Corporate Lobbying in the European Union

Until the 1990s, private business lobbying in the European Union had been a largely unresearched field. Consequently, the need for a more comparative theoretical framework in order to gain a better understanding of the way business interest groups reach out to the European decision-makers has been constantly stressed. Although since then considerable progress has been made, the main focus in the European literature has been on business and industry-related associations, rather than individual firms. As one of the most prominent approaches, Pieter Bouwen established a Theory of Access that explains the varying access of European business interests to the major EU institutions. On the basis of a supply and demand scheme, Bouwen argues that interest groups have to provide certain informational goods to successfully exert influence on political outcomes. Following this, the respective EU institution will give the most access to the private interest that controls its most demanded good, or as Bouwen calls it, the institution's "critical resource". However, his scheme seems to neglect the increasing role of third country, and especially American companies in policy fields related to new technologies. The aim of this study is therefore to narrow the existing knowledge gap and to better understand the decisive factors, which determine the access of non-European business interests to the three main EU institutions. On the basis of an in-depth case study, the access of the major US IT companies (Facebook, Google and Microsoft) to the decision-making process on the General Data Protection Regulation, proposed by the European Commission in January 2012, has been examined and tested against Bouwen's theoretical framework. As a result, the predictions, which derive from the Theory's assumptions, could not be confirmed. In particular the fact that the ranking of demanded goods by the three EU institutions (European Commission, European Parliament and the Council) differed in each case from Bouwen's assumptions, can be regarded as the decisive element in this context. Furthermore, the increased importance of Expert Knowledge as an access good to the Parliament and the Council appeared to have secured greater influence of the companies on the decision-making and draft positions of these institutions. Whereas its reduced importance in the case of the Commission resulted in a relatively limited access. This has led to the conclusion that Bouwen's exchange model should be modified, once non-European business interests start to engage in EU lobbying activities. The author therefore recommends further research on this subject.