Railway vendor lock-in. The Dutch case

For the concession of the high speed line in the Netherlands, the Dutch state preferred the same concessionaire as for the conventional lines. This thesis questions whether this preference can be economically rationalised by using the framework of path dependence. Within this framework the positive network effects and the economies of scale of the incumbent firm, the NS, and a potential entreat, the NS' contester for the high speed line are analysed. This analysis is based on railway literature, the Dutch state parliamentary proceedings and a game theoretical model. For the high speed line the Dutch states preference can be explained on the larger positive network effects the incumbent firm had over its contesters. However, insufficient economies of scale are present to justify an economic lock-in. This thesis concludes with policy recommendations to avoid future preference for one single concessionaire. These recommendations are to decrease the possibilities of both the NS and the Dutch state to influence each other policy and to increase the difference of the in-vehicle costs between both lines and decrease the waiting cost at high speed line railway stations.