This work is the first attempt at developing a profile of Mexican sicarios. I develop a database of 33 sicarios that contains information regarding payments (wages and per hit), expected life and types of sicario, age, emotional traumas, and other variables. As a result of developing the database, I found that normally there are two types of sicarios in Mexico: (1) Direct sicarios, the ones that join directly to the cartel and (2) former officer sicarios (12 cases). The classification is necessary because they have essential differences regarding payments and the positions they occupy in the cartel. With the information in the database I estimate the returns to being a sicario and calculate the opportunity cost of joining a legitimate labour or be part of the military or the police. I find that the sicarios that join directly to the cartel most of the time will accumulate a total income that could be equalized or surpassed by the average Mexican labourer. The result shows that there is more than a rational decisionmaking for those who join voluntarily or by persuasion. Former officers show a higher economic rationale in their decision to become sicarios. In most cases they are able to earn a total income that an average policeman or soldier would never be able to reach during his active life. This could happen because they posses a more professional set of skills and tend to occupy high hierarchy ranks in the cartel. Additionally, I complimented the analysis with the review of the profile of inmates sentenced for first-degree murder.

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Bedi, Arjun
hdl.handle.net/2105/33202
Economics of Development (ECD)
International Institute of Social Studies

Valdés Benavides, Ruy Alberto. (2015, December 11). Who becomes a sicario and why? A supply-side analysis of Mexican hitmen. Economics of Development (ECD). Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2105/33202