Multiple Principals Problems with Incentive Contract in a Moral Hazard Setting in Principal-Agent Model

Additional Metadata
Keywords	Principal-Agent Relationship; Common Agency; Moral Hazard; Multi-tasking
Thesis Advisor	Delfgaauw, J
Persistent URL	hdl.handle.net/2105/62966
Series	Business Economics
Organisation	Erasmus School of Economics
Citation APA APA Style APA-ALL Style AAA Style Cell Style Chicago Style Harvard Style IEEE Style MLA Style Nature Style Vancouver Style American-Institute-of-Physics Style Council-of-Science-Editors Style BibTex Format Endnote Format RIS Format CSL Format DOIs only Format	Lin, Z. (2022). Multiple Principals Problems with Incentive Contract in a Moral Hazard Setting in Principal-Agent Model. In Business Economics.http://hdl.handle.net/2105/62966

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