Multiple Principals Problems with Incentive Contract in a Moral Hazard Setting in Principal-Agent Model

Additional Metadata
Keywords	Principal-Agent Relationship; Common Agency; Moral Hazard; Multi-tasking
Thesis Advisor	Delfgaauw, J
Persistent URL	hdl.handle.net/2105/62966
Series	Business Economics
Organisation	Erasmus School of Economics
Citation APA Style AAA Style APA Style Cell Style Chicago Style Harvard Style IEEE Style MLA Style Nature Style Vancouver Style American-Institute-of-Physics Style Council-of-Science-Editors Style BibTex Format Endnote Format RIS Format CSL Format DOIs only Format	Lin, Z. (2022, September). Multiple Principals Problems with Incentive Contract in a Moral Hazard Setting in Principal-Agent Model. Business Economics. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2105/62966

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