The Effects of Morality and Risk Aversion on Moral Hazard between Lawyers and Clients

Additional Metadata
Keywords	Morality; Risk aversion; Lawyer-client relationship; principal-agent problem; moral hazard
Thesis Advisor	Karamychev, V
Persistent URL	hdl.handle.net/2105/65875
Series	Business Economics
Organisation	Erasmus School of Economics
Citation APA Style AAA Style APA Style Cell Style Chicago Style Harvard Style IEEE Style MLA Style Nature Style Vancouver Style American-Institute-of-Physics Style Council-of-Science-Editors Style BibTex Format Endnote Format RIS Format CSL Format DOIs only Format	Muller, L.B.J. (2023, March 2). The Effects of Morality and Risk Aversion on Moral Hazard between Lawyers and Clients. Business Economics. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2105/65875

Publication