Representation-Affecting Claims

Anna Alexandrova [2018] invented the term “mixed claim” for an empirical hypothesis which includes at least one variable that presupposes a value judgement. Such claims, she argues, are distinct from other roles that values play in science and bring with them particular “dangers” such as those of “value imposition” and “value inattention”. To come by these dangers, Alexandrova calls for “procedural objectivity” which she claims is achieved through the deliberative co-creation of mixed claims between scientists, policymakers, and members of the public. In this thesis, I point out prima facie problems of the mixed claims account. I argue that Alexandrova is ill-advised in defining mixed claims as ‘presupposing a value judgement’. I furthermore hold that the acclaimed dangers of mixed claims and the solution of procedural objectivity lack argumentative support. I o↵er an alternative notion which I call representation-a↵ecting claims. A representation-a↵ecting claim is an empirical hypothesis about a putative causal or statistical relation, at least one variable of which is defined in a way that makes a lack of representation of legitimate and relevant interests in a process of science-based policy-making more likely. On this definition, a representation-a↵ecting claim is problematic as it constitutes an illegitimate infringement of scientists into the democratic process. I thus propose an alternative perspective on mixed claims that rests more explicitly on their significance in science-based policy-making. I hold that this definition su↵ers less from the issues of Alexandrova’s definition. Furthermore, I provide an argument which underscores the dangers of representation-a↵ecting claims and supports the mitigation proposal of deliberative co-creation.