Allocating CO2 Emissions to Customers on a Distribution Route

Currently, there is no generally accepted method to allocate CO2 emissions to customers on a dis- tribution route. When such a method would be available, the Logistics Service Providers (LSPs) could compete with each other in terms of the amount of CO2 they emit. Moreover, their cus- tomers would be able to choose an environmentally friendly way of transportation. This thesis provides a comparison of one relatively simple and four more advanced allocation methods. The methods based on the theory of cooperative games have been used to share the costs of joint delivery, but this problem differs from the sharing of emissions in several ways. Moreover, earlier comparative studies do not take into account the fact that customers may want to be served within specific time windows. Four ways of penalizing customers for this are suggested as an extension to the existing allocation methods. The methods are applied to both a business case and some hypothetical ones. Their results are compared in terms of fairness, robustness and computational effort. The cooperative game theoretic methods generate more fair allocations, but the simple method is more robust and requires less computation time. Which allocation method is preferred will be dependent on the preferences of the user.