcome their differences. Lijphart awards special power to the elites, as they are able to recognize the dangers of non-cooperation. In his article in World Politics, Lijphart has this to say about the role of elites in consociational democracies:

“Successful consociational democracy requires: 1) That the elites have the ability to accommodate the divergent interests and demands of the subcultures. 2) This requires that they have the ability to transcend cleavages and to join in a common effort with the elites of rival subcultures. 3) This in turn depends on their commitment to the maintenance of the system and to the improvement of its cohesion and stability. 4) Finally, all of the above requirements are based on the assumption that the elites understand the perils of political fragmentation (Lijphart, 1969).”

Secondly, there is a mutual veto between the groups involved. Mutuality means that (the elites of the) groups recognize each other as important parts of society. Consensus between the groups is needed for majority rule in government. Each groups is given veto-power over issues that are important for them. Contrary to what one might think, mutual veto stops the minority in society from blocking the majority. This is because using the veto-power evokes the same reaction of the other group on a later date.

Another characteristic of a consociational democracy is proportionality. The relative size of a group is related to its relative size in parliament, the executive and other aspects of the government. When it comes to the parliament and the executive, strict proportionality is enforced. For example, if a group consists of 40% of the overall population in society, they get 40% of the seats in parliament and, e.g., 40% of the positions in the police force. This ensures that groups are evenly represented and they can exert influence in every aspect of the government.

The fourth characteristic of a consociational democracy is segmental autonomy, which means that the groups each have separate institutions in society. Different laws applying for different groups are also allowed. This can also be seen in the Dutch case. Separate institutions leave groups with a sense of individuality and do not force integration, as force can lead to further disintegration.

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5 Verzuiling refers to the vertical structure in the Dutch society that was in existence between 1850 and 1965, which highlighted between 1925 and 1965. The Dutch society was categorized into four pillars: Roman-Catholic, Protestant, Social-Democratic and a Liberal pillars. A pillar in this context can be defined as “a composition of various societal organizations who share the same religious-philosophical-political base” (Verzetsmuseum Amsterdam, 2010). Each pillar had, among others, its own political party, insurance company, unions, sports associations.
Segmental autonomy is not the definite state of society, as consociational democracy itself is but a temporary stage in the process towards a stable democracy.

Consociationalism presupposes that elites are willing to cooperate with each other. However, Lijphart (1969) identifies three factors which “are strongly conducive to the establishment or maintenance of cooperation among elites in a fragmented system”. The existence of external threats urges elites to cooperate to defeat those threats. Also, moderate multiparty system helps elites recognize the need for cooperation. As with this system no party is close to the majority, the various political parties and their elites need to cooperate with each other if they want to stay (or get into) government. Finally, ‘a relatively total load on the decision-making apparatus’ helps cooperation as it does not ‘distract’ the elites with other issues that need to be dealt with first. The elites can thus focus on cooperation and conflict management and the danger of immobilism is reduced.

In short, Lijphart’s consociational democracies form the stage before a stable democracy. These democracies have several characteristics that are designed to help cooperation: grand coalition, mutual veto, proportionality and segmental autonomy. The idea is that cooperation on a national level is eventually transferred to the regional and local levels. By leaving segmental autonomy and not forcing integration, conflict management turns into conflict resolution.

3.1.1 Hypothesis one
Consociationalism leads to the first hypothesis of the research. As consociationalism praises itself by not forcing integration and yet leading to conflict management and conflict resolution, the first hypothesis refers to this.

Hypothesis 1:
The more characteristics of consociationalism are implemented, the less conflict there will be.

As mentioned in chapter 3.1, consociationalism relies heavily on the willingness of the elites to find a way out of the conflict. By leaving the separate institutions of the groups in place (segmental autonomy), cooperation is only on a political level; cooperation is not forced for the rest of the group. This is also the case with the proportionality-rule, which is in place for the parliament and the executive, and means that the whole government consists of members of the various groups. Also by imposing the mutual-veto, groups have the opportunity protect their interests and keep their sense of individuality. Because in a consociational democracy integration is not forced, this kind of democracy gradually turns into a stable democracy, as cooperation between the groups becomes more natural and conflict management becomes more effective.

3.2 Europeanization
Another theory of what constitutes effective conflict management is Europeanization. This occurs when (aspects of) the European Union is involved in the conflict.

“Europeanization in the field of secessionist conflict settlement and resolution should be understood as a process which is activated and encouraged by European institutions, primarily the European Union, by linking the final outcome of the conflict to a certain degree of integration of the parties involved in it into European structures” (Coppieters, et al., 2004).

Coppieters et al. (ibid) make a distinction between Europeanization in EU countries and Europeanization in the EU periphery. EU periphery countries are countries that border the EU, but are not members themselves. Europeanization in EU countries is an interactive process, whereby the countries that are affected by the EU integration process also have an impact on the integration process themselves and are ‘players who initiate and shape this process’.
Europeanization is different in the EU periphery, where each country has varying degrees of Europeanization, shown by a difference in degrees of institutional contacts with the EU. Here it is a foreign policy instrument of the EU and is tailored to each country’s characteristics. But more important, the two-way relationship that exists between EU countries and EU structures, does not exist in the EU periphery. These countries cannot shape the EU-decisions that affect them. However, because both Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country are not part of the EU periphery, this aspect of Europeanization will not be considered any more in this research.

The EU can have two possible roles in conflict settlement. It can have a direct impact on conflict settlement by acting as a mediator between the groups involved in the conflict. The EU can also support mediation efforts between the groups. EU mediation can change the short-term strategies of the involved groups and thus lead to short-term conflict resolution. However, long-term conflict resolution is also possible if the EU “deploys the right set of incentives and disincentives to the conflict situation” (ibid).

A second role the EU can take is to provide a framework for conflict settlement. This can be done by providing an option for resolving the ‘disagreement’ over the constitution of the country in question. This is an indirect role of the EU, as it merely provides a framework and the EU is not immediately involved in the resolution of the conflict. However, this second role can also have an impact on both short-term and long-term conflict resolution. It does this by providing new possible constitutional and policy solutions to the conflict. “The EU can also serve as a general point of reference with regard to various governance practices and standards, thus contributing indirectly of conflict settlement and conflict resolution” (ibid).

3.2.1 Hypothesis two

Europeanization leads to the second hypothesis of the research. According to this theory, conflicts can only be solved when the EU plays a role in conflict management. The EU can affect conflict resolution in two ways: direct and indirect. The second hypothesis refers to this point.

Hypothesis 2:

The more involvement of the EU, the less conflict there will be.

Direct influence occurs when the EU acts as a mediator. The mere provision of a framework for conflict settlement is an indirect way of the EU to influence the conflict. This research looks at several ways in which the EU can be involved in conflict management, both directly and indirectly.

3.3 Definitions of concepts

This research looks at the effectiveness of the consociational model as a conflict management tool in Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country. In this thesis, the following definition of effectiveness is used: the degree to which objectives are achieved and the extent to which targeted problems are resolved (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003). Effective conflict management thus looks at to which extent the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Spain are resolved, following the goals set by the governments.

Because sectarianism is part of this research, it is useful to define this concept. Sectarianism refers to existence of conflict within a subgroup of a society (Ford & McCafferty, 2005). This subgroup can be, for example, characterized by the sharing of a political movement or a religion, as is the case in Northern Ireland. Here, sectarianism takes place within the nationalist and unionist subgroups of society.

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6 The United Kingdom has been part of the EU since 1973, and Spain has accessed the EU in 1986 (European Union, 2011).
3.4 Data sources

As will be mentioned in chapter five, the interrupted time series analysis is used as the research design for this research. Yin (2003) mentions several data sources, but not all of those will be used in this research. For example, the research will not feature interviews with experts, as it is deemed that they are not necessary for a full understanding of conflict management in Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country. The experts will, however, be indirectly consulted via articles and books that they have written about the topic. Examples of those are mentioned in the next paragraph. Articles are found in several professional journals.

Data is also gathered from archival records. These are useful for the formation of a chronology of events in the conflicts. Newspapers are also used as source of data, as they can also provide information about the events that happened during the conflict.
4. Operationalization and measurement

In the last chapter the theoretical framework of the research was given. Two conflict management theories were explained and two corresponding hypotheses were stated. This chapter features the identification of the unit of analysis. The dependent variable and two independent variables are also stated. Thirdly, the indicators for these three variables are mentioned. After which, this chapter gives the measurement validity and reliability of the research.

4.1 Unit of analysis

A unit of analysis is the entity being studied in the research (Trochim, 2006). The unit of analysis in this research are geographical units, namely countries. More specifically, the units of analysis are regions in countries. They are Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country.

4.2 Dependent variable: Violent conflict

The dependent variable is the variable that is supposedly affected by a change in the independent variable (Buttolph Johnson & Reynolds, 2005). In this case, violent conflict is measured. A conflict is a state of disharmony between incompatible or antithetical persons, ideas, or interests” (Kalaitzidis, 2011). As noted before, both regions in the regions feature a conflict. In Northern Ireland it is between the incompatible interests and religions of the unionists and nationalists. In Spanish Basque Country the conflict is between the incompatible interests of the Basques and the national government of Spain (and France). The main research question talks about conflict management and thus refers to the amount and intensity of the conflict. Indicators to measure this are stated in the next paragraph.

4.2.1 Indicators

In this research, several indicators for violent conflict are used. In order to measure the amount and intensity of the conflict, two indicators are given. The first of which is the number of victims that are due to the conflict. With victims, the casualties are meant that can be directly related to the conflict, for example casualties by bomb attacks and other conflict-related violence. This is to avoid confusion about the total number of victims of the conflict, which is always subjective due to the amount of ‘damage’ done to the individual. The number of casualties is used as an indicator for the intensity of conflict, because, presumably, the number of casualties lessens as the conflict is effectively managed or solved. For this indicator, the presumption is that if there are no more conflict-related casualties, the conflict is solved.

“Reliability concerns the extent to which a measurement procedure yields the same results on repeated trials” (Buttolph Johnson & Reynolds, 2005). The measurement reliability improves when the results of indicators can be empirically determined. Data for Northern Ireland comes from the Police Service of Northern Ireland and for Spain is gathered from the newspaper The Guardian. Because the Police Service of Northern Ireland is an official government institution and it gets its data from its own statistics, data from this source is reliable. Data from a newspaper such as The Guardian is less reliable, but as no official sources could be found, this data source is used for this research. The number of deaths related to the conflict can be empirically determined and thus this indicator is reliable. “Validity involves the correspondence between the measure and the concept it is thought to measure” (ibid). Using the amount of casualties as an indicator of the amount of violent conflict is valid, because casualties only occur when the conflict is violent. If the conflict is not violent, there should be no casualties.

The second indicator for the amount and intensity of violent conflict is the number of bomb attacks. In both conflicts bombing is used as a means of goal-attainment by the segments of society (Tonge, 1998). The number of bomb attacks complements the first indicator, the number of casualties,
because not every act of violence leads to casualties. The number of bomb attacks is thus another indicator of violent conflict.

When it comes to the reliability of this indicator, it can be said that it is reliable. The number of bomb attacks can be measured and gives reliable results each time while measuring. Data for Northern Ireland comes from the Police Service of Northern Ireland and for Spain is gathered from the Global Terrorism Database. As noted before, the Police Service of Northern Ireland is a reliable data source. The Global Terrorism Database is less reliable, as it gets its information from newspaper articles. Gathering data from different newspapers does not guarantee reliable data, but there is, again, no official source of the Basque Government or Basque research agency that covers the number of bombing. Because of time limitations, the Global Terrorism Database is used. The indicator is also valid, as bombings are a violent way to express conflict. The number of bomb attacks should decrease with the reduction in violent conflict. The idea here is that no bombings take place in both regions if there is no violent conflict.

4.3 Independent variable one: Consociationalism

The independent variable is the variable that is changed in the research and that affects the outcome of the dependent variable (Buttolph Johnson & Reynolds, 2005). In this research, the independent variable is the variable that changes the violence of the conflict in Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country. There are two theories that might affect the amount and intensity of conflict: consociationalism and Europeanization.

Firstly, consociationalism is discussed as an independent variable. The consociational model is defined as “government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented culture into a stable democracy”, in which the elite has to meet four requirements: “ability to accommodate different interest, collaboration in a common effort, shared commitment to cohesion and stability, and awareness of the dangers of political fragmentation” (Copete).

4.3.1 Indicators

There are numerous indicators that are used to determine if (elements of) the consociational model has been implemented in Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country. The first of which is the presence of more than minimal winning cabinets (Luther & Deschouwer, 1999). Consociational democracies with multi-party systems should be governed by cabinets that represent more than minimal winning cabinets in parliament. That is, the coalition that is formed between political parties in order to form a cabinet, should represent more than the minimum support that is needed in parliament. If consociationalism is applied, the likelihood of ‘oversized cabinets’ is increased. According to Riker (1962), a minimal winning cabinet will occur:

“In any situation where three or more actors bargain over the formation over a coalition and where one actor’s gains are exactly balanced by the losses of the other ‘players’. Only coalitions will form that control an overall majority of the parliamentary seats, but do not share the spoils of government office with more parties than necessary.”

A minimum winning cabinet thus represents 50% + 1 of the seats in parliament and can be measured by counting the number of seats in parliament that belong to party members of the parties in the cabinet.

**Formula 1: Minimal winning cabinet**

| Minimal winning cabinet = 50% of seats in parliament + 1 |

The presence of more than a minimal winning cabinet refers to Lijphart’s grand coalition. A grand coalition refers to any institutional arrangement as the deliberate joint effort by the elites to stabilize the system (Lijphart, 1969). “Grand coalitions violate the rule that in parliamentary systems cabinets should have, and normally do have, majority support, but not the support of an overwhelming
majority” (Lijphart, 1977). This is because the elites of the segments of society are willing to cooperate with each other, instead of the necessary cooperation needed to form a majority in parliament.

Data for this indicator comes from newspapers, who mention which political parties form the coalition. Even though newspapers are used as data sources, this indicator is reliable, because it is an unquestionable fact which parties form a grand coalition at which time. Minimal winning cabinets are linked to consociationalism by the causal theory that consociationalism decreases the amount of minimal winning cabinets, and instead increases the parliamentary support of cabinets. Thus this indicator is also valid.

The effective number of parties is the second indicator, with which the success of political parties to come into government is meant (Luther & Deschouwer, 1999). “The effective number of parties is the number of hypothetical equal-size parties that would have the same total effect on fractionalization of the system as have the actual parties of unequal size” (Taagepera & Laakso, 1979).

This indicator measures the relative strength of political parties by looking at their vote share or seat share in parliament. In two-party systems, when there are two parties with equal strength and size, the effective number of parties is always two. However, this number changes when the strength of political parties is unequal (Lijphart, 1994). For example, in two-party systems where one party has 70% of the votes and the other party has 30%, the number of effective parties is less than two, namely 1.72 (ibid). The number of effective political parties is relatively high in consociational (multi-party) democracies, as coalition-building between political parties is standard practice and parties have a higher chance of making it into office (Luther & Deschouwer, 1999).

How is this number calculated? The most common way of calculating the effective number of parties is by using the following Laakso-Taagepera formula, where $p_i$ stands for the seat share of a party in the parliament:

**Formula 2: Effective number of parties**

$$ N = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^2} $$

“The Laakso–Taagepera index was invented to provide a non-arbitrary way to count the effective number of political parties in situations where parties vary substantially in their vote and/or seat shares” (Feld & Grofman, 2007). This index will also be used in this research. When calculating the effective number of parties in Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country, the seat share in parliament will be looked at (instead of the vote share during elections). For Northern Ireland, only the election results of the NIA are taken into account. For Spanish Basque Country, the election results for the Basque Parliament are taken a look at.

The effective number of parties is a reliable indicator for consociationalism. Data comes from the official sources of the election bureaus of Northern Ireland and Basque Country. The gathering of the data thus produces the same results after each measurement and is reliable. It is also a valid indicator, because the effective number of parties can be linked to consociational theory. The effective number of parties increases when consociationalism is implemented. This is because in the accompanying multi-party system, there are more ‘big’ parties in parliament. This in turn means that the parties are forced to work together and gain support from other parties if they want to achieve something in parliament.

