An Empirical Test of Economic Theories of Democracy: The Decline of Public Association with Formal Politics and how Governments can Stem the Tide

In this paper we use quasi-experimental regression designs to estimate population effects on voter turnout based on theory, to try to explain the decline of voter turnout in the 20th century. Using municipal mergers in the Netherlands we provide causal estimates for population effects on turnout with a fixed number of seats. We then make a first empirical test of the game theoretic account put forward by Feddersen & Pesenderfer (1996) by comparing voter abstention rates with different levels of education, using reference categories. This is done to test an alternative, game-theoretic model from where population effects may also be derived. Here we show how rising inequality within geographical boundaries can lead to lower voter engagement in politics alongside loss of voter power caused by larger populations, proving that newer, game-theoretic models provide additional possibilities for identifying mechanisms that affect the vote.