The study explores the institutional alternatives in power sector reforms in Maharashtra (India), by using combination of actor-based analysis, principal-agent theory, actor-network theory and concept of embedded autonomy. The paper looks at institutional alternatives to increase positive autonomy and reducing negative interference at the same time, so that the conflicting objectives of economy and efficiency in electricity supply could be achieved simultaneously. So, there is a trade off between control and autonomy where complete privatization leads to, too much autonomy and too little control while traditional state administration leads to, too much control and too little autonomy. Both being extreme cases, are unsatisfactory to achieve the objectives of efficiency, economy and quality at the same time. Therefore, the hybrid arrangements like Bhiwandi model of franchising of electricity distribution in Maharashtra can be the solution to reduce the negative interference through control over setting the right or desired policies, and increasing the positive autonomy through execution of these policies transparently and efficiently.

Tankha, Sunil
hdl.handle.net/2105/7212
Public Policy and Management (PPM)
International Institute of Social Studies

Misal, Annasaheb B. (2008, January). Electricity Reforms: Exploring Institutional Alternatives in Maharashtra, (India). Public Policy and Management (PPM). Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2105/7212