Anti-Corruption Commission of Bangladesh: Diagnosis of a Fading Hope

This study analyses design and performance of anti-corruption agencies – Bu-reau of Anti-Corruption (BAC) and Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) of Bangladesh – under two different political regimes (democratic and authoritari-an) and deep-rooted causes of their performance. It begins from the hopes of an effective and independent ACC that were created mainly by civil society and international development partners. However, the study finds the faded hope emanated by bad performance, and tries to understand it through assessing expectations, powers, safeguards, focus, resources, results and value-addition of anti-corruption agencies and highlighting complementary conditions and institutions regarding political space, leadership qualities, key NIS institution, social organization, civil society and markets. The long-nurtured paralytic condition of ACC was not an accidental out-come, rather it is a programmatic error of initiation based on following princi-pal-agent theory where both key actors are underperforming and not loyal to their respective duties in fertile conditions of clientelism, patrimonialism, and neo-patrimonialism. The coercive policy transfer – a shift from BAC to ACC that was a shift from multiple-agency paradigm to single agency approach – was insisted on by the international development partners who never tested the feasibility and followed up effectiveness continuously during implementation but compelled Bangladesh to replicate the Hong Kong ICAC-model. Although ACC achieved some stunning outcomes such as filing corruption charges against central leaders of political parties, bureaucrats and influential business-persons and created dynamism and pro-activeness in the organization during the extra-constitutional arrangement of the authoritarian regime (2007-2008), then the new democratic government swept away all achievements and tamed it by their directives. Additionally, a culture of politicizing governance institu-tions was re-established, so key complementary institutions, for instance politi-cal leadership and commitment, judiciary, markets etc. are not conducive to make ACC independent and effective. Though strong civil society and social organizations are raising mass awareness against corruption, their coverage of audiences and access to policy level is quite a limited so they cannot compel or persuade political elites to make substantive change in policies regarding ACC and in implementation mechanisms for public interest.