Ethical Know-How and the Ethical World

Morality pervades the entirety of human life, by structuring our thoughts, feelings and behaviour. It is a subject that has occupied philosophers since the days of classical antiquity. Currently, ethics captures the interests of not only the philosophers, but also scientists working within the cognitive sciences. This has led to a fruitful and interesting dialogue between disciplines. Traditionally, a moral agent is generally understood as someone who acts on the basis of moral reasons and is in conscious control of his action. However, those working the cognitive have challenged this traditional view on moral agency. The subject of this thesis concerns how we should understand moral agency in light of these challenges. In this thesis, I show that underlying this traditional view are certain assumptions that are not supported by evidence form moral psychology and the neurosciences. Furthermore, I argue that an alternative conception of moral agency is possible. I try to show this by sketching an embodied, situated account of moral agency, based on insights form the enactivist approach. In this view ethics should be conceptualised as a skilful interaction and the application of ethical know-how.