Why Complain? The Accountability of Public and Private Schools in India

The accountability of schools in developing countries has captured the attention of researchers. Concurrently, a body of literature has devoted itself to studying the effect of information on accountability in the schooling system, and in other domains of public service. A subset of the studies considering the effect of information proposes that information leads service recipients to complain, which in turn improves outcomes. In this thesis, I ask whether households in India are able to raise the test scores of their children by complaining at schools in a context where households do not have accurate information on their children’s competencies, and where teachers might not find the threat of complaints credible. I find no evidence that complaints raise test scores. However, I find evidence that complaints lead households to perceive improvements in their children’s competencies, even when the improvements did not occur. I conclude that information symmetry and credible threats are both necessary, if not sufficient, for complaints to cause improvements in outcomes.