The Effect of Anti-takeover Provisions on Acquirer's return - An empirical study on the US market

This thesis investigates the influence of corporate governance provisions on the M&A performance of bidder firms for completed deals in the United States after the financial crisis. Using the period 2008- 2018, the results show that the anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) have a positive relation with acquirers’ returns, which is in contradiction with previous studies. However, this outcome is not significant. On the other side, I find evidence that the entrenchment indices of Bebchuk et al. (2004) and Bebchuk & Cohen (2005) have an inverse association with bidders’ profitability. In addition, this research studies whether CEOs who possess the position of chairman of the board proceed to value destruction acquisitions, although findings show an insignificant relationship between them. Finally, this paper reports no conclusive evidence that firms with CEO duality proceed to more valuable acquisitions.