Running head: reputational concerns in innovation implementation

models of motivational antecedents of individual innovative behaviour typically assume efficient behaviour of workers. This paper contributes by discussing how reputational concerns incentivize signalling behaviour in innovation implementation. By constructing an exploratory model of signalling, testable hypotheses are derived. The proposed model predicts efficient behaviour from all actors in the absence of reputational concerns; a symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. When reputational concerns are introduced, additional equilibria arise. If only the least creative workers are able to signal, workers may decide to engage in signalling behaviour, given that gains from reputation are sufficiently large. In the extended innovation model, highly creative workers may also decide to signal. Three symmetric equilibria in pure strategies may occur; both workers refrain from signalling for any creative ability level, workers engage in signalling only when attributed with high creative ability, or workers signal no matter their creative ability. Each equilibrium outcome arises for multiple sets of parameter values. Future research must test the empirical validity of these findings.