Proportional representation is the next indicator of consociationalism. PR states that proportionality should not only be implemented in decision-making organs, but also in the representation of groups of society. This research focuses on proportionality in parliament and the executive. PR-systems
favor multi-party systems, as it supports accommodating practices between the different groups in society (Luther & Deschouwer, 1999). When it comes to PR as an electoral system, Lijphart (1977) states the following:

“As an electoral system, it merely translates voting strength into parliamentary seats as faithfully as possible, without requiring a set of policy decisions. Decisions are postponed again by the formation of a proportionally constituted grand coalition cabinet. This method of postponing the decisions to the highest levels entails the concentration of decision-making in the hands of a small group of top leaders. The advantage of this arrangement is that in intimate and secret negotiations the likelihood of achieving a package deal is maximized and that of the imposition of a veto is minimized.”

When PR is implemented as an electoral system, it links the percentage of votes received by a political party to the percentage of seats they then receive in parliament (Yon, 2011). However, not in all PR-systems every political party that gets voted on, gets into parliament. In ‘party-list’ PR-systems political parties make lists of candidates that are up for elections and the seats are allocated to each party in proportion to the number of votes the party receives (Electoral Reform Society, 2011). These systems also feature an election threshold, which is a clause that states that a party must receive a minimal number of votes to obtain any seats in parliament (Colomer, 2011).

Formula 3: Proportionality without election threshold

| Number of seats in parliament | % of votes received during election |

When calculating the proportionality of any given electoral system, it is better to look at the disproportionality of that system. This is because “it is impossible for any electoral system to yield exactly proportional results” (Lijphart, 1984), which has to do with the limit of the amount of parliamentary seats. If an electoral system is 100% proportional, the vote share of a party would be the same as it seat share in parliament. For example, party A gets 30% of the votes and 30% of the seats. In a disproportional system the vote share is not equal to the seat share. In a highly disproportional system, for example, party A with its 30% of the votes can end up with 5% of the seats in parliament. In general, multi-party systems are more proportional than two-party systems, that often times implement the first-past-the-posts system.

There are several indices which can be used to measure the amount of disproportionality of an electoral system, for example those of Douglas Rae, and John Loosemore and Victor Hanby. Because another index is used in this research, the indices of Rae and Loosemore and Hanby will not be elaborated upon.

According to Lijphart (1994), the best way to measure disproportionality is by using the Least Squares-index. This measurement is devised by Michael Gallagher and measures disproportionality per election and runs from 0 till 100. "The Least-Squares-index can be seen as a happy medium between the Loosemore-Hanby and Rae indices" (Gallagher, Proportionality, disproportionality and electoral systems, 1991). The disproportionality is calculated by the following formula (Mitchell, O’Leary, & Evans, 2001):

Formula 4: Disproportionality with the Least Squares-index

\[
D = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum (Vi - Si)^2}
\]

Yet again, this indicator is both reliable and valid. Proportional representation is part of Lijphart’s consociational theory and is linked to conflict management because the different sizes of segments in society are all and proportionally represented in parliament. Thus, they can all exert influence on the executive, which, according to Lijphart, leads the conflict management process on a political

---

7 The first-past-the-post system is based on the concept of majority. The candidate or party that receives the most votes, wins the seat in parliament (Jones, Kavanagh, Moran, & Norton, 2007).
level. It is a reliable indicator because the proportionality can be measured by comparing the percentage of votes a political party got, with the amount of seats in parliament it has (keeping in mind any implemented election threshold). Data comes from the official sources of the election bureaus of Northern Ireland and Basque Country, which means that on repeated trials the same data appears. This makes it a reliable indicator.

The fourth indicator of consociationalism is the mutual veto. The mutual veto complements the grand coalition, proportionality and segmental autonomy in engaging the minorities in the political system (Lijphart, 1977). It is in possession of each segment in society and protects the most sensitive policy areas for each of these segments. According to Calhoun (1953), minority veto:

“Invests each segment with the power of protecting itself, and places the rights and safety of each where only they can be securely placed, under its own guardianship. Without this there can be no systematic, peaceful, or effective resistance to the natural tendency of each to come into conflict with the others.”

The mutual veto can help with conflict management as it provides a way of protecting the areas that ‘are at stake’ the most for the segments. It guarantees that without the segments’ approval, no policy changes can be made in that area. With the most important areas protected, it is easier for the elites of the segments to work together in the political system and find a way to manage and resolve the conflict.

The mutual veto is both a reliable and a valid indicator. Data for this indicator comes from Tonge (2005) and Benedikter (2008). Because no official governmental sources of this indicator could be found, it is unclear whether a mutual veto exists over more than the policy areas described by the authors. Therefore, this indicator is moderately reliable. The indicator is valid because it is a characteristic of consociationalism defined by Lijphart, and can be related to conflict management by way of the description above.

The final indicator of consociationalism is segmental autonomy. This aspect of consociationalism refers to the idea that the groups in society should be able to rule in the areas that are of their exclusive concern. It is an extension to the grand coalition-element in consociational democracies. Lijphart (1977) makes a clear distinction between ‘common’ policy areas and ‘other’ areas:

“On all matters of common interest, decisions should be made by all of the segments together with roughly proportional degrees of influence. On all other matters, however, the decisions and their execution can be left to the separate segments”.

Lijphart (ibid) notes that federalism is a special form of segmental autonomy, because it has some aspects in common with consociationalism. Just like with consociationalism, autonomy is granted to constituent parts of the state and subdivisions are overrepresented in the (federal) parliament.

In order to research segmental autonomy as an indicator, the control over certain policy areas is taken a look at. This research will focus on four policy areas that can be argued to be of importance to separatist groups: education, culture, taxation and policing. A distinction is made between two levels of governance: regional and segmental. The level of decision-making power over these four policy areas is investigated. If the decision-making powers lie with the NIA or the Basque Parliament, segmental autonomy is not implemented in these regions. If the powers lie with the elites of the segments of society however, segmental autonomy is implemented.

As an indicator, segmental autonomy can be argued to be reliable. Data for this indicator comes from Benedikter (2008) and Coakley and Gallagher (2010). In this research segmental autonomy is limited to four policy areas and decision-making power over these areas can only lie in one place at any given moment, whether this is at the national or regional level. This makes it a reliable indicator. Segmental autonomy is also valid, as this part of consociational theory links autonomy to conflict management. The integration of segments of society is not forced, but instead power-sharing only takes place at areas that are common to all segments. Lijphart (1977) argues that conflict management is more effective this way.
4.4 Independent variable two: Europeanization

The second independent variable is Europeanization. Europeanization hopes to affect the amount and intensity of conflict by involving the EU in conflict management. The provision of a neutral platform for political deliberation or the direct involvement of the EU as a mediator could lead to conflict resolution. There are several indicators for Europeanization, which are discussed next.

4.4.1 Indicators

There are several indicators that are used to determine if (elements of) Europeanization have been implemented in Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country. The first indicator of Europeanization is funding from the EU. Here the question is examined if both regions have received funding from the EU. Because the EU is a very broad ‘organization’ and has many types of funding, grants and subsidies, this research only looks at certain types of EU funding. These funds can be linked to conflict management and/ or regional development and are thus of interest for this research.

The first fund that is taken into account is the European Regional Development Fund. This fund “aims to strengthen economic and social cohesion in the European Union by correcting imbalances between its regions” (European Commission, 2010). The second fund that is examined is the Cohesion Fund. This fund aims to stabilize the economies of the member states and tries to reduce disparities among them (European Commission, 2008). The third fund used for this indicator is the Social Fund, which is linked to the promotion of economic and social cohesion (European Commission, 2011a).

Data for this indicator is gathered from several articles in journals and websites of the EU. Because there is no comprehensive overview of what funding has been given to the regions over the past decades, repetition of the data gathering could produce other results at another time. This means that this indicator is not reliable. It is, however, a valid indicator, as only EU member states are able to be recipients of these funds. Another reason for the validity of this indicator is that all these funds are related in some way to conflict management and/ or regional development, for example by providing means for the establishment of cross-community initiatives.

The second indicator of Europeanization is direct contact between the EU and representatives of the segments in society. This contact is outside of the ‘normal’ EU-channels (see next indicator). The direct role of conflict mediation by the EU falls under this indicator. A second aspect of this indicator is the establishment of bodies that organize the implementation of the received EU funding (Tonge, 2005). As EU funding is given to the region itself and not to the specific groups in society, it is essential that the groups work together to distribute the funding evenly over the society. EU involvement can thus have an impact on conflict management.

When it comes to reliability, it can be said that this indicator is not reliable. Data for this indicator is gathered from the EU itself, but the amount and type of direct contact between the representatives and the EU is not recorded on every occasion and not collected in a comprehensive overview. Repeated trial may thus produce different results. Direct contact is a valid indicator, because it refers to the direct role of the EU in conflict settlement. This is, according to the theory of Europeanization, one of two roles that the EU can assume while dealing with conflicts in member states.

The third and final indicator that is used for Europeanization is the representation of the regions in the EU. This indicator can be linked to the indirect role of providing a framework for conflict resolution by the EU. Regional representation in the EU can be narrowed by looking at specific types and places for representation. Officially, the regions of the EU are represented in the Committee of the Regions (Committee of the Regions, 2011). The CoR provides a platform for regions to influence the EU policy. The CoR has to be consulted by the Commission, Parliament and Council if they have to decide on policy that affects the regional or local level. Regions experiencing heavy conflict, for
example, can play a role in EU policy by providing information on terrorism. This information can help to define EU policy in that area (Bourne, 2003).

However, regions can also be represented by lobby groups that try to influence, for example, members of the European Parliament to accept policy positions that are favorable for the region. Lobby groups can also feature the different sides of the conflict. Thus, for this indicator the European representation of Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country is looked at.

This indicator is a reliable indicator of Europeanization, as the number of representatives of the regions can be measured. Data for this indicator is gathered from the EU and the representative offices of the regions in Brussels. Because there are only so many official representatives of Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country at work in the EU institutions looked at, this number is reproducible for several types of research. The indicator is thus reliable. Representation in the EU is also a valid indicator, as it looks at the involvement of the regions in European structures. This, by very definition, is linked to Europeanization (Coppieters, et al., 2004).

4.5 Conclusion

In this research there is one dependent variable, violent conflict, and there are two independent variables, consociationalism and Europeanization. Figure nine presents a flowchart that captures an overview of the different relations between the variables and their indicators. What can be seen is that, in theory, both consociationalism and Europeanization lead to a reduction of conflict. When it comes to consociationalism, proportional representation in the parliament leads to a multi-party system. This system, in turn, can lead to a higher number of effective parties, as each party in parliament has less support than in a two-party system. The presence of a grand coalition leads to more cooperation between the segments in society, first limited to elite cooperation and eventually leading to cooperation on all other levels of society. The presence of traditions of elite cooperation also make it easier for elites in political parties to form a grand coalition.

**Figure 9: Flowchart of the dependent and independent variables and the indicators**

Both the mutual veto and segmental autonomy point to a non-forced cooperation of the segments, as the segments can maintain decision-making power over the areas that are most important to
them. Because they maintain power over these areas, the segments (and their representatives in office) can cooperate on other areas than the ones protected under these two indicators. For all indicators of consociationalism and Europeanization the causal theory applies that more cooperation between the segments leads to a mutual understanding of the differences and - after that - a reduction of the differences and finally a reduction of the conflict.

When it comes to Europeanization, the EU mediation indicator means that the EU acts directly as a mediator between the segments in society. The EU acts as a neutral referee and tries to increase the inter-segmental cooperation. EU funding can lead to more cooperation directly and indirectly. Directly by, for example, providing funds for initiatives that promote cooperation. Indirectly by forcing the segments to work together about decisions on how to spend the funds in the regions. The representation of the regions in the EU means that the segments can try to influence EU funding given to the regions. This indicator is different from the previous one, as segments can now influence the allocation of funding on the European level instead of the regional level (as is the case with the previous indicator). EU representation can also influence the conflict by providing a neutral background where the elites of the segments can cooperate on other issues than the ones that have to do with the conflict.
5. Research design

Chapter five discusses the research design of the thesis. It starts with a discussion of several types of research design, the cross-sectional and case-study designs. After which, the interrupted time series analysis will be discussed and it will be concluded that this design is the best design to answer the main research question. For all research designs, the feasibility and the internal and external validity will be mentioned.

5.1 Cross-sectional and case-study research designs

In general, there are five main types of research design: experiment, cross-sectional design, comparative case-study, single case-study and interrupted time series analysis. In this paragraph two of those research designs are applied on the research topic, namely case-study research and cross-sectional design.

5.1.1 Cross-sectional research design

Cross-sectional designs have 3 features (Vaus, 2001). They rely on existing differences, don’t have a time dimension and the groups are based on existing differences.

This design collects data from one point in time and can only detect differences rather than a change in conditions. Detecting change by an intervention would be done by creating several groups within the same time frame. Detecting the amount of change “involves comparing the groups simply in terms of their dependent variable”. With this research topic, this would come down to three categories that would be applied to several regions in Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country. Namely: 1) no implemented consociationalism, 2) consociationalism implemented in the last 12 months, and 3) consociationalism implemented more than 12 months ago. The downside of this design is that it cannot compare across time. This is solved by repeating a cross-sectional study. “This design involves collecting information at a number of different time point but from a different sample at each time point” (ibid).

External validity refers to the question if the research outcomes can be generalized to other populations, times and settings (Onwuegbuzie, 2003). In this case, it is the question whether consociationalism is an effective conflict management tool in other conflicts besides the ones in Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country. Cross-sectional design for this research is not externally valid. This is because the groups that it researches are not randomly chosen, but are “constructed on the basis of existing differences in the sample” (Vaus, 2001). To generalize from not randomly chosen groups is very difficult.

Internal validity refers to the question if the independent variable leads to the dependent variable, thus the cause-effect relationship between X and Y (Onwuegbuzie, 2003). The question here is if consociationalism leads to effective conflict management. The research done would be internally valid. That the groups are not randomly selected is an advantage in this way, as the effectiveness of the consociational model can be better examined. One does assume that the ceteris paribus-clause is present here.

The improved design, the repeated cross-sectional study, would be better for this research, but it is still not good enough. It is not feasible because regions in Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country cannot be split between those who have had consociational conflict management and those who haven’t.

5.1.2 Case-study design

A second research design is case-study research. “A case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2003). This research design can be
about a single or about multiple cases. Applied to this topic, it can be said that the conflicts are contemporary, as there are still bomb attacks. The design would be a multiple case-study research design, as there are two cases (Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country).

A case-study design for my topic is certainly feasible. This is because it does not involve test and control groups, but only studies the current situation in the cases. However, this sort of feasibility also endangers the internal validity. Because if one only studies the situation as it is, one cannot say if the change has been established by the consociational model, Europeanization, or by another variable entirely. Maybe the conflict in both regions hasn’t lessened through power sharing, but through Europeanization (the second hypothesis). With a congruence analysis, the researcher tries to ensure internal validity by checking what he would expect to see if the theory in the hypothesis was true and what he sees in reality. Theoretical expectations are checked against facts in reality. Co-variational designs have a higher level of internal validity, because they involve multiple cases.

When it comes to external validity, Yin (ibid) argues that the case-study design focuses on analytical generalization, instead of statistical generalization. Case-study research about the effectiveness of consociational conflict management is only valid when the results are the same (replicated) in both Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country. Co-variation means that the independent variable brings a change in the dependent variable. In this topic, this would mean that the more characteristics of consociationalism are implemented in a region, the more effective the conflict management is. The case-study design is not ideal for my topic, as the internal validity is endangered by the researcher researching the status quo.

5.2 Interrupted time series analysis

A third research design is the interrupted time series analysis. This design looks at the development of the dependent variable before and after the introduction of an independent variable. So the observation is done on the dependent variable. As such, in this topic the design looks at the effectiveness of conflict management before and after the introduction of consociationalism. “Time series data are observations on some variable gathered at regular intervals” (Hartmann, Gottman, Jones, Gardner, Kazdin, & Vaught, 1980). This means that data is gathered throughout the conflict settlement process. Changes in the result of this data can then possibly be linked to the introduction of elements of consociationalism (or Europeanization). The participants in this research are Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque county. The treatment they are subjected to is consociationalism or Europeanization.

