In this thesis I formulate a coalition formation model in a proportional representation democ- racy setting. Initially, two ank parties and a centrist party exist, after which I extend to model to allow for the entry of a fourth party that pursues extreme-right beliefs, creating an asym- metric distribution of parties. Afterwards, I extend the model by allowing for party-specic bliss points. The model is inspired by the well known framework developed by Austen-Smith and Banks (1988), but my model generates some interesting additional insights. I nd that allowing for a fourth party on the extreme right wing of the spectrum has little eect on the policies advocated by the incumbent parties, but yields a more left-wing coalition in equilib- rium, along with lower volatility surrounding the outcome. Furthermore, by allowing for bliss points, the equilibrium policy becomes considerably more left-wing, and incumbent parties tend to polarise, i.e. they move away from the political centre.

Additional Metadata
Thesis Advisor Crutzen, B.S.Y.
Persistent URL hdl.handle.net/2105/52035
Series Business Economics
Citation
Schuijren, C.P.M. (2020, June 3). Right Wing Extremism and Political Competition. Business Economics. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2105/52035