Targeting the Truth: The Impact of a Russian Disinformation Campaign on the OPCW’s Investigation of the 2018 Chemical Attack in Douma, Syria.

In contemporary international relations, disinformation is increasingly recognised as a security threat, able to disrupt governance, sow doubt, and manipulate the public opinion. A particularly dangerous subset of this phenomenon is the spread of false narratives about Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Despite its growing relevance, the impact of state-led CBRN disinformation on international bodies remains empirically under-studied. This thesis addresses this gap by investigating a critical case of a Russian disinformation campaign that targeted the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) following a 2018 chemical attack in Douma, Syria. Specifically, this study examines the impact of Russia’s false narratives on the OPCW's policy responses to the attack, which attempted to deny the attack, shield the Assad regime, and discredit the organisation. To do so, a qualitative single case study design is employed, informed by the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) (Kingdon & Stano, 1984), with the policy stream being systematically measured through the five institutional design features of Koremenos et al. (2001): Membership, Scope, Centralisation, Control, Flexibility. Data is drawn from an analysis of 54 official documents and 9 semi-structured interviews, with relevant experts on the topic. The findings reveal that the OPCW demonstrated considerable resilience, as Russia’s campaign ultimately failed to prevent decisive policy responses. However, this resilience also came at a cost, as the campaign imposed a significant strain on the OPCW by increasing its operational burden. In doing so, it highlighted the tangible threat that CBRN disinformation poses to the broader non-proliferation and disarmament regime by attempting to erode trust in evidence-based institutions and the international norms they uphold.