In times of unhealthy food being plentily available and exercise during our daily lives existing only in walking to and from the car, obesity and other physical, but also psychological, diseases reign. Living unhealthily often leads to long-term results many people did not have in mind, such as obesity or other diseases related to unhealthy life styles. It is thought the government, employers and other choice architects could help people make better decisions by nudging them towards those options that are more consistent with their own long-term goals. However, objections have been raised from an ethical point of view against the use of nudges. This thesis sets forward three important concerns, namely regarding autonomy, a lack of information on preferences and the heterogeneity of these preferences, and regarding truth and transparency. The objective is to investigate whether the objections against nudges are still as strong when it comes to health-related nudges. In particular, it is argued that the autonomy problem is less stringent, because of the greater ease of habit-formation in health, and autonomy may even be enhanced though nudges if they improve health. Also, because of the nature of health and the relative rather than absolute goal of the health nudges at hand, informational and heterogeneity problems regarding preferences are less severe, and the intrusion is weakened. The general objections against nudge do not disappear completely, but are less sever and not as worrisome in the health-related context as opposed to other applications of nudge. Since not all objections are discussed, it is recommended that further research focus on whether other objections actually become more severe in the case of health-related nudges.

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Dr. C. Binder
hdl.handle.net/2105/14782
Erasmus School of Philosophy

C.R. Rentier. (2013, August 30). Judging about health nudging. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2105/14782