The interrupted time series design for my topic is feasible. This is because, first, one looks the development of de amount and intensity of the conflict before the introduction of consociationalism and separatism. After which, one does the same research after the implementation of consociationalism and separatism. The interrupted time series design is the best type of research design for this topic. This because it is feasible and internally valid. However, the external validity is limited in the research about this topic. The comparison covers only two regions, which is not enough to make a conclusion about the effectiveness of the consociational model. Thus, in this thesis the focus will lie on making the research internally valid. Because of the limited external validity, the conclusion of the thesis will feature only very general conclusions about consociationalism as a effective conflict management tool.
6. Consociationalism and Europeanization in Northern Ireland
This chapter discusses the implementation of consociationalism and Europeanization in Northern Ireland. It determines if all elements of consociationalism, identified by Lijphart, are or were present in these regions. The implementation of the indicators of Europeanization are discussed as well.

6.1 Implementation of consociationalism
The idea of the possible implementation of consociational principles was first mentioned by a journalist in 1969, who said that majority rule wasn’t appropriate in Northern Ireland. In 1972, the political party SDLP proposed to form:

“a Swiss-type executive, whose members would be elected from a new assembly by means of proportional representation; it would then select its own chief executive, who would assign portfolios subject to the approval of British and Irish government representatives, or ‘commissioners’; and its four-year term could be cut short only by a qualified majority vote supported by 75% of the assembly” (Coakley, 2010).

The Alliance party later backed the SDLP in the proposal of a consociational government, all be it in a more modest form.

Meanwhile, the UK also faced a debate about the constitutional form of Northern Ireland and the UK government was thinking about changes in the Northern Ireland political system. A green paper produced shortly before the 1973 Northern Ireland Constitution Act stated that the Northern Ireland Executive could no longer consist of one party with partial support of the citizens of Northern Ireland. Instead, the Executive should have wide support across the region and thus could no longer be made up of only one (unionist) party; nationalist parties should also be represented in the Executive (ibid).

The Northern Ireland Assembly was established in May 1973 and was an attempt to restore a devolved government to the region. The Northern Ireland Constitution Act passed two months later and officially suspended the Parliament of Northern Ireland and removed the position of Governor (the UK representative in Northern Ireland). The Northern Ireland Executive was established in January 1974 under the Sunningdale Agreement, which was supposed to be a power-sharing Executive consisting of unionists and nationalists, and chosen by the NIA (CAIN, 2011c). This meant that the power-sharing element was introduced and the Executive should represent more than a minimum winning coalition. The Sunningdale Agreement also set up the cross-border Council of Ireland. However, this government did not last long. After opposition from unionists and a strike from the Ulster Workers’ Council, the Sunningdale Agreement collapsed in May 1974. The PR-element of the Sunningdale Agreement, however, was used in every election following.

In order the measure the amount of proportionality in the NIA, the disproportionality needs to be measured. This is because the NIA can never be 100% proportional, as explained in chapter 4.3.1. Table 3 shows the disproportionality values in the NIA between 1962 and 2011. Table 3 also shows the proportionality, which is calculated by subtracting the disproportionality from 100. What stands out in this table is that the disproportionality sharply decreased after the 1973 elections, when the PR-system was implemented for NIA elections. The disproportionality value in 2011 is higher than the years before, indicating the slacking of the PR-system. Nevertheless, proportional representation has been implemented in Northern Ireland.

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8 A green paper is a governmental document that contains propositions which are put before the whole nation for discussion (Franks, 2011).
Table 3: Disproportionality in the NIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Disproportionality</th>
<th>Proportionality</th>
<th>Number of parties/ candidates participating in election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>17,41</td>
<td>82,59</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>15,59</td>
<td>84,41</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>17,21</td>
<td>82,79</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>5,12</td>
<td>94,88</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>5,78</td>
<td>94,22</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3,61</td>
<td>96,39</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2,88</td>
<td>97,12</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3,14</td>
<td>96,86</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>6,89</td>
<td>93,11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (Northern Ireland Elections, 2011) (CAIN, 2011b)

Most consociational elements in Northern Ireland were, however, introduced with the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 (also known as the Belfast Agreement). Appendix I gives a summary of the GFA. The GFA represented the biggest success of consociationalism in Northern Ireland. The GFA can be seen as a continuation and expansion of the Sunningdale Agreement, which also bore some consociational elements. “The defining factor leading to the conclusion of the GFA was an overriding unity of purpose between London and Dublin to regulate power-sharing institutions in Northern Ireland” (Kerr, 2005). Kerr describes the GFA as a ‘sophisticated piece of consociational engineering’, as the Agreement included a blend of the positions of all the political parties referring to the constitutional status of Northern Ireland, the disagreements between which lay at the heart of the conflict for the past decades.

Strand one of the GFA accounts for the internal democratic institutions of Northern Ireland and applies several consociational principles. The first of which is proportional representation. Like stated in the Sunningdale Agreement, the electoral system of the NIA should follow a system of Single Transferable Voting and a proportional representation system. The GFA outlined the d’Hondt PR system for appointing members of the Executive, choosing it from several other available systems. The election of ministers to the Executive is overseen by the dual premiership of the First and Deputy First Ministers. The First and Deputy First Minister posts are of equal power. When they are elected by a majority of the members of the NIA, they also have to obtain majority support from both unionist and nationalists MLA’s (members of the NIA). The Executive should thus form a grand coalition.

Table 4 shows the support if governmental parties in the NIA. Because the Northern Ireland Executive has only ruled since 1998, only data from the last four cabinets is provided. What can be seen is that the governmental parties can count on a great many MLA’s in the NIA. The smallest grand coalition is the current one, which still accounts for 82.41% of the seats in the NIA. Furthermore, the Northern Ireland Executive has consistently consisted of the four largest parties after the elections, as can be seen in both table 4 as appendix V. The consociational element of the grand coalition has thus been implemented in Northern Ireland.

Table 4: The Northern Ireland Executive and its support in the NIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Coalition</th>
<th>Seats in Parliament</th>
<th>% of total seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>UUP-SDLP-DUP-SF</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>83.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Suspended when SF would not rule with the DUP</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>DUP-SF-UUP-SDLP-Alliance</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>97.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>DUP-SF-SDLP-Alliance</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>82.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


9 The STV system does not presuppose that political views are organized in political parties. Rather, voters vote on several persons by ranking the candidates in terms of preference, for example by placing the numbers 1, 2 and 3 behind their names. The votes are counted using the Droop quota, which is calculated as “the smallest whole number greater than \[\frac{v}{(s+1)}\]”, where \(v\) is the number is valid votes and \(s\) the number of seats in a constituency” (Gallagher, Laver, & Mair, 2006).

10 The d’Hondt system is one of several systems that can be used to achieve PR. The d’Hondt system links the number of seats in the Executive to the strength of a political party and the number of seats it won in an election (BBC News, 2011b). It hereby favors large parties.
When consociationalism is implemented, the Northern Ireland Assembly should also see a high number of effective parties. Because consociationalism refers to a multi-party system representing the several segments of society, the NIA should consist of multiple parties that are relatively equal in size. Thus, more parties are able to ‘make a difference’ in Northern Ireland politics.

Table 5 shows the effective number of parties in the NIA between 1962 and 2011. Besides making a difference in the disproportionality, the implementation of the PR system in 1973 has also greatly increased the effective number of parties. The effective number of parties after the 1973 elections was always more than half of the total number of parties in the NIA. Before 1973, the effective number of parties hovered around 2, while after 1973, it hovered between 4 and 5. Thus, this indicator shows that consociationalism has been implemented in Northern Ireland.

Table 5: Effective number of parties after elections for the Northern Ireland Assembly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective number of parties</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>5.18</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>4.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of parties in Parliament</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (Northern Ireland Elections, 2011) (CAIN, 2011b)

Mutual veto rights were also implemented with the ratification of the GFA. All MLA’s have to designate their identity as nationalist or unionist when coming into the NIA and cross-community support is needed for all key-decisions. As mentioned before, cross-community support is also needed for the election of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister. This means that mutual veto is implemented for key decisions and the election of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister.

The GFA also established the North-South Ministerial Council and the British-Irish Council, which were supposed to improve the relation between Northern Ireland, the UK and the Republic of Ireland. A mutual veto exists in the North-South Ministerial Council: “the GFA provides for each side to take decisions in the Council while both delegations remain accountable to the Assembly and the Oireachtas, respectively, thus being dependent on both institutions for the implementation and ratification of any executive decisions. [...] Therefore, internal consociation and external confederation go together” (ibid). This Council is made up of representatives from both the Northern Irish and Irish governments and is aimed at improving the relation between the two regions. The other council, the British-Irish Council, consists of representatives from Westminster and the Irish government and aims to improve the relation between these two countries.

As can be seen in table 6, segmental autonomy is limited according to the GFA. The segments had a right to choose their language and their place of citizenship (Coakley & Gallagher, 2010). Nationalists could opt for the Irish language and Irish citizenship, while unionists could opt for the English language and British citizenship. When it comes to the location of the decision-making power of important policy areas, half of them are located at the Northern Ireland government. The policy areas referred to here are the ones mentioned in chapter 4.3.1.: education, culture, taxation and policing. Decision-making powers over the areas of education and culture were devolved to the NIA with the ratification of the GFA (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2011) (Smith, 1999). Policing was reserved for later devolution, and taxation powers were still located at Westminster.

Table 6: The application of consociational principles in the Good Friday Agreement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Application</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grand coalition</td>
<td>Cross-community power-sharing executive, headed by First/ Deputy First Minister duopoly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportionality in government</td>
<td>Use of D’Hondt system for executive formation and proportional representation in elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority veto rights</td>
<td>Parallel consent/ weighted majority voting within the Assembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segmental autonomy</td>
<td>Limited. Respect for the rights of both communities and language provision, but little else.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Tonge, 2005)
The St. Andrews Agreement, signed in 2006, provided a further devolution of powers to the NIA. The Agreement was between the political parties and the Irish and British governments. It restored the NIA after its suspension in 2002 (see box 1) and arranged that the First Minister and Deputy First Minister would be automatically nominated from the leaders of the two biggest parties after elections (Northern Ireland Office, 2006). When it comes to devolution, it envisaged the devolution of policing and justice powers within two years after the Agreement. With some delay, policing and justice powers were eventually devolved to Northern Ireland in 2010 (BBC News, 2010). Although currently decision-making power over taxation still lies with at Westminster, talks about the possible devolution of Corporation Tax to the NIA have begun (Belfast Telegraph, 2011).

Thus, in conclusion, Northern Ireland has featured the implementation of almost all consociational principles, although not all of them to the same extent. PR has been implemented relatively early in the peace process, with the ratification of the Sunningdale Agreement. Most other characteristics of consociationalism have been implemented with the GFA, by providing, for example, a grand coalition in the Northern Ireland Executive and mutual veto rights. Segmental autonomy has been very limited, although the devolution of certain powers to the NIA has given the segments in society more influence on decisions on these matters than previously when power were located at Westminster.

6.2 Implementation of Europeanization

Because Northern Ireland is part of the UK, it has been a member of the EU since 1973. The UK is represented in the EU in, for example, the European Commission (although the European Commission is officially a supranational body) and the European Council. However, these institutions feature representatives of a country as a whole and not of the regions in a country (Dinan, 2005). Now it’s a case of looking for specific representatives from Northern Ireland in the EU, to begin with the European Parliament. The members of the EP are elected directly by the citizens of the EU. Citizens of Northern Ireland directly elect three MEPs using the Single Transferable Voting-system (BBC News, 2009). The first elections for the EP that Northern Ireland could partake in were in 1979.

Table seven shows the party affiliation of the Northern Irish MEPs who were elected during the period between 1979 and 2009. What is evident in this table is that during the whole period, two out of three Northern Irish MEPs were unionist and only one was of a nationalist affiliation. The UCUNF-party (Ulster Conservatives and Unionists - New Force) that got elected in 2009 was a special alliance between the Ulster Unionist Party and the Northern Ireland branch of the UK Conservative Party (Ballymoney and Moyle Times, 2009).

Table 7: Northern Irish MEPs 1979-2009

|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|

Source: (Northern Ireland Elections, 2011)

Northern Ireland is also represented in the Committee of the Regions. It has been a member of the CoR since its establishment in 1994. The UK has 24 seats in the CoR, with Northern Ireland having two full and two alternate seats. Northern Irish members of the CoR serve in four out of six committees (see box 2). Furthermore, “CoR members must hold a local or regional authority mandate or be accountable to an elected assembly” (Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister, 2011a).
Box 2: Committees of the CoR and Northern Ireland membership

Committees of the CoR:
- Territorial and Cohesion Policy (COTER)
- Economic and Social Policy (ECOS)
- Education, Youth and Research (EDUC)
- Environment, Climate Change and Energy (ENVE)
- Citizenship, Governance, Institutional and External Affairs (CIVEX)
- Natural Resources (NAT)

Besides the establishment of the CoR, 1994 also featured the establishment of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities (Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, 2011b). Although the Congress technically not an EU institution, it is the representation of the European regions in the Council of Europe. Northern Ireland is represented by one member in the Congress, who is also a member of the NIA. The current Northern Irish member of the Congress is an MLA from the Alliance Party.

Another EU institution that Northern Ireland is a member of, is the European Economic and Social Committee. The Committee was established under the Treaties of Rome in 1957 (ibid). Northern Ireland has two representatives in the Committee, who are part of the 24-member UK delegation. Both of the Northern Irish representatives are part of Group III of the European Economic and Social Committee, meaning that they provide expertise not on employers or employees, but on ‘other interests’.

The Northern Ireland Executive is also represented in the EU. The Office of the Northern Ireland Executive was established in 2001 and is responsible for the representation of the interests of the NIE in the EU. To do so, the NIE has set three specific priorities for the Office: “to support Northern Ireland’s engagement with the EU, to ensure that Northern Ireland has the opportunity to engage in policymaking with the EU Institutions, and to raise the positive profile of Northern Ireland” (Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, 2011c). Although the Office represents the interests of Northern Ireland, it is still part of the UK representation in Brussels. It is thus not an independent body.

Chapter 4.4.1. also mentioned the possibility of the regions being organized in lobby groups and influencing the EU representatives in the various EU institutions outside the institutional channel. Northern Ireland as a region is not organized in a lobby group. Research in the ‘Register of interest representatives’ does show, however, that various parts of Northern Irish society are EU lobby groups. Examples are ‘the Law Society of Northern Ireland’ and the ‘Attorney General for Northern Ireland’ (European Commission, 2011b). Because the Northern Ireland Government itself is not organized as a lobby group, the possible impact of these lobby groups on the amount of conflict is not examined. It is, however, an idea for further research another time (see paragraph 11.4).

The second indicator of Europeanization is EU funding. Three EU funds are taken into account: the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the Social Fund. These funds can help by allowing projects and organizations to be formed in which the segments in society have to work together. Northern Ireland has received money from several EU funds. Appendix III gives an overview of the EU structural funding given to Northern Ireland between 2000 and 2004. Most of the funding that Northern Ireland receives from the EU is covered under the PEACE-program. The program combines funding from several structural funds and is specially designed for Northern Ireland. It aims “at reinforcing progress towards a peaceful and stable society, and promoting reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland” (European Commission, 2011c).

Currently, the PEACE III-program is implemented, which runs from 2007 until 2013. The first PEACE-program was implemented in 1995. The EU contribution for that program was €500 (Special EU Programmes Body, 2003). A specification of the structural funds that attributed money to this
program could not be found. The following program, PEACE II, was implemented in 2000 and ran until 2004. This program was extended to 2006. The total PEACE II program encompassed €796 million, of which the EU structural funds contributed €597. Graph one shows the total expenditure on the three PEACE programs.

The implementation of the PEACE programs is managed by a special EU body, the Special EU Programmes Body. The Programmes Body has three offices in Northern Ireland, but is also responsible for the management of the INTERREG IVA program in Scotland (Special EU Programmes Body, 2011). It was set up under the 1999 British-Irish Agreement.

