In this thesis I formulate a coalition formation model in a proportional representation democ- racy setting. Initially, two ank parties and a centrist party exist, after which I extend to model to allow for the entry of a fourth party that pursues extreme-right beliefs, creating an asym- metric distribution of parties. Afterwards, I extend the model by allowing for party-specic bliss points. The model is inspired by the well known framework developed by Austen-Smith and Banks (1988), but my model generates some interesting additional insights. I nd that allowing for a fourth party on the extreme right wing of the spectrum has little eect on the policies advocated by the incumbent parties, but yields a more left-wing coalition in equilib- rium, along with lower volatility surrounding the outcome. Furthermore, by allowing for bliss points, the equilibrium policy becomes considerably more left-wing, and incumbent parties tend to polarise, i.e. they move away from the political centre.

Additional Metadata
Thesis Advisor Crutzen, B.S.Y.
Persistent URL
Series Financial Economics
Schuijren, C.P.M. (2020, June 3). Right Wing Extremism and Political Competition. Financial Economics. Retrieved from