Privileges and immunities of international representatives in a receiving country: a favor or a burden?

The conduct of diplomats and IO employees is currently high on the agenda in the Netherlands. While the media focus on their ‘bad’ conduct, unpaid traffic and parking fines, the Dutch government is expected to react to this media focus by developing new policies. However, an explanation of these officials’ conduct is currently lacking. The data presented by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs shows that IO employees are more respectful of local laws than diplomats and usually pay their fines. The object of this research is this conspicuous difference in use and interpretation of privileges and immunities in the Netherlands, analyzed by the rational choice theory. Out of four perspectives that might explain this difference, the first, historical perspective that focuses on shifts and developments is found to be insignificant. The second, political perspective explains the difference in the relation a representative has with the host country. Third, the judicial perspective shows that the Vienna Convention leaves room for interpretation that creates differences in conduct. Fourth and finally, the public administration perspective suggests further guidance, for example a code of conduct could contribute to positive conduct. Even though several diplomats and international organizations were positive about their experiences in the Netherlands, some improvements can still be made on the administrative level. Further development of the administrative capability of the government might positively influence the use of privileges and immunities.