Besides the Special EU Programmes Body, the Northern Ireland Task Force was established in 2007. The Task Force was set up within the European Commission “in order to examine how Northern Ireland could benefit more from EU policies, and how it could participate more actively in the EU policy process in order to generate more prosperity” (European Commission, 2011c). This was the first time that such a task force was established. The Task Force is compromised of the European Investment Bank and those European Commission DG’s whose departments are related to fostering the socio-economic status of a region. It is managed by the DG for regional policy.

Most of the funding in the PEACE III program comes from the European Regional Development Fund. This fund aims to increase the economic and social cohesion between European regions. For Northern Ireland specifically, the 2007-2013 Competitiveness Program is mostly aimed at “promoting investment in research and technological development and encouraging enterprise and entrepreneurship in an overall context of sustainable development” (European Commission, 2011d). The Competitiveness Program is not wholly financed by the EU. The total budget for the Program is €614 million, but the European Regional Development Fund will provide half of the money at €307 million. The other half of the budget is to be financed by public contribution. For the PEACE II program, the European Regional Development Fund contributed 60% of the budget (European Parliament, 2010).

The second fund is the Cohesion Fund. The Cohesion Fund aims to stabilize the economies of the member states. Money from this fund goes to projects involving environment and transport infrastructure (European Commission, 2008). Not every member state is eligible for this fund. The only recipients are member states with an average GNP that is less than 90% of the EU average. As such, the UK and Northern Ireland are not eligible as recipients and currently don’t receive funding from the Cohesion Fund.

The third fund taken a look at is the European Social Fund. The European Social Fund aims to create economic and social cohesion (at the workplace). Northern Ireland is also eligible for this fund. The 2007-2013 program appoints €166 million of EU funding from the European Social Fund to complete the goals set out in the regional profile (European Commission, 2011e). The UK has to pay €249 million itself to contribute to the program. In its regional profile, Northern Ireland set out two priorities for the current period. The region wants to use the Fund to help people into sustained employment and to improve the workforce skills. For the PEACE II program, the European Social Fund contributed 32% of the budget.

Through its funding, the EU has promoted cross-border linkages between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, like the North-South Ministerial Council. “The largest providers of funds for cross-border initiatives have been the International Fund for Ireland and the EU” (Tonge, 2005). The Fund was established with the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1986 and most of that funding comes from the US.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total PEACE budget</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU expenditure</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The third indicator specified in chapter 4.4.1. is direct contact between the EU and representatives of the segments of society. This falls under a conflict mediation effort by the EU. The EU has not played a direct meditative role in Northern Ireland. It did, however, make efforts for conflict resolution in other ways. For example by adapting certain policies to the conflict, the PEACE program springs to mind here (Bourne, 2003). The EU also provided a supranational framework in which the nation stats could be more accommodating.

The various political parties in Northern Ireland look differently against the future role of the EU in Northern Ireland. Generally speaking, unionists are Euro-sceptic and nationalists favor further European integration. The SDLP embraces “the possibility of an EU contribution to the debate on Northern Ireland’s constitutional future” (Tonge, 2005). Sinn Féin still wants Northern Ireland to become part of the Republic, but within the context of an integrating Europe. The UUP, in contrast, supports the EU’s economic aid, but is against any territorial implications. The UUP, DUP and Sinn Féin prefer the EU to be a non-interfering body presiding over independent European states.

6.3 Conclusion

Both consociationalism and Europeanization have been implemented in Northern Ireland. However, not to the same extent. Four out of five indicators of consociationalism have been implemented. Only segmental autonomy has not been implemented here, although decision-making power over the four policy areas is largely devolved from Westminster to the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive. The NIA features a high amount of proportionality and effective number of parties. Moreover, the Northern Ireland Executive has always been a grand coalition. The mutual veto was implemented with the ratification of the GFA in 1998.

Europeanization has also been implemented in Northern Ireland. Two out of three indicators were implemented here. The EU did not play a direct mediation role, but it did give funding to the region. This funding came in the form of the three PEACE programs, which incorporated the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund. Northern Ireland was not eligible as a recipient of the Cohesion Fund. The region is also represented in the EU institutions, for example in the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Moreover, Northern Ireland also has its own representative office in Brussels.
7. Consociationalism and Europeanization in Spanish Basque Country

After looking for the implementation of elements of consociationalism and Europeanization in Northern Ireland in the previous chapter, this chapter focuses on the implementation of elements of the two models in Spanish Basque Country. To determine if consociationalism and Europeanization have been implemented in this region, the indicators determined in chapter four are used.

7.1 Implementation of consociationalism

Spanish Basque Country was created under the 1978 Constitution and the Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country established its political system. The ratification of the Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country in 1979, gave the Basque Parliament decision-making powers over several policy areas. Basque Country was now the most autonomous region in Europe, and its Parliament was given powers to control social security, culture, policing, language and taxation (Mansvelt Beck & Van Amersfoort, 2000).

Overall, the region has more autonomy than Northern Ireland. However, when it comes to the segmental autonomy over the policy areas defined in paragraph 4.3.1., it's segmental autonomy is about the same. Rather than placing decision-making power over these policy areas on the national (Spanish) or segmental level, the regional level was now responsible. As a consequence, segmental autonomy is limited in Basque Country. Just like in Northern Ireland, it is limited to respecting the different cultures and languages of the segments in society. This, among other things, is done by making the Basque language one of the official languages of the region (Benedikter, 2008).

When the Statute created the Basque political system, it also determined that the Basque Parliament should be elected by way of the d'Hondt system (Álvarez-Rivera, 2010). This is one of the possible systems of creating proportional representation and the same system that is used in Northern Ireland for nominating members of the Northern Ireland Executive. As noted before, the d'Hondt system uses party strength after elections as a sign of a party’s strength in parliament. The electoral system in Basque Country, besides using the d’Hondt system, also uses an electoral threshold of 3%. The threshold was 5% until 2001.

Chapter 4.3.1. specified that when measuring the proportionality of a parliament, one actually has to measure the disproportionality. The disproportionality scales from 1 till 100, with 100 being a highly disproportional system. When looking at the data and calculating the disproportionality in the Basque Parliament, it can be seen in table nine that the amount of disproportionality is fairly low. Table 7 also shows the proportionality, which is calculated by subtracting the disproportionality from 100. The disproportionality value of the Parliament in 2009 doesn’t seem to have changed much from the value at the start of the Basque Parliament in 1980. On the contrary, the value is even a bit higher. Although the disproportionality value has shifted between 2,02 and 3,96, it seems to hover around the average value of 3,04.

Has the lowering of the election threshold had an effect on the disproportionality? The preliminary answer seems to be ‘yes’. The threshold was lowered in 2001 and although the disproportionality was lower in that year, the disproportionality grew in the elections following. The value in 2009 was even higher than in 1980. The number of parties participating in an election doesn’t seem to have a relevant effect on the disproportionality in the Basque Parliament. Although the number of participating parties differs greatly per election, no relation can be found between these variables. In 1990, for example, the number of participating parties was 19 and the disproportionality was low at 2,66. In 1994, however, the number of participating parties was only 8, but the disproportionality was higher at 3,26.
Table 9: Disproportionality in the Basque Parliament

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disproportionality</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>3.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportionality</td>
<td>96.16</td>
<td>97.98</td>
<td>96.79</td>
<td>97.34</td>
<td>96.74</td>
<td>97.27</td>
<td>97.76</td>
<td>96.56</td>
<td>96.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of parties participating in election</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (Álvarez-Rivera, 2010) (Basque Government, 2011)

When parties are successful in gaining seats in parliament, the second indicator of consociationalism shows its head: the effective number of parties. Because of the proportional representation system, not every party has the same number of seats in parliament. This means that not every party is evenly successful in fulfilling its goals in parliament. As consociationalism refers to power-sharing and close cooperation between political parties and their elites, the effective number of parties in parliament should be high when consociationalism is applied (Lijphart, 1977).

Table ten shows the effective number of parties in the Basque Parliament. The effective number of parties is the highest in 1994 and the lowest in 2009. The election threshold that was lowered in 2001 seems to have lowered the effective number of parties in parliament. Compared to the number of parties in the Basque Parliament, the effective number of parties is relatively high during the past three decades. This points to a relatively equal seat-share of each party in Parliament. Appendix VI shows that after each election, there were several parties with a large percentage of the seats. The high number of effective parties is sign of the presence of consociationalism in Spanish Basque Country.

Table 10: Effective number of parties after elections for the Basque Parliament

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<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective number of parties</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>5.24</td>
<td>5.27</td>
<td>5.86</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>4.01</td>
<td>3.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of parties in Parliament</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After elections it is time to appoint new members of the Basque Government. If Lijphart’s consociational theory is implemented, the seat-share in the Basque Parliament of the members in the Basque Government should be at least 50% plus 1. If the governmental coalition has the support of 50% plus 1 of the Parliament, a minimal winning coalition is in effect. Consociationalism envisages the cooperation of the elites of all segments of society and thus wants that the government or executive consists of as many parties as possible (Lijphart, 1999). Thus, when the Basque Government consists of a grand coalition, consociationalism is implemented.

The support of the current and pasts Basque Governments is shown in table eleven. What can be seen in table 9 is that the coalitions most of the time got even less than 50% support in the Basque Parliament, the less support having the current government at 33.33%. The highest support was achieved by the governments of the early 1990s, at 58.67%. Apparently, most of the time parties got into Government that have a minority in Parliament, thus forming a minimal winning coalition. According to Mansvelt Beck (2008), there was only a grand coalition between 1986 and 1998. However, the little support between 36% and 58.67% in this period cannot be called a grand coalition. It is, for example, nowhere near de parliamentary support achieved by the Northern Ireland Executive. This leads to the conclusion that the principle of a grand coalition was and is not implemented in Spanish Basque Country.
Table 11: The Basque Government and its support in Basque Parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Coalition</th>
<th>Seats in Parliament</th>
<th>% of total seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>EAJ-PNV</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>41.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>EAJ-PNV</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>42.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>EAJ-PNV, PSE-PSOE</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>48.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>EAJ-PNV, EA, EE</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>49.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>EAJ-PNV, PSE-PSOE, EE</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>58.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>EAJ-PNV, PSE-EE</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>58.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>EAJ-PNV, PSE-EE, EA</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>56.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>EAJ-PNV, EA</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>36.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>EAJ-PNV-EA, EB-IU</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>48.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>EAJ-PNV-EA, EB-IU</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>42.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>PSE-EE</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (Minder, 2011) (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2010)

Now it’s time to see if the segments in Basque society are in possession of a minority veto, as implemented in Northern Ireland. The idea of a minority veto has not been implemented in the Basque political system (Benedikter, 2008). A veto-right is in place, however, during negotiations that are meant to resolve the conflict (Mansvelt Beck, 2008). Thus, this element of consociationalism has not been implemented in Spanish Basque Country.

Table 12: The application of consociational principles in Spanish Basque Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Application</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grand coalition</td>
<td>Not implemented, a majority of the governments having less than 50% support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportionality in government</td>
<td>Use of D’Hondt system for proportional representation in parliament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority veto rights</td>
<td>Not institutionally implemented, but is in effect during conflict negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segmental autonomy</td>
<td>Limited. Respect for the rights of both communities and language provision, but little else.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.2 Implementation of Europeanization

Because Basque Country is a part of the state of Spain, it has been a member of the EU since Spain accession in 1986. This paragraph looks at the possibly ways that the EU is involved in the resolution of the Basque conflict. Just as in the previous paragraph, the indicators mentioned in chapter 4.4.1 are used.

The region’s representation in the EU can help reduce conflict by providing a neutral framework for conflict resolution. Spanish Basque Country is represented in the EU in several ways. It is of course represented through the Spanish representatives. However, Basque Country also has its own representative office, located in Brussels. The Delegation of the Basque Country in Brussels was established in 1988, shortly after Spain’s accession (Europe’s World, 2006). It has several objectives, among which are promoting Basque interests in the EU, monitoring decision-making about the statutory competences of the Basque Country, and offering technical assistance to public and private organizations who, for example, want to get involved in EU projects. The Delegation works closely with the Spanish representative office in Brussels. The Delegation has a contested history, as the Spanish government appealed the decree that created it. The Constitutional Court ruled against the appeal in 1994. During the court case, the Delegation was suspended and Basque Country transferred its tasks to the specially established private company Interbask SA. As a result of the ruling of the Constitutional Court, Interbask SA was dissolved in 1995.

Basque Country also has its own representatives in the European Parliament, although they operate under the Spanish flag. Spain currently has 50 MEPs operating in the European Parliament.
Basque citizens, opposed to Northern Irish citizens, cannot directly elect members of the European Parliament, but elections are held in Basque Country. People that are eligible to vote in these elections are not only the citizens of Basque Country, but also Basques living outside the autonomous region and EU citizens living inside Basque Country (EITB, 2009).

Table 13: The three biggest parties after EP elections in Basque Country

|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|

Just like Northern Ireland, Basque Country is also represented in the Committee of Regions. Spain has 21 members in the CoR, with Basque Country having one full and one alternate member in the CoR (Committee of the Regions, 2011b). Spanish Pasqual Maragall was president of the CoR from 1996 until 1998. In 2003, the CoR adopted a special resolution that showed its support to the Basque Government in dealing with the conflict (Europolitics, 2003).

Basque representatives from the Delegation of the Basque Country also participate in several committees of the Council of Ministers. They participate in a total of four committees: Environment; Employment, Social Affairs, Health and Consumers; Agriculture and Fisheries; and Education, Culture and Youth.

Spanish Basque Country doesn’t have its own lobby group that represents and lobbies for the regions’ interests. This is a similarity to Northern Ireland. There are, however, interest groups representing Basque companies, like ‘Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria’ (European Parliament, 2011). Because the government of Basque Country itself is not organized as a lobby group, the possible impact of these lobby groups on the amount of conflict is not examined. It is, however, an idea for further research to do another time (see paragraph 11.4).

The second indicator of Europeanization is EU funding. Three EU funds are taken into account: the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the Social Fund. EU funding can be used to reduce the violence by providing funding for, for example, projects that bring together the segments in society. Spanish Basque Country has received money from all of these funds. Unlike Northern Ireland’s special PEACE program, there is no special combination of EU funding for Basque Country.

The first fund taken a look at is the European Regional and Development Fund. Basque Country is eligible for this fund under the Regional Competitiveness and Employment Objective (European Commission, 2011f). For the current period, 2007-2013, Basque Country receives €241 million from the EU. The national contribution for this period is planned to be €260 million. For the previous period, Basque Country received €588 million from the European Regional Development Fund (European Commission, 2011g). Basque Country also received funds in the 1994-1999 period, worth a total of €566 million.

The Cohesion Fund is meant to stabilize the economies of the member states. Spain (as a whole country) is a recipient of the Cohesion Fund, from which is has been receiving money since 1994 (European Commission, 2008). The allocation of money from the Cohesion Fund runs through the national government of Spain which in turn can choose to give the money to the Basque Government. However, no information could be found about how much Cohesion Funding Basque Country has received in the past decades. For the current period, 2007-2013, the EU has made a special arrangement for Spain’s Cohesion Fund. It is now only a phase-out fund, because its GNI is less than the average of the EU-15. Basque Country will receive €3,25 billion in this period (Yuill, Méndez, & Wishlade, 2006). In the period 2000-2006, Spain received €12,36 billion from the Cohesion Fund. In the period before that, 1994-1999, Spain has received 55% of the total budget of the Cohesion Fund, which amounts to €9,19 billion (Gomis-Porqueras & Garcilazo, 2003).
The third fund is the European Social Fund. The European Social Fund is established to improve people’s skills and job prospects. Besides the past two funds, Basque Country has also received money from the European Social Fund. For the 2007-2013 period, Basque Country can expect to receive €24.66 million from the EU (European Commission, 2011h). In the period 2000-2006, it received €25.49 million from this fund. From 1994 until 1999, Basque Country received €27.88 million.

Through its funding, the EU has promoted cross-border linkages between Spain and France. Basques live in both these countries, but only have an autonomous community in Spain. As explained earlier, Spanish Basque people also live outside Basque Country in the province of Navarre. By setting requirements to reception of certain funding, the EU managed to steer political behavior and create cross-border cooperation between these two countries (Bourne, 2003).

