The spell of the self-ownership thesis: an attempt to break it

The thesis of self-ownership (SO) asserts that each individual qua exclusive proprietor of his own self possesses “original moral rights over his own body, faculties, talents and the fruits of his labour” (Nozick 1974, Cohen 1995). Nozick in his famous Anarchy, State and Utopia argues that the rights of self-ownership entitle each individual to make use of his own body as he sees fit and to impose upon others the obligation to respect these rights. The same prerogatives extend to the extra-personal objects one legitimately possesses. Libertarianism, in its traditional vest is essentially a moral and political theory that stresses the inviolability of individuals’ natural rights of ownership. The term “natural” is owed to the fact that these rights belong to the individuals independently of a civil framework of legal rules and their binding force “obtains and can be recognized as valid by moral and rational people quite apart from any provisions of positive law” (Waldron 1988: 64). More precisely, libertarians of the right and the left hold property rights to be the non-acquired rights individuals have over their bodies. Such rights determine what individuals may do to others. The chief purpose of this thesis is to interrogate the possibility of building up a theory of justice and a theory of private property on the grounds of the principle of SO. First I am going to cast doubt on the foundation of SO rights and then I am going to present the difficulties in making property rights over extra-personal resources a corollary of property rights over one’s body. By these means I hope to offer valid reasons against the use of SO as a starting point in a theory of justice.