Hausman’s Evidential View of Preferences

In the philosophical controversy about the definition of well-being, Daniel Hausman puts forth the alternative that preferences - instead of constituting well-being - are merely evidential thereof, a concept that he claims can be determined using simple platitudes that allow economists to refrain from a conceptual approach to well-being. In this thesis I argue that this evidential and platitudes-based account gives economic policymakers insufficient guidance on what well-being is, and consequentially on how to promote well-being. As major shortcomings of this view I identify that Hausman remains too vague when determining under which conditions the evidential view holds. Moreover, due to their ambiguity, Hausman’s citation of platitudes or “common sense” fails to replace a conceptual notion of well-being and is therefore an insufficient tool when the evidential view seems to have reached a dead end. Instead, philosophical considerations about well-being are indispensable for welfare and policy economics.