Table 14: EU funding received by Basque Country (€ million)

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ERDF</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>27.88</td>
<td>25.49</td>
<td>24.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1518.88</strong></td>
<td><strong>1843.49</strong></td>
<td><strong>590.66</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The final indicator used for Europeanization is direct contact between EU representatives and the representatives of the segments of Basque society. The EU did not play a direct meditative role in the Basque conflict, although the Basque PNV MEP argued for a mediating role of the EU. EU involvement in Basque Country “sought to induce change by creating new external facts, events or processes that change the internal co-ordinates of conflict” (ibid). An example of this is that the EU has accepted new regulations about terrorism, which, in case of the Basque conflict, can only to the ETA. The Spanish political parties PP and PSOE are strong supporters of tougher terrorism prosecution.

### 7.3 Conclusion

Both consociationalism and Europeanization have been implemented in Spanish Basque Country. Less elements of consociationalism have been implemented here than in Northern Ireland. The proportionality and the effective number of parties in the Basque Parliament were relatively high. When it comes to the grand coalition, the Basque Government only received majority support in three out of eleven cabinets since 1980. The mutual veto and segmental autonomy were not implemented. Decision-making power over the policy areas in question has been devolved from the Spanish government to the Basque Government, but not to the segments themselves.

Europeanization has been implemented as well. The EU has not played a mediation role here either. While Northern Ireland received funding in a comprehensive special program, Spanish Basque Country did not. The EU gave funding via the three European funds taken into account: the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European Social Fund. Basque Country is also represented in various EU institutions, such as the Committee of Regions, certain committees of the Council of Ministers and in the European Parliament. The region also has its own representative office in Brussels.
8. Effective conflict management in Northern Ireland?

This chapter discusses the effectiveness of conflict management in Northern Ireland. It tries to link developments in the amount of conflict with events in implemented consociationalism and Europeanization. First the developments in the amount of conflict are discussed, after which the developments are linked to both theories.

8.1 Developments in the amount of violent conflict

To assess the amount of violent conflict, two indicators are used. The number of casualties and the number of bomb explosions are reliable and valid indicators for this (dependent) variable. For the number of casualties, the only casualties that are taken into account here are the ones that can be directly linked to the conflict, for example people who died because of terrorist attacks by the IRA. Data for both indicators can be found in appendix VII. Graph 1 shows the number of casualties in Northern Ireland in the period 1969-2011.

Graph 1: Number of casualties in the Northern Ireland conflict

What can be noticed in this graph is the spectacular rise in the number of casualties in 1971 and 1972. The following years showed a decline, but the number was still far higher than before 1971. Another peak was reached in 1976, when a number of 297 casualties were reported. However, the number was never as high as the 470 casualties in 1971. After 1976 there was another sharp decline, but the number of casualties relatively stabled in the period 1978-1994. The average number of casualties in this period was 81 per year. A third sharp decline took place after 1994 and lasts until today. The low amount of casualties was broken, however, in the period 1997-1998, when respectively a number of 22 and 55 deaths were reported.

The second indicator of violent conflict is the number of bomb explosions. However, because no data could be found concerning the number of bomb explosions in Northern Ireland in the period 1998-2011, data about the number of bomb devices is used. This data shows the total number of bomb devices used in each year, which means that it also includes the number of unexploded bombs. Furthermore, one has to keep in mind that the number of bomb devices does not equate the number of bomb attacks, as multiple bombs can be used for one attack. However, the number of used bomb devices is still a valid indicator, as bombs are only used when there is violent, instead of non-violent,
conflict. When the conflict is solved, no more bombs should be used. Graph 2 shows the number if bomb devices used during the Northern Ireland conflict.

Graph 2: Number of bomb devices used during the Northern Ireland conflict

The number of bomb devices used follows roughly the same patterns as the number of casualties. This is logical, as the number of casualties is inextricably linked to the number of bombs. Terrorist groups in Northern Ireland used bombs as a means of defeating the other terrorist groups and thus caused a great amount of injuries and casualties. The number of bombs used showed a sharp increase in 1971 and 1972, just like the number of casualties. It also showed a sharp decrease after 1973, but the use of bombs rose again in 1976. The period after 1976 showed a steady decline and the number of bombings even reached the lowest point of 2 in 1995. After that the number rose again, experiencing a new peak of 444 in 2001. This year, the number of bombings is already 21.

Furthermore, what can be noticed in graph 2 is that the number of bombings was much higher in the past decade relative to the number of casualties. When only looking at the number of casualties in the last decade, one might think that the violent conflict has come to a halt. However, if one also looks at the number of bombings, one cannot but conclude that violence is still used as a method of goal-attainment.

8.2 Developments linked to consociationalism

According to Lijphart, the effects of consociationalism have been limited in Northern Ireland (1977). However, he wrote his argument more than 30 years ago and a lot has happened since then. This paragraph reviews if consociationalism in Northern Ireland is indeed as ineffective as Lijphart said or if the theory has had a positive effect on the amount of violent conflict. In order to do this, the effect of each consociational element on the two indicators of the amount of violent conflict is looked at.

The first element of consociationalism that was implemented in Northern Ireland, was that of proportional representation. PR was implemented with the signing of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act in 1973. Graphs 3 and 4 show the amount of disproportional in the NIA in relation to the number of casualties and bombings, in the period 1962-2011. The Northern Ireland Constitution Act had a positive effect on the amount of proportionality in the NIA, as the 1973 elections and its NIA were a great deal less disproportional than the three elections before the
signing of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act. But has the implementation of PR in the NIA elections had an effect of the amount of violent conflict?

The implementation of PR does not seem to have had much of an impact on the number of casualties. Consociational theory states that the higher the proportionality in parliament, the fewer the number of casualties in the conflict. Although the number of casualties declined after the implementation of PR in 1973, it sharply rose again in 1975. After the next elections in 1982, the disproportionality rose slightly and the number of casualties declined until 1987. This is contradictory to consociational theory. The elections following the GFA in 1998 had the lowest amount of disproportionality so far, but 1998 also saw a sharp increase in the number of casualties. However, the five years following 1998 until the next election in 2003, were witness to a steady decline in the number of casualties. The elections in 2003 were even more proportional than the 1998 elections, achieving a disproportionality rate of 2.88 (see table 3 in chapter 6.1). In the period 2003-2007, the low amount of disproportionality does seem to fit consociational theory, as the number of casualties also declined and ‘only’ three casualties were reported in 2007. The amount of disproportionality rose again slightly in 2007, but the number of casualties continued to decline. The elections in 2011 showed the highest amount of disproportionality since 1973, having a rate of 6.89. However, this doesn’t seem have an effect on the number of casualties, as so far there are none in 2011. Thus, the implementation of PR and the level of disproportionality don’t seem to have an effect on the number of casualties in the conflict in Northern Ireland.

Graph 3: Disproportionality in the NIA in relation to the number of casualties

Has the amount proportionality in the NIA had an effect on the second indicator of violent conflict, the number of bomb devices used? The high amount of disproportionality after the 1969 elections did coincide with a high number of bombings. The number of bombings started decreasing in 1973, when the PR system was implemented and the amount of disproportionality also decreased. The decreasing trend continued until 1982, although 1976 showed a peak when 1192 bombs were used. The amount of disproportionality after the 1982 elections was slightly higher, but the decreasing trend still continued until 1985 (with the exception of 1983). The NIA elected in 1982 lasted until 1986, when it was abolished following debates from the nationalists in the NIA about the signed Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985. The number of bombings rose from 1986 until 1992. This cannot be attributed to the amount of disproportionality, as the NIA was abolished during this period. The 1998 GFA led to a high amount of proportionality, but also a new high in the number of bombings. Even though the disproportionality was the lowest so far, the number of bombings increased. After the 2003 elections both the amount of disproportionality and the number of bombings decreased. The same relation between the variables can be found after the 2007 elections, meaning that the amount
of disproportionality increased together with the number of bombings. It is too early to tell what the high level of disproportionality after the 2011 elections will do to the number of bombings this year, but the first three months of 2011 were already witness to 21 bombings, making it likely that this number will increase even more in the rest of the year.

Graph 4: Disproportionality in the NIA in relation to the number of bomb devices

All in all is the relation between disproportionality and the number of bombings stronger than the relation between disproportionality and the number of casualties. This even though the number bombings does not 100% reflect the trends in disproportionality.

The second indicator of consociationalism is the effective number of parties. Consociationalism implies a multi-party system in which several parties are able to gain large support of the constituents. If consociationalism is successfully implemented, it should thus lead to relatively high amount of effective parties, which in turn should lead to a low amount of casualties and bomb attacks. Graphs 5 and 6 show the number of effective parties after each NIA election in relation to the number of casualties and bombings.

Graph 5: Effective number of parties in the NIA in relation with the number of casualties

Does the number of effective parties affect the number of casualties and bomb attacks? The effective number of parties was low after the elections in the 1960s, being around two. From 1969 until 1973, this coincided with a high number of casualties and bomb attacks. The implementation of the PR-system in 1973 not only increased the effective number of parties to 5,18, it also decreased
the number of casualties and bombings. The slight decrease in the effective number of parties in 1982 came with a decrease in the number of casualties and bombings. In 1998, the effective number of parties had increased again till 5.45. This means that consociational theory would expect that the amount of violent conflict would decrease even further. However, this is not what happened in Northern Ireland. The period 1998-2002 experienced a relative upsurge in violence, leading to relatively more casualties and bombings than the period before 1998. The elections in 2003, 2007 and 2011 all had a relatively high number of effective parties, although showing a decreasing trend. The number of casualties in this period also showed a steady decrease, but the number of bombings showed a more erratic pattern.

Graph 6: Effective number of parties in the NIA in relation with the number of bomb devices used

The number of casualties and bombings does seem to be in relation with the effective number of parties in the NIA. Most of the time in the past decades, an increase in the effective number of parties led to a decrease in the number of casualties and bombings (and the other way around). The only period that is not consistent with this relation, is the period 1998-2002, when an increase in the effective number of parties coincided with an increase in the number of casualties and bombings.

The third indicator of consociationalism is the grand coalition. The idea here is that the NIE consists of parties that a wide support in the NIA. If the elites of the segments of society work together to resolve the conflict, the amount of violent conflict should lessen. However, was this really the case in Northern Ireland?

Because the modern NIE was established in 1998, data about the supposed effectiveness of the grand coalition can only be gathered from the last decade. Graphs 7 and 8 show the amount of support the parties in the NIE received in the NIA in the period 1998-2011, in relation to the number of casualties and bombings. The three cabinets after 1998 have always met the criteria of being more than a minimum winning coalition, with a minimum winning coalition representing 50% + 1 members of the NIA. This means that the expectation is that the number of casualties and bombings in this period is fairly low. The 1998 coalition received 83% support in the NIA. However, as said before, the violence experienced a relative upsurge in this period. In 2003, no coalition was formed because the DUP and Sinn Féin refused to rule together. Did this political turmoil reflect in a rise in violence in society? The answer is no. Although the number of bombings increased in 2005, this seemed to be anomaly in the trend of a lessening of the violence. The coalition that was formed in 2007 received support from almost the whole NIA, 97%. Despite of the grand coalition in this period, the number of bombings increased again. The number of casualties remained relatively stable. Again, it is too early to say anything about the effect of the current grand coalition, that can count on 82% of the MLA’s. So far there have been 21 bombings, but no casualties.
The grand coalition does not seem to have much of an impact on the amount of violence in Northern Ireland. The grand coalition of 1998-2003 went together with an upsurge in the violence. The absence of a coalition in 2003-2007 didn’t increase the violence. In fact the violence lessened. Furthermore, the grand coalition of 2007-2011 also went together with an increase in the amount of violence.

What effect does the suspension of the NIA have on the number of casualties and bombings? The modern NIA has been suspended four times in the past decade (see box 1). It could be that the political turmoil in these years has transferred into an upsurge in the amount of violence. In 2000, the NIA was suspended 3.5 months. Both the number of casualties and the number of bombings increased in this year. In 2001, the NIA has been suspended two times (2 x 24 hours). The number of bombings did increase greatly in 2001, but the number of casualties still followed the decreasing trend. The fourth suspension of the NIA was from 2002 until 2007. Unlike in 2000 and 2001, there was a decrease in violence in this period. It is thus difficult to form a conclusion about the influence of the suspension of the NIA on the amount of violence.
The next indicator of consociationalism is the mutual veto. This has been implemented with the signing of the GFA in 1998. The number of casualties has steadily decreased since then, but the number of bombings, although still decreasing, showed a more unstable trend. This leads to the assumption that the implementation of the minority veto in 1998 didn’t have an effect on the amount of violence.

The final indicator of consociationalism is segmental autonomy. This element of consociationalism was also implemented in 1998. Segmental autonomy by the GFA is limited, covering only the respect in choosing the English or Irish language and citizenship. The devolution of powers from Westminster to the NIE officially does not fall under segmental autonomy. The conclusion about the effect of segmental autonomy on the amount of violence is the same as mentioned with the mutual veto.

8.3 Developments linked to Europeanization
The next step in trying to explain the changes in the number of casualties and bombings in Northern Ireland, is linking the changes to implemented Europeanization. The first indicator of Europeanization is the representation of Northern Ireland in the EU institutions. The representation of Northern Ireland in the various EU institutions can affect the amount of violent conflict because it can provide a framework for conflict settlement. The EU can offer the various segment a neutral platform to discuss their differences, or it can provide new ideas of conflict resolution. Chapter 7.1 taught us that Northern Ireland is represented in the EU in several ways. First of all, the NIE has its own representative office in Brussels. However, Northern Ireland also elects three of its own MEPs (although these MEPs are still part of the larger UK delegation), is represented in the CoR, and partakes in the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. Northern Ireland is also represented in the European Economic and Social Committee. However, the region it not organized in a lobby group, although some of its business sectors are organized in EU lobby groups. Has Northern Ireland’s participation affected the number of casualties and bombings in the conflict?

The UK (and Northern Ireland) became a member of the EU in 1973. Since 1973, the number of casualties has shown a decreasing trend. The number of bombings has also decreased since 1973. However, to automatically attribute this to the accession would be premature, as the PR-system was also introduced in 1973.

The presence of Northern Irish MEPs in the European Parliament can also have an impact on the amount of violent conflict in Northern Ireland. The first elections that were held for the European Parliament after the accession of the UK, took place in 1979. Since then, there have always been three Northern Irish representatives in the European Parliament. From 1979 until 1994 there was a relatively stable period in the yearly number of casualties, and the number of bomb explosions decreased only slightly in that period. This means that the presence of Northern Irish representatives in the European Parliament does not influence the amount of violent conflict in Northern Ireland.

The CoR was established in 1994 and Northern Ireland has been a member since its beginning. Since 1994, the number of casualties has decreased further and actually shows a quite a big difference between the pre-1994 and post-1994 period. The number of bombings also decreased in 1994, but increased again shortly after, though it did not reach the same level as before 1994 (except in 2005). Thus the presence of Northern Ireland in the CoR seems to decrease the amount of violent conflict in Northern Ireland.

The Northern Irish representative office in Brussels, Office of the Northern Ireland Executive in Brussels, was established in 2001. Has the establishment of Office had an effect on the amount of violent conflict? Since 2001, the number of casualties has decreased and the number of bombings has remained relatively stable, although there was a peak in 2001 and 2002. The establishment of the Office thus did not affect the amount of violent conflict in Northern Ireland.
The second indicator of Europeanization is EU funding. The EU has made a specialized funding program for Northern Ireland, called the PEACE program. The program was established “to promote cross-border peace and reconciliation and is targeted at the Border Counties and Northern Ireland” (The European Social Fund in Ireland, 2011). This program encompasses funding from several of the EU funds, among which are the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund. In order to determine the influence of EU funding on the amount of violence in Northern Ireland, the total amount of received EU funding in three periods is looked at. This, in turn, is compared to the developments in the amount of violence. Graph 9 and 10 show the PEACE program expenditure in the three periods from 1994, in relation with the number of casualties and bombings. The total expenditure refers to the money Northern Ireland received from the EU and its own contribution to the program.

