The performance of the CIA during the Tonkin-incident and Tet-offensive.

Did the CIA underperform during the Vietnam War or were policymakers unrealistic in their demands? How did the CIA perform compared to its main rival, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV)? Among others, primary sources from the CIA were used as research objects. Although the CIA did make mistakes, they still delivered valuable information. There were three main problems with intelligence during the Vietnam War. Firstly, there was the (deliberate) misuse of information by policymakers and military. Secondly, Cold War doctrines such as the Truman doctrine and the domino theory dictated future US policy. Thirdly, a culture of no dissent existed within the White House. Often it were not intelligence agencies that were wrong, it were the questions asked or the specific rapports chosen that gave a distorted view of reality inside Vietnam. This research paper also gives suggestions for policymakers and researchers to be able to measure the performance of intelligence reports.