What is the real effect of “early agreements” on the potential impact that the European Parliament has on the final legislative outcome within the Codecision legislative procedure?

Amsterdam treaty gave both EU legislative institutions the opportunity to decide legislation on first reading. During the last legislative term (2009-2014) this practice has been highly appreciated by the EU legislative bodies and above 85% of the EU legislation has been decided through early agreements. This thesis examines the effect of early agreements on the potential impact that the European Parliament (EP) is able to make on the final legislative outcome. The theory used in this study is the theory of the New- institutionalism and more precisely historical institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism. In order to assess what effect the early agreements have on the ability of the EP to make an impact on the final legislative outcome two carefully selected cases have been compared, using the method of amendments examination. The first case is decided on conciliation committee while the second one is decided on first reading. The comparison of both cases is based on four factors derived from the body of literature – coherence, expertise, sensitivity to time limitation and sensitivity to failure of an agreement. The qualitative analysis of the data shows that early agreements have positive effect on the ability of the European Parliament to make an impact on the final legislative outcome.