In the period 1995-1999, the PEACE I program encompassed € 692 million. Has the establishment of the first PEACE program made a difference in the amount of violence in Northern Ireland? The first year of the PEACE I program showed a dramatic decrease in the number of casualties and bombings. However, this number rose again from 1996 until 1998. In the last year of the PEACE I program, the amount of violence dropped again to seven casualties and 100 used bomb devices. Overall, the PEACE I program didn’t decrease the amount of violence.

The second PEACE program encompassed € 796 million and was implemented from 2000 to 2006. Although the number of casualties increased in the first year of the PEACE II program, 2000, it decreased in the rest of its period. The number of bombings shows an erratic pattern in this period. The number of bombings increased in 2000 and 2001, but decreased the following year, with 2005 being an exception in this trend. Overall it can be said that the PEACE II program affected the number of casualties more than the number of bombings.

Graph 9: PEACE program expenditure (€ million) in relation to the number of casualties

The third and current PEACE program runs from 2007 until 2013. This program encompasses € 333 million, which is much less than the previous PEACE programs. Because the PEACE III program is currently still running, its impact cannot totally be measured yet. However, it can be seen that the number of casualties has continued to decrease, although 2005 is an exception to this. Unlike the number of casualties, the number of bombings is increasing since 2007.

What can be said about the total impact of all three PEACE programs on the amount of violent conflict in Northern Ireland? Since the implementation of the first PEACE program in 1995, the number of casualties has decreased drastically. Even the peak in the number of casualties in 1998 is still lower that the number of casualties before 1995. The number of bombings also decreased...
after 1995, but showed more peaks than the number of casualties. The number of bomb attacks showed peaks in 1998, 2001 and 2002. However, despite of these peaks the average number of bomb attacks from 1995 was still much lower than before 1995. It seems that the EU funding aspect of Europeanization has had a positive impact on the amount of violence in Northern Ireland. This is because the number of casualties and bombings decreased drastically in 1995, when the PEACE I program was implemented and, as yet, the (average) amount of violence has never reached the levels that it had before 1995.

Graph 10: PEACE program expenditure (€ million) in relation to the number of bomb devices used

The third indicator of Europeanization is direct contact between the EU and representatives of the segments of society and refers to the mediation role that the EU can take in conflicts. In the Northern Ireland conflict, the EU has not taken this role. The effects of this indicator on the amount of violence in Northern Ireland thus doesn’t have to be researched.

8.4 Conclusion
Both consociationalism and Europeanization have had an impact on the amount of conflict on Northern Ireland. Out of the four implemented indicators of consociationalism, only the implementation of proportional representation could be seen to have reduced the number of casualties and bombings. For the other indicators - the effective number of parties, the grand coalition and the segmental autonomy - no significant relation could be found between a reduction in the amount of conflict and the presence of these elements of consociationalism.

The two implemented elements of Europeanization have both had an effect on the amount of conflict in Northern Ireland. Europeanization has mostly had an impact on the Northern Ireland conflict by providing funding in the form of the PEACE programs. Besides EU funding, the accession of the UK into the EU in 1973 decreased the amount of violence.
9. Effective conflict management in Spanish Basque Country?

After reviewing the effectiveness of consociationalism and Europeanization in Northern Ireland, it is time to do the same for Spanish Basque Country. The indicators of violent conflict are discussed first. The evaluation of consociationalism and Europeanization takes place in, respectively, paragraph 9.2 and 9.3.

9.1 Developments in the amount of violent conflict

To assess the amount of violent conflict in Spanish Basque Country, the same two indicators of violent conflict are used as the ones for Northern Ireland. However, for Basque Country there is data available about the actual number of bomb explosions, instead of data about the number of bomb devices used. This means that for Basque Country, the number of bomb explosions is the second indicator of violent conflict. Data for both indicators can be found in appendix VIII. Graph 7 shows the number of casualties that are due to ETA attacks in Spanish Basque Country from 1968 to 2010.

Graph 11: Number of casualties in the Basque conflict (caused by ETA)

What can be seen in graph 7 is that the highest amount of casualties in Spanish Basque Country fell in the period between 1973 and 2000. However, the number of casualties was never as high as in Northern Ireland. Between 1974 and 1976 the number of casualties was relatively stable, numbering between 15 and 20 deaths. After a short drop in 1977, the number of casualties increased significantly in the three years following and sharply dropped again in 1981. After 1981 the number of casualties rose again, after which the number decreased in 1988. The next peak in the number of casualties was in 1991, numbering 46 deaths. After 1991 the pattern in the number of casualties showed a deceasing trend. There were, however, two exceptions: 1997 and 1999. For the past ten years, the yearly number of casualties varied between zero and four.

The second indicator of the amount of violent conflict is the number of bomb explosions. Graph 8 shows the number of bomb explosions in Basque Country between 1970 and 2008. The increase in the number of bomb explosions began later than the increase in the number of casualties, as the number of bomb explosions only started increasing in 1975 (two years later than the number of casualties). This indicates that bomb attacks as a means of goal attainment were not or rarely used at the beginning of the conflict. However, the number of bomb explosions quickly increased until 1979. Between 1979 and 1991 the number of bomb explosions showed quite an erratic pattern, although the lowest number of bombings was still high at 36 in 1981. After 1991 the number of bombings decreased and remained relatively stable between 1992 and 1995. The erratic pattern started again
in 1996. There were only two bomb explosions in 1999, but the following three years the number rose again to 23 bomb explosions per year. After which it dropped, rose and dropped again to four bomb explosions in 2007. In 2008 the number of bomb explosions increased again to 30.

Graph 12: Number of bomb explosions claimed by ETA

Source: (Global Terrorism Database, 2011)

9.2 Developments linked to consociationalism

What can explain the changes in the number of casualties and bomb explosions in Spanish Basque Country? One explanation can be consociationalism. Chapter 4.2.1 mentioned several indicators of consociationalism, which were applied to Spanish Basque Country in chapter 6.2. From chapter 6.2 was learned that not all elements of consociationalism were implemented in Basque Country. For the elements of consociationalism that were implemented, this paragraph features a comparison between the developments in these elements and the developments in the amount of violent conflict over the past several decades.

The first indicator of consociationalism is the amount of proportional representation in the Basque Parliament. In consociational theory, the amount of PR should be high and the amount of disproportionality should thus be low. That creates the best parliamentary environment for conflict resolution. Graphs 13 and 14 show the amount of disproportionality in the Basque Parliament after each election since 1980, in relation to the number of casualties and bomb explosions.

The amount of disproportionality in the Basque Parliament follows quite an erratic pattern. Between 1980 and 2009 there is no trend discernable of it either increasing or decreasing. The amount of disproportionality after the 2009 elections is almost as high as the amount of disproportionality after the elections in 1980. According to consociational theory, a high level of disproportionality should correspond with a higher amount of conflict (and vice versa). Has the level of disproportionality had an impact on the amount of violence in the conflict in Spanish Basque Country?

After the first elections for the Basque Parliament in 1980, the amount of disproportionality was relatively high and the number of casualties first decreased and then remained relatively stable. The number of bombings, however, increased to 79 in 1982. The amount of disproportionality after the second elections in 1984 was low and should thus correspond with low levels of violence, but the number of casualties in this period showed a slight increase. The number of bombings decreased sharply in this period. The amount of disproportionality was higher again after the elections in 1986. This period shows a discrepancy between the trend in the number of casualties, which first increased and then decreased, and the trend in the number of bombings, which showed the opposite relation
to the number of casualties. After the elections in 1990, the amount of disproportionality decreased again. With the exception of 1991, both the number of casualties and the number of bomb explosions decreased in this period. Although the 1994 elections increased the amount of disproportionality in the Basque Parliament, the elections in 1998 and 2001 decreased it again. Thus consociational theory would expect that the number of casualties and bombings also decreased in this period. Overall, the number of casualties and bombings decreased between 1994 and 2004, although for the number of casualties there were more exceptions in this trend. After the last two elections, the amount of disproportionality rose again sharply. Thus consociationalism would expect that the number of casualties and bombings would increase as well. However, the number of casualties only increased slightly and the number of bombings decreased further, although in 2008 the number of bombings increased again. There is no data available for the number of bombings after 2008, so no conclusion can be formed about the effect of the disproportionality after the 2009 elections on the number of bombings.

Graph 13: Disproportionality in the Basque Parliament in relation to the number of casualties

Graph 14: Disproportionality in the Basque Parliament in relation to the number of bomb explosions

Overall, there seems to be no clear relation between the amount of disproportionality and proportionality in the Basque Parliament and the number of casualties and bombings in Basque Country. This means that this element of consociationalism was not responsible for the reduction in the amount of violent conflict in Spanish Basque Country.
The second indicator of consociationalism is the effective number of parties. If consociationalism is applied, the effective number of parties should be high and the amount of violent conflict should be low. Graphs 15 and 16 show the effective number of parties after each election for the Basque Parliament since 1980, in relation to the number of casualties and bomb explosions.

**Graph 15: Effective number of parties in the Basque Parliament in relation to the number of casualties**

![Graph showing the effective number of parties in relation to casualties from 1980 to 2010.](image)

**Graph 16: Effective number of parties in the Basque Parliament in relation to the number of bomb explosions**

![Graph showing the effective number of parties in relation to bomb explosions from 1980 to 2010.](image)

The effective number of parties was always more than half the number of parties in the Basque Parliament, except after the elections in 2009, when there were seven parties in parliament but only 3,28 of those were considered effective. During 1980-1985, the effective number of parties decreased slightly and thus consociational theory would expect a rise in the amount of violence in this period. The number of casualties first decreased in this period and then remained relatively stable around 33 casualties per year. The number of bombings experienced a peak in 1982 and 1983, making those years (and 1989) the deadliest year is the conflict. In the period 1986-1997, the effective number of parties increased from 5,24 to 5,86. Despite of the peak years in 1989 and 1996, the number of bombings decreased in this period. On average, the number of casualties showed a decreasing trend as well; there were peaks in 1987 and 1991. From 1998 until 2011, the effective number of parties decreased again to 3,28 in 2011. Thus consociational theory would expect a decrease in the amount of violence. The elections in 2005 should be an exception to this rule, as the number of effective parties temporarily increased after these elections. The number of casualties in
the 1998-2011 period doesn’t correspond with the consociational expectations. Although the number was higher in 1999 and 2000, the rest of the period showed a low number of casualties. The period after the 2005 elections did not deviate from this trend. The number of bomb explosions doesn’t correspond with the consociational expectations either. There were only two bombings 1999 and although the number of bomb explosions increased again after this year, it never reached the same level as before 1998.

Overall, it can be concluded that the effective number of parties in the Basque Parliament did not have an effect on the number of casualties and bomb explosions in the conflict in Spanish Basque Country. From the comparison of graph 10 with graphs 7 and 8, no discernable relation can be found that an increase in the effective number of parties leads to a decrease in the amount of violent conflict (and vice versa).

The third indicator of consociationalism is the grand coalition. If consociationalism is implemented, there should be a grand coalition in the Basque Government. This means that the seat share of the political parties in the Government, is at least 50% + 1 in the Basque Parliament. Consociationalism believes that a grand coalition will lead to a reduction in the amount of (violent) conflict. Graphs 17 and 18 show the coalition support of the Basque Government in the Basque Parliament for all governments after 1980, in relation to the number of casualties and bomb explosions.

**Graph 17: Coalition support of the Basque Government in Basque Parliament (% seats in parliament) in relation to the number of casualties**

The only times a grand coalition was implemented in the Basque Government was with the 1991, 1993 and 1994 coalitions. From 1980 to 1991 the parliamentary support of the Basque Government increased. The 1991 and 1993 coalitions received the same amount of support in parliament (58,67%). This means that, according to consociational theory, the amount of violent conflict should decrease in this period. Until 1991, the number of bomb explosions increased and the number of casualties decreased. Although the number of casualties decreased in this period, it did not do so in a consistent manner. Between 1985 and 1987, the number of casualties increased and 1991 was a peak year as well. The 1994 and 1998 coalitions had less parliamentary support than the previous coalitions and these years should thus show an increase in the amount of violent conflict. The number of casualties in this period shows an erratic pattern, but the average lies along the number of casualties in 1992. Thus the number of casualties hasn't increased or decreased. The number of bomb explosions, however, decreased in this period. In the period 2001-2004, the coalition support increased again. Both the number of casualties and bomb explosions decreased in this period. This decrease should be followed by an increase, as the parliamentary support decreased again from
2005. The number of casualties didn't increase after 2005, but rather remained around the same level of 2002. The number of bombings decreased after 2005, but increased again in 2008.

Graph 18: Coalition support of the Basque Government in Basque Parliament (% seats in parliament) in relation to the number of bomb explosions

Overall, the observed developments in the number of casualties and bomb explosions don't correspond with the consociational expectations of the periods. This means that the grand coalition element of consociationalism did not have an impact of the amount of violent conflict in Spanish Basque Country. One could say that this is because there was only a grand coalition in three cabinets, but even in the periods of those cabinets the amount of violent conflict did not decrease.

The next indicator of consociationalism is the mutual veto. As the research in chapter 6.2 has shown, this element of consociationalism hasn't been implemented in Spanish Basque Country. Thus the effectiveness of this element on the amount of conflict does not need to be researched.

The final indicator of consociationalism is segmental autonomy. This element refers to the placing of decision-making powers over certain policy areas (education, policing, taxation and culture) at the level of the segments in society. Thus the elites if the segments can decide over these policy areas. Like the mutual veto, segmental autonomy has not been implemented in Spanish Basque Country. And like Northern Ireland, there is, currently, a respect for the choice of language for the people living in Basque Country. Another similarity with Northern Ireland is that decision-making over these policy areas is placed at the regional level, instead of the national level.

9.3 Developments linked to Europeanization

The research in the past paragraph seems to point out that the developments in the amount of violence in Spanish Basque Country cannot be explained by the implementation of consociational elements. However, maybe the developments can be explained by the implementation of Europeanization?

The first indicator of Europeanization is the representation of Spanish Basque Country in EU institutions. The representation of Basque Country in the various EU institutions can lead to a reduction in the amount of violent conflict. The EU can reduce conflict by providing new ideas of conflict resolution, or by providing a neutral platform for conflict settlement by the segments in society. Just as Northern Ireland, Basque Country is represented in the EU in several ways. It is also a member of the CoR, there are Basque MEPs and Basque Country is member of several committees of the Council of Ministers. Although there are MEPs from Basque Country, they are not directly elected by the Basque citizens; they are appointed after the votes of each election in every region are
counted. Thus these MEPs represent Spain. Apart from participating in these institutions, Basque Country also has its own representative office in Brussels. The Delegation of Basque Country in Brussels was established in 1988 and has somewhat of a controversial history, which is mentioned in chapter 7.2. The Delegation does not have to represent Spain's interests, only the Basque ones. Basque Country is not organized as a lobby group in the EU. Has the representation of Basque Country in the EU institutions had an impact on the amount of violent conflict in Basque Country? To answer this question, several indicators are looked at.

The first indicator is the accession of Spain (and Basque Country) to the EU in 1986. The number of casualties has steadily gone down since 1986. The number of bombings too has gone down, albeit since 1991. Accession to the EU seems to have at least influenced the number of casualties in the Basque conflict.

The second indicator is the establishment of the Delegation of the Basque Country in Brussels in 1988. The Delegation was only established two years after Spain's accession to the EU. Thus the trends in the number of casualties and bomb explosions follows the same pattern as after the accession, which was the previous indicator.

Thirdly, the CoR is looked at. Here three things are taken into account. The first of which is the establishment of the CoR in 1994. After the establishment of the CoR the number of casualties and bombings continued at the same level. The establishment thus did not immediately influence the amount of violent conflict. The second thing that is taken into account is Spain's presidency of the CoR in the period 1996-1998. It could be that Spain used the presidency as an opportunity to address the violence in Basque Country on the European level and find ways to reduce that violence. Although the number of bombings slightly increased in 1996 and 1997, the years following showed a dramatic decrease. The number of casualties during Spain's presidency of the CoR reached new lows in 1996 and 1997. Overall, Spain's presidency did not seem to have a big effect on the amount of violence. The third thing taken a look at is the resolution that was passed by the members of the CoR in 2003. This resolution supported the Basque Governments in its attempts to reduce the violence. The resolution does not seem to have an impact on the number of casualties and bombings, as it neither decreased nor increased them.

