THE QUEST FOR COOPERATION IN HARSH SOCIAL DILEMMAS

Previous research has identified leading-by-example, by a democratically elected leader, and continuous face-to-face communication among the most successful cooperation enhancing solutions, in both give-some and take-some games. The present study examines whether these solutions are also effective in the recently introduced Claim Game; a give-some, take-some laboratory game that is much more representative of harsh real-world social dilemmas, as it extends the strategy space of the public goods game by allowing for claims. I found that both solutions are indeed effective in increasing cooperation in the Claim game; and although a combination of both solutions is also effective, it is not more effective compared to the individual solutions. Adding communication to the leading-by-example treatment did however increased leader cooperation, and altered the way people tried to convince an another. Further I found that communication in the Claim Game is not just ‘cheap talk’, people tend to keep their word. And consistent with previous research I found that leader preferences, influence cooperation rates. Finally this study demonstrates that communication can be simulated in a web survey, and that the thought of communication can be enough to increase cooperation.