Lower monitoring incentives and worse acquisitions from CDS insurance on acquirer’s debt

Additional Metadata
Keywords	Mergers and acquisitions (M&A), Credit default swap, Monitoring
Thesis Advisor	Ghazizadeh, P., Kramer, S.
Persistent URL	hdl.handle.net/2105/20926
Series	Finance & Investments
Organisation	Rotterdam School of Management
Citation APA Style AAA Style APA Style Cell Style Chicago Style Harvard Style IEEE Style MLA Style Nature Style Vancouver Style American-Institute-of-Physics Style Council-of-Science-Editors Style BibTex Format Endnote Format RIS Format CSL Format DOIs only Format	Faloppa, D. (2012, December 20). Lower monitoring incentives and worse acquisitions from CDS insurance on acquirer’s debt. Finance & Investments. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2105/20926

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