Overall, Basque Country's participation in the EU institutions does not seem to have influenced the amount of violent conflict very much. After Spain's accession to the EU in 1986 and the establishment of the Delegation of the Basque Country in Brussels in 1998, the violence, however, has reduced.

The second indicator of Europeanization is EU funding. Funding from the EU can help reduce the amount of violence by, for example, providing funding for co-operations between the segments in society. Basque Country has received funding from all three funds identified in chapter 4.4.1.: the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European Social Fund. Graph 19 shows the total amount of received EU funding by Basque Country, broken down in the three funds, from 1994 to 2013. Graphs 20 and 21 show the total amount of EU funding in relation with the number of casualties and bomb explosions. Unlike Northern Ireland, the various EU funds for Basque Country were not combined into a comprehensive program to decrease the amount of conflict.

The first period that Basque Country received funding from the EU is from 1994 to 1999. In this period, Basque Country received a total of € 1,52 billion. Most of the money came from the Cohesion Fund, which contributed € 925 million. Has the EU funding in this period decreased the amount of conflict? On average, the number of casualties in this period did not decrease. The number of bombings first remained stable, then increased and after that decreased drastically. This goes against the theoretical expectations, which state that the amount of violent conflict should decrease when more EU funding is received by the region. The second period of EU funding is 2000-2006. Basque Country received even more funding in this period than in the previous period, amounting to a total of € 1,84 billion. This means that the amount of violence should decrease.
Again, most of the funding came from the Cohesion Fund. The number of casualties did decrease in this period, but the number of bombings showed a more fickle trend. Although first increasing in 2000, the number of bombings remained relatively stable until 2002, after which, following a drop, the number rose again and then dropped again afterwards. Thus the second period of EU funding did not seem to have an impact on the amount of violent conflict in Basque Country. In the third and current period of EU funding, Basque Country received €0.56 billion, which is much less than the previous periods. From 2007 to 2010, the number of casualties remained stable and did not increase. A conclusion about the number of bombings cannot be reached yet, as there is only data available about 2007 and 2008.

Graph 19: EU funding in Basque Country (€ million)

Graph 20: Total amount of EU funding in relation with the number of casualties

Overall, however, it seems that the EU funding did not have an impact on the amount of violent conflict in Spanish Basque Country. Although Basque Country has received a lot of funding from the EU and the violence has reduced since 1994, the reduction in violence cannot be linked to the periods of EU funding.
The third indicator of Europeanization is direct contact between the segments of society and representatives of the EU. This refers to the mediation role the EU can take in conflict management and resolution. The EU has not taken a mediation role in the conflict in Spanish Basque Country and thus the effectiveness of the third indicator does not need to be researched.

9.4 Conclusion
Neither consociationalism nor Europeanization have shown to have reduced the amount of conflict in Spanish Basque Country. When it comes to consociationalism, none of the implemented elements reduced the amount of conflict in the region. When it comes to Europeanization, the only elements that could be linked with a reduction in the degree of conflict, were Spain's accession in 1986 and the establishment of the Delegation of the Basque Country in Brussels. The reception of EU funding has not decreased the amount of conflict in Basque Country.
10. Effectiveness of consociationalism and Europeanization

After comparing the indicators of consociationalism and Europeanization with the developments in the amount of violent conflict in Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country, it is time to reach some conclusions about the effectiveness of consociationalism and Europeanization in the regions. This chapter makes such conclusions and tries to explain if consociationalism and Europeanization were effective in Northern Ireland and Basque Country. First the effectiveness of conflict management in Northern Ireland is examined, after which the same is done for Spanish Basque Country. Finally, the hypotheses of chapter three are either proven or refuted.

10.1 Northern Ireland

In chapter eight the elements of consociationalism and Europeanization were linked to the developments in the amount of violent conflict in Northern Ireland. Not all indicators of consociationalism led to a reduction in the amount of conflict. Table 15 gives an overview of the relations found between the researched indicators and the reduction of conflict in the two regions. Only the introduction of the proportional representation-system in 1973 could be coupled with a reduction in the amount of violence. No relation is found between the reduction in violence and the other indicators of consociationalism: the effective number of parties, the grand coalition and the mutual veto. Segmental autonomy has only been partially implemented in Northern Ireland, and is limited to a respect in the choice of language and citizenship. Although the decision-making power over the policy areas defined in paragraph 4.3.1. (education, culture, taxation, policing), is transferred from Westminster (national level) to the NIA (regional level), it does not lie with the segments themselves. Thus segmental autonomy over these policy areas is not implemented. Overall, the reduction in the amount of violence can only partially be attributed to the indicators of consociationalism mentioned in this research.

Table 15: Matrix of relations between the indicators and both conflicts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Northern Ireland</th>
<th>Spanish Basque Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proportional representation</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective number of parties</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand coalition</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segmental autonomy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual veto</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation in EU institutions</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU funding</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU mediation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When it comes to the effect of Europeanization on the amount of conflict in Northern Ireland, results vary. The implementation of the EU PEACE-programs has had an effect on the conflict in Northern Ireland, reducing the amount of violence. Research in chapter eight has also shown that the participation of Northern Ireland in the various EU institutions did not have a major influence on the amount of violent conflict. However, because of time-reasons, this research has been very superficial and could be done a lot more detailed (see paragraph 11.4). Overall, consociationalism has had more effect on the decrease in the amount of violent conflict in Northern Ireland than Europeanization.

The empirical information found in chapter eight only partially matches the theoretical expectations stated in chapter four and summarized in figure nine. The theoretical expectations were that all indicators, when implemented, lead to a decrease in the amount of violent conflict in Northern Ireland. However, for consociationalism only proportional representation fulfilled the expectations. In Northern Ireland, Europeanization proved to fulfill the expectations. Both EU funding and the regions’ representation in the EU led to a reduction in the amount of violent conflict.
So what about the question if there is conflict management or conflict resolution in Northern Ireland? The answer to this question is that there is conflict management. There are still attacks and bombings, which still lead to casualties. That there is still conflict-related violence, albeit less than before, is a sign that there are still tensions between the segments in society and that the conflict has not been solved yet. Even on the night before the Orange Parade in Belfast this year, there were riots (Taggart, 2011).

### 10.2 Spanish Basque Country

Like Northern Ireland, Spanish Basque Country has featured the implementation of consociational theory. However, not all elements of consociationalism were implemented here. In fact, fewer elements were implemented in Basque Country than in Northern Ireland. For instance, segmental autonomy and a mutual veto were not implemented here. The other elements were implemented. The Basque Parliament is elected via the d'Hondt proportional representation system and has since its establishment in 1980 always featured a relatively high effective number of parties. The grand coalition was also implemented, albeit in only three out of eleven governmental coalitions since 1980.

Research in chapter nine shows that none of the implemented elements of consociationalism has had a significant effect on the amount of violence in Basque Country, which is reflected in table 15. If consociationalism has had an effect on the conflict in Basque Country, it does not show in a relation with the number of casualties and bombings. The number of casualties and bombings has decreased since the 1990s, but this cannot be attributed to the proportionality in parliament, the effective number of parties, or the absence/presence of a grand coalition.

Just like in Northern Ireland, the EU has tried to influence the developments in the conflict. It did this not by adopting a direct mediation role, but by the indirect form of providing EU funding. Spanish Basque Country has received funding from all three funds investigated in chapter seven. Unlike Northern Ireland, Basque Country was eligible for the Cohesion Fund, and it also received funding from the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund. The research in chapter nine showed that there is no significant relation between EU funding and reduction in the amount of violent conflict.

Basque Country is represented in the EU in several ways. It has its own representative office in Brussels, but there are also Basque MEPs and Basque Country partakes in the CoR and several committees of the Council of Ministers. Research has shown that, here too, there is no significant relation between Basque representation in the EU and a reduction in the amount of violent conflict. Though a statement has to be made that after Spain’s accession in the EU in 1986 and the establishment of the Basque Delegation in 1988, the number of casualties and bombings in Basque Country did decrease.

Overall, neither consociationalism nor Europeanization have had a significant effect on the developments in the amount of violent conflict in Spanish Basque Country. The number of casualties and bombings in Basque Country did decrease in the last decades, but this cannot be attributed to either consociationalism or Europeanization. Europeanization has been partially effective in that the accession of Spain in the EU and the establishment of the Delegation seem to have reduced the amount of violent conflict. However, the other indicators of Europeanization have had no effect on the conflict. The elements of consociationalism that were implemented have had no significant effect on the violence of the conflict.

The empirical information found in chapter nine only partially matches the theoretical expectations stated in chapter four and summarized in figure nine. The theoretical expectations were that all indicators, when implemented, lead to a decrease in the amount of violent conflict in Spanish Basque Country.
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Country. However, neither of the indicators of consociationalism fulfilled the theoretical expectations. Europeanization proved to fulfill the expectations partially. Only the Basque representation in the EU led to a reduction in the amount of conflict.

In both Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country, the amount of violent conflict decreased significantly in the last decades. However, in Northern Ireland the decrease was relatively more than in Basque Country. This can mainly be attributed to the fact that more elements of consociationalism were implemented in Northern Ireland and these elements were designed to complement and strengthen each other (Lijphart, 1977).

So what about the question if there is conflict management or conflict resolution in Northern Ireland? The answer to this question is that there is conflict management. Just like in Northern Ireland, the violence continues, as there are still casualties and bombings. Thus the conflict has not been resolved yet and is still in the conflict management stage.

10.3 Testing the hypotheses

After making conclusions about the effect of consociationalism and Europeanization on the amount of violent conflict in Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country, it is time to test the hypotheses stated in chapter three. Two hypotheses were given that are related to the summaries of the theories in chapter three. This paragraph tests if these hypotheses are true in the cases of Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country.

The first hypothesis is linked to consociationalism and states: "the more characteristics of consociationalism are implemented, the less conflict there will be". There were more characteristics of consociationalism implemented in Northern Ireland than in Spanish Basque Country. The grand coalition was only temporarily implemented in Basque Country, and the mutual veto was not implemented at all. In both regions the conflict has reduced, but more in Northern Ireland than in Basque Country. Moreover, the reduction in Northern Ireland is mostly due to the implementation of consociationalism. This is not the case in Basque Country, were no significant relation could be found between implemented consociationalism and a reduction in the amount of violent conflict. Therefore, this hypothesis is true.

The second hypothesis is linked to Europeanization and states: "the more involvement of the EU, the less conflict there will be". The number of elements of Europeanization that were implemented in Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country are the same. Both regions have received funding from the EU; Northern Ireland via the comprehensive PEACE-programs and Basque Country via the three funds mentioned in chapter seven. Both regions were and are also represented in various EU institutions. They also featured a reduction in the amount of conflict. The main difference between the two regions is that for Northern Ireland more elements of Europeanization are linked to the reduction in conflict, than in Basque Country. Only EU funding shows an overall strong relation with the reduction in the amount of conflict in Northern Ireland, while for Basque Country only the accession of Spain and the establishment of the Delegation show a strong relation. This means that more involvement of the EU does not necessarily lead to a reduction in the amount of conflict. Therefore, this hypothesis is false.
11. Conclusion
This thesis has featured research after the effectiveness of consociational theory as a conflict management tool in Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country. Because developments in the amount of conflict are not necessarily due to (not) implemented consociationalism, a second conflict management theory was added to the research. Europeanization can also argued to be having an effect on the developments in a conflict. This chapter of the research features the conclusion and wraps the research up. First the sub-questions and main research questions are answered, after which the difficulties experienced in this research are explained. Finally, ideas for further research are given in paragraph 11.4.

11.1 Answers to the sub-questions
In order to make conclusions about the effectiveness of consociationalism and Europeanization as conflict management tools in Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country, four sub-questions and a main research question are used. The main research question is stated and answered in the next paragraph. The sub-questions are stated and answered below.

1. What are the backgrounds of the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country?
The background of the conflict in Northern Ireland goes back to the 17th century, when Protestant settlers from the UK arrived in Ireland. Slowly an economic cleavage grew between the 'rich' settlers and 'poor' Irish in the rest of the country. The Catholic Irish were repressed by the Protestants over a long time and Irish nationalism grew. In 1920 the Republic of Ireland was officially separated from Northern Ireland, which remained part of the UK. The Irish Catholics who lived in Northern Ireland wanted Northern Ireland to become part of the Republic. They underwent discrimination and were repressed by the unionist majority. Civil disobedience of nationalists grew into civil strife in 1968-69, which marked the beginning of the violent conflict in Northern Ireland.

Basque nationalism started in the late 19th century, when industrialism created a large flow of immigrants into the region. Before the industrialization, the region featured several centuries of emigration of Basques to other cities in Spain and the US. At the same time, nation-building in Spain meant that, instead of Basque, Spanish was now the official language in Basque Country. The expression of the Basque culture reduced. When the immigration started, local inhabitants were shocked by the living conditions of the immigrants. Under the lead of Sabino de Arana y Goiri, a Basque nationalist movement was started and gained much support in the region. During the Franco regime, all expressions of Basque culture were forbidden. In 1959 ETA was established, which became a force against the regime and killed its first victim in 1968. The Franco regime ended in 1975 and three years later the Basque Autonomous Community was established. ETA soon established its political wing, which can count on steady support with each election for the Basque Parliament. ETA violence, however, continues until this day.

2. What are consociationalism and Europeanization?
Both consociationalism and Europeanization are theories that can be used as conflict management tools. Consociationalism refers to power-sharing between the various segments in society. The integration of the segments is not forced, but rather only the elites of the segments are expected to work together to eventually find a way out of the conflict. Consociationalism is elite cooperation on the political level and meanwhile remaining the autonomy of the segments on the societal level. According to Lijphart (1977), if the various elements of consociationalism are implemented, the amount of conflict should decrease. In this research, the elements of consociationalism that were used as indicators were the following: proportional representation, the effective number of parties, a grand coalition, the mutual veto and segmental autonomy.

Europeanization refers to the integration of the parties involved in the conflict into the European structures. This can be done in several ways. First of all, the EU can take a mediation role in
the conflict. EU representatives can act as mediators between the segments in society and thus try to influence the developments in the conflict and conflict settlement. Another way Europeanization can influence the conflict is by providing EU funding to the regions. This funding can help create and maintain structures that encourage cooperation of the segments and thus can reduce the amount of conflict. A third way Europeanization can influence the conflict is by the representation of the region in the various EU institutions. The EU can provide a neutral platform for cooperation of the segments, where they can cooperate on other issues than what the conflict is about. The EU can also provide new insights in way the conflict might be resolved. The three ways Europeanization can influence the conflict are used as indicators of Europeanization in the research in this thesis.

3. Are there elements of consociationalism and Europeanization in the conflict management in Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country?

Both consociationalism and Europeanization have been implemented in Northern Ireland and Basque Country. In Northern Ireland, the implementation of consociationalism has been a deliberate choice in this region. Out of the five indicators looked at for the implementation of consociationalism, only segmental autonomy has not been implemented here, although decision-making power over the four policy areas is largely devolved from Westminster to the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive. Europeanization has also been implemented in Northern Ireland, but only two out of three elements. There was no direct mediation between EU representatives and the elites of the segments. Northern Ireland did, however, receive funding from the EU in the form of the specially made PEACE program. The region is also represented in the EU institutions, for example in the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Moreover, Northern Ireland also has its own representative office in Brussels.

Consociationalism has also been implemented in Basque Country. However, there were less elements implemented here than in Northern Ireland. Proportional representation was implemented and the effective number of parties was relatively high, but there was only a grand coalition in three out of eleven cabinets since 1980. The mutual veto and segmental autonomy were not implemented. When it comes to segmental autonomy, the case in Basque Country is the same as in Northern Ireland. Decision-making power over the policy areas in question has been devolved from the Spanish government to the Basque Government, but not to the segments themselves. The other theory, Europeanization, has been implemented as well and roughly on the same scale as in Northern Ireland. The EU has not directly meddled in the Basque conflict, but has given funding from the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European Social Fund. Basque Country is also represented in various EU institutions, like the Committee of Regions, certain committees of the Council of Ministers and in the European Parliament. The region also has its own representative office in Brussels.

