The Economic Partnership Agreements negotiation processes in West Africa and Southern Africa

This paper aimed to evaluate which regional integration theory best explains the negotiation processes of West Africa and Southern Africa regarding the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the European Union (EU). The EPAs are trade agreements whereby regions gain preferential access to the European market while partially opening up their domestic markets. West Africa and Southern Africa approached the EPA negotiations significantly different, with West African countries mandating their regional institution called the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to negotiate with the EU on their behalf, while the Southern African countries negotiated with the EU directly on the governmental level. The two theories applied in this study were liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, which are the most prominent theories used to explain regional integration. The main argument by liberal intergovernmentalist is that member states and their national preferences dominate the regional integration process. In contrast, neofunctionalist argue that regional integration is dominated by elites and interest groups who shifted their loyalties to the regional level and that regional institutions established by member states can reach a certain level of autonomy. From these theories, three propositions were derived each, which were tested on the cases of the EPA negotiation processes of West Africa and Southern Africa. Analysing the first set of propositions, the aim was to determine whether national interest groups or regional interest groups influenced the national preference formation of governments. In both regions, interest groups, such as export industries, farmers organisations and trade associations, were active nationally and regionally. However, the preferences of the West African and Southern African governments reflected the demands from the national interest groups to a larger extent than regional interest groups’ demands, as expected by liberal intergovernmentalist theory. The second set of propositions focused on the role of the regional institutions. ECOWAS had an active role in the West Africa EPA negotiations, and the ECOWAS Commission was able to influence the negotiations in its favour, as neofunctionalist theory predicts. On the contrary, Southern Africa’s regional institution, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), was relatively absent during the EPA negotiations. Therefore, the SADC Secretariat was unable to influence the outcome of the negotiations, in line with liberal intergovernmentalism. The third set of propositions examined the negotiation process on the regional level. Both in West Africa and Southern Africa, negotiations were dominated by asymmetric interdependence between countries and interstate bargaining. This process was expected by liberal intergovernmentalists. To conclude, liberal intergovernmentalism has its limits, mainly when it comes to capturing African countries’ dependence on the EU. Still, the theory has the most explanatory relevance when analysing the EPA negotiation processes of West Africa and Southern Africa