TRANSFORMATIVE EXPERIENCES AND HOW TO LIVE LIFE TO THE FULLEST WHILE KEEPING IT RATIONAL

How can individuals compare alternative futures to make rational life-changing decisions when they cannot foresee how the aftermath of their decision might change their tastes and preferences? In Transformative Experience, Laurie Paul (2014) argues that some experiences in life cause epistemic and personal transformation to the extent that their outcomes fundamentally affect individuals’ tastes and deliberations, and even change their selves. Paul identifies two problems that transformative experiences pose for decision-makers. When making choices about such experiences, individuals cannot first-personally imagine what the experience is like to make informed evaluations regarding their taste for it and have an ‘information problem’. Secondly, they cannot make judgments about their post-experience self at the time of the decision to choose between their current and future selves, which have different preference sets so they have a ‘preference-change problem’. Due to these two problems, individuals cannot follow decision-theoretic rules of evaluation to build a rational and complete preference-order for alternative futures. Nevertheless, Paul suggests that to make transformative decisions in accordance with the normative standard of rationality, people can decide whether they prefer the revelation of the new experiences and new selves entailed. This thesis aims to address the role of revelation—i.e. ‘the preference for discovery of new experiences’ in solving the problems that are caused by transformative experiences in a way that the decision-makers can still apply the normative standard of rationality. Accordingly, I first discuss Paul’s suggestions and then engage with the critics of Paul who propose their own solutions to make informed transformative choices and to compare alternative futures. I argue that the revelation strategy, by and large, fails to solve the problems of transformative experiences in accordance with the normative standard of rationality. In terms of the information problem, the revelation strategy does not incorporate enough experience-specific factors that individuals may need to make their decisions. Regarding the preference-change problem, having a taste for the discovery of new experiences alone is not sufficient to develop higher-order preferences to change one’s current preferences and to discriminate between various transformative experiences. The critical engagement with the debates on Transformative Experience also fails to yield satisfying suggestions to improve the revelation strategy in a way that it can fulfil Paul’s project. Key words: Transformative Experiences, Life-Changing Decisions, Preference Change, Epistemic Transformation, Personal Transformation, Revelation Strategy, Revelatory Value, Rational Choice, Decision Theory.