4. Have consociationalism and Europeanization had an impact on the degree of the conflicts?

The answer to this question differs per region. Overall, consociationalism and Europeanization have had an impact on the amount of violent conflict in Northern Ireland. Chapter eight showed that the implementation of the proportional representation system reduced the amount of violence. For the other elements of consociationalism, no significant relation could be found. Europeanization has mostly had an impact on the Northern Ireland conflict by providing funding in the form of the PEACE programs. Besides EU funding, the accession of the UK into the EU in 1973 decreased the amount of violence.

For Basque Country, however, no significant relation between the reduction in the amount of violent conflict and consociationalism or Europeanization could be found. Chapter nine showed that none of the implemented elements of consociationalism are responsible for a reduction in the number of casualties and bombings. When it comes to Europeanization, the only elements that could be linked with a reduction in the degree of conflict, were Spain's accession in 1986 and the
establishment of the Delegation of the Basque Country in Brussels. The reception of EU funding has not decreased the conflict in Basque Country.

11.2 Answer to the main research question
After answering the sub-questions, the main research question can be answered. The main research question is the following:

*Has the consociational model been an effective conflict management tool in the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country?*

Consociationalism has been implemented as a conflict management tool in both regions. However, more elements of the theory were implemented in Northern Ireland than in Spanish Basque Country. The introduction of the proportional representation element of consociationalism in Northern Ireland in 1973, caused a decrease in the amount of violence. For the rest of the implemented elements of consociationalism no significant relation with a reduction of the amount of conflict could be found. However, because several elements, like the mutual veto and segmental autonomy, were only implemented in 1998 and after, overall consociationalism has been an effective conflict management tool in Northern Ireland.

Consociationalism has also been implemented in Spanish Basque Country, but to a lesser extent than in Northern Ireland. Moreover, in Basque Country no relation could be found between consociationalism and the reduction in the amount of violent conflict. Because the implemented elements of consociationalism have not caused a reduction in the amount of conflict, the consociational model has not been an effective conflict management tool in Spanish Basque Country. Yet the hypothesis stated in chapter three is true, as the conflict has reduced more in Northern Ireland than in Basque Country and this 'rapid' reduction can be attributed to the implementation of more elements of consociationalism.

11.3 Difficulties experienced in this research
During the research for this thesis, several difficulties were encountered. The most important of which is the availability of data in English about Basque Country. The Basque Government and Parliament do have websites in English, but these are very limited in numbers. Moreover, the information they do give in English is very limited. Almost all data sources about Basque Country are either in Basque or in Spanish, making it not very accessible to people who do not speak either of those languages. For example, no data could be found on the websites of the Basque authorities about the number of casualties and bombings during the conflict. Instead, this data had to be gathered from the Global Terrorism Database and a factblog from a newspaper. The authorities of Northern Ireland do have this data available on their websites.

Another difficulty experienced is the availability of data from the European Union, with respect to the several EU funds. Enough information is available about what the several funds constitute and which countries and regions are eligible for the funds in the current 2007-2013 period. However, finding the same data about the past periods on the website of the European Union is almost impossible. There is no comprehensive website that combines all available information about EU structural funds in the past and present periods.

11.4 Recommendations for further research
As the research in this thesis is limited in scope, several recommendations for further research about this topic can be made. First of all, more research can be done after the effect of the representation of the regions in the various EU institutions. This thesis has only compared the data of joining the
Conflict management in Northern Ireland and Spanish Basque Country

institutions to the developments in the amount of conflict, but for a better understanding of this element of Europeanization more research needs to be carried out. Stevenson (1998) contributes the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty to a reduction in the amount of violent conflict in Northern Ireland. "Unionist business executives were tired of explaining partition to foreign colleagues and quietly conceded that, in the EU context, a unified Ireland makes at least as much economic sense as Northern Ireland's union with Britain" (Stevenson, 1998). This claim can be researched further. Bourne (2003) states that the Committee of the Regions passed measures to combat ETA's terrorism and that the international collaboration between the Basque Government and the EU in the prosecution of terrorists has increased the cross-border ties, which is seen as a positive thing by the Basques. Research needs to be done about the effect of the measures of the CoR on the amount of conflict in Spanish Basque Country.

More research also needs to be done about exactly how EU funding has had an impact on both conflicts. This thesis has shown that EU funding has reduced the amount of violent conflict in Northern Ireland, but it has not discussed in detail how this has taken place. According to McCall and Williamson (2000), it could be because the EU has encouraged power-sharing arrangements, for example by providing INTERREG-funding for cross-border initiatives. EU funding did not reduce the amount of violence in Basque Country, but given that the region has received a lot of funding, it must have had some effect on the conflict. Research after this effect can be carried out as well.

A third recommendation for further research is establishing what the role of the US has been in the Northern Ireland peace process. In 1988, for example, senator George Mitchell facilitated talks between the leaders of the political parties at Stormont (Byrne, 2001). However, the US can be seen as being partial to the nationalist segment (Guelke, 1996). The Clinton administration was involved in the peace process, but no sources could be found about the exact role the administration played and the effect it has had on the conflict.

Another idea for further research is investigating the effect that traditions of elite accommodation have had on the amount of conflict in Northern Ireland. As specified in table 16, there have been several attempts to establish a devolved government in Northern Ireland during the past decades. During these attempts, the elites of the segments had to work together and make policy compromises. This could have had an effect on the amount of conflict, in that the tradition of accommodation made it easier for the elites to find a successful compromise in the GA.

Finally, research can be done about the effect that private lobby groups operating in the EU have on the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Basque Country. Chapter seven established that there are no public lobby groups that represent the regions as a whole, but there are private sector lobby groups. These could, for example, have an impact on the conflict by changing EU regulations about hiring nationalists or unionists and thus impacting the equality on the workplace. However, the exact effect of these lobby groups needs to be researched.
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Appendix I: The Good Friday Agreement

1. **Strand one: devolved government for Northern Ireland**
   - A 108-member legislative assembly with consociational provisions;
   - A First Minister and a Deputy First Minister elected on a cross-community basis*;
   - An executive compromising up to ten ministers chosen by the D'Hondt formula;
   - A committee system with chairs and deputy chairs chosen by the D'Hondt formula.

2. **Strand two: links between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland**
   - A North/South Ministerial Council bringing together ministers from the two administrations;
   - A North-South secretariat compromising civil servants from Belfast and Dublin (now based in Armagh);
   - Six North-South implementation bodies;
   - Six areas of cooperation between the two administrations.

3. **Strand three: links between Ireland and Great Britain**
   - A British-Irish Council linking eight administrations;
   - A British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference linking the two sovereign governments;
   - A British-Irish joint secretariat compromising of British and Irish civil servants (now based in Belfast).

4. **Other provisions**
   **Constitutional issues**: the agreement acknowledged that a majority of the population of Northern Ireland wished to remain in the United Kingdom; the Irish government agreed to hold a referendum to drop its constitutional claim on Northern Ireland; and the British government agreed to facilitate Irish unity should a majority so wish.

   **Equality**: the governments acknowledged the divided nature of Northern Irish society and committed themselves to respecting the equality of the two cultures, including a right to opt for either British or Irish citizenship, or both, whatever the overall territorial arrangements.

   **Policing and human rights**: an independent commission on policing would recommend on a police force acceptable to the two communities; the criminal justice system would be reviewed; and a commission on human rights would be established.

   **Addressing the legacy of conflict**: there would be an accelerated program of early release of prisoners; structures to assist victims of the violence would be established; the parties to the agreement pledged themselves to work in good faith to remove all paramilitary weapons; and the British government agreed to a reduction in the security force presence.

   *Amended by the St. Andrews Agreement in 2006, to provide for automatic selection based on party strength within the two communities.

   **Source**: (Coakley & Gallagher, 2010)
### Appendix II: EU Structural Fund programs for Northern Ireland

#### Table 16: Breakdown of EU Structural Fund programs for Northern Ireland 2000-2004 (£ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU funds</th>
<th>Combined EU and matching total (incl. additional sources)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northern Ireland</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace II</td>
<td>274.0</td>
<td>366.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader +</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interreg IIIA</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>69.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban II</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>351</td>
<td>469.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Border region/ Ireland: funds</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace II</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>141.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader +</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>73.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interreg IIIA</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>71.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban II</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>246.7</td>
<td>344.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: (Tonge, 2005)*
### Appendix III: Chronology of key events in Northern Ireland 1920-2010

*Sources: (Tonge, 2005) (Imbornoni, Brunner, & Rowen, 2007)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Government of Ireland Act</td>
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<td>1921</td>
<td>First Northern Ireland Parliament opened</td>
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<td>1921-23</td>
<td>Irish civil war</td>
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<td>1922</td>
<td>Six of the nine counties of Ulster opt out of Irish Free State</td>
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<td>1949</td>
<td>Republic of Ireland established, leaving the Commonwealth</td>
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<td>1967</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association formed</td>
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<td>1972</td>
<td>Bloody Sunday</td>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>Direct rule from Westminster imposed</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972 (January)</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Sunningdale Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972 (March)</td>
<td>White Paper published on constitutional proposals, incl. Irish dimension</td>
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<td>1972 (June)</td>
<td>Elections for Northern Ireland Assembly</td>
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<td>1972 (November)</td>
<td>Agreement reached between parties on the formation of a Northern Ireland power-sharing executive</td>
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<td>1974 (January)</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Executive takes office at Stormont</td>
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<td>1974 (4 January)</td>
<td>Ulster Unionist Council rejects Council of Ireland proposals</td>
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<td>1974 (7 January)</td>
<td>Brian Faulkner resigns as Official Unionist Party leader</td>
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<td>1974 (February)</td>
<td>Westminster general election – 11 seats won by UUUC</td>
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<td>1974 (14 May)</td>
<td>Executive carries Assembly vote on Sunningdale; UWC strike begins</td>
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<td>1974 (17 May)</td>
<td>Dublin and Monaghan bombings</td>
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<td>1975-76</td>
<td>Constitutional Convention fails to regulate the conflict</td>
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<td>1979</td>
<td>Margaret Thatcher becomes Prime Minister of UK</td>
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<td>1981 (March)</td>
<td>IRA man, Bobby Sands, refuses food at the Maze Prison</td>
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<td>1981 (April)</td>
<td>Sands wins Fermanagh and South Tyrone by-elections</td>
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<td>1981 (May)</td>
<td>Sands dies on 66th day of his hunger strike</td>
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<td>1981 (July)</td>
<td>IRA ceasefire announced</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981 (October)</td>
<td>CLMC ceasefire announced</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Margaret Thatcher and Garret Fitzgerald sign the AIA</td>
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<td>1988</td>
<td>SDLP opens dialogue with Sinn Féin</td>
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<td>1989</td>
<td>Peter Brooke becomes Secretary of State for Northern Ireland</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>British reopen secret back channel with the IRA; Irish government steps up back channel contact with Sinn Féin</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>Political process culminates in Department for Social Development</td>
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<td>1994 (January)</td>
<td>Bill Clinton grants Gerry Adams US visa</td>
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<td>1994 (August)</td>
<td>IRA ceasefire announced</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994 (October)</td>
<td>Framework Documents produced by British and Irish governments</td>
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<td>1996 (February)</td>
<td>IRA ceasefire breaks down</td>
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<td>1996 (May)</td>
<td>Elections to the Northern Ireland Forum</td>
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<td>1996 (June)</td>
<td>Talks process begins</td>
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<td>1997 (May)</td>
<td>Tony Blair becomes British Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997 (June)</td>
<td>Bertie Ahern becomes Taoiseach (Irish Prime Minister)</td>
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<td>1997 (July)</td>
<td>IRA ceasefire reinstated; DUP and UKUP withdraw from talks</td>
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<td>1998 (April)</td>
<td>GFA signed</td>
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<td>1998 (May)</td>
<td>Referendums held in Northern Ireland and the Republic approving the GFA</td>
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<td>2005 (May)</td>
<td>Trimble’s UUP lose Westminster general elections</td>
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<td>2007 (March)</td>
<td>Agreement for power-sharing government was made by Gerry Adams of Sinn Féin and Ian Paisley of the DUP</td>
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<td>2007 (May)</td>
<td>Direct rule from Westminster ended</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Control over policing was handed over to Northern Ireland</td>
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### Appendix IV: Chronology of key events in Basque Country 1937-2011

*Source: (BBC News, 2010)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>General Franco occupies Basque country</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>ETA is founded with the aim of creating an independent homeland in Spain’s Basque region</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>ETA’s violent campaign begins with an attempt to derail a train transporting politicians</td>
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<td>1968</td>
<td>ETA kills first victim</td>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>Basque nationalists assassinate Prime Minister Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>ETA’s political wing Herri Batasuna is founded (renamed Euskal Herritarrok in 1998)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Attempt to assassinate the leader of the opposition party, Jose Maria Aznar</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Right-wing Popular Party, which is viewed by ETA as heir to Franco’s dictatorship, wins general election</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>(July) ETA kills councilor Miguel Angel Blanco, sparking national outrage</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(December) 23 Leaders of Herri Batasuna jailed for seven years for collaborating with ETA</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>(March) Spain’s main political parties engage in talks to end violence in the Basque region. The government is not involved.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(April) GFA signed. ETA is understood to have been heavily influenced by the Northern Ireland peace process. ETA has traditionally had relations with the Irish republicans and the political wing Herri Batasuna has been schooled by Sinn Féin on strategy for negotiation.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(September) ETA announces first indefinite ceasefire</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>(May) The first and only meeting to date between ETA and the Spanish government</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(November) End of ETA ceasefire</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>(May) The King and Queen lead thousands of Spaniards in a nationwide silent vigil to protest against the killing of journalist Jose Luis de la Calle.</td>
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<td>(August) Thousands of people demonstrate in support of ETA in the city of Bilbao</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>The EU declares ETA a terrorist organization</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>Judge Garzon suspends Batasuna for three years</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>(March) Spain’s Supreme Court bans Batasuna permanently</td>
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<td>(May) The US and EU declare Batasuna a terrorist group</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>(March) ETA declares a permanent ceasefire</td>
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<td>(December) Bomb attack in Madrid Airport. ETA takes responsibility, but says the ceasefire is still in effect</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>(January) Spanish Interior Minister Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba declares the peace process “broken, liquidated, finished”</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(April) ETA says it is ready to make new commitments to peace if Spanish authorities end ‘attacks’ against it. The government replies by saying ETA “only has to take one single step: renounce violence”</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(June) ETA ends its permanent ceasefire with the Spanish government</td>
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<td>(October) Spanish police arrest almost the entire alleged leadership of ETA’s banned political wing, Batasuna</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>(September) The Supreme Court bans two Basque political parties accused of acting as a front for the militants, PCTV and ANV</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>Parliament in the Basque region of Spain votes in its first non-nationalist government in 30 years</td>
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<td>2010</td>
<td>(March) Spanish judge Eloy Velasco accuses the Venezuelan government of assisting ETA and Colombian rebel group FARC</td>
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<td>(September) ETA announces decision “not to carry out offensive armed actions”</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>ETA announces a permanent and ‘internationally verifiable’ ceasefire</td>
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### Appendix V: Northern Ireland Assembly election results 1962-2011

**Table 17: NIA election results per party in parliament after each election**

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34 = number of seats in Parliament
(*) = % of votes received
x = did not partake in election/ not enough votes for parliament

Sources: (CAIN, 2011b) (Northern Ireland Elections, 2011)
## Appendix VI: Basque Parliament election results 1980-2009

Table 18: Basque Parliament election results per party after each election

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25 = number of seats in parliament  
(*) = % of votes received  
x = did not partake in election/ not enough votes for parliament  
* = EA was in coalition with EAJ-PNV during the 2001/2005 elections  
** = EE was in coalition with PSE-PSOE from 1994 onwards  

Source: (Álvarez-Rivera, 2010)
## Appendix VII: Casualties and bombings in Northern Ireland per year

### Table 19: Number of casualties and bomb devices used per year in Northern Ireland

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
<th>Bomb devices used</th>
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*Sources: (Police Service of Northern Ireland, 2011a) (Police Service of Northern Ireland, 2011b)*
### Appendix VIII: Casualties and bomb explosions in Basque Country per year

**Table 20: Number of casualties and bomb explosions per year in Basque Country**

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
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Sources: (Sedghi, 2011) (Global Terrorism Database, 2011)