Corruption in Romania

Corruption has become a very severe issue in many countries in past years, especially in Romania. This paper aims to shed more light on causes and solutions to this problem, within the context of prior literature. To this aim, a game theoretical model is presented, in which corruption is an equilibrium strategy, taking into account the specifications of the Romanian political system. Subsequently, the factors contributing to the equilibrium are individually analysed and their effects on deterring corruption are elaborated on, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, a set of extensions provides ways to extend the model to other situations, such that, for instance, it can apply to other political frameworks. The results suggest that corruption could be minimised by increasing the distribution of voters on the spectrum of political preferences, by decreasing expected future incomes by either increasing uncertainty or decreasing expected rents, by increasing voter valuation of public goods, or by increasing the costs associated with corruption, as perceived by the politicians.