Lobbying the EU Copyright Directive

The world has rapidly grown in the digital realm, especially regarding consumer behaviour and the use of technology. Online sharing service providers have become integral to daily life and have surpassed existing legislation on the rights and limitations of copyright protected work. Moreover, the European Union has broadened its scope and influence to more policy areas. Consequently, more organisations travel to Brussels to express their opinion on EU policies. Some of these organisations are not from the EU and some are firms that skip lobby organisation and attempt to influence the EU directly themselves. Using the European Union Copyright Directive as a case, this thesis sets out to answer the research question: Does logic of collective action theory, access theory, interest group strategy or interest group characteristics better explain the influence exerted by Google, GESAC and BEUC lobbying the EU Copyright Directive? By triangulating the methods process-tracing and preference attainment, this thesis uncovers the actions and influence of three interest groups in several phases of the EU decision-making procedure. Studying the interest groups’ behaviour and attained preferences when approaching the European Commission, Parliament, the Council and the European public provides an insight in the interest groups’ influence. The results of this thesis show that the access theory best explains the influenced exerted by Google, GESAC and BEUC in lobbying the EU Copyright Directive. Hence, this thesis suggests that lobbying the European Union as an exchange of critical resources between interest groups and EU institutions. Consequently, the influence exerted by an interest group depends on the information they possess and the institution they lobby. More so, in the case of the EU Copyright Directive, expectations assuming differences between diffuse and special interest were not confirmed in this thesis.