Lower monitoring incentives and worse acquisitions from CDS insurance on acquirer’s debt

Additional Metadata
Keywords	Mergers and acquisitions (M&A), Credit default swap, Monitoring
Thesis Advisor	Ghazizadeh, P., Kramer, S.
Persistent URL	hdl.handle.net/2105/20926
Series	Finance & Investments
Organisation	Rotterdam School of Management
Citation APA APA Style APA-ALL Style AAA Style Cell Style Chicago Style Harvard Style IEEE Style MLA Style Nature Style Vancouver Style American-Institute-of-Physics Style Council-of-Science-Editors Style BibTex Format Endnote Format RIS Format CSL Format DOIs only Format	Faloppa, D. (2012). Lower monitoring incentives and worse acquisitions from CDS insurance on acquirer’s debt. In Finance & Investments.http://hdl.handle.net/2105/20926

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