Does a mandatory gender boardroom quota lead to more gender equality in the corporate sector? A dual country perspective

Does a mandatory boardroom gender quota lead to more gender equality in the corporate sector? I hypothesize that such a quota leads to an increase in female participation and a decrease in the gender pay gapamong executive directors.As a response to the quota,firms have the option to onlyhire female non-executive directors to satisfy the rules of the quota.This gives firms the opportunity to limittheinfluence ofnew enteringfemales and withho ld females from theexecutive board. Therefore, I testthe effectof a gender quotaon participat io n for executive directors, because thisgivesastrongerindication ofwhether a quota leads to more gender equality. To researchwhether the quota leads to more gender equality,I examine the effect of a quota for CEOs and Non-CEO executives in France and Norway.The resultsof probit regressionsshow that the quota leads to an increase in female participation for all groups examined.Between France and Norway,I find no difference in the strength of the quota effect on participation. Using difference-in-difference models, I find mixed results on the effect of the quota on the gender pay gap.The quota decreased the raw gender pay gap for CEOs. In addition, results suggest that there exists equality in cash-compensationbetween females and malesafter the quota. Results for Non-CEO executives in France fail to prove a positive effect on the gender pay gap.In Norway, there isalsono significant quota effect present for Non-CEO executives. The shortage ofdata makes it impossible to concludeon the quota effect for Norwegian CEOs.