Truth-Telling Incentives for Unverifiable Questions Using Choice-Matching

Additional Metadata
Keywords	choice-matching; truth-telling; incentives; Bayesian Truth Serum; subjective well-being; health; behaviour; socially desirable responding
Thesis Advisor	Bleichrodt, H.
Persistent URL	hdl.handle.net/2105/52731
Series	Business Economics
Organisation	Erasmus School of Economics
Citation APA Style AAA Style APA Style Cell Style Chicago Style Harvard Style IEEE Style MLA Style Nature Style Vancouver Style American-Institute-of-Physics Style Council-of-Science-Editors Style BibTex Format Endnote Format RIS Format CSL Format DOIs only Format	Arienti, A. (2020, August 25). Truth-Telling Incentives for Unverifiable Questions Using Choice-Matching. Business Economics. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2105/52731

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