The object of study of this research paper is the 1996 Electoral Reform in Mexico, specially regarding the changes made in the composition of the legislative branch. The interest for studying this reform rests on the fact that, due to the changes in the composition of the congress that it enforced, from that moment up to the last congress elected, non of the presidents of the republic has had the support of a legislative majority to put in motion its government agenda. The main hypothesis that the institutional arrangement that arose from the 1996 political reform resulted in a legislative inertia that (intended or unintended) has support a lock-in of the economic reforms done during the 1980’s and 1990’s.

Additional Metadata
Keywords political reform, democratization, divided government, institutional change, passive revolution, liberalization, production structure
Thesis Advisor Knio, Karim
Persistent URL hdl.handle.net/2105/13176
Series Governance and Democracy (G&D)
Citation
Rodríguez, S. (2012, December 14). Divided governments and economic change : the political economy of the 1996 electoral reform in Mexico. Governance and Democracy (G&D). Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2105/13176